WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300200001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1999
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 June 1954
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'I I
C O N T E N T S
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . Page 8
Political
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Current Military Discussions
Supervision and Guarantees of a Truce
Political Questions
Bilateral Political Talks
SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS . . . . . Page 24
France
Great Britain
Australia
India
Burma
Philippines
Thailand
Japan
South Korea
INDOCHINA REPORT 2
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Indochina
Political: The Vietnamese government, in a
desperate a? empt to bolster the morale of the army
and civil population, promised political and military
reforms. The reforms were just around the corner,
the government said. The regime's greatest hope of
inspiring a will to fight continued, however, to rest
on the hope of American intervention.
INDOCHINA REPORT 3 16 June 54
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General Ely's awkwardly delivered address on the
occasion of his arrival in Hanoi did nothing to dispel
the impression that he and General Salan have been sent
to help negotiate a settlement, rather than to resist
the Viet Minh. Ely's reference to Vietnamese independ-
ence as an accomplished fact rather than as a pledge
France would fulfill was received in stony silence.
Bao Dai for the third straight week held over Pre-
mier Buu Loc's head the threat of dismissal and replace-
ment by Ngo Dinh Diem, the "honest mystic." A 16 June
press dispatch from Saigon reported that Buu Loc had
submitted his resignation. Bao Dai appeared to be
operating, as usual, on the principle that it is not
good for prime ministers to feel too secure, but, also
as usual, he resisted pressure to assume more vigorous
personal leadership. He remained in France.
The American charge in Saigon said the hour had
passed when Bao Dai's return could make any differ-
ence, "except to complicate our task."
Geneva Conference
The Communists continued to move slowly in the
Indochina talks, apparently still believing that time
was on their side.
They were expected to offer minor concessions
in an effort to keep the conference from collapsing.
Meanwhile they urged direct French-Viet Minh
talks which could serve as an alternative to the
conference.
The Communists probably think it is in their
interest to keep the conference alive. Participation
at Geneva confers prestige on Peiping and the Viet
Minh, and an Indochina settlement concurred in by
all or most of the Geneva powers would seem prefer-
able to one concluded solely with France.
16 June 54
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_I
Soviet Orbit Propaganda
Moscow and Peiping kept up a drumfire of
allegations that the United States was deliberately
wrecking the Geneva conference and seeking to form
a "Southeast Asian aggressive bloc" and extend the
Indochina war. The Communists did not, however,
follow up Soviet foreign minister Molotov's warning
on 8 June that extension of the war would have
"dangerous consequences."
Immediate American intervention in Indochina
is unlikely in view of the imminence of congres-
sional elections, Radio Moscow said on 13 June.
Free World Policies and Opinions
France: In office only by virtue of a two-
vote majority grudgingly granted by the National
Assembly on 13 May, the Laniel government lost
even this feeble hold on power and fell on 12 June
by a vote of 306 to 293.
The search for a successor to Laniel seemed
likely to be bitter and prolonged.
National Assembly dissatisfaction with Foreign
Minister Bidault's conduct of negotiations at
Geneva played a major part in causing the downfall
of the cabinet, and it was virtually certain that
any successor government would be pledged to bring
about an early end to the Indochina war.
Recent French official and parliamentary state-
ments have made it increasingly clear that unless
the United States or the UN intervenes in Indochina,
the French military effort there will cease within a
few months.
Great Britain: Prime Minister Churchill told
the House of Commons on-15 June the Geneva confer-
ence was hopelessly deadlocked. For over a week
the cabinet has apparently been systematically pre-
paring the British public for a collapse of the
Geneva talks.
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Britain was deeply concerned over the effects of
the crisis in France on the defenses of Western Europe,
Burma: At least some Burmese seemed to per-
ceive more clearly than previously that the Communist
threat to Indochina must necessarily constitute a
threat to Burma too, and this growing realization
generated at least a slight increase in sympathy for
Thailand, the only buffer between Burma and Indochina.
Philippines: The press accused Washington of
vacillation i n is Indochina policy. One paper
said the United States "must stop blowing hot and
cold on this situation. It is wreaking havoc with
morale."
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Thailand: The Thais continued to press forward
with Their to the UN. Foreign Minister Prince
Wan quickly accepted, with minor reservations, a
draft resolution drawn up with British and French
approval which calls for the sending of a subcommittee
of the UN Peace Observation Commission to Thailand.
Bangkok fears, however, that Czechoslovakia might be
named a member of the subcommittee, and Thai officials
have indicated they may bar the entry into Thailand
of any Czechs so designated.
Japan: The Japanese showed a marked lack of
interes n a Cambodian suggestion that Japan
serve as a member of the proposed Indochina truce
supervisory commission, and are, indeed, unwilling
in general to give positive support to measures for
Far East'stability, according-to the American embassy
in Tokyo.
South Korea: President Rhee again offered to
send two c1v s ons to Indochina.
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Vietnam: The Vietnam government, in a desperate
bid tobools ter morale in the army and civil population,
promised political and military reforms designed to
satisfy nationalist demands. The government's greatest
hope of inspiring a will to fight lies, however, in the
possibility of American intervention.
The general attitude of reserve or hostility of
the Vietnamese population toward the Bao Dai government
and the low morale of the Vietnamese army as a whole
have, not unexpectedly, been aggravated by continuing
Viet Minh military pressure and the indecisive response
of the French and Vietnamese authorities.
The regrouping of French forces in Tonkin will leave
several million villagers in the southern part of the
delta protected from the Viet Minh only by a frail screen
of Vietnamese army battalions. It has been rumored that
the priests of the predominantly Catholic population of
this area have already fled to Hanoi, although the bishop
of Bui Chu remains in his diocese. Another report states
that only three percent of the villages in the delta
remain "loyal."
The submission of villages throughout the delta to
the Viet Minh is largely a consequence of the lack of
any alternative. The French, after much hesitation, have
approved in principle the distribution of a more adequate
armament to Governor Tri's village militia, but have been
slow to make these arms available. The American consul
in Hanoi points out that because of earlier American
commitments to back the militia project, French failure
to deliver arms may hurt American interests.
An indication of the part French military command
thinking has played in weakening Vietnamese morale came
out in a conversation between the American charge and
General Navarre. The charge got the impression that
Navarre would take a certain satisfaction in seeing units
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of the Vietnamese army, for which he has always had the
greatest contempt, "chewed to bits" by the Viet Minh in
southern Tonkin. The Australian minister later told the
charge that he suspected Navarre of having assigned
defense of southern Tonkin to the Vietnamese army in
order to "prove" that the army could not be relied on.
General Ely's awkwardly delivered address to French
and. Vietnamese officials on the occasion of his arrival
inHanoi did nothing to dispel the impression that the
E1 '-'Salan team has been sent to help negotiate a settle-
ment rather than to resist the Viet Minh. Ely's reference
to Vietnamese independence as an accomplished fact rather
than as a pledge which France would fulfill was received
in stony silence.
Governor Tri, in a talk with the American consul,
expressed his concern over Ely's failure to provide Viet-
namese authorities in Tonkin with information on French
military plans in the delta. Such information, Tri pointed
out, is essential to Vietnamese planning for the civilian
population.
The Vietnam government is promising that long-awaited
political reforms are now just around the corner. These
reforms involve the grant of a larger voice in municipal
administration to elected town councilors and the eventual
creation of a national assembly, some of whose members
will be elected, and some appointed by Bao Dai. Viet-
namese skeptics are certain to point out that a power-
less "Provisional National Assembly" has already existed
for several years.
For the third straight week Bao Dai threatened
Premier Buu Lac,, who is expected to resign momentarily,
with dismissal and replacement by Ngo Dinh Diem, the
"honest mystic." Bao Dai appears, as usual, to be
operating on the principle that it is not good for
prime ministers to feel too secure, but, also, as
usual, he is resisting pressure to assume more vigorous
personal leadership. His current justification for
remaining in France is that the French have not yet met
his demand for Vietnamese participation in French military
planning. Bao Dai further explained his inactivity on
the ground that if he were to take vigorous, independent
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action to strengthen the Vietnamese army during the Geneva
conference, he would be accused of "warmongering."
Strong opposition to the return of Bao Dai to Viet-
nam was expressed by two French generals, an influential
Vietnamese leader, and the British chief of mission in
Saigon in separate conversations with the American charge.
The charge adds as his own opinion that the hour has
passed when Bao Dai's return could make any difference in
the fate of Vietnam "except to complicate our task."
As in previous weeks, Governor Tri and Defense
Minister Quat have been the most emphatic in urging
greater American participation in the war. Both officials
begged that General O'Daniel reconsider his decision that
American training of Vietnamese units be confined to the
south. They feel that training in the north is imperative
for psychological as well as military reasons.
The American embassy in Saigon believes that the
Viet Minh, possibly in anticipation of eventual elections,
is conducting a campaign of terror against village officials
in south Vietnam, forcing them to co-operate or flee.
Normally, these village "notables" would determine the
eligibility of voters.
Cambodia: American charge Montllor, on his departure
from Cambodia after 22 months' service, summed up the
situation there in the following terms:
The leaders of the country unanimously look to
the United States for the salvation of their
country from Communism.
Cambodia wants arms to build its army and it
wants them directly.
Cambodia needs bold military leadership, and
General Tioulong is helping to provide such
leadership at the top.
The United States now has in staunchly anti-
Viet Minh Cambodia a potentially important
supporter in the struggle against Communism
in Southeast Asia.
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The Communists continue to move slowly in the
Indochina talks, apparently believing that time is on
their side.
They are expected to offer minor concessions in
the next few days in an effort to keep the conference
from breaking down. Meanwhile, they have urged direct
French-Viet Minh talks which could serve as an alterna-
tive to the conference.
The Communists do not seem to feel under any
pressure to make substantial compromises in the talks.
In their view, the political climate in Paris, the
military situation in Indochina, and the apparent trend
of thinking in Washington all are operating to their
advantage.
Nevertheless, the Communists will probably judge it
to be in their interest to keep the conference alive.
In addition to the prestige which accrues to Communist
China and the Viet Minh from participation at Geneva,
a military and political settlement for Indochina which
had the concurrence of all or most of the Geneva powers
would seem preferable to one concluded solely with
France.
The Communists could make a number of concessions,
at small cost to themselves, in the matters now being
discussed at Geneva. They are reported to have sub-
mitted exaggerated claims of territorial control in
the military talks, they have insisted on a veto at
every level of authority supervising a truce, and they
have insisted that any settlement include their ghost
governments in Laos and Cambodia as well as the Viet
Minh regime.
While seeking to prolong the conference, the
Communists are apparently preparing for a possible
early breakdown. They have urged that direct French-
Viet Minh military talks get under way in the field
as well as at Geneva, and that direct political talks
INDOCHINA REPORT
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be arranged at Geneva or in the field or both. Such
talks would open the way for moving all the Indochina
negotiations to the field in the manner of the Panmunjom
talks.
Current Military Discussions
There has apparently been little progress in the
military talks resulting from the 29 May agreement that
representatives of the two commands would meet at Geneva
and in the field to "study the disposition of forces."
The Communists have reiterated their demand for a re-
grouping of forces in Laos and Cambodia as well as in Viet-
nam. Chou En-lai said on 9 June that the study "should
undoubtedly apply to the whole territory of Indochina."
The military representatives at Geneva are reported
to have exchanged maps to serve in any regrouping of
forces. The Viet Minh is believed to be bidding for con-
trol of three fourths of Vietnam, including all of the
delta area except Hanoi and Haiphong, and about half of
Laos and much of Cambodia.
Both Molotov and Chou have urged that the military
talks in the field be started soon. Such military talks,
together with the direct French-Viet Minh political con-
versations proposed by the Communists, could be a vehicle
for transferring Indochina negotiations to the field as
was done in Korea.
Supervision and Guarantees of a Truce
The Communists have continued to demand a veto at
each level of the proposed supervisory authority--the
mixed committees of belligerents, the international
commission, and the nine "guarantor" states. They have
made only one minor concession in the past week.
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The Mixed Committees: The Communists have reaffirmed
that mixed committees of the belligerents must "bear'the
main responsibility for implementation" of the truce.
These committees would be half Communist in composition.
The International Commission: The Communists have
continued to define the "main tasks" of the international
commission as:
(1) Preventing the introduction of troops and
arms into Indochina.
(2) Supervising provisions relating to military
demarcation lines and a demilitarized zone.
Chou En-lai proposed on 3 June that the international
commission "take up" disputes among the mixed committees,
and, if necessary, refer them to the nine "guarantor"
states participating in the Indochina talks. As of
14 June, the Communists were still insisting that the
commission could only make recommendations to the mixed
committees, and would not have any authority over them.
The Communists have also stood firm in demanding
that two Communist states be members of the international
commission. They have rejected Eden's proposal, backed
by the United States, for a commission composed of Burma,
Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.
The Communists made a minor concession on 14 June by
agreeing that the international commission could decide
some questions by majority vote, with India as the chair-
man having a tie-breaking vote. The more important
decisions, however, would still require unanimity.
There are several points relating to the function,
composition, and procedure of the commission on which
the Communists could compromise at no real cost. They
are likely to do so in order to appear "reasonable."
The Nine Guarantors: The Communists still demand
that supreme authority must rest with the nine powers
participating in the Indochina talks. Molotov has said
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~Iw. I w
that in the event of a dispute within the mixed committees
or the international commission, or between the two, "the
states which are the guarantors become the body to which
an appeal should be made."
The Communists have continued to insist that the
nine "guarantor" states must operate in unison or not
at all. Their formula provides that the nine guarantors,
which include three Communist states, "carry on consulta-
tions and adopt collective instead of individual measures."
Should the Communists retain this veto at the top level
of supervisory authority, they could easily relinquish
it in a feeble international commission.
Political Questions
The Communists have continued to insist on settling
"at least some" political questions as a condition for
a truce. As in the military field, the Communists have
demanded that a political settlement include Laos and
Cambodia as well as Vietnam.
Molotov stated on 8 June that "there should be no
more delay in discussion of problems of a political
settlement." He defined the "main political questions"
as:
(1) "Establishing new mutual relations" between
France and the three Associated States.
(2) "Holding free elections" in all three states.
This statement, echoed by Chou En-lai on 9 June,
was a reaffirmation of the Viet Minh proposal of 10 May,
which called for French recognition of the sovereignty
and independence of the three states, the withdrawal
of foreign troops, formation of committees to carry
out elections, and establishment of unified governments
in the three states.
On 10 June Molotov, in a speech in which he was
obviously marking time, cited American statements as
evidence for his contention that the Associated States
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do not have genuine independence. He concluded that
all participants in the Indochina talks should realize
that an Indochina settlement must resolve "the question
of ensuring the independence of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia and the question of re-establishing the unity
of each .... "
It is not known whether the Communists have followed
up Molotov's 8 June proposal that representatives of "both
sides"--i.e., the French and the Viet Minh--make contact
to discuss political questions just as they have been
discussing military matters. Molotov's phraseology
suggested a Communist hope for such talks in the field
as well as at Geneva.
The Communists have long advocated direct negotia-
tions between the French and the Viet Minh, apparently
believing the French would be easier to handle if isolated.
If the Communists are able to arrange direct French-Viet
Minh political talks at Geneva or in the field, together
with direct military talks in the field, they will have the
framework of negotiations on the Panmunjom style. In such
an event, they might be willing to see the Geneva con-
ference break down.
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SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA
Moscow and Peiping continue to assert that the
United States intends to make the Geneva, conference
fail, to extend the Indochina war, and to form a "South-
east Asian aggressive bloc."
The most recent Communist statements seem to reflect
a belief that American intervention in Indochina is not
an immediate danger. There has been no follow-up to
Molotov's warning on 8 June that American extension of
the Indochina war would have "dangerous consequences."
The following statements are typical of those issued
in the past week:
(1) There has been no "basic change" in the
American policy "designed to extend the
war in Indochina and to prevent the
Geneva conference from reaching agreement."
The United States is still seeking to
"organize a Southeast Asian aggressive
bloc...."" (Chou En-lai, 9 June)
(2) The military talks in Washington are
"working on a plan in deep secrecy for
intervention in Indochina and spreading
the war. "" (Moscow, 9 June)
(3) Admiral Radford wants a "big war, if not
a world war." Senator Knowland wants
the United States to fight in Indochina.
Senator Bridges advocates dropping an
atomic bomb on Indochina. (Moscow, 10 June)
(4) The United States wants nothing more than
a temporary settlement in Indochina, a,
"respite" in which to prepare for inter-
vention, preferably after the congressional
elections this fall. (TASS from Geneva,
11 June)
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(5) Immediate American intervention in Indochina
is unlikely in view of the approaching con-
gressional elections. High American officials
have been advised to "hold their tongues" in
view of the "complete muddle" caused by the
cleavage in official opinion on Indochina.
(Moscow, 13 June)
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FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS
France
National Assembly dissatisfaction with Foreign
Minister Bidault's handling of the Indochina negotia-
tions at Geneva played a major role in bringing about
the downfall of the Laniel government on 12 June by a
vote of 306 to 293. It is virtually certain that
any successor government will be pledged to bring
about an early end to the war. ]r'rench official and
parliamentary statements during recent weeks have made
it increasingly clear that without American or UN
intervention, the French military effort in Indochina
will cease within a matter of a few months.
The search for a successor to Laniel is likely
to be bitter and prolonged. Of the various candi-
dates, Radical Socialist Mendes-France had been the
most outspoken in criticizing the Laniel government's
negotiations at Geneva and in advocating direct talks
with the Viet Minh to end the war. Possible succes-
sors to Laniel include Pinay, an Independent, and
Faure,? a Radical Socialist. In view of the present
parliamentary attitudes on Indochina, any aspirant
to the premiership will be forced to offer a program
for getting France out of the war. One candidate,
Francois Mitterrand, leader of the small Resistance
Union, has repeatedly proposed that France abandon
Indochina and concentrate its energies on its African
possessions.
Great Britain
Prime Minister Churchill's pronouncement in the
House of Commons on 15 June that the Geneva confer-
ence was hopelessly deadlocked climaxed a week of
speculation that the end of the conference was
approaching. There are indications that the British
government began systematically to prepare the public
for the collapse of the negotiations following the
cabinet meetings on the week end of 5 June. In any
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case, Foreign Secretary Eden seems assured of wide
popular support for any new policy moves because of
his previous resolute efforts to induce the Commu-
nists to negotiate.
It is becoming increasingly evident that Britain
is deeply concerned over the effects of the crisis in
France on the defense of Western Europe--possibly more
concerned than it is over the situation in Southeast.
Asia. Alarm over the plight of France since the fall
of the Laniel government has acquired new intensity
in the British press and may well impel Prime Minister
Churchill and Eden to raise the questio~~Aurinz their
visit to the United States next week.
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On 13 June, shortly after his return to Geneva,
Australian minister for external affairs Casey stated
that the UN should deal with the Viet Minh aggression
in Laos and Cambodia. He indicated his government
would support those countries if they made a direct
appeal to the UN.
The Australian press was pessimistic on the
chances for anything being accomplished at Geneva
and also on the chances of saving Indochina.
India
The Indian press has switched abruptly from
admiration to hostility in its attitude toward
British foreign secretary Eden, since his speech
on 8 June, which included a reference to possible
participation of the Colombo powers in supervising
an Indochina truce. Eden is accused of giving way
to American pressure.
Burma
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Many Burmese papers have been expressing a more
sympathetic attitude toward Thailand recently. The
American embassy in Rangoon attributes this to a
growing awareness that Thailand serves as a buffer
,against Communist expansion from Indochina.
Philippines
There has been criticism in the Philippine
press of what is regarded as shifting American
attitudes on intervention. One paper said: "The
United States must stop blowing hot and cold on this
situation. It is wreaking havoc with morale."
Thailand
Thai officials are anxious to press forward with
their UN appeal. In Geneva, Foreign Minister Prince
Wan quickly approved, with minor reservations, a draft
resolution drawn up in New York with British and
French approval, calling for a subcommittee of the
Peace Observation Commission to be sent to Thailand.
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The resolution meets the chief Thai requirement that
the committee's jurisdiction not be confined to
Thailand.
The Thai fear, however, that Czechoslovakia might
be selected to serve on any subcommittee appointed.
They have indicated an intention to refuse entry into
Thailand to any Czechs so designated.
Meanwhile the Thai government is showing in-
creased concern over the deterioration in Indochina.
Police units along the Indochina border have been
reinforced. The arrest of several suspected Commu-
nists in northeastern Thailand indicates that security
in the area has generally been tightened.
Japan
The marked lack of Japanese official and press
interest in the Cambodian suggestion at Geneva that
Japan be a member of the proposed Indochina truce
supervision commission demonstrates Japanese unwill-
ingness to give positive support to measures for Far
East stability, according to the American embassy in
Tokyo. A Foreign Ministry official has dismissed as
premature any thought of Japan's joining a regional
security organization now.
South Korea
At the opening session of the Chinhae confer-
ence on 15 June, President Rhee again offered to
send two South Korean divisions to Indochina. Rhee
is convinced that military force is the only effect-
ive way to deal with the Communists. He probably
also feels that American support of South Korea
derives principally from the conflict between Commu-
nist China and the United States, and that promotion
of this conflict will result in gains for South Korea.
INDOCHINA REPORT 28
16 June 54
25X1
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 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300200001-3
The Chinhae conference, called by Rhee, also
appears designed to convince the United States that
popular Asian support exists for a collective anti-
Communist action program, in which South Korea would
play a part.
INDOCHINA REPORT 29
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP91T01172R000300200001-3