CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE BASIC UNDERSTANDINGS IN CONNECTION WITH PROCUREMENT UNDER PROJECT OXCART/KEDLOCK CONTRACTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 18, 1962
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For .ease 2003/lQp : fi@it75B0032r0300160002-4
SUBJECT :
Central Intelligence Agency and Department of the Air
Force Basic Understandings in Connection with Procurement
Under Project OXCART/KEDLOCK Contracts
REFERENCE:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Department of the Air Force letter to DCI dated
11 Jan 56 signed by Trevor Gardner (TS-142960)
DCI letter to the Secretary of the Air Force dated
30 Jan 56 signed by Allen Dulles (TSm142959)
Memorandum for the Record, subject same as this
N.emorandum, dated 8 Feb 56 (TS-143314)
Agreement, signed by Allen Dulles and General White.
Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities
Project OXCART, 15 Feb 60 (TS. 4403)
i, References (a) and (b) represent the basic agreement reached
between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of the Air
Force with respect to the utilization of special CIA contractual
mechanisms to procure certain supplies and services required by the
Air Forces By reference (c)9 procurements under Project AQUATONE in
support of Project OARFISH/Air Force were made to the mutual benefit
and gain to the United States Government,
20 New requirements have been established, the fulfillment of
which will again be to the mutual benefit of both the CIA and the
Department of the Air Forceo Accordinglyo the general agreements as
outlined by reference (c) and as reiterated herein, set forth the
basic general understanding of procurement and production efforts
under Project OXCART/KEDLOCK0
3o Basic general understandings are as follows:
25X1
Ts-'155709
Copy 4 of
Page 1 of 5
NRO and USAF
review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/d~a~ :$E Rplr75B00326R000300160002-4 own
 Approved Foreease 2003/09/30 ANKT5130032000300160002-4
SUBJECT : Central Intelligence Agency and Department of the Air
Force Basic Understandings in Connection with Procurement
Under Project OXCART/KIM-LOCK Contracts `
25X1
bo CIA will implement the requirements set forth in writing
by the authorized Air Force representative by negotiation of contracts
for delivery of the required services and supplies, To assure mutual
understanding, the authorized Air Force representative will certify
that each contract is consistent with and in fulfillment of previously
stated Air Force requirements,
co The policies and procedures to be followed in connection
with contracts negotiated on behalf of the Air Force by CIA shall be
the same policies and procedures in effect on CIA contracts for
similar procurements under Project OXCART. Requirements set forth
by the Armed Services Procurement Regulations shall be complied with
to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the unique security
considerations inherent in these procurements,,
do The Air Force and CIA shall maintain close liaison
on all aspects of Project OXCART/KEDLOCK and shall consult with each
other, utilizing personnel designated for this purpose, whenever such
consultation is required or indicated.
4o Specific Understandings:
a, Secs itv: It is agreed that all aspects of security
control in connection with contracts under this agreement are the
responsibility and province of CIAO The Air Force shall be guided
by the CIA in the discharge of Air Force security responsibilities
under these contracts and the Air Force shall lend to CIA all assis-
tance and cooperation in maintenance of the necessary level of
security. Clearance requirements for the KEDLOCK Program will be
handled through AFCIGm5 in the same manner as the basic OXCART
Program*
bo Modifications:
k1
(1) The basic concept governing the procurement of
aircraft under the airframe contract contemplates that three (3) LRI
versions of the A-12 will be procured as prototypes and test beds
for the early development and possible acquisition of a follow-on
program of a greater number of AF.12's configured as long range inter..
ceptors. It is anticipated that 80% of the design and development
effort on the A-12 will be applicable to the Air Force LRI version.
With the exception of the design criteria necessary to develop
TS-155709
Copy of
Page 2 of 5
Approved For Release 2003/09/"R1$YB00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For0ease 20031010P : M RE175130032100300160002-4
SUBJECT s Central Intelligence Agency and Department of the Air
Force Basic Understandings in Connection with Procurement
Under Project OXCART'/BLOCK Contracts
the LRI9 all other aspects of the AF 12 will be as nearly identical as
possible to the original. A-12 version in order to effect the greatest
percentage of interchangeability possible. Any modifications desired
by the Air Force9 exclusive of those required solely for development
of the LRI9 shall be made known to the CIA for purposes of determining
whether such modifications are of interest to the CIA with respect to
its own procurement of aircraft,
(2) With particular reference to mission equipments9 it
is recognized that the Air Force will desire installations peculiar
to its own mission and not necessarily uithin the scope of current CIA
contractors. In those areas where the Air Force desires to procure
equipments from suppliers not presently under contract to CIAO the
CIA will9 where security requires and permits,, place such a contract
with the sources desired by the Air Forceo
co Prop-Tess Reports.- Progress Reports under these contracts
shall be submitted to the Air Force Project Office. The Contracting
Officer will also receive a copy of each progress report for review
and/or retention.
5o Im tpegtation CIA Rasgon3ibilit-es
ao Negotiate and execute contracts,, together with the
administration and settlement thereof 9 in furtherance of written
requirements from the Air Force representative to the Contracting
Officera
bo Issue to contractors from time to time change orders to
the contracts to reflect additional or changed work requirements
indicated in writing to the Contracting Officer by the Air Force
representative. (Any and all changes in contract requirements and
specifications whether Involving additional costs or whether involving
no additional costs shaLA be issued to the Contractor through the
Contracting Officer).
co Pay progress payments as contractually appropriate during
life of contracts.
do Establish a secure payment procedure for vouchers sub-
mitted by the contracvorso
e Establish in conjunction with the Air Force a system of
inspection and acceptanceo
fo Arrange with the Contractors for periodic reports
(fiscal,, financial and work progress).
TS-155709
copy 7 of
Page 3 of 5
arik
Approved For Release 2003/0TOP: W
75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved Foroease 2003/O1%: SW5BOO32q&00300160002-4
SUBJECT -. Central Intelligence Agency and Department of the Air
Force Basic Understandings in Connection with Procurement
Under Project OXCART/KEDLOCK Contracts
go Arrange with the Air Force and the contractors for an
audit system utilizing cleared Air Force auditors,
ho Arrange for delivery and shipment of completed items,
io Establish, with concurrence of Air Forces time and
method of redetermination of the contract prices,
6o Implementation - Air Force Responsibilities-.
ao Furnish written scope of work requirements for procure.
ment guidance of CIA, including initial Letter Contraets9 Definitive
Contracts, and specifications or other changes desired by the Air Force
regardless of whether or not such-changes involve a change in the cost
of the services and supplies,
bo Furnish inspection and acceptance personnel and perform
inspection and acceptance duties by means of Air Force designated
representatives.
Co Monitor contract performance from a technical standpoint
and provide advice and guidance to the Contracting Officer thereon,
do Furnish delivery and shipping instructions for completed
so Furnish cleared audit personnel to be utilized on contracts
for the advice and guidance of the Contracting Officers Approving
Officers and Certifying Officer.
fo Furnish certification of satisfactory contractor performs
ance from a technical standpoint for the advice and guidance of the
Contracting Officer.
go Furnish any other advice, guidance or material required
by the Contracting Officer and available in the Air Force to effec-
tively negotiate, administer, and settle all contracts for this project
written by CIA on behalf of the Air Forceo
h. Furnish any GFAE required for effective performance of
the contract -cork.
7, Other Provisions
ae As previously agreed by Mro Bissell and Gen. Estee? LAC
line ships 70 12 and 13 will be configured as prototype AF-12's and
assigned to the Air Force, thus affording an early Air Force evaluation
of the LRI version,
TS-155709
Copy -7 of
Page 4 of 5
Approved For Release 2003/
 Approved Fortease 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B0032 00300160002-4
TOP SEC E1.
SUBJECT Central Intellige ce Agency and Department of the Air
Force Basic Understandings in Connection with Procur men,
Under Project OXCART/K)LOCK Contracts
b9 The Air Force will use CIA flight test facilities
consistent with the dictates of security and program interests.
cC Representatives of he Air Force Project Office will
participate in the early flight test eva'luacion programs of the
A,-12, Such participation be ng prim rily 1a the interest of
mutual3y furthering the develoiiment of the weapon system,
do A representative of the Air For :e ??ffzce may particii
pateD as deemed approprtatep, in management, ni th :3 field from time
to time during the dovelopmerit of the A-12,
FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A,(T S'C'I
SIGIEV
Allen W. -Dullea
TITLE Director
AUG?g1
DATE
,3-ti__ _ _ _ - ./s/
JOSEPH V. CHARYK
?. T .f. Under Secretary of the Air Force
DAT4,_. - 18 Marchpi962
TS-155709
Copy of /
Page 5 of 5
Approved For Release 2003 R0 E ', 75B00326R000300160002-4
 - Approved :For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP75B00326R00
A. Introduction
1. Following the establishment of the National Reconnaissance
Office and implementation of the National Reconnaissance Program,
certain problems and incidents have occurred which have demonstrated
a complete breakdown in the understanding of CIA's relationship to
the NRP. A brief summary of the NRO history as well as a capsule
narration of the various problems and incidents which have occurred
during the NRO's young life are included herewith to acquaint you with
the framework in which CIA is now called upon to cooperate. We feel
that the requirement for an overall coordinating body of the National
Reconnaissance Program is a sound one, but one in which CIA should
play a managerial, as well as a coordinating role, as oppose to its
present secondary membership.
2. In spite of the past differences with the Air Force which have
taxed our relations seriously we feel that the situation is salvagable
provided certain modifications and suggestions to the present NRO
agreements and understandings are adopted which will grant the
Agency a senior partnership in the NRP, These modifications and
suggestions are amplified as recommendations within this paper.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release
"'k I
P I rLL t% I
25X1
25X1
~4 OR
!LT -ff
1. The National Reconnaissance Office and the National
Reconnaissance Program were initially identified in writing on
6 September 1961 in a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, to Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director
of Central Intelligence. That memorandum, which was concurred
in by General C. P. Cabell, the then Acting Director, CIA, defined
the management of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
and officially established on a covert basis a National Reconnai sance
Office to manage the NRP. The Office was placed under the co-
direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy
Director (Plans), CIA. It was charged to include a small special
staff of personnel drawn from DOD and CIA. The Office was granted the
charter of direct control over all elements of the total reconnaissance
program, whether overt or covert. According to the 6 September
memorandum, decision; of the National Reconnaissance Office "will
be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance
Program made effective: within DOD by the exercise of the authority
delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; within CIA, by the
Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned
duties...... The management and conduct of individual projects or
S' r
Approved For Release 2003/091$: CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 ? Approved For Release 2003/09/307
SERI
DRAFT
00326R000300160002-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be
assigned to the CIA as the operational agency. "
2. On 15 November 1961, a working level meeting was held between
Colonel Martin, USAF and members of the OSA Staff. In that meet-
ing, Colonel Martin said that Dr. Charyk's stated view was that the
NRO would not become a single geographic entity confined to one office.
3. By 22 November, a working draft of the NRO functions and
responsibilities was forwarded to the Agency for comment by Colonel
Martin which designated CIA with the responsibility for security of
the National Reconnaissance Program and the handling of black contracts;
technical and operational management would be the sole responsibility
of the Air Force with CIA participating on a target selection group.
The CORONA Program was to continue under CIA operational manage-
ment since the project at that time was nearing a close.
4. On 7 December 1961, Mr. R. M. Bissell, the DD/P, gave
xecutive Secretary of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, a document titled "The Division of
Responsibility within the NRO. " Mr. Bissell had received Dr. Charyk's
agreement to the document by telephone prior to submitting it to
In that document, the NRO was acknowledged as being
headed by co-directors, each of whom would act using the authority
Approved For Release 20O TCIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/0 RDP75B003?000300160002-4
,age air'
25X1
of his overt position within his own organization. With respect to
major programs, it allocated responsibilities of the CORONA/
MURAL/ARGON to CIA as primarily responsible for targeting,
operational planning, and control of payload operation; development
and procurement of photographic payloads and nose cones; and finally
security. The Air Force was charged with launch scheduling and
launching; orbit and recovery operations; and the development and
procurement of boosters, orbit vehicles, and FLINT payloads. In
the SAMOS Program, the Air Force was held primarily responsible
for SAMOS with CIA in the supporting role particularly in target
and security planning. The OXCART Program was the primary
responsibility of the CIA with the Air Force in a supporting role.
With respect especially to the later configurations of SAMOS and to
other advance systems, the document stated that "consideration will be
given to gradual modification of this distribution of responsibilities.
In general, it is clear that Air Force elements will retain primary
responsibility for operations and for fuel development and procure-
ment. For the most part, these activities not only can but must be
'white,' that is conducted in a reasonably public fashion. CIA's main
contribution will be in target planning serving as the communications
channel for operational control and security and that development and
Approved For Release
Tai
CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 ~~ ~EGEi ?
DRAFT
25X1
Page-ARMaw % e
procurement which must be 'black'. " The paper went on to state
"consideration will also be given in due time to the desirability of
gradually converting the NRO into a more unified single office with
a single directing bead. This development presumably will require
a delegation of authority from both the Secretary of Defense and Director
of Central Intelligence to the Director of the NRO so as to permit him
to exercise an appropriate degree of control over elements of both
agencies. It might also render appropriate some re-distribution of
responsibilities as between the two components of the NRO and a
change in budgetary procedures.
5. On 20 March 1962, Dr. Scoville as the DD/'R forwarded in a
memorandum to the DC1 an agreement for the management of the
National Reconnaissance Program. In that agreement, which had
been concurred in by Dr. Charyk, the Central Intelligence Agency was
tentatively assigned the primary responsibility for OXCART and CORONA
25X1
25X1
6. On 20 March, James Cunningham recorded the following
comments relayed by Dr. Scoville concerning his meeting with the
DCI on 19 March. In that memorandum, three major reactions of the
Approved For Release 2003/A-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved Fo -lease 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP75BOO 000300160002-4
25X1
eageAwvwil~ rx
DCI to the proposed NRO management agreement were as follows:
"a. The DCI does not favor a dual chairmanship for NRO. He
believes that a single source must be the chairman with the other
Agency's senior individual being the deputy chairman. The language
of the agreement will not mention individuals as such, but the DCI
is reportedly ready to concede to having Dr. Charyk as chairman,
with Dr. Scoville as deputy or vice chairman. Within this general
statement, however, the Director insists upon specific assignments
of projects to each Agency; i. e. , OXCART to CIA. SAMOS to USAF.
Amplifying this, it is reasonable to infer that the senior responsible
official will be determined in each case by the assignment of the
project to a given group; i. e. , Charyk to head SAMOS, Scoville to
head OXCART.
"b. The DCI wishes to have language written into the draft agree-
ment specifying that programing and even planning on all new collection
systems will be done jointly by the NRO chairman and the deputy
chairman.
"c. Lastly, it is the Director's wish that CIA control,
kll security clearances for all programs
within the purview of the NRO. 11
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2QMKV : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved Fo.elease 2003/09/3,x; CIA-RDP75B003 000300160002-4
D R A F T
age euev,
25X1
7. On 2 April 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Under Secretary of the Air
Force, forwarded a memorandum to the DD/R stating the delegation
of responsibilities for the LANYARD Project. Within that Project,
contract administration of the payload and those portions of the recovery
system which must be procured under covert contract were assigned
the responsibility of CIA. Technical management of all aspects of
LANYARD including the payload were assigned to the Director of
Special Projects, OSAF (General Greer). Operationally the CIA was
charged with the responsibility for pre-mission planning and on-orbit
operational decisions in the same manner as currently followed in the
CORONA Project.
8. On 5 April, Dr. Scoville replied to Dr. Charyk stating CIA's
agreement to accept responsibility for the operational aspects of the
LANYARD Program as well as contractual administration for payload
and certain recovery systems.
9. On 2 May 1962, the Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense
co-signed the agreement between the Secretary of Defense and Director
of Central Intelligence on the responsibilities of the National
Reconnaissance Office. In that document, CIA was designated as an
executive agent for the Director, NRO for those covert projects already
Approved For Release 2003/GW/30 'CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved Fo 0 lease 2003/09/3 IT P75B00310000300160002-4
SE,
under its management and such additional covert projects as are
assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence. The Director, NRO was held responsible for
funding the National Reconnaissance Program.
25X1
25X1
CIA will be responsible for funding covert. projects for which
it has management responsibility. Secondly, the D/NRO was charged
with the responsibility for all NRP contracts with CIA, as executive
agent of the D/NRO, responsible for administering procurements and
contracting for covert projects for which it is assigned responsibility.
The D/NRO was held responsible for advance plans (post calendar
year 1962) in support of the NRP. In view of the DCI's major responsi-
bility to the NSC for all intelligence programs, all NRO advance
planning will be coordinated with CIA.
10. On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to the Deputy Secretary of
Defense his agreement that Dr. Joseph Charyk be named Director of
the NRO.
11. On 22 to 23 May, Dr. Charyk, General Greer, General Curtin, 25X1
Colonel Martin, and Colonel Geary met with Dr. Scoville, Colonel Beerli,
Mr. Gene Keifer, Mr. George Miller, and
Approved For Release 2%Wg91 J0 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
25X1
Page ftmow- 1=i
 Approved For Release 2003 '~'IA-RDP75B0031R000300160002-4
Page i n e
25X1
establish the mechanics to functionally carry out the May 2 agreement
regarding the NRO.
12. On 15 June, Dr. Charyk forwarded. a memorandum to the
DD/R which .stated, "In regard to our agreement that the NRO Staff
should be put into a single office located as closely as possible to the
D/NRO. I believe that the satellite operations functions requires an
early resolution"; Dr. Charyk proposed that all satellite projects of the
National Reconnaissance Program be handled in the same manner by
a single operations unit of the NRO Staff, which staff would also make
all on-orbit selection between target coverage options based on target,
weather situation, or intelligence factors. He further proposed that
the nucleus of the CIA satellite operations unit be integrated within the
NRO Staff.
13. On 26 June, regarding the procedure for initiation of overflight
reconnaissance, Dr. Scoville proposed to the D/NRO that the Committee
on Overhead Reconnaissance would submit its recommendations on
reconnaissance for U. S. intelligence needs to USIB, who in turn would
forward its own recommendations to the NRO for submission to the
Special Group. However, in the case of on-going programs which
have already been suggested to the aforesaid procedure, COMOR will
forward its recommendation for additional reconnaissance directly.
to the Special Group with information to the USIB and D/NRO.
Approved For Releas /30: CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
3RE27
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
25X
Page vN
14. On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to
the President on Intelligence Matters, directed a memorandum to the
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence wherein
he remarked that the Foreign Intelligence. Advisory Board in its report
to the President noted the agreements that had been reached between
the DCI and the Secretary of Defense with respect to the organization,
management, and functioning of the NRO with .the following comment:
"We believe that the actual structure of the documents is iriadequate
to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and
distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We,therefore recommend
a continuing study of a more satisfactory, permanent documentary basis
for the NRO with particular references to existing NSC directives
with which the present NRO plan may be in conflict. " Mr. Bundy
indicated that the President had approved the Board's recommendation
and was therefore requesting the DCI and Secretary of Defense that
appropriate implementing action be taken and that a joint report of
the progress made be furnished to the President and the Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board-by 15 September.
15. On 12 July in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from
the DCI. as Chairman of the USIB, Mr. McCone stated, "The USIB
also wished to note that they felt that the FIREFLY proposal had
Approved For Releas 3/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/ A-RDP75B003 000300160002-4
Vfln
25X
reached higher authority without adequate consideration by the NRO
or the USIB. The Board therefore believes that in the future for this or any
similar reconnaissance system, the NRO should first, as a result of
coordinative development and testing, advise the U?iIB if the NRO
believes that it is a suitable reconnaissance system, including all
necessary information on capabilities and characteristics of the system
involved. The USIB would then consider the use of the system to meet
appropriate intelligence requirements and make recommendations
relative to targeting and priorities for consideration by higher authority. "
16. On 19 July, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO, replied to the
DD/R's memorandum concerning the procedure for initiation of over-
flight reconnaissance. In that memorandum, Dr. Charyk stated that
it was his opinion that as a normal procedure, the COMOR, which is
f ,iECOn.(4q T!o /5
solely concerned with requirements, should submit its e
for U. S. intelligence needs to USIB. The USIB in turn would forward
its recommendation to the NRO. The NRO would forward its specific
recommendations to the Special Group for a decision. In cases where
significant new factors entered or where new systems were rl's-4
the NRO as a normal rule would forward its assessment to USIB for
comments and would include these in its portion to the Special Group.
Approved For Release 200r~Jf CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For elease 2003/09 DP75BO03C000300160002-4
j
DRAFT' 25X1
I ---h
Page AMWPMPovp- we
In the case of on-orbit programs, the NRO treatment would be
perfunctory, but Dr. Charyk felt it desirable that all such matters
go to the Special Group through the NRO since under the charter the
NRO had the operational responsibility for the total effort.
17. On 23 July 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO forwarded
a memorandum to NRO Program Directors and the Director of the
NRO Staff outlining the organization and functions of the NRO. In
outlining the overall concept of the organization and operation of the
NRO, Dr. Charyk established the NRO as an operating agency separately
organized, concealed entirely within other agencies using personnel
and other resources of these agencies on a full- or part-time basis as
required. The NRO was designed to consist of the D/NRO, the NRO
Staff, the NRO Program Directors, and their Project Directors, and
any Staff Officers at that present time. At that time, there were two
NRO Program Directors: the Director, Program A being responsible
0,.r Ff=ncJtt ,4NZ Mr DIRBROR,,PROGRAM B U-SPONSI13LE Fae THE. MltR'
for the NRP;1 conducted by the NRO through utilization of CIA resources.
Program
Directors would be responsible directly and solely to the D/NRO. The
D/NRO assumed responsibility for all funding of the NRP. All covert
Approved For Release 2003/09~ -RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
25
 '-~ Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP75B003 R000300160002-4
25X1
25X1
1 h~ r-~Fh
funds would be budgeted by the CIA, and all covert NRP contracts
let by the CIA as executive agent for the D/NRO.
25X1
25X1
The D/NRO would assign operational control for aircraft
projects to the appropriate Program Director. The NRO Staff will
keep the D/NRO currently informed of the status of such operations.
In the case of satellite projects, the NRO Staff would be responsible
for actual mission planning from the standpoint of specifying desired
targets to be covered, desired on-orbit target program options and
approval of the actual mission target program. The staff would also
make all on-orbit selection between target coverage options based on
weather or intelligence factors. The NRO Staff also would be respons-
ible for the NRO interface with USIB and for NRO coordination of all
peripheral reconnaissance activities. Prior specific approval of the
D/NRO would be required for any matter of the NRO or NRP to be
processed with higher authority.
18. On 9 August 1962, Dr. Scoville, by way of memorandum,
advsed Dr. Charyk of his complete agreement in holding final control
of satellite mission planning and the matching of intelligence collection
requirements and satellite collection capabilities in Washington and that
Approved For Release 2003/09 `TIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
Ia?
 Approved Fo lease 2003/09/30 : CIAA-RDP75B003*000300160002-4
SETURET 25X1
age winammma. Fo-: eevi
such control can be usefully centralized in a single location in the
Pentagon. Dr. Scoville indicated that he questioned the need for
great urgency in any transfer physically or organizationally in the
CORONA/MURAL Program. He preferred to make such changes,
i. e. , integration of CIA personnel into the NRO Control Center at
more leisure with attendant greater confidence so that no procedural
mishap would occur during any change-over. In conclusion,
Dr. Scoville stated that it must be understood and agreed that
operational control of satellite reconnaissance by this means, i. e. ,
NRO Control Center be confined to satellite programs and not expanded
in the future to include certain other activities. Dr. Scoville said
that he believed that the operational control center for such aircraft
programs as TACKLE, etc., should be maintained in Langley
Headquarters.
19. On 21 August, Dr. Scoville agreed with Dr. Charyk's proposal
regarding the procedure for initiation of overflight reconnaissance.
However, he continued with the proposal that in the case of on-going
programs, it will be the responsibility of the Project Director for a
given program to consult with the Director, NRO where new factors
are resolved, such as the introduction of a new subsystem or where
new and unusual risk or sensitivity has arisen. In the absence of such,
Approved For Release 200x/0 7 CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For elease 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP75B003000300160002-4
scnr-T,
DRAFT ,
the D/NRO will look to the specific Project Director to exercise
the NRO responsibility as a means of expediting the movement of
recommended acts for an on-going program to the Special Group
for approval.
20. On 29 August, Dr. Scoville submitted to Dr. Charyk the
budgetary procedures for CIA portion of the NRP.
21. On 29 August 1962, Dr. Scoville forwarded his comments
on the organization and functions of the NRO as proposed by
Dr. Charyk on 23 July. Although concurring in general, Dr. Scoville
proposed that the DD/R be designated as a Senior CIA Representative
25X
25
22. On 10 September, Dr. Charyk wrote that we should proceed
expeditiously in developing a satellite control center in the Pentagon
and that the CORONA/MURAL operational planning team be integrated
into it.
23. On 13 September, Dr. Charyk accepted the concept of a
relatively Senior CIA Representative to be accredited to the NRO Staff
4l.$u
and would t4aft approach Gilpatric to name Dr. Scoville as Deputy D/NRO.
Approved For Release
i
/0 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 25X1
X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
40 -
0
25X1
24. On 26 September, Dr. Scoville identified to the D/NRO
the CORONA/MURAL operational planning team as
25X1
26. On 5 October, Dr. Scoville reported the following concerning
a meeting with Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric,
D/NRO, and the DCI wherein Mr McCone presented a paper relative
to the revision of the NRO organization to eliminate the present dual
reporting feature for the D/NRO and the establishment of the Secretary
of Defense as Executive Agent to the National Reconnaissance Planning
Group. In commenting on the proposal, Secretary McNamara stated
that he had reservations on the requirement for a special organization
for reconnaissance and did not understand why in the long run this
could not be handled by normal intelligence organizational procedures.
Secretary McNamara indicated that while he was satisfied for the
present with the existing NRO organization, he would review Mr. McCone's
paper and discuss it with him at a later date.
Approved For Release 209f/ e'p'. CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 25X1
Approved For 2003/09/30 CIA-RDP75B003226 000300160002-4
1Ievcteevi
Tra-ge4ommma ii-.7L
27. On 17 October, D/NRO assigned DOD to manage and
operate all FIRE FLY drones against Cuba under NRO supervision
and with CIA assistance
contracting, and security.
28. On 17 October, D/NRO refused the assignment of
25X1
X1
of CIA to the NRO Staff with the statement, "I
feel that we already have all of the full-time staff personnel necessary
to accomplish the functions assigned to the NRO Staff by V4
23 July 1962 memorandum. "
29. On 17 October, in a memorandum addressed to DD/R, the
D/NRO assigned NRO management responsibility for the development
of the AQ-12 drone project to Directo Dr. Charyk
went on to state, "In view of the potential importance of this effort,
I believe that it should be established now on a separate project basis
under a full-time project manager reporting directly to you. I am
prepared to assign Lieutenant Colonel Henry Howard from NRO Staff
to the Directorl or this important task.
30. On 26 October, in a memorandum signed by the DD/R to
D/NRO, Colonel Ledford assumed managerial
25X1
responsibility for the AQ-12 drone project and concurred in assignment
of Lieutenant Colonel Howard as project'officer for the AQ-12.
25
25
Approved For Release 2 3/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003 IA-RDP75B00326R0003001600024
~'p -
DRAFT
Page Eighteen
25X1
C. Problems and Incidents
In order that we may set the stage for our recommendations concerning
the NRO, we wish to highlight several incidents involving the NRO/ CIA
relationship. We do this reluctantly, realizing that the replay of any
incident is subject to a loss of objectivity and context. We do feel, however,
that the compounding of the several incidents reveals a certain trend
within the NRO and that their recitation is essential in order to appreciate
the atmosphere which now surrounds the Agency in the NRO.
1. a. An urgent situation now facing CIA in the NRO is the procedure
concerning the handling of funds. In July 1962, while outlining the basic
organization and functions of the NRO, Dr. Charyk stated that the D/NRO
is responsible for all funding of the NRP. He went on to indicate that 25X1
all covert funds would be budgeted by the CIA.
b. On 29 August 1962, Dr. Scoville replied to Dr. Charyk by point-
ing out the Agency as a legally separated entity budget-wise from the
Defense Department. Dr. Scoville proposed an operating procedure for
handling CIA/NRO funds which in effect agreed that the D/NRO should
present and defend the NRP Budget to the Bureau of the Budget, but that
CIA would defend its portion of the NRP to Congress. After Congress
had. approved the CIA program, including
Approved For Release 20031Q9/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
5X1
 Approved For lease 200310913-RDP7513003 000300160002-4
25X1
age Nineteen
those for the NRO, and provided the funds, Dr. Scoville would look to the
Bureau of the Budget to apportion these funds to the Agency in the
normal manner.
c. Dr. Charyk orally expressed his disagreement with the
29 August proposal; and after several discussions, a second Agency
proposal was submitted to Dr. Charyk on 6 September 1962. The
second CIA proposal strengthened the earlier one with the addition
of the stipulation that should there be surpluses in the amounts of
CIA/NRP funds, the surpluses would be available to the DD/R and
the Director, CIA for application to other NRO programs as the
D/NRO may suggest.
d. On 11 September 1962, Dr. Charyk and Dr. Scoville met
again on the budget but could not reach agreement. Following this
meeting, Mr. Bross was appointed action officer to prepare a staff
study of the problem for the Director.
e. On 5 October in a meeting with Secretary McNamara,
Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and the D/NRO, the DCI presented his
views regarding the NRP budget. In that presentation the DCI stressed his
desire to have a single NRO program and budget which would be
presented to the Bureau of the Budget with an indication of the portions
for which CIA, Air Force, Navy, etc., should have the responsibility.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/OAM&
YYA-RDP75B0032 8000300160002-4
0 .
25X1
D R A F T
The DCI stated that CIA would defend its portion of the NRP
budget through its normal procedures with Congress and that
money would be appropriated to it through BOB in the same fashion
as the remainder of the CIA budget.
f. Secretary McNamara in response to the DCI stated that the only
question was the preservation of the integrity of the NRO funds and
program. He felt that it was essential that none of the agencies could
transfer funds which had been designated and defended for NRO
purposes to other non-NRO projects. Mr. McCone concurred in this
and indicated that any such transfers would have to be approved by
the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.
g. Following this understanding, Dr. Charyk has continued
to pursue and endorse the process whereby Agency NRP funds would
be appropriated to the NRO, which in turn would transfer them to
the Agency as needed. His failure to accept the Agency's reasoning
has resulted in a stalemate concerning receipt by CIA of NRP funds.
As the fiscal year moves along, the financial inconvenience of this
delay is paramount.
Approved For Release 2003709130? CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
S
DRAFT
I
age Twenty-One
2. As the Cuban crisis began to unfold, the NRO was put to its
first real test regarding the flow of timely information from Air .Force
to CIA. On 15 October, during a meeting in McGeorge Bundy's office,
the D/NRO was commissioned to coordinate with CIA and the Air Force
a reconnaissance plan for Cuba. CIA has yet to be contacted regarding
such a program. As t1-a tempo of reconnaissance was increased by the
Air Force and Navy, details concerning the mission schedule and
planned activity were denied CIA, although Agency aircraft and assets were
at the time being employed by SAC. Repeated phone calls to the NRO
from CIA were either ignored or guaranteed information never received.
Final access to DOD information was only achieved after CIA detailed
an air operations officer to the JRC/JCS. We will admit that the
responsibility for Cuban reconnaissance was in all reality taken from the
NRO by the military services, however, during the period of scant
information Dr. Scoville protested to Dr. Charyk that CIA was not being
included in certain information channels. Dr. Charyk stated clearly
that he was not trying to keep CIA informed on everything the NRO was
doing. He further stated that he would only make information available
to CIA on those programs which were specifically CIA's responsibility,
per agreement which "Mr. McCone had drawn up" and which had been
agreed to. (The document to which Dr. Charyk referred was the rewrite
Approved For Release 2003/09/30;:: CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30: C1A'51300326R000300160002-4
0 25X1
DRAFT
rage Twenty- wo
of the NRO-CIA basic agreement prepared by Mr. McCone and
given to Mr. McNamara for his comments on 5 October. It was
Dr. Scoville's understanding that this documents had not been signed
by Mr. McCone.) Dr. Charyk went on to say that he did not report to
anyone but Mr. McNamara and that the NRO was not a joint operation
at all. If Mr. McCone has any other understanding, Dr. Charyk
suggested that he (Mr. McCone) speak to Secretary McNamara.
3. When a SAC pilot was lost in an Agency aircraft, the Air Force
delayed for nearly a week before providing us with information relative
to the mission and probably reasons for his loss.
4. On -28 October, following a special session of the National
Security Council, the D/NRO requested the Agency to prepare for the
immediate contingency that aerial surveillance of Cuba would be delegated
by the U. N. to civilian airlines. The Agency contacted various companies
throughout the U. S. and Canada and held them on stand-by pending a final
determination. Dr. Charyk was provided this information for presenta-
tion to the U. N. on Sunday afternoon. By ten o'clock Sunday night,
having received no further word, Dr. Scoville telephoned Dr. Charyk
to inquire of the status and was informed that it was simply a dead issue.
5. After agreeing on 13 September 1962 to approach Deputy Secretary
Gilpatric to name Dr. Scoville as Deputy Director/NRO, Dr. Charyk has
evaded any further reference to the subject. Subsequent correspondence
25X
fro o DD/RR hh le ed 5 ille as Directo
ro~ Ftorelease zv030~93b IA-R~b036~F 000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30t,,CpP75B0032 R000300160002-4
~l pto'iL .iY
Page wenty-Three
D. Discussion and Recommendations
25X1
1. As the problems and various incidents related above would
indicate, the National Reconnaissance Office in its present form is not
functioning as we would desire and too often has been the arena for
misunderstanding between the Air Force and the CIA. Possibly the
extreme overbalancing of the NRO staff by Air Force personnel without
CIA. participation or membership other than security, has resulted in
NRO decisions and designations to be reached without the full apprecia-
tion, of the interest of CIA. We look for no early resolution of this
situation since the Director, NRO has ignored our repeated requests
to name Dr. Scoville as Deputy Director/NRO and does not agree with
the assignment of an Agency career employee to the NRO Staff.
2. It is suggested that the basic concepts inherent in the establish-
ment of the National Reconnaissance Office remain as valid and necessary.
today as they did when they first prompted the formation of the NRO.
In its present role, however, we have found the NRO to be an ineffective
means- of discharging the responsibilities of the CIA. The exclusion of
CIA from overall NRP activities M-7-13y stems from the contention
within the Pentagon that the DD/R is merely a Program Director within
the NRO organization and should not be knowledgeable of, nor concerned
with, the planning and implementation of the entire NRP activity.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
0
25X1
D R A F T
Page Twenty-Four
3. If this understanding is correct, then it would remain the
responsibility of the D/NRO to keep the DCI informed on the NRP.
History to date, as evidenced by the Cuban crisis, had indicated
that this is not the case as the D/NRO referred pertinent information
solely to the Secretary of Defense.
4. The variety of incidents can only lead us to conclude that a
mutual relationship within the NRO has not, and will not be consummated
in its present form. Yet we believe that the Agency, in view of its
charter and responsibility to the Intelligence Community should enjoy
a definite voice concerning the overall NRP activities as well as receive
current and timely information on each and every project within the NRP
as it relates to the intelligence spectrum as a whole.
5. Although unchecked sentiment may compel us to recommend
withdrawal from the NRP, we have agreed that a dissolution of the
NRC) and NRP would place the Agency and DOD departments in the posture
of once again conducting parallel reconnaissance activities and develop-
ments. We further contend that the concept for a coordinating body was
born out of necessity and that sound management of a Government-wide
reconnaissance program would dictate its continued existence.
6. Accepting the continuation of the NRP, we advocate that the
DD/ .R continue to be the focal point within the Agency to oversee the
Agency's interests in the NRP. In view of the close working relationship
Approved For Release 20Ol9/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
T
Page Twenty-Five
which the DD/R and its predecessor had with the Air Force for the
past six years in the development and conduct of IDEALIST, OXCART,
CORONA, and MURAL, it is logical that this unit coordinate and
implement the Agency's responsibilities to the NRO. In fact, the first
discussions of the NRO were to the DD/R the mere official recognition
of that state of close coordination which already existed between the
Air Force and the CIA. The DD/R , however, understood that the
NRO would provide now the forum for the Air Force to apprise the CIA
of DOD activities and permit the Agency to derive the benefit of the
various programs and developments within the DOD. Once sanctioned,
unfortunately, the NRO did not provide a reciprocal mechanism for
any such interchange. In retrospect, we feel that we, on our part, have
acted in good faith in keeping with the goal of providing maximum
benefit to the Government as a whole in the conduct of a broad program
of reconnaissance under the NRO auspices. Illustrative of this point,
SAMOS, as you know, has met more than its share of hard luck; on the
other hand, CORONA/MURAL has been extremely successful and to
date is the only operational U. S. photo-reconnaissance satellite. In
order to permit the Air Force to profit by our success and experience
operationally, we agreed to integrate our CORONA/]VMURAL operations
officers into the Pentagon Control Room facility. Although it was
25X1
Approved For Release ,/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/0a RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
~
DRAFT
Page Twenty-Six
25X1
planned that this newly established facility would control all satellite
reconnaissance operations, the CIA personnel, who possessed the
only operational satellite reconnaissance experience within the U. S.
Government. were assigned by the D/NRO to secondary post.
7. In reviewing the history and decisions of the NRO to date, we
strongly suspect that the Agency's legislative and contractual flexibi-
lity has wooed the Air Force to the marriage within the NRO, and not
our operational and developmental aspects. Yet when one looks at the
accomplishments of IDEALIST, CORONA/MURAL and the potential
of OXCART, it is evident that the Agency has contributed immensely
to intelligence by reconnaissance vehicles and systems developed and
operated by the CIA.
8. To more fully utilize the experience which the Agency has in
the reconnaissance and reconnaissance systems field, as well as to-
satisfy the Agency's charter responsibility to the Intelligence Community,
we propose for your consideration two recommendations, either one of
which if implemented should meet all the requirements for the coordina-
tion and direction of a national reconnaissance program. The first
recommendation, and the one which we prefer, would modify the present
NRO/NRP agreement to place the Agency in the day-to-day managerial
as well as coordinating role of the national reconnaissance program.
A proposed modified NRO agreement is submitted herewith as
roe Fo Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B0 326R000300160002-4
Attac en A. In essence, a more noteworthy modifications:
~c
 Approved For lease 2003/093 RDP75B0032 000300160002-4
25X1
Page Twenty-Seven
Designate the DD/R as Deputy Director/NRP with full
cognizance over the NRP.
b. Place the burden of the NRP operations upon the various
Program Directors who would retain the responsibility for coordinating
the activities of their respective programs, including the preparation
of recommendations for Special Group consideration. Each Program
Director would in effect provide the staff functions now envisioned for
the NRO staff, thus eliminating in many instances duplication of staff
work. The D/NRP and DD/NRP would be the focal points for coordinating
and directing the Program Director's activities.
In view of the _aaawmptivn oi-ee ain NRP cur ent
and financed
/
offic to t at(office w he Pe esignate-cT`io hanflle RP f
ds.
C,AL Establish the NRP with a war-time mission responsible for
military requirements levied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By so doing
the military services could be relieved of the responsibility of duplicating
the assets of the NRP in time of peace, in order to meet wartime
responsibilities. By way of -example; SAC is presently exploring the
establishment of a capability to take over our CORONA/MURAL asset
in time of war. If the NRP had a defined wartime mission, SAC could
be relieved of the responsibility of duplicating our capability thus also
easing a potential security problem inherent with SAC moving into the
Approved For Releask2q&3/8 0 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For-Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B003 000300160002-4
Yy
Page Twen-Itylight.
25X1
at Designate CIA as the Executive Agent for the DINRP to
coordinate and control the processing and dissemination of ise~ie
collected by the NRP Projects.
9. Although it would not necessarily have to be cited in the agree-
ment, we feel it should be understood that the Agency will retain its own
control room for the conduct of those operations assigned by the D/NRO
to CIA. Those projects such as CORONA/MURAL/ARGON, LANYARD,
IDEALIST, and OXCART which are operationally controlled by CIA as
well as future covert operations, will be conducted as they now are
from the control room at Langley Headquarters. Those projects
controlled by the Air Force such as SAMOS
existence between Langley and the Pentagon
land other NRP
projects will be operationally controlled from the Pentagon or wherever
the Executive Agency may be located. Communications lines now in
will permit flight following information of
each other's projects. Comma may be expanded as other services
are brought into the NRP, with the result that both Dr. Charyk and
Dr. Scoville as D/NRP and DD/NRP respectively will receive
simultaneous information relative to the conduct of each project as it
unfolds.
Approved For Release` 200 /30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 CIA-RDP75B003000300160002-4
'
5:
. rage -Nine
10. The second recommendation is to assign the responsibilities
25X1
for the development and conduct of the national reconnaissance program
to a newly established subcommittee of USIB. As such it would
obviate the need for a NRO per se, however, the same coordination
and direction could be achieved, possibly with greater representation
and appreciation of each member=s interests.
a. The subcommittee would recommend to the Chairman of
USIB those agencies or services responsible for the development of
specific reconnaissance systems and those responsible for the operation of
the reconnaissance vehicles now in being. This would not preclude
joint operations such as now exist with the Air Force and CIA in the
IDEALIST, OXCART, CORONA/MURAL and LANYARD Projects.
b. The committee,-would in effect be the brokerage house for all
activity and information regarding reconnaissance projects and
reconnaissance systems. Representation on such a subcommittee would
be limited to those departments, services, and agencies concerned
with the actual conduct of the reconnaissance program, and such other
members as the Chairman, USIB may direct. Such a forum would
permit equal voice and representation for all services as well as place
the program within that governmental structure, namely USIB, primarily
concerned with the overall national intelligence interests.
Approved For Release,
gp@A 30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For elease 2003/09 ?} DP75B003 R000300160002-4
Page sr
25X1
c. Unresolved -disagreements within USIB would be referred
by the Chairman to the Special Group, or higher authority if necessary,
for resolution.
Approved For Release 20 M? CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved Fo elease 2003/09/39 CIA,RDP7513003 000300160002-4
.u J
Agreement Between
Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence
on
National Reconnaissance Planning and Operations
Definitions:
51
25X1
ILLEGIB
G-- _ -National Reconnaissance Planning Group
NRP - National Reconnaissance Program, to consist of
all overt and covert satellite and overflight
projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping
photography and electronic signal collection
Respons abilities:
ILLEGIB
National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and for making final determi-
nations in connection therewith which do not require the exercise of
higher authority. There is hereby established a Director/NRa respons-
ible for implementing plans and policies developed by the NRPG, and for
managing and directing the NRP in such manner as to insure the most
effective utilization of the particular talents, experience, and capabilities
within the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Director of
Central Intelligence, designates the Director and Deputy Director of the
National Reconnaissance Program (DNRE), who are responsible for the
operation of that program in accordance with the following terms and
conditions:
e
L National Reconnaissance Planning Group (NRPG), consisting
of the Secretary -of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence,
is responsible for providing policy and proram guidance for the
1. Requirements and Priorities:
The NRP will be directly responsive to, and only to, the
photographic and electronic signal (SlaNT) collection requirements
Approved For Release 200/30 CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 'Approved For lease 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP75B0032 000300160002-4
and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board and
will develop the over-all reconnaissance program to satisfy these
requirements..
2. Management:
a. The technical management responsibility for all the
NRP. is assigned to the D/NR . Under this over-all, responsibility
for NRP, D/NRV will utilize existing resources in the following manner:
(1) CIA will be the Executive Agent for D/NRe to
operationally control those covert projects already under its manage-
ment and such additional covert projects as are assigned to it by the
NRPG. The D/NRe will designate the appropriate military service as
Executive Agent to control those NRP projects of an overt nature.
(2) To provide for full use of available capabilities and
resources, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment
development by agencies outside the NRP, personnel of Army, Navy,
Air Force, and CIA, may be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate
positions within the NRV under the Program Directors who will be
designated as Executive Agents for the D/NRg.
(3) A firm liaison channel between the N". and the NSA
will be established as an adjunct to the technical management structure
of signal collection projects, and the conduct of such projects carried
out in accordance with the exploitation responsibilities of the NSA.
(4) Planning will encompass maximum utilization of
the technical and operational resources of the DOD, the Army, Navy,
Air Force, NSA, and the CIA to support all collection programs,
including, but not limited to, electronic signal and photographic collec-
tion programs.
(5) CIA will be Executive Agent for the D/NRJ to coordi-
/ L~14,,"cc NDUCr
nate the processing and dissemination of acquire by the NRP projects,
b. Fiaiancial Management:
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
25X1
25X1
In accordance with the basic responsibility of the Director
of Central Intelligence for protection of intelligence sources and methods,
CIA will establish security policy for the NRP, including provision for a
uniform system of security control and appropriate delegations of
security responsibility.
3. Security:
4. Operations:
a. Scheduling: The mission schedule for all NRP efforts
will be the responsibility of D/NRP!, subject to coordination with CIA
on covert projects for which it is Executive Agent and the obtaining
of appropriate clearances where required from higher authority.
Operational control for individual projects under the NRP will be assigned
to the DOD or to the CIA by the D/NRIB in accordance with policy guidance
from the NRPG. D/NR ' will be responsible to assure that mission
planning will make full use of all intelligence available in the community.
b. Format: The D/NRV will be responsible for the format
of the collected RiW-product as follows:
Approved For Release 2003/09 ' :R; t4RDP75B00326R000300160002-4
 *nproved Fo Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75400326R000300160002-4
25X1
(1) Photographic format will include the initial.
chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the users
as specified by the USIB, through CIA in accordance with paragraph 2. (5). 25X1
c. Engineering Analysis: The D/NRP{ will be responsible
for engineering analysis of all collection systems to correct the
problems that exist on the operating system as well as to provide
information for new systems. In connection with covert projects for
which CIA is Executive Agent, this responsibility will be carried out
under the supervision of CIA.
d. In time of war or whenever designated by the NRPG,
the D/NRP and NRP assets will be responsive: to requirements levied
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5. The D/NRP is responsible for advanced plans
in support of the NRP. In view of the DCI's major responsibility to
the NSC for all intelligence programs, all NRP advanced planning will
be coordinated between the Directoru ai d Director/NRP.
6. Public releases of information will be the responsibility of the
DNRP subject to the security guidance of CIA.
\7. The Deputy D ector (Research), CIA, will be respon 6le5for
seeilig than he particip ation of CIA`in this Agreement is carried out.
John A. McCone Roswell L. Gilpatric
Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Secretary of Defense
JIM
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00326R000300160002-4