CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE RE: TREATMENT OF VC POWS IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 10, 1970
• Content Type: OPEN

Judy 10, 1970
Approved Fo CONREQ/;0~/?5 f1-#j72s1%000300070029-8
Surely the officials of this agency knew
of their financial situation prior to the
time that these students left the Ameri-
can continent, and I am requesting that
the Senate Committee give attention to
this problem.
The questions may well be asked, To
what extent did this bankruptcy result
from siphoning the money out of the
concern by its management, and what is
even more important, Do we need laws
requiring the licensing or bonding of
these travel agencies?
I have had somewhat similar com-
plaints-not necessarily involving bank-
ruptcy, but situations where students
were misled when in making their travel
arrangements they were not fully ad-
vi ,td as to the limited coverage of the
contract. For example, in some instances
the stated cost covered standby travel
alone with the possibility that even at
the last minute the contract would be
that an immediate agreement to sell jets to
Israel would go a long way to demonstrating
to the Soviet Union that she cannot freely
work her will in the Middle East. An addi-
tional, but most important, reason leading
me to this conclusion is that it is one method
of dete g the Soviet Union without com
Initting one American.
L have re with great interest and con-
cern the rote t article, "Suez is the Front
to Watch" y on. George W. Ball, former
Under Secretary P State, a man for whom
I have the highe regard. His conclusions,
however, are very isturbing. Although he
seems to minimize th utility of selling addi-
tional jets to Israel, h too readily concludes
that "we should be in a osition to demand,
on threat of direct mi tary involvement,
that the Soviets remove st, if not all, of
their military personnel fro Egypt."
It is of even greater cone n to read re-
ports- this past weekend of " hite House"
ently ascribing to this thesis. Conl4ng as they
do on the heels of your announced ew peace
I must respectfully renew my urgi for
the immediate sale of additional jet air aft
Nation on this grave crisis.
Sincerely,
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, Jr.
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mr.
President, I cannot find the words to e1n-
phasize strongly enough my deep con-
viction that time is of the essence.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. Pres-
ident, notwithstanding the order that the
Senator from West, Virginia (11+Ir. BYRn)
be recognized at this time, I ask unani-
minutes, and that the 3 minutes used
me riot be counted against the time of
Senator from West yirginia
.
The ACTING PRESIMN'T . prytem-
pore,-Without objection, it is so grdered.
SENATE RESOLUTION 428+SUBMIS-
SION OF A RESOLUTIO AUT#OR-
IZING TIDE COMIVIITT ON COM-
MERCE TO CONDUCT N XNVESTI-
GATION OF FIRMS/ PROMOTING
TRAVEL ABROAD Y AME1ICAN
STUDENTS
TRAVEL AGENCIES ;,EAVE AMERICAN STUDENTS
6TRIjNDE ABROAD
Mr. WILLIAM of Delaware. Mr.
President, in the J ly 7, 1970, issue of the
Washington Star here appeared an arti-
cle entitled "bout 3,000 Tourists
Stranded.' " is article outlines the
desperate situ ion in which several
thousand Ame can students found
themselves when s ranged in 'El}rgpe as
the result of the bankruptcy of the travel
agency with which they had placed their
money.
A second article appearing in the
Washington Post of July 10 indicates
that these students will lose about 75 per-
cent of their advance payments.
According to these articles, after these
students were in Europe the travel
agency declared bankruptcy, listing as-
sets-of about, $800,000 against deb s of
around $4,000,000.
port, thereby necessitating the c of
additional hotel arrangement t the
point of departure either In s country
There are reports th our American
consuls in Europe agpitt Asia are often
st nded study s who have been
tra ed by the owing promises of some
trave agent advertisements.
In 11 w the serious hardships that
result In such misunderstandings I am
today q esting that the Senate Com-
merc Corn ittee examine not only this
par color ca e involving bankruptcy but
al the Indus y in general to determine
quiring a greatesponsibility on the
part of these tra el agencies, perhaps
even to the extent a bonding or licen-
I ask unanimous onsent that the
three articles to which, have referred,
together with an article p blished in yes-
terday's issue of the Wil 'ngton Morn-
Ing News on the same subje , be printed
in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, a articles
were ordered to be printed in thRECORD,
as follows :
July 7, 1970]
PARIS.-Several thousand American u-
dents found themselves temporarily strap ed
in Europe today after their Cincinnati-b d
tour group filed for bankruptcy.
But spokesmen for the group quickly
in Paris, Rome, Cologne, Geneva, Vienna,
Athens and parts of Yugoslavia-promising
"we have the money."
HAVE RESERVATIONS
Some pf the students took the whole affair
as a lark, others were bitter and a few were
anxious. But nobody was suffering.
"Nobody has been stranded," asserted T.
Budge Hyde, acting president of the World
Academy, the ill-fated tour group.
"They are all safely housed in their accom-
modations and they have their plane reserva-
tions home." Five planes will leave New York
today and seven more tomorrow to evacuate
half the youths.
PETITIONS FILED
Hyde said there were about 3,000 students
on the tour program throughout Europe.
S11617
"We already sent 600 to 700 of them home
in the past few days up to today," he added.
World Academy and four of its subsidiaries
filed voluntary bankruptcy petitions yester-
day in U.S. District Court of Cincinnati.
The agency's brochure had offered the
young people "the best of all summers," a
study trip to Europe with school work and
classroom credit worked in.
"We are no longer financially able to meet
commitments for transportation and accom-
modation," a statement from the organiza-
tion said. An attorney said the firm had
assets of about $800,000 and debts of $4
million.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, July 10,
19701
BANKRUPTCY RETURN
CINCINNATI.-A bapkruptcy referee said the
3,200 high scyoO?T and college students
stranded iq,-!?,`urope when a travel agency
went b e will receive 10 to 25 cents on the
dol on the total amount they paid for their
firm that arranged the student tour, had
arranged for airline tickets for the students
but had not paid for food and lodging.
The students paid between $700 and $1,000
for the trip.
[From the Wilmington (Del.) Morning News,
July 9, 1970]
STRANDED STUDENTS To RETURN
Thirteen Archmere Academy students
stranded in Europe when their travel agency
declared bankruptcy will be returning to the
United States by today or tomorrow.
Father Alexander Arndt, the academy's
registrar, said the students will arrive in New
York City on a Capitol International Airlines
flight.
The Archmere students were among 3,500
students stranded when the agency, World
Academy Tours for Foreign Study, Inc., filed
a bankruptcy petition.
The students were left with their return
air tickets but without food and lodging.
The Archmere students and four other
students in their group had toured Italy and
were in Geneva, Switzerland, when they
learned they would have to return.
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I submit.
for appropriate reference,. a resolution,
Senate Resolution 428, and ask unani-
mous consent that the resolution be
printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BIBLE). The resolution will be received
and appropriately referred and, without
objection, will be printed in the RECORD
in accordance with the Senator's request.
The resolution, Senate Resolution 428,
which reads as follows, was referred to
the Committee on Commerce:
S. RES. 428
Resolved, That the Committee on Com-
erce, or any duly authorized subcommit-
tin Act of 1946, as amended, and in accord-
ante with its jurisdiction specified by rule
ma a full and complete study and investi-
gati of firms promoting travel in foreign
counties by American students, with par-
'es reference to the financial responsi-
bility f k such firms.
SEC. . The committee shall report its find-
ings u n the study and investigation au-
thorized by this resolution, together with
such rec mendations as it deems advisable,
to the n-ate at the earliest practicable
date. `
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Appro e Ar Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD _ SENATE jut, 10 Y "
,y 9i?
The ACTING PRESIL pro tem-
pore.Under the previous or , the Sena-
tor from West Virginia r. BYRD) is
TB I, UNITED STATES SHOULD CRY
OCT AGAINST INHUMANE TREAT-
MENT OF PRISONERS WHEREVER
IT OCCURS
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. Pres-
ident, Americans are understandably
shocked by the statements which have
been made in the last few days with
respect to mistreatment of prisoners by
the South Vietnamese.
I note some conflict in the reports con-
cerning conditions at Con Son Island,
some 60 :miles off the coast of South
Vietnam, and I would say, first, that
efforts should be made to get a correct
assessment of the fact-,. If any action Is
called for by our Government, decisions
should not be made on the basis of sen-
sational reports in the press alone.
If the reports are true, however, the
mistreatment of prisoners should be con-
defined strongly. The United States
should withdraw any financial aid that
might contribute to prison conditions
such as those which have been described
in the news media, and our Government
should use every means at its disposal
to compel the government in Saigon to
treat prisoners humanely.
Men and women-many of the polit-
ical prisoners-reportedly have been in-
carcerated in windowless cells or cages
under extremely primitive and unsani-
tary conditions. Allegedly, some have
been shackled to iron bars in the floor
and. have been beaten until they cannot
stcind. The food given them, apparently,
is below the subsistence level, and, ac-
cording to the news reports, they have
been "disciplined with dustings of chok-
ing lime."
All of this is abhorrent and foreign to
the effort we have been making in behalf
of the South Vietnamese people, and is
of direct concern to the United States,
if the investigation-preferably by the
Red Cross-which should be made bears
out the allegations.
This situation is closely related to an-
other prisoner situation In which Amer.-
icara are also deeply involved and about
which we should be increasingly con-
cerried and active, and that is the situa-
tion in which American military per?-
sonnel are being held as prisoners of
war by the North Vietnamese.
What is happening to these men? we
do not know, since Hanoi has not even
had the humanity to reveal the names o.f
the Americans it holds prisoners. The
families of these men do not know if
they are dead or alive. If they are alive,
they, too, may be the victims of mistreat.
went and brutality. Certainly the un-
fortunate families of these men here at
home are the victims of fear and dread
as to the fate which has befallen their
loved ones. This is cruelty carried to air
uncivilized degree.
I cannot understand, Mr. President,
why there is no apparent concern for
these men on the part of those who dem-
on,Arate against America's efforts in
South Vietnam. Why do we never hear
condemnation of our country's enemies
in North Vietnam for their callous in-
humanity? Why are there no protests
over what may be happening to U.S. air-
men, soldiers, sailors, and marines who
are held incommunicado in communist
jails?
There is something dreadfully distorted
about a public conscience which con-
demns warfare, yet condones brutality
inflicted upon those who are in no way
able to defend themselves. There Is as
much reason to condemn the North Viet-
namese for their vindictiveness and re-
calcitrance with respect to prisoners of
war as there is to condemn the South
Vietnamese for their mistreatment of
others held prisoner. Hanoi has kept
American POW's in almost total isolation
over the past several years, refusing even
to let the prisoners communicate with
their families in the United States.
The Geneva Convention of 1949 rela-
tive to the treatment of prisoners of
war-to which North Vietnam subse-
quently became a signatory-provides
that prisoners of war "shall in all cir-
cumstances be treated humanely." Hanoi
is thus guilty of willful and flagrant dis-
regard of an international agreement
which it is pledged to uphold.
Mr. President, it is my hope that the
disclosures with :regard to Con Son Island
will serve to focus new attention upon
all aspects of the situation involving
those held prisoner by either side in the
war in Southeast Asia. America must al-
ways be strongly on the side of decency
and humanity.
Hanoi and Saigon--can be influenced
by U.S. public opinion, A nationwide out-
cry against mistreatment of human be-
ings held as prisoner,; in this conflict is
needed. Human treatment for them must
be demanded. Our Government, our
churches, our civic organizations, and
concerned agencies throughout the land
ought to raise their voices in protest
against uncivilized cruelty and savagery,
whatever the guise and whatever the
country.
The American people--who have been
so divided over the war itself-surely can
make it plain to both Hanoi and Saigon
that American public opinion Is strongly
united in its demand that prisoners be
treated in accordance with civilized
practices.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I commend the dis-
tinguished Senator from West Virginia
on the statement he has just made rela-
tive to prison conditions as they affect
both North and South Vietnam. I am
delighted that he has shown, once again,
his leadership in this area, among other
things, by bringing his views to the at-
tention of his colleagues in the Senate;
and I hope most sincerely that what he
has suggested will be given every atten-
tion.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I thank
the majority leader.
TERMINATION OF CERTAIN JOINT
RESOLUTIONS AUTHORIZING THE
USE OF THE ARMED FORCES
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Pursuant to the previous order, the
Chair lays before the Senate the unfin-
ished business, which the clerk will state.
The LEGISLATIVE CLECsK.. A concurrent
resolution S. Con. Res. 64) to terminate
certain joint resolutions authorizing the
use of the Armed Forces of the United
States in certain areas outside the
United States.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the
Senator from Arkansas, who as chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions is manager of the resolution, will
yield to me briefly, I should like to sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
-pore. The absence of a quorum having
been suggested, the clerk will call the
roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the
roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. l.'resident, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FULBRIGHT obtained the floor.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Arkansas yield?
Mr, FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. SCOTT. Last night, I suggested
a limitation of debate on this resolution
of 10 minutes, 5 minutes to a side. It has
been often debated before. I think we
ought to be more generous, perhaps, than
that, and I wonder whether the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas would
agree to 20 minutes, 10 minutes to a
side.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not believe I
want to agree to a tirne limitation. I
can assure the Senator, however, that
my statement will not take over 10 min-
utes. I see no occasion for debate, but
I want to make clear the procedural
question that arose in the former con-
sideration of this question. I do not be-
lieve I am disposed to make an agree-
ment at this time.
Mr. SCOTT. I do not believe that we
have a great amount of requests for
time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not, either. If
we can be allowed to proceed, I think we
will be through with it.
Mr. SCOTT. I should like to ask how
many requests we have on our side.
Mr. MATHIAS. I have some remarks
to make. I have no knowledge of any
other.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from
Maryland, as the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania knows, is a sponsor of this reso-
lution.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT, I yield for a ques-
tion.
Mr. DOLE. I might observe that we
could talk until until the cows come
home-they were mentioned in the last
debate-but it probably is not necessary
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Jul Yp 197 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA7RDP72-00337R000300070029-8 '
MY , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 11019
that we have extended debate op this and approved by the Foreign Relations resignation, an attempt by Congress to
matter.' I have only a few minutes. Committee, give away its own constitutional war
Mr, Ft7LBltICIJT. Walk to.the .cows? . Repeal of the Tonkin resolution under powers. The other approach, favored
Mr. DOLE. Until the cows come.home. the Dole amendment was part of a larger. by the committee, would eliminate an
Mr..FULBRIGHT. I have no intention legislative package which, taken as a illegitimate authorization and, in so
of talking until the cows come home, whole, gave the repealer a connotation doing, reassert the constitutional author-
whenever that may be. quite different from that which I believe ity of Congress to "declare war," "raise
Mr. SCOTT. Or until the chickens to have been the intent of a majority in and support armies," and "makes rules
tome home to roost. the Senate. I refer to the Byrd amend- for the Government and regulation of
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, on ment, which purported to concede sweep- the land and naval forces."
June 24 I voted against a move to re- Ing powers to the President, in his capac- For these reasons I strongly recom-
peal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of- ity as Commander in Chief, to initiate mend adoption of the concurrent resolu-
fered by Senator DOLE, of Kansas, de- military action whenever and wherever tion now before us, which would repeal
spite the fact that I strongly favor re- he might wish, provided only that he the Tonkin resolution by majority votes
peal of that resolution. I voted against thinks such action necessary to protect of the two Houses, without depending on
repeal in the form in which it was the lives of American troops, wherever Presidential action. The present resolu-
brought up, however, for reasons I be- they may be deployed. Read in conjunc- tion is not redundant; it represents the
lieve to be valid and substantial., tion with the Byrd amendment, which only means through which we can repeal
The first reason has to do with the attempts to concede undefined powers to the unfortunate Tonkin resolution in
traditions and standards. of the Senate. the President as Commander in Chief, such a way as to assert rather than re-
One of the strongest Senate traditions- repeal of the Tonkin resolution in the sign*from the constitutional authority of
although it is not a formal rule-is that formed. sponsored by Senator DOLE may Congress.
Senators do not call up proposals sport- be read as acquiescence in the Execu- This action is within the spirit of the
-sore4Y' by others to be voted on prema- tive's contention that the Tonkin resolu- commitments resolution passed last year
turely, especially when they would do tion was of no consequence in any case by the Senate,
so for purposes quite different from those because the President, in his capacity as I am encouraged by various actions
of the original sponsor. That was the Commander in Chief, has full authority taken by the Senate, to indicate that this
case with the vote to repeal the Tonkin to make war without authorization by body, after a considerable period of ac-
resolution. The original Mathias. pro- Congress. quiescence to the demands of the Execu-
posal, which is now before us, stands In the form sponsored by the Senator tive, is reasserting its constitutional re
alone as a concurrent resolution, which from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) and en- sponsibilities.
does not require the signature of the dorsed by the Foreign Relations Com- I believe that this resolve of the Sen-
President. It.is the form provided for mittee, on the other hand, repeal of the ate is the most significant development
by the original resolution. In the form Tonkin resolution would signify not a in recent years for the preservation of our
in which it was taken over and sponsored surrender to Executive presumptions but constitutional democratic system of gov-
by the ,. Senator from Kansas (Mr.- the removal of an inauthentic substi- ernment.
DOLE), repeal of the Tonkin resolution tute for a constitutionally mandatory Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I send
became an amendment to a controversial congressional authorization. It would an amendment to the desk and ask that
bill, which, if enacted by the House Of clear the books of an enactment which it be stated.
Representatives, will require the Presi- has been interpreted as authorizing full- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
dent's signature to become law. scale war in Southeast Asia although BIBLE). The Chair would advise the Sen-
When the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Congress had no such intention in ator from Maryland that an amendment
ALLOTT) subsequently employed a simi- adopting it. As endorsed by the commit- is not in order until after the commit-
jar procedure prematurely to call up tee, repeal of the Tonkin resolution tee amendments have been disposed of,
the so-called end-the-war amendment would neither eliminate a valid congres- except by unanimous consent.
sponsored by the Senator from South sional authorization for the Indochina Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask
Dakota (Mr. MCGovERN) and the Sena- war nor acknowledge the Executive's unanimous consent that it may be in
tor from Oregon (Mr. HATk'Igrp), the claim to the power to make war on order.
Senate voted to table the motion, declin- its own. It would simply confirm The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
lug to consider the proposal until its and clarify an existing state of affairs, BIBLE). Is there objection to the request
rightful sponsors were prepared to put which is, that the war in Indochina is of the Senator from Arkansas? The
it forward. This action was taken as and always has been a Presidential war, Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
more than a matter of privilege and pro- initiated and conducted without valid The amendment will be stated.
tocol. It had to do with the maintenance authorization by Congress. The assistant legislative clerk read as
of dignified, responsible, and, orderly The repeal of the Tonkin resolution in follows:
procedure. For the Senate to have stone conjunction with the Byrd amendment to On page 2, line 9, after the word "upon",
otherwise would have set an unfortunate the Cooper-Church amendment has the strike out "the day that the second session of
example at a time when extremists of wholly different connotation of acqui- the Ninety-first Congress is adjourned." and
both right and left are showing contempt escence in the Executive's inflated con- insert "approval of both Houses of the Con-
for orderly democratic procedure. As the cept of the President's authority as gress."
majority leader said, the violation of Commander in Chief. It eliminates the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
mutual respect and courtesy involved in Tonkin resolution not as illegitimate tion is on agreeing to the amendment of
the proposal to call up the McGovern- but as superfluous. This is attested the Senator from Maryland.
Hatfield amendment prematurely threat? to by the fact that the sponsor of the The Senator from Maryland is recog-
ened to turn the Senate's usual "atmos-: repealer of June 24 was also an ardent nized.
phere of comity and unity" into "a jun?? advocate of the Byrd amendment, Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, more
gle of one-upmanship." _. The matter is more than one of pro- than 7 months have passed since intro-
The same principle was involved in the cedure, prerogative and courtesy in the duction on December 8, 1969, of the com-
Dole.amendment for repeal of the Tonkin Senate-important as these are. The prehensive foreign policy resolution (S.J.
resolution. That is why I joined .such two forms of, repeal of the Tonkin Res. 166) which in different and partial
strong supporters of the Senates rules resolution-that sponsored by the Sen- form reaches the floor today. The earlier
and traditions as the, Senator from Misr. ator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE) and that resolution had several provisions that
sissippi (Mr. STENNIS) and the, Senator, recommended by the-Foreign Relations seemed to me to be important. But it was
from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN) in vot- Committee-though nominally leading chiefly devoted to a single' purpose: the
lug against repeal of the Tonkin resolu- to the same result, in fact have practical application of the principle em-
tion in that form. I certainly intend to radically different connotations. The bodied in Senate's national commit-
vote for repeal now that it is before us one, coupled as it is with a legislative ments resolution of 1969 (S. 85).
in its original and proper form. as. the. enactment which can be read as acqui- That historic measure, S. 85, defined a
concurrent resolution sponsored by the escence in the Executive's claim to ple- national commitment as the use of Amer-
Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) nary war powers, represents an act of ican troops in a foreign country or the
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029r-8
 S 11020
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE July 10, 1970
coritingerxt promise of :such use. S. 85
resolved that It was the sense of the
Senate that such a national commitment
requires "rmative action by the execu-
tive and legislative branches through
means of a treaty, convention, or other
legislative instrimsentality specifically
intended to give-effect to such a commit-
ment."
The Senate had spoken and this resolu-
tion was justly acclaimed as a historic
utterance. Yet the words of the Senate
resounded boldly only because the aac-
tions of the Congress had long been so
timid. The national commitments reso-
lution issued from a body that for years
had remained silent or irresolute in rela-
tion to national commitments---for years
had allowed the Executive to act ever
more freely with American troops
abroad.
Even in this moment of rare asftertive-
ness, moreover, from one point of view,
the Senate spoke modestly. It did not
declare the constitutional prerogatives
of the Congress in words as em-
phatic as those used in the Con-
stitution itself. In article ii, section
8, alter all, the Founding Fathers
had assigned to the Congress every sig-
nificant power of decision over the ez-
gagement of troops abroad. Far from
giving the President the power to inter-
vene overseas, the Constitution did not
even permit him to intervene on the seas
without congressional approval--even
against piracies. The President is as-
signed the initiative power only to repel
attack.
The Constitution does not make refer-
ence, of course, to modern weapons and
military strategies-to nuclear deter-
rence or to protective-reaction strikes.
But it does catalog all the likely military
contingencies of the day-and it gives
the decisionmaking authority to the Con-
gress.
Congress is to "raise," "regulate,"
,support" "govern," and. otherwise "pro-
vide" for the Armed Forces. Congress is
to define and punish felonies on the high
seas and other offenses against interna-
tional law. Congress is to make rules con-
cerning captures onland. and water; and
it is to declare war. Finally, Congress is
to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying these powers into
execution.
And yet, as we meet here today, all
that has been finally enacted by Con-
gress--beyond the long record of defer-
ence to the Executive in military coan-
mitments abroad-all that has been fl-
nally enacted into law is one poorly un-
derstood amendment restricting the use
of ground troops in Laos and Thailand,
which can probably be avoided if not
evaded. After all this, the most impor-
tant new congressional declaration of
principle remains a sense of the Senate
resolution in which we make bold to
paraphrase the Constitution. A sense of
the Senate resolution, moreover, that is
violatedby several standing acts of Con-
gress.
In its context, I do not deny that S. 85
is historic. It is an important first step,
a major new departure, for which its
authors serve all the acclaim they have
received. But in a very real sense-mi-
less Its words are put into practice-it
will seem In history as a case of a mouse
that roared.
So it was to put the Senate's words
Into practice that Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 186 was introduced last December
by the distinguished majority leader, the
Senator from Montana, and myself. It
was for the same modest purpose that
Senators COOPER and CHURCH introduced
their amendment to the Military Sales
Act recently passed by the Senate, but
yesterday, I regret to say, was dealt a
blow in the other body that will probably
prove fatal. It is for the same modest
purpose, that a? series of bills has been
prepared belataedly to give Congress a
role in the final stages of the Vietnam
war-even if Congress shirked a respon-
sible role during the inception of that
war.
Mr. President, I do not attempt to
avoid my own xesponsibiiity during this
period of time In which I have been a
Member of the Congress.
Now I do not deny that this analysis-
both of the constitutional issue and of re-
cent legislation-raised important ques-
tircns. If these proposals are really so
modest, and if the Constitution is really
so clear, why, one may ask, is the legis-
lation so controversial? Am I impugning
the President's respect for the law of the
land which he is sworn to uphold?
Do I mean to suggest that the House
of Representatives was incomprehensibly
negligent when it in effect instructed its
conferees to reject the Cooper-Church
amendment? My answer to both ques-
tions is an emphatic no. For the past
actions of the Congress-both the Sen-
ate and the House-have created such a
large body of Inconsistent legal prece-
dent, and have endorsed such extensive
overseas deployments, that the present
locus of power over military commit-
ments has been hopelessly confused. In
this situation, it is understandable that
the executive branch, which like the rest
of us is the victim of the barnacles of
habit may not view with perfect accord
the Senate's initial efforts to reassert the
constitutional power of Congress.
For even the Senate has as yet failed to
establish a coherent record. We have de-
clared our position in S. 85. But we
have a long record of action in con-
flict with these views. And as a con-
tinuing symbol of this conflict, we have
allowed to remain on the books as the
law of the land a series of enactments
that Implicitly grant to the President as
the Commander in Chief the power to in-
tervene abroad at his own discretion. A
crucial step in an orderly and responsible
reassertion of congressional power that
can be understood by both the executive
and the public is the repeal of these en-
actments of abdication-an abdication
not of power, but of constitutional duty.
The proposal of last December, a joint
resolution (8.3. Rea.. 166) was intended
to repeal four such enactments, while at
the same time giving the President au-
thority to conduct military activities in
Vietnam as part of a program for total
withdrawal. The proposed repeal was to
apply to the Tonkin Gulf, Middle East,
Formosa, and Cuban foreign policy sup-
port resolutions; and in addition a com-
mittee was to be established to reexamine
the national state of emergency created
at the time of the Korean war and still
in effect today. This approach would
unite the executive and legislative
branches in advancing the constitutional
principles that the Congress and the
President share the powers of peace and
war and that neither can act alone to
engage American troops abroad.
The reception accorded our resolution
was highly gratifying. Largely because
of the educational leadership of the dis-
tinguished majority leader and of the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee and the members
of that committee-and of course, be-
cause of the constitutional problems of
the tragic war in Southeast Asia-our
proposal attracted immediate and in-
formed attention. I was u specially grate-
ful for the close examination given the
resolution by the State Department and
for the detailed testimony given the For-
eign Relations Committee by the able
and distinguished then Under Secretry
of State Elliott Richardson. The admin-
istration indicated that it would not op-
pose our initiative. The subsequent
months have seen a sometimes bewil-
dering chain of events---moving so rap-
idly that it has been cif lcult to keep
the underlying issues in. view as we re-
sponded to the immediate crises. Most
dramatic was the decision by the Presi-
dent to move troops into Cambodia with-
out even. cousulting the Congress. This
action was followed by the Cooper-
Church amendment to the Military Sales
Act, judiciously providing for coordina-
tion of the Congress and the President
should ii: become necessary to order our
troops back into Cambodia. Meanwhile,
Senator GOODELL's proposed amendment
to the military procurement bill, de-
signed to establish a tirn.etable for U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, was rewritten
and expanded to apply also to Laos and
Cambodia. As the Ha-l:tleld-McGovern
amendment to end the war it has ac-
quired over 30 or more cosponsors.
In addition, the Senator from New
York (Mr. JAVITS)-with the cosponsor-
ship of the Senator from Kansas (Mr.
DOLE)-has introduced a major long-
range proposal to Codify for the future
the specific powers of the Executive with
regard to troop commitments overseas.
And then, finally, in a surprise develop-
ment, the administration supported in-
troduction of an amendri.ent to the Mili-
tary Sales Act intended', to repeal the
Tonkin Gulf resolution. This passed
overwhelmingly in the Senate. Now,
however, the bill is moving into what
appears to be a stalemated conference
with the House, and I would submit
that its prospects are in doubt, to say
the least.
With regard to Senate Joint Resolu-
tion 166, the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee decided that the Tonkin Gulf and
Middle East resolution:; should be re-
pealed by concurrent revolution, as their
language originally stipulated, rather
than by a joint resolution also repealing
the Formosa and CubaLi. resolutions, as
was envisaged in the initial version of our
proposal. I agree with this change. It
conforms more closely with the legisla-
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
July 10, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 11021
tive history of the various resolutions and
facilitates disposal of the Tonkin Gulf
and Middle Eastern resolutions.
It has -been suggested that repeal of
the Mideast enactment at a time when
our resolve in that region is under chal-
lenge might lead to misinterpretation
abroad, even though the resolution in
question has no direct application to to-
day's crisis. Recent initiatives by the
Senate reaffirming our determination to
maintain a balance of power in the area
should reduce the danger that repeal
would be misconstrued. None the less, the
concurrent 'resolution I am supporting
now applies only to the Tonkin Gulf en-
actment. I would hope for repeal of the
Mideast resolution at an appropriate
time. And I also urge repeal of the For-
mosa and Cuban enactments, which-it
would appear from their language-can
be revoked only by joint resolution.
All four of these resolutions have al-
ready been on the books too long. Rather
than authorizing the President to under-
take specific military actions under spec-
ified contingencies and within a stipu-
lated time period, these resolutions "sup-
port" the Executive claim of authority
to act essentially at his own discretion,
under his own authority, and without
termination dates. Thus these resolutions
implicitly deny their own'necessity; and
indeed the State Department has on oc-
casion asserted that the President could
have acted as he did without them either
in Lebanon or in Vietnam.
Nonetheless, President Johnson's Un-
der Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzen-
bach, testified before Congress that the
Tonkin Gulf resolution was the "func-
tionitl equivalent of a declaration of
war." f myself-and, of course, many of
us-have seen President Johnson per-
sonally and physically flaunt the docu-
ment as full authority for his Southeast
Asian actions.
Although there is some dispute among
members of the Eisenhower administra-
tion on the President's attitude toward,
the powers of his office, with regard to
the Mideast resolution, it is clear from
his public statements that President
Eisenhower in essence accepted the prin-
ciple of the national commitments reso-
lution. At that time, ironically, the lead-
ing advocates of ' plenary Presidential
authority came not from the Executive
but from Congress itself.
President Nixon currently _ maintains
that he has ample authority as Com-
mander in Chief to protect forces that
were already deployed when he assumed
office. Two weeks ago-we voted over-
whelmingly to attach to the Copper-
Church amendment to the Military
Sales Act language explicitly recognizing
this Presidential. Power. In most cases,
of course, protection of our troops is
best achieved by removing them from
poorly chosen positions and unnecessary
cotbat; but it would be improper for
the Senate to deny the President the au-
thority to protect our troops by other
means- where necessary.
The constitutional challenge does not
rest chiefly with the, President. It rests
with the Congress. As long as we leave.
the contradictions of precedent unre-
solved, the President will understand-
ably base his actions on his powers as
Commander in Chief rather than mov-
ing onto shifting sands and shoals of
congressional positions. He will natur-
ally deny his reliance on the Tonkin
Gulf resolution, since that. enactment is
more congressional abdication than con-
gressional authorization. It does not em-
power the President to take specific ac-
tion; it supports the President in his own
determination to take whatever action
he believes is In the national interest.
And even if the Tonkin Gulf resolution
is to be considered as authorization for
our presence in Vietnam, the President
would be ill-advised to base his powers
on it at a time when its repeal is being
considered without a clear congressional
intention to provide new authorization.
It was to avoid such confusion of the
congressional purpose that I originally
proposed repeal by a joint resolution
which would also authorize an American
military presenec during the period of
negotiations and withdrawal from Viet-
nam.
In advocating repeal of the Tonkin
Gulf resolution as a first step in a larger
process, I do not need to reiterate its
brief but embroiled legislative history.
Suffice to say that later investigation by
the Foreign Relations Committee and by
various authors and journalists has cast
grave doubt on the stated premises of the
enactment. The U.S. destroyers said to
have been "lawfully" present in inter-
national waters turned out to have been
engaged in provocative military activities
within the 12-mile limit; and what were
described as "deliberate and repeated
attacks" on these vessels left hardly a
scratch. If the late Earle Stanley Gard-
ner were to have written a detective story
on these incidents, he might well have
called it the "Case of the Cuckolded
Congress."
A more timely consideration today is
the fact that the resolution was inter-
preted as supporting an overwhelming
and substantially ineffectual extension of
the Vietnam war into the north through
bombing of an intensity which exceeded
even that directed against Germany dur-
ing World War II. As long as this reso-
lution remains on the books, it might
some day be interpreted as authorizing
a resumption of such attacks.
Also, in keeping this resolution on the
books, Congress maintains an emblem
of its own irrelevancy at a time when we
are ostensibly moving to fulfill our con-
stitutional responsibilities in the realm
of military and foreign affairs.
This resolution should be repealed; and
I support its repeal today through con-
current resolution not only because that
is the legislatively prescribed way but
also because this may be the only way.
As I have said, however, in moving to
repeal this enactment by concurrent res-
olution, it should not be imagined that
we reduce the need to act on the other
sections of the comprehensive resolution
introduced last December.
In fact, repeal of the Tonkin Gulf res-
olution will make action on the rest of
our proposals even more urgent. As the
Senator from North Carolina (Mr. ERVIN)
has said in an eloquent speech, simple
repeal of the resolution would place our
troops in -a "constitutional quandary."
Unless we wish to pass by this oppor-
tunity to assert the principle we en-
dorsed in the national commitments res-
olution,^it is imperative that we follow
up our repeal with action to grant the
President authority to conduct the mili-
tary operations that will be necessary
under his plan for the withdrawal of all
American troops. We should not attempt
to ignore the laws of nature, both physical
and political by trying to replace the
Tonkin Gulf resolution with a vacuum.
The President has moved away from the
policies associated with the Tonkin Gulf
enactment; away from what appeared to
be the previous administration's plan for
a military solution in Southeast Asia. It
is time for the Congress also to move. It
is time for Congress also to replace the
Johnson plan for the war with a plan for
withdrawal and peace.
We should specifically authorize in
joint resolution those military operations
necessary under our commitment to a
rapid withdrawal of all American troops
and under our continued effort to achieve
a negotiated settlement. In accord with
the President's professed intentions, we
should prohibit repeated extension of the
war to Laos, Cambodia, or any other
countries without specific new legislative
authority. And we should consider the
imposition of new legislative constraints
to. assure early full withdrawal and ne-
gotiated peace. These limits and author-
izations, moreover, should be enacted in
joint resolution with the force of law
when signed by the President. Without
such a resolution, I repeat, the Congress
will signify that it considers itself op-
tional on the most vital issues of war and
peace and will abdicate its constitutional
responsibility.
The President has undertaken a major
shift in Vietnam policy since he as-
sumed office. In recognizing this shift, I
think we understand that it is to some
extent precarious. If Congress does not
act to corroborate it, if Congress relapses
into a posture of irrelevance, there are
forces in the executive branch which will
move into the legislative void that we
leave after repealing the Tonkin Gulf
enactment. There are forces within the
executive branch that may attempt to
reverse the current presidential policy
of withdrawal.
I do not believe that the President
should have to face these pressures
alone. I do not believe that the entire
political burden of the shift in Vietnam
should be borne by the President alone.
Just as I believe that Congress should
have.been'more deeply involved in the
decisions of engagement in Southeast
Asia, so I believe Congress should par-
ticipate now in this historic process of
engagement.
Because this further part of the pro-
posal is to be a joint enactment, with the
force of law when signed by the Presi-
dent, it would bring the Congress and
the executive together again under the
Constitution, with the Congress playing
its specified role in matters of war and
peace. And It would bring the two
branches together again on the road to
peace. Let us act quickly now on this
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : clA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
S 11022 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD - SENATE
repealer to take the first steps in this
redemptive journey.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. MATHIAS. I yield to the chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to compliment the Senator on a
very thoughtful and perceptive state-
ment. He deserves much of the credit
for bringing this matter to the atten-
tion of the Senate in proper form. His
discussion of its significance is very use-
ful.
I think, his effort to help the Senate
shoulder, as he said, part of the respon-
sibility with the President in solving the
tragic conflict in Vietnam is a very proper
one. I compliment the Senator for what
he has stated.
Mr. MATHIAS.?I am thankful to the
distinguished chairman for his words-
and for his own leadership, which has
been so important from the very begin-
ning of these efforts.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MATHIAS. I am happy to yield to
the distinguished majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. l: want to join: the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, the Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), in extending
my felicitations and thanks to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Maryland.
What we have before us now is,. in ef-
fect, the Mathias resolution, a resolution
which the Senator from Maryland sub-
mitted originally on his own behalf,
which represents his own thinking, and
which I think represents the thinking of
the Senate as a whole, perhaps unani-
mously-who can tell?-but certainly
the thinking of the great majority of
Members of the Senate.
I think it is a good first step in the right
direction of bringing about better coordi-
nation between the legislative and execu-
tive branches. I am delighted that the
President and the administration have
indicated their support in rescinding the
Gulf of Tonkin measure. In so doing, it
gives us the opportunity to work together,
so to speak in tandem, to bring to an end
this ill-founded resolution.
Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the majority
leader not only for his words today but
for his continuing encouragement and
support.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator from Maryland yield?
Mr. MATHIAS. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Kansas.
Mr. DOLE. Let me say, first of all, that
:{ commend the Senator from Maryland
for his initiative. It was the initiative of
the distinguished Senator from Maryland
along with the distinguished Senator
from Montana, which now brings this
resolution to the floor.
Let me add that nothing that may
have transpired on the floor of the Senate
last month, on the 22d or 24th of June,
should in any way detract from that ini-
tiative. The Senator from Maryland has
made an outstanding contribution.
I would hope, of course, that the House
might act on a proposal that will now be
In conference, which includes the amend-
ment I offered on the 22d of June and
which was adopted on the 24th of June,
as I recall, by a vote of 81 to 10, so
that the President might also participate
in the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution.
I would like to ask a question of the
distinguished Senator from Maryland
with reference to the proposal offered
originally. As I understand the Senator's
amendment, it simply indicates an ear-
lier effective date. Is that correct?
Mr. MATHIAS. The Senator from Kan-
sas is right. He will recall that at the time
his own amendment was before the Sen-
ate, with his concurrence I made the
same proposal-that the effective date of
the repeal should be at the time of its ap-
proval by both Houses of Congress, rather
than at the expiration of the 91st Con-
gress, as provided in the original
resolution.
Mr. DOLE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I yield
the floor.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I join my
colleagues in congratulations to the
Senator from Maryland for introducing,
with the support and help of the major-
ity leader, the resolution he did last De-
cember. I say this notwithstanding the
fact that I myself perceived, even be-
fore then, the critical aspect of termi-
nating the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in
the eventuation of U.S. policy with re-
spect to ending war in Vietnam.
Indeed, several months before the
Senator from Maryand (Mr. MATHIAS)
submitted his comprehensive resolu-
tin-in October of 1969-I joined
with the Senator from. Rhode Island
(Mr. PELL) in submitting a specific con-
current resolution to terminate the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution.
I am very grateful to the Senator from
Maryland 0/1r. MATHIAS), the Senator
from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), and the
Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FuLBRICHT)
for joining me, as they have, as principal
cosponsors of the Mathias resolution
which has finally, after considering all
the other phases relating to different
resolutions of commitments for the
United States, brought us here.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator yield briefly so we may order the
yeas and nays?
Mr. JAVITS. Surely.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask for the
yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a
sufficient second for ordering the yeas
and nays on final passage?
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from New York.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, we are
down essentially to the point where I
started and which was one of the ele-
ments of the original proposal of the Sen-
ator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS).
Much attention has been directed to
the so-called End the War Amendment
of SenatorgS MCGOVERN and HATFIELD,
my own colleague l3enator GOODELL, Sen-
ator CRANSTO:N, and Senator HUGHES. We
have all been visited by literally thou-
sands of college students, members of
faculties, and. many other persons inter-
ested in the so-called peace movement,
urging us to be for the McGovern-Hat-
field end-the-war amendment.
July 10, 1970
As I have stated before, if it came to
a vote, I should probably vote for it. But,
Mr. President, in evaluating actions
which will help bring us out of the Viet-
nam war, I value repeal of the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution as of the first priority
I respectfully submit that if those who
are interested in peace for the United
States will analyze the situation care-
fully, as I shall now try to do, they will
come to the same conclusion. The lobby-
ing should have been directed to that in
my view.
There may be many arguments about
the effect upon the President in his ca-
pacity as the spokesman of the United
States in foreign policy-and that is un-
questioned in our history-inherent in
directing him to quit a given place and
a given war because we withhold the
money. There can be no question about
the utilization by the Congress of its au-
thority, acknowledged by President
Johnson when he signed the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution, that when he thought
it was no longer needed, or when we
thought it was no longer needed, it could
be terminated. This is, therefore, an ad-
mitted, uncomplicated, unprejudicial as-
sertion of congressional authority.
We find it is no longer desirable to
have on the books this authority from
us for the President to wage war in
Asia and, therefore, we take it off the
books. Really, that is the end-of-the-
war resolution. That is the critical point.
Really, then, what we are enacting to-
day, hopefully, is the end-of-the-war
resolution.
Now, what happens if that resolution
is off the books? I say this to my col-
leagues also with an eye to the other
body. Their concurrence also is re-
quired with respect to repeal of the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution, and apparently
they are concerned. We saw that just
yesterday in respect of the highly de-
sirable, long-debated, and historic
achievement of Senators COOPER and
CHURCH here on the floor. They are our
brothers on the other side. Apparently
they are very reluctant to invoke the
ultimate remedy of cutting off money
and giving the President directions. That
is what it really comes down to, because
if he cannot finance it., then he cannot
do what he believes may be in the best
interests of our country.
This is a tough one, I agree. But, none-
theless, there can be no question, if they
too agree that it is done to get out, and
that is all this comes down to. They,
too, would agree without any of the
reservations which are implied under di-
rections of the President that, having
the authority by law signed by the Pres-
ident to signal the point at which we
think it is time to get out, this is the
way to do it. This is completely unpre-
judiced in terms of the foreign policy
powers of the President. It is not an
invocation,. as it were, of a mandatory
authority-to wit, "We out off the money
unless you obey our orders"--but it is
rather the exercise of discretion, the act
of our wisdom, based upon a complete
legislative authority in which the Presi-
dent joined with us in giving us that
power.
So, I repeat, I know that perhaps in
the press and in the media, perhaps even
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
July 10, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S11023
in the minds of. many Senators on this
floor, this Gulf of Tonkin termination is
somewhat perfunctory. I do not want to
shake a big thing of it and lose any votes,
but I deeply believe, in the perspective
of history and the law-I shall analyze
the law, but will not detain my col-
leagues too long-this action is the "end
of the war resolution."
Now, Mr. President, a word about the
law, since that is very significant and
very important.
There is no real deficiency, Mr. Presi-
dent, in the definition of the legal powers
of Congress as they relate to warmaking,
or any dearth of interpretation of those
powers. What has really occurred is that,
for 40 years, since President Franklin D.
Roosevelt. utilized the Executive author-
ity in putting troops into Iceland and in
the so-called destroyers-for-bases deal,
Congress has been willing to forego its
responsibility, to abdicate its responsi-
bility, and to allow the Executive essen-
tially to carry on the warmaking power
in its modern tense. It is only in the most
adverse circumstances, such as Pearl
Harbor, that Congress has utilized its
In addition, Mr. President, there was
for a long time an absence of refinement
of the proposition that Congress did not
have only the warmaking power, which it
could exercise through a declaration of
war, but that it also could exercise the
warmaking power through other parts of
the Constitution, including its authority
over the Armed Forces of the. United
States in terms of their Government as
well as in terms of their financing and'in
terms of their disposition, .other than
their tactical disposition, which was up
to the President as Commander in, Chief.
Now, Mr. President, because of the
terribly disillusioning experience of the
Vietnam war, we are, at long last, go-
ing into this area; and, as in every war-
and there is a war in .Congress, too;
there is lots of shot and shell and confu-
sion here-somehow a line of action
emerges. That line of action is now be-
coming clear. The action that we will
take today is the important, and, I think
decisive turning point in respect to it.
The action taken on the original
Church-Cooper amendment with respect
to Laos and the action taken on the
Church-Cooper amendment with respect
to Cambodia were really defensive in
their nature. They sought to limit the
theater of war.. They sought to avoid
peripheral actions which threatened to
expand the theater of war and to expand
America's exposure. They were abso-
lutely right, and they were , absolutely
essential; and I believe that the objec-
tives which were sought have, in sub-,
stance, been accomplished.
Now we get to the main show, which is
the Vietnam war. The ?question js now,
first, what are the legal relationships,
and second, once we settle the legal
relationships, what should be our policy?
Gulf of Tonkin termination is critical
to clearing the books of any residual
legal authority we have given the Pres
ident. Qnce the books are cleared-that
Is why I speak today with an. eye to the
other body, which is reluctant to move
into this field except in a very orderly
way and a way which is justified by the
precedents-and I believe that the ter-
mination of Gulf of Tonkin is fully jus
tifie-i by the precedents-once we have
Gulf of Tonkin off the books, then only
the constitutional authority of each
body remains. We have ours, the Presi-
dent has his. I think it is only f air to
say, in all deference to the view of the
President, that he himself, through the
Secretary of State, said on December 23,
in a press conference; We have not re-
lied on the Tonkin Gulf resolution par-
ticularly. We were faced with a situa-
tion when we came in office in Vietnam,
and I am not sure the legalities are all
that important.
Also, the President himself has said,
in his most recent presentation to the
country, in the interview which he had
with TV commentators, that the legal
basis for his action is his power as Com-
mander in Chief. When he came in, there
was a war, and it was his responsibility
to deal with forces at war. He did not put
them at war, they were at war.
The implication is clear that he is not
proceeding on the authority of Gulf of
Tonkin. I think that is-fine. I have no de-
sire for us to have a tug of war with the
President. It is much better if we do not.
Therefore, I think the road is clear to
terminate Gulf of Tonkin and put the
President and ourselves on even basis as
to. our respective constitutional author-
ity.
The next question is, Then what? I
believe we face two new propositions.
First, shall we express our satisfaction
with the rate at which the President is
now exercising his constitutional author-
ity to liquidate the war and withdraw
our forces? Or, should we endeavor to
interpose our ideas in that regard? And
the final question is, Shall we endeavor
to do a better job than we have up to now
in respect of making clear the respective
constitutional powers of both the-Presi-
dent and Congress hereafter-and I em-
phasize that word=in respect of making
war. In view of the speed with which
modern emergencies break, and of the
fact that it seems highly unlikely that
we will, at least in cold blood, utilize the
declaration of war power, because of its
invidious aspects, as raised in interna-
tional law and embargoes, such a new
clarification is required.
I have endeavored to deal with this
final step myself by. the introduction of
a bill S. 3964. I hope very much other
Senators will deal with it, or use their
minds and ideas in respect to it. I intro-
duced my bill, S. 3964, on June 15.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. JAVITS; I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has
made a very fine statement., He has a,
great reputation as a layer and former
attorney general of the' State of New
York, and I know we are all interested
in his views about our Constitution and
how it applies in our present difficulties.
What prompted me to ask the Senator
to say a few words further about it was
that he made mention of the speed of
modern life. That, seems to imply that, in
some way, we should modify the Consti-
tution, and should accept some form of
updated interpretation of it.
The. Committee on Foreign Relations
asked former Under Secretary of State
Katzenbach about the Constitution, and
he more or less said the war power is ob-
solete, presumably because of the devel-
opment of modern technology. This
bothers me a good deal.
There is no idea in my mind-and I
do not think there is in the mind of the
Senator from New York-that the Pres-
ident at any time lacks the power to re-
spond to any kind of attack. He can al-
ways respond to an attack. I do not, how-
ever, see that the alleged need of speed
in instances other than response to a
sudden attack should govern our inter-
pretation of the Constitution-or serve as
an excuse to reinterpret the Constitution.
The decisions we are talking about are
not of that character.
The alleged incidents in the Gulf of
Tonkin did not require, under any cir-
cumstances I can imagine, an immediate
response. As a matter of fact, the Pres-
ident had already responded when the
resolution was put before Congress. He
had already ordered the attack. The at-
tack had already taken place upon the
mainland of North Vietnam. He asked us
to approve what he had done and then
add, as a plus, that in the future he
might do these things at his discretion.
I hope the Senator will demolish the
idea that, because airplanes fly fast or
because television is instantaneous, we
should modify the provisions of the Con-
stitution and now say that Congress no
longer has a role to play in warmaking.
I do not think that is true. I think that
is an injection into this matter of an
idea that has no place in it, because no-
body contests that if we are attacked by
missiles or in any other way, the Presi-
dent has-and has always had-the au-
thority to respond, that is quite different
from going 10,000 miles away with 500,-
000 troops and making war.
Mr. JAVITS. I thoroughly, agree with
the Senator. That is best evidenced by
the fact that it took some 6 months to
deploy some 500,000 troops in Vietnam.
That could not be done overnight, not-
withstanding modern means.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. As a matter of fact,
he .did not even begin within 6 months,
because he presented the Tonkin resolu-
tion as a means of avoiding having to
deploy any troops. That was the stated
purpose of the resolution as he presented
it to the&nate.
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator from Ar-
kansas has always been very realistic
about that, and it is to his credit and
character as a man. He has always stood
up for the proposition that he, too, as
the rest of us-I join in that fully, in
responsibility-was taken in by the fact
that at a moment when a President who
might be facing unforeseen eventualities
came to us and said, "Show your con-
fidence in me and in our country by giv-
ing me the broadest possible powers, and
I will use them with great discretion."
We did not doubt our President. We gave
him the broadest possible powers.
A number of Senators-Senator NEL-
SON, Senator COOPER, Senator FULBRIGHT,
I, and others-observed that it was a
Approved For Release'2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 S 11024
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD '-SENATE July 10, 1970
blank check; but we were, under the cir-
curnstances, asserting our confidence in
the American system. That confidence
,turned out, unhappily for us and even
for President Johnson, to have been very
much misplaced. It just shows that you
do not always do a fellow a favor when
you give him a broad mandate of power.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Exactly. It would
have been a great favor to him as a
leader if, instead of taking that course,
we had had the wisdom to say, "Now,
look, this Is all very well; but we're going
to have full hearings. We want a report
from the field."
It never occurred to me that the events
in the Gulf of Tonkin could have been
misrepresented. It was so forcefully rep-
resented by the highest officials-the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff-that it
did not occur to me that this could not
have happened as it was reported to have
happened.
There is no use again saying that I
was mistaken, and that it was a great
mistake not only on my part but also on
the part of the Senate.
I commend the Senator from New
York for having introduced a resolution
which will be the vehicle for examination
of future policies. That is a, very proper
and timely thing to do. It has been said
often that, because of modern technology
and the rapidity of communications, for
some reason we must let ourselves be led
down the road of abandoning the Con-
stitution. I do not see that these have
anything to do with the constitutional
question. I cannot think of one situation
right now-in modern times, at least--to
which this would have any application
at all. If the Russians or anybody else
fires a missile at us, there is nothing in
the Constitution that anybody now or in
the past would claim would prevent the
President from responding.
Mr. JAVITS. Not only to respond, but
it is also his duty to respond.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the other hand,
I certainly do not want this modern tech-
nology to be interpreted to mean that,
when the President so chooses, any day
he wakes up and feels in a bad humor,
he can fire weapons off without any au-
thority or without even the knowledge of
Congress.
This is what really bothers me about
Cambodia. The expansion of the idea
that, as Commander in Chief, he can go
into a new country without even notify-
ing-much less asking the approval of-
Congress, or the Senate, raises a very
serious question in my mind. I do not
want to precipitate an argument now
about the character of the sanctuaries.
Let us consider this for the purpose of
illustration, without trying to accuse the
President of having done anything im-
proper, Let us consider it only as a recent
illustration of an action which can cer-
tainly be interpreted to be an attack or
an incursion upon a neutral country with
which we had been at peace. I do not see,
simply because the President wants to act
quickly or surreptitiously, that this could
possibly or reasonably be interpreted as
.justification for ignoring the Constitu-
tion.
Mr. JAVITS. There is no question
about the fact that the powers of the
Commander in Chiief, as interpreted by
us currently and as interpreted, I think,
by the highest constitutional experts,
currently reserve in the President the
full authority to deal with the repulse of
any attack or even grave endangerment
of the United States or of the security of
our forces, wherever deployed, provided
this does not imply committing ourselves
by the same channel in which we were
committed to a war in Vietnam.
All it amounts to is an accommodation
between the President and Congress
that, where the exigencies of the security
of the country really require, in substan-
tive fact, a rapid response or an -auto-
lnatic response by the President, he has
complete authority-indeed, the duty-
to make it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Exactly.
Mr. JAVITS. But at the moment when
the interposition of Congress becomes
possible because it is clear that this is
going to be much more protracted, more
involved, will have more forces at stake,
and perhaps involve broader dangers-a
major war or something like that-it is
equally the duty of Congress to interpose
itself and the duty of the President to see
that Congress is interposed.
I can see no inconsistency between
carrying out those powers and the pro-
visions of the bill :1 have introduced. In
fact, my bill makes all this explicit. As
the Senator has said, it is a vehicle for
inquiry and exploration. My standard of
judgment was to define the areas we are
talking about in which the President
could respond. immediately, and then to
set a 30-day limit as being an arbitrary
figure, but which would still -take care
of all urgent contingencies before Con-
gress must get into it or authority is
canceler}.
Others may have better or different
ideas, but this does not change anything
in the Constitution, It only enforces what
is already contained in the Constitution.
We have the right to make appropriate
laws and the President will have to join
its in signing it, or we will have to over-
ride his veto. But it is entirely suscepti-
ble of being made the subject of law, as
I have atteQaped to do in S. 3964.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Finally, I want to
ask one other question and to invite the
comment of the Senator from New York
on a proposition that has grown up in
matters of foreign affairs especially re-
lating to the war powers. The idea has
grown, as spelled out by Mr. Katzenbach,
that Congress should not seek to inter-
vene. Really, it was Dean Acheson, in his
famous statement of 1951, which was re-
produced in the report of the Foreign
Relations Committee on - the national
commitments resolution. Mr. Acheson
said in 1951 said that Congress has no
right to interfere with the President's
discretion in the use of the Armed Forces.
It is interesting to see how the idea
has grown up that, due to modern tech-
nology, Congress no longer has any role
to play.
What has interested me is how, in do-
mestic affairs, as evidenced recently by
a rather unusual overriding of a veto,
Congress is not a bit reluctant or hesi-
tant to exercise its authority.
I think that, in the Constitution, the
power of Congress to declare war, to
raise and support armies, and to make
regulations pertaining to the Armed
Forces is just as explicit, if not much
more so, than some of our powers in do-
mestic affairs-especially when we get
into the welfare area, where congres-
sional authority is not explicit at all, so
far as the Constitution is concerned.
That has been a matter of interpretation.
It seems strange to me that Senators
or Representatives, who all work hard
to be elected-which means that they
wish to play a part in the Government
of this country-seem to be eager to re-
linquish their authority or the role that
they are to play in foreign affairs, but
not in domestic affairs.
For the record, let me read what Dean
Acheson said in 1951. It shows how far
things went. He, of course, was con-
sidered to be an able lawyer as well as
Secretary of State:
Not only has the President authority to
use armed forces in carrying out the broad
foreign policy of the United States and in
implementing treaties, but. it is equally clear
that this authority may not be interfered
with by the Congress In the exercise of
powers which it has under the Constitution.
That is a broad statement which is
extremely misleading.
I wonder, would the Senator from New
York comment on why some Senators,
and Members of Congress seem to be
more than eager not to play a role or
take any part in foreign relations, as
opposed to domestic relations. This
seems especially incongruous when we
look back over the past 20 years, or since
World War II, and note that the country
has expended more than one thousand
billion dollars on military affairs, far
more than it has spent on education,
health, and many other activities that
need improvement. Yet, they seem to
want to relinguish their authority in
the field of foreign affairs. Why? This is
a peculiar psychology, a phenomenon I
do not understand, and I should like to
ask the distinguished Senator from New
York to comment on it.
Mr. JAVITS. My feeling is, having
forfeited their authority for 40 years
because of the alleged complexity of the
world, it has grown to be built in. The
only privilege Congress reserved to itself
was the privilege of being for or against
the President because he was or was not
doing what they thought the country
needed.
I thought the events of the past four
decades brought Congress to this pass,
and that the Vietnam war, when it went
wrong-as it is did-finally encouraged
Congress to reassert the authority which
it always had and could have asserted
at any time.
As a lawyer, I believe that I could in-
terpret what Dean Acheson said in 1951
in such a way as to let him out of the im-
plication the Senator from Arkansas
reads into it. I could construe his words
as having meant that Congress should
do nothing. while the :President is neg-
otiating or is speaking with the heads of
governments, and so forth, to undercut
him in terms of the President's author-
ity, prestige, and so forth, rather, to be
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 July 10, 1970Approved For E 2ppp Lp~/ ? CIA-}~DP72-00337R000300070029-8 S 11025
~~ ;RE55 ONA RE_ORD SF1~TATE
careful when they listen to him, to feel hot war. He said that the Congress had the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong.
that he speaks the views of the country. empowered him to proceed. Those are two of the three conditions
I do not think that is necessarily so. But When I first read the resolution be- the President has set.
Dean Acheson was going much further fore its adoption, I thought it was simply . Vietnamization is the readiness of the
than that, because he was talking to the giving the President a right he already South Vietnamese forces to take over.
Congress. He, was saying to it, "Foreign had; that is, to protect our ships in the Now we see them thinned out and spread
affairs is the business of the Executive. Gulf of Tonkin in international waters. into Cambodia which was never con-
Your business is, to vote us the dough When section 2 was added, I was sur- templated by Vietnamization. This makes
when we ask you for it," prised. I am sure that the distinguished it absolutely indeterminable. When will
That is the exclusivist view of thepres- Senator from Arkansas remembers that they be ready? Are they doing, as we
idency which I. think by now is out of I discussed the matter with him on the lawyers say, everything reasonably nec-
date. We could probably get Dean Ache- floor, and I thought then that it was a essary to make them ready? All of these
son to agree with us on that today. declaration of war and asked why was things are left up in the air,
Thus, I do not think it is any longer it necessary to go that far. Even if they are ready, they might
germane as to our colleagues. I think. I was informed, as I remember-and decide tomorrow to have an expedition
this terrible vale of tears through which if I am not stating it correctly, I wish into Laos or North Vietnam or Commu-
we have passed has been a salutary the Senator from Arkansas would chal- nist China. They would then be less ready
"waker-upper" as to what is really our lenge me-that the purpose of the reso- than ever.
responsibility. So_ far as this country is. lution was simply recognizing the right Now, concerning the degree of force
concerned, they will not let us off the of the President to defend our ships in used by North Vietnam and the Viet
hook just because for 40 years we yielded international waters; that he could do Cong against our forces we have never
that authority to the President. That is whatever he thought was necessary for hesitated to bomb the sites of antiair-
whatit comes down to. that purpose. When I raised the question craft weaponry directed at our airplanes.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr.,President, I re- of its application to our land forces, I They can intensify that and we could go
gret that I was.not here to listen to all was informed at the time that although back to the bombardment of North Viet-
the arguments made by my good friend this language was written into the res- nam. We would then once again be in
from New York in respect to the repeal olution, yet the President did not intend over our ears. Moreover, the alleged
of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, As I told to use it, but it was smiply to back him potential threat of a later attack against
my respected friend from Arkansas on up in his efforts to try to obtain some our forces in Vietnam was cited as a jus-
several occasions, I would almost give settlement of the issues involved. With tification for attacking into Cambodia.
my right arm had I persisted in the that understanding, I dropped the idea We are now under the necessity, it
adoption of the amendment that I ,pro- of my amendment to the resolution and seems to me, of clearing doubts concern-
posed to section 2 of the Gulf of Tonkin took it for granted that the President ing residual authority which, if the Pres-
resolution, I felt that portions of section would simply use it for the protection of ident wished to invoke it-and he said
2 were really and truly a declaration of our rights in international waters, that he does not, but he could if he
war. My desire was to strike from it the Mr. JAVITS. The Senator from Lou- wished to-would leave us in a position
power of the President to use our armed isiana has asked me two questions. of being absolutely unable to determine
forces as he determined, One, the Senator says are we not try- when to get out of Vietnam.
What are we going to gain by repealing ing to lock the barn door after the horse it is necessary to clear the books of
the resolution? has gone- that. And if we are not satisfied with
Mr. JAVITS, What we will .gain is to Mr. ELLENDER. We cannot efface his- the pace of the withdrawal, we may be
clear the books of any residual authority tory. It has been done. able to do a good deal about it. But so
given to the President pursuant to the Mr. JAVITS. Right. I will answer that. long as this resolution is on the books,
Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which has no Second, was not the method of giving it seems to me that we are inhibited.
termination date except as it may be the President, by section 2, a much Our hands are tied. We have given the
declared by the -President or maybe broader- authority than he really needed President the authority and taken it
declared by us. at the time? away from ourselves. We should now re-
Mr. ELLENDER. As the Senator from I will answer the second part first. Of store our ability or capability. In the
Arkansas stated awhile ago, the Presi- course, it was much broader. Of course, strict military sense, we may not actual-
dent had already acted; our troops were the Senator from Louisiana has divined ly exercise any power, but we would re-
in South Vietnam, when the resolution exactly why it was much broader. It was store to ourselves the right to do so by
was adopted. He already had some of an effort to inspire confidence in the this concurrent resolution.
our Armed Forces there to do our bidding. country and the world by showing how That is why we consider this matter
What we were doing was merely saying much confidence we had in our Presi- to be so critically important.
to the President, "Do what you think is dent. Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, does
necessary with our Armed Forces to pro- Mr. ELLENDER. And to also get the the Senator believe that President John-
tect the integrity of South Vietnam in Congress involved in backing him, son had the right to do what he actually
giving the people a chance to choose That is what the President was after, did before the resolution was enacted?
their own government. Go to war if Mr. JAVITS. Exactly right. So we give Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I think
necessary, we are with you." him a broad mandate to "assist any mem- President Johnson had the right if there
We cannot restore the situation. We ber or protocol state of the Southeast Asia was an attack on U.S. naval forces to
cannot simply erase history. The Presi- collective defense treaty requesting as- act to prevent further attack or to pun-
dent had already acted before the Gulf sistance in defense of its freedom." Ish those who had attacked, by reason of
of Tonkin resolution was adopted and The other question concerns whether his power as Commander in Chief. That
the resolution sanctified what he had we are not locking the door after the is all he had the right to do.
done, and we gave him authority to pro- horse has gone. There I say definitely Mr. ELLENDER. I agree. Mr. Presi-
ceed with our Armed Forces as he de- no, and for this reason. The President dent, I do not believe he had the right
termines. has stated, "I am going to get out of to do more, except through the Con-
I am sure that the Senator remembers, Vietnam, but on my own timetable, which gress. I doubt if many Senators felt that
not too long after the Gulf of Tonkin I am not acquainting you with in the this resolution went beyond that point,
resolution was enacted, that the Presi- Foreign Relations Committee, and on that is, to protect our ships in interna-
dent sent for us. He talked to all of us certain conditions." tional waters, until they began to read
in groups, composed of about one-third Those conditions are three. First, prog- and study the resolution.
of the Senate in each group. When I ress in the Paris peace talks-obviously I thought it dealt solely with the situ-
was present, I discussed the resolution nil. Conditions two and three, however, ation that had developed in the Tonkin
with hiwn, in the presence of others and are very trying in a very substantive way. Gulf, But on the day the resolution was
I said that in my opinion he was going The second condition is Vietnamiza- considered and I read section 2-and
too far in the light of promises made tion. particularly the last four lines of that
before the resolution was adopted. I felt The third condition is the degree of section -I felt that it was really and
that we would soon be engaged in a real force expended against our forces by truly a declaration of war.
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-0A337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
S :[1026 C:oNG SSft7gAt 1 ECOltb SENATE Ja{ly 10, 1970
Notwithstanding that, the Senate voted Mr. ELLENDER. Does the Senator Mr. ELLENDER. Wh makes the de-
to give the President that power. And, as mean when wai- is actually going on? cision?
I have said, now that there has been a Mr. JAVXT"S. That is right, when it Is Mr. JAVITS. We are going to make it
fat aecomili, I still think the President going on. Otherwise, when do we un- when we repeal this authority. When he
has the right to protect the soldiers that declare it? no longer has the Guli of Tonkin au-
were there and those he sent there later Mr. ELLENDER. When it is com- thority he is remandec'=. to his position
by virtue of the resolution. pleted, when the President, our Com- under the Constitution, which I have
Mr.JAVITS. The Senator Is absolutely mander in Chief, so decides. tried to define.
right about the fact that he has the right Mr. JAVITS. I am sorry. I do not be- Mr. ELLENDER. And his duty here
to protect the soldien. and that he has Bove the President alone can determine after is to terminate the war as soon as
the right to pull them out. But he does the lives and the future of his country- possible and get the troops out?
not have the right under the guise of men by being the sole decider of when to Mr. JAVITS. Consistent with the secu-
protecting the soldiers without congres- terminate the war. rity of American troops. The reason is
sional authority to broaden the theater of That is the real issue here. And that that this was has now gone long beyond
the war or the commitment; he does not is not under the Constitution, in my the point of replying to an attack. It is
have the right to leave them in at his jidgment, the exclusive power of the a question solely of, Shad we be at war?
sole discretion when leaving them in con- President. That is a power that he shares That decision, without a declaration of
tinues to Involve the United States in a with the Congress, consistent with the war, is riot in the hand., of the President
broad-scale war. i security of the troops under his com- alone. He has authority in concluding
The only way we can demonstrate that mand. When the Mansfield Commander the war but he cannot, in effec, make a
as a matter of law is by clearing the in. Chief amendment to Cooper-Church war.
books, as the Senator says, of the very was agreed to and when the one I of- Mr. ELLENDER. Suigpose, in trying
resolution which gives him that au- fered about Congress power was agreed to withdraw American forces from
thority. to. unanimously, that stated the issue very South Vietnam, something should hap-
If he continues to invoke this power, we clearly. pen in Cambodia whereby the North
say, "Mr. President, you say you don't Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, is the Vietnamese and the Viet Cong or maybe
want this. Fine; we don't want it either. Senator telling us that if war should be the Cambodians might turn against us.
Let us take it off the books." This is the declared and the Congress takes action Is the Senator saying; the President
"end of the war" resolution in my judg- to declare a war or sanctions it, that the would not have the right to proceed?
merit. - Congress can in tarn terminate it at Mr. JAVITS. I am not saying that.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, that will by a resolution'? When it comes to protecting the lives
is what President Nixon contends. I do Mr. JAVITS. Consistent with the of American troops, he could even go
not suppose that President Johnson security of our troops. into Cambodia in "hot pursuit." I have
would have said that, because most of the Mr. ELLENDER. Who is to determine always said that.
fighting was started wader his admin- that? President Nixon's mistake with respect
istration. Mr. JAVITS. The President is to deter- to Cambodia was that he made a big
I am proud to say that I was In South mine that later, international issue a.bo.rt going in, lead.-
Vietnam at least four times before we Mr. ELLENDER. Of course. Our Com- ing us to believe he was ambivalent about
became engaged in this war. And I begged mander in Chief must make the decision. it, that, he did not know, for sure, if he
President Eisenhower and Secretary Mr. JAVITS. If I may finish. Another was going in to prop up the government
John Foster Dulles not to send trainers important point of that the matter of in Cambodia or to protect the lives of
to train troops there and not to make it consistency with the security of our American troops whirr. were seriously
possible for us to develop an army there troops Is not a coterminous decision with threatened on their flank.
for the use of Diem. the President's decision as to when the Mr. ELLENDER. Is it the Senator's
I well remember that when I was In- war is to be over. view that by repealin?; this resolution,
voted to the White House a few days after Mr. JAVITl3. It is only coterminous that it amounts to an order from Con-
this resolution was enacted as I previous- if he is as resolved as we are to termin- gress for the President to end the war?
ly stated, I took issue with the President. gate that war. Then the decision with Mr. JAVITS. I would not say it is an
And we got into quite a hot debate. The respect to conditions for terminating order. I would only express my judg-
Senator from Montana (Mr. M)kNSFrEI.n) , and withdrawal is a decision relating to ment as to where the Constitution at
I believe, was there. I told the President their security; but it is not the substan- that point leaves the President. It is not
In no uncertain terms that what he was tive decision that we are getting at. It an order. I am glad it is not an order. I
doing was contrary to what was repre- is not his decision alone. For, if that is am very reserved about such an order. I
sented to us before the resolution was the case, then we have lost the power as am not a cosponsor rlec not parties is
pendence. It is a declaration of principles nt.sm.
and does-not require the advice and consent As I stated in my address to the Nation on the treaty. While a special relationship ought.
of the Senate. September 15, the unity envisaged by the to prevail as between those countries which
There is further transmitted for the in- treaty is something that the United States together assume serious commitments, the
formation of the Senate the report madcr-to has long sought. In 1951, on behalf of the treaty countries are fully aware of the fa-
me by the Secretary of State regarding the preceding administration, I negotiated portance from an economic standpoint of
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and security treaties with Australia and such nations as Japan, Indonesia, Burma,
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
July 10, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD `-SENATE
Ceylon, India, Formosa, and other areas in
the Far East and South Asia area. Article III
does not preclude our continued economic
cooperation with theseand other countries
whose economic welfare is deemed important
to the stability of the treaty area as well as
to our own well-being.
Article IV contains some of the most im-
portant provisions of the treaty. It sets forth
any measures by which the parties agree to
take action against armed aggression and
against the danger of subversion and indirect
aggression.
Under paragraph 1 of that article each of
the parties recognizes that "aggression by
means of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the Parties or against any
State or territory which the Parties by unani-
mous agreement may hereafter designate,
would endanger its own peace and safety,
and agrees that it will in that event act
to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes." That lan-
guage is based upon the Monroe Doctrine
principle and follows the pattern of other
United States security treaties in the Pacific.
Each party recognizes in article IV, para-
graph 1, that the armed attack referred to
therein would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety.
In the case of the United States, only a
Communist armed attack can bring that
treaty provision into operation. The under-
standing of the United States in this respect
is embodied In the treaty itself. It reads as
follows :
"The United States of America in executing
the present Treaty does so with the under-
standnig that its recognition of the effect of
aggression and armed attack and its agree-
ment with reference thereto in Article IV,
paragraph 1, apply only to communist ag-
gression but affirms that in the event of
other aggression or armed attack it will con-
sult under the provisions of Article IV, para-
graph 2."
This understanding reflects the special po-
sition of the United States as the only one
of "the signatories which does not have any
territory in the treaty area. For the other
signatories the treaty deals with any and all
acts of aggression which might ? disturb the
peace of the area. For the United States,
however, it is- expressly stipulated that the
only armed attack which the United States
would regard as necessarily dangerous to our
peace and security would be a Communist
armed attack. Recognition that Communist
arm:ecl aggression in Southeast Asia would in
fact endanger the peace and security of, the
United States, and call for counteraction by
the United States, is based on the realization
that the spread of international communism
poses a threat to the United States as it does
to the entire free world.
The language of paragraph 1 also provides
for designation, by unanimous agreement, of
other states or territories an armed attack
against which will result in bringing certain
of the treaty provisions into operation. I
'recommend that you inform the Senate that
this provision is to be interpreted as requir-
ing the advice and consent of the United
States Senate to any agreement making such
a designation.
The agreemnt of each of the partie~s to
act to meet the Common danger "in acc'bed-
ance with its constitutional processes'.' leaves
to the judgment of each country the type of
action to be taken in the event an armed at-
tack occurs. There~is, of course, a wide range
of defensive measures which might be ap-
propriate depending upon the circumstances.
Any action which the United States might
take would, of course, be in accordance with
its constitutional processes.
Provision is made in the final sentence of
the paragraph for reporting the measures
taken against armed aggression to the Se-
eurity Council of the United Nations In ac-
cordance with the obligation of the parties
under article 51 of the United Nations
Charter.
The danger from subversion and indirect
aggression is dealt with in paragraph 2 of
article IV, which meets this difficult problem
more explicitly than any other security
treaty we have made. It provides for immedi-
ate consultation by the parties whenever any
party believes that the integrity of the treaty
area is threatened by other than .armed at-
tack. The threat may be to the territorial in-
violability or integrity, or to the sovereignty
or political independence of any party in the
treaty area or any other state or territory to
which paragraph 1 of the article may from
time to time apply. The paragraph contains
no obligation beyond consultation, but the
purpose of consultation is to agree on meas-
ures to be taken for the common defense. In
its understanding with reference to article
IV, paragraph 1, the United States affirms
that in the event of any aggression or armed
attack other than Communist aggression it
will observe the consultation provisions of
article IV, paragraph 2.
Paragraph 3 affirms the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples pro-
claimed by the treaty signatories in the Pa-
cific Charter. It states the understanding of
the parties that, except at the invitation or
consent of the government concerned, no
action shall be taken on the territory of any
state designated under paragraph 1 or on any
territory so designated.
To facilitate implementation of the treaty,
article V establishes a Council, on which
each party is to be represented. The Council
will provide for consultation with regard to
military and other planning as the changing
situation in the treaty area may require.
No material changes in the military plan-
ning of the United States will be required
by our participation in the Council, At pres-
ent, United States plans call for maintaining
at all times powerful naval and air forces in
the Western Pacific capable of striking at any
aggressor by means and at places of our
choosing. As I explained at the Manila Con-
ference, the responsibilities of the United
States are so vast and farflung that we be-
lieve we would serve best not by earmarking
forces for particular areas of the Far East but
by developing the deterrent of mobile strik-
ing power plus strategically placed reserves.
The Conference accepted that viewpoint, rec-
ognizing that the deterrent power 'we thus
create can protect many as effectively as it
protects one. However, other treaty members
may deem it desirable to make their contri-
bution toward strengthening the defense of
the area by specific force commitments for
that purpose.
Article VI makes clear that the obligations
of the parties under the treaty do not affect
in any way their obligations under the
United Nations Charter. It recognizes the
primary responsibility of the United Nations
in maintaining international peace and se-
curity. Each party, declares that it has no ex-
isting international obligations in conflict
with the treaty and undertakes not to enter
into any international engagements in con-
flict with it.
Article VII takes into account that not all
countries whose interests now or in the fu-
ture may be bound up with the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty are In a posi-
tion to become parties at this time. It ac-
cordingly provides that the parties, by unani-
mous agreement, may invite any other state
in a position to further the objectives of the
treaty and to contribute to the security of the
area, to accede to the treaty at a later date.
I recommend that this article be inter-
preted as requiring the advice and consent
of the Senate for the United States to join
in the "unanimous agreement" required for
the invitation of new parties.
Article VIII defines the "treaty area" as
the general area of Southeast. Asia, including
the entire territories of the Asian parties, and
the general area of the Southwest Pacific not
including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees
30 minutes north latitude. Provision is made
S 11033
for amendment of the treaty area by unani-
mous agreement. On the part of the United
States, I recommend that Senate advice and
consent be required for such agreement.
Article IX assigns to the Republic of the
Philippines the customary duties as deposi-
tary of the treaty. Paragraph 2 provides that
the treaty shall be ratified and its provisions
carried out by the parties in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes. The
association of the United States in collec-
tive arrangements "by constitutional process"
was recommended by the Vandenberg reso-
lution and has been the basis for all of our
security treaties.
Paragraph 3 or article IX provides that de-
posit of ratifications by a majority of the
signatories shall bring the treaty Into force
between the states which have ratified it.
With respect to each other state it shall
come into force on the date of deposit of
its ratification.
According to article X the treaty has in-
definite duration, but any party may cease
to be a party 1 year after its notice of
denunciation has been given. It is hoped
that the cooperation for peace and security
which is the objective of this treaty will
be permanent. However, since the conditions
in the treaty area are subject to fluctuation,
a flexible provision in respect to duration
seems desirable.
Article XI is a formal article regarding the
authentic language texts of the treaty.
The protocol extends the benefits of ar-
ticles III and IV to the States of Cambodia
and Laos and the free territory under the
jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam. The
Indochina situation was considered by some
of the treaty signatories as creating ob-
stacles to these three pountries becoming
actual parties to the treaty at the present
time. By designating them as states or ter-
ritories for the purposes of article IV, the
protocol assures that armed attack or in-
direct aggresion against Cambodia, Laos, or
the territoy under Vietnamese jurisdiction
will bring into operation the obligations
of the parties under that article. It thus
throws over those new nations a certain
mantle of protection. The protocol also ex-
tends to those countries eligibility in re-
spect of the economic measures, including
technical assistance, contemplated by article
III. It thus recognizes that economic prog-
ress and social well-being in these areas are
essential to the economic welfare of the
whole area and a vital force in combating
the opportunities of communism.
In addition to the, treaty and protocol,
there was also drawn up and signed at the
Manila Conference a declaration known as
the Pacific Charter. The charter was the
idea of President Magsaysay of the Republic
of the Philippines, who emphasized the im-
portance of making clear that the treaty
signatories were seeking the welfare of the
Asian peoples and were not promoting
"colonialism." As I said in my opening
address to the Conference, one of com-
munism's most effective weapons is to pre-
tend that the Western Powers are seeking
to impose colonialism on the Asian people.
I said then that we must make abundantly
clear our intention to invigorate independ-
ence.
The Pacific Charter proclaims certain basic
principles in relation to the right of peoples
to self-determination, self-government, and
independence. It dedicates all the signa-
tories to uphold these principles for all
countries whose people desire it and are able
to undertake its responsibilities. In the
Pacific Charter the West and the East have
joined in a pledge of fellowship that supports
and invigorates the basic principles which
underlie the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty and protocol.
In view of the importance of the Southeast
Asia Collective IDefense. Treaty and protocol
as a deterrent to Communist and other ag-
gression and as a bulwark in the mainte-
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R0.00300070029-8
 S11-034
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE July 10, 1970
nance of peace and security in the Pacific
area, it is hoped that the treaty including
the understanding of the United States con-
tair,.ed therein, together with the protocol,
will be given early and favorable considera-
tion; by the Senate.
Respectfully submitted.
JoHN',F'OSTER DULLES.
(Enclosures: (1) Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty, (2) protocol, (3) Pacific
Charter.)
]2. Testimony of Secretary Dulles before the
Foreign Relations Committee in connec-
tion with the SEATO Treaty]
STATEMENT OF Hoc.JOHN POSTER DULLE3,
SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED SY ADM,
ARTHUR Cl. DAVIS, Dntzcron, OFFICE or FoE.-
EIGN MILITARY AFFAIR, OFFICE, SECRETARY
Or DEFENS7C
Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman and mem-
bers of the committee, let me first express,
on behalf of President Eisenhower and my-
self, my appreciation of the promptness with
which the committee has taken up this mat-
ter. The documents were transmitted only
yesterday by the President to the Senate,
and the fact that the committee is meeting
the next morning to deal with the treaty is,
perhaps, without precedent in Senate his-
tory. I believe that this expeditious handling
of the matter is fully justified by its Impor-
tance,
A SOLID COLLECTIVE-SACUAITY SYSTEM
This treaty, Mr. Chairman, as you have
indicated, represents a major further step in
the evolution of our policy to try to create
a solid collective-security system In the
Western Pacific area. That is a well-estab-
lished policy. It was the policy which ex-
isted under the preceding administration,
and which has been carried on by the pres-
ent administration.
When I went out to the Pacific area in
1950 to begin the negotiations which resulted
in the Japanese Peace Treaty and a series of
security treaties, the original hope had been
that we could have a fairly broad collectiVe
security arrangement. As it happened, it
was not possible to do that at that time,
and we were content perforce with a series
of treaties, the security treaty with Australia
and New Zealand, our mutual security pact
with the Philippines? and a security treaty
with Japan. But those treaties themselves in-
dicated that we did not regard them as as
end, but only as a beginning, because they re-
ferred to the fact that the treaties were made
pending the development of a more compre-
hensive system of security in the Pacific area.
Since then We have negotiated the treaty
with Korea.
The present treaty with Southeast Asia
its an element in that total picture which
we have long wanted to create.
When President Eisenhower made his first
notable address called "The Chance for
Peace" on April 16, 1953, he then advocated
"united action" for Southeast Asia. I pushed
for that quite vigorously during the net
year.
It turned out, naturally, that it was quite
difficult to complete a Southeast Asia pact
while the war in Indochina. was still active.
Nations, I think on the whole; like to tro
into these pacts on the theory that they are
deterrents to war rather than involvements
in a war. Furthermore, the Issues of the war
going on in Indochina were not entirety
clear.
So, while the United States would have
been willing to have made this pact earlier
in the hope that it would exercise a helpful
influence upon the negotiations at Geneva,
it did not prove practical to do it until after
the Geneva armistice agreements had been
made.
NEED FOR THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE FACT
The making of those armistice agreements
at Geneva did not, of course, end the need
for a pact. The need for the collective secu-
rity pact is indeed quite evident as a result
of many evidences of continuing aggressive
tendencies on the part of the Communists.
To name only a few of these things, I
could' mention the fact that there exists on
Chinese Communist soil a so-called "free
Thai" movement, which is designed to sub-
vert and overthrow the Government of
Thailand. In Vietnam the military forces in
the portion that has been conceded to the
Communists have been almost doubled since
the Geneva armistice.
In northern Lacs, two provinces are largely
dominated by the Communists who are in
revolt against or do not accept the authority
of the Government of Laos.
in Singapore there is continuing concern
as to the activities being conducted by the
Communists as against the large Chinese
population of Malaya. Most of those Chinese
are not themselves Communists, but they
are the subject of very vigorous propaganda
and subversive efforts being conducted by
small elements of Chinese Communists who
are extremely active at the present time in
that area.
In the Province of Yunan, China, where
there is no risk at all of any armed attack
against China, there is nevertheless main-
tained a very substantial military force by
the Red Chinese.
All of these facts, and others which I
could adduce, indicate that there persists an
aggressive intention on the part of the Chin-
ese Communists which belies their protesta-
tions of a desire for peace.
Therefore, the creed for this treaty exists
irrespective of the Geneva armistice. That fact
has been recognized by the nations who met
in the early part of September at Manila to
conclude the treaty which you are now con-
sidering. ,
APPRECIATION FOR SENATE COOPERATION
As I turn to that Manila conference, I
want to express on behalf of the President and
myself and the executive branch of Govern-
ment, our great appreciation for the coopera-
tion which was shown at that conference by
the Senate through two distinguished mem-
bers of your committee;, Senator Alexander
Smith and Senator Mansfield. They were
members of the delegation; they played an
active part In the negotiations and discus-
sions at Manila; and with me, under the au-
thority of the President, signed the treaty.
Senator Mansfield came to that conference
directly from Indochina, where he had spent
some little time, and he brought to the
Manila conference an appraisal of the situa-
tion in Indochina which was of great value
not only to the United States delegation but
to the delegates of the other countries that
were there.
MEMBER:i OF rI7E TREATY
The members of this treaty are, in addition
to the United States, the Philippines? Thai-
land, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand,
France, and the United Kingdom. We would
have been glad if there had been more mem-
bers, particularly Asian members, but the
treaty is open ended in that respect. There is
an invitation to other countries to join
the treaty, of which we hope in due course
they will avail themselves, with the concur-
rence of the present members, a prerequisite
for bringing in new members.
Nevertheless, the present membership of
the treaty Is Important, and I believe ade-
quate to build e, very substantial defense
against the menace to which I have referred.
In my report to the President, which went
up to the Senate yesterday and which you,
with commendable speed, have already
printed, I review in considerable detail the
various provisions of the treaty, and I will
not now attempt to duplicate what I there
said.
DISTINCIIVE ASPECTS Or THE TREATY
There are. however, certain rather distinc-
tive aspects of this treaty, as the chairman
has pointed out, to which I would briefly
allude.
Broadly speaking, the pati,ern of the treaty
is similar to the other Pacific treaties which
we have made. the Anzus Treaty, the Philip-
pine Treaty, the Korean Treaty, and so forth.
But there are differences.
The treaty area is defined not merely by
the treaty itself, but by a protocol to the
treaty which brings in Laos, Cambodia, and
the free portion of Vietnam as treaty terri-
tory which, if attacked, would be under the
protection of the treaty and Which, we hope,
the treaty will deter from being attacked.
Those nations themselves are not members
of the Manila Pact. The reason is that the
armistice provisions at Geneva at least raised
a question in the minds of some of the parties
to those agreements as to whether the As-
sociated States could actually join such a
pact. Nevertheless, those states welcomed the
fact that the mantle of protection of the
treaty was thrown around this area. This pro-
vision is one novel feature of the treaty.
A second novel feature of the treaty is the
fact that more than any other of our security
treaties it emphasizes the danger from sub-
version. It deals, of course, as other treaties
have, and in the same formula, which I call
the Monroe Doctrine forinuta, with an open
armed attack, and We belicae that what is
said in that respect will constitute a deter-
rent against such an open armed attack.
MOBILE STRIKING POWER
I might say in this connection, departing
somewhat from order of my presentation,
that it is not the policy of the United States
to attempt to deter attack In this area by
building up a local force capable itself of
defense against an all-our attack by the
Chinese Communists if it should occur. We
do not expect to duplicate in this area the
pattern of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization and its significant. standing forces.
That would require a diversion and commit-
ment of strength which we do not think is
either practical or desirable or necessary from
the standpoint of the United States.
We believe that our posture in that area
should be one of having mobile striking
power, and the ability to use that against the
sources of aggression if it occurs. We believe
that is more effective than if we tried to pin
down American forces at the many points
around the circumference of the Communist
world in that area.
It may very well be that other countries
of the area will want to dedicate particular
forces for the protection of the area under
this treaty. But we made clear at Manila
that it was not the intention of the United
States to build up a large local force in-
cluding, for example, United. States ground
troops for that area, but that we rely upon
the deterrent power of our mobile striking
force.
PROVISION TO PREVENT t,ND COUNTER
SUBVERSION
To go on now to the question of subversion,
as I pointed out, we deal with that in this
treaty more specifically than we have with
any other treaty. We recognize the danger
more clearly. I must admit that the mere fact
of recognizing the danger does not mean
that we automatically have found a way to
meet the danger. Subversion in that area is
a very difficult thing to combat. It is virulent,
it Is well organized, it is effectively prose-
cuted by trained persons, and the task of
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-003~37R000300070029-8 S 11035
July 10, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.- SENATE he area
tha meeting that threat will tax our resources ssies hould the local We hroveragreid that if there DIFFERENCE SET WEENTRNEA SAND SOUTHEAST ASIA area, we
and ingenuity to the utmost. What is the major differ-
One reason why I am very anxious to have would join with others in consultation to see I ence have between very few. SEATO, as this has been called,
ax them. But the,
this treaty that I hope considered this cam- what should be done IV, about
and NATO? In other words, do you anticipate
mutes is that es that t it will gsi hee provisions of article IedlaSth 1, would
that SEATO will develop along the lines of
the' only nly apply so o far as the United United States is con-
for us, perhaps even without t awaiting possible
final coming in force of the treaty, to have cerned in the event of Communist aggression. NATO with a joint military force under a
a meeting of the signatories to the treaty, THE PACIFIC CHAPTER joint commander and joint headquarters, and
at which we will begin to think of ways and As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, there will so forth?
might probably be other matters which the com- Secretary DULLES. There is a very sharp
ea subversion. ede available com- difference, which I think I suggested in my
means that
bat this terat o moment threat is mittee members will want to raise by way of statement, between what we contemplated
most ac at the moment t in Vietnam, but, question. I will conclude my opening state- under the Manila Pact, and the North At-
as I indicated, as there are threats of the same ment by one other reference, and that is to lantic Treaty.
character as to Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, the Pacific Chapter. That is a document
NATO, of course, is the North Atlantic
and Malaya; and Burma and Indonesia are which is not in the nature of a treaty, it is ourse that is what the "tic
not free from that danger. in the nature of a declaration which is im- Treaty "Organization";
Therefore, I think it is of the utmost im- portant in that it expressed by joint action stands for. That is not an inherent or nec-
ce that we should have an early meet- of so-called western colonial powers and the essary part of the treaty.
lug of
ing of the signatories in which we began to Asian powers, a common position with ref- As a matter of fact, when the North At-
think of ways and means to meet this sub- erence to self-determination and self-govern- lantic Treaty was before the Senate and the
versive threat which is recognized by the ment by the peoples of Asia. Senate consented to its ratification, there
treaty as being a particular danger in this This document was suggested by President was at that time no serious thought of creat-
aaea. Magsaysay an outstanding anti-Communist ing a North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Th t came as a later development.
together in economic matters. It is clear, He thought that it would be useful for the
and I want to reaffirm he, that this is not Conference to make what he called a Pacific
meant to and does not e e engage the United Charter declaration, affirming the intention
States to any particular program of vast eco- of all the parties to this treaty to work for
nomic aid. self-determination and self-government
As I sda be a press conference wHicli I .among the Asian peoples who wanted self-the of usefday before yesterday, sums possibility
economic government and were capable of exercising
money spending responsibilities.
money in this area rea vast has sut not ms s been demon- economic
e The negotiation of that agreement involved
that strated.
w we the had the Eu- situation considerable difficulty to reconcile the diver-
existed It isisted in Europe qn ewhere from
ropean recovery plan. That was a question of gent points of view of the former, and to
rehabilitating, reestablishing a pre-existing some extent, present, colonial powers and
industrial plant. People knew how to operate the Asian powers, and I think it was a nota-
it and were well versed in industrial life, and ble achievement that agreement was reached,
the problem was to recreate something that and that there was this declaration made in
had been destroyed. ringing terms which I think will go far to
In this part of the world the problem is to meet the Communist propaganda that the
create something that is totally new, and r East and West cannot operate for freedom.
am inclined to think that while the problem That document, by its psychological im-
certainly needs our very best thought, the pact, may have as great a force for sustain-
finding of ways and means to help is the Ing freedom in Asia as the treaty does itself.
most important first thing. The problem That document, as I say, is not one which
needs to be tackled first from that stand- requires any action by the Senate, because
point rather than the standpoint of first it is merely a declaration of policy, but it
appropriating vast sums of money and then has been transmitted the Senate because I
trying to think later on how it can be spent am confident that the Senate will be very
with advantage. happy that it was possible to make this
TREATY DEALS SPECIFICALLY WITH COMMUNIST declaration.
AGGRESSION It was no problem for the United States
There is at the end of the treaty a clause to make it because we said similar things
of significance to the United States, and that oftentimes before. It did involve certain
is a declaration that the armed aggression problems for some of the western powers,
which is referred to and which the United and the fact that they and the Asian powers
States declares would be dangerous to its own were able to agree is, I think, a very signifi-
peace and security would be Communist ag- cant fact.
gression. IMPORTANCE OF TREATY
There was considerable discussion at the So all together, Mr. Chairman, I believe
working group party at Manila which pre- that this treaty, coupled with the declaration
ceded the formal opening of the Conference, of policy represented by the Pacific Charter,
and at the Conference itself, as to whether marks an important forward step in building
the treaty, as a whole, should be exclusively security for freedom in the Pacific area.
directed against Communist aggression or I would not say that this represents the
whether it should deal with any form of consummation of all our hopes. There are
aggression. other steps which need to be taken. The
I pointed out at Manila that the United area needs to be bound together more closely
States was in a rather special position in that than it is now. All of that we are still working
respect because of the fact that we alone of on. But I hope that this treaty will commend
the treaty members did not have any terra- itself to your committee and to the Senate
tory of our own in the area that was in- for prompt approval because it does repre-
volved. Therefore, our concern with the area sent, in my opinion, at least, one very major
was not primarily with interarea quarrels, step in the evolution of a sound policy which
but only if there should be Communist ag- .the United States has had for that area for
gression. many years which, I think, should be per-
In fact, we had advocated that the treaty manent American policy, and which I think
should be limited to Communist aggression. still has a possibility of future evolution for
But other countries were unwilling to do
that; so the issue was resolved by the United good'
you.
States including in the treaty a declaration Thank that as far as it was concerned the open The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
aggression which we would regard as danger- We will now proceed in the usual way."I
ous to our peace and security would be Com- will ask you a few questions, and then I will
munist aggression. pursue the course that has heretofore been
This means that we are not similarly con- followed of permitting each member of the
cerned with what might be local contrwier- committee to ask you questions.
ECONOMIC CLAUSE figure, a very noble figure, who exerted a pro- a
The treaty has a brief economic clause found and benign influence on the whole in the case of the Manila Pact, we have
tried to avoid the use of the word "SEATO."
I did not use it in my presentation. It is not
in1the documents before us. We are trying
to get away from that word because it implies
a southeast Asia treaty organization com-
parable to the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization. That organization. is designed in
the case of the North Atlantic Treaty to
build up a defensive force on the Continent
of Europe which itself would be sufficient to
resist attack by the Red armies.
As I point out, that is not now the pur-
pose under this treaty. We do not intend to
dedicate any major elements of the United
States Military Establishment to form an
army of defense in this area. We rely primari-
ly upon the deterrent of our mobile strik-
ing power. That we made clear to our as-
sociates in the treaty, and that is our policy.
It would involve, in the opinion of our
military advisers-Admiral Davis is here and
can confirm that-it would involve an in-
judicious overextension of our military power
if we were to try to build up that kind of an
organization in southeast Asia.
We do not have the adequate forces to do
it, and I believe that if there should be open
armed attack in that area the most effec-
tive step would be to strike at the source of
aggression rather than to try to rush Amer-
ican manpower into the area to try to fight
a ground war. So that we do not intend,
Mr. Chairman, to have under this treaty any
such local combined forces as have been
created in Europe under the North Atlantic
Treaty, and which goes by the name of NATO.
TREATY CONSISTENT WITH PROVISIONS OF
U.N. CHARTER
The CHAIRMAN. You see nothing incon-
sistent here between this and the United
Nations? You think that the arrangement
that was made is consistent with the region-
al provisions in the United Nations Charter?
Secretary DULLES. I would say, Mr. Chair-
man, that it comes under the collective secu-
rity provisions of article 51 rather than the
regional provisions of article 52. Article 51
is a provision that nothing contained in the
charter shall deprive any of the states from
the individual or 'collective right of self-
defense. That is the provision we are opera-
ting under rather than the regional provi-
sion, one reason being that under a regional
organization, no enforcement measures can
be taken without the prior approval of the
Security Council, where the Soviet Union
has a veto, and we would not want to have
an organization where action could be
vetoed by the Soviet Union.
PACIFIC CHARTER
The CHAIRMAN. While you were in Manila,
you also signed the Pacific Charter uphold-
ing the principles of equal rights, self-
determination of peoples. Do you expect that
will be submitted to the Senate?
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8 .
S 11036 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE J a.ly 10, 1970
Secretary Dulars. It has, as I said, been
submitted to the Senate for its information
but not for action,
The CHAIRMAN. Not for ratification?
Secretary DULLES. Not for ratification; no,
sir.
ADDITIONAL MEMBES:S OF THE TREATY
The CHAIRMAN. Article VII of the treaty
provides;
"Any gther State In a position to further
the objectives of this Treaty and to coastrib-
ute to the security of the area may, by unan-
imaous agreement of the Parties be invited to
accede to this Treaty."
What are the chants of bringing India,
:Burma, Indonesia, and the Associated States
of Indochina into the treaty; and further,
are there any indications of a shift in In-
dian policy since the visit of Nehru to Red
China? Those are two questions.
Secretary DuLLES. I would not want, Mr.
Chairman, to speculate here on the likell-
hood of the other countries you mentioned
coming in.
As I say, we would be very happy if they
were disposed to come in; that Is entirely a
matter fcr them to decide for themselves.
I think, perhaps; in describing earlier the
various threats of subversive activity, I may
have mentioned certain countries that were
not parties to this treaty. I should make
clear that I did not, in doing so, Intend in
any sense to imply that the treaty members
felt that they had any responsibility with
respect to such action. 'r was merely outlin-
inf; the general threat in the area and the
Communist tactics.
I am not intending to suggest that where
those activities are directed against coun-
tries who were not parties to the treaty that
the treaty places any. responsibility or au-
thority upon the treaty members to deal with
that type of activity. The subversive activity
against which we are concerned, is of course,
subversive activity which involves the treaty
area.
You asked whether there was any evidence
of changing intentions on the part of Red
China since Nehru went to Peiping. I would
say that we have no such evidence. That
does not , exclude the possibility . that he
:might have exerted a useful influence. All I
can say is that we have no facts which would
lead me to affirm that that is the case.
ADDITIONAL MEMBERS IIF POSSIBLE BY
AMENDMENT TO TREATY
The CHAIRMAN. Ii some of the members I
have mentioned should come in under the
new treaty, do you think that would require
further advice and consent by the Senate?
Secretary I tn,asS. Yes, sir; I would assume
that the same practice would prevail here as
prevails with relation to the North Atlantic
Treaty. The language is the same, and it was
agreed between the Executive and the Senate
at the time of the North Atlantic Treaty
that if additional states ,carne in that would
require an amendment of the treaty or a pro-
tocol to the treaty, on which the advice and
consent of the Senate.would be sought.
We would interpret -this language in the
same way that similar language in the North
Atlantic Treaty Is interpreted, namely, as re-
quiring Senate action in that event.
RELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO LAOS, VIETNAM,
AND CAMS'?DIA
The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think you said
something about this subject, but in the prc-
tocol to the treaty Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-
nam are designated for purposes of article
III and article IV. Just what does this desig-
nation mean? In that connection, would you
l iscuss with the committee the relationship
of those three states to the Southeast Asia
Treaty in the light of the armistice concluded
at Geneva In May?
Secretary DULLES. The addition by the pro-
ts ooI to the treaty area of Cambodia, Laos,
and the free territory under the jurisdiction
of the state of Vietnam, has the effect that inter of France, Mr. Mendel-France, when he
if there should be an armed attack against arrives here next week. But until we are
that area, It would be regarded by the parties further advanced in our awn thinking, Mr,
as dangerous to the peace and safety of the Chairman, I would ask to be excused from
parties to the treaty under article IV. trying to elaborate on just what we expect to
As I pointed cut, the countries in question, do there.
Cambodia, Laos, and free Vietnam, did not THREAT OF SUt VERSION
themselves became parties to the treaty be- The CHAIRMAN. In paragraph 2 of article IV
cause of the fact that the Geneva armistice there is a provision in sut'bstance, that the
agreements at least raise a question as to the Parties will consult immediate) in order to
propriety of their doing so, and it seemed y
undesirable to some of the parties to those when agree a on. threat occurs hich should be than
agreements to raise that question, particular- when occuin rF, iy other way than
ly at a time wren the armistice was in the by armed attack. Do you want to be a little
process of being carried out and had not yet more definite as to just what you mean?
been fully carried out,. Secretary DULLES. Well, that applies pri-
The armistice terms themselves are ex- marily m the e threat of t~verthrocv by sub-
themselves
complicated, somewhat ambiguous, might, internal revolution which
might, p, perhaps, be inspired from without,
wth respect to these matters. It was ob- but which does not involve open interference
viously a situation where the countries con- from without.
cerned were properly the judges as to what That is a situation wh;:;h threatens very
was the best line for them to take. The much in that area and where, I believe, there
AusOcoated States concluded that they would should be concerted action to meet it. In fact,
be very happy to have their area included the need ill that respect is so great that I
under the mantle of protection that this would hope that we can within the next few
treaty would throw about it, whether or not weeks begin to talk together with other
they themselves become signatories to the treaty signatories about: some of those
treaty. problems..
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO TREATY The CHAIRMAN. Well, in any ease, I take it
AREA that paragraph I of article IV applies--that
The CHAIRMAN. With reference to article Part particularly--to meeting the common
III, in which the parties undertake "to co-
operate with one another in further devel-
opment of economic measures," you stated
hi your report ta) the Nation September 15:
"Congress this year had the vision to see
that there might be special needs in south-
east Asia. So, by the Mutual Aid Security
Act, Congress has already provided a fund
to be available in this area. Part of it will
no doubt be spent to assist the free govern-
ments of southef'rt Asia."
Could you give us further details on the
plans, if any, to advance the economic and
military stability in that area?
Secretary DULLES. I could not at this time,
Mr. Chairman, give the details of that be-
cause the problem is still being studied.
The situation, particularly in Vietnam, is
extremely confused, due to the lack of ef-
fective authority in the free Vietnam area.
The President a few days ago, last week
in fact, asked General Collins to drop his
other business arid to go there, representing
the President himself and the Department
of State, Department of Defense, and the
Foreign Operations Ad!srinistration, with a
view to making recommendations and, if
need be, taking action with respect to these
matters.
The question of what can be done effec-
tively from a military standpoint and eco-
nomic standpoint is being very intensively
explored both there arid in Laos and Cam-
bodia.
We have for the first time now indepen-
dent political missions; to Laos and Cam-
bodia, and new Ambassadors are there to
study what can be done in those two areas.
Of course, the major problem of Indo-
china is in free Vietnam. There are there
French forces which are contributing to the
support of law and order at the present time,
and there Is a question of our cooperating
with respect to the maintenance of those
forces to the extent it seems desirable. There
is also the problem of building up an en-
larged police force, constabulary, and per-
haps an army, for the Vietnam Government
so that they can take over the responsi-
bility for their own security.
There are a number of economic problems
of acute necessity which are created by the
emigration or flight of non-Communists from else so that in the event of an attack upon
the northern area to the southern area. Norway, for example, he would have exactly
All of these matters are being actively the same power as he would have if there
studied on the spot primarily now by General was an attack upon New York or Washing-
Collins on behalf of the United States. They ton.
will be discussed further with the Prime Min-- That matter was very fully debated In the
danger. Would it be in accordance with the
constitutional processes?
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So whether it were the
threat mentioned in section 2 or the common
danger resulting from op;:n attack, action
could be taken only after r'ensultation with
Congress?
The CHAIRMAN. I thank y iu very much.
Senator Smith, any questions?
Senator SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman; I have
a few questions.
I want to say first, Mr Secretary, and I
am sure that senator Mansfield will join
me in this, that I wish to express my appreci-
ation of the opportuntiy or being with you
and your group on this trip and of being
able to get a firsthand look at some of these
far eastern problems. I want to thank you
very much for that opport.unity,
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATO AND BOU'r.'HEAST
ASIA TREAT.
Now, there are one or two things I have
put down here, and I have quite a few ques-
tions that, have been asked from various
sources. I have been asked a good many ques-
tions since I got back, and I am going to try,
for the record, to get you to answer some
of these.
You referred to the difference between
NATO and this Southeast Asia Treaty and
indicated the different approach.
But is It fair to say that whereas in NATO
we use the expression "an attack on one is
an attack on all," and that was possibly one
of the reasons for setting up our NATO col-
lective forces, that here we do not quite take
the same extreme position that an attack on
one is an attack on all, Ilcwever, we take
the view that an attack, any aggression, is a
source of concern until we meet together and
consult and act according r,) our constitu-
tional processes. People have asked me what
is the real difference between the obligations
under NATO and the obligations here?
Secretary DULLES. You will remember, Sen-
ator Smith, the constitutio,aal debate which
was evoked in relation to that clause In the
North Atlantic Treaty, whit-h said that an
attack upon one is an attack upon all. It
raised the question as to whether that auto-
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
July 10, 1970
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S11037
senate at the time. I had the honor of being
a Member of your body at that time and par-
dcipated in that debate.
Therefore, when I had the responsibility
of starting to negotiate treaties in the Pa-
cific, I felt that it would be preferable to
adopt the language which was taken from
the declaration of President Monroe, and
which reflects our oldest and, in a sense,
most respected foreign policy, the Monroe
Doctrine, where we declared that an intru-
sion would be dangerous to our peace and
security.
Now, that was a formula which I recall
that Senator Taft, who opposed the North
Atlantic Treaty formula, had said would
have been acceptable so far as he was con-
cerned.
It seemed to me that the practical differ-
ence between the two from the standpoint
of its giving security to the other parties
was not appreciable, and that it was better
to avoid a formula which would reopen the
constitutional debate which took place in
reference to that provision of the North At-
lantic Treaty, so that formula was used in
the Philippine Treaty, in the Anzus Treaties,
it has been reproduced now in the Korean
Treaty, and been reproduced in this treaty.
I think that the difference practically is
not great, but that the present formula does
avoid at least a theoretical dispute,as to the
relative powers of the President and the
Congress under these different formulas.
;RELATIONSHIP TO MONROE DOCTRINE
Senator SMITH. Well, this particular treaty
which we have just signed and the other bi-
laterals that you have initiated might be
said to have the Monroe Doctrine approach,
which over a period of a good many years
now has been very effective. This approach
has accomplished the results that were
sought originally by the Monroe Doctrine.
We are practically giving a Monroe Doctrine
warning here against aggression and we are
standing by the votes that we took.
Secretary DULLES. The language used here
which has now become, I would say, almost
conventional with reference to these treaties,
makes perfectly clear the determination of
our Nation to react to such an armed attack.
It does not attempt to get into the difficult
question as to precisely how we act and pre-
cisely how the responsibilities are shared
between the President and Congress.
But as far as our national determination is
concerned, it is expressed here; that is the
thing that other countries are concerned
with, and the question of our internal pro-
cedures is not properly a matter of their con-
cern, and, in fact, none of the countries with
whom we have dealt are concerned about the
difference in the formula,
Therefore I think it is better to use this
language, which does avoid constitutional
controversy, which has been used in these
other treaties, and which stems from one of
our oldest foreign policies, that of the
Monroe Doctrine.
In a sense, it is perhaps not quite as auto-
matic as the other, but that would depend
on circumstances. It is a 'clear determination
of our national resolve, which I think will
adequately serve to deter, if it is possible to
deter at all.
PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE
Senator SMITH, Well, Mr. Secretary., I was
very much impressed by 1 or 2 things while
we were out there, one of which was the pie-
amble in which we set forth pretty clearly
the fundamental principles of freedom and
independence, with self-determination for
peoples who desired or were able to under-
take responsibilities. I remember we had quite
a discussion of how It should be worded, and
what should be done by the various nations
involved; but it seemed to me that was a
terribly important factor, which you so
brilliantly and so inspiringly presented from
the standpoint of the United States.
I would just like to emphasize that and
ask you to comment briefly on that point,
because I think it was very important. It is
embodied also in the so-called charter which
was initiated by Mr. Magsaysay, as you said.
Secretary DULLES. You will recall, Senator,
that in the opening remarks which I made
at the Manila Conference, I said that it
must be made clear and abundantly clear
that association between the Asian countries
and the western countries would not in any
way directly or indirectly involve any sub-
servient relationship, any perpetuation of a
colonial relationship because, if that was
the case, then we would not have that as-
sociation.
Of course, the Communists are trying des-
perately to make the Asian peoples believe
that if they have any association at all with
western powers it means perpetuation of
colonialism. They do that because they know
that the Asian powers will be extremely weak
unless they can enjoy collective security,
which, to some measure, will involve the
-western nations, and if they can create that
breach, then Asia can readily fall under their
control and power. Such slogans as "Asia for
the Asians," "Keep the West Out," are only
slogans which are invented by people who
want to exert a mastery over all of Asia, and
who know they can only do it effectively if
they can get the Asians themselves first to
break wholly their ties with the West and
then become so weak that they automatically
almost fall into the Communist camp.
Now, that is the great danger which we
are combating, in that area, and it is the
danger which we must be eternally vigilant
to combat. I believe that one of the major
achievements of this Manila Conference was
the fact that we took a big step forward in
combating that Communist line.
POSITIVE INITIATIVE OF THE ASIANS
Senator SMITH. I wanted to stress that
because it impressed me personally as one
of the most important things when we dis-
cussed it.
One of the other things that impressed me
was the very positive initiative taken by the
Asians themselves. Our old friends, the Fili-
pinos were the hosts there and, under your
wise direction, the Filipinos were asked to
chair the meetings. I think you will agree
with me, and I would be glad to have you
say so if you do, that the Asians themselves
showed great initiative in working out the
form that the treaty was to take.
Is it not true that the Asians were eager
to move right ahead with this, and contrib-
uted enormously? I remember the speeches
made by Prince Wan of Thailand, and Mr.
Khan of Pakistan, and their understanding
of the spirit of the whole thing. They joined
with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom, France, and ourselves
in setting up this protocol.
Secretary DULLES. I thoroughly agree with
you, Senator Smith. The interest, the initia-
tive, taken by the Asian members of this
Conference was 'S very encouraging and
heartening fact.
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY
Senator SMITH. You referred to the ques-
tion of subversive activity mentioned in ar-
ticle II. This contains, as you said in your
opening remarks, a significant new under-
taking providing for mutual aid to prevent
and counter subversive activity directed
from outside against the territorial integrity
and political stability of the members.
Under what circumstances would this pro-
vision be applicable, and what measures are
contemplated to make it effective?
I think you said you were hoping to have
a conference in the new future with the
countries concerned as to how the provisions
of this article can best be carried out. Can
you develop this further at this point?
Secretary DUisEs. Well, I can develop it
somewhat. Obviously it is not `practical pub-
licly to develop details.
Senator SMITH. That is true.
Secretary DULLES. As a prior question
brought out, I think, one of the questions of
the chairman, it is contemplated that there
may be in this matter a conference to decide
what to do about these subversive activities
if they do become acute. They already are
becoming acute in some areas, and I believe
we should very quickly put our heads to-
gether to decide what to do about it.
There is a very considerable experience in
these matters. The Philippines themselves
have had a very educational, if hard, time in
dealing with the Huk revolution, but I would
say that President Magsaysay is as well quali-
fied as any man in the world today to know
how to deal with these subversive activities.
He has done an amazing job in the Philip-
pines.
The British have had cosiderable experi-
ence in Malaya; we have had considerable ex-
perience; the Thailanders have had consid-
erable experience; and I think that there are
measures to be taken.
Of course, the hard core of any measure
should be found in the country which is it-
self involved, and there is a grave need, par-
ticularly in Vietnam, for a strong govern-
ment which commands the loyalty of the
people, and which has an effective police and
constabulary at its command to detect and
run down these subversive activities.
That situation is by no means satisfactory
at the present time. It calls for very atten-
tive consideration by all of us, and I think I
can say that it will be given such considera-
tion.
THE TREATY AREA
Senator SMITH. Now, Mr. Secretary, article
VIII defines the treaty area, and it is not
quite clear to me just what the area is. It
seems to me it is important for all of us to
understand just exactly what area the treaty
covers.
Secretary DULLES. Well, broadly speaking, it
includes the territory of the parties and the
Pacific Ocean area which is south of 21 de-
grees and 30 minutes; that is a line which
runs north of the Philippines. There are ter-
ritories of some of the parties which lie north
of that area, which it was not felt desirable to
include.
But, broadly speaking, the area, therefore,
is Pakistan, Thailand, and, by protocol, Laos,
Vietnam and Cambodia, Malay, Australia and
New Zealand, and the Philippines.
Senator SMITH. It does not go far enough
north to include what might be called the
Hong Kong area or Formosa or Japan or
Korea?
Secretary DULLES. No.
Senator SMITH. They are not included it
this treaty at all?
Secretary DULLES. That is correct.
Senator SMITH. I wanted to get that.
Senator DULLES. Of course, neither the
Republic of China nor the Japanese Govern-
ment were parties to the treaty, so they would
not have been included in any event.
The United Kingdom is a party to the
treaty and, if it were not for this limiting
clause, Hong Kong would have been included,
but Hong Kong is not included.
SENATE RATIFICATION NECESSARY FOR AMEND-
MENT TO TREATY
Senator SMITH. The treaty provides for in-
cluding nations other than the ones that
signed it, and also possibly extending the
treaty area. That can be done by unani-
mous consent, apparently, of the parties to
the treaty.
I think the question has previously been
raised-I just do not recall the form of your
answer-but would that require us to bring
back to the Senate of the United States for
ratification, in your judgment, any additions
of; that kind? We have the protocol here
which includes Laos, Cambodia, and the free
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
S 11038 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE July 10, 1970
territory of the state of Vietnam, and, I
suppose when we ratify this treaty we will
also ratify that protocol. But do you con-
template that in the future, if there are any
amendments, we will need to bring the mat-
ter to the Senate for ratification?
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.
Senator SMITH. That would be our policy?
Secretary DULLES. Yes; It will be, the
policy.
I think it has now almost become more
than policy; I think it is a practical con-
struction of this language Which has been
adopted with reference to the North Atlantic
Treaty, and I would assume that the same
interpretation would be put on it here.
You will note that the President in his
letter of transmittal of this treaty to the
Senate says this:
"I concur in the recommendation of the
Secretary that the 'unanimous agreement'
required by article IV, paragraph 1, for the
designation of states or territories, by article
VII for the Invitation to states to accede
to the treaty, aid by article VIII for a change
in the treaty area Is to be understood in each
instance as requiring the advice and ccnsent
of the Senate.
I think there is no doubt but what that
would be a binding interpretation of the
language.
THE TREATY AREA
Senator SMITH. Well, now, let us get back
to the area question. Suppose there is ag-
gression against India or Burma, who are
not in the treaty; would we feel that this
constituted a threat of a nature that would
call for action on our part?
Secretary DULLES. Well, we might feel so,
but that would be a matter for purely na-
tional action; that Is not covered by any
international engagement of any country.
Senator SMITH. It would be a matter for
us to decide.
Secretary DULLES. Yes, it would be. Of
course, it would be a violation of the United
Nations Charter and would presumably bring
into play the processes of the United Nations,
but we have no particular treaty engagement
other than the United Nations Charter to
cover that situation.
SITUATION IN INDOCHINA
Senator SMITH. Now, referring to Indo-
china where we are all very much concerned.
According to >t. number of reports, one of
the areas mentioned in the protocol. the
present territory and jurisdiction of Viet-
nam, is in danger of falling under Communist
domination. If that occurs, due to internal
or external pressure, will the treaty involve
us in measures to resist Communist control
of the area? I think you answered that be-
fore, but I would like to get a clear answer
as to whether a sudden movement toward
Communist domination in south Vietnam
would bring this treaty Into operation.
Secretary DULLES. Are you referring now to
armed attack?
Senator SMITH. It would be armed attack;
but suppose there were internal pressures-
the subversive activity; was that not one
of the questions we were trying to include?
Secretary DULLES. Yes. I just was not clear
as to whether your question is directed to
article IV, paragraph 1, or article IV, para-
graph 2.
Senator SMrrH. Let us consider them both.
Suppose there is an armed attack under
article IV, 1. I would think there would be
no question in this instance, but if there
is subversive activity which Is threatening
the integrity of south Vietnam-free Viet-
nam-would we feel that we were called
upon under the treaty to give a danger signal
and get together with our allies and con-
sider it?
Secretary DULLES. Well, article IV, para-
graph 2, contemplates that if that situation
arises or 'threatens, that we should consult
together immediately in. order to agree on
measures which should be taken. That Is
an obligation. for consultation. It is not an
obligation for action.
Of course, we are free to and are taking
measures already, apart from the treaty and
before the treaty is enforced to assist in com-
bating subversion in that area.
But we can do much more effectively, I
think what needs to be done, if the treaty is
In force, and. we have procedures for con-
sultation under the treaty as to how to deal
with these situations.
As I said, there are other members of this
treaty who have very considerable experience
in these matters. I referred to, as you will re-
call, President Magsaysay and, I believe, by
meeting together we can find more effectively
and surely the necessary redemptive meas-
ures than we could if we each operated sepa-
rately.
Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am going
to yield to my colleagues.
MEMBERSHIP Or THE TREATY
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Green,
Senator GREEN. PMr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, in the first place, let me say
that I am rather at a disadvantage In asking
questions. This message came from the Presi-
dent only yesterday, and I suppose, like other
members of the committee or at least most
of them, we have not seen it until this meet-
ing. The questions I ask are for information
only, and I hope you will not think that I am
in any way opposed to the treaty or even
have any exceptions to take to its terms.
It is simply for information that I am ask-
ing, and you may think the question is quite
unnecessary in view of your statements here
this morning. But It is rather difficult to read
a text such as this and listen to your exoosi-
tion of it at the same time.
If, on further reading or reading of the
whole text, my associates on the committee
or I have further questions to ask, I suppose
we may be given that opportunity later.
There appear to be several questions that
I can ask, though, and the first is this: What
was the principle on which certain nations
joined in this and other nations are excluded?
Secretary DULLES. Well, the Communist
nations are excluded because we do not place
confidence in their word and in their com-
mitments. If we had confidence in the un-
dertakings, for example, that the Commu-
nist countries have given under the United
Nations Charter, there would be no occasion
for treaties like the North Atlantic Treaty,
and so forth.
If we really believed that these Commu-
nist countries were determined to settle all
of their differences by peaceful means, as
they have agreed to do, we already have
their undertaking in the United Nations
Charter. But their conduct, their teaching,
Indicates that they do not intend neces-
sarily to live up to .that--certainly we have
grave doubts about it and reasonable doubts
about it--and for that reason we try to get
together with countries whom we can trust.
Therefore, the only exclusion that operates
here is an exclusion of countries who, by
their own teachings, say that agreements of
this sort are not designed to be lived up to
but only designed to gain temporary advan-
tages from which they can go on and make
further gains.
I think it is legi':imate to exclude coun-
tries who preach and practice that doctrine.
Now, except for that, there is no practice
of exclusion. Any other country which wants
to join and which is able and willing to make
a contribution to the defense of the area
would be very welcome.
RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD NONMEMBERS
Senator GREEN. Well take Indonesia as an
illustration. Indonesia is not a party to this
treaty; is it?
Secretary DULLES. No, sir.
Senator GREEN. Well, why not?
Secretary Dv'LLES. Because it prefers not to
be, and it is a free and independent country
and has a right to decide for itself.
Senator GREEN. Well, now, there are parts
of Indonesia or at least what the Indonesians
claim is Indonesia, which are also claimed by
the Dutch. That is right; is it not?
Secretary DULLES. The fact is that the cur-
rent differences between, the Dutch and the
Indonesian Governments with respect to
western New Guinea arise basically from their
dispute over whether the question of sover-
eignty over the area is still to be negotiated.
Senator GREEN. Well, now, suppose trouble
breaks out between the two; is it covered by
this treaty?
Secretary DULLES, No, sir.
Senator GREEN. Is trouble not much more
likely to break out in Indonesia than other
situations that are provided for in the treaty?
Se cre,tary DULLES. Well, I do not think so,
but In any event, the danger which con-
fronts the United Status and which makes
fighting a danger to the peace and security
of our Nation Is the Communist threat. We
are concerned naturally with any quarreling
and fighting that goes on anywhere, and if
that broke out there would be various proc-
esses, in the United Nations and otherwise,
which could be invoked. and probably would
be invoked. But I think it very difficult in-
deed to say that it is a danger to the peace
and security of the United States if there
is a quarrel, a border quarrel, between two
friendly countries.
It may be a very u ifortunate thing; it
may be a thing that we want to deal with
through processes of arbitration, mediation,
through the various procedures that are rec-
ommended by the United Nations Charter,
but the mortal threat to the United States
is the threat of communism. That is what
this treaty is directed against. It is not di-
rected against differences which may arise,
unhappily, between friendly states.
Senator GREEN. There are certain terri-
tories in dispute between the Netherlands
and Indonesia still; are there not?
Secretary DULLES. There is a question that
has been raised by Indonesia with reference
to the sovereignty of part of New Guinea;
yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. What is. the attitude of our
country toward that?
Secretary DULLES. The attitude of our
country is that we are neutral In a con-
troversy between two friendly countries.
Senator GREEN. As I glanced through this
text, I saw reference to the policy of self-
determination of peoples
Secretary DULLES. Yes. The dispute be-
tween Indonesia and the Netherlands with
reference to New Guinea does not of itself
involve the question of self determination.
The people of New Guinea are a race totally
distinct either from Indonesia or the Neth-
erlands, and in that case the question of
their self-determination is not the issue in
the controversy.
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY
Senator GREEN. Well, the treaty under-
takes, as I understand it. to provide for cases
where there is Insurrection; it obliges us,
does It not, to take the part of the govern-
ment against the revolutionaries?
Secretary DULLES. I did not get that ques-
tion, sir,
Senator GREEN. Is there not some provision
In the treaty-I thought l: saw it as I glanced
through it-that we join in putting down in-
surrections in these countries?
Secretary, DULLES. No, sir. There Is provi-
sion that if there is a subversion, threatened
subversion, of the political independence of
any country, then we will consult together
what to do about it.
Senator GREEN. That is subversion then..
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. Well, isn't that another
word for insurrection?
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 July 10, 1970 Approved Fot8gMa2IkEEP72?ff~3Vf2000300070029-8
Secretary DULLES. I would think insurrec-
tion is a form, of subversion, yes.
Senator GREEN. Then we are obliged to
help put down a revolutionary movement.
Secretary DULLES. No. If there is a revolu-
tionary movement in Vietnam or in Thai-
land, we would consult together as to what
to do about it, because if taht were a sub-
versive movement that was in fact propa-
gated by communism, it would be a very
grave threat to us. But we have no under-
taking to put it down; all we have is, an
undertaking to consult together as to what
to do about it.
Senator GREEN. I did have time to read the
message of the President in communicating
this treaty to the Senate,, and he says as
follows:
"It is a treaty for defense against both open
armed attacks and internal subversion."
Then he limits the meaning of armed at-.
tack-that is from outside-to a Communist
Armed attack.
As I read that, two questions occurred to
me. In the first place, the question was
whether internal subversion is not another
phrase for insurrection or revolutionary
means. That is excluded from the under-
standing which the President refers to later,
because, it refers to an armed attack alone-
the other of the alternatives. So it seems to
me as though we are undertaking in all these
countries to put down revolutionary move-
ments. I know that, generally, both in Asia
and in South America there is a feeling that
the United States' sympathies ought tob e
with the revolutionaries because we were a
revolutionary government ourselves, and they
regret that not only do we not take the part
of the revolutionaries, but we take the part
against them.
Whta would be your comment on that?
Secretary DULLES. My comment on that,
Senator, Is that there are two kinds of revolu-
tions. One is a truly indigenous revolution
which reflects the will of the people, and we
ourselves, who had our birth in revolution,
naturally are sympathetic to the aspirations
of the peoples.
On the other hand, communism has
adopted revolution as one Of Its principal
tools of expansion. It gains control of revolu-
tionary movements, and certainly I do not
think that we should go so far as to say that
any revolutionary movement has the sym-
pathy of the United States.
other question that occurred to me, with
regard to the provision for other states to
join. I think this question was asked be-
fore, and you answered that this would be
possible with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. But, the language in the
treaty itself is that any other state may
join, "by depositing its instrument with the
Government of the Philippines."
Now, that does not require the consent of
the Senate.
Secretary DULLES. The treaty, I think, says
that it requires the unanimous agreement
of the present parties first.
Senator GREEN. I must say that I am still
at a disadvantage. Somewhere in here I no-
ticed that any other state may join "by de
positing its instrument with the Govern-
ment of the Philippines." If that is so, why
does it have to be, or would it be contrary
attack which is covered by the treaty is a
Communist attack?
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. Communist armed attack?
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir.
Senator GREEN. That does not cover Com-
munist subversion?
Secretary DULLES. Subversion is covered by
the provisions of article IV, paragraph 2,
which lead to consultation, but there is in
the treaty itself no commitment to action in
that event unless action is subsequently
agreed to as a result of the consultation.
Senator GREEN. Well, then, the Communists
would include not only Soviet Russia, but
China, and so much of Indochina as has been
recognized as Communist.
Secretary DULLES It would cover at the
present time the Communist regime in China
and also the regime of He Chi Minh in North
Vietnam.
Senator GREEN. Well, these were some of
the questions I wanted to get for my own
information.
consent of the Senate? Secretary DULLES. Yes.
Secretary DULLES. The article reads, Sen- Senator GREEN. Thank you very much.
ator: The CHAIRMAN. Thank you,
"Any other state may, by unanimous agree- Senator Hickenlooper?
ment of the parties, be invited to accede to RELATIONSHIP OF THE TREATY TO THE V.N.
this treaty. Any state so invited may become CHARTER
a party to the treaty by depositing Its .in- Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, most
strument of accession with the Government of the questions that I would be interested
of the Republic of the Philippines." in have already been asked, and I shall not
In other words, no state is entitled to join plow the same ground twice. But I do want to
this treaty merely by its own action of de- ask you about article I:
positing an instrument of ratification. It has The parties undertake-
to be invited and has to be invited unani- I am reading from article I-as set forth
mously. In the charter of the United Nations, to set-
Now, we did not attempt in the treaty it- tie any international disputes in which they
self to prescribe the constitutional procedures may be involved by peaceful means in such
whereby each of the eight parties gives that a manner-and so on.
consent. Under our constitutional procedure I am concerned as to whether or not that
it is agreed that that consent can only be provision in this treaty enlarges either our
given with the concurrence of the Senate. responsibility under the United Nations
Therefore, the United States Senate has a Charter or alters in any way the relation-
complete control over whether and to whom ship of the authority of our Government
this treaty is extended. under the United Nations Charter. Does
Senator GREEN. Then it would have to re- this have any effect on either enlarging or
quire the subsequent assent of all the differ- diminishing our relationships with the
ent governments? United Nations or our responsibilities under
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. the United Nations Charter?
Senator GREEN. In spite of the language of Secretary DULLES. No, sir. This article I is
article VIII?
-- r~pe or II, 'The Communists got control of china guage of article VII, because article VII says II itedlNationsrCharter, which will be found
through a revolution, The fact that they they can only come in by unanimous agree- in, I think, all of the other collective security
used a revolution to do it does not prove that went of the parties. arrangements which we have made since the
we are, therefore, sympathetic with the Chi- . COMMUNIST AGGRESSION adoption of the charter.
nese Communists-at least I do not think Senator GREEN. Then the President in his The charter language to which I refer reads
so. message said that the term "armed attack," as follows-
Senator GREEN. On the other hand, we as used in the treaty, means a Communist Senator HICKENLOOPER, I understand what
ought not to take the position that any up- attack. That does not limit it to a Soviet the charter reference is.
rising of peoples is necessarily subversive attacks, does it? Secretary DULLES. Yes.
and communistic. Secretary DULLES. No, sir. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am only attempt-
Secretary DULLES. That is quite correct. Secretary GREEN. So it would be an attack ing to find out whether or not the reiteration
Senator GREEN. They usually are a result by any government which is considered com- of this statement in the treaty adds to or
of mixed motives, munistic? detracts from our responsibility or obliga-
Secretary DULLES. That is why, Senator, Secretary DULLES. Yes. If, for example, the tions under the United Nations Charter.
there is no obligation whatever in this treaty Chinese Communists were to make such an Secretary DULLES. I can say categorically,
for any automatic action in the event of a armed attack, that would be included in this Sir, that in my opinion this neither adds one
subversive movement. If there is a subversive reference.
of
thing which seems dangerous, we sit together Senator GREEN. Where in the treaty can jot
ex ressone in jot the a title, from of
our or objective as expressed title nor subtracts
United
and talk about it, and then try to agree as that t statement be found? Why didn't they the United Nations.
to whether it calls for action. say that in the treaty, if that is what it Senator HICKENLOOPER, In other words,
Senator GREEN. Well, that is largely because means?
the Communists are clever enough to iden- Secretary DULLES. This is in the treaty, sir. t this reference to the ed cle I, in your view, is fort reference urntoes
tify themselves with any uprising; is it not? Senator GREEN. I thought they had a mu- only, and has no influence in adding to or
Secretary DULLES. Well, they are extremely tual covenant against resisting armed stack. detracting from whatever obligations or lack
clever in getting control of the discontented Secretary DULLES. There is a provision of of obligations we already have under the
movements in all of the countries. article IV which talks about armed attack United Nations Charter. It has no effect on
Senator GREEN. Well, we certainly go to generally. Then there is an understanding in- increasing or diminishing the authority, ei-
the Other extreme and identify ourselves corporated in the treaty which says that, as ther ours or the United Nations, under the
against any uprising Or revolutionary move- far as the United States is concerned, the United Nations Charter?
ment. only armed attack which we will regard as
Secretary DULLES. We do not try to do obligatingvus under article IV, paragraph 1, opinion, DULLEe. Yes, ssr,uy st ntiv, v my
that, but we do try not to identify ourselves , this article has a value,
is a Communist armed attack. In fact, 'but has as customarily been been put in
with revolutionary movements which are Senator GREEN. I have not had a chance to such treaties. In pursuance of that custom
dominated and engineered by communism. read it, as I said before, but is it inhere that it was inserted here, but it, in my opinion,
S 11039
ADMITTING NEW MEMBERS TO THE TREATY in the case of the United States, the only
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
S 11040 'CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE July 10, 1970
does not add anything to the obligations: al- parallel to that was created, it would be re- Secondly, while this does not directly relate
ready assumed by the United States. garded as coming under subdivision 2 rather to the manila Pact, it does affect the peace
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Nor does the repo- than subdivision 1. in the Far Pacific, I would likewise desire to
tition in this treaty of a reference to the Senator FERGUBOri'. In other words, the have for the information of the Foreign Reia-
United Nations Charter increase or diminish, words "armed attack" in paragraph 1 of ar- tions Committee, for subsequent questions to
ar alter in any way whatever, existing powers bole IV are the ordinary armed attack rather be raised and answered, full information
which the President of the United States as than a subterfuge of penetration or subdivi- relative to Communist compliance with the
Chief Executive or Commander? in Ch. ief ,::ion. terms of Korean armistice agreement.
might already have? Do you think it alters Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. And, third, full information relative to the
those? Senator FERGUSON That is all I have. Mr. functioning or inability to function of the
Secretary DULLES. It does not alter, in- Chairman. so-called Neutral Nation:, Armistice Commis-
crease, or diminish those powers. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman? Rion in Korea, again affecting the general
Senator HICKENLOOPER.. Thank you. MEMEERSHr? OF THE TREATY peace of the entire Pacific area.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fulbright? Those are my reque: is for information
Senator Setions -t Mr. Secretary, I have at the present time, anu I want to close by
COMMUNIST AC.GRESSYON very few questions :o ask. I think the sub- - commending the Secretary of State and the
Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I, like jeer has been pretty well covered. But I want members of the delegationtion, including the two
Senator Green, have not had a chance to so pursue a little further something that Senators, Senators ega d and Smith, who M
study this, and I have only 1 or 2 questions. Senator Green touched upon, and that is the accompanied you. I believe that this is a step
I was not clear about the status of this un- possibility of the inclusion of other nations in the right direction toward developing a
derstanding of the United States regarding in that area of the world, collective system of defense in the Pacific.
the aggression coming only from Cornrnu- It'seems to me that if there is one weak- Secretary DULLES. Thank you, Senator. I
Gists. Is that in the treaty itself or is that flees in this proposed treaty, it is the fact will try to obtain this information and pres-
an understanding just outside of the t.^eaty that there are only three really Asiatic na- ent it in executive session
among the various signatories? tions parties to it. Those countries are Pakis- (The information, all of a classified na-
Secretary DULLES. It is part of the treaty tan, Thailand; and the Philippines. tare, was subsequently furnished the coin-
itself and is subscribed to by all the other Now, I assure that the other nations were mitten and has been made a part of the
parties to the treaty; they accept our under- invited to come inroo the conference? permanent record.)
standing in that respect. Secretary DULLES. It was made clear to RECOGNITION OF THE PHILIPPINE DELEGATION
Senator FULBRIGHT That is contained in them that they would have been very wet- The CHAIRMAN. I want to call the atten-
Secretary last paragraph: is it not? come at the conference; yes, sir.
Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir; it appears just Senator SPARKMAN. Was an invitation sent tion of the committee and the audience that
above the signatures, out or was it just more or less a gathering we have the privilege o having with us the
TECHNICAL COOPERATION of those who were :interested-each one act- group of the Philippine delegation that was
ing In its own interest and on its own ac- introduced on the floor of the Senate yes-
Senator FIILBRIGHT. All right. I had over- cord? terday. Today is what we used to call Armi-
looked that. Secretary DULLES There was, as I recall, no stice Day, and I think it is a special occasion
I have one other point. Could you give formal invitation sent once it was ascer- when we realize that ltd years ago the na-
your view as to the significance of article tained that they would prefer not to receive tions of the earth thought they had a great
III, somewhat along the line of your last such an invitation but, subject only to that, destiny of peace ahead of them, and we
answer to the Senator from Iowa's remark? their welcome: was made very clear to them. know what has happened-since. We are glad
In what way, if any, does article III change Senator SPARKMAN. You made clear in your to welcome this delegation, glad they are in
our present policy regarding point 4 or tech- statement that you hope other nations may America to get acquainted with us. Thirty-
nical assistance? Was it intended to increase see fit to come in at a later time. I wonder six years ago the belle rang out for peace
our obligations, or just what did you mean if you might tell us if you have any real around the world, and I think it is a good
by article III? hope that Burma; for instance, might at omen that today, Mr. Secretary, we have
Secretary DULLES. It was designed to re- some later date come in, or Indonesia? It before us the Manila Pact, the accomplish-
affirm our conviction that certain economic seems to me that certainly those two na- ments in Egypt, Iran, Trieste, the nine-power
efforts, such as technical assistance pro- tions are right in the midst of the treaty pact, all symbolic, I trust, of that faith we
grams, cultural exchanges, and the like, all area, and would greatly strengthen the expressed 36 years ago.
play an important part in combatting com- agreement. Senator Gillette?
munism, and that we intend to use all of Secretary DULLES. I think it would prob- UNITED STATES POLICY IN CASE OF ARMED
the weapons in our arsenal to meet the ably be indiscreet of me, Senator, to guess ATTACIL
threat of communism in this area. about their future. Senator GILLETTE. Mr. Secretary, I have
Senator FULBRIGHT. Then is it fair to say Senator SPARKMO.N. But the door is left- just one question to ask. Referring to article
that this is a specific recognition of the Secretary DULLES. The door is wide IV again, the first section is clear. It states
importance of technical cooperation in help- open- that each party recognizes an armed attack
ing to overcome the difficulties that exist Senator SPARKMAN. Wide open, and they as threatening all, and agrees to act in meet-
in this part of the world? well understand that? Ing the common danger according to its con-
Secretary DULLES. Yes sir. SecretaryDuLLES. Yes, sir. stitutional processes.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I must say I think Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that is all, But section 2 provides that any similar
that is a very important article. I hope it Mr. Chairman. threat, other than by armed 'attack will be
may lead to further developments. As I said, The CHAIRMAN. Senator Knowlandl met by consultation among the parties and
I have no particular criticism to offer on the COMMUNIST COM'?LIANCE TO THE KOREAN agreement as to what action will be taken.
a whole. It seems to me propers for a atlater ARMISTICE. ANSI GENEVA AGREEMENTS Now, keeping those two things in mind,
but I will hen I oad little m a tim we come to the concluding paragraph,
meeting when have - had a little more time Senator I~NOWso Mr. Secretary, I which states that we only recognize the ob-
mandigest the treaty- That is all, Mr, Chair- would like to i have some e see that ligation under section 1. in case of Commu-
The the committee, ee, and I can Oan see that there nist aggression when we will proceed by our
The CIIAIRMQN. Senator Ferguson? may be some valid reasons why either you constitutional processes.
would not have the information Immediately
SIMILAR PROVISIOrfS IN RIO TREATY available or feel that this would not be a Now, this is a hypothetical question-very
Senator FERGUSON. Mr, Secretary, in article proper place to furnish it, but I do think the improbable-but one that I should like to
IV the first section apparently applies to requests are pertinent because the Senate's have answered. In the event that there is
armed attack and the second section to sub- decision in felatton to this Manila Pact armed attack in this area by other than a
version and acts that might be considered may very definitely be tied in with the entire Communist country, does that mean that
attacks through subversion. security situation in the Far Pacific. we, as a signatory, cannot take any action
is article fV,, section 2, very similar to I would like to have furnished to the Com- in case of such armed attack in accordance
article VI of the Rio Treaty? mittee on Foreign Relations for executive with our constitutional processes until we
have consulted with all the others and ob-
Se VI by DULLES. I e not have that fu'- executive and study, and later questioning tained agreement as to what we should do'?
title VI before me. There is the same dastirc- execsession, full information a tion relative ve Secretary No, sir. In that respect
tion made in the Rio Treaty as is made_here to the Communist compliance with the terms y
between armed attack and disturbances of the Geneva Armistice Agreement. I think we retain entire control of our own policy,
which involve less than armed attack. I do that information is sufficiently clear so that according to our own judgment. If there
not have the article Vi that you refer to be- you have in mind what the committee may should be an armed attack which is not a
fore me, but I assume that is the article. be interested in; namely, are they carrying Communist attack, affecting one of the
Senator FERGUSON. I wanted to inquire on out the terms? have there been the with- parties to this treaty, the question of what
this point: Would a situation like that in drawals from Laos and Cambodia of any units we should do would then be determined by
Guatemala with regard to the shipping of that were in those countries; and, is the us as a matter of national policy. We would
arms require action under article IV, para- freedom being given to the people within the not be obligated under this treaty.
graph R, rather than under paragraph I? northern part of Vietnam to get out, as was Senator GILLETTE. I May not supplement
see t my
Secretary DULLES. I would think that if the the general 'understanding. question by saying quite why
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 July 10, 1970 Approved Fat& *&gQ&VA2 ihF&WP7?E
N1 000300070029-8 S11041
that follows. We provide by agreement that rying out the policies of our country on a Raymond A. Spruance, American Ambas-
in case of an armed attack by a Communist bipartisan, statemanlike basis. sador to the Republic of the, Philippines
country, we shall proceed, as you have just I think that he and Senator Smith are to be Press officer:
designated, by our constitutional processes, -highly commended for the magnificent work Henry Suydam, Chief, News Division, De-
but we specifically provide in this concluding they did there. I am delighted to see Ad- partment of State
pagaraph that if there is an armed attack by miral Davis, Ambassador Sebald, and Doug- Advisers:
any other than a Communist country that las MacArthur, who also were there and did James D. Bell, officer in charge, Philippine
we shall first consult with these associates great. work. Affairs, Department of State
and obtain their agreement before we take I believe special credit sl}ould go to Messrs. Chester L. Cooper, Office of Chinese Af-
any action. Spruance and Lacy, our /representatives to fairs, Department of State
Secertary DULLES. No. I think you have the Government of the Philippines, and I James Cross, Bureau of Far Eastern Af-
read into that more than it contains. think it ought to be brought out that while fairs, Department of State
Senator GILLETTE. Well, I hope I have. this is, perhaps, not the ideal solution, It Is John E. Dwan, lieutenant colonel, United
Secretary DULLES. It does not say that we the best possible solution which could be States Army, Department of Defense
will only act in agreement or consultation. It arrived at during the time of considera- William J. Galloway, does say that in that event we will be willing tion Office of the Coun-
does
GILLETTE. No; it says that we will countries in that part of the world, of Outerbridge Horsey, officer in charge, com-
consult under the provisions of article IV, different religious backgrounds-Buddhist, monwealth affairs, Department of State
paragraph 2. Moslem, and Christian-got together, ironed William S. B. Lacy, American counselor
Secretary DULLES. fYes, sir. out their differences, and arrived at a solu- of Embassy, Manila
Senator GILLETTE. The language does not tion satisfactory to all. N. Paul Neilson, Deputy Assistant Director
state that we will be willing to consult, but I was especially impressed with the states- for the Far East, USIA
before we take any action we "will" consult manship shown by President Magsaysay and Charles C. Stelle, policy planning staff,
under that provision and obtain agreement the Phili
ine dele
atio
d
Vi
pp
g
n un
er
ce Presi- Department of State
as to what action shall be taken. dent Carlos Garcia, and our old colleague, Charles A. Sullivan, Chief, American and
Secretary DULLES. No, sir; it does say that Senator Francisco Delgado, who, I am hap- Far East Division, Office of Foreign Military
we will consult before we act. All it says is py to see, is with us this morning.
we will consult. It seems to me that Senator Delgado Is Affairs, Department of Defense
Senator GILLETTE. And that may be subse- carrying his interest in this matter to the Deputy Coordinator:
quent to action that we take? logical extreme, and it is a pleasure for me Walter N. Turlock, Executive Secretariat,
Secretary DULLES. It could be.. to state for the record that it was an honor Department of State
Senator GILLETTE. That we take independ- and a privilege to be at this Conference and Reports officer:
ently? to work with Secretary Dulles and Senator Eugene V. McAuliffe, Executive Secretariat,
Secretary DULLES. As you say, it is quite un- Smith and the rest of the American delega- Department of State
likely as a practical matter that we would tion, and to come up with what I think is a Administrative officer:
act first, because, as I indicated, unless the sound solution to the difficulties confronting Bruce Grainger, Division of International
hat i
C
s all, `~ r.
difficult to say truthfully that it seriously
hair `an. Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I had only
affects the security of the United States. If The CHAIRMAN. I woul l like to add a word now observed the presence of Senator Del-
affects praise for the distinguished Senator who
communism throws aside all restraints and has just spoken. hich which w H
y
e was blotted out en here dght. ere goes son for at that then it is I starting think w can a I might say that in the recent campaign It is indeed very gratifying twee
me that the
reason bl coa conne cl which is directly s st aimed a a he did not hesitate to say, in substance, senator, who so ably led the Philippine
what he has said now, which indicates the
the United States, that we are the target. We mind not only of a statesman, but a level delegation at Manila, should be here at this
could not say that truthfully in the event headed thinker. hearing.
that theer is an armed attack which occurred Senator Capehart? The Philippine Government was not only
between two of the parties to this treaty, Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I see the their this Conference,
That which
their Vice President,
would would not not be prove of that there Communist. was origin. our very efficient Assistant Secretary of State and the chairman of their delegation, a great
any for Far Eastern Affairs, Walter Robertson, is
design against the United States. Therefore, here. Although he was not at the Manila substantive contribution to the constructive
achieved,
we do not assume the same commitments in Conference, he was holding down the fort terms which have been the Pacific Char In
that respect. g terms of the treaty and of the Paclflc Charter.
in this part of the globe at the time. He was
We do say that we will consult. We do not doing so under extremely difficult circum- Senator CAPEHAaT. Mr. Chairman, I do not
say that we will consult prior to any other stances, because he was quite ill. think I want to ask any questions, but I
action. We merely say we will consult, period. I would like to ask permission, if I may, would like to make this observation, that I
Senator GILLETTE. That is all, Mr. Chair- to insert all the names of the members of am hopeful that the other nations will be-
man. the American delegation in the hearings at bebome much m parties ore to this eiveaiy. I ththe it would h
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken? this point. ebre of the pa all
nations
the pat. It looks
me likewise
COMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES The CHAIRMAN. So ordered. to were
like e an an excellent members o treaty. I do not think
DELEGATION (The names of the American delegation I should spoil the Secretary here by throwing
Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I doubt if are as follows:) any bouquets at him, because there were a
any questions which I might ask at this UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE MEETING lot of them thrown at him this morning. We
time would contribute to the information ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA PACT, MANILA, SEP- do not want him to go to, what shall I say-
which we already have on hand. TEMREa, 6, 1954 he may quit making these fine treaties and
1Led orates plenipotentiary representa- guuu,
plinient the Secretary of State, Secretary tives: Secretary DULLES. Senator, I get plenty of
Dulles, on having conscientiously and appar- John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State the other things, so you need not worry about
ently effectively performed what appeared to H. Alexander Smith, United States Sena- my being spoiled.
be an almost impossible task, not only with tor from New Jersey Senator CAPI:HART. I have no questions or
regard to this treaty, but to the whole han- Michael J. Mansfield, United States Sena- suggestions. It looks to me like an excellent
dling of our foreign relations. As far as this for from Montana treaty, Mr. Secretary.
treaty goes, I would like, to Include Senator Roderic L. O'Connor, special assistant to Secretary DULLES. Thank you, sir.
Smith and Senator Mansfield in my remarks, the Secretary
g
because I think so long as we operate as the Delegation coordinator The CHAeRwex. Mr. further -and I pre-
have been doing, not only the of this : men, before we proceed pre-
re-
have y people Douglas MacArthur II, counselor, Depart- testimony,
country but the people of other countries as we can expect some can we,
well will have a great deal of respect for ment of State from from Adm. Arthur G. Davis-I want to say,
their efforts. Special advisers: as in the Korean Defense Pact, there was in-
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield? Arthur C. Davis, -vice admiral, United serted in the record a comparative chart of
Senator ,MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I have States Navy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for mutual-defense treaties between the United
no questions, but I would like to make a few International Security Affairs, Department of States and other Pacific countries with whom
comments, if I may. Defense we had concluded such treaties.
fference cesch tws forth the similarities
Senator Smith and Senator Aiken in con- Herman Phleger, legal adviser, Department and di it,
gratulating the Secretary of State for the of State and s between the Southeast Asia
e
outstanding job that he did at Manila, car- Ambassador William J. Sebald agin the Defense chart. . It and will the be so other order eyed.
appearing ppea
d.
Approved For Release 20.03/03/25: CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 S 11042
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
c;ONG1 ESSTONXL S ECORD - SENATE Jury 10, 1970
I. Excerpts from the Report of the Foreign those countries Ere made eligible for the kind briefly, from Adm. Arthur ' - Davis, Director
Relations Committee on the SEATO Treaty] of economic measures and technical assist- of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs
RE9roar'TO AccoawAN!' ExacuT1YE K, Erca-LY- once contemplated in article III of the treaty. speaking on behalf of the Department of
THIRD CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION 2. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY Defense.
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to At the time that negotiations were began After the 84th Congress had convened, the
. committee considered the treaty in executive
whom was referred the Southeast Asia Col- in 1950 leading to the Japanese security treaty session on January 13, 195!>, when additional
leetlve Defense Treaty (Bx. K, 83d Cong., 2d and to the series of separate security pacts testimony was received fro ii the Secretary of
less.) and the protocol therdto signed at in the Pacific area, it was hoped that a rather State. This second appearitace of Mr. Dulles
Manila on September 8, 1954, reports bath broad type of collective security arrange- was useful in bringing thc; committee up to
instruments to the Senate, and recommends ment might be worked out It was not then date on events bearing upon the treaty since
that its advice and consent to ratification be passible to realise this goal, and further ac- its transmittal to the Senate, and in review-
given at art early date. lion on a multLparti'le protective umbrella log for the committee and Its two new mem-
i. MAIN PURPOSE OF THr TREATY AND PROTOCOL over Southeast Asia had to be deferred as bers (Senators Barkley and Morse) the un-
treaty COrlstitutAS .I an important s7ep long as active hostilities continued in Into- denying conditions deeened by the Secretary
This
the treaty n st IIites States pantos eP china. The defense treaties with Japan, the of State to justify expeditious action.
in
nethe a evolution of collective States security in the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand, A second public hearing was held on Janu-
sitio area. coll irt addition which were approved by the Senate on March ary 19. lion. Hamilton Fish, former Congress-
ereate,a
the protective ve ea. it is of ee ecu mutual defense 20, 1952, were not regarded as ultimate ends man from New York, representing the Amer-
to in themselves, but were expressly conceived scan Political Action Committee, Miss Freda
treaties which have been concluded by the as measures taken "pending the development Utley, on behalf of the American China Policy
United States with Japan, Australia and New of a more comprehensive and effective system Association, and Mrs. Ames, Waters appeared
Zealand, the Philippines and Korea. of regional security" in the Pacific area. Fol- and were heard.
Designed to promote security and to lowing an address by President Eisenhower On January 21, the er ma-,ittee agreed, by a
strengthen the fabric of peace in southeast on April 16, 1953, in which he advocated vote of 14 to 1, to report both the treaty
Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the treaty is '.united action for Southeast Asia", Secre- and the protocol to the Senate for final ac-
intended to deter, aggression In that area by tarp of State John Forster Dulles sought dur- Lion.
warning potential aggressors that an open tug the next year to complete a pact covering The committee desires to commend the
armed attack upon the territory of any of 'the this area. Until after the Geneva armistice executive branch for its efforts to keep the
parties will be regarded by each of them as agreements were conc]pded, however, circum- committee thoroughly informed during the
dangerous to its own peace and safety (art.
IV, par. 1). In such circumstances the stances made that impracticable. course of the negotiations. In the prelimi-
In the course of hearings on the Korean nary discussions as well at, at the conference
her In n accordance with their cx.natit titwtional Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 93d Cong., to meet the c>arn dan- itself a spirit of cooperation was exhibited
lit sass.)
processes the committee triad stilted d its conviction that between the legislaidve? and executive
a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, branches which contribu',ed greatly to the.
They also agree to consult on measures to comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, satisfactory outcome of tae proceedings.
be taken for the common defense, whenever would be desirable. Secretary Dulles, how- 4. SUMMARY OF TRIA' Y PROVISIONS
t,]-.,e territorial integrity or Political independ- ever, pointed out that substantial cultural, The basic of any of the roes is threatened in political, of defense etreaties cof the the treaty y similar to
any way other than b armed attack, or by among , the and ge Parogcaodifferences
which existed that pray, arid the any fact or situation `which might endanger a es countries from m Europe with Korea,
countries, the ral
important
the peace of the area 1 art. IV, par. 2). Inter- tit ed seriouou area Europe and and earivie- , but with th several important ANZUS
subversion directed from without would sirired sired serious obstacles a achieving the ale- ences.
s developme tit at an early date. The con- In the preamble, the parties reaffirm their
be an example of one such fact or situation
mittee. acknowledged these difficulties but sovereign e, unlit
t.llingforconsultation. y, their faith in, the United
nevertheless expressed the hope that the De- Nations s Charter, their dc .i:^e to live in peace
The treaty is thus a mechanism for col- partment of State would continue its efforts
iective defense against: both open armed at- to encourage the nations of the Pacific to with all peoples and all g?;vernments and the
intentions expresse in to
tack and internal subversion, and it is in work together for their regional and col- uerphol the principl es e of e thie.s Manila Cha andncse l(-ual
rights this latter respect that it differs uphold n on of The sea primarily lective self-defense. determination of peoples. The reaffirmation
from the previous bilateral and trilateral After 4 months of negotiations between of these principles is accompanied by a dec-
security treaties in the Pacific. As with the the United States and other governments, it laration that the parties will strive to pro-
Korean Mutual Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d was announced on August 14, 1954 that upon mote self-government acid to secure inde-
Cong., 2d sess.) and similar defense treaties, the invitation of the Government of the pendence for all countries whose peoples
the parties to the treaty reaffirm their solemn Philippines, the Foreign Ministers of the desire it and are able to undertake its respon-
obligation under the Charter of the Unf.ted governments concerned had agreed to meet sibilities. The preamble frirther sets forth as
Nations to settle their dispues by peaceful on September 8 to consider measures to fur- the fundamental purposes of the treaty, co-
means and to refrain from the threat or use Slier their common objectives. At the re- ordination of the part.; es efforts for coliec-
o;? force in their international relations (art. quest of the President, two members of the tive defense and the preservation of security,
I. The treaty pledges them to maintain and .,:mrmittea, Senator H. Alexander Smith and warning potential aggressors that the signa-
develop their individual and collective ca- Senator Michael J. Mansfield, accompanied tories stand together. 'Thus the character of
pacity to resist armed attack, and, further, to Secretary Dulles to Manila as plenipotentiary the instrument as a peceful arrangement
prevent and counter subversive activities di- delegates and, together with him, signed for defense against aggression is plainly
recited from without against their territorial txoe treaty, the protocol arid a "Pacific Char- marked.
integrity and: political stability (art. II). It tear" which was also adopted at the confer- Article r reproduces i;ae undertaking found
provides for cooperation in developing mess- ence. The charter, a declaration of principles in other security treader to settle any in-
ures, including technical assistance designed dedicating the signatory governments to the ternational disputes in which the parties
to promote the economic progress and social ideals of self-determination and indepen- may be involved, by peat ful means, and to
well-being of the parties (art. III), for im- dence, does not require ratification. The refrain in their internaticaaal relations from
mediate consultation whenever their tern- treaty and protocol were signed on Septem- the threat or use of force in any manner in-
t:zrtal integrity or political independence is her 8, 1954, and transmitted to the Senate consistent with the purp.'ises of the United
threatened by other than armed attack or for its advice and consent on November 10, Nations. This article take= cognizance of the
any fact endangering the peace (art. IV, par. 1954. status of all signatories me members of the
2), and for the creation of a council to con- 3. COMMITTEE ACTION United Nations.
sider matters pertaining to the imp]eme:ata-
tion of the treaty (art. V). Other articles de- Because the administration was part,icu- Article II embodies the principle of the
Sue the area to which the treaty shall apply larly concerned that the last session of Con- Vandenberg resolution ('3. has. 239, 80th
(art. VIII) and the circumstances wider 'cress should not close without some prelim- Cong.) characteristic of ;he ether mutual
which other states may be invited to accede unary consideration being given to the treaty, security Treaties. It pledges the parties, sep-
to its terms (art. VII). Finally; an under- the committee decided to act with unusual arately and jointly, tin ugh self-help and
standing is incorporated in the text of the dispatch. Accordingly, the first public hear- mutual aid to maintain Cuff develop their in
instrument itself by which the United States ing was held on November 11, 1954, the dividual and collective capacity not only to
declares that the armed aggression referred morning after the President had transmitted resist armed attack; but also "to prevent and
to in article IV as dangerous to its peace and the pertinent documents to the Senate. counter subversive aci.i* ties directed from
security would be Communist aggression. There was no `.ntentlon to press for further without again et their Sar'I oriail integrity and
action on the treaty at that time; but it political stability."
The protocol designates the States of Lane: was hoped that. such a demonstration of the This rocognitiOn of tf .e 'dangers of sub-
mind Cambodia and the :Free territory under Government's coninued interest in the pact version and indirect aggro talon introduces an
the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam as would provide additional impetus to other element not found in th+' system of defense
:states or territories fur the purposes of article signatories to proceed promptly with their agreements which preceded the Southeast
IV, thus, bringing into play the obligations own ratification. At the hearing on Novem- Asian Treaty; in none 0r the prior pacts is
of the parties with respect to armed attack her 11, extended testimony was heard from there a provision for countering subversion,
and indirect aggression against this addi- Secretary Dulles on the various legal and po- although the Japanese Security Treaty does
-don to the "treaty area". At the same time litieal implications of the treaty, and, more contemplate the use of United States forces
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 July 10, 1970 Approved F gfN(A /2ftfEBM7*N,4W000300070029-8 S 11043
to put down large-scale riots and. disturb-
ances instigated by an outside power (art.
I). Article II, therefore, seeks to stimulate
positive action to defeat the erosive devices
which international communism has utilized
to destroy the freedom and independence of
nations.
Under article III the parties agree to co-
operate in developing economic measures,
including technical assistance, designed to
promote their economic, progress and social
well-being. This is accompanied by an under-
taking to strengthen the parties' free in-
stitutions. No comparable provision appears
in any of the previous defense treaties. It is
founded upon the conviction that if the free
nations can develop their internal stability
through economic cooperation, the ground
for Communist penetration will be rendered
less fertile. However, the article does not com-
mit the United States to a specific aid pro-
gram, nor does it preclude continued eco-
nomic cooperation with any country whose
economic welfare is important to our own
well-being and the stability of the treaty
area.
5. OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE IV
Article IV contains the activating, opera-
tive core of the treaty. Paragraph 1 corre-
sponds generally to article III of the Korean
Treaty and article V of the Philippine and
Australia-New Zealand Treaties in the rec-
ognition by each party that-"aggression by
> The SEATD members are Australia, It is against this background that the un-
fit September of that year: Prance, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philip- provoked attacks by North Vietnam on U.S.
"Vietminh sympathizers are to be found pines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and forces in international waters must be as-
Viroughout that region [South Vietrn,im] the United States. sessed. The joint committee believes that the
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 July 10, 197?`pproved For 2-0 WARR0300070029
best means of describing these events is by
quoting from the presentation of Ambassador
Adlai E. Stevenson to the ZJ,N. Security
Council, convened at our request on August
5:
"At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time,
August 2, 1964, the U.S. destroyer Maddox
was on routine patrol in international wa-
ters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a
southeasterly direction away from the coast
about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of
North Vietnam.
"WARNING SHOTS FIRED
"The Maddox was approached by three
high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats
in attack formation. When it was evident
that these torpedo boats intended to take
offensive action, the Maddox, in accordance
with naval practice, fired three warning shots
,.;across the bows of the approaching vessels.
"At approximately_ the same time, the air-
craft carrier Ticonderoga, which was also In
international waters and had. been alerted
to the impending attack, sent out four air-
craft to provide cover for the Maddox, the
pilots being under orders not to, lire unless
they or the Maddox was fired upon first. '
"Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes
which the Maddox, evaded by changing
course. All three attacking vessels directed
machinegun fire at the Maddox. One of the
attacking vessels approached for close at-
tack and was struck.by fire from the Maddox.
After the attack was broken off, the Maddox
continued on a southerly course in inter-
national waters.
"Now, W. President, clearly this was a
deliberate armed attack against a naval unit
of the U.S. Government on patrol In the high
seas-almost 30 miles off the mainland.
"HASTY RESPONSE AVOIDED
"Nevertheless, my Government did its ut-
most to minimize the explosive potential of
this' flagrant attack in the hopes that this
might be an isolated or uncalculated action.
There was local defensive fire. The United
States was not drawn into hasty response.
"On August 3, the United States took steps
to convey to the Hanoi regime a note calling
attention to this aggression, stating that U.S.
ships would continue to operate freely on the
high seas in accordance with.the rights guar-
anteed by international law, and warning
the authorities in Hanoi of the 'grave con-
sequences which would inevitably result from
any further unprovoked offensive military
action against U.S. forces.'
"This notification was-In accordance with
the provisions of the Geneva accords.
Our hope that this was an isolated in-
cident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Green-
wich time, August 4, when it was nighttime
do the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers Mad-
,40X and C. Turner Joy were again subjected
to an armed attack by an undetermined
number of motor torpedo boats of the North
Vietnamese Navy.
"This time the American vessels were 65
miles from, the shore, twice as far out on
the high seas as on the occasion of the previ-
ous attack. This time, numerous torpedoes
were fired. The attack lasted for over 2
hours.
"NO 'SHADOW OF DOUBT'
"There no longer could be any shadow of
doubt that this was planned deliberate mili-
tary aggression against vessels lawfully
present in international waters. One could
only conclude that this was the work of
authorities. dedicated to the use.of force to
achieye their objectives regardless of the
consequences.
"lay Government, therefore determined to
take positive but itmited relevant. measures
to secure Its naval units,against further ag-.
gression. Last night , aerial strikes were thus
carried out against boats and .their support;
facilities.
"This action was limited in scale, its only
targets being the weapons and the facilities
S 11049
against which we had been forced to defend new acts of Communist aggression in Laos,
ourselves. the United States undertook reconnaissance
"Now, Mr. President, gentlemen, it is our flights over Laotian terri+-- at the t
, reques
fervent hope that the point has now been of the Government of Laos. These flights had
made that acts of armed aggression are not the essential mission of determining the
to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any situation in territory where Communist
more than they are to be tolerated any- forces were preventing inspection by the
where else." International Control Commission. When the
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE Communists attacked these aircraft, I re-
On August 4 and 5 the President consulted sponded by furnishing escort fighters with
with congressional leaders, both before and instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus,
after the limited military retaliation di- these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our
rected against North Vietnam. On August 5. naval vessels are not the first direct attack
on Armed Forces of the United States.
1964. he sent thp fn11-1- -----
"Last night I announced to the American
people that the North Vietnamese regime
d
ha
conducted further deliberate attacks
against U.S. naval vessels operating in inter-
national waters, and that I had therefore
directed air action against gunboats and sup-
porting facilities used in these hostile op-
erations. This air action has now been car-
ried out with substantial damage to the
boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were
lost in the action.
"After consultation with the leaders of
both parties in the Congress, I further an-
nounced a decision to ask the Congress for a
resolution expressing the unity and determi-
nation of the United States in supporting
freedom and in protecting peace in south-
east Asia.
"These latest actions of the North Viet-
namese regime have given a new and grave
turn to the already serious situation in
southeast Asia. Our commitments in that
area are well known to the Congress. They
were first made in 1954 by President Eisen-
hower. They were further defined in the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty ap-
proved by the Senate in February 1955.
"This treaty with its accompanying proto-
col obligates the United States 'and other
members to act in accordance with their
constitutional processes to meet Communist
aggression against any of the parties or pro-
tocol states.
"Our policy in southeast Asia has been
consistent and unchanged since 1954. I sum-
marized it on June 2 in four simple propo-
sitions:
"1. America keeps her word. Here as else-
where, we must and shall honor our com-
mitments.
gress, on its part, to join in affirming the na-
tional determination that all such attacks
will be met, and that the United States will
continue in its basic policy of assisting the
free nations of the area to defend their free-
dom.
"As I have repeatedly made clear,. the
United States intends no rashness, and seeks
no wider war. We must make it clear to all
that the United States Is united in its de-
termination to bring about the end of Com-
munist subversion and aggression in the
area. We seek the full and effective restora-
tion of the international agreements signed
in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South
Vietnam, and again at Geneva in 1962, with
respect to Laos.
"I recommend a resolution expressing the
support of the Congress for all necessary ac-
tion to protect our Armed Forces and to
assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty.
At the Same time, I assure the Congress that
we shall continue readily to explore any
avenues of political solution that will ef-
fectively guarantee the removal of Com-
munist subversion and the preservation of
the independence of the nations of the area.
"The resolution could well be based upon
similar resolutions enacted by the Congress
in the past-to meet the threat to Formosa
in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East
in 1957, and to meet the threat to Cuba in
1962. It could state in the simplest terms
the resolve and support of the Congress for
action to deal appropriately with attacks
against our Armed Forces and to defend free-
dom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in
accordance with the obligations of the
United States under the Southeast Asia
Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such
a resolution promptly and thus to
ive
g
con-
"2. The issue is the future, of southeast vincing evidence to the aggressive Commu-
Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in nist nations, and to the world as a whole,
that region is a threat to all, and a threat that our policy in southeast Asia will be
to us. carried forward-and that the peace and
"3. Our purpose is peace. We have no mill- - security of the area will be preserved.
tary, political, or territorial ambitions in the "The events of this week would in any
area. event have made the passage of a congres-
"4. This is not just a jungle war, but a sional resolution essential. But there is an
struggle for freedom on every front of human additional reason for doing so at a time
activity. Our military and economic assist- when we are entering on 3 months of polit-
ance to South Vietnam and Laos in particu- teal campaigning. Hostile nations must un-
lar has the purpose of helping these coun- States that in such a period the United
tries to repel aggression and strengthen their States will continue to protect its national
independence. Interests, and that in these matters there is
"The threat to the free nations of south- no division among us.
east Asia has long been clear. The North "LYNDON JOHNSON.
Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to "THE WHITE HovsE, August 5 5, , 1964,"
take over South Vietnam and Laos. This COMMITTEE ACTION
Communist regime has violated the Geneva The President's message and Senate Joint
accords for Vietnam. It has systematically Resolution 189, introduced by Senator Ful-
conducted a campaign of subversion, which bright (for himslf and Senator Hickenlooper,
includes the direction, training, and supply Senator Russell, and Senator Saltonstall) to
of personnel and arms for the conduct of , give effect to the Presidential recommenda-
guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese terri- t'ions, by unanimous consent were referred
tory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime jointly to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
has maintained military forces, used Laotian tions and the Committee on Armed Services.
territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, During the morning of August 6 the joint
and most recently carried out combat oper- committee, with Senator Fulbright presid-
ations-all in direct violation of the Geneva ing in executive session, heard Secretary of
agreements of 1962. State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Rob-
"In recent months, the actions of the ert McNamara, and Gen. Earle Wheeler,
North Vietnamese regime have become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
steadly more threatening. In May following After receiving the testimony the joint
.Approved For Release 2003/03125 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 S 11050 Approved For RL~~ s ~2~1~ I E &WS 72- ffP00300070029-8July 10, 1970
committee voted 31 to 1 to report the reso- that it should be furnished, stating that removal of Communist subversion and
lu-tcm favorably without amendment, our purpose was to "assist the Government agression.
SCOPE Or THT RESOLUTION of Vietnam in developing and maintaining Essentially, the outcome of this conflict,
ion 189 is patterned a strong, viable state, capable of resisting at- and the course of events Ire the area as a
Joint tempted subversion or aggression through whole, is up to the Communist Side. It has
quite closely upon Resolution 189 afforded by military means." the option of accepting the freedom and
in- resolutions: the Formosa resolution In the fall of 1954, Secretary Dulles ne- dependence of neighboring nations, or of
of 1955, the Middle East reslution of 195'?, gotiated, and the Senate in early 1955 con- continuing its aggressive tactics.. For our
and the Cuba resolution of 1962. sensed to, the Southeast Asia Collective De- part, as President Johnson stated on June
Tae phrasing in section 2, "in accordance fence Treaty, sometimes known as the Ma- 23: "The United States intends no rashness,
with its obligations under the. Southeast nila Pact. This treaty provided for the col- and seeks no wider war. But the United
Asia Collective Defense Treaty," compre- lective defense of the parties to this treaty-- States is determined to use Its strength to
hends the understanding in that treaty that Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New help those who are defending themselves
the U.S. response in the context of article Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, the against terror and aggression. We are a peo-
aV (1 i is confined to Communist aggression. United Kingdom, and France. It provided ple of peace-but not of weakness or tim-
It s'iould also be painted out that 15.S. assist,- funher that the protection of the treaty idity."
ante, as comprehended by section 2, will should extend, under art annexed protocol, to Purpose of the resolution
be i atorry y or had a only state on covered request by and the only to protocol a the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos This, then is the background of the Reso-
tothe SEATO l and Cambodia. lution before you. We have never doubted
to the Treaty. The protocol states are I do not need to review for you the sub- the support of the American people for the
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. sequent history of North Vietnamese efforts policies that have been followed through
The language in section 3, which governs to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and three administrations over a period of a dec-
t:he termination of the resolution, combines to do the same in Laos. Having found that ade. But In the face of the heightened ag-
the relevant provisions of the Formosa and South Vietnam would not collapse of itself gression on the Communist :aide, exemplified
Middle East resolutions. but. was on the contrary making remarkable by these latest North Vietnamese attacks, it
JOINT COMMITTEE RECOMMENoATION progress, Hanoi in 1959 Initiated a systematic has seemed clearly wise to seek in the most
With only one dissenting vote, the joint; campaign of terror and. subversion in South emphatic form a declaration of Congressional
committee endorsed the resolution and rev- Vietnam,. directed and supplied with key per- support both for the defense of our armed
ormmnended its adoption by the Sennate. Mem- sonnel and equipment from the north. By forces against similar attacks and for the
hers of the committee expressed approval 1961, the situation had reached a critical carrying forward of whatever steps may be-
of the handling of the crisis in southeast point and the United States greatly increased come necessary to assist the free nations
Asia by the President and the Secretaries of its advisory and supporting assistance to the covered by the Southeast Asia Treaty.
State and. Defense, by the Joint Chiefs of Government of South Vietnam. We cannot tell what steps may in the fu-
Staff, and by U.S. naval forces in the area Despite this assistance, the task of coon- - ture be required to meet Communist ag-
of Vietnam. tering'the extensive Viet Cong effort remains gression in Southeast Asia.. The unity and
On the basis of testimony submitted by a long and arduous one, and as you know determination of the American people,
the Secretaries of State and Defense and we have moved within the last two weeks to through their Congress, should be declared
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further increase our support while recogniz- in terms so firm that they cannot possibly
the committee was satisfied that the de- ing always that the struggle in South Vietnam be mistaken by other nations. The world has
vision of the President to retaliate against, must essentially be the responsibility of the learned over 50 years of history that aggres-
the North, Vietnamese gunboat attacks was South Vietnamese themselves. sion is invited if there is doubt about the
both soundly conceived and skillfully exe- in Laos, the agreements reached at Geneva response. Let us leave today's aggressors in
cured. In the circumstances, 'the United In 1962 have been consistently violated by no doubt whatever.
States could not have done less and should. Hanoi and in May of this year the situation i now turn to Secretary McNamara, who
not, have done more. took on a more critical character when a will describe the recent attacks and our
Communist military offensive drove neutralist response.
[13. Statement by Secretary Rusk before the forces from the area of the Plain. of Jars they I now turn to the specifics of the Resolu-
Joint Hearing of the Senate Foreign Rela- had held in 1962. Our responses to these tion before you.
tions Committee and The Senate Armed events, including the provision of additional The preamble, I believe, speaks for itself.
Services Committee In connection with T-18's to the Government of Laos [deleted] It spells out in the simplest and shortest
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution] are well known to you. terms possible the fact of North Vietnamese
The present attacks, then, are no isolated attacks, their relation to she over-all cam-
,,31'ATEMENT OF SECRETARY or STATE DBA;V' event. They are part and parcel of a-continu- paign of aggression by North Vietnam, and
Rim= ing Communist drive to conquer South Viet- the purposes and objectives of the United
chairman Fulbright, Chairman Russ(ll, nom, control or conquer Laos, and thus States in Southeast Asia.
and members of the committees, I appear weaken and eventually dominate and conquer As to the operative sections of the Reso-
before you In support of the Joint Congres- other free nations of Southeast Asia. One does lotion, Section 1 declares the approval and
atonal Resolution on Southeast Asia now be- not need to spelt out a "domino theory"; it support of the Congress for actions, in re-
fore your committees. If the committees are is enough to recognize the true nature of the sponse to armed attack on United States
agreeable, I shall proceed 'by explaining the Communist doctrine of world revolution and forces, which the President has the authority
purpose of the Resolution. Secretary Mc- the militant support that Hanoi and Peiping and obligation to take in his capacity as
Namara will then describe to you the re- are giving to that doctrine in Southeast Asia. Commander-in-Chief.
cent: attacks on our naval vessels and the objectives
U..i. response thereto. I would then propose U.S. SPolio& and oi'~ Turning next to Section. 2 of the draft
to conclude by going over the text of the Although the United States did not itself Resolution, let me make clear at the outset
Resolution itself and discussing its meaning sign the Geneva Accords of 1954, Under Sec- what the Resolution does not embrace. It
and scope. retary Walter Bedell Smith made a formal does not cover action to assist any nation not
The immediate occasion for this Resolution statement that the United States "would view a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty or-
I-; of course the North Vietnamese attacks any renewal of the aggression in violation of ganization or a protocol state. It does not
on our naval vessels, operating in interna- the aforesaid agreements with grave concern cover any action in support, of a nation un-
ticnal waters in the Golf of Tonkin, on Au- and as seriously threatening international less such nation requests it. It does not cover
gust 2nd and August 4th. peace and security." We have repeatedly made any action to resist aggression that is not
:However, it is obvious that these attacks clear that the independence and security pro- Communist In origin. The Southeast Asia
were not an isolated event but are related di- vided for South Vietnam under those Ac- Treaty includes a United States understand-
re>t.ly to the aggressive posture of North Viet- cords was a satisfactory status for South ing that it is directed solely against "Corn-
nam and to the policy that the United States Vietnam. All that is needed, as I have myself munist aggression."
has been pursuing in assisting the free na- often said, is for Hanoi and Peiping to leave The language, "to take. all necessary steps,
tions of southeast Asia and particularly their neighbors alone. Including the use of armed force", is similar
South Vietnam and Laos, to defend them- The same Is true with respect to the 1962 to the authority embraced in the Formosa
se,,ves against Communist aggression, and Accords for Laos. Thee provided a reason- Resolution of 1955, the Middle East Resolu-
thus to preserve the peace of the area, able arrangement for the status of Laos, and tion of 1957, and the Culba Resolution of
When Indochina was divided and the in- what is needed, again, is simply that the 1962. Copies of each of these have been made
dependent states of South Vietnam, Laos, s.nd Communist side should honor the commit- available to you for comparative purposes.
Cambodia were created 'under the condi- merits it undertook. The Formosa Resolution authorized the
lions of the Genevan Accords of 1954, It was Above all, there can be no doubt of United President "to employ the armed forces of
at once clear that in the face of the North States objectives for these nations and for the United States". The Middle East Reso-
Vietnamese threat South Vietnam and Laos the area as a whole. Here, as elsewhere, we lution stated that the United States was
eculd not maintain their independence with- believe that nations are entitled to remain "prepared to use armed forces." The nearest
out outside assistance. The Government of free and to develop as they see fit. The United parallel to the language of the present Reso-
South Vietnam turned to the United States States has no military, territorial, or political lution is in the first clause of the Cuba Res-
for such,' assistance, and President Risen- ambitions for itself in Southeast Asia. We olution, that the United States is "deter-
hower in December 1954 made the decision seek only the restoration of peace and the mined ... to prevent by whatever means may
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 6
July,10, 1970proved For q72-W7Agp0300070029-8 S 11051
be necessary, including the use of arms" the direct hit by the Maddox. At 3:29 P.M., them, they had suffered no hits nor casual-
Cuban subversive activities extending to any the engagement terminated and the air- ties and the defensive aircraft from the
part of the hemisphere. craft escorted the Maddox southward on its Ticonderoga were illuminating the area and
I 'shall not take your time this morning to patrol course.
ti.: attacking the enemy surface craft. Shortly
t}eview the constitutional aspects of resolu- On Monday, August 3, the President made thereafter, they reported that at least two
tions of this character. I believe it. to be the public instructions that he had issued the enemy craft had been sunk although low ceil-
generally accepted constitutional view that day before regarding future patrols and en- ings continued to hamper the aircraft opera-
the President has the constitutional author- gagements with enemy craft. He instructed tions. The Turner Joy reported that during
ity to take at least limited armed action in the Navy, first, to continue the patrols in the engagement, in addition to the torpedo
defense of American national .interests; in the Gulf of Tonkin; second, to double the attack, she was fired upon by automatic
at least 85 instances. Presidents of the United force by adding an additional destroyer to weapons while being illuminated by search-
States have in fact taken such action. As i the one already on patrol; third, to provide lights.
have said before, we cannot now be sure what a combat air patrol over the destroyers; and Finally, after more than two hours under
actions may be required. The Formosa Reso- fourth, to issue instructions to the combat attack, the destroyers reported at 1:30 A.M.
lution of 1955 was followed by the_use, of aircraft and to the destroyers (a) to attack that the attacking craft had apparently
United States warships to escort supply any force which attacked them in interna- broken off the engagement.
convoys to the offshore island in 1958; the tional waters, and (b) to attack with the ob- The deliberate and unprovoked nature of
Middle 'East Resolution was followed by Presi- jective of not only driving off the force but the attacks at locations that were indis-
dent Eisenhower's sending of troops to Leb- of destroying it. putably in international waters compelled
anon in 1958; the Cuba Resolution was At the same time as these instructions were the President and his principal advisers to
followed by the well-known events of October being broadcast throughout the world, the conclude that a prompt and firm military
1962. I do not suggest that any of these State Department, acting pursuant to _ the response was required. Accordingly, the
actions may serve as a parallel for what may President's further Instructions, took steps President decided that air action, in reply
be required in Southeast Asia. There can be to deliver a note of protest to the North to the unprovoked attacks, should be taken
no doubt, however, that these previous res- Vietnam regime. The note was also widely against gunboats and certain supporting fa-
olutions form a solid. legal precedent for the Publicized. It concluded with the words, cilities in North Vietnam which had been
action now proposed. Such action Is required The United States Government expects that used in the hostile operations. On Tuesday
to make the purposes of the United States the authorities of the regime in North Viet- evening, after consulting with Congressional
clear and to protect our national interests. Nam will be under no misapprehension as leadership, he so informed the American
to the grave consequences which would in- people.
17. Statement by Secretary of Defense Mc- evitab y result
m any further unprovoked The United States military response was
Namara before the same Committees in offensive military action against United carefully planned and effectively carried out.
connection with the Tonkin Gulf Resolu- States forces." The U.S. air strikes began approximately
tion] Our hopes that the firm defensive action at
taken in response to the first attack and noon Wednesday local time against North
:.PTATEMENT BY SECRETARY or DEFENSE ROBERT the protest to Hanoi would end the matter Vietnamese PT and gun boats, their bases and
S. McNAMARA were short-lived support fabyities. These
raftisof attacks, United
. ried
Fulbxight, Chairman. Russell, After the firs
t attack on Sunday, the Sta o out e naval a tiro o the United
and members of the Senate Foreign elations Maddox joined with its sister destroyer, the Ticn Seventh oast from the carriers
and Armed Services Committees, during the USS Turner Joy, in the Gulf of Tonkin and In scale-their and primary ZZa arge s being ng the
past few days, deliberate and unprovoked resumed its patrol in international waters, in scale-their primary targets being the
military attacks by the North Vietnamese as directed by the President. weapons against which our patrolling de-
have given rise to the need for us to appear Monday, August 3, was uneventful. strayers had been forced to defend them-
here today. I should like to review the at- The selves twice in the prior 72 hours,
tacks with you briefly and to describe the patrol was also uneventful during Specifically, our naval air forces launched
responses we made to those attacks. most of the daylight hours of Tuesday, Au- 64 attack sorties against 4 North Vietnamese
gust 4 In the early evening of August 4, how- patrol boat bases and their boats and against
The first incident occurred on. August 2. ever, ?he Maddox reported radar contact with a major supporting oil storage depot. Strike
It concerned the USS Maddox, one of our unidentified surface vessels who were paral- reports indicate that all targets were severely a routine detestroyers gage engaged In of the Gulf, patrol in leling its track and the track of the Turner hit, in particular the petroleum installation
In ernatio al Viat Nam coast. At about noon, Joy. It was 7:40 P.M. when the Maddox re- where 10% of North Vietnam's petroleum off e
North when the Maddox was about At
ported that, from actions being taken by storage capacity was 90% destroyed. Smoke
30 miles from
the coase she reported that three torpedo those unidentified vessels, an attack by them was observed rising to 14,000 feet. Some 25
boats oast, on a reported
course heading td- appeared imminent. At this time the Maddox North Vietnamese patrol boats were de-
ward the were. o southerly of over 1h miles. was heading southeast near the center of stroyed or damaged.
Two the ship at a , at range f over o 10 m ml 2:40 the Gulf of Tonkin in International waters Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and
15.T? e Gu ,
knotapr approached
She reported to have crashed with his plane between two
spee the 45 to apparen50
t of intention t. this craft was The Maddox at 8:36 P.M. established new PT craft he had under attack. Another pilot
t9 conduct a torpedo attack and that she radar contact with two unidentified surface reported that he was electing from his
intended to open fire in self-defense if n she vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At downed aircraft. His whereabouts is at
in
essary
ten. She was attacked by the three PT this time, U.S. fighter aircraft were launched present listed as unknown.
craft at 3:08 P.M. She opened fire with her from the Ticonderoga to rendezvous with the In view of the unprovoked and deliberate
five-inch battery after three warning shots Maddox and the Turner Joy to provide pro- attacks in international waters on our naval
failed to slow down the attackers, The PTs tection against possible attack from the un- vessels and bearing in mind that the best
continued their closing maneuvers, and two identified vessels and aircraft, in accordance way to deter escalation is to be prepared for
of the M closed to 5,000 yards, each firing with the President's previously issued direc- it, the President and his principal advisers
one torpedo, The Maddox changed course in tives. Shortly thereafter, the Maddox re- concluded that additional precautionary
an evasive move and the two torpedoes passed Ported that the unidentified aircraft had dis- measures were required in Southeast Asia.
on the starboard side at a distance of 100 to appeared from its radar screen and that the Certain military deployments to the area are
200 yards. surface vessels were remaining at a distance. therefore now underway. These include:
The USS Ticonderoga, which was operating The aircraft from the Ticonderoga arrived a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from
In waters to the southeast and which had and commenced defensive patrol over the the Pacific coast to the Western Pacific;
been alerted to the impending attack, ad- Maddox and the Turner Joy. b. Movement of interceptor and fighter
vised she was sending four already airborne At 9:30 P.M., additional unidentified ves- bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;
F-BE (Crusader) fighters with rockets and sels were observed on the Maddox radar, and
20 mm ammunition to provide air cover for these vessels began to close rapidly on the Movement of fighter bomber aircraft
the Maddox. At about 3:21 P,M., the third destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 Into Thailand;
hostile PT moved up to the beam of the knots- The attacking craft continued to close d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter
Maddox and received a. direct hit by a five- rapidly from the west and south and the bomber squadrons from the United States
inch round; at the same time it dropped a Maddox reported that their intentions were to advance bases in the Pacific;
torpedo into the water which was, not seen evaluated as hostile. The destroyers reported e. Movement of an antisubmarine force
to run. Machine gun fire from the PTs was at 9:52 P.M. that they were under continuous into the South China Sea;
directed at the Maddox. However, there was torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive f. The alerting and reading for movement
no injury to personnel and no damage. The counterfire. of selected Army and Marine forces.
Maddox continued in a southerly direction Within the next hour, the destroyers re- In the meantime, U.S. destro yers with pro-
to join with a sister destroyer, the C. Turner layed messages stating that they had avoided tective air cover as needed, continue their
Joy, as Ticonderoga aircraft commenced at- a number of torpedoes, that they had been patrol in the international waters of the
tacking the PTs. ZUNI rocket runs and 20 under repeated' attack, and that they had Gulf of Tonkin,
aim strafing attacks were directed against sunk two of the attacking craft. By Midnight The moves we have taken'to reinforce our
two of the PTs, and they were damaged. The local time, the destroyers reported that, even forces in the Pacific are in my judgment
third PT remained dead in the water after though many torpedoes had been fired at sufficient for the time being. Other rein-
..
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 S '11052
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE July 10, 1970
forcing steps can be taken very rapidly if the and not treaty powers. As I have always The Senator from Iowa is suggesting
sit' ation requires. viewed the matter, we have no treaty that there should be another factor;
This concludes my descriptions of the two obligation under SEATO. We are al- namely, withdrawing troops consistent
deliberate and unprovoked North vietna-
meuc attacks on. U.S. naval vessels on the ready in the war, and have been for with the security and handking the ter-
high seas; of the United States reprisal years, so the President stands on his urination of the war consistent with
against the offending boats, their bases and constitutional powers. treaty obligations to the people we have
related facilities; and of the precautionary Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will been helping. The Senator from New
deployment and alerting steps we have taken the senator yield? York recognized that as an additional
t3 guard against any eventuality. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- factor. However, I think we can vote for
Mr. ALLOTT and Mr. HOLLAND ad- ator from Florida has the floor. the repeal'of the Gulf of Tonkin resolu-
dressed the Chair. Mr. FULBRIGHT. I repudiate any tion as a`deckclearing opera..tion, without
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- suggestion that I was the father of this getting into any argument as to how we
ator froza Florida is recognized. resolution. interpret the constitutional powers of the
Mr HOLLAND. Mr. President, I had Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Ar- President as Commander in Chief.
come to the floor expecting to support kansas sponsored it here on the Senate Mr. President, I shall vote for repeal,
this resolution. I have understood that floor, but I certainly want it understood.-that
the President has said he (toes not need Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Lyndon Baines when it comes to interpreting the pow-
this resolution, that he is proceeding to Johnson was the father. ers of the President as Commander in
handle the situation which he found I was the midwife for an illegitimate Chief, that means more than just with-
when he went into office, that es Com- child, [Laughter.] I did not at that time drawing troops as fast as possible con-
mander in Chief he feels that he has recognize the nature of Its parentage, sistent with their security. There is an-
ample power to handle that situation and I was not aware of the falsity of other ingredient, and that is what Viet-
wL?dchever way it leads to an honorable the circumstances under which it was namization is designed to nneet.
conclusion. conceived and presented to me, and I Mr. HOLLAND. I thank the Senator.
However, after I have heard what the repudiate any suggestion, that I am its Mr. President, I yield temporarily to
distinguished Senator from New York has father. Under the rules of the Senate, the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARK-
had to say as to his interpretation of the as chairman, I was merely the midwife MAN) and hope that he will confine his
resolution-and he is one of its joint to bring it to this Chamber. comments to 2 minutes, because one of
authors-and after I have talked with Mr. STENNIS. I was referring to the our friends has to catch a plane.
my distinguished friend, the Senator presentation here. by the Senator from Mr. SPARKMAN. I will certainly do
from Arkansas, who I understand sup- Arkansas, and in jest, also. I have heard that.
ports the same interpretation, I could not these cases of Illegitimacy in court cases Mr. President, I want to say that in
possibly support it. but not here on the Senate floor. committee I voted to report the resolu-
I think that we all in good faith voted Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I had tion favorably to the floor. I did not feel
for the Gulf of Tonkin reso:l faith . I think not expected to hold up the Senate that anyone in the committee felt that
that we all would not want to leave the longer. My sole position is this: I voted the interpretation of the Senator from
present President,' who had nothing to the other day for an amendment which New York, as I have heard it, was Gor-
do with it at that time, inhibited in any would have repealed this resolution, but rect.
way or crippled in any way with respect under a completely different understand- In fact, all the testimony before the
to dealing actively and effectively with ing from that stated now by the Seikator committee from the administration was
the various steps that need to be done from New York-and I understand sup- to the effect that no longer are they
to bring this whole matter to a conclu- ported by the distinguished Senator from using the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, that
stop and the fulfilling of such obligations Arkansas-as being the interpretation of they would not use it, that they did not
we have incurred there. . Since one of the pending joint resolution. I cannot intend to do so, that they neither op-
as' t of support it under that interpretation, and posed nor recommended its repeal, that
the w e, s theren has
what authors hrs stated on sol tool- I honor that is what I am trying to make clear. it was entirely up to us.
and I also honor the candor am not going to be a party to pulling Therefore, Mr. President, I think it is
wis candor, stated
distinguished nor th of dor the rug out from under the President. I most unfortunate that this interpreta-
of the
of the di on Foreign chairman the could think he has complete power to deal with tion has come up here on the floor. I do
committee this situation, which he inherited, and to not believe it was the interpretation that
not possibly support this resolution, be- do everything that is honorable in bring- prevailed in the committee when we
cause I do not believe that we should. ing the situation to a conclusion, but voted to report it.
pull the rug from under the President without having to come back here for Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say to the
or that we should do something that look, this, that, and the other consent and long Senator that he is absolutely correct.
as though we are completely withdraw- hearing and debate before he does things The President has stated time and time
ing our support. I just want to make my that the situation. requires. again that he was not operating on the
position completely clear. Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the basis of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution
I would be happy to vote for the repeal. Senator yield? and, as a matter of fact, he disavowed it.
of the resolution, but with a completely Mr. HOLLAND. I Yield. Mr. SPARKMAN. That is right. I agree
different understanding from that stated Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator. that he has the constitutional powers,
by the Senator from New York; namely, Mr. President, I share somewhat the regardless of what we do with the Gulf
that the President would have f ail power concern
of the Senator from Florida. OOf Tonkin resolution.
to do all the things that are necessary In But, in fairness, I want to repeat what The PRESIDING OI?E'ICER (Mr.
fiilfilling honorable obligations that we the Senator from New York did say. He SPONG). The Senator from Florida has
have there in protecting our troops and said his interpretation of the action by the floor.
ultimately getting them out. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, he
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the the Senate's repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin sat down.
Senator yield? resolution was that it; would "clear the The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
Mr. HOLLAND. I yield. decks," so to speak, and that the powers ator from Florida has the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. I understand that a vote of the President then' would be covered
Is Is enuring up in a few minutes. I will not by the Constitution. Then he said that Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I
x for the repeal of this resolution., how each Member of the Senate would yielded the floor but I am glad to yield to
vote regardless of its history--and it is re- interpret those ;powers would be up to diated here by its own father, the his own individual judgment. He said: The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
Seaa,tor from Arkansas-if it is going to I am only stating my own personal Judg ator from Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT) is rec-
detract from the President's position. mint on it. ognized.
Now that we have moved on with the war, He went on to say that the powers of Two OR WORE CHEERS FOR TWO oR MORE
REPEALS
and the President, himself, has said that the President as Commander in Chief
be does not need the resolution, as I would cover withdrawal of troops in an Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, things
understand the situation, the President is appropriate manner consistent with their are becoming, as Alice said in Wonder-
standing on his constitutional powers security. land, "curiouser and curiouser."
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 f Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
July 10, 1970, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 11053
Unless my eyes and ears deceive me,
we are about to repeal a resolution that
we have recently repealed.
Now I have been in this body for 16
years `and I thought I had seen pretty
much everything by now.
But this is truly remarkable. I sup-
pose that there is nothing in the laws
of nature that makes it impossible to re-
peal something twice. I just hope the
laws of legislation are different from
some of the laws of the sciences. I would
hate to think that two negatives would
make a positive. In that case, two re-
peals might make an enactment and we
would be back with the Tonkin Gulf res-
olution. It is my understanding that this
is not the intention of the junior Senator
from Arkansas, who only wants to be
floor manager of the Tonkin Gulf reso-
lution once in this lifetime.
Mr. President, this double repeal has a
certain charm, and it also has limitless
possibilities. If repealing something twice
means we find it especially bad, then per-
haps we should pass very good measures
twice-or maybe even more.
For example consider the 19th Amend-
merit. Clearly it was a splendid thing to
give women the vote. Perhaps we should
pass it again, just to show our enthusiasm
for the wohien of the Nation.
In addition, I think the confirmation
of. John Marshall as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court was especially fortunate
for this Nation. Therefore, perhaps we
should give some consideration to recon-
firming him, just on general principles.
It cannot do any harm. It certainly can-
not inconvenience him, because he is as
dead as the Tonkin Gulf resolution.
Mr. President, I must point out that
this business of repealing the repealed
does represent a certain departure from
Senate procedure. I do not want to be a
stick in the mud; this departure con-
tributes to the public stock of harmless
pleasure.
I would not mention it except that
some of those most anxious to repeal the
Tonkin Gulf resolution have recently
been very eloquent in defending what
they take to be accepted Senate proce-
dures. In fact, if my memory serves me,
the distinguished and learned junior
Senator from Arkansas found fault with
the -original procedures whereby the
Tonkin Gulf resolution was repealed.
Of course it is understandable that the
floor manager of the Tonkin Gulf res-
olution would want to see it laid to rest
with proper solemnity and ceremony.
Nevertheless, it is odd that the defenders
of Senatorial due process should be pio-
neering this most imaginative improvisa-
tion-the double repeal of measures they
come to deem obnoxious.
Mr. President, I have one more
thought. Perhaps it is a good idea to re-
peal this resolution twice, just to make up
for the fact that some things that need
doing cannot even be done once.
For example, we have not yet managedofficially to end the Second World War.-
So let's repeal the Tonkin Gulf resolution
once more to n}ake up for that.
In addition, we have not yet got a real
settlement of the Korean war. So when
we are done repealing the Tonkin Gulf
resolution a second time, lets march
ahead and repeal it a third time, just to
show how good we are at terminating
some things.
Then we should repeal it a fourth time
just to show how determined we are
someday to find a cure for cancer.
Then maybe we could repeal it a fifth
time, to show our sympathy for the
downtrodden.
Mr. President, as I said at the outset,
the possibilities are limitless for this new
kind of imaginative legislating. I only
want to salute those who are here pio-
neering new dimensions in creative gov-
ernment, and who have transcended last
week's enormous commitment to tradi-
tional Senate procedures.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the Tonkin
Gulf resolution is inappropriate to to-
day's realities in Southeast Asia. It is a
vehicle of escalation and widening in-
volvement, whereas U.S. operations in
Southeast Asia are today directed toward
deescalation and reduced involvement in
combat. It is the policy device of a pre-
vious administration which sought to ex-
pand the American presence in Viet-
nam; whereas the Nixon administration
has never relied upon nor invoked the
Tonkin Gulf resolution in policy.
The Tonkin Gulf was variously and in-
consistently interpreted after its adop-
tion. Some saw it as a purely defensive
and narrow-ranged response to a spe-
cific incident. Others saw it as a carte
blanche mandate with which to enmesh
the United States in a full-scale com-
mitment to the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment. Some considered it a virtual
declaration of, war.
In the wake of these differing interpre-
tations, the Tonkin Gulf resolution now
stands as an obsolete and unused vestige
of our foreign policy. It has been rejected
by the Nixon administration, and it
serves no useful purpose other than as a
reminder of its past abuses and their
consequences.
Since the resolution was subjected to
such abusive interpretation, its presence
on the statute books presents a clear and
not altogether fanciful danger that some
other and equally vexatious reading
might be given in the future.
Recent Senate debate has repeatedly
emphasized the responsibility of Con-
gress to assume its obligations in the for-
mulation and conduct of foreign policy.
While care should be taken to avoid ac-
tions which would appear to limit or
transgress upon the President's preroga-
tives in this field, Congress, the Senate In
particular, has a significant role to play
in establishing policy objectives and
guidelines. By repealing the Tonkin Gulf
resolution we can exercise our powers and
fulfill our responsibilities in a positive
and meaningful way. Having provided the
peg upon which the Vietnam escalation
was hung, we can make a start at exert-
ing congressional influence and wisdom
by removing that peg and clearing the
way for other worthwhile achievements
in defining foreign policy and national
priorities.
Mr. I'IANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Wyoming
(Mr. MCGEE) is necessarily absent from
the Senate today, but he has asked that
a statement he prepared in advance of
this occasion be shared with his col-
leagues as part of the debate on Senate
Concurrent Resolution 64. The Senator
from Wyoming's views in this area are
strong ones, firmly held. I ask unani-
mous consent that the statement of
Senator McGEE be included in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
SENATOR MCGEE'S STATEMENT ON SENATE
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 64
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, this body is
awash in Irrelevancy today. Action on this
resolution to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution means nothing. It will not change
things. We cannot repeal history. In fact,
there is really nothing in the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution itself that either permits or with-
holds from the President any of the actions
which have taken place in Southeast Asia.
Mr. President, nearly every member of the
Senate voted for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
Despite that, there have been many attempts
by individual members to explain away or
excuse their vote. I for one am not prepared
to say that the Senate was either deceived
or simple minded at the time this resolution
was passed. I believe we voted as we did be-
cause we thought it the wise thing to do.
And in all honesty I believe It fair to say
that if events in Southeast Asia had taken
a better turn after that resolution was en-
acted, we would be pnore inclined to point
with pride at our action in approving that
resolution, rather than exacerbate the con-
tinuing debate over the war by pushing
through some official sort of mea culpa
which pretends to undo what has already
been done.
Aside from the irrelevancy of the issue,
there is a serious negative aspect to the pro-
position before the Senate today. The people
here at home may read into the action itself
more than even its proponents ever intended.
At the very least, it may be interpreted as
a slap at the President of the United States.
In this context, it could become a complica-
tion hampering his efforts to deescalate and
disengage with responsibility in Southeast
Asia.
Its fallout almost certainly will have the
effect of startling or even panicking the
governments of a number of small, inde-
pendent countries in Eastern Asia. Their in-
clination, we are told, will be to interpret it
as an affirmation of American withdrawal
from any sense of commitment in the West-
ern Pacific.
In essence, the domestic politics within
our own country which dictates the tactics
on the floor of the Senate these days will
not be understood or correctly interpreted
by the Asians themselves.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the Tonkin Gulf
resolution per se has so little substance in
our current policy activities, and because it
reflects more of tactical maneuvering rather
than basic motivations, it appears to me that
we are ill-advised in running the risks of
adverse impact in those parts of the world
where we need respect and confidence and
trust in American leadership.
It is my view that instead of looking back,
the Senate ought to look forward to what
our role ought to be in the next crisis. Surely
there will be future crises, Mr. President,
and if we have learned anything it would
seem to be that the role of the Senate ought
not be bound up in retrospective fault-find-
ing, but in helping define what the future
policies of the United States should be and
how the Government should function in
matters of critical foreign policy decisions
in the future.
In my mind it is of questionable value
for this body to be measuring the violations
of constitutional intent from the past when
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 S11054
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE Jwy 10, 1970
we ought to be seeking a more modern and
surely more enlightened procedure for the
future. i realize that the newsworthiness of
our present dialog seems to be far greater
than would a scholarly and statesmanlike
study of where we go from here. But the
coverage or popularity of the subject mat-
ter really is not the issue--and dare not be.
The issue is whether our form of free so-
ciety can survive the tensions and crises in a
nuclear world without law. I wish I had some
ready answers to submit in this discussion.. I
do not have, and I am not aware of those who
may have.
It is my hope that the Foreign Relations
Committee in particular and this Body in
general will assign a top priority to this pur-
suit. If only we can agree to proceed toward
that objective now, the rhetoric and the par-
liamentary maneuvering of the past many
weeks may not appear as starkly shallow in
substance as I believe they will appear if left
as we see them now-devoid of positive and
constructive and imaginative new sugges-
tions on how we might more wisely proceed
from here.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG). The question is on agreeing to
the amendment of the Senator from
Maryland.
The amendment was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion now recurs on agreeing to the com-
mittee amendments.
The committee amendments were
agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion now recurs on adoption of the reso-
lution (S. Con. Res. 64), as amended.
On this question the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. ELLENDER (after having voted in
the negative). On this vote I have a live
pair with the Senator from Tennessee
(Mr. GORE). If present and voting, he
would vote "yea." I have already voted
nay." I withdraw my vote.
Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the
Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH), the
Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the
Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON),
the Senator from Connecticut (Mr.
Done), the Senator from Mississippi (Mr.
EASTLAND), the Senator from Tennessee
(Mr. GORE), the Senator from Indiana
(Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from South
Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Senator
from Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the
Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEEI),
the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss),
the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr.
PASTORE), the Senator from Georgia (Mr.
RUSSELL), the Senator from Missouri
(Mr. SYMINGTON), and the Senator from
Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS), are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) and the Sen-
acor from North Carolina (Mr. JORDAN)
are absent on official business.
On this vote, the Senator from Mis-
souri (Mr. SYMINGTON) is paired with
the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. Mc-
GEE). If present and voting, the Senator
from Missouri would vote "yea" and the
Senator from Wyoming would vote
On this vote, the Senator from South
Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) is paired with
the Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
THURMOND).
If present and voting Mr. HOLLINGS
would vote "nay" and Mr. THURMOND
would vote "yea."
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
BAYH), the Senator from Nevada (Mr.
CANNON), the Senator from Alaska (Mr.
GRAVEL), the Senator from North Cara-
litia (Mr. JORDAN), the Senator from
Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Sen-
ator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE),
would each vote "yea."
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
ator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON),
the Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT),
the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr.
COTTON), the Senator from Nebraska
(Mr. CuRTIs), the Senators from Ari-
zona (Mr. FANNIN and Mr. GOLDWATER),
the Senator from New York (Mr. Goo-
DELL)", the Senator from Michigan (Mr.
GRIFFIN), the Senator from Florida (Mr.
GURNEY), the Senator from California
(Mr. MURPHY), the Senator from Illi-
nois (Mr. SMITH), the Senator from
South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) and
the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are
necessarily absent.
The Senator from Kentucky (Mr.
Cool), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr.
HRUSKA) and the Senator from Alaska
(Mr. STEVENS) are absent on official busi-
ness.
The Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
MUNDT) and the Senator from Maine
(Mrs. SMITH) are absent because of ill-
ness.
The Senator from Kansas (Mr. PEAR-
SON) is detained on official business.
If present and voting, the Senator from
Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from
Utah (Mr. BENNETT), the Senator from
New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON), the Sen-
ator- from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the
Senator from Florida (Mr. GURNEY), the
Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA),
the Senator from New York (Mr. Goo-
DELL), the Senator from South Dakota
(Mr. MUNDT), the Senator from Califor-
nia (Mr. MURPHY), the Senator from
Kansas (Mr. PEARSON), the Senator from
Kentucky (Mr, Coos), the Senator from
Maine (Mrs. SMITH), the Senator from
Illinois (Mr. SMITH) and the Senator
from Texas (Mr. TOWER) would each
vote "yea."
On this vote, the Senator from South
Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) is paired with
the Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
HOLLINGS). If present and voting, the
Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THUR-
MOND) would vote "yea" and the Senator
from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS)
would vote "nay."
The result was announced--yeas 57,
nays 5, as follows:
[No. 237 Leg.]
YEA&--57
Aiken Cooper Inouye
Allott Dole Jackson
Anderson Dominick Davits
Bible Eagleton. Jordan, Idaho
Boggs Fong Kennedy
Brooke Fulbrigh.t Mansfield
Burdick Hansen Mathias
Byrd, Va. Harris McCarthy
Byrd. W. Va. Hart McGovern
Case Hatfield McIntyre
Church Hughes Metcalf
Miller
Prouty
Spong
Mondale
Proxmire
Stennis
Montoya
Randolph
Talmadge
Muskie
Ribicoff
Williams, N.J.
Nelson
Saxbe
Williams, Del.
Packwood
Schweiker
Yarborouih
Pell
Scott
Young, N. Dak.
Percy
Sparkman
Young, Ohio
NAYS-5
Allen
Holland
McClellan
Ervin
Long
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED---l
Ellender, against.
NOT VOTING-37
Baker
Goodell
Murphy
Bayh
Gore
Pastore
Bellmen
Gravel
Pearson
Bennett
Griffin
Russell
Cannon
Gurney
Smith, Maine
Cook
Hartke
Smith, 111.
Cotton
Hollings
Stevens
Cranston
Hruska
Symington
Curtis
Jordan, NO,
Thurmond
Dodd
Magnuson
Tower
Eastland
McGee
Tydings
Fannin
Moss
Goldwater
Mundt
So the concurrent resolution (S. Con.
Res. 64), as amended, was agreed to, as
follows :
The title was amended so as to
read:
Concurrent resolution to terminate the
joint resolution commonly known as the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
SPONG). Without objection, the amend-
ment to the preamble is agreed to.
The preamble, as amended, was agreed
to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which
the concurrent resolution was agreed to.
Mr. MATHIAS. I move to lay that.,
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
passage of this concurrent resolution ful-
fills a great responsibility under the Con-
stitution by the U.S. Senate. I wish to
particularly commend the able Senator
from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) who con-
ceived this idea earlier this year. It
was through his leadership that this
measure reached final action in this
body-first as an amendment to the
Foreign Military Sales Act and now in
the prescribed form of a concurrent
resolution.
To the distinguished chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. FUL-
BRIGHT, who swiftly conducted the hear-
ings and brought this measure to the
floor, we must also render our thanks.
His management of this resolution today
and the explanatory basis provided by
his presentation brought better focus on
the meaning of this measure. In like
manner, the distinguished Senator from
New York (Mr. JAVITS), portrayed today
his great grasp of the issues involved in
this measure; and his participation truly
generated a discussion of the highest
quality on this meaning of this resolution.
His dialog with the distinguished Senator
from Louisiana (Mr. ELLxavDER) produced
a definition and a refinement of the
issues that could only be brought about
by the keen focus of these two fine minds.
To all the Senate, the leadership owes
a debt of gratitude. I think the action to-
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
July 10, 1970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
fits coverage of Federal employees and
annuitants, and for other purposes, was
read twice by its title and
f
d t
re
erre
o
THAT GULF OF TONKIN
RESOLUTION the Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service.
Mr. YOUNG of. Ohio subsequently
said. Mr. President, on June 24 the Sen- EXPANSION OF THE UNITED
ate voted for an amendment to repeal NATIONS HEADQUARTERS
the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolution.
That amendment was a part of the For- Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
eign Military Sales Act which, unfor- unanimous consent that the Senate turn
tunately, faces an unceitain fate in con- to the consideration of Calendar No. 867,
Terence committee. Hopefully the Sen- Senate Joint Resolution 173.
ate agrees to the concurrent resolution The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
today repealing the Gulf of Tonkin res- SPONG). The joint resolution will be
olution which was originally adopted, stated by title.
based on. false statements made to the The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
Senate and to the American people. Joint resolution (S.J. Res. 173) authoriz-
The Gulf of Tonkin joint, resolution ing a grant to defray a portion of the cost
was passed by the Senate on August 7, of expanding the United Nations Head-
1964 in the midst of confusion acid a quarters in the United States.
flurry of half-truths misrepresentations, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
and downright false statements of an al- objection to the present consideration of
leged submarine attack on the destroyer the joint resolution?
Maddox which In truth and in fact was There being no objection, the Senate
never perpetrated. For nearly 6 years proceeded to consider the joint resolu-
this ill-advised resolution has served as tion.
a prime foundation of our policy of es Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this
calation in Southeast Asia. The impor- is a straight up and down proposition. I
tance of our vote this day cannot be un- have talked tk the most interested Mem-
derestimated. We shall be removing the bers on this matter.
principal basis of our Asian war policy I ask unanimous consent that there be
and demonstrating for the first time a time limitation of 20 minutes on the
that a clear majority of U.S, Senators pending proposal, the time to be equally
believe that our participation in an im- divided between the manager of the bill,
moral, undeclared war in Southeast the Senator from Alabama (Mr. SPARK-
Asia should be ended. MAN), and the acting minority leader, the
Mr. President, the repeal of the Gulf Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
of Tonkin joint resolution will mark a BROOKE) or whomever they may desig-
particularly proud moment for me. On nate.
March 1, 1966, more than 4 years ago, The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
I joined with Senators Morse, Gruening, objection, it is so ordered.
FULBRIGIIT, and MCCARTHY in an effort to Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
overturn that disastrous joint resolu- for the yeas and nays.
tion. We were the only Senators who so The yeas and nays were ordered.
voted at that time. ' Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I yield
Our action today on the resolution to myself 5 minutes.
repeal the Gulf of Tonkin joint resolu-? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
tion marks a reassertion of the consti- ator from Alabama is recognized.
tutional powers of. Congress. Until this Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, my
fraudulent resolution is cleared from statement is very brief but I do have some
the books, the Senate cannot as readily facts and figures in the statement which
face the crucial issue of the division of I hope may be understood.
warmaking powers between Congress Mr. President, the Purpose of Senate
and the President. Joint Resolution 173 is to authorize a $20
Once congressional acquiescence in a, million appropriation to the Secretary of
policy of escalation in Southeast Asia State for a grant to be made to the
has been removed, the President must United Nations to defray a portion of the
undertake a complete and systematic cost of the expansion and improvement
withdrawal of American troops from In- of its headquarters in New York City,
dochina without delay. According to the Department of State,
h
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE{ I
A message from the House of Rrpre-
sentatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its read-
ing clerks, announced that the House had
passed a bill (H.R. 16968) to provide for
the adjustment of the Government con-
tribution with respect to the health bene-
fits coverage of Federal employees and
annuitants,, _ and fpr other purposes, in
which it requesteai the concurrence of the
Senate.
'EOtJSE BILL REFERRED
The bill (H-R. 16968) to provide for
the adjustment of the Governlnent.cpn-
t
e total estimated cost of the expan-
sion project is $80 million, of which about
$64 million would be for construction of
a new building and approximately $16
million for the renovation and extension
tions Headquarters complex. Inv adds- Mr. SPARKMAN. But the percentage
tion, the estimated value of the construc- of our contribution in this instance is
tion site, which is to be donated by the not much larger than our regular con-
city of New York, is $12 million. tribution to the U.N.
The financing for the proposed expan- Mr. ELLENDER. I do not think I
sion project is expected to come from agree, because the Senator said we con-
four sources: First, a $20 million grant tribute $20 million, and also $25 million
from the U.S. Government; and second would be contributed by the U.N.
a $20 million matching cash contribu- Mr. SPARKMAN. By the U.N. itself.
tion which has been promised by the Mr. ELLENDER. We put up ?30-plus
mayor of New York City; third $15 mil- percent of that, so we are putting up 30-
lion from, the U.N: Development Pro- plus percent of the contribution of
S-11055
gram and the U.N. Children's Fund-an
amount based on rentals these organiza-
tions would have to pay for quarters out-
side the U.N. complex; and fourth a $25
million appropriation out of the regular
U.N. budget.
In addition, financial support for the
project is being sought from other sources
such as private U.S. foundations and New
York park authorities. In this connection,
when Ambassador Charles W. Yost testi-
fied before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, he stated that any increases
resulting from rising 'construction costs
would have to be met from private contri-
butions.
Mr. President, at the time the United
Nations Headquarters was originally de-
signed in 1947 and 1948, it was expected
to accommodate sufficient staff to serv-
ice a membership of 70 countries. In the
meantime, however, the number of
member states has increased from 59 in
1950 to 126 in 1970. Moreover, during the
same period, the number of United Na-
tions secretariat employees in New York
requiring office space has grown from
2,900 to approximately 4,900.
As a consequence of the increasing in-
adequacy of existing facilities at the
United Nations Headquarters in New
York, the need for expansion has been
under consideration by the General As-
sembly and the Secretary General for
the past 10 years. The pending proposal
is the result of a $250,000 architectural
and engineering study which was author-
ized by the General Assembly on Decem-
ber 21, 1968, and submitted to- the Sec-
retary General on November 1, 1969. It
was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 17, 1969.
Mr. President, in my view, there is an
urgent need for the construction of new
facilities at the United Nations Head-
quarters in New York. It is my hope,
therefore, that the Senate will approve
Senate Joint Resolution 173 without
delay.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder
of my time.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, in
connection with the $20 million we are
granting to the U.N., I understood the
Senator, in private, to state that all
members would be contributing.
Mr. SPARKMAN. No, that is not what
I said.
Mr. ELLENDER. They are not con-
tributing on the same basis that we are.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Actually, each mem-
ber of the U.N. is not assessed the same
amount, because there are many small
nations that cannot do it on that basis.
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
 S 11056
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE July 10, 1970
whatever is put up by the U.N., plus $20 from funds that would otherwise go as that basis the United States will con-
million. rentals for UNESCO? tribute its proportionate part, but I do
Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct. Mr. SPARKMAN. Approximately $15 not think it is fair for the United States
Mr. ELLENDER.. How much are the million. to pay 85 to 90 percent of its cost.
Russians putting up? Mr. HOLLAND. Which fund comes in Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will
Mr. SP KMAN. I cannot tell the the main from other countries? the Senator yield? -
Senator. I d of have the figure. Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct. Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I yield.
Mr. ELL . I wonder if we could Mr. HOLLAND. There was another Mr. ELLENDER. Does the Senator
put that in the ECOBD to show we are fund mentioned that comes from an know how much we contribute to
contributing a mu greater share with agency that is supported only in part by UNESCO? Does he have those figures?
the $25 million- the United States. What was that? Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. No, not
we are putting Mr. ELLENDER. How much do we con- Mr. ELLEN .-,My recollection is
tribute to UNESCO? that it >,s st 60 percent.
true. Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not have the Mr. AMS of Delaware. It could
are putting up $20 million. Is
rect?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.
Senator had better correct the RECNID, ator just mentioned, $20 millio
because we are putting in $20 milliq~q other fees we pay for the $25~Ct'
`contribution
d
.
.
more than we shoul
Mr. SPARKMAN. Pursuant to the Mr. SPARKMAN, And
Government will grant $20 million to the Mr. ELLENDER.
` - "
United Nations and other member na- SPARKl~
tions will also be making contributions. Mr. LEND:
Mr. ELLENDER. How? To the U.N.? that j
Mr SPARKMAN. They will pay their Mr.
share of the $25 million which is to be to reserve
appropriated out of the regular U.N. The PR
Mr. SPARKMAN. That is correct.
Mr. ELLENDER. Is there any con-
+,.phi,+irn ARirip from the 125 million that
!cost of the project is $
The answer is "No:
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ELLENDER. I would like to live
f
an answer to that question.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I am told the na-
tor's statement is essentially cortect.
Mr. BILENDER. So we put u around
30 percent of the $25 million pl a bonus
of $20 million.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, ofj Course---
Mr. ELLENDER. Is the not correct?
Let us not argue about Is that cor-
rect?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Y .
Mr. ELL1liVDER. VeAr well.
Mr. SPARKMAN., But I think we
and that there
from it. I thin
ity of New York is an
indication.
Mr. ELI,
U.N. Children's Fund and the U.N. De-
velopment Program that contribute $15
million. I do not know what percentage
now. // percent. But we are having to pay a lot
-RKX AN. Mx. President, I want more than that since many of the coun-
Pr dent, on May 1 the Senate Foreign Mr. ELLENDER. In addition to that,,
R ations Committepproved the reso- we put up funds for UNESCO. In addi-
amount--I think this veers somewhat contribution we make. The amount we
the questions of the Senat from Louisa- are contributing will be closer to 50 per-
ana-$20 million would paid, under cent than the 31.57 percent mentioned
this resolution, as a direct rant of the in the report.
U.S. Government, $20 million ould come Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I think
from the city of New York, 45 million the amount contributed will be well over
from the United Nations de lopment 50 percent of the total cost of this
program, the U.N. children's nd, to project.
which we contribute about one-t d, $25 Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, how
million would come from the U.N. much time do I have left?
budget, in which the United States are The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
is 31.57 percent, plus the fact the we Senator from Massachusetts has 6
may have to make some additional c - minutes.
tribution if other nations do not y Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I yield :l
their proportionate share. That mea minute to the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
we would be paying a substantial pa SAXBE).
of the cost. Mr. SAXBE. Mr. President, there ap-
I have supported over the years the pears to me to be a conflict. The Presi-
principle of an organization for world dent has asked for a freeze on construc-
government. I still support it, but I think ion on at least two buildings. One, an
we would have a stronger United Na- portant Federal building in Akron,
tions if all the other nations within that hio, is being held up because of the
organization assumed the proportionate tionary. . pressures of construction.
part of their :responsibility. By so doing, hear arguments now that we should
they will feel they are a part of it, de y highway construction, even though
As long as our country continues to th funds are earmarked, because of
pick up the tab not only for this con in tionary pressures. Here we are put-
struction project but for other projects ting up $20 million for construction of a
and exempt other governments from U.N. building in New York at the same
their share of the cost, they are not time a have a freeze on construction of
going to feel they are a part of the orga- Fede buildings in Ohio.
nization, and therefore, I do not think Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I yield
it will be respected as much worldwide. to the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BriD).
For that reason, I think this measure Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. Presi-
should be rejected. If the building is dent, through the years I have been a
needed, It should be built by the United strong advocate of the U.N. I returned
Nations itself out of its own funds, and from Okinawa during World War II at
let the proportionate part of the cost be the same time that the U.N. was estab-
shared under the formula of the United lished in San Francisco, so I have felt a
Nations and paid for by the respective strong rapport with that world orga-
governments that are going to use it. On nization.
record straight that, again we are con-
tributing much more than our share.
Mr. SPARKMAN. We are contributing
more any other individual nation. I will
put it that way.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mi?. ]?resident, will the
Senator yield?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Alabama has 2 minutes re-
maining.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield 1 minute to
the Senator from Florida.
Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I want
to ask a question. Did r not understand
that $16 million-plus is being contributed
Approved For Release 2003/03/25 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300070029-8
other contribution that we are making. port shows that we are contributing 31.5i
In other words, we are contributin *in percent, that is of the, $25 million that
he four ways--UNESCO, the one then- comes from the general fund. Am I cor-