WEST BANK: A HANDBOOK

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Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Directorate of Secret Intelligence 25X1 West Bank: A Handbook Secret NESA 83-10147 GI 83-10231 September 1983 Copy 3 0 8 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Directorate of Secret Intelligence West Bank: A Handbook Information available as of 1 August 1983 was used in this report. This paper was prepared by the Arab-Israeli Division of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, and the Geography Division of the Office of Global Intelligence. Biographic material was contributed by the Office of Central Reference. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA, Secret NESA 83-10147 GI 83-10231 September 1983 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Contention Over Water Supplies 9 Population and Society 15 Palestinian Society, Lands, and Villages 18 Refugee Camps 21 Land Acquisition 28 Types of Settlements 29 Cereals and Vegetables 37 iii Secret NESA 83-10147 GI 83-10231 September 1983 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 West Bank's Strategic Value Chronology Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret West Bank: A Handbook Since Biblical times the West Bank has been one of the world's most hotly contested territories. This and and hilly region, roughly the size of Delaware, is the historical homeland of the Jews, Palestinian Arabs, and several smaller ethnic groups. It is also holy to the three major monotheistic religions-Islam, Christian- ity, and Judaism. Today, the West Bank is the focus of the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. Attempts to establish a Palestinian homeland in the territory have run up against Israel's attachment to the land and its determination to maintain control over it. Construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank began almost immediately following Israel's occupa- tion of the territory in 1967. Unlike the Labor governments, which followed a more limited settle- ment policy, the Begin government has embarked on an ambitious program to develop new urban and suburban communities that would bring the territo- ry's Jewish population to about 100,000 by the late 1980s. Today there are about 135 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, with a combined population of 30,000. Another 90,000 Jews have settled in areas incorporat- ed into Jerusalem in 1967. The Israeli Government, settlement agencies, and private companies have had little difficulty acquiring land for these projects. About one-third of the West Bank's territory has already been requisitioned for military and settlement purposes, and another one-third is available for leas- ing to settlements. Current Israeli policies in the West Bank are aimed at facilitating the eventual annexation of the territory. Tel Aviv is committed by the Camp David Accords to the development of a Palestinian self-governing au- thority for the territory, but the Begin government's concept of autonomy would give the region's 721,000 Palestinian inhabitants little real control over the territory's affairs. The Israeli civilian administration has in recent years sought to attract Palestinian leaders to participate in a limited autonomy plan. Tel Aviv, however, has so far been unable to recruit Palestinians who would be credible in such a role. Israel's latest attempt to generate a conservative West Bank leadership by sponsoring the expansion of Vil- lage Leagues appears dead. The overwhelming majority of West Bankers support the PLO and its call for an independent Palestinian state in the territory. Many of the rural, uneducated West Bankers, however, are unprepared to risk their livelihoods for the sake of a political cause. The urban, more educated West Bankers-particular- ly the student population-have the strongest nation- alist aspirations. As in most traditional societies, it is this group that is the cutting edge of political change. The Israelis have been unable to wean these Palestin- ians away from the PLO. Nevertheless, aggressive Israeli political and security policies have so far kept social unrest in the West Bank to what Tel Aviv considers tolerable levels. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97ROO694ROO0200890001-1 00 100 Kilometers 100 Miles Alexandria Egypt *NICOSIA Cyprus 7> Bouedary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Tel AvivYafoe a *AMMAN Israeli r dete mi Strip ~7 Sea`i Israel y 'Armistice Line CAIRO . Sinai 1 I Syria Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97ROO694ROO0200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret The West Bank refers to that portion of Palestine that was annexed by Jordan in 1950 and that has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 war with the Arab states.' Roughly the size of Delaware, the territory extends 130 kilometers from Janin in the north to Hebron in the south, and as much as 55 kilometers from the Jordan River in the east to the foothills overlooking the coastal plain of Israel. The central sections of Samaria in the north and Judea in the south consist of broadly rolling limestone hills, rising above 900 meters in elevation. The prima- ry topographic difference between the two regions is that the Samarian hills are interrupted by numerous valleys, producing a countryside more accessible than the "closed" hills of Judea. To the west of these uplands are foothills leading down to the coastal plain of Israel. To the east, steep cliffs mark the line between the uplands and the Jordan River Valley, which descends to 395 meters below sea level at the Dead Sea. This depression is part of the Great Rift Valley, which extends from Syria to Mozambique.F- Temperatures are mild year round, and the climate is dry. The summer is a time of nearly unrelieved drought. In general, rainfall decreases eastward and southward; temperatures increase in the same direc- tions, and desert conditions prevail on the deep Jordan Valley floor and in southeastern Judea. Water Resources The scarcity of water in most parts of the West Bank constrains both agriculture and urban development in the region. As a result, water use has become a contentious issue between the resident Palestinians and the occupying Israelis. The West Bank's theoretical annual potential water supply of 850 million cubic meters (mcm) originates mainly from rainwater. Nearly all of this precipita- tion, however, quickly seeps through the thin soils and into the porous limestone aquifer that underlies the area. A small fraction of rainfall is caught in cisterns ' Israeli spokesmen generally refer to the area by the Biblical names of Samaria and Judea. The term "West Bank" has meaning primarily in the Jordanian context-to distinguish the Jordanian- controlled territory west of the Jordan River from that lying to the The soils of the West Bank uplands are well suited to agriculture. In the hill regions terra rosa and rendzi- na soils have been formed. The rich terra rosa is susceptible to erosion if proper soil conservation techniques are not practiced. This is one reason why tree crops are favored over grain crops in the hill country-they hold the soil better. The yellow-brown rendzina soils, richer in calcium than the red terra rosa, are also fertile for farming, especially in the valleys where they contain a high portion of organic material. Much of the Jordan Valley and the Judean Wilderness west of the Dead Sea, on the other hand, is nonarable. Here are found highly saline and thin soils, rugged dunes, boulders, and exposed rock. The only arable soil in this area is alluvial, some of which remains uncultivated for lack of irrigation water.F_ mcm-becomes surface runoff. Most of the West Bank's water potential, more than 600 mcm, is held in underground aquifers that are shared with Israel and which in recent years have supplied almost 40 percent of Israel's water needs. Increased pumping from wells in both Israel and the West Bank has lowered water tables and reduced the flow of some springs and shallower wells. Moreover, water from some of the springs and wells, especially in Judea, is brackish, limiting its value for domestic and even agricultural uses. The Jordan River is an additional potential source of water. Though an estimated 200 mcm could be drawn from the river during the winter floods, only limited amounts of water actually are taken. Since the con- struction of the Israeli security fence in 1967, West Bankers have been denied access to the Jordan River. Today the western side of this underutilized river is available only to the Israelis, who use about 10 mcm of Jordan River water annually-primarily for irriga- tion of settlement farms. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04 : CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 3rcrrt The Arab village of Lubban ash Shargivah, along the Nablus- Ram Allah road, and sur- rounding olive orchards near the end of the dry season.= The Gush Emunim settlement of Shave Shomeron, looking south from the ancient Israeli capital of Sebastiya near the end of the wet season. The set- tlement houses commuters to Tel Aviv and is engaged in vini- culture. Olive orchards in the foreground and on surrounding The Dead Sea, north of En Gedi. Steep slopes, such as those at left, parallel both sides of the downdropped Dead Sea- Jordan River rift valley and inhibit east-west transporta- Israeli well being drilled along the Allan road south of the Israeli settlement of Mevo Shillo. Well is adjacent to an Figure 2 Sea Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 4 Tolkarm Oalgrlyah Israel & ndwy representation i$ not necessarily autho, tat,ve West Bank Annual Precipitation 0 15 Kilometers 0 15 Miles Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 3 Tel Aviv- Yafo eoe~da~y ~ep~eeemaooo a poi ~e~esaa.~iy amno.nai~~e 200 m m 150 100 50 0 J F M A M J J A S O N D Temperature in degrees Celsius Precipitation in millimeters Jordan West Bank Mean Annual Temperature Degrees Celsius 17 19 21 23 63 66 70 73 Degrees Fahrenheit 15 Kilometers Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret The amounts and sources of water available in various parts of the West Bank differ sharply. The central hills, which divide the Mediterranean and Dead Sea/ Jordan River watersheds, receive adequate rainfall for fruit trees and limited field crops. To the east of these hills, however, the Jordan River Valley receives only scant and highly variable rainfall, particularly in the south around Jericho. In the deserts of southeastern Judea water sources are limited to a few wells and springs. Irrigation. Irrigated land accounts for only about 5 percent of the total cultivated land on the West Bank, most of it located in the Jordan Valley, where irriga- tion is mandatory for agriculture. Until the early 1950s Jordan Valley irrigation relied chiefly on tradi- tional gravity-fed canals. Under Jordanian rule, Arab farmers began introducing mechanical pumps and pressurized pipelines from small reservoirs or drilled wells. Following the 1948 war and the resulting increase in Palestinian refugees in the West and East Banks, the Jordanian Government sought ways to increase irriga- tion to improve the potential for agriculture and settlement in the Jordan Valley. Two US firms com- missioned by the Jordanian Government proposed the construction of two large canals-one on each side of the river-to carry water from the Yarmuk River, a principal feeder of the Jordan. The eastern (East Ghor) canal was finished in 1966 and at that time served 12,140 hectares of East Bank land. The 1967 war precluded completion of the second half of the plan, the West Ghor Canal, which would have served 15,100 hectares in the West Bank. Since then, the need for such a canal has been reinforced by the rising salinity and declining flow of the Jordan, caused by the Israeli construction in 1964 of a conduit diverting water to Israel from the Jordan River system at Lake Tiberias. Contention Over Water Supplies. Under Israeli occu- pation, the amount of water available to Palestinians has declined. The greatest water loss has resulted from construction of the security fence, which cut off Palestinian access to the Jordan and denied their use of wells within the border zone. Moreover, prewar water delivery systems have been left unrepaired, and Palestinian Arabs are prohibited from developing new water sources for agricultural purposes. Under Israeli occupation policy, any new irrigation resources devel- oped in the West Bank in excess of pre-1967 Palestin- ian usage may be used only for Israeli settlements. Wells drilled for Israeli needs have in some cases depleted nearby ground water sources used by Arabs. 25X1 Arab complaints concerning West Bank water use 25X1 center on the apparently unlimited supplies available to the Israeli settlements. They note that the settlers, who make up only 3 percent of the population, are using 20 percent of the water, and that most of the pumping from the shared aquifer takes place in Israel, where per capita water consumption is three times greater than in the West Bank.l 25X1 Planned growth of the Israeli settlement population in the West Bank to 100,000 during the 1980s would 25X1 increase Israeli water consumption for domestic uses to about 6 mcm annually. Moreover, Israel is plan- ning increases in irrigation which will bring Jewish agricultural consumption to 40 mcm annually by the Much of Israel's planned agricultural expansion is taking place within the border security zone, from which Arabs are excluded. In early 1983 Jordan protested that Israel had installed numerous pumps to irrigate newly cleared land along the Jordan River in violation of Jordan's riparian rights.) 25X1 For domestic, nonagricultural uses Israel has offered to connect Arab communities to the Israeli national water system. Many Palestinian villages and towns have refused, fearing domination of their lives through control of the water valve. Ram Allah has been the exception, being forced to join the Israeli system when its own wells dried up. Since 1967 the trend most evident in West Bank domestic water use has been a sharp decrease in 25X1 reliance on public wells and increasing access to tap water, which now serves more than 40 percent of Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 5 West Bank: Annual Water Use - s Israeli agriculture 25 individual households. Of 25 water plants on the West Bank, 16 are controlled by Arab municipal councils; the remaining nine, formerly operated by the Jordani- an Government, have been controlled since 1982 by the Israeli water company Meqorot (also the supplier of water to many Jewish settlements on the West Bank). Territorial Claims Palestinian Arab and Israeli claims and contentions over the West Bank are based on several concerns. From the Palestinian perspective the area is an impor- tant part of their homeland, controlled by a foreign, colonialist power. For most Israelis, the West Bank is seen as a strategic asset, affording Israel territorial depth against a possible Arab attack from the east and protecting the densely populated coastal strip. Both peoples share a religious and historical attach- ment to the West Bank. The historical foundation of Jewish claim to Palestine is based on the fact that Jewish civilization was created and developed largely in this area. The West Bank is holy to Muslims and Christians as well, all of whom revere the Biblical patriarchs. To Israel 400-500 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 The West Bank has long been the scene of conflict between hostile forces. It was conquered by the Jews, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Christian Crusaders, and Ottoman Turks be- fore it was placed under British jurisdiction in the Palestine mandate carved out at the San Remo conference in 1920. Conflicting British commitments to both Arabs and Jews compounded the difficulty of determining the area's ultimate disposition. In 1916 Britain promised the Arabs a vast independent state in the region in an effort to foment an Arab uprising against the Turks, who were allied with Germany in World War I. But in 1917, in the Balfour Declara- tion, Britain promised to allow Jews to establish a "national home" in Palestine. Jews had started to migrate to Palestine in the 1880s. Most settled along the coast and in Jerusalem. At the time of the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish popula- tion of Palestine numbered some 56,000 against an Arab population of 600,000. By 1932 the Jewish population had grown by some 120,000-primarily as a result of immigration-whereas a high rate of natural increase brought the Arab population to 800,000. Over the next five years, immigration from Germany and Central Europe swelled the Jewish population to 400,000, precipitating bloody riots in 1936 and a general Palestinian Arab uprising a year later. The British, having had little success in controlling the internecine strife or the heavy postwar Jewish immigration, referred the whole question of Palestine to the United Nations in 1947. The UN appointed a commission of representatives of 11 disinterested states to inquire and make recommendations. The majority of the commission members recommended partition, while the minority advocated a federal state with autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces. The partition plan called for the creation of independent Arab and Jewish states and designated Jerusalem as an international zone under UN administration. The plan was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947 but was rejected by the Arab states. On 15 May 1948 the new Jewish state of Israel was formally proclaimed and immediately attacked by neighboring Arab countries. The war of 1948 forced far-reaching modifications in the UN partition plan. The Arab state envisaged by that plan failed to emerge, and the territory it was to have occupied was divided among Israel, Transjordan, and Egypt by the armistice agreements of 1949. Israel got the largest share, some 6,500 square kilometers, which it formally annexed to the 14,600 square kilometers allotted to it by the partition plan. Trans- jordan acquired 5,700 square kilometers, which it formally annexed a year after the conclusion of the armistice, transforming itself into the state of Jordan. Egypt retained control of the Gaza Strip, some 350 square kilometers, which it administered as an Egyp- tian-controlled territory. Jerusalem was divided be- tween Israel and Jordan. The West Bank did not prosper during the 18 years that it was under Jordanian rule. Many of the Pales- tinians who left Israel settled in the West Bank or in East Bank Jordan; in 1950 they constituted two-thirds of the population of expanded Jordan. The West Bank had little unused agricultural land or industry to support its refugee population. In addition, the West Bank's economy was cut off from its traditional markets and its access to the sea, and the Jordanian Government generally favored the East Bank in its economic development schemes. Organizations dedicated to the liberation of Pales- tine-and to the destruction of Israel-soon prolifer- ated throughout the Palestinian refugee communities in the Middle East. Jordan was unable to prevent many of these groups from carrying out guerrilla or terrorist raids into Israel from West Bank territory. Military exchanges between Jordan and Israel were limited, however, to small-scale skirmishes until 5 June 1967, when Israel chose to preempt an appar- ently imminent attack by a military alliance of Arab nations. Within three days Israeli ground forces had reached the Jordan River, gaining control of Jerusa- lem and the West Bank. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 7 Palestine Partition Plan (accepted by the United Nations General Assembly-29 Nov. 1947) Arab partition area Jewish partition area Jewish land prior to 1948 Israel Today Jewish land prior to 1948 0 30 Kilometers 3 o 30 Miles Tel Aviv-Yafo. Gaza Strip lts.aen c cup;ed slat- to be determ.ned Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative Galati Heights t/.ar occupied) West Bank (l r b do/e ed tL taNa !o be datermmedi Gt Jordan Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 The ensuing 16 years have witnessed a plethora of plans and proposals dealing with the disposition of the West Bank. The most important international propos- al is UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied during the Six- Day War and recognizes the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It also "recognizes that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." UN Security Council Resolution 338, passed during the 1973 war, basically calls for the implementation of Resolution 242. The Camp David Accords, signed on 17 September 1978 by the government heads of Egypt, Israel, and the United States, represent the first concrete steps toward implementing Resolution 242. The Accords call upon Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representa- tives of the Palestinian people to enter into negotia- tions to resolve the Palestinian problem by providing "full autonomy" to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Accords specify that a five-year transitional period will begin as soon as the Israeli military government has withdrawn from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a self-governing authority has been elected in its place. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are then to begin negotiations on the final status of the territories. To date, little progress has been made in these negotia- tions due to Jordan's absence from the talks and to differences between Egypt and Israel concerning the meaning of the term "full autonomy." Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret West Bank population estimates are based on projec- tions from the last census, which was conducted by the Israel Defense Force following the 1967 war. According to Israeli reports, there were at that time 596,000 inhabitants of the territory. Recent projec- tions estimate a population of 721,000 at the end of 1982.1 Another 120,000 Arabs reside in East Jerusa- lem. Average population density, at 131 persons per square kilometer, is high but far below the 1,290 inhabitants per square kilometer for the Gaza Strip. The growth rate of this population is strongly affected by political as well as natural factors. The Arab population's crude birth rate is about 47 births per thousand inhabitants. Forty-four percent of the West Bank's Palestinians are under the age of 15 (see figure 8). Although the natural growth rate is nearly 3 percent, the mean annual growth rate for the West Bank population is only slightly more than 1 percent. This difference is explained by migration from the area. Between 1967 and 1968 high emigration actual- ly caused the total population to decrease by 1.7 percent. Net emigration has totaled about 143,000 since 1967 and has averaged about 10,000 to 12,000 individuals annually since 1974 (see figure 9). Most of these emigrants leave for nearby Arab nations, but others head for North America, South America, and Europe. We estimate that 100,000 West Bankers are em- ployed abroad, and an unknown number of relatives reside with these workers. This "shadow" population makes regular visits to the West Bank. For the most part, the migrant population is not included in West Bank statistical reports, although its absence is appar- ent upon examining the sex ratio of the territory. In age groups between ages 25 and 55, there are only 76 males for every 100 females. Although rural-to-urban migration is increasing, about 70 percent of the West Bank's nonrefugee Arab population is still classified as rural. The majority live in some 300 to 400 villages of less than 3,000 people, located mainly in the uplands. The four major urban areas-Nablus (60,000), Ram Allah-Al Birah (34,000), Bethlehem (35,000), and Hebron (53,000)- are located in the central hills along a north-south axis that runs through Jerusalem (see figure 10).'F- Labor Force More West Bankers are employed outside the region than in the West Bank itself. Of the 100,000 West Bankers employed abroad, most are in the Gulf states and Jordan. An additional 40,000 commute to jobs in Israel, while 93,000 are employed in the West Bank itself (see figure 11). Job opportunities in the West Bank are scarce because of the paucity of investment. The college-educated, except for teachers, have a particularly hard time finding work either in the West Bank or in Israel. Most Arabs who have left the West Bank for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan are skilled workers-many are employed as teachers, civil servants, bank officials, and engineers. As the Israeli economy expanded after the 1967 war, the number of West Bank residents employed in Israel increased steadily, reaching a peak of 42,400 in 1974. Most West Bank workers in Israel hold unskilled jobs in construction, industry, and agriculture. The wide differentials between West Bank wages and those in Israel and the Arab states are an inducement to accept jobs outside the West Bank. Some 30,000 young West Bankers will be entering the labor force over the next five years, increasing the number of West Bank workers at an average annual rate of 5 percent. Since the soft oil market is forcing the Gulf states to scale back their development plans, these countries cannot be counted on to provide job opportunities for growing numbers of West Bank workers. The number of West Bankers working in Israel has stabilized in recent years and is unlikely to increase any time soon. Finding employment for West ' This estimate is projected from data prepared by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. Because of seasonal migration of workers, midsummer figures may be 20,000 to 30,000 higher than they would be in the winter months Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 8 West Bank: Population, by Age and Sex, 1981 Age 75 + 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 Bank youth will be difficult, and if large numbers of Palestinians now abroad return for economic or politi- cal reasons, the problem will be compounded. Ethnicity and Religious Composition The great majority of the West Bank population is Palestinian Arab. About 93 percent of these are Muslim, predominantly Sunni, and the rest are Chris- tian. At least half of the Christians are Greek Ortho- dox; the others follow Greek, Roman Catholic, and various Protestant creeds. Many of the approximately 40,000 Arab Christians live in the urban centers of Bethlehem and Ram Allah, where in each case they 75 + 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 make up about 50 percent of the population. Non- Arab Christian minorities include Armenians, Nesto- rians, and representatives of other Eastern Christian churches. European Catholic orders and European and American Protestant missionaries are also repre- sented. Some 40,000 Bedouins are also dispersed throughout the West Bank. Many have lived as nomads in the Judean desert for generations, while others are fairly recent arrivals-refugees from Israel since the 1948 war. The Israeli military government is establishing permanent settlements for the Bedouin tribes. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 9 West Bank: Population and Migration ^ Population Migration 700 F-I 650 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 5 10 15 The Samaritans, one of the smallest ethnic groups in the world, number only about 500 persons. Half of this population is located in the West Bank, around the town of Nablus. A Jewish sect that follows only the Pentateuch (the first five books of the Bible), the Samaritans have maintained their unique religious beliefs since the 8th century B.C. A small Jewish population lived in several West Bank urban centers from before 500 B.C. until this century. The largest Jewish community lived in Hebron, where the British counted 757 people in 1917. After World War I, however, Hebron and other West Bank cities became hotbeds of Arab nationalism and the locales Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Patriarchs, whom Islam shares with Christianity and Judaism. Abraham is claimed by both Jews and Arabs as the father of their people, the Jews having descended through his son Isaac, and the Arabs through Ishmael. Bethlehem and many of the places where Jesus lived and taught are Christian holy places today. Many of the holy sites in the West Bank are claimed by two or more of the major religions. One such place, near Hebron, is the Cave of Machpelah-the tradi- tional burial site of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and most of their wives-which is sacred to Jews and Muslims. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Downtown Nablus, 1975. The largest community on the West Bank, Nablus has been a center of Palestinian-Israeli tension and violence, most recently as a result of announced Israeli intentions to construct a large urban settlement on nearby Mt. Gerizim.F_ of numerous protests and riots against Jewish immi- gration. Following riots in August 1929, in which over 60 Hebron Jews were killed, the Jewish community fled that city. Most of the West Bank's remaining Jewish population, including the members of the Gush Ezyon settlement south of Jerusalem, were either killed or fled the territory in May 1948. The Islamic, Christian, and Jewish religions each lay claim to various holy sites in the West Bank. Various groups of Muslims have inhabited this land since the time of Muhammad and have established mosques in every major population center. The Muslims include among their holy sites those places associated with the Palestinian Society, Lands, and Villages Palestinian society on the West Bank is essentially agrarian. Historically, Arab village life and agricul- ture were regulated by the Islamic code's agrarian system. This system classified land into one of several categories: mulk, those limited areas of private own- ership; metruka, communal land used for grazing, wood lots, roads, and other public concerns; mawat, abandoned land claimed by no one; miri, state land leased to private owners, particularly farmers; and wagf, land consecrated through religious institutions for welfare purposes. Most farming land traditionally has belonged to the miri category. Under Ottoman law, both miri and mulk land could be transferred by will, as long as the land was evenly divided among the children. The plots consequently became smaller through time as they were passed from fathers to sons. This constant decrease in plot size resulted in farms that were uneconomical or impractical; small land owners in- creasingly fell into debt and became tenant farmers. Many Arab hill villages are located on sites that have been sporadically inhabited through time, often dat- ing back thousands of years. Limestone and mud brick are the principal building materials. The land- scape around the villages reflects the division of land into small plots-irregular pieces in the hills and long, narrow plots in the flatlands below. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 10 Mearterranean Sea Tel Aviv- Yafo ~"~, 4J ? ? Ram No&11-,Land { ? e ee East ~~ ? Jerusalemi ? J _ ^' 4 J7'~ ?1P ? ? srael 0ethleheem? I ? _ ' S l ? ? Hebron ? ? euun N aee9 P,esenl eon ie not d n aoty aulhorilatioe Sea ( West Bank Population Arab settlements ~?ho14o+ ? s rp (data as of 1967) Israeli settlements ? ? (data as of 1982) Refugee camps - . ? ? (data as of 1982 ) Jordan Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure II West Bank: Employees in West Bank" and Israel, by Industry VAni king in \k,? Ran -Nnrkinp in Israel Li U Construction n ^ Injusln ^ ^ Agriculture bb 25X1 "And after this, Abraham bur- ied Sarah his wife in the cave of the field of Machpelah before Mamre: the same is Hebron in the land of Canaan. " (Gen. 23:19). The Mosque of Abra- ham now stands over the tradi- tional site of the sealed Cave of Machpelah, or Tomb of the Pa- triarchs. Dating back to 25 B.C_ the present structure is shared by Muslims and Jews. Mud brick homes of the Arab village of Siir hug the hillside northeast of Hebron. Vallee lands are reserved for agricul- Most of the smaller villages have a government- appointed mukhtar, who serves as the head of the hamula, the basic Palestinian village organization comprising a group of interrelated families. At least for the older generation, the hamula determines an individual's relationship to political and cultural soci- Palestinians continue to place great emphasis on family ties. The male head of the family group holds sway over marriage, family, and business affairs. Traditional Islamic codes of personal behavior are still adhered to faithfully by many Muslims. Christian Palestinians tend to be more urbanized, wealthier, and better educated than their Muslim neighbors, yet family and religion play an important role in their Refugee Camps As of June 1982 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East registered a total of 340,643 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank.' Of this number, which accounts ' I or relief purtwses, UNRWA defines a refugee as a person and his children) who lived in Palestine for at least two years mmedi- atel prior to the 1948 war and who lost both his home and means for more than 45 percent of the territory's population, 86,206 are registered as residents of the 19 occupied UNRWA refugee camps.` Although each camp is administered locally by a leader appointed by UNRWA, the Agency has no territorial jurisdiction over the camps; like the rest of the West Bank. they are under the authority of the Israeli military govern- The history of these camps dates back to the 1948 war and immediately thereafter, when hundreds of thou- sands of Palestinians left Israel for the Arab nations. Thinking they would soon be able to return, many resettled as close to their homes as possible, particu- larly in the West Bank, which absorbed several hundred thousand displaced persons. Approximately 130,000 of them established residence in what were expected to be temporary camps. Permanent camps. however, soon were constructed by UNRWA, which was established in 1949 to provide temporary relief to the displaced Palestinians. Since then, UNRWA has 25X1 ZOAI Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Dheisheh, a UNRWA-operated refugee camp south of Bethle- hem, has about 6,000 residents. Ein el-Sultan, a UNRWA-oper- ated refugee camp north of Jer- icho. The Israelis have recently threatened to dismantle the camp, which has been almost been the primary means of support for the camp and near Nablus, with 11,000 people. The camps, original- for some out-of-camp refugees, furnishing housing, ly temporary tent villages, are now condensed, hap- education, medical services, and food rations for hazard collections of mud brick and concrete block selected groups. huts. The typical hut houses a family of five and is Most of the camps are located on the outskirts of the major West Bank urban areas. The largest is Balata, about 3 meters square. Living conditions are poor. In Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Table I West Bank: Population in Refugee Camps (June 1982) In Camps Not in Camps Total Total 86,206 254,437 340,643 a Nablus 47,089 104,301 151,390 Askar 7,462 Balata 11,081 Far'a 4,048 Camp No. 1 3,505 Nur Shams 4,054 Tulkarm 9,096 Jenin 7,843 Jericho 3,352 5,700 9,052 Aqabat Jabr 2,705 Ein el-Sultan 647 Nu'eima Kalandia 4,367 Hebron 16,981 59,072 76,053 Dheisheh 5,985 Aida 2,086 Beit Jibrin 1,004 Fawwar Arrub 3,312 4,594 a Including 4,367 Gaza Strip refugees receiving rations in West Bank. Refugee Aid, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Inter- national Red Cross, and the American Friends Serv- ice Committee (Quakers). The main fields of activity of the international voluntary agencies are the distri- bution of food rations, rural and economic develop- ment, health care, and education.. The Israeli Govern- ment and the Jordanian Government, in cooperation with other Arab states and the PLO, also provide social assistance and financial aid to West Bankers. Health Care. The overall health of the West Bank population has improved during the last 16 years. In addition to the salutary effects of the increase in the West Bankers' per capita income in recent years, the territory's residents have also benefited from improve- ments in housing, water supply, and sewage systems. The infant mortality rate of nearly 80 per 1,000 live births (compared to 15 per 1,000 in Israel), as well as the incidence of malnutrition and illness among chil- dren, indicates, however, that there still is consider- able room for improvement in health care standards. The Israeli military government has divided the West Bank into six health service regions, each with its own general hospital serving approximately 120,000 peo- ple. These government hospitals, inherited from the Jordanians, take care of 87 percent of the West Bank's hospitalized patients. In addition, there are a total of 141 public and 65 private clinics, two private hospitals, 17 dental surgeries, and one state-run men- tal hospital. The number of physicians has increased since the Israeli occupation. The hospitals are, for the most part, well equipped, although many complex cases are referred to Israeli hospitals. West Bankers have taken advantage of the addition to living quarters, most camps feature food increased availability of health care. For example, and ration distribution centers, a clinic, and separate baby deliveries in hospitals have increased from 13.5 boys' and girls' schools. percent in 1968 to over 40 percent in 1978. Health Social Services About two dozen international voluntary agencies help provide social services to the West Bank's Arab population. In addition to UN agencies, these include such private organizations as American Near East insurance is obligatory for all residents of the West Bank who work in Israel proper and is optional for all others. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04 : CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 secret .School children leaving clacees at Hi Nahula, north of Jerusa- Inn. hildren under 1 5 make up 44 percent of the West Education. West Bankers, and Palestinians in gener- al, compare favorably with other Arabs in terms of their education and literacy levels. Some 250,000 West Bankers about one-third of the total popula- tion attended school during the 1979-80 school year. Of this number, about 35,000 were receiving universi- The Israeli Government administers most of the territory's 1,000 educational institutions. About 200 schools are privately administered or are run by UNRWA. The three most important universities are Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank was started almost immediately following Israel's occupation of the territory in 1967. Israeli spokesmen have justified the program at various times as an expression of the right of Jews to live anywhere in "Eretz Israel"--the Biblical land of Israel once occu- pied by the Jewish people-and as part of Israel's defense against Arab attack from the east.6 Israel's Labor-dominated government sought to estab- lish settlements in the West Bank to solidify Israel's political claim to secure borders. It ruled out an indiscriminate settlement policy so as to allow for the possibility of a peace agreement with Jordan that would include large-scale territorial concessions by Israel. Labor leaders also rejected outright annexation of the territory because they were concerned that absorption of the West Bank's large Arab population would over time compromise the Jewish character of Israel. Settlements thus were limited largely to those areas most likely to be claimed by Israel in peace negotiations. For the most part, the location of the 32 settlements established by Labor in the West Bank followed the geographic priorities of an unofficial plan formulated by then Minister of Labor Yigal Allon in July 1967. Allon proposed creating a security zone approximate- ly 105 km long and 16 to 24 km wide west of the Dead Sea and the Jordan River-which would be treated as Israel's eastern security border. Up to 20 military outposts would be established in the sparsely populat- ed zone to deter the crossing of Jordanian or other Arab forces into the West Bank. In Allon's view, Israel's continued presence in the Jordan Valley would give the military the independent capability to monitor any militarization of the West Bank. Menachem Begin and his Likud Party-which gained control of the government in 1977-have brought a different philosophy to the development of settlements in the West Bank. Begin and his supporters believe ' In the prestate era, settlement also was a primary instrument in the Zionists' political struggle. More Jewish settlements implied more footholds, thereby extending their control over and claim to that the Israeli Government should strive to regain the key territories that composed the land of Israel during Biblical times. Just as settlement activity before 1948 helped establish a Jewish claim to what is now Israel, the Likud Party believes a vigorous settle- ment campaign throughout the West Bank will help ensure Israeli retention of the territory. Begin believes 25X1 that the potential problems posed by the need to govern the West Bank's large Arab population are secondary considerations that can be managed. In the nearly six years it has been in office, the Begin government has made significant progress toward its settlement goals. There are today about 135 Jewish settlements in various stages of completion in the West Bank with a population of about 30,000. In addition, approximately 90,000 Israelis live in areas of East Jerusalem annexed by Israel after the 1967 war. Before Begin took office there were less than 5,000 settlers in the West Bank and only about 50,000 Jewish residents in the annexed areas of East Jerusa- lem. At the same time that it has increased the number of 25X1 settlements in the West Bank, the Begin government has also set out to populate new areas of the territory. Most of the new settlers are moving into those regions of the West Bank where 95 percent of the territory's Arab residents live. 25X1 Ariel Sharon, first as Agriculture Minister, then as Defense Minister, has been instrumental in encourag- ing expansion of the settlement program. Even after relinquishing the defense portfolio, Sharon as the Cabinet's most outspoken hardliner on Palestinian questions-has continued to reinforce Prime Minister Begin's inclination to stand firm on settlement ques- tions. Sharon's replacement, Defense Minister Arens, also takes a hardline position on West Bank questions-25X1 Another key figure has been Matityahu Drobles, director of the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), whose plan for the West Bank calls for the control of large chunks of land surrounding, and hence isolating, concentrations of Arab population. The settlement pattern is designed to prevent the eventual creation of an independent Palestinian state. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 12 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Tel Aviv- Yafo Lattun Salient Jordan West Bank Israeli Settlements May 1983 ? Settlement established June 1967 through May 1977 Settlement established June 1977 through Dec 1982 Settlement block (Drobles Plan, Sept. 1980) Proposed Israeli security one (Allon Plan, August 1967) Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 13 West Bank: Israeli Settlements and Jewish Population 11 ,NI id~c ii I'I +(imaicd 30.000 250 _ 50 5,000 The Gush Emunim settlement of Elon More overlooking Nab- Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 The Israeli Government has maintained throughout that its use of West Bank land is consistent with international law. Two international agreements are technically applicable to Israel's role as an occupying power in the West Bank: ? The fourth Geneva Convention (1949) forbids an occupying military power from either taking land in an occupied territory for civilian settlements or financing their establishment, and states that an occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies. Israel signed this convention in 1951. ? The Hague Convention (1907) forbids the perma- nent confiscation of land by an occupying power. It allows, however, an occupying government to use publicly (or state-) owned land temporarily and to use privately owned land for military purposes if compensation is provided. The Israeli Government argues that the more restric- tive Geneva Convention does not apply to its activities in the West Bank because the convention relates only to relations between two sovereign nations. Jordan's occupation of the West Bank was recognized only by Great Britain and Pakistan. Jordan, therefore, has no sovereign claim to the West Bank, says Israel. Israeli actions in the territory-Tel Aviv argues-are only affected by the Hague Convention, which contains fewer specific restrictions on the actions of the occu- pying power. The Israeli Housing Ministry's budget report for fiscal year 1983 confirms the trend toward locating settlements in areas close to the pre-1967 border. This trend will be reinforced by government policies aimed at encouraging investors and builders to undertake most of the homebuilding, with the government pro- viding infrastructure, loans, and grants. Such private- sector development is most likely to take place where there is a profitable market-in bedroom communi- ties within easy commuting distance of Israel's main employment centers. Currently, about 70 percent of all settlement construction in the territory is taking place in five such urban settlements. Land Acquisition The manner in which West Bank territory has been requisitioned for Jewish settlements has changed over the years. Prior to 1979 an important method of land seizure was expropriation for "vital and immediate military requirements." In October of that year, however, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that land expropriated from Arab residents for purported secu- rity needs was in fact taken for civilian, political reasons and was therefore illegally acquired. The court declared that the government had not demon- strated the military purpose served by the settlement in question and ordered its removal. Since this decision, the Begin government has made extensive use of the 19th century Ottoman land code and other devices to redefine areas as state land. Under the Ottoman code anyone who is in need of mawat land "can, with the leave of the official, cultivate it on the condition that ultimate ownership shall belong to the Sultan." The Israelis argue that they are now administrators of the laws in effect when the occupation began. State-owned land forms the bulk of the property available for settlements, although private Israeli companies and individuals can also purchase land from Arab owners. Some state land was owned by agencies of the Jordanian Government or by the Jordanian monarchy before 1967 and is now under Israeli trusteeship. Tel Aviv leases this land to settle- ments. Much of the land, however, comes from the large tracts that the government, after physical and archival survey, decides are state lands. Following the government's declaration that an area is state land, local Arab inhabitants have 21 days to challenge such a declaration or to provide documented proof of ownership. Prior Israeli administrations ac- cepted oral testimony, tax records, and other forms of proof, but the Begin government specifies the need for formal deeds. Only about one-third of the West Bank's territory is under secure title. Moreover, deeds issued by Ottoman authorities and British Mandate officials often cannot be located, and land records of the Jordanian Government are incomplete because 25X1 2 A11 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret the Jordanian West Bank land survey of the 1960s was stopped by the 1967 war with only 37 percent of the territory surveyed and documented. The Israeli Government has not made public the extent of land acquired for settlement, but under the principles it is now following, up to two-thirds of the West Bank's territory would theoretically be available for leasing to settlers. In practice, one-third of the West Bank has already been requisitioned, either for settlements or military purposes. Types of Settlements Many of Israel's political parties are the prime movers behind Jewish settlement activities in the occupied territories. Through their affiliated settlement move- ments, the parties provide political and financial support to many of the settlements. The Labor Party-despite its limited territorial ambitions in the West Bank-supports settlement activity through its kibbutz and moshav federations. MAPAM-which is aligned with Labor-is affiliated with several settle- ments through its own kibbutz federation. The kib- butz movement of the National Religious Party (NRP) also supports settlement efforts. Other settle- ments are affiliated with Herut-part of the Likud- Poalei Agudat Israel, and the extremist KACH move- ment. Each of the settlement federations has its own social, economic, and political philosophies. West Bank settlements range in size from small agricultural communities to large urban centers planned for thousands of inhabitants. About half are Nahal (Fighting Pioneer Youth) outposts or agricul- tural communities: ? Civilian agricultural settlements are usually kib- butzim or moshavim having only a few hundred settlers. In a kibbutz most property is collectively owned and collectively worked on the principle that members should contribute according to their abili- ties and receive according to their needs. Members share common dining and social facilities. Ih a moshav, each family works a separate piece of land. The size of the individual plots is governed by the families' ability to work them; hiring outside labor is discouraged. All moshav members buy their agricul- tural supplies and market their produce jointly. The moshav shitufi is a combination of the moshav and kibbutz; production is cooperative, but income is divided among the individual members. ? Nahal outposts are paramilitary settlements estab- lished by the Nahal Corps of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). They are founded with the intention of eventually converting to civilian status, though some fail to become viable and are abandoned. Many Nahal outposts are primarily devoted to agriculture. Since 1975, Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful")-- a religious group that combines traditional Jewish and nationalistic values-has assumed an important role in the creation of new settlements. Gush Emunim supports extensive Jewish settlements in the West Bank as a means of restoring all of the Biblical land of Israel to Jewish control. Although it is not formally affiliated with any political party, Gush Emunim is connected to the social and political structure of the NRP's youth faction, the Likud, and the Tehiya Party. The settlement organizations first present their pro- posals for new settlements in the West Bank to the World Zionist Organization. WZO-approved propos- als are then presented for Israeli Government approv- al to the Ministerial Committee on Settlements, which gives the official go-ahead. ? Regional centers are settlements that function as market towns for four to six smaller agricultural settlements in the surrounding area. ? Community settlements and urban centers are the largest Jewish settlements and are the type current- ly being emphasized by the Begin government. Community settlements are generally planned for eventual populations of 1,000 to 1,500. Urban cen- ters are projected to become complete towns with 20,000 or more inhabitants, but none have reached that size. These settlements are located within easy commuting distance of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and offer low-cost, desirable housing to Israeli families. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04 : CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 ,ecret Daniel, a Gush Emunim settle- ment in the Enron Bloc south- west of Bethlehem. Many set- tlements such as Daniel begin with prefabricated or mobile homes, then later build perma- Kefar Qedumim. a community settlement west of Nablus. Mane of the residents commute to Tel Aviv, others work in one of the settlement's industries, which include an insecticide E,framh, an urban settlement in the Egon Binc, has been under rnnsiruction since 1980. The vet:lenient plan calls far a pop- Ma ale Itravim a regional center !orated on the ridge overlooking the Jordan Valley. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 14 Israel: Economic Inducements to Settle on the West Bank The Housing Ministryprovidesfnancial incentives for West Bank settlers in the form of low-interest loans and grants. For example, the following incentives are available to a family that does not already own a home: Type of Financing Zone I II III IV Indexed Loan 600,000 470,000 (no interest) c Indexed Loan 150,000 150,000 300,000 120,000 (with interest) d ? 40Shekel-51.00. n Repayable in 20 years at 1 percent interest per year during the first four years, 2 percent per year during the next six years, and 3.4 percent per year during the remaining 10 years. c Repayable in 25 years, linked 100 percent to consumer price index. e Repayable in 20 years and 5.7 percent annual interest; linked 100 percent to consumer price index. ? If a settler remains in a West Bank home for at least five years, the amount is a grant; otherwise the amount is a loan. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret They are preferred by the Begin government be- cause they can be built on public land of little or no agricultural value and because they offer the cheap- est and most practical way to increase significantly the Jewish population in the West Bank. Government Projections Ariel Sharon commented earlier this year that he expects some 40,000 Israelis to have moved to the West Bank by 1983. By 1986 the government hopes to have 100,000 settlers in the territory, most of them residing in the new community settlements and urban centers. Adding the Jewish population of East Jerusa- lem to this figure, there could be upwards of 200,000 Israelis living on West Bank territory by 1986. Much of this goal apparently is achievable, though perhaps not until the late 1980s because of financial constraints and the limited pool of potential settlers. Approximately 3,000 new housing units-with a ca- pacity for 12,000 inhabitants-are being started in the West Bank each year, and completed housing that is now unoccupied has a capacity for 12,000 more. To date, young, middle class Israelis looking for inexpen- sive housing have shown considerable enthusiasm for the West Bank communities, particularly the Jerusa- lem suburbs and the new settlements located on the border close to Tel Aviv. The Israeli Government is busy building the infrastructure to handle a signifi- cant increase in the territory's population. It is likely that the Jewish population of the West Bank- excluding Jerusalem-will double, if not triple, by the end of the decade. Tel Aviv hopes that most of the funding for these settlements will come from private sources because it does not have the financial resources for the current, accelerated settlement development. Much of the financing for settlements has been provided by Zionist organizations, and private companies are now heavily involved in developing the new satellite communities. In FY 1983, funding for settlement-related activities from various government agencies will amount to about 1 percent of the national budget, or roughly $250 million. The boundary between Israel and the West Bank has virtually disappeared. There are no border check- points and few signs that one is entering occupied territory. Increasingly, Jewish settlements in the West Bank are treated as part of Israel proper. Although land for the settlements is technically only leased from the military government, Tel Aviv has reserved the right to claim sovereignty over the territory in any future negotiations. Under international law the military government is supposed to exercise authority over all of the occupied territory, but in practice six Jewish regional councils and five local (urban) councils control most of the West Bank lands requisitioned for settlement. These councils answer to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior and not to the military government. Israelis living in the West Bank have their own municipal courts, which are part of the Israeli judicial system. They vote in their own districts in national elections instead of through absentee ballots. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Agriculture Agriculture has always been the primary sector in the West Bank economy, but modern agricultural meth- ods have been introduced on a large scale only in the past 16 years of Israeli administration. During this period, production of nearly all agricultural products has substantially increased. This has occurred despite a halving of the farm labor force, expropriation of land and deprivation of water resources by Israeli authorities, and market restrictions-both in Israel and Jordan. Because the dry climate, summer drought, and limited fertile soil restrict the area on which crops can be grown, animal husbandry is a traditional and important sector of the rural economy. Under Jordanian rule, most West Bankers employed farming methods that had not changed in hundreds of years. Mechanization was limited-there were only 120 tractors in the territory-and yields were low. Wheatfields, for example, yielded only one-fourth of the crop grown on similar size fields in Israel. Irriga- tion was restricted to the Wadi Farah and the Jericho oasis, although work was under way to bring large new areas under irrigation. In 1967, 47 percent of the population was directly engaged in agriculture, and another 20 percent derived their livelihood from agri- culture-related services and commerce. Under Israeli occupation, agricultural production has increased through the introduction of chemical fertil- izers, pesticides, improved seeds, and mechanization. The last has been most dramatic: in 1982 the number of tractors had increased by a factor of 22 to 2,606. Mechanization, a decrease in the amount of land under cultivation, and the draw of higher paying industrial jobs in Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf states have caused a decrease in the farm labor force and a consequent urban reorientation in West Bank society. In recent years, agriculture has accounted for 25 percent of employment, more than 35 percent of the value of gross domestic product, and 25 percent of export earnings. Table 2 West Bank Agricultural Production, 1980-81 Value (million US $) Quantity (thousand tons) Total crops Field crops 41.2 Vegetables and potatoes 37.4 159.5 Melons and pumpkins 5.2 42.7 Olives 43.3 45.0 Citrus 73.5 Other fruits 105.9 25.7 27.8 38.8 4.6 50.0 Fruit. The most valuable cash crop, olives, occupies about 53,000 hectares-about 25 percent of the more than 200,000 hectares in cultivation. Olives are noted for their erratic fruit-bearing behavior and vary con- siderably in yearly output. For example, the 1980/81 olive yield was 45,000 tons, compared with 120,000 tons harvested in the 1979/80 season and 21,000 tons in 1978/79. Olives are grown primarily for oil. In 1981, 222 active oil presses on the West Bank formed the area's main industry, employing 1,500 people on a seasonal basis. The Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, recognizing the importance of the olive crop, has helped rehabilitate old and weak trees and introduced fertilizers, pesticides, and the use of a new mechanical olive picker. As with the olive, other fruit crops that occupy the hills of the West Bank rely on the annual rainfall and usually go unirrigated. Since most of these orchards are on small, isolated plots, many agricultural opera- tions are still carried out manually, with some assist- ance by draft animals. The tree crops include apples, peaches, pears, almonds, apricots, plums, and figs. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 15 Tel Aviv- Yafo Jordan West Bank Arab Fruit Growing Regions-1967 Bananas Deciduous fruit Olives Table grapes Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret The Wadi Farah, an area of traditional Arab agriculture based on wells and spring wa- The Jericho oasis. Here water from wells and springs and high temperatures make possible the growing of dates, citrus fruit, Table grapes are a major crop of the Hebron Hills. Low areas east and west of the hill region are frost free all year, allowing tropical crops to be grown. Citrus plantations are found where the Sharon coastal plain extends into the West Bank near Tulkarm and Qalqilyah. In the Jordan Valley-especially in the Jericho oasis-warmer temperatures permit the grow- ing of bananas, citrus fruits, pomegranates, dates, Cereals and Vegetables. Wheat and barley are the chief field crops and account for two-thirds of all cropland. The grain harvest varies with the annual rainfall, especially in the marginal areas of cultivation in Judea, and grain is raised entirely for domestic consumption. mangoes, and guavas. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 16 West Bank: Crop Production, by Year ^ olives ^ Other fruit Citrus El Melons and pumpkins Vegetables and potatoes Fieldcrops 1967/68 68/69? 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73 73/74 74/75 75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 80/81 Crop year In 1980-81 more than 200,000 tons of vegetables were raised on the West Bank. The most important vegeta- ble crops are tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, egg- plants, and onions, though numerous other varieties are grown as well. Most of the West Bank's vegeta- bles are grown in Samaria in summer and in the Jordan Valley in winter. Since 1967 innovations in farming methods have doubled vegetable production. New irrigation techniques include sprinkler systems, drip irrigation, and clear plastic crop coverings. The only major nonfood crop raised on the West Bank is the 400 tons of tobacco grown annually in northern Samaria. Livestock. Sheep and goats are the most important livestock in the West Bank, and the effects of decades of overgrazing can be seen in the denuded and eroded landscapes throughout the area. Though the number of flocks has decreased in recent years, the number of animals has remained relatively constant, resulting in a much larger average herd size. In 1979 there were more than 235,000 sheep and 155,000 goats in the territory. Cattle, now numbering around 15,000 with the number declining, are mainly of the local breed, though about one-third of the herd now consists of Friesian dairy cows. The territory has 800 poultry farms; in addition, small flocks of chickens are kept in farmyards and scavenge freely in many villages. Almost all of the West Bank's production of meat, milk, and eggs is consumed locally. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 17 West Bank: Animal Products A Palestinian shepherd sepa- rating the sheep from the goats near the Arab village of Duma, along the Allon road. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04 : CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 xc rci One ofrnane soot'mr shops in Brddrhrrn. toekine w h Rest Bank h andi roRv as terii/[s. timid-carted slice Mood, and Agricultural Trade. Agricultural exports, mainly fruit and vegetables, arc outweighed by imports, principal- ly from Israel. This imbalance will tilt even more in Israel's favor if Tel Aviv continues to place restric- tions on West Bank produce going into Israel. Israeli farmers have complained in the past several years about the flooding of their markets with West Bank and Gaza) fruits in season. These are usually sold for lower prices, due in part to cheaper labor and the lack of West Bank crop taxes. West Bank farmers charge, in return, that they are subject to unfair competition from subsidized Israeli produce and that the restric- Other Sectors West Bank industry is small, and most production is for local consumers or tourists. Although there are a few firms with over 100 employees, most industrial plants are small factories or workshops employing no more than 10 workers, These factories are generally family businesses or partnerships that have operated for years, producing such things as cement, textiles, soap, olivewood carvings, and mother-of -pearl souve- Uncertainty over the West Bank's political future has resulted in relatively low levels of investment in productive assets. Investment in machinery and equip- ment was only 4.4 percent of GDP in 1980. Most of the expansion that has occurred has been in sectors benefiting from high Israeli tariffs designed to protect Israel's industries. Four pharmaceutical companies serving the West Bank have been established since 1967, and textile firms are reportedly thriving. Israeli firms have taken advantage of lower wage rates to establish production units in the West Bank that Since most businessmen are not willing to gamble on the area's political future and no West Bank govern- ment organization exists to make decisions affecting economic development, residential construction ac- counts for the bulk of private-sector investment. Ac- tivity in the housing sector reflects both rising dispos- able incomes and the desire of West Bankers to assure a claim on property under any future political ar- 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 18 West Bank, Israel, Jordan: Economic Indicators ^ West Bank Israel ^ Jordan Real GNP Percent change 35 Insestment as a Share of GNP 40 Consumer Prices Percent change 30 a 20 - - 10 It Istinated h Projected LCn Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 New Palestinian homes along the Jerusalem-Ram Allah road. Extensive areas of new Arab housing on the outskirts of all West Bank towns are primarily financed by earnings in the Gulf states and in Israel. Financial Flows Only Israeli banks operate in the West Bank. Their role in the economy is quite limited-their credit and deposit facilities are used primarily by Israelis. There is, however, an extensive network of West Bank money changers who perform a variety of banking services such as transferring balances between local residents and those outside the territory-primarily in Jordan. Most economic transactions are in cash. Both the Israeli shekel and the Jordanian dinar are legal tender. The Arab population chooses to keep only minimum balances in Israeli shekels-in part because of the rapid depreciation of the shekel but also because of political factors. Substantial savings are kept in Jordan and elsewhere; political and cultural factors lead many West Bankers to keep large hold- ings of cash. Wages earned in Israel and remittances from mi- grants to Arab countries have spurred rapid economic growth-real GNP grew an average annual 12.7 percent since 1968-led by private consumption and housing construction on the West Bank. Worker remittances from Arab states are estimated at $200- 300 million annually, while earnings from Israel add another $200 million. Together these inflows account for roughly one-third of West Bank GNP. Worker remittances finance the West Bank's chronic trade deficit-$215 million in 1980. Most of the area's imports and exports go to and through Israel. The remainder, including more than half of all agricultur- al exports, transit Jordan. A large portion of the funds available to West Bank municipalities comes from contributions made by the Arab states-particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. Jordan continues to pay the salaries of civil servants employed by the municipalities prior to the 1967 war. Money pledged to the West Bank at the Baghdad summit in November 1978 goes through the PLO-Jordan Joint Fund-Israel occasionally prevents the transfer of this money to the West Bank-and is used to help fund various municipal development projects. The remainder of municipal revenues comes from local tax collections and funds made available by the Israeli Government. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 19 West Bank: Composition of GDP ~erILLIt nre ^ I ransportation and trade Public Seniics r% U (in1 t1 rti0n Infrastructure Because there are no railroads or navigable rivers in the West Bank, transportation is entirely dependent on the road network. The only airfield that handles scheduled commercial flights was incorporated into Israel in 1967 as part of the municipality of Jerusa- lem. Roads. The West Bank road network was poorly developed in 1967 but has since been expanded and improved by the Israelis, mainly to meet their own requirements. New and improved roads primarily connect Israeli settlements and serve both military and civilian needs; they often bypass Arab villages. Among the important Israeli-built roads are the Jor- dan Valley road connecting the string of Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley; the Trans-Samaria, Trans-Judea, and Trans-Judean Desert roads, all completed within the past few years; and the Allon Road, finished as far south as Ma'ale Adummim and projected to reach Arad. Other major local highways connecting Jerusalem with commuter settlements to the east and south are also being constructed or are in advanced stages of planning. Road building in the West Bank has been speeded up during the past year. Numerous roads connect the West Bank to Israel, but only two transit points provide access across the Jordan River into Jordan. These are the Damiya Bridge near the Jewish settlement of Massu'a, used by the Nablus population, and the Allenby or King Hussein Bridge east of Jericho. A third bridge, the Abdullah, just north of the Dead Sea, has been closed since 1967.0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 20 West Bank: Trade Flows, 1981 ? ? Agricultural ^ ^ Industrial Agricultural Industrial Vehicles. As of 1982 there were 32,194 vehicles in the West Bank, one for every 22 inhabitants. The years between 1970 and 1981 have seen phenomenal growth in the number of both private and commercial vehi- cles, reflecting the increased prosperity of the average West Banker in recent years. The growth of public transportation has been slower than the statistics indicate. Many of the buses regis- tered in 1970, already 20 to 30 years old at that time, are still in service today. The fact that more than 100 different companies operate the buses indicates the extreme inefficiency in the system. Donkeys, horses, and even a few camels continue to have a role in local transport. Electric Power. Israel has linked several West Bank municipalities to its national power grid, beginning in 1971 with Tulkarm along the border with Israel. Most Jewish settlements, including those in the Jordan Valley, are also plugged into the grid. In 1981 three new high-tension axes were completed in Samaria, connecting numerous Arab villages to the Israeli system The Israeli military government has also attempted to gain control of the East Jerusalem Electric Company, a privately owned Arab company given the power concession for the Jerusalem area by the Turks and, later, the British. Failures to provide adequate and continuous power to the company's 70,000 consumers, including almost 20,000 Jewish customers in the Jerusalem suburbs, prompted the Israeli Energy Min- istry to announce its intention to take over the company's concession on I January 1981. This at- tempt was blocked by the Israeli Supreme Court, but by mid-1981 the government had forced the company to accept up to 50 percent more power from the Israeli national power grid. Aside from the national grid and the East Jerusalem Electric Company, the West Bank has 12 small municipal power stations and numerous privately Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 21 West Bank: Motor Vehicles Thousands of' vehicles ^ 1`1S2 Priv,ae car, Trucks and commercial vehicles Fa v, Tractors Buses inc' niinihuve, Special service and other vehicles N1otorevelea and cootcrs owned generators that serve small Arab villages and businesses as well as some of the smaller Israeli settlements. There are no interconnections among these local systems, which in many cases are more than 30 years old. Communications. There are no indigenous radio or television stations on the West Bank. Residents with receivers can pick up the Voice of Palestine (broad- casting from both Damascus and Baghdad), Radio Cairo, Radio Amman, and various Israeli stations-a few of which broadcast in Arabic. As of 1981, 80 percent of all West Bank households owned a radio, and 60 percent possessed a television set. There are several newspapers, including the official Israeli Ara- bic language paper, Al-Anba, the three dailies Al- Quds, Al Sha'b, and Al Fajr, and several weeklies. Al 25X1 Sha'b and Al Fajr favor the PLO in their editorial line, while AI-Quds is considered pro-Jordanian. All of the West Bank publications are subject to Israeli censorship.0 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Israeli Occupation and Policies The Israeli occupation of the West Bank since 1967 has triggered a number of changes in the region's society. The economic links that developed between Israel and the West Bank have significantly affected the income and employment of the territory's resi- dents and led to the emergence of a politically more sophisticated middle class. The international contro- versy over the territory's future status has made it more difficult for West Bankers to ignore political issues. The prospect of some form of self-government in the West Bank has placed a premium on the development of a modern political culture from which new national leaders can emerge. Despite this political evolution, Israeli policy in the West Bank remains the determining factor in the territory's political life. Various Israeli governments have, in different ways, sought to control the develop- ment of the territory's new political culture. Although the Israeli policies have often not produced their intended result and have increasingly alienated the Arab residents, West Bankers, the Jordanian Govern- ment, and the PLO have been powerless to seize the initiative from Tel Aviv. Development of Israeli Policy. Israeli policy toward the West Bank has undergone significant changes since 1967. When the West Bank first came under Israeli control, most Israelis probably expected that the territory-with the exception of Jerusalem- would eventually be returned to Jordan in exchange for Amman's recognition of Israel. Military occupa- tion authorities confined themselves largely to serving as proxy administrators of Jordanian law. The lack of significant political activity by Palestinians in the West Bank was as much due to policies and habits established under Jordanian rule as it was to Israeli restrictions. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Israelis were content to deal with the "notable" families in the West Bank who had traditionally been the territory's power brokers. In the mid-1970s, however, the West Bank's military government assumed a more active role in the politics of the territory and attempted to direct the emerging political aspirations of West Bank residents into chan- nels the Israelis thought would be constructive. Dur- ing the voting for village and municipal leaders in 1975 and 1976, the military administration took great pains to ensure that the elections were relatively open and democratic. Israeli officials who advocated this liberalization of West Bank politics believed that the elections would produce a new echelon of moderate West Bank leaders who would cooperate with the military government and who could compete with the PLO for the allegiance of West Bank residents. Most of the mayors who were elected in the 1976 municipal elections, however, openly sympathized with the PLO. Although traditional clan competition remained an important factor in the elections, those candidates who were identified with the PLO were consistent winners. By the late 1970s, the mayors of the larger Arab communities in the West Bank had become the most prominent political elite in the territory. The call in the Camp David Accords for a self-governing author- ity in the West Bank focused additional attention on the mayors. As popularly elected officials, they were expected to play an important role in the negotiations to develop some form of autonomy for the occupied territories during the five-year transition period stipu- lated in the accords. Like most West Bankers, howev- er, the municipal leaders rejected the Camp David process. Despite their unanimous stand on this issue, the mayors did not agree on all questions affecting the West Bank. Ilyas Frayj of Bethlehem, for example, was receptive to the idea of a West Bank confedera- tion with Jordan and was thus not always on the best of terms with the PLO. Other mayors, such as Karim Khalaf of Ram Allah, Muhammad Milhim of Halhul, and Fahd Qawasmah of Hebron, supported the con- cept of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. The mayor of Nablus, Bassani Shak'a, was a political hardliner often identified with the more radical Palestinian factions. The differences among 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 the municipal leaders were exacerbated by the tradi- tional rivalries that existed among the various West Bank communities and by each mayor's aspiration to be the territory's principal spokesman. With political parties and territorywide organizations banned in the West Bank, the mayors-particularly Khalaf, Milhim, Qawasmah, and Shak'a-were by early 1979 functioning as a coordinating body for West Bank political activity. These four municipal leaders were the driving force behind the National Guidance Committee, which appeared on the West Bank shortly after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. In addition to the West Bank mayors, the committee's members included representatives from the Gaza Strip, welfare organi- zations, universities, and labor unions. The commit- tee's success in coordinating general strikes and pro- tests against the Israeli occupation reflected the growing politicization and frustration of many West Bank residents. The mayors and the National Guidance Committee also were able to provide the PLO with a more direct means of communicating with the West Bank. The mayors, whose municipalities depended on Arab states and the PLO for much of their funding, often traveled to Amman for legitimate business reasons. During these visits to Jordan, they would on occasion meet secretly with PLO officials to discuss conditions on the West Bank and to coordinate the Palestinian response to the Camp David Accords and Israeli moves in the occupied territories. The Begin government questioned the wisdom of affording West Bankers openly sympathetic to the PLO the opportunity to dictate the tenor of the territory's politics. During its first two years in office, the Begin government's preoccupation with the Egyp- tian-Israeli peace negotiations precluded significant changes in the administration of the West Bank. Once the peace treaty was signed, however, and the West Bank's leaders refused to accept the Begin govern- ment's proposals for limited autonomy, relations be- tween the military administration and the West Bank- ers quickly soured. In late 1979 the military government sought to deport Nablus Mayor Shak'a because of his role in organiz- ing West Bank demonstrations. A threatened mass resignation of the territory's municipal leaders staved off the deportation, but in early 1980 the military government postponed indefinitely the elections for mayors scheduled that April. Most West Bankers viewed the postponement as a signal that Tel Aviv was considering ways of restricting the mayors' freedom of action. The killing in May 1980 of seven Israeli religious students in Hebron brought matters to a head. Within days, Mayors Qawasmah of Hebron and Milhim of Halhul were deported. One month later, Shak'a and Ram Allah Mayor Khalaf were seriously injured in car bombings apparently perpetrated by rightwing Israeli settlers seeking revenge for the earlier killings. By the summer of 1980, these four leading members of the National Guidance Committee were no longer in a position to organize West Bank political activity. Tel Aviv in the last three years has continued to seek ways to limit the activities of West Bank leaders sympathetic to the PLO. New restrictions have been placed on the ability of West Bankers to bring Arab funds into the territory, making it more difficult for the PLO and Jordan to disburse funds to the territo- ry's leaders. The military government has also prohib- ited some West Bankers from traveling to Jordan and has made it illegal for any West Banker to meet with PLO officials. In early 1982 Tel Aviv dismissed several municipal councils and mayors, including Shak'a and Khalaf, and outlawed the National Guid- ance Committee. These steps in essence completed the dismantling of what had become the West Bank's first territorywide leadership. Current Israeli Policies. Current Israeli policies in the West Bank seem to be aimed at facilitating the eventual annexation of the territory. If Israel remains permanently in control of the West Bank, one of the most difficult problems it will confront is how to 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret govern the more than 700,000 Palestinian residents of the territory. The current thrust of Israeli policy suggests that Tel Aviv would create a separate politi- cal structure for non-Jewish West Bank residents, thereby limiting their political role on the national scene and preserving the Jewish nature of the Israeli state In November 1981 Defense Minister Ariel Sharon separated the civilian administration of the West Bank from the military government. The decision to create a separate civilian administration was de- scribed, at least initially, as a bureaucratic move intended to make it easier for the military government to deal with its two main functions: security matters and management of the West Bank's day-to-day affairs In practice, however, the establishment of a civilian administration marked a new Israeli attempt to shape West Bank politics. The first head of the civilian administration, Menahem Milson, a noted Israeli academic, had been a constant and vocal critic of previous Israeli policies in the territory, which, in his view, had handed control of West Bank politics to the PLO. Rather than sponsor elections for mayors who would inevitably emerge as spokesmen for the PLO, the military government, Milson argued, should en- courage the development of a rural-based leadership that would presumably be more conservative and thus more receptive to the Israeli concept of autonomy for the territory. The purging of the West Bank's municipal leadership created a vacuum that Milson proceeded to fill with just such a rural-based political system-the Village Leagues. The Hebron Village League, founded in 1978, was the model for the four additional leagues that were formed in 1982. These associations of prominent rural leaders were theoretically responsible only for those matters not under the jurisdiction of the municipal authorities, but the leagues, encouraged by Israeli officials, have attempted to supplant the may- ors and municipal councils as the preeminent govern- ment structure in the West Bank. In August 1982 the leagues took an important step toward expanding their authority in the West Bank by establishing a regional federation. Mustafa Dudin, founder of the Hebron league and an ex-Jordanian Cabinet minister, was elected the federation's presi- dent. 25X1 25X1 The leagues have nonetheless failed to gain significant political influence among most West Bank Palestin- ians, who have rejected league leaders' claims to be responsible representatives of the Palestinian cause. Most politically active West Bankers have branded the league members as collaborators. Violent attacks against league officials have led the Israeli Govern- ment to permit some members to carry arms, a 25X1 development that has cast additional doubts on the leagues' political legitimacy. The optimistic predictions of Israeli officials that the Sharon approach toward the West Bank would cleanse the territory of PLO influence have not been fulfilled during the civilian administration's first 21 months. Most residents continue to view PLO leaders as legitimate spokesmen for the Palestinian cause. The civilian administration's hesitant beginning and frictions between Milson and the military government led to Milson's resignation in September 1982, al- though he publicly stated at the time that his action was due to the government's initial refusal to establish a commission of inquiry into the massacre of Palestin- ian refugees in Beirut. A military man, Brig. Gen. Shlomo Ilia, succeeded Milson as head of the civilian administration, thereby blurring the distinction between it and the military government. Milson's resignation, however, did not herald a fundamental change in Tel Aviv's policies toward the West Bank, which are intended to estab- lish a pro-Israel, anti-PLO leadership in the territory. The Village Leagues may fail to be the vehicle for such leadership, but the Begin government-firmly committed to its claim of Israeli sovereignty over the 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 West Bank-will continue to place a high priority on the development of malleable leaders who can be groomed to take over many of the civilian functions of the military government in the territory. Some Israeli political observers have speculated that divorcing the civilian component from the military administration was the first step toward the unilateral establishment of a "self-governing" authority in the West Bank.F- The Israeli Government can already claim that some of the actions taken in the West Bank conform to the autonomy arrangements stipulated in the Camp David Accords. According to these arrangements, the Israeli military government must withdraw from the occupied territories once a self-governing authority is in place. Technically, Tel Aviv could argue that the military government, which has its headquarters in Israel proper, has already withdrawn from the West Bank, leaving the civilian administration in its place. In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the civilian administration could at some point transfer its duties to appropriate local leaders-who, according to the Camp David Accords, would have to be freely elect- ed--thus giving them control over Palestinian affairs. The Israeli Government, however, would retain re- sponsibility for Jewish residents in the territory and ultimately assert its sovereignty over the West Bank. Israeli Public Attitudes. Prime Minister Begin has strong popular support for some, but not all, aspects of his hardline policy toward the occupied territories. Polling data indicate that the public considers the West Bank vital to Israeli security and adamantly opposes a return to the pre-1967 border, establish- ment of an independent Palestinian state, or negotia- tions with the PLO.' Opinion is deeply split about the ultimate status of the West Bank, however, and support for Begin's aggressive Jewish settlement poli- cy has fluctuated over time. ' Public opinion polling is a growth industry in Israel. Numerous social science organizations, market research firms, academic institutions, and the media are involved in surveying the attitudes of Israelis toward individuals and issues. Unfortunately, the wording of West Bank questions has often changed significantly from poll to poll. In assessing polling results it is important to pay close attention to the precise wording of the question and to analyze the There is widespread agreement in Israel on West Bank issues that are considered to involve vital securi- ty interests. A dominant and persistent theme, for example, is that Israel's security would be unaccepta- bly jeopardized by withdrawal to the pre-1967 bor- ders. This position has long been held across the spectrum of public opinion. The overwhelming majority of Israelis are adamantly opposed to the establishment of an independent Pales- tinian state on the West Bank. While some share Prime Minister Begin's religious-historical vision of the territory as part of the traditional land of Israel, the attitudes of most Israelis seem rooted in security concerns. Polls have also consistently revealed adverse reactions to negotiating with the PLO, reflecting deep-seated fear and mistrust of what most Israelis regard as an irredeemably "terrorist" organization. The antipathy with which Israelis view a separate Palestinian state and the PLO probably contributes to their strong belief in the importance of Jordan in any future peace negotiations concerning the West Bank. Overwhelmingly, and among all groups, Israelis see Jordan as having a key role in discussions about a possible peace settlement. Public opinion is deeply divided on whether to absorb the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or to trade some part of it for peace. In a June 1982 poll, 52 percent of those questioned responded positively when asked if Israel should retain all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, even if such retention would make final peace impossible; 40 percent disagreed. Yet in the same poll, Israelis by 50 percent to 35 percent said that Israel should remain a state with a Jewish majority rather than incorporate the largely Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories in a larger state that might ultimately have an Arab majority. Jewish settlements in the West Bank, like the question of the territory's ultimate status, have generated much controversy. Opinion on the subject has fluctu- ated over the years. Opposition to expanding settle- ment was at its high point after Camp David and the 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Figure 22 Israel: Public Opinion Polls Support of Jewish Settlement Expansion (October 1978-October 1982) Favor Oppose Percent 1 IuI I I I I I I I l l I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I i I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1979 80 81 82 Favor Oppose Palestinian State October 1978 October 1979 June 1980 Dealing with PLO April 1981 June 1981 March 1982 Jordanian Role in Negotiations June 1982 October 1982 0 25 Percent signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. It de- clined, however, as prospects for successful negotia- tions on the West Bank dimmed. apathetic. The Israeli Government argues that most West Bank Palestinians have only a superficial at- tachment to the PLO based not on any intellectual identification with the organization's goals but on the fact that the PLO has a virtual monopoly of the Attitudes on settlements have also seemed to relate closely to the public's evaluation of the Begin govern- ment's overall performance. An increase in support for settlement expansion between June 1980 and October 1981, for example, paralleled a rebound in Begin's personal popularity and the Likud's successful election campaign in June 1981. Polling results in late 1982 continued to show majority support for expand- ing the settlements. Palestinian Politics The principal assumption behind current Israeli policy toward the West Bank is that the majority of the territory's residents are politically conservative or territory's politics. In some respects, Israeli perceptions of the West Bank are correct. Despite the political evolution there in the last few years, the West Bank largely remains a traditional, rural-based society. More than half of the territory's nonrefugee residents, for example, still live in villages of 3,000 people or less. For most West Bankers, even those living in the larger urban areas, family or clan ties are the most important factors in Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 23 Israel: Political Party Attitudes Towards the West Bank a Total withdrawal from occupied territories and creation of independent Palestinian state. h Withdrawal from occupied territories (with only minor border adjustments) and recognition of national aspirations of Palestinians. c Withdrawal from densely populated areas of West Bank; retention of strategic zone along Jordan River and Dead Sea, Latrun Salient, and Jerusalem environs; West Bank to become part of Palestinian-Jordanian state. dNo withdrawal; the Israeli Government will decide when to extend Israeli sovereignty to West Bank; Palestinian inhabitants of West Bank will enjoy limited autonomy. e Immediate annexation of West Bank. their lives. Even the city of Nablus-the largest and most politically active West Bank town-is essentially an overgrown agricultural market center whose in- habitants are either still farmers or not far removed from the rural lifestyle. The Israeli-backed Village Leagues hope to draw upon the conservative West Bank population to form a constituency large enough to enable them to challenge the PLO for political leadership of the territory. League officials, in fact, are seeking to popularize a new name for their organizations-the Palestinian The meager results of many PLO-inspired attempts to organize large-scale demonstrations or general strikes have indicated that many West Bankers are hesitant or unwilling to engage in visible political protests against the Israeli military government. Participation levels in general strikes called to protest unpopular Israeli moves in the territory, for example, have been inconsistent. Small businessmen, particularly those with shops in the principal tourist areas, have often made only token attempts to conform to the strike calls, and West Bankers who work in Israel have usually reported to their jobs. In general, the political and security problems relating to Israel's 16-year occupation of the territory have been well within what Tel Aviv considers tolerable limits. Organizations. Only in Hebron, however, has the league enjoyed limited popular success. The Village League there is the strongest and oldest such group in the West Bank. It was formed in 1978 before the military government took an active interest in the concept and thus is not so tainted by the charge that the leagues are Israeli creations. In addition, the Hebron area, a religious center for Muslims, has historically been the most conservative region in the West Bank. Mustafa Du- din, in particular, has developed a following among 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret the conservative residents of several small villages near Hebron. In other areas of the West Bank, however, such as Nablus, the Village Leagues operate in less hospitable circumstances. The people of the West Bank are accustomed, more- over, to dealing on a practical plane with local agents of the ruling authority without attaching any particu- lar political significance to the transaction. For centu- ries most foreign powers occupying the West Bank delegated many of their responsibilities to a few wealthy, "notable" families, with whom West Bank- ers dealt for most basic government services. The system gave them little experience with participatory politics. The military government's attempt to strengthen the Village Leagues has included delegating to them many of these same responsibilities. Although the leagues may thus become more important to West Bankers, they are unlikely to have any more success in attracting political support than did the notable fam- ilies who, during the West Bank elections of the 1970s, lost many votes to PLO-backed candidates. F_ As in most traditional societies, the majority of the West Bank's residents are more concerned about earning a living for themselves and their families than they are about political affairs that often do not affect them directly. The group in West Bank society that is most likely to act on its political beliefs is the educated elite. White-collar workers, professionals, teachers, students, and journalists-who are the cut- ting edge of political activity in most traditional societies-are a growing force on the West Bank. The Village Leagues are at a distinct disadvantage in competing with the PLO for such elite support. There are conservative members of the elite group who do not agree with PLO goals, but public opinion surveys and other studies indicate that they are in a minority. Most West Bank elites are chafing under the rule of yet another occupying power, and they are eager to realize their nationalist aspirations. For them, the PLO comes closest to representing their views. The West Bank Elite and the PLO. Over the last 16 years, large numbers of West Bankers have moved from the agricultural sector to wage labor jobs in the urban areas of the territory and in Israel. Many teachers, doctors, and engineers have found employ- ment with the plethora of international relief agencies in the territory and even with the Israeli military government, which employs about 12,000 West Bank- ers. According to Israeli Government figures, about 18 percent of the West Bank labor force can now be classified as white-collar workers. Despite their increasing numbers, the West Bank's educated elites have had little direct political impact on the territory. This is due in large part to the ban on political parties in the West Bank. During the late 1970s the mayors and municipal councils did reflect the views of most West Bank professionals, but since the Israeli crackdown on municipal leaders, the West Bank elite has lacked even that channel for expressing its political views. The professional associations and unions formed by the white-collar workers are now the closest these West Bankers come to having political organizations. Most of these professional associations strongly sup- port the PLO; many, for example, signed petitions in the late 1970s lambasting the Camp David Accords. Among the most influential and radical of these groups are the Arab Thought Forum, the Engineers' Union, and the Society of Voluntary Workers. Israeli restrictions on territorywide organizations, however, make it difficult for these associations to function effectively by preventing them from coordinating their activities. The elites can also make their views known through the Arabic-language newspapers in the West Bank. Al Fajr is the territory's most influential newspaper. It is reported to receive funds from the PLO and its editorial line often reflects PLO policy. Its effective- ness is limited, however, by routine Israeli censorship of the West Bank press. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Masked Arab youths, protest- ing Israeli policies in the West Bank, hurl stones at Israeli po- lice in the main square of Nab- Students. Unlike the West Bank's professional and white-collar workers, the territory's student popula- tion is more vocal in its support of the PLO and more strident in its opposition to Israeli rule. About one- third of the territory's population-some 250,000 people-are students. Young people are almost al- ways in the forefront of protests and demonstrations, and they account for most of the casualties in these disturbances. Students have also become increasingly involved in Islamic fundamentalist activity as a way of protesting Israel's occupation. The West Bank's universities are the principal centers of anti-Israeli, pro-PLO sentiment. The Bir Zeit and An Najah campuses are the most politically active, and both have often been shut down for long periods by the Israeli authorities. In 1982 Tel Aviv tried to curtail political activity at the universities by forcing out pro-PLO faculty members who, according to the Israelis, are often the prime instigators of student protests. During the year the military government deported over 30 Bir Zeit and An Najah professors- in this case foreign (non-West Bank) teachers who had to have work permits to remain in the territory- who refused to sign pledges renouncing their support of the PLO. Although these Israeli actions may in the short term disrupt pro-PLO activities on the campus- es, they have probably only further deepened the antagonism between students and the military govern- ment. PLO Activity in the West Bank. The constant watch- fulness of Israeli authorities in the West Bank has prevented the PLO from using its supporters there more effectively. The PLO has agents in the West Bank who can relay the organization's policies and decisions to the territory's residents, and influential West Bankers who travel to Jordan meet secretly with PLO representatives in Amman. But unlike the period of the late 1970s, when the National Guidance Com- mittee-led by the PLO-backed mayors-was able to coordinate territorywide activities, the PLO today does not have a convenient mechanism for supervising political tactics in the West Bank. In addition, the high profile of the West Bank's elite makes it difficult for them to work actively for the PLO without attracting Israeli attention. Most members of the West Bank elite know that if they, like the former mayors, try to develop an active pro-PLO movement in the territory, the Israeli authorities will react harshly. At best, the PLO can let it be known when it disapproves of possible moves by West Bankers. Re- cent attempts by some West Bankers to rally support for the US peace initiative, for example, have faltered Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Despite 16 years of Israeli occupation and the 1974 Rabat summit conference declaration naming the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Jordanian Government still plays a role in the West Bank. Under international law, Jordanian law is still technically applicable in the region, even though the Israeli military govern- ment has over the years issued some 1,000 adminis- trative decrees that have significantly modified these laws. The principal means Jordan uses to maintain influ- ence in the territory is financial support. Amman continues to give subsidies to the West Bank munici- palities and to pay the salaries of about 6,000 West Bank residents who were registered Jordanian Gov- ernment employees prior to the 1967 war. In agree- ment with Israel, it has maintained an "open bridges" policy that helps the West Bankers market their agricultural and industrial products and travel to and from jobs in Jordan. West Bankers still hold Jordanian citizenship and carry Jordanian passports when they travel abroad. In 1980 Jordan reopened passport offices in the West Bank in an effort to help West Bankers keep their Jordanian passports current. In 1978, at the Baghdad Arab summit conference, the Jordanian-PLO joint committee was formed, giving Jordan a formal role to play in West Bank affairs for the first time since the Rabat summit. In conjunction with the PLO, Jordan administers an Arab aid fund in part because of the PLO's veto of the move. The PLO sometimes relies on violence and other forms of intimidation to maintain political control of the West Bank. For the most part, however, the West Bank's political elite believes it to be of paramount impor- tance that they and the PLO speak with a common voice. The Moderates and the Jordanian Connection. The US peace initiative announced by President Reagan on 1 September 1982 has sparked renewed interest in developing a centrist position in West Bank politics. of $150 million to the Palestinians in the occupied lands. During 1982, as part of a growing cooperation between Jordan and the PLO, the mission of the joint committee was expanded to include coordination of all policies and actions taken by the PLO and Jordan on the West Bank. The Jordanians have taken measures to counter Israeli political moves in the territory. In March 1982 the Jordanian Government passed a law ban- ning membership in the Israeli-supported Village Leagues. The law required Palestinians to renounce their membership within one month of its issuance or be tried for treason. Although Amman made no real effort to implement the law, it blacklisted several mukhtars (village leaders) for collaborating with the Village Leagues and ignored official documents signed by them. With the breakdown of the PLO-Jordanian talks last April, the Jordanian Government has implemented a number of restrictive measures against West Bankers traveling to Jordan. West Bankers are now permitted entry into Jordan only via the two bridges over the Jordan River, thereby preventing West Bankers from leaving from Israeli-controlled airports or border crossings. West Bankers are also banned from cross- ing into Jordan if their Israeli-issued travel permit prohibits their return before the permit expires. In addition, the territory's residents are limited to a 30-day stay in Jordan. ment in the process. The mayor of Bethlehem, Ilyas Frayj, has been the principal leader of the West Bank moderates. Al- though it is difficult to pinpoint who the moderates are and exactly what they stand for, they can best be described as those West Bankers who would like the PLO to be more flexible concerning peace negotia- tions and who generally support Jordanian involve- 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 In late 1982, Frayj circulated a petition that ex- pressed support for a confederation with Jordan and a Jordanian role in the peace process, urged the PLO to accept UN Resolution 242, and called for mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. At first Frayj represented the petition as having at least tacit PLO support, but once it became clear that the PLO disapproved of his actions, Frayj sought to convince influential West Bankers to diverge from the PLO on this issue. Frayj's position, however, failed to garner significant support. The failure of the petition is evidence of the inability of West Bank moderates to gain widespread support for a position that might be contrary to PLO wishes. In addition, most West Bankers see little utility in antagonizing the PLO as long as Tel Aviv appears unwilling to consider the US initiative and Jordan is unprepared to make important moves with- out first seeking PLO approval. Secret 56 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret West Bank's Internal Security During the 16 years of Israeli military occupation, the IDF has had little difficulty in maintaining security in the West Bank. In the late 1960s the PLO attempted to organize West Bank resistance against the Israeli occupation of the territory, but these efforts were soon quashed by the military authorities. The PLO even attempted to establish permanent bases in the hilly areas of the West Bank, but these were systematically discovered and destroyed by Israeli forces. The organized PLO presence in the territory is limited now to undercover agents and small terrorist cells that seek to avoid detection. Even so, the IDF appears to have considerable success in ferreting out many PLO members and sympathizers before they can organize terrorist activity. In 1978, for example, the Israelis announced that of the 140 terrorist cells discovered in the West Bank that year, 100 were unearthed before they had carried out any terrorist missions. The military government also has had considerable success in containing civil disturbances in the territo- ry, but the resentment that many West Bankers harbor against the Israelis makes a certain level of unrest inevitable. Much of the violence is cyclical in nature, and tensions are often highest during anniver- saries commemorating important events in the history of Palestinian nationalism. The highly vocal and nationalistic school-age population poses a special problem for Israeli authorities, and the opening days of school terms are often marked by protests and demonstrations. The military government has dealt forcefully with civil unrest, and it has not hesitated to employ its discretionary powers of arrest and detention to con- tain disturbances. The IDF has also followed a policy of punishing entire groups for the actions of individ- uals by, for example, razing homes when one family member is guilty of offenses. The stiffest crackdown on West Bank demonstrations occurred during 1980 and 1981, when Israeli authorities moved against the PLO-associated National Guidance Committee, which had been organizing numerous demonstrations and strikes. The continuous flow of Jewish settlers into the West Bank is evidence of the relatively stable security situation existing there. Many Israeli settlers, howev- er, aggravate the security situation by taking actions that antagonize the territory's Arab residents or by taking the law into their own hands. Some settlers- particularly members of Gush Emunim or other fer- vently nationalistic settlement groups-have, for ex- ample, squatted on land without prior government approval or torn down Arab facilities built on disputed territory. In addition, extremist settlers have formed vigilante-type groups to carry out terrorist acts against Palestinians and to retaliate against Arab violence. Terrorism Before the Six-Day War, Palestinian groups and, during the 1950s, even the Jordanian Army randomly shelled Israel's coastal plain from the Judean and Samarian hills, and armed bands frequently crossed into Israel to carry out terrorist attacks. After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the IDF succeed- ed in clearing out much of the PLO's infrastructure from the territory. Israeli settlements built in the Jordan River Valley were in part intended to help monitor and stop PLO infiltration from Jordan, al- though the actual border patrolling has been per- formed by IDF units. Amman, in turn, after the 1970 civil war that resulted in the ouster of the PLO from Jordan, also had considerable success in preventing terrorists from using its West Bank border area as a staging point for raids into Israeli-held territory. Consequently, the incidence of terrorist attacks in Israel declined. The influx of West Bank laborers to Israel during the early and mid-1970s, however, has provided the PLO with a new means of carrying out terrorist attacks inside Israel. The large number of West Bankers who work in Israel travel freely and regularly across the border. Rather than rely on more easily detectable bands of terrorists, the PLO now depends largely on individuals who deposit simple bombs in busy Israeli urban areas and disappear from the scene long before 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04 : CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secrei Razed Arab house near Qirvat Arha. The house was destroyed hr the Israeli military govern- ment or In extremist settlers probably because it lacked a permit and was built on land designated Jr settlement ex- an explosion occurs. As a result, the incidence of terrorist attacks in Israel proper and in Jerusalem has These terrorist incidents have not had serious effects on Israeli society-in magnitude they do not approach the levels of the 1950s. Such attacks, however, will be impossible to prevent as long as the Israeli economy West Bank's Strategic Value In spite of the sharp differences in Israel over settle- ments and over the degree to which Israel can afford to compromise in West Bank negotiations, there is virtually universal agreement that the territory is vital to Israel's security. No political faction of any signifi- cance would agree to a treaty that did not permit an The Israelis stress the importance of denying the territory to potentially hostile military forces. They note that Israel's pre-1967 border with Jordan consti- tuted one of the least defensible boundaries imagin- able. It left Arab forces in control of high ground overlooking a coastal plain only 15 to 30 kilometers wide on which 75 percent of the Jewish population and half of Israel's industry are located. An armor thrust from the Arab hills could theoretically have divided Israel and seriously challenged its defense. The West Bank itself offered ideal sanctuaries for a Treaty arrangements that demilitarized the territory could reduce this threat, particularly if they also featured force limitations on the Jordanian side of the border. As long as Israel maintained its overwhelming qualitative advantages over potential Arab enemies, its forces could quickly reestablish defensive positions on the West Bank if they concluded that the treaty was about to be violated. Israeli planners, however, looking to a day when their advantages may not be so pronounced as they are now, would argue they cannot afford to relinquish their military presence in ex- change for political arrangements of uncertain dura- The topography of the territory makes it an attractive military asset even in an era of modern weapons capable of spanning it and striking directly at targets in Israel. In the absence of hostile nuclear forces, Israel recognizes that the only real threat to its survival would be an invasion by enemy ground forces. 25X1 25Xl .4 portion of the Israeli security Ience in the Jordan Valley. The cleared strip to the right of the fen,e is harrowedfregaenilr to help in detecting footprints of horder crossers. Fields and ounouaim in the background The Jordan Valley, edged for most of its length by chains of steep hills and escarpments, is an ideal boundary from the military perspective. The few east- west lines of movement across the valley depend on breaks and passes through hills that have narrow choke points. Within the valley itself, military move- Access to elevated positions increases the effectiveness of modern battlefield missiles and guided artillery shells against low-flying aircraft and tanks by improv- ing the defender's ability to detect targets and vector appropriate systems against them. In addition, hold- ing the high ground gives the defender the traditional advantages in observation and cover and concealment, and in the channeling of enemy forces into restricted spaces where they are more vulnerable to interdiction. The Israeli forces required to defend the valley could conceivably be reduced over time as Israel acquires new technologies that achieve better results with less manpower. Such technologies include "assault break- er" munitions and "smart" artillery shells that togeth- er significantly enhance the effectiveness of indirect fire against offensive armor. With such weapons, well- prepared, small Israeli enclaves probably could hold the terrain indefinitely against much larger attacking Security Value of Settlements One of the primary justifications for building settle- ments in the West Bank--at least initially was that their inhabitants would help to detect and delay a possible attack from Jordan. This rationale is still occasionally cited, but several senior Israeli military officers have noted that the settlements would actual- ly be it liability in a conventional conflict because, as happened in the Golan Heights in 1973, the IDf would be diverted to rescuing these civilians at the start of the war. By establishing settlements in the West Bank the Israelis have reduced the area's value as a buffer zone; the settlements themselves are now potential targets within range of the Jordan border. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Table 3 IDF Deployments in the West Bank Standing Forces Maximum Deployment 97th Brigade 170 3,400 218th Artillery Regiment 105 2,100 21st Command and Support Brigade 2,554 2,554 162nd Armored Division 6,780 11,300 194th Armored Division 1,130 11,300 97th Infantry Brigade 170 3,400 408th Territorial Parachute Brigade 160 3,300 Total 11,069 37,354 West Bank settlements possess only rudimentary de- fenses, designed to defend against isolated terrorist attacks or to delay a larger attacking force until help arrives from the IDF. Most settlement sites are selected on the basis of economic, religious, or land availability considerations and not because of their tactical significance. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret The status of Jerusalem is recognized as the most difficult of any of the issues that must be resolved by the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute. By more or less general agreement, consideration of Jerusalem will be one of the final items on any negotiating agenda. Nevertheless, in order to reach an overall Middle East settlement, it will be necessary to reach an under- standing on the ultimate status of the city. Jerusalem is comprised of the Old City, a walled area that contains sites considered sacred by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; the Arab area outside the walls north and east of the Old City; the primarily Jewish area to the west known as the New City; and the area of the West Bank that was incorporated into Jerusalem in 1967, consisting of Arab villages and new Jewish housing developments. Jews and Muslims consider one part of the city to be especially sacred: the raised area of 14 hectares in the southwest corner of the walled city called the Temple Mount by the Jews because within this area the Temple once stood. The Western Wall, frequently referred to as the Wailing Wall, is part of the retaining wall around the raised area and is consid- ered holy in Jewish tradition because of its proximity to the inner sanctuary of the Temple. Located on the Temple Mount-called Haram al-Sharif by the Mus- lims-are the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, which according to Muslim tradition is built over the spot from which Muhammad ascended to heaven. The conflict between the forces of Israel following its creation as an independent state in May 1948 and the armed forces of the Arab states left Jerusalem a divided city, with Jordanian forces holding the Old City and the adjacent areas to the north and east and the Israeli forces in control of the New City. The 1967 war brought the entire city, as well as the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights in Syria, under Israeli control. Jerusalem is the focal point and symbol of Israeli identity. For most Israelis, the reunification of the city marked the completion of the creation of the Jewish state. They are determined that Jerusalem remain a united city, under exclusive Israeli sover- eignty, and the capital of Israel. The third most sacred city in the world for Muslims, after Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem is also of paramount importance to most Arabs. Since the 1967 war, the Israeli Government has taken a series of actions that are clearly intended to make the reunification of Jerusalem irreversible. This proc- ess of Israelization, or "creating facts" as the Israelis have termed it, has involved annexation, expropria- tion, and the construction of housing for Israeli Jews in the expropriated areas. In June 1967 the Knesset approved a series of decrees greatly expanding the municipal boundaries northeast, east, and south of the city and annexing the entire area to Israel. In 1968 and 1970 large tracts of land in the newly expanded city were expropriated by the Israelis. Several major housing projects for Israeli Jews were subsequently established on the expropriated land. The effect of this action has been to separate Arab Jerusalem from the West Bank. Some government offices, including the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the Israeli National Police, were transferred to East Jerusalem shortly after the 1967 war, an action intended to strengthen Israeli claims to Jerusalem as its permanent capital. offices. In recent years the Likud-dominated government, which came to power after the national elections in May 1977, has continued the Israelization of the city. More land has been expropriated and construction of additional housing for Israeli Jews begun. Since 1977 there have been a number of reports that Prime Minister Begin intended to move his office to East Jerusalem. By 1983 approximately 90,000 Jews had moved into the 10 large housing developments in the expropriated areas of East Jerusalem. In July 1980 the Knesset enacted the "Cohen law" making it virtually impossible for any future government to change the status of the city without Knesset approv- al. Construction has also begun on an office complex in East Jerusalem to accommodate more government 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Figure 25 Bet Heron West Bank (Israeli occupied - status to be determined) Jeruulul - Airfield Ra not Allbn 1C Sanhedriya Givat !i.`EX-t HaMtvtar Jerusalem city limit unilaterally expanded by Israel, 28 July 1967; see,annexed by Knesset, 30 July 1980. Newe Ye agov South Newe Ya'agov u/c Giv'at Shapira +Otd City) Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Giv'at Zeev Gin on Haddasa East Tatpiyot Sur Whir West (Israeli status to bt Bethlehem Mit Gov't HO to Hebron (22 km) i cwiYN the fiedlrllt Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative. Built-up area Israeli-developed area beyond the Armistice Line Jerusalem to Jericho (21 km) Ma'ale Adummim Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 I he Old (m of Jerusalem, rienrd from the east.A Mies- Ii... r emeten and a portion (>f the (itr wall are in thefore- raurid 1he Dome of the Rock ce nt(n dominates Mt Moriah, nr the I ivnple Mount Modern I4cct Jentsnlem is in the dis- Apartment (omples in the Je- rusalem neighborhood of Ra- mot Illom These modern, hon- errcnnb-Iik e tuhirles are recidenecc .1 r Orthodox Jew,c. Begun in l97?. Rumor Alton has a population of approxi- rnate/r 9.200. with plaac for Since 1967 the Israeli position on Jerusalem has been that continued Israeli control over the expanded city is not negotiable. Although government spokesmen have stated that the future of the city will be dis- cussed in direct negotiations, they have avoided giving details on what might be offered the Arabs, and it is clear that no government is prepared to compromise on the issue of Israeli sovereignty over the united city. There is disagreement among Israelis over what role the Jerusalem Arabs should be permitted to play in the city. Israeli moderates, such as former Deputy Mayor Meron Benvenisti, have advocated the recogni- tion of the religious and cultural integrity of the Arab community and the creation of self-governing councils Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 in Arab neighborhoods. The Likud-dominated coali- tion, however, has opposed any arrangement that would even appear to give the Arab community a separate voice. Benvenisti's recommendation that Je- rusalem Arabs be allowed to vote and participate in the self-governing authority envisioned for the West Bank during the five-year transition period prescribed in the Camp David Accords drew charges that he was agitating for the redivision of the city. For the most part, the Arab states publicly have adopted a hardline position on Jerusalem. Although Jordanian King Hussein in early 1972 indicated that he would agree to Israeli sovereignty over the Arme- nian Quarter as well as the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall plaza, he subsequently toughened his position and called for the return of all East Jerusa- lem to Arab sovereignty. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have also called for Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, recognizing that even under extreme pressure Israel is unlikely to agree to the return of East Jerusalem to Arab control, we believe that at least some Arab states, particularly Egypt and Jordan, may be prepared to compromise on the ultimate status of the city. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Iq Next 8 Page(s) In Document Denied Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Chronology 2000-1000 Abraham enters covenant with Yahweh, who prom- ises Abraham and his descendants land extending from the Nile to the Euphrates. Abraham's grandson Jacob, later called Israel, and his family migrate to Egypt. Jews return to the land of Canaan-roughly approximate to modern Israel and the West Bank-in the 13th century B.C. Several small Semitic tribes already inhabit the region, and the Philistines-a seafaring people-have settled the coast. Under the warrior kings Saul and David, Israeli tribes consoli- date their control over region. 63 Pompey captures Jerusalem for Rome. During Ro- man rule, several Jewish revolts occur that lead to the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 A.D. and the dispersal of Jews throughout the Roman Empire, leaving them a small minority of the Semitic popula- tion in Palestine. 395-638 Byzantine rule. Christianity prospers in some towns in the region, but traditional religions remain important in the villages. 1000-928 638 Establishment of Jewish Kingdom. After the death of Arab Muslims conquer Jerusalem. Solomon, kingdom split into two parts-Israel in the north and Judah in the south. 638-1072 722 Israel falls to the Assyrians. 586 Judah falls to Babylon; leadership taken into captivi- ty. Destruction of First Temple. 538 Following the defeat of Babylon by the Persians, Cyrus decrees the return of the Jews to their home- land and the rebuilding of their temple. 322 Conquest of Palestine by Alexander the Great. After his death, area is ruled alternately by the feuding Ptolemids of Egypt and Seleucids of Syria. 167-160 Judah Maccabee leads rebellion against Greeks that results in establishment of independent Jewish kingdom. Palestine ruled by Arabs. Most inhabitants of the region convert to Islam, but small Jewish and Chris- tian communities preserve their religious identities. 1099-1291 Palestine ruled by Crusaders. 1291-1517 Palestine ruled by Mamelukes, a military slave class that controlled Egypt. 1517 Palestine conquered by Turks and governed as part of Ottoman Empire for 400 years. 1882 Beginning of first aliyah (Jewish immigration to Palestine). Immigrants come mainly from Russia and Eastern Europe, where the Czarist government is following policy of persecution. By 1914, 85,000 Jews are in Palestine. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 1897 First Zionist Congress held in Switzerland. 1916 Hussein ibn Ali, the grand sharif and amir of Mecca, leads Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Hus- sein believes that in return Great Britain will support the creation of an independent Arab state, which would include Palestine. 1917 Balfour Declaration issued, stating that British Gov- ernment favored "the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people." 1918 Defeat of Turks by British. 1920 Palestine comes under control of Great Britain by authority of a League of Nations mandate. 1921-22 Britain divides Palestinian mandate and appoints Abdallah, Hussein's son, as amir of Transjordan. British prohibit Jewish settlement in Transjordan. 1929 Arabs in Jerusalem riot over acquisition of land by Jewish immigrants. 1933-39 Jewish immigration to Palestine increases with the emergence of Nazi Germany. 1936 Arab rebellion in Palestine. 1937 British commission on Palestine recommends parti- tion of region into Arab and Jewish states with British retention of mandate over Nazareth, Bethlehem, and Jerusalem. A second government commission declares partition impractical. 1945 Britain seeks to limit postwar Jewish immigration into Palestine. Palestine in effect becomes armed camp with reprisals and counterreprisals between Jews and Arabs and by both against British authority. 1946 Britain grants full independence to Transjordan. 1947 Great Britain turns Palestine issue over to UN, which on 29 November adopts proposal for partition. West Bank to be part of Arab state; Jerusalem to have international status. 12 May 1948 Arabs kill 100 Jews at Kefar Ezyon. 15 May 1948 State of Israel declared. 15 May 1948 Arab military forces attack Israel. 3 April 1949 Israel concludes armistice with Transjordan. "Green Line" drawn as boundary between the two forces. April 1950 King Abdallah incorporates West Bank into Kingdom of Jordan. Only Britain and Pakistan recognize this annexation. 1950 Palestinian terrorist groups, or fedayeen, begin con- ducting raids into Israel from the West Bank, killing over 500 Jews between 1951 and 1955. Israeli reprisal raids into West Bank and Gaza. January 1964 First Arab summit conference agrees to creation of a Palestinian entity. May 1964 Palestine Liberation Organization founded in East Jerusalem. 5 June 1967 Six-Day War begins. 7 June 1967 King Hussein agrees to truce with Israel, which has seized West Bank. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret July 1967 Israel annexes East Jerusalem. September 1967 Israel establishes first West Bank settlement-a kibbutz-at Kefar Ezyon. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. 1974 Rabat summit declares PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 17 May 1977 Likud coalition takes over Israeli Government. New government regards West Bank as permanent part of Eretz Israel. Establishment of Israeli settlements accelerated. 18 September 1978 Camp David Accord. Egypt and Israel agree to set up an "elected self-governing authority" on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to the withdrawal of the Israeli military government to ensure full autonomy for the inhabitants. This step is to be followed by a five-year transitional period leading to final agree- ment on the status of the territories. 1 September 1982 The United States calls for the establishment of a federation linking Jordan with the West Bank and for a freeze on Israeli settlements. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret July 1967 Israel annexes East Jerusalem. September 1967 Israel establishes first West Bank settlement-a kibbutz-at Kefar Ezyon. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242 calls for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. 1974 Rabat summit declares PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 17 May 1977 Likud coalition takes over Israeli Government. New government regards West Bank as permanent part of Eretz Israel. Establishment of Israeli settlements accelerated. 18 September 1978 Camp David Accord. Egypt and Israel agree to set up an "elected self-governing authority" on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to the withdrawal of the Israeli military government to ensure full autonomy for the inhabitants. This step is to be followed by a five-year transitional period leading to final agree- ment on the status of the territories. 1 September 1982 The United States calls for the establishment of a federation linking Jordan with the West Bank and for a freeze on Israeli settlements. Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2008/04/04: CIA-RDP97R00694R000200890001-1