A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00681R000100300006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 10, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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?A. REVIEW OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COM, MUNIT
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March 14, 197k
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TABLE OF CON'.~ENTS
' .'ace
1
INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
.
OF INTELLIGENCE ...............'..........?....
1.-
II.
COST TRENDS ............. ............~..,......
3
III.
QUESTIONS ABOUT TIIE PRODUCT ... ............
10a,/
IV.
ORGANIZATIONAL DILMNNAS ......
13
V.
SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES
20
VI.
LEADERSHIP OF THE COYNNUNITY ....:..???-~??-???
25
VII.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEADERSHIP ..??????????
34
VIII..
CHANGING FUNCTIONAL BOUNDARIES AND COSTS .....
39
IX.
TOWARD IMPROVEMENTS: IN THE PRODUCT ............
44
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I INTRODUCTION : THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INT LL7:GENCE
The operatios of the intelligence cornunity have pro-
,
two disturbing phenomena. The first is an impressive
'rise in-their size and cost. The second is an apparent in-
ability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope
and overall quality of.intelligence products.
During the past decade alone, the cast of the intelli-
gence community has almost doubled.. At the same time, spec--
tacular increases in collection activities have occurred.
Where satellite photography is concerned, ..the increases have
led to greatly improved knowledge 'about. the military capa-
bilities of potential enemies.. But expanded collection by
means.other?than photography has not brought about a similar
reduction in our uncertainty, about. the intentions, doctrines,
and political processes 'of foreign' powers. Instead, the
growth in raw intelligence --.and here satellite photography
must be included -- has come to serve as a proxy for improved
analysis, inference, and estimation. .
The following report seeks to identify the causes of
these two phenomena an dl the areas in which constructive chang
can take place. its principal'conclusion-is that while a
number.of . specific measures may. help to bring about' a closer
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~~ zela~ionship'between cost and effectiveness, the main hope
for doing so lies in a fundamental reform of the intelligence
do munity' s decisionm aking bodies and procedures.
This conclusion is advanced in full recognition that
reorganization will, at best, only create the conditions in
which wise and imaginative: leadership can flourish. In the
absence of reorganization, however, the habits of intelligence
community will remain as difficult to control as was the per-
formance of the Department of Defense prior to. the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958.
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II.. COST TRIEINIDS
To understand the phenomenon of increasing costs, it
is necessary to consider briefly the organizational history
of the intelligence community. The National Security _,_ct of
1947 and the National Security. Council Intelligence Direc-
tives (NSCIDs) of the late 1940s and ea~ly?.1950s established
the basic division of responsibilities among agencies and
departments. This division.had its origins in traditional
distinctions between military and non-military intelligence,
between tactical and national intelligence, and between
communications (COMINT).and non-communications (or agent)
intelligence. Thus, CIA was directed to employ clandestine
agents to colletxt "non-military" intelligence and produce
"national" intelligence. The Department of State was made
responsible for the overt collection of "non-military".in--
telligence. The National Security Agency (NSA) was estab-
?lished to manage COMINT collection. The Military Services
were instructed to collect "military" intelligence as well
as maintain tactical intelligence capabilities for use in
wartime. Al]. were permitted to produce "departmental" in-
( Tl lv dea
;1Q t. '= t
this division of functions and responsibilities-worked rea-
sonably well into the mid-1950s.
Since that time, these traditional distinctions and
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 become increasingly obsoloscent.. The line between "military"
and "non-military" has faded; scientific and technical in-
telligence with both civilian and military applications has
become a principal area of endeavor, for. almost all intelli-
gence organizations Similarly, under the old distinctions,
the national leadership -- namely the President and the NSC ---
concerned itself with,!national" intelligence, while pre-
sumably only battlefield commanders cared about tactical in-
telligence. But a rapidly advancing technology which has
revolutionized the collection, processing, and communication
.of. intelligence data casts doubt on the-validity of the dis-
tinctions.
Simultaneously, technological advances have created new
collection possibilities which do not fit convenient-ly within
a structure based 'on traditional distinctions and were not
covered in the original directives. Satellite photography,
telemetry intercept, electronic intelligence (FLINT), acoustic
detection, and radar have become some of the most important and
vital-methods of intelligence collection not, currently covered
by any uniform national policy.
The breakdown of the old distinctions and the appearance
of new collection methods has been a simultaneous process
raising a host of questions about intelligence.organization.
Is ELINT related to COMSINT, is it technical or military in
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nature:, is it of primary interest to tactical or national
consumers? Where should the radar tracking of missile or
the acoustic surveillance of Soviet ballistic missile sub-
marines -fit? Is telemetry more similar to CO`SINT or to
ELINT; who should analyze it?. Who should be responsible for
satellite photography? On the more mundane, but nonetheless
critical level, questions arise about the?'organizational re-
sponsibilities for such topics as.Sihanoukville supply in-
filtration, VC/NVA order of battle, and missile deployments
in the Suez Canal area. Are these military or non-military
issues? Is the intelligence about.them tactical or national?
Who should be responsible for collection and what collection
In the absence of an authoritative governing body to
resolve these issues, the community has resorted to a series
of compromise solutions that adversely affect its performance
and cost. In general, these compromises have favored multiple
.and diffuse collection programs.and the neglect of difficult
and' searching analytical approaches. The most serious of the
resulting problems are outlined below in brief form, and dis-
cussed in more detail in the appendices.
1. The distribution of intelligence functions has hccomo
.increasingly fragmented and disorganized.
? The old, distinctions among national,' departmental,
and tactical intelligence are out of date. Today,
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CIA is as likely to produce intelligence relevant
to, say, NVA/VC order of battle as DIA or MACV,
just as NACV produces many reports that arc of
a
'interest to the national leadership.
Similarly, the relatively neat ordering,of collec-
tion functions that existed after World War II has
broken down. CIA now engages in a wide range of
collection activities aircraft and satellite
photography, FLINT, COMINT, radar, telemetry as
well as clandestine, and overt agent collection.
NSA has added telemetry and FLINT to its COMINT
capabil.ities. The Services now have a full panoply
of sensors to .perform a variety of functions
tactical inte.lligence,..surveillance, early warning,.
and so 01-1.
Table I illustrates how almost all major com-
ponents of the-intelligence community are_in
.volved in each of its various collection and
production functions
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2. The Li_e r; are do:niizzt.r~1 by co].1_r ction
co;."pcLiti.on and have bcco`nc unnr.oclltc~i.vc~_( cTupli.cativc,
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0 budge L.ed for in-
telligence in 1972 will be spent on collection
(Table I above). Despite past massive increases in
the collection of photography, COMINT, ELINT, radar
and other sensor data; sizeable'.additional collec--,
tion capabilities are planned to become operational
? The blurring of traditional boundaries .has encouraged
community members to engage in a competitive struggle
for survival and dominance, primarily through new
technology,'which has resulted in the redundant
acquisition of data at virtually - all levels --
tactical, theater command, and national.,
?3T c` p:..D1 _~ `vr
C s `C a danc~ s col
i
become commonplace as exemplified by aircraft in
.Y
both CIA and Defense which collect photography,
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and by aircraft which compe to with satellites in
the collection of ELINT.
? Collection capabilities remain in operation beyond
their useful lives. As older systems lose their
attractiveness at. the national level, they are
taken over at the command or tactical level where
they duplicate higher level.,activities or collect
data of little value.
0. Simultaneously, compa rtluentalization.::. within various
security systems has served to hide or obscure com-
petitive capabilities" from evaluation, comparison,
and tradeoff analysis.
3. The community's growth is largely unplanned and un-
guided.
Serious forward planning is often lacking as decisions
are made-about the allocation of. resources.
The'consumer frequently fails to specify his product
needs.for the producer; the producer, uncertain about
eventual demands, cncoi_:.-ages the collector to pro-
vide data without selectivity or priority;. and the
collector emphasizes quantity rather than quality.
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4. The. community's activities have beco:mm.e exceedingly cx-
? The fragmentation of intelligence functions and the
competitive drive for improved collection technology
are important reasons why the cost of intelligence
? a
has almost doubled during the past decade.
J.
? A significant part of this cost growth is attributable
to the acquisition of expensive new systems without
simultaneous reductions in obsolescent collection
programs.
In the absence of planning and cruidance, internally
generated values predominate in the community's in--
stitutions. ?:These values favor increasingly sophisti-
'cited and expensive collection-technologies at the
expense of analytical capabilities.
Few interagency comparisons are contemplated. Po-
tential tradeoffs between PHOTINT and SIGINT, between
PHO'TINT and HUMINT, and between data collection and
analysis are neglected. -
the bud e %? y 7 X C a s might Used , cu.--,
some of. the more obvious excesses, it cannot sub-
stitute for centralized management of the. community.
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Ill. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRODUCT
In a world of perfect information, there would be no
uncertainties about the present and future intentions, capa-
bilities, and activities of foreign powers. Information,
however, is bound to be imperfect for the mot part. Con-
.sequently, the intelligence community can.at best reduce the
uncertainties and construct plausible.hypotheses about these
.factors on the basis of what continues to be partial and
often conflicting evidence.
Despite the richness of the data made available by modern
methods of collection, and the rising costs of their acquisi--
?tion, it is not.at all clear that our hypotheses -about.foreign
intentions, capabilities, and activities have improved com-
mensurately in scope and quality. Nor can it be asserted with
confidence that the intelligence community has shown much in-
itiative in developing the full range of possible explanations
in light of available data. Among the more recent results of
this failure to acknowledge uncertainty and entertain new
ideas in the face of, it, has been a propensity to'overlook
such unpleasant possibilities as a large-scale exploitation:
G~ 3:~h oukk?v.ill e by tha NVA to transship supplies, a co::tinu-
ation of the SS-9 buildup and its possible MSRVing, or Soviet
willingness to invade Czechoslovakia and put forces into-the
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Difficulties of this kind with the intelligence product
are all the more ciistur.?.~.ing because the need to explore and
test a number of hypotheses will, if anything, expand as the
Soviets project their military power and coT.-e to play a more
direct global role. Yet there is no evidence that the in-
telligence community, given its present structure, will come
to grips with this class of problems.,`
The community's heavy emphasis on collection is itself
,detrimental to correcting product problems. Because- each
organization sees the maintenance and expansion of its col-
lection capabilities as the principal route to survival and
strength with the community, there is a strong presumption
in today's intelligence set-up that additional data collec-
tion rather than improved analysis, wi11 provide the answer
to particular intelligence problems. It has become common-
place to translate product criticism into demands for en-
larged collection efforts. Seldom does.anyone'ask if a
further reduction in uncertainty, however small, is worth
its cost.
The inevitable result is that production remains the
stepchild of the community. It is a profession that lacks
military and civilian cc.aree incentives, oven within
CIA. The analysts, with a heavy bu:den of responsibility,
find themselves swamped with data. The consumers, at the
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sam,mc time, treat thcl.r product as a free good, so that demand
exceeds supply, priorities are not established, the system
becomes overloaded and the quality of 'the output suffers.
As if this were not enough, production, instead of guiding
collection, is itself guided by collectors and the impetus
of technology. Since the military arethe'principal collec-
tors, they are more likely to focus on the needs and interests
of their own Services than on the issues of concern to'the
national leadership, and they continue the wasteful practice
of counterpart targeting. Under such difficult conditions,
it is not surprising that hypotheses tend to harden into
dogma, that their sensitivity to changed conditions is not
articulated, and that new data are not sought to test. them.
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IV. ORG111,1,117\TIOid 1L y7:L).;Li!~a?1S
Questions about cost and product might exist even if the
intelligence community possessed strong leadership. It is
noteworthy, however, that they have arisen under conditions
the most marked of which is a lack of institutions governing
the community with the authority and responsibility to re-,
solve issues without excessive compromise, allocate resources
according to criteria of effectiveness, and consider the re-
lationship between cost and substantive output from-a national
perspective.
This lack of governing institutions stems fundamentally
from the failure of the National Security Act of 1947 to
anticipate the ."constitutional" needs of a modern and techno-
logically complex intelligence community. The primary intent
of the Act, under standably,.?was to prevent a recurrence of the
intelligence confusions and delays that occurred prior to
Pearl Harbor. These problems were seen as having resulted-
from defects in the'central processing, production, and dis-
semina`cion of intelligence. The critical need, accordingly,
was to create an organization which would have access to all
intelligence and report its S1i.. ion.
ship.
In 1947, the size and cost of 'individual programs were
relatively small, and the scope and - nature of the management
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V~. oblcl;is associated with today's community were not antici-
L_ ze
patecd. Consequently he issue of how to plan and rational-
the.collcction of intelligence did not,seem of great moment,
and the Act did not explicitly provide for. a .mechanism to per-
form these functions or evaluate the scope. and quality of its
product.
There is another reason why the 1947`Act did so little
to provide strong leadership for the community: powerful in-
?terests in the -14ilitary Services and elsewhere opposed (and
continue to oppose).more centralized management of intelli-
gence activities. Partly, this opposition arises from the
belief of the Sarvices that direct control over intelligence
programs is essential if they are to conduct successful mili--
Lary operations; partly, it results from bureaucratic concerns.
The Services are reluctant to accept assurance that informa-
tion from systems not controlled by them will be available as
and when they require it.
Despite such opposition, the National Security Act of
1947- did stipulate that the CIA would coordinate the "in-
telligence activities" of the Government under the direction
of the National Security Council. However, the Act also made
clear provision for. the' continuation of "departmental in
telligenc&". Since then, three Presidents have exhorted the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to play the role of
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co:;;,;;unnity leader and coordinator, nut his authority over the
cort:nunity has rcmaincc::' minimal. While the DCI has been the
catalyst in coordinating su:hs-4antive. intQl7igence production,
he has made little use of such authority as he possesses to
manage the resources of the community.
Realistically,. it is clear that the DC!, as his office,
is now constituted, cannot be expected to perform effectively
the community-wide leadership role because:
? As 'an agency head he bears a number of weighty op-
erational and advisory responsibilities which limit
the effort he can devote to comnmuni ty--wide management.
? He bears a particularly heavy bur den for the planning
and conduct. of covert actions,
? His multiple roles as community leader, agency head,
and intelligence.adviser to'the President, and to
a number of sensitive executive committees, are
mutually conflicting.
He is a competitor for resources within the community'
'owing to his responsibilities as Director of CIA,
:1lch tia i c.I C': o c ' c r.og'i_=S Of i
he cannot be wholly objective in providing guidance
for community-wide collection
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? lie controls only 15 percent of the community's re-
sources and must therefore rely on persuasion to
influence his colleagues regarding the allocation
and management of the other 85 percent, which is
appropriated to the Dcpartmcnt'of Defense. Since
Defense is legally responsible for these very large
resources, it feels that i t .cannot be bound by out-
side advice on how they should be used.
? The DCI is outranked by other departmental heads who
report directly to the President and are his immediate
supervisors on the National Security Council.
In spite of these handicaps, the DC1 has established
several institutional-devices to assist him in leading the
community. They are the National Intelligence Program Evalua-
tion Staff (NIPS) and the National Intelligence Resources
Board (NIRB). }Iowever, the principal agencies have largely
ignored or resisted the ef forts of management by these bodies.
As a"consequence, the NIPE and the NIRB have concentrated on
developing improved data about intelligence programs and
better mechanisms for coordination. Because of their work,
both institutions could prove useful to a? strong community
leader; however,' their contribution to the efforta of the
currently constituted DC-.r is small.
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In the absence of an effective institutional framework
within which one. official could be hold responsible and ac-
countable for the performance and cost of the intelligence
community, the United Statos Intelligence Board (USIB), origi-
nally established to advise the DCI, has become a sort of
governing body for the community. However, the USIB has proved
generally ineffective as a management mechanism for several
reasons:
It is acommittee of equals who must form coalitions.
to make decisions. -
it is &-minated by collectors and producers who avoid
raising critical questions about the collection pro-
grams operated by their colleagues.
As a result, USIBtS collection requirements -- which
are an zggregate of all requests, new. and old'-- mean
all things to all agencies, thus leaving them free
to pursuc.their own interests.
Since po:licy--level consumers are not represented on
the Board, they are unable to'give guidance as to
pr ? t
Even within the. Department of Defense, there is no cen-
tralized management of intelligence resources and activities.
Although the Assistant Secretary for Administration has been
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givon a responsibility in this area, together with a sma
Staff for resource analysis, his efforts to master the Defense
intelligence complex have proved of little avail for several
reasons. First, not all Defense programs come under-his pur-
view, and this limits his ability to do cross-program analysis.
Second, he remains responsible for his functions as Assistant
Secretary for Administration.
Below the level of review provided by an Assistant
Secretary, manacement leadership is still absent. The
Directors of DIA and NSA are themselves unable to control
the activities of the components supposedly subordinate to
them but operated by the Military Services. Because of a
history of compromises and "treaties", the Director of
the
National Reconni.issance Office (NRO) is similarly -unable t
control a large part of his program which is run by the Deputy
Director for Science and Technology (DD/S&T) in CIA.
This lack of lower-level leadership shows up in the fol-
lowing ways:
The current failure of NSA adequately to direct
Service cryptologic activities, organize them into
a coherent system, or manage FLINT activities.
? Large-scale Service-controlled tactical intelli-
gence assets, inflated by the war and partly dupli-
cating both national and allied capabilities, but-
programmed?and operated outside of the community.
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A host of unresolved problems concerning organization
and the allocation of resources within both General
Defense Intelligence Program (GDSP) and non-GD11P
0
activities, including: duplication in the collection
of ,LINT between NRO and SAC; internally overlapping
activities among varous mapping, charting, and
-geodesy agencies, and the severall investigative
services; and inadequate supervision and control of
counterintelligence activities.
it follows from this analysis that the President's ob-
jectives can be achieved only if reform addresses four or-
ganizational i..sues.
? The- leadership of the intelligence community as a
whole.
? The direction and control of Defense intelligence
.activities.
? The division of functions among the major.intelli--
gence agencies.
? The structuring, staffing, and funding of the
processes by which our _raw in-L-e7 ? i gea ce data
analyzed and interpreted.
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V. S aPLCIFTC O1RGhNIZAT'.T01,?L ISSU1 S
T.i.'he effectivencss and efficiency of the intelligence
co.nmiunity depend on a number of organizational variables.
. 21.mong the most important of these variables are:
? The power over resources available to the leader of
excise, particularly over collection programs, will
determine the size of the economies that can be
achieved within the community.
the community. How much power'{ the leader can ex--
,
? The size and functions of the staff provided to the
.leader of the community. The effectiveness of a
national intelligence leader depend no-' -:nly*
on his power over resources, but also on how well
informed he is about issues and options within
the community, which, in turn', is a function of his
immediate staff. Among the potential functions for
such a staff are:
-_.The planning, programming, and budgeting of
resources.
Control over resources once allocated.
Supervision of R&D.
---- inspection of ongoing programs.
Production' and dissemination of national estimates.
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Not as ` Sc~ s smcn~ of U.S., allied, and opposing
'-,s
on-posing
capabilities and doctrines.
? The future role of the United States Inteiligcnce
Board (US113) . As ratters now stand, the USIB is both
a parliament and a confederate head of the community.
If more authoritative leadership is established, the
USIB could become simply. an obstruction unless its
ILLEGIB
. .role is specifically redefined. Since the lea der' of
the community, however powerful, will need close and
continuing relationships with prod?,ucers., and collectors
as well as consumers, one .possibi.lity would be to re-
constitute the USIB so as to fornalize these relation-
ships cn an advisory basis. in any case the future
role of USIB should be addressed'as part of a corn-
prehensive review of new institutional arrangements
for .the functioning of a reorgan.zed intelligence
community.
? Future Defense Department control over the resources
under its jurisdiction. Even without charges in the
community as a whole, major improvements in effective---
ness and effic i ncv could be achieved if Defense were
to .master its own massive intelligence operations .
However, a num?aer of: coiwrnuni ty-\?ride issues would still
remain, and substantially firmer Defense management
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of its intelligence rc-sources could prejudice the
ability of a future leader of the community to ex-
crcise his own aut-hority.
? The jurisdiction of either a national leader or a
Defense leader over the Military Services. The three
Military Services are estimated' to- spend
part from
.their . sx,pport of the national agencies. Yet these
activities, which partly duplicate national intelli-
gence programs, are reviewed in isolation from them.
If the Services retain control ever the assets for
this "tactical" intelligence, they can probably weaken
efforts to improve the efficiency of the corl=unity.
At the same time, there is little question about their
need to. have access to the output of specified assets
in both. peace and war. How to combine overall rei
source management. and control with this access is an
issue that will require resolution.
The future .functional boundaries of the major in--
tellicrercc C cenc?cs.
Collection and production
activities do not. now tend to be consolidated by type
.r
in particular functional agencies. Important econo--
mies can.probably be achieved by rationalizing these
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activities. 1Io''t VCr It Should he noted that economy
and organizational tidiness, without concomitant
strengthening of the ' cor^ nunity tl_cadership, might be
achieved at the cost. of creating even more powerful
vested interests and losing diverse and usefully com-
petitive approaches to collection problems.
? The number and location of national analytical and
estimating centers. The National estimating machinery
no doubt will have to be preserved under the leader
of the community in order to continue production of
national estimates and inputs to the NSSM process.
The' cont-inuation of DIA and the. State Departments
Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) as producers
is essential as.well. Beyond that, improvement in
the intelligence product will probably depend to a
large extent on increasing the competition in the
interpretation of evidence. and the development of
hypotheses about foreign.intentions, capabilities,
and strategies. This may require not only the
strengthening of existing organizations,. but perhaps
e add ' ion O% _^~'. Cti g c = on
some entirely new organizational units may be needed
to perform currently neglected intelligence analysis
functions, for example , to~ conduct research on in-,
proved intelligence analysis methods and techniques_
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The 7:ole of the inclo7e ilt ~:evie~~ ]ncc}rani. ;rns. Be-
cause of the secrecy surrounding the operations o.
the intelligence co munity, the'necd for strong in-
dependent review mechanisms within the Executive
Branch remains particularly important. Since the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
(PFIAB), the "40" Committee, the Office of Science
and Technology (OST), and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) already exist to perform this
function, the only issues are how they can be
strengthened, to what extent they need larger and
more pe:_.nanent staffs, and whether new review
boards :;hould?be created; especially to evaluate
the analytical and estimating ac-%:ivities of the
community.
Subsequent sections do not address all of these issues;
nor do they exh.aust'the list of organizational possibilities.
Only, the most salient options are' presented with respect to
the leadership.of the community, the Department of. Defense,
and functional.reorganization. Each is described in schematic.
form,.
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VS LEADERSHIP OF THE CO:' _UNITY
The effectivcnc-s of a new leader of t., c community will
depend critically on his ability to control intelligence re-
sources and make his decisions stick. Basically, there are
three different roles he can play in this respect, each with
different organizational implications. -'They are:
As legal or direct. controller of all or most intelli-
gence resources: -
.As de facto manager of most resources even though
they arc not appropriated to him, -
s Coo-dinator of resources' that are appropriated
elsewhere, as .now.. -
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Although each of the three basic approaches could be in-
stitutionalized in a number of different ways, the principal
options that accord Frith these roles.are listed below.
A Director of national intelligence (Option ,fl), with
the bulk of ppropriated
to his office. That office would control all the major col-
,~ dot l c-~. r L:i`s 1?; c`~
`;se:5 an- - aU Te O7 .^ t r
are the most costly programs of the community and are most
likely to yield large long-term savings. The Director would
also operate the Government?s principal production and
estimating center and retain the CIA's present
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responsibility for covert action programs. Defense and State
would retain production groups, both to serve their own leader-
ship and to provide competing centei-s in the analysis of in--
telligence inputs to the national intelligence process. The
Defense Department would maintain budgetary and operational
control over only the selected "tactical" collection and
processing assets necessary for directisupport of military
forces, although these assets should. be subject to the DN'lls,
review.
This option affords a number of advantages:
? It pinpoints responsibility; the President knows who
is in charge.
? It permits major economies through rationalization of
the community'.s functions and through the elimination
cf,duplicative and redundant capabilities.
?.. It'establishes a management system which can deal com-
prehensively?with the implications of evolving tech-
nology and make efficient choices between competing
collection systems.
? It brings producers and collectors closer together
and increases the probability that collectors will
become more responsive to producer needs.
? It allows the Director to evaluate fully the con-
tribution each component makes to the final product,
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enabling readyidentification o low performance
- no
elements and pe mitt' subsequent adjustments to
their mission.
0 It provides one responsible point in the community to
which high-level consumers can express their chang.i^g
needs.
.It facilitates the timely-selection and coordination
of the intelligence.assets necessary to provide in-
telligence support to
crisis.
1--ages:
the President in periods of
Creation of a DNI has at least five potential disadvar.-
assigned to him. As noted, -these - include' substantive
advice to the President and to several high-level
corimi rte es , day-today management of a large. operating
program, appearing as a witness before Congress, and
running numerous sensitive collection and covert
action projects. It should be noted, however, that
It gives still further responsibilities'to the DI-1.
A major criticism of the present confederate organi-
zation is that the DCI is overloaded and cannot be
expected to perform well the many functions now
with adequate staff and. competent deputies, the
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Director should be able to delegate responsibilities
and case his task. Also, under this option, the
DCI's power would be comnensur;.te with his present
responsibilities.
? This option could generate substantial resistance
from the Secretary of Defense and. the Joint Chiefs
over the transfer of intelligence functions to a new
agency. It would also necessitate fundamental changes
in the National Security Act which might cause major
congressional resistance and open debate on a range
of.sensitive national security issues..
Even if all U. S. Government intelligence assets were
transferred to the Dire ctor.,.there would remain the
serious and continuing problem of finding ways to
meet the intelligence.needs of. Defense without, at
the?same time, causing the Services to reconstitute
.their own intelligence activities, even at the expense
of other programs.
There could be adverse reaction from the news media
and ~.h public to a consolidation of such cons : ive
activities under the control of one man, even though
so many of them already are controlled, in principle,
by the Secretary of Defense.
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it is possible that this option will continue the
present dominant influence of collectors relative
to producers and consumers in the intelligence
process.
A Director of Central Inteli icence (Motion : 2) , with a
strong presidential mandate and a subs'antial staff. NSA,
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NRO, and DIA would remain under present jurisdiction. The
CIA would be divided --- one part'supplying the DCI staff and
intelligence production component, the other part, principally
current CIA collection organization, comprising a new agency
.under a separate director.. The DCI would have senior status
within the Government and would serve as principal intelli--
gence adviser t:) the NSC. He would produce all National
Intelligence Estimates and other national intelligence re-
quired by top, level national decisionmakers, and would control
the necessary production assets, including NPIC..- This would
include continued management of a national intelligence
process that involved the participation, and inputs from,
other intelligence production organizations.
Under Presidential directive, the DCI.would review and,
plans, programs, and budgets of his own office, a reconstituted
r
CIA, and the Department of Defense. He would also pre sent a
consolidated intelligence budget for review by the 0MB. By
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this means the Director oulc e able -Co guide resource allo-
25X1
cation and influences. -community organization.
A t Cation Til o~ fers she ise ofhough greatest prom.
achieving the President's objectives, this-option has ad-
vantages over it and over the.present situation in the fol-
lowing. respects
The DCI would .be freed from the day-to-day management
tasks incumbent upon the head of a large operating
agency with major collection and covert action re-.
sponsibilities. This would enable him to devote
most of his attention to substantive' intelligence
matters, the tasking of collectors, and community
resource management issues as they
production activities.
relate to
0 This option eliminates the present situation in
which the DCI.serves as both advocate for agency
programs and judge' in community-wide matters, a
role which diminishes the community's willingness
to*accept his guidance as impartial.
Ci re.lforns c'oul'_'i be cc3M'Dl-shed, without- major
legislation, by a reorganization plan and Presidential
directives to the DCI, the Secretary of Defense,-and
the head of CIA.
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? This option would offer improvements in efficiency
and effectiveness without the major. disruptions in
;t rcuuired under option one.
y
u
,
_
. he co:t,
? It would enhance the stature Of the community leader
?while.avoiding the potentially dangerous concentra-
tion of power inherent in option cane.
Option 112 has several potential. disadvantages:
? Responsibility for -the community as a whole would
be more diffuse than under option one.
would have to.rely on persuasion and the process of
budgetary review rather than directive authority in
order to eliminate redundant and duplicative activi-
ties, resolve trade-off issues, and reduce overhead:
? He would lack the ability to mobilize, deploy, and
Large - collection assets u..1-1 a time of L psis, ? nleeJ
given specific Presidential, authority.
A Cdordina _'S-r of National Intelligence (Opti.on 3) J who,
? 'The abi..ity of the DC?' to supervise the detailed
activities of the operating. parts of the community
would be weaker.
?The new DCi, compared to the DNI under option one,
under presidential mandate, would act as `'r; ite Louse O_- NSC
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overseer of the Intelligence Community, directing particular
attention to :
? Intelligence resource and management issues.
? Representing the concerns and needs'bf national
policy level consumers.
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? Evaluating the suitability of intelligence output in.
light cf consumer demand.
Under this arrangement, CIA, Defense, and State intelli-
gence responsibilities would-remain essentially uncharged.
The Coordinator would express the views and concerns of the
President and the National Security Council on product needs
and quality; he would provide guidance on present and future
collection priorities; he would critique and evaluate the
current. 'performance of the community,. identifying gaps and
oversights; and he would conduct studies of specific intelli-
gence com-nunity activities as required. But he would not be
responsible for the actual production of intelligence. Nor
would he have any direct control over resources.
This opt-ion 1_e adva s..a g-es :
? The creation of this position would provide a means
for more direct representation of Presidential in-
terest in the Intellignce Community. Consumer
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ropresenta ion in the telligencs process would
enhanced.
? No legislation would be required,,and the President
would be snared a number o.::. bureaucratic battles.
The option h : A -f ..t. eral marked disadvantages
? There is the potential for unproductive competition
between the Coordinator and the White House staff.
Achievement of the President?s management and re-
source control objectives is- unlikely.
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I1c:.~'1~t\TriM-11 OE' D ~,N`SF LET'D1 RSHIP
.although the President has indicated his desire to in-
stitute community wide reform, changes within the Department
of Defense alone could improve the allocation and management
of resources and reduce the overall size of the intelligence
budget. Provided that care -is taken iri,making them, these
reforms need not be incompatible with subsequent decisions
about the governance of the community as a whole.
? Within the Department of Defense, there has never been
an individual with formal responsibility for management of
all DoD. intelligence activities. The D-?putt' Secretary .of
modest amount of time to the complex intelligence issues that
arise within his domain. Consequently, if the problems of
Defense intelligence are to be resolved in a fashion satis-
25X1
Defense historit:all%r has been charged with this task, but he `
has very little staff to assist him and can devote only a
factory to the President, it will be necessary either to
create .a Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) with specific
responsibility for the Department's collection assets,'or
provide the Deputy Secretary with major staff support in the
i0: 0 . ail ss star: L Sec= tar o : DefCe .se for 1.ntc IIigenc C
Neither of these posts would. be incompatible with options
two and three relating to community-wide leadership reform.
Eoweve , the DDI concept confl '.ct's with option one, in which
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the 'bulk of U. S. .intelligence resources t':ou? d be appropria-
tcd ;.o a Director oIL -1:a .ional Intelligence.
A D :rector of Defense In tel li crence would have the auth-
ority and responsibility to direct and control all Defense
intelligence activities. He would allocate all the Defense
intelligences resources., including those. for tactical intelli-
gence, the funds for the NRP, and budgets.for other national
programs under departmental;jurisdiction. He would report to
and represent the Secretary of Defense in all matters re-
lacing to the management of intelligence resources; review
the need for, and conduct of, sensitive intelligence collec-
tion and operations; review all Defense intelligence. "require-
ments" with resource. implications in order to evaluate need
and determine priorities; serve-as the principal Defense
representative on the USIB; and monitor other DoD programs
which have clear implications' =or the collection of intelli-
gence. Under this option the DDS would. be able to reorder
completely the Defense intelligence collection structure as
deemed appropriate.
The DIA would be involved in collection management only
so c rec tee, by the
duction of finished intelligence for the Secretary of Defense
and other national consumers.
`Lt J S important that the Director of Defense Intel. ..genre
be responsive to tasking by the co lmunit_y leaders who would
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be the principal substantive intelligence of is ial of the
25X1
Government. Both the _co.m n1Un~,ty leader and the DDI should re--
ccivc authoritative guidance about national consumer interests.
This could be provided by a Council of Intelligence consti-
tuted within the NSC and with the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of Defense as its ineinbers.,' the restructuring
of USIB and revision of NSCIDs can help in establishing the
appropriate DCI/DDI relationship.
The post of DDI has great prospective advantages:
a it would provide for the concentration of resource
? management authority. in one individual, which would
allow authoritative comparisons and decisions about
competing collection programs.
~. It would provide'for the centralization of direction
and control over all Defense intelligence activities,
including conduct of sensitive -intelligence collec-
tion operations.
But there are possible drawbacks as.. well, in that the
position would:
at a sin e l, in te 311 1~ ~E~nS~'
This could possibly diminish the community leaderls
access to information, as well as his ability to
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task collection systems in support of national in--
telligence production, and design balanced collec-
tion programs, in- support of his production respon-
sibilities.
Superimpose a large staff over those of other major
intellige c "managers within Defuse (the" Directors
of DIAL NSA, and NRO), although a.reduction in
various coordination staffs should be possible at
the same time.
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An Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD/%)
who would act as 'the principal staff ass i.stant to the Secretary
of Defense. His responsibilities would be similar to those of
the DDI, except that he would not exercise direct control over
Defense intelligence collection programs, and would not be a -
member of USIB unless the Board were reconstituted -Co advise
the DCI on the allocation of collection resources.
This, option has a number of advantages:
? It allows,for effective cross--program analysis within
Defense.
. It avoids the conc. ntration of po.7er in~.e e in t ha
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DD.I option, if that is considered a danger.
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? Compared to tine DDT., an ASD/I would be more likely 25X1
present DCI.oz the
the ~
to respond to the needs o
community-aide leader established under either option
two or three.
th? t:;
The post has a number of potential weaknesses in
compared caith the DDI, it. would probably: ?
?
Lack both the strong mandate .provided to the DDI
and direct authority over Defense intelligence
activities, including those carried out by the ?
program managers.
Make the ASD/I vulnerable to "end runs" by major
components within the Defense intelligence. com-
munity who might wishh to appeal directly to the
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` o achieve further E CO.' omiCs, p rticulc ry w t:iout major
. Ca
rcol:ganiza'iOn, will be difficult for revert reasons.
? Savings that we ;Eoresee as irr nedi ately feasible
are likely to be. counterbalanced to a considerable
degree by further pay and price increases.
? With the heavy R&D costs for.proposed new systeihs,
there already is built into the budget a strong
upward bias which may prove difficult to-control,
particularly considering the intense'interest in
high-technology and expensive new systems for SALT
and other purposes.
The U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia will permit
reductions in SIGINT and HUMINT resources, but they
will only partially offset the above cost increases.
o Some of the largest savings can only result from
shifting and consolidating current activities in
such a way as to redraw the functional boundaries
of the major intelligence organizations..
Despite these difficulties, it is-the case that func-
-tonal boundaries can be withdrawn without a major reorganiza--
Lion of Defense intelligence or the co:rmunity as a whole. -We
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~heulc stress, however, teat actions of this character will
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=1 l leave a number o co :'1r y- W de issues unresolved and
at the same time arouse all 'L--he opposition of the military
Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, . with the
rapid evolution of technology, further changes in boundaries and comparable upheavals --- will probably have 'to follow in
With all these cautions,. -there area number of specific
functional actions that can be taken at the present time.
'=ng the most. important are 'the establishment of NSA as a
truly national cryptological service with authority over all
signal intelligence and the consolidation of a number of
activities now operated separately by the 141ilitary Services.
The effect of these changes should he to achieve economies
of scale, eliminate excessive duplication,. and promote com-
petition. among like activities so as to weed out the less
productive programs.
The following table of possible savings; while only an.
estimate, indicates what economies might.be feasible as a
'result of redrawing. functional boundaries, consolidating
i -n :and eliminating duplication -
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changes. We also believe that the economies should be e
fected over a period of years. ,Without these two conditions,
the reductions could prove illusory or transient, and a
heavy price in disruption and lowered morale might Lollo:-w.
It should be noted that the anticipates savings. come
primarily from collection. activities; .major aL alytica'. and
estimating capabilities are not affected. .Their. improvement
is the subject of the next section.
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~X, TO;^JE~RD z~:riRCVE'-'.`riS IN THE PRODUCT
.?tuchz of the om2. hasis by the intelligence community and
the bulk of its resources go' to the high technology necessary
to overcome barriers to information in the USSR and China.
Yet this stress on the technology of collection -- admittedly
important -- comes at a time when improved analysis is even
more important. -
Because of the keener competition from the Soviets, and
the narrowing gap in relative resources devoted to defense,
the U. S. must refine its evaluation of. foreign capabilities;
intentions, activities, and doctrines rather than assume that
it has the resources to insure against all possibilities.
The community must also improve its current political esti-
mates and find ways of becoming more responsive to-national
consumers and their concerns. ?.
important improvements. in performance may be-feasible
without major. reorganization, But preliminary investigation
suggests that higher quality is much more likely to come
about within the framework of a coherently organized com-
munity which is focused on improving. output rather than in-
J C ed, it seems a - ai1_ assam2ti oil t.h . the President
^J . U a
would be willing to rebate some of the potential savings from
the community if he had any hope of improved performance as
.a consequence, As of now, however, he has no such assurance
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1, reasonably argue tha "L., for cur,- current perfOr:c;anc,~, he
_,noulu at least obtain the bone it of lo;~e r cos; s.
,~ henefits of intelli-
.a Vc~1,1 if we }:I:C[. how t _o IIiCc sLC the
gei c , 1 t would be difficult. to relate specific changes in
programs to Improvements in performance. NonttheleSS, ex-
perienced observers believe that. the follo%.ling steps --- all
of them comparatively inexpensive --.should increase the use=-
control and product evaluation sections within the
production organizations themselves.
? Upgrading existing analytical centers .to increase
fulness of the product to the.national.leadership: -
? Major consumer representation to and within the in-
telligence community, perhaps through a restructured
USIB, a high-level consumer council, or other insti--
tution.lized ways of communicating consumer needs,
p riorities.. and evaluations to intelligence producers.
? Assessment.of the i,telligence product through quality
including a DI? with improved
the : ompetition of ideas, g
organization and staffing as a major competitor to CIA
L n* the area of military in-C.0lligence.
0 Periodic reviews by outsiders of 'intelligence products.
. Y ~
of the main working hypo theses wwrithi n. the. co,. uni. ,
and of analytical methods being used.
,
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0 A net assessment Croup establisheu at the national
level which, .along tai ~h the ~;S . J.Sr; l process, will keep
questioning the community of d challenging it to re-
fine and support its hypotheses. .
? Stronger incentives to attract.good analysts, better
career opportunities to hold them. as analysts ins"ead'
of forcing them to-become supervisors in order to
achieve promotion, and a more effective use of per-
sonnel already trained and experienced in intelli-
genca..
? -Increased resources and improved organizational ar-
angemen is within the intelligence community for
research on'. improved methods of analysis a .= es.ti.--
mation.
It is probably premature to ?recorrimend. the detailed
measures necessary to improve the quality and scope of the
intelligence product. In the near future, this issue should
be considered at greater length by the leadership of a re-
organized coi-munity. indeed, the leadership should be
OT i-m-)rovc-aluant
as a matter of the highest priority. What steps will prove
feasible will depend on..the particular type of ruorganiza tion
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selecLcd, and, in the preser.L_ ci cUm Lances, it may be well
to be guided in the choice by considerations of economy in
elusioln, that improvement of the product at current~ budget
levels is simply another way of achieving the efficiency that
is so desperately needed within the intelligence community
as it is presently constituted.
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