WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100130011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 30, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Officer for Africa
The Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Council
4P
NIC #03133-84/1
30 May 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
Community representatives and specialists met on 22 May 1984 with the
NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the
other participants but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views
have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns,
I'll report further to you.
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There has been a flurry of activity in recent weeks by the various
parties involved in the Chad situation. This activity seems to have been
of the "peace-feeler" variety, but no important breakthrough occurred.
The French talked to the Libyans in pri and a a i subsequently sent a
letter through the Austrians to Mitterrand. The letter is reported to
have stated nothing new and the Libyans effectively said they will not
withdraw unless the French abandon Habre. Chadian government
representatives have talked with dissidents and Libyans in Brazzaville
but no progress was evident. Representatives of the Goukouni dissident
group have also been traveling, trying to stay in touch with African
governments who have an interest in the Chad problem.
Some of the movement that has been taking place may stem from the
realization--particularly on Qadhafi's part--that the French do not
intend to leave. The dissidents may be casting about for other options
because they now realize that Oadhafi does not intend to move further
south against the French.
Forecast: It is unlikely that there will be any significant changes
in the adian situation over the next six months. Habre will remain in
place backed solidly by the French and the Chad question will not be a
serious issue when the OAU convenes later this year. Economic problems
and popular malaise in Libya will not be enough to prompt Qadhafi to
withdraw from Libya. One factor that might motivate Qadhafi to leave
Chad would be his perception that opposition to him within the military
was growing and that a ,withdrawal would soften the military's
discontent.
SUDAN
The internal situation in Sudan remains tense. Nimeiri's
Islamization policy and the recently declared state of
emergency--highlighted by a crackdown on corruption and the establishment
of so-called emergency courts--is beginning to create a backlash. The
military has not been able to blunt the insurgency in the south. The
insurgents may intend to "liberate" an area in eastern and southern Sudan
adjacent to the Ethiopian border to demonstrate their effectiveness,
thereby hoping to attract more outside support.
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CAMEROON
There is a general consensus within the Community that the political
situation remains fragile. Analysts are uncertain, however, about how to
assess President Biya's role since the unsuccessful coup attempt. Some
divergency of views exists concerning the degree to which Biya is in
control of the situation. The CIA analyst suggested that despite
appearing to take firm actions, Biya has not reestablished his former
position. Others believe that the president is beginning to regain
momentum in the actions he has taken to date to cope with the post-coup
attempt situation.
CUBAN INTENTIONS AND PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA
Analysts from CIA's Office of African and Latin American Analysis
briefed the meeting on the Cuban drawdown of troops in Ethiopia and the
issues that are central to a Cuban decision to remain in or withdraw from
Angola.
Ethiopia
The resumption of Cuban troop rotations to Ethiopia earlier this
month suggests the withdrawal of Cuban forces from that country has been
completed. Cuban combat personnel in Ethiopia serve a two-year tour of
duty and prior to the fall of 1983, approximately 25 percent of them were
rotated every six months. This usually involved three voyages by a
Soviet passenger ship between Assab and Havana, each carrying 600-700
troops. Last fall, however, coincident with other reports of the
withdrawal of Cubans from Ethiopia, the Soviet ship made only one trip
from Assab to Havana without returning, but made three trips from Havana
to Angola.
In the spring of 1984, Cuban troop rotation to Ethiopia resumed with
one round-trip voyage by a Soviet ship carrying 550 Cuban soldiers. If
the past pattern of rotating 25 percent of the Cuban forces is still
valid, this indicates a residual Cuban troop presence in Ethiopia of
2,000-2,500 men. Cuba probably would not have brought fresh troops to
Ethio is if they did not intend to keep them there for at least a year or
two.
SECRET
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Angola
Argumenjs for a Prolonged Stay in Angola
1. Defending Angola from "racist" South Africa is good for Cuba's
image in Africa and elsewhere.
2. Cuban assistance to Angola is psychologically and ideologically
important as a way for young Cubans to pay their dues in a revolutionary
society.
3. It alleviates unemployment at home.
4. It is an important source of hard currency.
5. Cuban assistance to Angola is an important way of earning
continued Soviet economic and military aid.
6. Failure to withdraw from Angola at this time denies President
Reagan a victory to aid him in his reelection campaign.
7. Withdrawal under current circumstances means the failure of a
nine-year investment.
8. Withdrawal would weaken the struggle against South Africa itself,
namely, it would complicate aiding the ANC and SWAPO.
9. The Cuban presence in Angola provides opportunities for stealing
luxury and manufactured goods and sending them to Cuba; also, Cuba makes
money as Angola's purchasing agent for many imports.
10. It feeds Castro's ego, increases his political stature, and
promotes him from only a national or regional political figure to world
status
Arguments Against a Long Stay
1. Casualties are very unpopular. Cuban casualties from the recent
UNITA bombing in Huambo were buried in Angola in order to minimize the
impact of the deaths in Cuba.
2. Angola is having difficulty making hard currency payments to Cuba.
3. Angola duty is not popular among Cuban troops (some have had two
or three tours there).
4. Cuba doesn't want to be viewed as an obstacle to peace and
Namibian independence.
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5. The Angola and Mozambique agreements with South Africa shook
Castro's confidence in dos Santos and Machel, damaged his ego by cutting
him out of negotiations of potentially great historical importance, and
robbed him of any degree of control over events affecting his vital
interests. His trust in them is diminished and with it his readiness to
go the last mile for them.
6. Castro does not want to oppose such African figures as Kaunda and
Nyerere.
7.
ome defenses at a time of increasing US
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