(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00508R000100030017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 3, 1965
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 :' CIA-RDP71 B0
AD WHEELON EF
(11/3/65)
25X1A
A. ROLE OF THE MCIRCUTIVE COMMITTEE:
An Executive Committee shall be established to
formulate, guide, and regulate the NRP. It will con-
sist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the
Director of Central Intelligence. /2`t will provide
a final decision forum for the National Reconnaissance
Program .7 The Executive Committee shall:
1. E*amine the reconnaissance requirements
provided by USIB against technical and fiscal
capabilities, so an to establish an appropriate
level of effort for the NRP. In this role it
will rely largely on cost effectiveness and
technical feasibility analyses prepared by the
DNR and the component elements of the N$ Organiza.
tion.
2. Approve or modify the consolidated NR
Program and its budget as forwarded by the DNR.
3. Initiate and assign responsibility for
research and preliminary design studies in CIA
and/or DOD for new systems through the DNR in
response to USIB requirements.
NRO and Navy
review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP71 BO
25X1A
hOD
1 j
 Approved For Release 2003f09/30-- UAA-fk P71 B00508R900100030017-6
4. Allocate development responsibility
for specific reconnaissance problems to DOD
or CIA, and establish guidelines for mutual
support where appropriate. It shall be free
to use technical advisory groups as necessary.
5. Assign operational responsibilities to
either DOD or CIA for various types of manned
overg.light missions, subject to the concurrence,
as appropriate, of the 303 Committee.
6. Review periodically the essential
features of the major program elements of the
NRP.
B. ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE:
To insure the coordination of CIA and DOD recon-
naissance activities and to provide a single point of
integration for the planning and budgeting of the
National Reconnaissance Program, a Director of National
Reconnaissance will be appointed by the Secretary of
Defense with the concurrence of the Director of Central
intelligence, who will report to the Executive Committee
on all matters affecting the NRP. Specifically, he will:
1. Be kept fully and completely informed
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RPP71 B00~08R000100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 :-CIA-F2bP71B00508R000100030017-6
of all reconnaissance activities in CIA and
2. Coordinate CIA and DOD use of the
space launching, tracking and recovery
facilities.
3. Coordinate film processing of CIA and
DOD activities so as to make best use of the
primary Eastman-Kodak facility at Rochester,
the backup Air force capability at Westover,
and field processing centers.
4. Prepare a coordinated and consolidated
NRP budget for examination and approval by
ExCom. This budget will be based on submissions
from appropriate elements of CIA and DOD.
5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP
appropriations to CIA and appropriate DOD ele-
ments in lump sum transfers each fiscal year.
Incremental funding from reserve or reprogramming
sources will be used only for supplemental pro-
grams approved by ExCom.
S. Deal with the operating head of the
CIA or his designated alternate on all matters
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 CIA-RDP71 B005081R000100030017-6
 Approved For Retease 2003/09/30 : CAA- DP7 1300508R
0100030017-6
of policy, coordination, or guidance.
He will
not exercise command control over operating
elements of CIA or its personnel.
7. Assume such command responsibilities
over DOD elements of the NRP as the Secretary
of Defense may designate. He will establish
suitable lines of coordination with those
line components which do not respond directly
to him.
8. Sitwith the USIB for the matters
affecting the NAP.
9. Appear before the 303 C ommittee with
appropriate operating elements of CIA or DOD
to secure approval for overhead reconnaissance
One.
C. RESEARCH AND PRELIMINARY DESIGN:
1. Research on reconnaissance technology
and preliminary design of new systems will be
encouraged and supported in both CIA and DOD.
It will be supported by a lump sum allocation
from NRP funds to each group in like measure
at a level to be established each year by the
Executive Committee.
25X1j4
Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP71 B00508R00g100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00508RQ00100030017-6
25X1A
2. A prescribed fraction of these resources.-
perhaps 20% to 40'%---will be earmarked for support
of basic research on reconnaissance technology*
to stimulate and assure the future vigor of this
field. CIA and DOD will keep each other fully
informed of such progress to avoid unwitting
duplication and encourage joint exploitation of
new techniques.
3. Preliminary design and small technical
feasibility demonstrations of new reconnaissance
systems will also be funded from this innovation
resource. Such work can grow out of requirements
passed down through the USIB/EXCOR/DNR chain,
proposing solutions to outstanding needs or im-
provements to existing capabilities, or can re-
sult from spontaneous initiative in the CIA and
DOD participating elements
25X1A
However, it is important that the DNR
and ExCom receive each month a comprehensive re-
port on the initiation, status, or conclusion of
such efforts. In this way, competitive study
forts will be recognized, approved or discouraged,
and synchronized for later decision actions.
..3_
*(i. e. , films, lens figuring, readout links,
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030
fop
i
ILLEGI~
 Approved For Release 2003/09/0 tIA-RDP71Bp0508RaO0100030017-6
4. It is intended that theme funds and
their products represent the flexible cutting
edge of the reconnaissance program. They should
not be used to fund actual development or opera-
tional activities.
D. SYSTEMS DE'V`ELOPMENT
1. When a new system concept has been
sufficiently well defined and its technical
feasibility established to the satisfaction of
proponents, the DNR, the ExCom and its
advisors, it would be included in the inventory
of the NRP. At this point, it should receive
necessary funding from line items in the budget
identified with these systems, These funds
would then be allocated to CIA and/or DOD, to
whom specific developmental responsibility has
been assigned by the ExCom.
2. The operating element of CIA and/or
DOD assigned development responsibility for a,
new system will be responsible for selecting
and supervising capable contractors, for estab-
lishing such systems engineering support as they
deem necessary and rendering periodic reports on
program progress to the DNR and ExCom.
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 :6CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00508ROD0100030017-6
3. Satellite reconnaissance systems are
characterized primarily by the payload /cameras,
spacecraft, data recovery system7 as well as by
their boosters. The interface between the launch
system and payload is often crucial and the
planning for compatible checkout and launch
facilities, boosters, tracking, and recovery
needs to proceed with the payload development.
The DNR will establish and facilitate lines
of technical and programmatic communications
between the groups in CIA and DOD responsible
for payload development and the satellite sup-
port elements of the Air Force. The DNR will
be responsible for the success of this interface,
an well as the compatibility and coordination
of the totality of payload Interfaces with the
Air Force. The responsible agency may call on
other elements of the NRO for support (Contract-
ing, security, technical, etc.) as needed, but
will carry the responsibility and authority for
the success of the program in th R&D phase.
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 ; CIA-,FDP71 B005089000100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/06130 : CIA-RdP7'1 B00508R000100030017-6
A normal phase of satellite development
programs is the initial flight testing in orbit
and engineering proof of the completed payload
system. Theme flight tests will be the primary
responsibility of the payload developing group
in CIA or DES, subject only to the compatibility
of such operations with the operational missions
and other flight teats coordinated by the DNR.
n specific terms, this means that the test
planning, mission profile and engineering super-
vision /not range safetyL7 of the flight would
lie with the developers. They would be expected
to include as many intelligence targets as were
consistent with the primary development so that
any film recovered would have intelligence value.
However, the planning and control of such flights--
once scheduled by the DNR--would fall primarily to
the developing group. When a system had been
successfully demonstrated and declared opera-
tionally reliable, it would enter the operational
phase.
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 20Q3/g0/30 :CIA2[P71 B00508R00 100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/b9'/30 : CIA[-RbP71 B00508R000100030017-6
1. ROUTINE OPERATIONAL PHASE:
1. When the satellite payload has been
successfully developed, it becomes a part of
the operational assets of the NIP. The payloads
together with appropriate boosters, launchers
and tracking stations represent the NRP capability
to obtain orbital photography, and accordingly
represent part of an orderly program to acquire
such intelligence in response to USIB require-
ments, target lists and priorities.' The BNa
must play the central role in planning this pro-
gram. It involves far-sighted budgeting for
payload production an well as booster procurement
and modification. It involves judicious scheduling
of operational launches from fixed resources, in
addition to development flight tests. It requires
a plan with sufficient flexibility to respond to
changing world situations and the corresponding
intelligence needs. It is a complex managerial
task for which a single individual must in the
last analysis be responsible.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RPP71 B09508R00010
ILLEGIB
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00508R900100030017-6
2. Both the long range requirements for
satellite missions and the shifting targets
for specific flights come properly from the
intelligence community in which all elements
of the Government have voice. The community
has named COMOR as the staff to provide these
requirements in an orderly way, subject to
approval by USIB.
3. The Satellite Operations Center is the
next step in that sequence of events. Its
function is to plan specific mission coverage
in light of COMOR target requirements. It
does so by first studying the spectrum of
orbital choices available. These are supplied
by various groups on the West Coast and represent
specific launch vehicle propulsion capabilities,
current range safety restrictions, etc. These
feasible orbits are then computer analyzed in
Washington to optimize target coverage in light
of sun angle, predicted weather conditions and
target priorities. An orbit to selected and
camera programs established for this mission.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 ,,CIA-RQP...71 B00508Rq
-
25X1A
P
T
 25X1A
25X1 D
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/09/4q j,. :IA-RQP '1 Bg0508F 0100030017-6
This is basically an intelligence function.
This process works somewhat differently for
T- I search payloads. In the
case of CORONA coverage, the SOC has played a
historic, central role.
are transmitted to the assembly, integration
and checkout
where the cameras, film, spacecraft and
reentry vehicle are mated and programmed. The
assembled payload is then taken to Vandenburg,
and after further checkout, launched into orbit
by the Air Norco and its contractors. Until
the spring of 1963, the Satellite Operations
Center was involved solely in CORONA and ARGON
and was located at CIA Headquarters next to
COMOR and in immediate communication with the
West Coast facilities. It was moved to the
Pentagon so as to control
etc.
LANYARD,
25X1
NRO
25X1
The SOC is an intelligence function NRO
Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP71 Bq
aj
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/09/ " .CIA-RDP ,1,3 0508RG00100030017-6
qt a ! F.
which should be at the center of intelligence
activities, communicating detailed intelligence
requirements to the launch site for the regularly
scheduled missions.
/Pick up Para 4 next page?
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003109130: CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030017-6
 ~ 0 W. -110
Approved For Release 2003/09/ ` A- DP71 BOp508R900100030017-6
25X1 D
25X1A
4. The individual satellite payloads are
quite different, both in concept and operation.
Different teams of contractors and Government
supervision produce and bring them to condition
for launch as integrated payloads. It seems
desirable to continue the present system of
providing separate assembly, integration and
checkout facilities for the individual systems
and contractor teams.. Quite different types of
test equipment are required. In practice this
means separate buildings at ''AFB. In CORONA
and ARGON, this is acc+c n fished first at the
d then finally at
Vandenburg.prior to booster mating. Payload
components are bought off-at the factory and
Government responsibility extends forward to the
launching.-with ample contractor support. It is
therefore necessary that the individual payload
assembly, integration, and checkout facilities
at ''AFB be administered by the CIA or DOD
component responsible for the payload.
Approved For Release 2003/09/30: CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/09/4 IAc713 0508R9fl0100030017-6
5. Although most of the responsibility of
the developing team is fulfilled when P. satellite
payload is declared operational, there are
persuasive arguments for extending this responsi-
bility indefinitely into the operational phase.
The most compelling argument is that payloads
systems are being continually improved--and
should be. The remarkable improvement of CORNOA
from monoscopic to stereo and then to doubled
film capacity via double recovery vehicles is an
example. Furthermore, theme are extremely delicate
instruments and no two systems are really alike, and
the continuity from factory to launch of the contractor-
Government team responsible is vital. This does
,llr'lt~~,~/ mean that the camera contractor
or CIA should fire a THOR or ATLAS. It doesmean
that there is no point in the production, launch and
recovery sequence when you can safely eliminate the
payload team completely from the operation. The
CORONA program recognized this and has representa-
tives of CIA and its contractors present at each
1 `, # step of an operational mission--but with varying
ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 200310
CIA-RDP71 B00508R00
~y 0( T
 Approved For Release 2003109/30: CIA-R 1 B00508R000100030017-6
degrees of authority.
6. Once a satellite payload is launched
in orbit, it enters a crucial period of real
time tracking, monitoring and control. Tracking
and telemetry recording from low altitude
photographic is accomplished by the Air Force
stations. This data is transmitted to the
Satellite Operations Center
,4~ CL ~& LIE
where the operation is run.
In the case of
CORONA, a CIA representative is part of the team
r. _
F~ -~G'r! V"1.ti1'ZES ~..1` Q C~'`+'1. -~"Z c px.~=a ~..f~^~"Z E:'h..,
n which continuously monitors the AGENA/payload
combination in orbit and makes decisions to recover
if a malfunction is suspected. They also transmit
camera program changes received from the SOC to
the satellite so as to take advantage of changing
weather.
Fw e believe
that this participation is natural and desirable;
it is an essential ingredient to the mission and
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/09/30.: CIA-F EP7..-1f~O:Q508R000100030017-6
25)1
NR
0 1
25X1
25)1
NRO;
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030017-6
25X1 D
25X1 D
25X1A
a strong support to the DNR in discharging
his responsibilities for successful operational
missions.
It is clear that all of these systems have a common
launching site and similar boosters. The on-orbit
control and readout varies considerably, but
involves an appropriate mixture of groups for each
task.
7. Processing intelligence data received from
reconnaissance satellites divides into two subjects:
SIGINT and photographic. Magnetic tape recordings
of SItINT data relayed from satellites goes eventually
to NSA where it is analyzed with the help of other
/,
Approved For Release 2003/ 9/ 0 : fig - 1 B00508R000100030017-6
 Approved For Release 2003/09/3?_:.,CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030017-6
ments of the intelligence community Costly
SAC and to a lesser extent CIA). Photographic
film recovered physically from satellites requires
developing and duplication before it is transmitted
to NPIC and other consumers.
25X1 A and continues to fund
or FT 6%)
a special processing facility at Eastman-Kodak's
laboratories in Rochester, N. Y..Ocir,ecause
j 25X1A
25X1A
of enormous research and technical base,O
represents the primary developing facility for photo-
graphic emulsions. The Air Force has created
and funds
for FT $~) a competitive facility
manned by k35O uniformed Air Force personnel at
Westover Air Force Base in Massachusetts (ASPPL).
Thus far, there is little dispute about the relative
quality of the two
groups and ASPPL has confined l T c- f
t~~er to making duplicate positives and doing
image quality evaluation which is quite helpful.
However, both EK and CIA are concerned by NRO actions
to trim progressively the EX capacility th*A a sub-
stitution is i I This was raised
explicitly during the past month and Dr. McMillan
asked in a belligerent way if this was of concern
to CIA. It certainly is in view of the vast importance
17
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 BOO508R0001
CIA has established
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 80050814000100030017-6
of superior original processing, and it is
proposed that EK's unique capability and facility
be re-established as the prime processing center,
not subject to progressive erosion.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP71 B00508R000100030017-6