ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET 'PEACE CAMPAIGN'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000300100001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET lmw~
CONFIDENTIAL
18 April 1953
OCI No. 3474
Copy No.
Document No. _______ -------------
He Change In Class.
F-1 Declassified
Class. Changed To: TS S
a--.. - - -- - @r
Date: By:
Office of Current Intelligence
State Dept. review completed
CONFIDEN
s T
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The recent Soviet conciliatory moves and Communist
proposals on Korea suggest that the new leaders in Moscow
have adopted a new tactical line and have modified their
short-range policies. These moves are aimed at relaxing
international tensions and reducing American vigilance and
preparedness in order to attain a greater field for Soviet
maneuver.
There have been no changes, however, in the basic
Soviet strategic objectives of consolidating the Soviet
Orbit and isolating and weakening the US. The new regime
has probably concluded that the disadvantages of a continua-
tion of the Korean war outweigh the advantages and that a
Korean truce will remove an embarrassing obstacle to the
effectiveness of their "peace offensive."
The need of the new Soviet regime to reassign top re-
sponsibilities and its desire to revise some internal policies
probably will contribute to a continuation of the "peace
offensive." However, internal considerations do not appear
at present to have been the primary determinant of the
current tactical shift.
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Interpretation of Recent Events and Speculation on Future
Soviet Actions (Page 3)
Appendix I Definitions and Applications of Terms Used
in This Analysis (Page 11)
Appendix II Assumptions Used in This Analysis (Page 14)
Appendix III Speculation on Possible Alignments in an
Internal Struggle for Power (Page 16)
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INTERPRETATION OF RECENT EVENTS AND SPECULATION ON
FUTURE SOVIET ACTIONS
The recent series of Soviet moves and the Communist
proposals on Korea suggest that the new leaders in Moscow
have decided to revise their tactical line and their short-
range policies. This does not mean, however, that there has
been any change in their basic strategic objectives. This
decision to alter tactics was probably based on the strategic
estimate of the current position of the Soviet Orbit held for
some time by the present determiners of Soviet policy. It
reflects an awareness that the previous foreign policies and
tactics had proved to be unproductive and that their impact
on the Soviet domestic scene had been disadvantageous.
The fundamental lines of Soviet objectives, now as well
as during the last years of Stalin's life, are governed by
the recognition that the present frontiers of the Soviet
Orbit probably can not be significantly extended and that at
:Least certain sectors of that frontier can not be made in-
vulnerable to Western pressure as long as American power re-
mains committed to blocking the attainment of basic Soviet
objectives. According to this "calculation of the relation
of forces," the security of the Orbit and the prospects for
future extensions of Soviet power and influence depend on the
degree to which the Soviet Union can achieve, by whatever
means, the withdrawal of American power from its present global
commitments and the weakening of our allies' dependence on and
confidence in our support and guarantees.
The policies and tactics which Stalin developed to
achieve his overall objectives of weakening and disrupting
the non-Communist coalition while building up the economic
and military strength of the Orbit were designed to isolate
the United States from its allies, particularly the members
of NATO. These policies and tactics were officially sanctioned
by the 19th Congress of the CPSU in October 1952. The Con-
gress served as an occasion for a restatement of the plan of
action which, in its main lines, had already been part of the
international Communist program for many months.
Communist propaganda and tactics attempted to substitute
the United States for Nazi Germany as the major enemy. The
Communists in every area of the world concentrated on ex-
ploiting all those issues which divide, or might tend to di-
vide, the US from its World War II allies and from its former
enemies, Germany and Japan.
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Soviet propaganda aimed at Western Europe attempted to
eliminate fears of Soviet aggression. There were constant
assertions that the Soviet Union did not fear war with the
West and that it expected affairs in Europe to reach an equi-
librium between East and West. A warning was given that Mos-
cow would regard all those in the "American camp" as enemies,
but that it would be willing to maintain friendly relations
with any power which would break away from US "domination."
Stalin told Nenni that there would be a long cold war lasting
at least 15 years, that the USSR would make no concessions to
the US either in Europe or Asia, but that there would be no
hot war in Europe.
Stalin apparently hoped by these tactics to persuade
America's allies to exert strong pressure on the US Government
to make concessions to Soviet demands. By prolonging the
deadlock on the prisoner-of-war issue in Korea, after agree-
ment had been reached on so many other points, the Communists
sought to arouse public opinion in the West to such an extent
that the UN Command would be compelled to abandon its stand
on the principle of voluntary repatriation. They may also
have expected that the frustration and anxiety generated by
a war of attrition would eventually drive the United States
into making extreme efforts to force a military decision which
would antagonize allied and "neutralist" opinion and would
produce a serious cleavage within the non-Communist world.
All these moves were intended to encourage America's al-
lies to challenge US leadership and to pursue their separate
and conflicting interests. Soviet pressure on Western
Europe in the latter part of 1952 was greatly reduced. In
mid-February 1953, the US Embassy in Moscow observed that
Soviet foreign policy had been "negative and relatively inac-
tive" in recent months and that the Soviet leaders apparently
considered it unnecessary to intervene more decisively in
Europe in view of the evidences of Western disunity.
While applying these varied policies and tactics in the
attempt to dissolve the Western coalition, Stalin seemed to
believe that it was either unnecessary or impossible to enter
into serious negotiations with the US on cold war issues. He
apparently had supreme confidence both in his own ability to
control the forces he had set in motion and in the unchal-
lengeable power of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. In
addition, such factors as his concern for personal prestige
and the rigidity of his views regarding the capitalist world
may have influenced his decisions. In his 17 February inter-
view with the Indian Ambassador, Stalin complained about the
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difficulty of dealing with the Americans. Indian Peace Prize-
winner Kitchlew, who also had an audience with Stalin on 17
February, reported that Stalin believed that President Eisen-
hower's hands were tied by the capitalists around him. British
Commonwealth representatives in Moscow remarked at this time
on Stalin's apparent obsession that capitalism was blocking
world peace.
Whatever may have been Stalin's real beliefs or motives,
the failure of his attempts to produce a cleavage. in the West-
ern world by prolonging the fighting in Korea was impressively
demonstrated by the overwhelming approval which the UN gave
to the Indian Resolution on 3 December.
The recent moves in the Communist "peace offensive" sug-
gest that with the passing of Stalin, the new leadership is
now free to act on its assumption that the two main policy
lines followed under Stalin's regime had clashed at many
points. The attempts to isolate the US by relaxing pressure
on Western Europe while doing everything possible to dis-
credit US intentions and policies proved to be ineffective.
Recent tactical shifts probably reflect an awareness that as
long as Western European and Asian allies can depend on a
continuation of vigorous US leadership and military and econ-
omic assistance, the non-Communist coalition will be able to
resist Communist pressures.
In view of the failure of previous tactics, Moscow ap-
parently has decided that the time has arrived for an important
revision in its approach to the non-Communist world. These
recent moves seem to indicate that the new leaders are now
ready to approach the US directly, that they have identified
American power and resolution as the crucial factors which
must be negated in order to prepare the conditions for achiev-
ing strategic success.
The Soviet leaders certainly recognize that an end to the
fighting in Korea is the indispensable condition for reopening
negotiations with the US and its major allies. Molotov's 1
April statement supporting the Chinese proposals for Korea also
suggests that the USSR is seeking a full dress UN debate on
the Korean question and other Far Eastern issues likely to
create dissension among the Western Powers and to split Asian
nations away from the United States. While it is probable
that the current negotiations will result in a cessation of
hostilities in Korea, this will not affect the basic power
position of the USSR in the Far East, and a definitive settle-
ment of the Korean question can be expected to be postponed
indefinitely.
SE R 141
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The Communist concessions on Korea are likely to be the
only major concessions the new leadership in Moscow will
feel compelled to make at this time. While the Kremlin may
offer to settle minor East-West issues where no direct or
vital Soviet interests are involved, it will make no conces-
sions which-might threaten the security or power position
of the Orbit.
There have been no decisive changes-in the relative capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Orbit which would
impel Moscow to consider negotiating a general settlement with
the West. The recent moves in Korea were intended to go only
far enough to remove the most conspicuous source of conflict
between East and West and to relieve Soviet policies and
tactics of an embarrassing and disadvantageous obstacle to
the effectiveness of the "peace offensive." The Korean conces-
sions will not significantly alter the momentum and orientation
of Soviet policies and tactics elsewhere in the world, because
they are firmly rooted in continuing and concrete Soviet in-
terests and objectives.
The long-range nature of these objectives was reflected
in Vyshinski's 9 April speech to the UN Political Committee
in which he called for a halt to Western rearmament, a ban
on atomic weapons, the reduction in the armed strength of the
Five Great Powers by one-third, the dissolu oia of _(ATO, the
abandonment of the Schuman Plan and EDC, and an end to plans for
the rearming of West Germany. (The only new element Vyshinski
introduced was the omission of the original demand for the
return of all POWs to their homeland, reflecting the only de-
cisive change in current Soviet policies,,)
The Kremlin is unlikely to follow up the Korean truce
with a basic concession affecting its power position in Europe.
Since World War II the Soviet Union has consolidated its poli-
tical and military control in Eastern and in much of Central
Europe and has maintained its military predominance over the
rest of the Continent. The Soviet leaders are unlikely to
withdraw from the present frontiers of the Orbit until they
become convinced that the Western powers are prepared to apply
military power against those frontiers so great as to make
likely a defeat of the USSR in war. Only then would the Soviet
leaders prefer a peaceful withdrawal from their present ad-
vanced positions to military defeat. However, the Kremlin
probably considers that Western Europe will not be able, for
the foreseeable future, either alone or with the support of
American arms and forces, to match or seriously challenge
Soviet power on land.
.FT
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The new Moscow regime may expect to regain a considerable
area of diplomatic maneuverability in Europe following the end
of fighting in Korea. They may elect to negotiate on such
important unsettled questions as the German and Austrian peace
treaties and the Trieste issue; they will probably continue the
"peace"offensive, and may make further conciliatory gestures
toward Western Europe such as offers for expanded trade agree-
ments and a general easing of tension in Berlin and Vienna.
The Kremlin could use diplomatic and propaganda pressures for
a four-power conference on all unsettled issues in Europe.
Minor concessions could be made with the hope of relaxing
tensions in Europe and thereby bringing about a slow-down in
Western defense.
It is not anticipated that the USSR would make any con-
cessions that would entail the loss of its hold on East Germany.
The strategic position of Eastern Germany between the USSR and
Eastern Europe, as well as its industrial and military con-
tribution to the Orbit is too great to relinquish. The East
German army, moreover, has not reached a state where it could
take over Soviet commitments in that area, nor is it likely
that it could be trusted to remain loyal to Moscow.
The Soviet Union could not accept a reunification of Ger-
many on Western terms. Moscow cannot allow the power of a
unified and independent Germany to be added to the combined
strength of the Western coalition. Neither the USSR nor the
Western coalition could accept the complete absorption of a
unified Germany into the other's camp because this could
lead to a decisive shift in the balance of world military and
industrial power.
_._.__..------ NQ,scow will probably continue its efforts to undermine
the Aden)lauer Government by reminding the Germans that the
alignment of West Germany with the NATO countries can only
lead to an impasse and that the only hope of reunification is
to attempt to negotiate directly with the USSR. Moscow prob-
ably hopes to encourage the emergence of a government in Bonn
favorably disposed to cooperate with the USSR by repeatedly
insisting that the integration of West Germany with the West
will seal the permanent division of Germany. By reminding the
Germans of this dilemma, Moscow will also be able to reduce the
value of any contribution West Germany might make to Western
defense and will accentuate Western fears regarding German in-
tentions.
Moscow could meet Western demands for negotiating an
Austrian Peace Treaty by not insisting on its demand for the
IA,
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withdrawal of the abbreviated treaty as a basis of discussion.
Although the stakes are not as high in Austria as in Germany,
it is unlikely that the Kremlin would sign an Austrian treaty.
This would involve the withdrawal of Soviet troops from an ad=
vanced position, the loss of an important economic stronghold,
and the removal of the legal pretext for maintaining troops
in Hungary and Rumania.
Without making any concessions, the USSR could propose
a conference to settle the Trieste issue. It could go further,
however, by adhering to the now outmoded 1948 Tripartite Dec-
laration which called for the return of Trieste to Italy. The
Trieste maneuver would serve a two-fold purpose of appearing
conciliatory to world opinion while at the same time embar-
rassing the Western powers in their relations with Italy and
Yugoslavia.
The conclusion of hostilities in Korea will not neces-
sarily lead either to a general peace settlement in the Far
East or to a transfer of Chinese Communist military forces to
new ventures in Southeast Asia. In the latter region the shift
on Korea will not have any immediate effects on Communist acti-
vities, with the exception of the Viet Minh forces in Indochina.
Communist activities in South and Southeast Asia will continue
to be oriented along "united front" lines, concentrating on
primarily political forms of action..
There is little likelihood of serious friction in the next
few years between Moscow and Peiping. Their alliance will con-
tinue to rest on such joint objectives as the elimination of
Western power and influence from the Far East and the eventual
absorption of "colonial" Asia in the Communist Orbit. Both
partners are anxious to achieve a withdrawal of Western mili-
tary power from the Pacific and to block the resurgence of
Japanese military and economic strength. Moscow regards Com-
munist China as a valuable ally against the US and Japan, as
a territorial base for advancing Communism into East Asia, and
as a major political and psychological asset. Peiping, in
turn, regards the USSR as its protector against possible US
and Japanese military action which might threaten the security
of the Communist regime and as an indispensable source of
economic and military assistance.
After the conclusion of an armistice agreement, the lines
which now divide the Korean peninsula are likely to remain
firmly established. The immediate objective of the Communist
powers will be to induce a withdrawal of Western military
forces from South Korea. Their policies and tactics probably
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will include a reversion to pre-June 1950 appeals for peace-
ful reunification, combined with tactics of infiltration and
subversion aimed at undermining the stability and resistance
capabilities of South Korea.
The primary target of Communist pressure in the Far East
may now shift to Japan where the impact of a Korean peace will
have immediate economic and political repercussions. Japanese
Communists will exploit labor unrest, promote pressure for in-
creased trade with the Communist mainland, and will encourage
elements of all political complexions which favor a greater
degree of "independence" from the US.
It would seem to be to the advantage of Moscow and Peiping
to delay the conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Japan
and the establishment of diplomatic relations until the effects
of the expected reduction in UN military spending in Japan
have been felt. Japan faces very serious economic adjustments
and her ability to resist extreme Communist demands may be
greatly reduced by economic difficulties and consequent poli-
tical instability.
In the Middle East, Soviet policy in recent months has
been relatively inactive. Moscow has promising opportunities
to exploit, through the local Communist parties, the prevailing
anti-foreign and anti-Israeli sentiment throughout the Near
and Middle East. It is conceivable that Moscow may make an
entirely new overture to Iran by suggesting that a new treaty
of friendship, along the lines of their 1921 agreement, be
signed. Mossadeq may find himself in such a perilous position
that he would be disposed to accept such an offer.
The recent conciliatory moves by Moscow and Peiping thus
form a more subtle and flexible approach which, the Kremlin
hopes will have far-reaching adverse effects on Western strength
and unity.
A good theoretical foundation for such an approach exists
in the post-war controversy within the Soviet hierarchy over
Varga's insistence that the capitalist world can engage in in-
telligent planning and avoid internecine struggle once it is
convinced that its whole social system is at stake. The recent
conciliatory Kremlin gestures, coupled with an apparent simi-
larity between Malenkov's and Varga?s attitudes toward Marxist
theory, would suggest that the present Soviet. rulers have been
in serious disagreement with Stalin's policies for several
years and that their approach reflects a different concept of
the capitalist world than that held by Stalin.
O'LlIp
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Accordingly, the task of Soviet diplomacy is to remove
the suspicions and fears in the non-Communist world regarding
Soviet intentions and to arouse a sense of security which would
undermine Western rearmament programs and produce economic and
political difficulties.
The new Soviet leaders will probably place greater con-
fidence in the steady build-up of the industrial and military
strength of the Soviet Orbit rather than in provocative and
indecisive adventures abroad. In their view, the cumulative
power of the Soviet Orbit will in the long-run, turn the
balance of world power against the West and open the way for
achieving world Communism.
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Definitions and Application of Terms used
in this Analysis
The following tentative definitions were drafted in an
attempt to avoid semantic confusion in preparing this inter-
pretive paper on current Soviet moves and intentions.
GOAL: The ultimate objective to be achieved; the in-
flexible and fundamental end. In this case, a world Communist
society under Russian domination.
. FOREIGN POLICY refers to the complex and dynamic course
that a nation follows in relation to other states. It in-
cludes all the elements that form the substance of a state's
foreign relations, such as objectives, estimates, strategies,
tactics, specific policies designed to attain specific ends,
commitments, and ideological preconceptions.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES: Long-range, but not-immutable ends
which remain constant within a given period but which may dif-
fer as they are determined according to prevailing circumstances
in different areas of the world.
STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: The personal or collective views of
the leader or'leaders regarding the current position of the
Soviet Orbit in terms of its relative capabilities and vul-
nerabilities in relation to the world situation. This estimate
governs the range of alternatives open to Soviet leaders for
achieving their strategic objectives.
POLICIES are specific courses of action designed to
achieve strategic objectives. Policies are always governed
by the current strategic estimate. Since policies are de-
veloped in relation to actual situations and current problems,
there is a greater degree of flexibility in the formulation
and application of policies than in the establishment of ob-
jectives.
TACTICS are concerned with the application of specific
policies to actual situations. Tactics may vary from one place
to another and from one time to another and can change a num-
ber of times during a given stage in the pursuit of a given
strategic objective.
G0 ; &ET
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SOVIET ORBIT: Includes the USSR, the European Satellites
and East Germany, Communist China, and North Korea.
FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES: Communist parties in countries
outside the Soviet Orbit.
Application of Definitions to Soviet Foreign
Policy, 1949 - 1952
GOAL: Throughout the post-war years, as always, the goal
or ultimate objective is assumed to remain constant -- a world
Communist society under Russian domination.
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
1. The consolidation and defense of the Soviet Orbit.
2. The neutralization of US military power, partic-
ularly American superiority in atomic weapons.
3. The weakening and disruption of the Western
coalition and the isolation of the US from its
allies.
4. The reduction and ultimate elimination of Western,
particularly US, power and influence in Asia
and the -Far East.
5. The achievement of Communist control of, or a
major voice in, Asian governments.
STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: Further attempts to extend the fron-
tiers of the Soviet Orbit and to overthrow Western-oriented
governments in Europe would probably be blocked following the
failure of Communist tactics, particularly in France and Italy,
and the success of American counteraction during 1947-1949.
In Asia, however, new opportunities were opened by the
victory of the Chinese Communists, the withdrawal of Western
military power, and the improvement of local Communist mili-
tary capabilities.
POLICIES AND TACTICS: Soviet policies aimed at neutrali-
zing American military power: demands for a ban on atomic-
weapons and an immediate reduction in armed forces by one-third;
opposition to NATO, MEDO and ANZUS, US bases on the periphery
of the Orbit, and defense arrangements with Japan.
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25X1
In Europe, Soviet policies were directed toward reducing
the effectiveness of American economic and military assistance
programs, obstructing plans for European integration and the
rearmament of Western Germany. Tactics included.such devices
as the Stockholm Petition, signed by millions throughout the
world, which would brand the first nation to use the atomic
bomb as an aggressor; World Peace Congress demands for a Five-
Power Peace Pact; propaganda designed to undermine cooperation
of allied governments with US objectives and policies; the
Berlin Blockade aimed at eliminating the last outpost of West-
ern influence in the Soviet Zone,
By 1949, Communist policies and tactics in Asia had shifted
from emphasis on primarily political forms of action to armed
struggle. This shift was motivated mainly by the victory of
the Chinese Communists and by the withdrawal of Western mili-
tary power from Asia. The Communist program now called for
Communist control of armed "liberation movements". The at-
tack on South Korea was an attempt to eliminate the last out-
post of American influence on the North Asian mainland and to
seize a strong position from which to apply pressure against
Japan.
By mid-1951, the armed "liberation movements" in Asia
were either stalemated or suffering reverses. In apparent
recognition of the failure of these tactics, from mid-1951 to
mid-1952, the Asian "liberation movements," except that of the
Viet Minh,, changed their tactics to emphasize political forms
of action. The most notable step in this emerging trend was
the Communist bid in June 1951 for truce talks in Korea.
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Assumptions Used in This Analysis
We assume that: 1. Stalin had unchallenged control of
Kremlin policy decisions. If discussion arose about a
decision, it ended when Stalin decided one way or the other.
2. Within top ranks there was disagreement as to
policies and tactics to be used in both foreign and internal
affairs, but no disagreement on strategic objectives.
3. These disagreements were between Stalin with the
possible support of others who felt that Soviet policies and
tactics despite their contradictory nature would succeed,
and the present determiners of Soviet policy who are attempt-
ing to erase such contradictions.
4. While it is possible that there is a power struggle
in the Kremlin (see Appendix III) the speed, consistency, and
thoroughness of present policy decisions suggest that despite
such a struggle there is at least temporary agreement on the
basic shift in policies and tactics. The need to reassign
top responsibilities because of the major reorganization
undertaken after Stalin's death will incline the new regime
toward a continuation of this shift. Since there is no
positive evidence which clearly identifies the views which
the various top leaders hold, it would be impossible to
speculate as to what influence a resolution of this struggle
may have on the future course of Soviet foreign policy.
5. The need of the new regime to consolidate its
power within the Soviet Orbit is not the primary determinant
of the current shift in policy and tactics. This shift,
however, will have the result of allowing time for the new
regime to consolidate.
6. Any Soviet fears of the new Washington administra-
tion; its emphasis on a more aggressive foreign policy, and
its moves on the international scene are not a primary
determinant in the Soviet's basic shift.
7. Developments in Sino-Soviet relations were not de-
cisive influences on the tactical shift in Korea. The prompt
actions taken by the new regime with regard to Communist
China reflect the high priority of the Sino-Soviet alliance
CQ~~/p~~
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in Moscow's thinking, but they do not necessarily indicate
that there was serious friction between China and the USSR
which required immediate attention. There is no reason to
assume that disagreements existed over the estimate that
the disadvantages of continuing the Korean war outweighed
the advantages and that the interests of both the USSR and
China would be best served by ending the fighting.
171
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low
Speculation on Possible Alignments in an Internal
Struggle for Power
There is much speculation that the basic tactical shift
in Soviet foreign policy is motivated by an internal power
struggle. Militating against the idea that an internal power
struggle is the cause of Moscow's present foreign policy
moves is the speed, thoroughness, and consistency of the
Kremlin's conciliatory campaign, which suggests that there
is unanimity or agreement within the top levels of Soviet
leadership.
On the other hand, the unexplained "release" of Malenkov
from the Secretariat, the cessation of a blatant propaganda
buildup of Malenkov which was begun early after Stalin's
death, and the reversal of the "doctors' plot" all point to
a readjustment on the top levels which might be the result
of a power struggle or the early signs of such a develop-
ment.
Among speculations as to possible power alignments in a
power struggle there are four possible and most popular
divisions: a) Malenkov vs. Beria, b) Malenkov, Beria vs.
others, c) Anti-Stalinist vs. Stalinist, d) Army vs. Party.
Data arguing pro and con on each of these speculations
follows:
(a) Malenkov vs, Beria:
PRO: 1/ While Stalin was alive and the succession
was in doubt ft was logical that these two powerful figures
would turn against one another and that after Stalin's death,
because of the totalitarian make-up of the Soviet regime,
each would attempt to subvert the power of the other to make
himself most powerful.
2/ The original "doctors' plot" was a move by
Malenkov to reduce Beria's power and prestige through the
the analogy that Beria was still responsible for MGB affairs.
Malenkov has been infiltrating his followers into positions
of power within the MGB, witness S. D. Ignatiev as head and
possibly others throughout the organization, and concurrently
ousting Beria men such as Abakumov.
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3/ The reversal of the "doctors' plot" was a
move on the part of Beria to oust Malenkov-protege Ignatiev
and to turn the plot against Malenkov.
4/ The unexplained "release" of Malenkov from
the Secretariat was an indication that his power was not
absolute and was now waning and that this in some way could
be tied to Beria's influence.
5/ The cessation of a blatant propaganda build-
up of Malenkov was likewise an indication that this power
was waning, and that this too could be tied to Beria.
CON: 1/ The first point above is logical only if
the assumption is accepted that the top hierarchy in a
totalitarian regime must necessarily be at odds, that they
must constantly be attempting to undermine each other's
authority and prestige. Opposed to this concept are many
reports that Malenkov and Beria were closely allied in their
attitudes and views, that they were friends who opposed
what has been termed the "Old Bolsheviks" in the Politburo,
and that they moved against Zhdanov together at the time
that he was clearly slated for succession. There are re-
ports that Malenkov and Beria operated during the war to
keep Zhdanov in Leningrad while they remained in Moscow and
that they engineered him out of Leningrad just before the
siege was lifted and a Russian victory in that area was
assured.
2/ On the second point, Beria has had nothing
overtly to do with the MGB since 1943 when it was separated
from the MVD. It appears that Beria took over the atomic
energy program and that the MGB, as a security organization,
was made independent. This was necessary because the task
of handling the vitally important atomic energy program re-
quired more time than could be given to the dual function of
economic organizations which the MVD included and the security
apparatus. Following the 1943 separation, the MVD lost to
the MGB the militia, border guards and other policing
functions, leaving the,MVD purely an economic organization.
with most of its activities possibly directed toward the
development of atomic energy.
Reducing the doctors' plot to a scheme of
Malenkov's to get Beria leaves out of the picture the possi-
bility of its being a major policy decision taken to advance
the vigilance campaign and the anti-Zionist campaign which
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culminated in the break in relations with Israel. The "plot"
may have been a decision as to how best to advance the above
drives based on a real suspicion concerning international
Jewish organizations and Western espionage, with no one on
a high level implicated.
Further speculation about the doctors' plot
could include the possibility that it was a move by Stalin
to eliminate Beria as he had Yezhov and Yagoda. It may
even have been designed to implicate both Malenkov and
Beria against whom Stalin was turning perhaps under the in-
fluence of old Bolsheviks such as Molotov. It is also
possible that Stalin, ailing and growing senile, was con-
vinced by someone, perhaps his personal secretary .
Poskrebeshev, with army backing, that the Kremlin doctors
were being used by Malenkov and Beria in a plot to murder
him. Of some possible significance is the fact that
Poskrebeshev, who had written eulogies to Stalin on his
60th and 70th birthday and who would be expected to appear
in some capacity at Stalin's funeral, has not been seen or
identified since the 19th Party Congress last October.
3/ This point of course depends upon the
truth of the speculation that the original plot was
Malenkov's attempt to get Beria. But further we have the
fact that if Beria was at first implicated in the accusation
that the MGB had been derelict in its duty to uncover the
plot by the analogy that he was presumably responsible for
its affairs, he is again implicated when it turns out that
the MGB had been more than lax, had, in fact, actually been
acting illegally, at the behest of an adventurers Ignatiev
was implicated because he had not correctly supervised his
inferiors and had been hoodwinked. Was the man responsible
for MGB affairs on the Presidium level also hoodwinked, and
is he also to be held responsible for not correctly carrying
out his supervisory functions?
Just as the original plot can be explained
by an internal and foreign policy decision or by Stalin's
instigation against Malenkov and Beria or Beria alone, so
its reversal can be the result of the repudiation of the
now obsolete internal and foreign policy which has occured
or the result of Stalin's death and therefore the removal
of the instigator of the plot.
4/and 5/ It must also be explained why Beria
was advanced To the-second position in the hierarchy ahead
of Molotov at a time when it appeared that Malenkov's
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power was great, if Malenkov had been working to undermine
Beria's power and had succeeded in placing the MGB under
his own men. If Malenkov had succeeded in removing this
base of Beria's power, where does Beria now get the ability
to cause a waning in what at first appeared as remarkable
strength on Malenkov's part? Furthermore, Beria had
elevated Malenkov to the "talented pupil of Lenin and
comrade-in-arms of Stalin" at the funeral oration and
during the Supreme Soviet meeting, while Molotov pointedly
did not refer to Malenkov at all.
(b) Malenkov and Beria -- vs. others:
PRO: 1/ Malenkov and Beria are reportedly close
friends aHUhave supported each other in their rise against
such men as Zhdanov. (see above)
2/ Beria at the funeral made a pointed
reference to Ualenkov as new leader.
3/ Beria at the 15 March Supreme Soviet meet-
ing did the same.
4/ At the time of the reorganization of Party
and Government immediately following Stalin's death Beria
was accorded the Number 2 position ahead of Molotov who had
always had this while Stalin was alive.
CON: 1/ Malenkov and Beria are in basic conflict.
(see above
(c) Anti-Stalinists vs. Stalinists:
PRO: 1/ The new regime has repudiated many of the
basic changes made at the time of the 19th Party Congress
when, presumably, Stalin was still alive. They have made
basic changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy, which
presumably represented Stalin's views.
2/ In the last few weeks there has been no
mention of Stalin's name or economic theses in authoritative
editorials of the central press; and the 1936 constitution,
always previously denoted "Stalinist," was not so denoted in
its last citation.
3/ If the Malenkov release from the Secretariat
and the IgnatTev affair reflect a power struggle, this
struggle may be between those men who believed Stalin to be
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too old and set in his ways and who wished to be more
realistic, and those who adhere to Stalin's own interpreta-
tion of things.
CON: 1/ If the Stalinists were powerful enough to
oust Mal-en-Nov-from from the Secretariat, thereby reducing his
power, we should have seen some change in the treatment of
Stalin himself, or some indication that the line would be
reverting to a more anti-"realists" one.
(c) Army vs. Party:
PRO: 1/ When the "doctors' plot" broke, the pros-
pective Vtims who were still alive were all regular Army
men. This may have indicated that the Army, tired of or
bitter about party interference in military affairs, decided
to implicate the MGB in a plot which would reduce its in-
fluence. Shcherbakov and Zhdanov both of whom had Army
ranks, and supposedly were murdered by the doctors, were re-
portedly closely allied with the Army..,
2/ Zhukov's recall to Moscow and high position
immediately alter Stalin's death js a recognition of the
power position of the Army and represents the Army's bid
for top leadership.
CON: 1/ This requires that the Army had someone
high up nn party organizations (in this case, necessarily
in the Party Presidium) powerful enough to convince Stalin
that he should move against the party itself and thereby
build up the Army's strength vis'-a?vis the party. The
evidence is much against Stalin or anyone high in party
circles agreeing to such a move. It could be contrary to
the whole matrix of Soviet power. Available evidence from
the Party Congress and since indicates that the Party was
increasing its control over other organizations, not relaxing
it.
2/ There is a good deal of evidence that
Zhukov's disgFace after the war was due to Stalin's personal
dislike for him and for the immense popularity which he
had built up. It is also reported that Zhukov was in agree-
ment with Malenkov against the Zhdanov concept of increasing
pressure on the West as a basic Soviet policy. With Stalin's
death, Zhukov's return to eminence can be explained by his
popularity with the people thereby giving the new regime
more popularity and by agreement with Malenkov on basic
policy.
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