NIO MONTHLY WARNING ASSESSMENTS: AUGUST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100020035-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #6289-83
1 September 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: August
1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situation.
a. Lebanon
(1) The renewed fighting in late August
poses the most serious threat to the survival
of the Gemayel government since last fall.
Collapse of the government, the assassination
of Gemayel, or major Muslim defections from
the Army would precipitate a showdown between
the Christian Lebanese Forces and the Muslim-
Druze coalition. Israeli withdrawal to the
Awwali River will remove the only remaining
restraint on a contest for control of the Shuf
and a renewed partition of Beirut along the
Green Line.
(2) The Syrians almost certainly will
seize the opportunity to deepen their
intervention in Lebanese politics. Syrian
media have warned that "Syria cannot be
neutral" when Israel and the Phalange militia
are attempting to sharpen the polarization
between Christian and Shia/Druze forces, and
it may orchestrate the installation of a
separatist regime based on the National
Salvation Front formed by Druze leader
Junblatt in late July. The Syrians may also
exploit the chance to gain control over the
port of Tripoli and to eliminate Palestinian
forces loyal to Arafat in refugee camps
outside the city.
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(4) If the Lebanese Forces appear to be
losing in a showdown with Syrian-backed Shia
and Druze forces, the Israeli government
almost certainly will intervene to prevent a
Christian defeat. This contingency would
sharply increase the chances of renewed
Israeli-Syrian hostilities, particularly if
Assad pursues a deliberately provocative
course in an attempt to force the U.S. and the
Soviet Union to intervene to arrange a cease-
fire and negotiations for a "comprehensive"
Arab-Israeli settlement, including the return
of the Golan Heights to Syria.
b. USSR-INF
(1) The Soviets are setting the stage for
a new proposal ostensibly designed to break
the imoasse in the Geneva talks. Moscow's
immediate objective will be to generate strong
sentiment in Western Europe for a postponement
of INF deployment. A new Soviet initiative
may be announced in connection with the next
round at Geneva that opens on 6 September or
during Andropov's visit to Bulgaria in late
October.
(2) The Soviets may couple a proposal for
a mutual moratorium on INF deployments as long
as the Geneva talks continue with further
revisions of Andropov's December 1982 offer to
reduce Soviet delivery vehicles and warheads
to a level equal to that of Britain and
France. Andropov's 26 August offer to
"liquidate" all missiles the Soviets would
reduce, including a "considerable number" of
SS-20's, suggests that Moscow is preparing
further gestures along this line, perhaps an
offer to allow Britain and France to retain
three missiles for each SS-20 in order to
freeze warheads at 162 on each side.
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c. Iran-Iraq
(1) An Iraqi decision in the next three
months to use five Super Etendards armed with
Exocet missiles to attack Iranian shipping in
the Gulf and Iranian oil facilities could
trigger a dangerous escalation of the war.
Although the Iraqi intent presumably would be
to compel the U.S. and the Soviet Union to
intervene to arrange a settlement, this gamble
more likely would backfire by forcing Iran to
carry out its threats to block oil exports
from other Gulf states. The Iranians may
-conduct air strikes on other Gulf countries
and/or mine the Straits of Hormuz.
d. Chad
(1) The de facto cease-fire and partition
of the country have created a temporary and
highly unstable situation. Qadhafi apparently
is content to hold the northern third of the
country while waiting for domestic pressures
to induce the French to withdraw their
personnel and aircraft.
(2) Habre cannot afford to acquiesce in
the loss of the north, and he probably will
initiate small unit raids on Goukoni and
Libyan forces in the next few weeks. Such
actions will trigger counteractions which
probably will escalate into another test of
strength in the next three months.
e. Central America
(1) The Salvadoran rebels appear to
believe that the FDR's meetings with the
government's Peace Commission in Bogota on
29 August and with Ambassador Stone in Costa
Rica on 30 August represent a significant
political breakthrough which implies de facto
recognition of the FMLN-FDR as an equal and
legitimate negotiating partner. FDR
representatives described the Bogota talks as
"historic" and made it clear that they intend
to seek further meetings.
(2) FMLN-FDR political strategy probably
is to exploit this dialogue to influence U.S.
public and Congressional opinion. They may
also believe that continuing contacts with the
Peace Commission will eventually precipitate a
rightist backlash in El Salvador that will
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weaken the government, divide the armed
forces, and perhaps lead to a rightist coup
attempt.
(3) FMLN-FDR strategy may also envisage
further political initiatives, coordinated
with the Sandinistas and Cubans, possibly
including a proposal for negotiations to
arrange a cease-fire and formal talks between
the FMLN and the Salvadoran government.
f. Chile
(1) The government's strategy to keep the
lid on, strengthen military support, and
divide the opposition by making a number of
concessions is vulnerable to leftist-
instigated violence. The next major test
probably will occur on 8 September, when
opposition leaders plan a fifth day of
national protest--the 10th anniversary of the
overthrow of the Allende government.
(2) If these demonstrations result in
casualties that exceed those of the clashes on
9-12 August, there would be heightened chances
of a split in the armed forces that could lead
to military pressure for Pinochet's
resignation. The Navy and Air Force appear to
be increasingly restive. Air Force Chief
General Matthei called on 12 August for an
"understanding" with the political parties and
for a "political debate."
g. Pakistan
(1) Violent disturbances by the Pakistan
People's Party have disrupted life throughout
Sina Province and forced Army units to take
control in several areas. If the movement
spreads to the Punjab, the home of most of the
Army, Zia's hold on power would be threatened.
Attachments:
NIO/AF
NIO/EA
NI0/Narcotics
NI0/LA
NI0/NESA
NI0/USSR-EE
NI0/WE
SECRET,/
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