WEEKLY INDOCHINA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300190005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 9, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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Dccu mcnt No. ---------------------
N? Change In Class.
Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S C
guth.: PO-2*T 7
k .
Date. z - -- By.
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State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . Page 3
INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . Page. 8
Military
Political
GENEVA CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Molotov's 8 June Speech
Current Military Discussions
Supervision and Guarantees of a Truce
SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDA . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS . . . . . Page 24
France
Great Gritain
Scandinavia
Australia
Iraq
India
Ceylon
Philippines
Thailand
Japan
INDOCHINA REPORT
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Military:
The attach con-
tinues to e ieve a an all-out attack on the delta
could come at any time after mid-June. French offi-
cials, on the other hand, appear to be slightly more
optimistic than a week ago.
Several French Union posts in the delta were lost
to the enemy during the past week.
All French forces in the delta are withdrawing
north of a line from Son Tay through Hung Yen and the
Bamboo Canal.
American charge McClintock in Saigon thinks the
French are far gone in defeatism, a view also expressed
by Vietnam's Minister of State Dac Khe in Geneva.
Political: A hardening of official Vietnamese
opinion aggainst any political division of the country
and an increasing tendency to attribute the Geneva
stalemate to Communist bad faith were the main.
developments of the week in Vietnam.
Defense Minister Quat gave the first official
public intimation that Vietnam looks primarily to the
United States for help against the Communists.
INDOCHINA REPORT 3 9 June 54
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The prospect of the return of Ngo Dinh Diem was
regarded by Vietnamese with mixed feelings compounded
of respect for his character, misgivings roused by
his inexperience in politics, and distaste for his
pride.
Cambodian officials viewed with great alarm what
they regard as a British tendency to press for delimi-
tation of truce zones in Cambodia. They also fear
that cessation of foreign aid will be provided for in
armistice terms, and are asking the United States for
immediate military assistance.
Laotian premier Souvannaphouma said he did not
believe reports that his brother, Prince Petsarath,
was plotting against the government, and said he
planned to invite Petsarath to return to Laos from
his seven years' voluntary exile in Thailand.
Geneva Conference
Molotov's 8 June speech at Geneva again makes it
clear that the Communists see no reason to compromise
on their maximum demands at this time. The speech
stated publicly the hard line the Communists have
been taking in private during the past three weeks of
restricted sessions on Indochina. Among other things,
Molotov warned that American extension of the Indo-
china war would have "dangerous consequences."
The Communists have moved slowly in the Indochina
talks, giving themselves time to exploit military
developments in Indochina and the political situation
in Paris. They seem to calculate that the French
government will eventually either move toward the
Communist position at Geneva or be replaced by one
which will be more amenable.
They have made small concessions in the talks,
keeping alive Western hopes for an acceptable settle-
ment, and at the same time deterring the West from
expanding the war.
INDOCHINA REPORT 4
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Military discussions at Geneva between
representatives of the two commands have made "no
progress at all," the American delegation reported
on 8 June.
The third week of restricted sessions on Indo-
china dealt with:
(1) The composition of the proposed
international commission to
supervise a truce.
(2) The authority of the commission as
compared with that of the proposed
mixed committees of belligerents
working with the commission.
(3) The question of supreme authority
over both these bodies.
The Communists insisted upon Communist represen-
tation on the international commission and demanded
that the mixed committees be parallel with, not sub-
ordinate to, the international commission.
On 3 June Chou En-lai offered an amplification
of the Communist position which appears to provide
for arbitration of disputes. This proposal calls
for the mixed committees to refer disputes to the
international commission, and for the commission in
turn to refer disputes which it cannot resolve to
the nine participants in the Indochina talks.
These various proposals would give the Commu-
nists a veto at all three levels of supervisory
authority: half the members of the mixed committees
would be Communists, half the members of the
international commission would be Communist states,
and there are three Communist powers among the
participants in the Indochina talks.
,INDOCHINA REPORT 5
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Soviet Bloc Propaganda
Moscow and Peiping continued to clamor that
American policy on Indochina is designed to serve
four purposes:
(1) To make the Geneva conference
fail.
(2) To extend the Indochina war.
(3) To form a "Southeast Asian
aggressive bloc."
(4) To wage war against the peoples
of Asia.
Communist propaganda was still less menacing
this past week, however, than that which preceded
the Chinese intervention in Korea in 1950.
Free World Policies and Opinions
France: The Laniel government placed the
direction of Indochina affairs in new hands. It
appointed General Ely chief of both military and
civilian affairs in Indochina and named moderate
ex-Gaullist Frederic-Dupont minister for the
Associated States.
Ambassador Dillon reported on 4 June that the
belief was growing among qualified observers in
Paris that the fall of the cabinet was imminent.
It will be difficult, however, for the opposition
to muster the 314 votes needed to overthrow the
government.
Great Britain: The press has begun to show
widespread pessimism regarding the prospects for
serious negotiations with the Communists.
Scandinavia: Danish and Norwegian newspapers
are more and more inclined to believe that the
conference will fail.
INDOCHINA REPORT 6
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H
Australia: Prime Minister Menzies told Ambassador
Peaslee that "time is running out on us" in Southeast
Asia. Peaslee thinks that increased participation
by Menzies in Commonwealth leadership will be useful,
both in the maintenance of a strong position and in
"bringing into line" the South Asian countries which
took part in the Colombo conference.
Iraq: The American embassy reported on 2 June
that a-g dad would be reluctant to allow planes air-
lifting French troops to Indochina to land in Iraq.
India: New Delhi strongly opposes Thailand's
proposal that the UN Peace Observation Commission
name a subcommittee to keep watch on Communist
actions in Indochina.
Ceylon: Ambassador Crowe believes it would be
exceedingly embarrassing for the Ceylonese government
to permit another American airlift for Indochina to
land at Colombo.
Philippines: General Vargas, Philippines chief
of staff, told-an American officer he believed the
delta would fall in the near future unless the
United States took "drastic action."
Thailand: Premier Phibun's newspaper stated
editorially that the Thai appeal to the UN puts the
Western powers on the spot. Failure of the UN to
respond quickly would mean a new loss of prestige
for the United States and the United Nations in
Asia, the paper said; many Asian countries feel it
might be better "to sign up with the Communists"
if they cannot count on help from the free world.
INDOCHINA REPORT 7
9 June 54
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Military
The attache continues to believe an all-out attack
on the delta could come at any time after mid-June. French
officials, on the other hand, appear to be slightly more
optimistic than a week ago. Possibly the French defensive
realignment in Tonkin will necessitate a period of Viet
Minh probing and re-evaluation of the military picture
before undertaking a large-scale offensive.
A strong Viet Minh attack on the Vietnamese post of
Quang Phung Ha, 15 miles south of Thai Binh, between 2 and
4 June resulted in loss of the post and 800 Vietnamese
casualties (see map, p. 9)0
The post of Cho Noi, eight miles northeast of Hung
Yen, fell on 3 June after what the attache described as
a gallant defense by its Vietnamese garrison of more than
one battalion. The post is situated near the Hanoi-
Haiphong road and railroad and its loss illustrates the
French difficulties in eliminating Viet Minh units from
this important area.
Several other posts of less significance than these
two were also lost during'the week.
French patrols moving across the Day River from Phu
Ly, the key defense point in the southeast delta en-
countered little Viet Minh resistance,
French defensive preparations in the Tonkin delta
are being pushed hard and without the near panic evident
a month ago. Certain static garrisons in the south have
INDOCHINA REPORT 8
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been evacuated and all French units are withdrawing
north of a line from Son Tay through Hung Yen and the
Bamboo Canal. Vietnamese battalions are assigned pri-
mary responsibilities for defense in the southern
delta area, but in the initial stages of the fighting
at least, they are to be backed up by the growing French
mobile reserve.
By 20 June French mobile forces will total 33
infantry battalions and six paratroop battalions. Thus,
with fewer posts to defend in the southern part of the
delta and a build-up of mobile strength, the French
have considerably improved their capability of defending
at least a part of the Tonkin delta.
Nevertheless, the regrouping of French forces in
the delta to form a smaller defensive position roughly
covering the Hanoi-Haiphong area, and current planning
for a possible retreat to a Haiphong bridgehead, bring
into sharp focus the change in strategy of the French
high command during the past year.
When Navarre arrived in Indochina in 1953 he
announced an offensive policy aimed at complete defeat
of the Viet Minh. Present strategy is designed purely
for defense purposes and there is no longer talk of
carrying the war to the Viet Minh.
American charge McClintock in Saigon believes the
appointment of the Ely-Salan team to command in Indo-
china shows the depths of French defeatism. Ely is
essentially a staff officer, not a combat commander.
Salan was removed from Indochina last year and was
widely criticized as being too defensive-minded.
The charge compared Salan's appointment as Ely's
deputy with the recent dispatch of two French cruisers
to Indochina--ships which, he said, could only be used
to cover the possible evacuation of ground forces from
a Haiphong bridgehead. Salan was being assigned, accord-
ing to McClintock, not with the expectation of conducting
an offensive military campaign, but in the hopes of using
his expertise on Indochina in the administration of an
armistice.
INDOCHINA REPORT 10
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9 JUNE 1954 he Serakham
TOTALS
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FRENCH UNION FORCES TRAIL
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Men----------594,000
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Battalions--------299*
TTT
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Surin
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VIET MINH FORCE
Men----------298,000 @~ /
Battalions------?157? Po;P sppn4
Pit ku
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? Combat battalions Porno
ompong Th.. M
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Kheu 1 V N
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(See following chart for
Pray
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d
details) PHNOM PENH
D,r;ng
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Take
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National capital 1
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Scale 1:7,500,000
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0 20 40 80 120 Miles
7LE5 DE
PDULD CON DORE
0 20 40 80 120 Kilometers POINTE DE CA MAIL-
Base 12516 1153 105 110
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114w, ~ 'low
FRENCH UNION FORCES
VIET MINH FORCES
FRENCH
ASSOCIATED
TOTAL
COMBAT
STRENGTH
AREA
REGULARS
REGIONAL
TOTAL
STRENGT
H
46 Inf Bns
1
32 Inf Bns
4
78 Inf Bas
97
700
I
63 Inf Bus
26 Inf Bns
89 Inf Bus
3 Arty Bus
Arty Bus
17 Arty Bns
,
6 Arty Bns
6 Arty Bns
86,500
27 Lt Bns
27 Lt Bns
5 Inf Bns
17 Inf This
22 Inf Bns
2 Arty Bns
I Arty Bn
2 Arty Bns
25,400
II
7 Inf Bns
6 Id Bns
13 Inf Bns
9 100
6 Lt Bns
6 Lt Bns
0 Arty Bnt
0 Arty Bns
'
4 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
7 Inf Bns
2
ty
Bus
11 Id Bns
0 Arty Bns.
~
11,200
III
3 Id Bus
0 A
t
0 Int Bns
3 In! Bns
2
100
B
Lt
2 Lt Bns
r
y Bus
0 Arty Bus
,
6 Inf Bns
20 Inf Bns
26 Inf Bns
1 Arty Bn
3 Arty Bns
1
7 Lt
B
s
4 Arty Bns
17 Lt Bus
43,900
IV
15 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
3 Inf Bns
18 Inf Bns
12,600
8
1
n1
8 Guard
0 Arty Bns
6 Inf Bns
13 Inf Bns
19 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bus
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
32,500
V
10 Id Bns
2 Id Bns
12 Inf Bns
8,400
24 Lt Bns
24 Lt Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
6 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bus
6 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bus
7,300
VI
0 Id Bus
1 Inf Bn
I Inf Bn
1,000
3 Lt Bns
3 Lt Bns
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
9 Inf Bns
1 Arty Bn
1 Inf Bn
0 Arty Bns
10 Inf Bns
I Arty Bn
10,900
VII
2 Inf Bns
0 Inf Bns
2 Inf Bns
2
100
2 Lt Bns
2 Lt Bus
1 Art
Arty Bn
1 Arty Bn
,
6 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns.
4 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
10 Inf Bns
0 Arty Bns
10,900
II
11 Inf Bns
1 Inf Bn
12 Inf Bns
8,400
3 Lt Bns
3 Lt Bns
V I
0 Arty Bns
0 Arty Bns
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Vietnam: A hardening of official Vietnamese
opinion against any political division of the country,
and an increasing tendency, evident in the press,.to
attribute the Geneva stalemate to Communist bad faith
were the main developments in Vietnamese politics.
Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat dwelt on the anti-
partition theme in an address to the graduating class
of the Vietnamese military academy on 2 June. He also
made the first official public reference to Vietnam's
primary reliance on the United States in the anti-
Communist struggle. "To the experience of the United
States in Korea," Quat said, "will be added French
knowledge of the particular conditions of the war in
Vietnam."
In a separate press interview, the defense minister
declared in favor of a divisional organization for the
army, and expressed the hope of seeing American aid
delivered directly to the Vietnam government rather than
through the French.
Premier Buu Loc, in a statement on partition which
he made following his recent return to Vietnam from Paris,
warned that Vietnam might not comply with any partition
plan. Vietnam is "determined to make the Geneva confer-
ence respect the territorial integrity of Vietnam," the
premier said.
At Geneva, Minister of State Dac Khe complained
of the "defeatist" approach of French military experts
charged with working out armistice zones, and in Hanoi,
a spokesman for the regional administration said his
government's submission of suggestions for a truce line
around the delta was merely pro forma.
INDOCHINA REPORT
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The Vietnamese tendency to pin their hopes on
continuing the struggle with American support, rather
than resigning themselves to a French-conceived armis-
tice, was given further impetus by the latest episode
in the perennial French-Vietnamese wrangle over the
question of independence.
Buu Loc and Premier Laniel initialed on 4 June
the French-Vietnamese treaties of independence and
association which had been drafted more than a month
previously. The process will be completed, however,
only by formal signature and ratification of the treaties,
and the French continue to insist that a precondition
for signature must be the negotiation of certain supple-
mentary economic and military conventions.
The Vietnamese press continues to take a virtually
unanimous stand against partition. Certain newspapers
which in the past had been prone to discern American
obstructionism at Geneva are now more inclined to blame
the Communist side. Viet Minh advocacy of what amounts
to a partition plan has helped considerably to open
Vietnamese eyes to the essentially cynical approach of
the Viet Minh where nationalist fundamentals are
concerned.
The prospect of the imminent return of the .Catholic
nationalist and potential premier, Ngo Dinh Diem,was re-
ceived with mixed feelings in Vietnam. In a conversation
with the American consul in Hanoi, Bishop Le Huu Tu,
potentate of a miniature theocracy in southern Tonkin,
dwelt at length on the good qualities which Diem could
bring to the premier's office, but cited his arrogance
as a shortcoming. Governor Tri, in a separate conversa-
tion with the consul, commented guardedly on Diem's
qualifications, acknowledging his high moral character
but stressing his inexperience and conceit.
Cambodia: Government circles view with great
alarm what they regard as a British tendency to press
for delimitation of truce zones in Cambodia. They also
fear that the principle of cessation of foreign aid will
be incorporated in possible armistice terms. A Cambodian
official has said that Commander in Chief Tioulong has
accordingly been instructed to contact General O'Daniel
immediately on the subject of early American military aid.
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Laos: Premier Souvannaphouma expressed disbelief
at predictions of domestic trouble. He said he intended
shortly to invite Prince Petsarath, his brother and
rumored plotter against the government, to return to
Laos from seven years' voluntary exile in Thailand.
INDOCHINA REPORT 16
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Molotov's 8 June Speech
Molotov's 8 June speech at Geneva has again made
it clear that the Communists have no intention of
reaching an early cease-fire agreement or abandoning
their maximum demands on Indochina at this time. The
speech states publicly the hard line which the Commu-
nists have been taking in private during the three
weeks of restricted sessions on Indochina.
The only new proposal is that the Indochina
sessions of the conference discuss political and
military problems on alternate days, and that repre-
sentatives of the two commands discuss political
questions just as they have been discussing military
matters. The Communists have insisted all along that
"at least some" political problems must be connected
with a truce.
Molotov suggested specifically that the talks
consider the "independence" of Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia,"free" elections in these states, and with-
drawal of foreign troops. This is a restatement of
the Viet Minh proposal of 10 May.
The Communists now appear more than ever con-
vinced that they will continue to achieve military
successes in Indochina and that these successes plus
political developments in Paris will eventually force
the French government either to move toward the
Communist position at Geneva or to give way to a
new government which will be more amenable.
Molotov's refusal to offer concessions may
have the immediate effect, however, of strengthening
French premier Laniel's position by helping him to
convince the National Assembly that his government
is making every effort to obtain an acceptable
settlement but is being balked by Communist
intransigence.
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In his speech, Molotov also reinforced Peiping's
tough statements of April and early May warning
against internationalization of the Indochina war.
He accused the United States of seeking to undermine
the Geneva conference and extend the Indochina war and
said that this would have "dangerous consequences."
Current Military Discussions
Current military discussions at Geneva between
representatives of the two commands have made "no
progress at all," according to a report from the
American delegation on 8 June. These direct talks
derived from the 29 May agreement that such repre-
sentatives would meet at Geneva and in the field to
"study the disposition of forces" to be made follow-
ing a cease-fire, "beginning with the question of
regrouping areas in Vietnam."
The Communists made it clear they are not pre-
pared to drop their demands for regrouping in Laos
and Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam. Molotov, Chou
and the Viet Minh delegate all said on 3 and 4 June
that the supervisory authority for an armistice must
cover all three states, and Molotov repeated this on
When the Communists get around to bringing out
their maps, their territorial claims are expected to,
be stiff. This is suggested by a recent Chinese
Communist map, by Chinese and Viet Minh propaganda,
and by Molotov's speech on 8 June. Molotov said
the Viet Minh controls, or at least prevents the
French and Vietnamese from controlling, three fourths
of Vietnam, about half of Laos, and a substantial part
of Cambodia.
Another question likely to make trouble, accord-
ing to a Peiping broadcast, is Western "insistence on
the 'disarming of irregular troops.'" Reference is
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to the estimated 180,000 Viet Minh irregulars, mostly
in Vietnam but some thousands in Laos and Cambodia.
The broadcast suggests an intention to demand that
certain of these forces be left out of the regroup-
ment scheme and thus be left free to wage guerrilla
war and perform other missions in non-Communist areas.
The Communists have not retreated an inch from
their 10 May proposal for a cease-fire followed by a
political settlement involving the withdrawal of
foreign forces, formation of committees to carry out
elections, and establishment of unified governments
in the three states. They have continued to leave
the way open, however, for a more modest settlement
based simply on a cease-fire and regrouping of forces
in three or more large zones. Whatever this might
be called, it would amount to partition.
Supervision and Guarantees of a Truce
The third week of the restricted sessions on
Indochina was occupied almost entirely with discuss-
ing proposals for supervision and guarantees of an
armistice. The basis for discussion was Chou En-
lai's 27 May proposal for a two-headed supervisory
authority--an international commission and a mixed
committee of the belligerents--with supreme authority
vested in the states represented at Geneva.
Composition of the International Commission:
The Communists strove throughout the week to get
Communist representation on the international com-
mission. Soviet delegate Gromyko proposed on 31 May
that it be composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia, India
and Pakistan.
Molotov and Chou En-lai told Eden in private
conversations on 1 and 2 June that the international
commission must include some states which could
reflect Viet Minh interests, Peiping's propaganda,
citing the Korean armistice agreement of July 1953,
defined a neutral simply as a state whose combat
forces had not participated in hostilities. On 2
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and ,4 June Molotov repeated Gromyko's proposal of 31
May, and this was still his position on 8 June.
American delegate Smith argued that supervision
by a neutral nations commission could not be effec-
tive unless the commission were composed of genuinely
neutral nations, with an agreed system for checking
on the introduction of troops and arms and with no
restrictions on the commission's movements.
Eden and Bidault backed Smith's position through-
out the week. On 4 June Eden suggested that the
question of composition be explored in private talks.
The British and French have since been reported will-
ing to have one Communist state on the commission if
necessary.
Authority of the International Commission: The
Communists insisted all week that the mixe commit-
tees of belligerents must be parallel with, not
subordinate to, the international commission. The
West stood firm in insisting that the former must
be "definitely subordinate."
Bidault told the session on 3 June the Commu-
nist proposal would in effect give the role of
enforcing a truce solely to the mixed committees.
He observed this would result in a "quarrel without
an arbiter, without an end, and without hope."
Chou En-lai then offered an amplification of
the Communist position which seemed to modify the
Viet Minh proposal, and in part to answer Bidault's
objection, by providing for arbitration of disputes.
Chou proposed that the international commission
"take up" disputes which the mixed committees were
unable to resolve. If the international commission
were unable to arbitrate such disputes, it would
submit them to the nine participants in the Indo-
china talks, and the nine would then discuss
"collective action."
In the 4 June session Eden asked for clarifica-
tion of Chou En-lai's 3 June proposal. This has not
yet been forthcoming.
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Supreme Authority: The most recent Communist
proposal is t at supreme authority for executing
the terms of an Indochina truce should be reposed
in the nine participants in the Indochina talks.
Chou and Molotov emphatically rejected a Viet-
namese proposal that the United Nations control the
armistice. They observed that five of the nine
participants in the Indochina phase of the confer-
ence are not members of the UN.
Chou En-lai's proposal of 3 June provides for
the nine participants in the Indochina talks to try
to resolve disputes which the international commis-
sion has been unable to resolve. Molotov backed
Chou on 4 June by stating that the "guarantor
states" would "agree on necessary collective
measures."
This proposal would give the Communists a veto
at all three levels of authority. The mixed commit-
tees would be half Communists in any case, the
international commission would be partly Communist,
and three of the nine participants in the Indochina
discussions are Communist states.
This would mean in practice that the mixed
committees would disagree, the international commis-
sion would be deadlocked, and the guarantor states
would be unable to take "collective action."
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Moscow and Peiping continue to clamor that
American policy on Indochina reflects a combination
of hostile intentions. These intentions, in order
of planned accomplishment, are:
(1) To make the Geneva conference
fail.
(2) To extend the Indochina war.
(3) To form a "Southeast Asian
aggressive bloc."
(4) To wage war against the Asian
peoples.
The following examples are from recent broad-
casts:
(1) Secretary Dulles' 25 May speech
climaxed a series of American
maneuvers "to get the UN embroiled
in another Korea and to menace the
progress of the Geneva negotiations
with the prospect of an extended
Indochina war." (Peiping, 28 May)
(2) American reservations on the 29 May
agreement at Geneva show an inten-
tion to make the Geneva talks fail,
while the United States is "busy
outside the conference preparing.to
expand the Indochina war." (Peiping,
31 May)
(3) "While sabotaging the Geneva confer-
ence from within, American ruling
circles are going ahead with their
plans for a Southeast Asian aggres-
sive bloc...." (Peiping, 3 June)
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(4) Thailand's appeal to the UN, made at
American instigation, is "aimed at
undermining the Geneva conference
and at extending the war in the
name of the United Nations."
(Peiping, 31 May)
(5) The United States has repeatedly
indicated that the five-power mili-
tary talks in Washington "will pave
the way for the forming of a South-
east Asian aggressive bloc."
(Peiping, 31 May) The talks are
concerned with a "military pact in
Southeast Asia directed against the
national liberation movements...of
this area." (Moscow, 4 June)
(6) The American effort to establish a
Southeast Asian bloc and expand it
to an aggressive alliance through-
out the Pacific is part of a fantasy
of dominating Asia and finally the
world. (Peiping, 27 May) Admiral
Carney's speech shows an American
desire to "organize large-scale
aggression" against Asian peoples.
(Moscow, 2 June)
Communist propaganda continues to be much less
menacing than was Communist comment on the Korean
war prior to Chinese intervention there in 1950. In
the summer and fall of 1950, the United States was
alleged to be actively engaged in aggression against
both Korea and China. In contrast, the no-Soviet
line on Indochina throughout 1954 has charged the
United States with intervening (rather than aggress-
ing) in Indochina and merely preparing for wider
action (against China, or more recent y, against
all Asian peoples.)
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France
The Laniel government has completely reorganized
the command and civil direction of Indochinese affairs
by appointing General Ely, former chief of staff for
the armed forces, as chief of military and civil affairs
to replace both General Navarre and Commissioner General
Dejean.
General Salan, Navarre's predecessor in Indochina,
has been appointed military aide to Ely. While this may
bolster French prestige in Indochina, it is possible
Paris may be setting up a military and civil administra-
tion designed to handle a cease-fire situation, rather
than to implement an increased military effort.
At the same time, the appointment of moderate ex-
Gaullist Frederic-Dupont as minister for the Associated
States restores this position to the full cabinet rank
which it lacked under his predecessor, Jacquet. His
appointment is reported causing distress among the
negotiate-at-all--costs segment of the National Assembly.
Frederic-Dupont said after his appointment, "I
will seek every means of achieving a peace in Indochina,
but on the other hand, as long as peace is not re-
established in Indochina, all my attention will be given
to giving the means to fight to our soldiers."
He told Ambassador Heath on 5 June, however, that
as the solution to the military problem,, he favored
partition of Vietnam at its narrowest point, just north
of Tourane.
Foreign Minister Bidault, whose policy differences
with Jacquet were public knowledge, has expressed con-
fidence that Frederic-Dupont can take over negotiations
at Geneva when he himself is absent.
Ambassador Dillon in Paris reported on 4 June that
the belief was growing among qualified observers that the
fall of Laniel was imminent. Dejean believes Ely's
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appointment was largely a move of desperation by Laniel
to win a vote of confidence in this week's Indochina
debate.
Although parliamentary dissatisfaction with his
government has seemed on the rise since the 13 May vote
of confidence, it will still be difficult for the oppo-
sition to muster the 314 votes needed to overthrow him
if a new vote of confidence follows the current Indo-
china debate. The premier is reported to have said
before the 13 May vote that he would not resign if
beaten by a simple majority.
Ambassador Dillon also reported growing parlia-
mentary support for new assembly elections. Laniel
would probably press the cabinet for such a move if
the opposition mustered the required 314 votes; but
there is a good possibility that dissensions among
the center and right would result in Communist gains
in a general election at this time.
British press treatment of the Geneva conference
has begun to display widespread pessimism over the
prospects for serious negotiations with the Communists.
Many correspondents in the past few days have expressed
fear that the breakdown of the talks is imminent.
The London Times correspondent at Geneva reported
on 7 June that "mos estern delegates" there believe
the Communists have decided not to negotiate seriously
"for the present."
The London Observer on 6 June reported that certain
Conservative quarters in London believe Eden may have
fallen into a Communist trap. These elements, which
according to rumor include members of the cabinet, have
come to hold "some sympathy" for "American impatience."
A strain of optimism about Geneva nevertheless
persists in British public opinion, based largely on
confidence in Foreign Secretary Eden.
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Scandinavia
The pervading tone of Danish and Norwegian press
comment on the Geneva conference is increasingly pessi-
mistic, with a growing expectation that the conference
will fail and the whole matter eventually be placed
before the UN. TherDanish foreign minister expressed
disappointment in parliament with the Geneva conference
but paid tribute to Eden's "persevering" efforts to
negotiate.
Australia
Prime Minister Menzies told Ambassador Peaslee
in Canberra last week that "time is running out on us"
in Southeast Asia. Menzies called a cabinet session
on 4 June which dealt exclusively with the problems
of that area.
Peaslee believes that increased participation
in Commonwealth leadership by Menzies would have great
usefulness, both in the maintenance of a strong position
and in "bringing into line" the South Asian countries
which took part in the Colombo conference.
The American embassy in Baghdad reported on 2
June that Iraq would be reluctant to have planes air-
lifting French troops land at Shaiba, near Basra, in
view of the probable local reaction. Many Iraqis dis-
like French colonial policy and would therefore oppose
any Iraqi action aiding the French.
The embassy added that the proposed landings in
Iraq would also alienate nationalists and neutralists,
particularly since the American military aid agreement
was recently announced. With elections scheduled for
9 June, a request at this time for landing the planes
in Iraq would be particularly unpropitious.
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India has indicated it is vehemently opposed to
Thailand's request that the UN Peace Observation Com-
mission keep watch on Communist actions in Indochina
as a threat to Thai security. New Delhi sees the move
as an American-inspired attempt to by-pass, impede
or belittle the Geneva negotiations. On 2 June the
secretary general of the Indian Foreign Ministry sum-
marily refused the Thai ambassador's formal request
that India support the appeal.
Ceylon
Ambassador Crowe believes it would be exceedingly
embarrassing for the Ceylonese government to permit
another American airlift for Indochina to land at
Colombo at this time. He cites the strong reaction
in the press and parliament to the last two flights,
and advises against additional airlifts unless they
are absolutely essential. Crowe notes, however, that
if there are developments at Geneva which tend to fix
on Communist China the blame for failure of an Indo-
china settlement, a less hostile public attitude might
result in Ceylon.
Philippines
General Vargas, Philippine chief of staff who
left Manila on 8 June on a mission to Washington, told
an American officer shortly before his departure he
believed the delta would fall in the near future unless
"drastic. action" were taken by the United States. .
He thought the French would be unable to improve
the situation materially, regardless of any reinforce-
ments, unless they give Vietnam complete independence.
He asserted that as long as the French remain, the
country will be divided, since anti-French feeling is
such that the local people would support the Viet Minh
or other dissidents.
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He believed, however, that if a stable government
could be established, an active psychological campaign
could win over many Viet Minh sympathizers.
Vargas' estimate was based on reports of a Philip-
pine colonel currently in Saigon as an unofficial observer
for the Philippine armed forces. Earlier information
indicated that an anti-French bias on the part of this
officer has been reinforced during his present mission
and, according to the American army attache in Manila,
such feeling is prevalent in the Philippine military
establishment.
Thailand
Official sentiment in Bangkok attaches considerable
importance to Thailand's appeal to the United Nations.
Premier Phibun's newspaper stated editorially last week
that the Thai move has put the Western powers on the
spot-and that failure of the UN to respond quickly would
mean a further loss of prestige for the United Nations
and the United States in Asia.
Apparent Western reluctance to take an all-out
stand against, Communist advances was already causing
many Asian countries to take a second look at their
foreign policy, the paper added. These countries feel
it might be better "to sign up with the Communists" if
they cannot count on help from the free world.
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Japan
Prime Minister Yoshida reiterated on 1 June his
conviction that Japan should not: participate in a
Southeast Asian security organization. He argued that
to do so might cause anxiety among the Japanese people.
At the same time, an influential politician of the
government party confided to the American embassy in
Tokyo that if the United States decided to intervene
in Indochina, it should not repeat Japan's mistake in
China of doing it in "driblets," but should go in in
full force.
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