IN JUNE 1983 THE SENATE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE DIRECTED THE DCI TO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000701330027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 8, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
0 6 NO 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: DCI Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis
Background
1. In June 1983 the Senate Oversight Committee directed the DCI to
prepare an "in-depth report on how best to meet the needs of the United
States Government for\multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis."
At the same time the D CI was also instructed by the Committee to con-
stitute a small advisory commission to work with the intelligence
community to develop a clear and coherent definition of multidisciplinary
counterintelligence analysis requirements and frame practical recommend-
ations for meeting those requirements. In conformance with those
directions in August of 1983, the Intelligence Community Staff began
canvassing the Community for its views on the subject and the DCI in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the FBI
created the Advisory Commission on Multidisciplinary Counterintelligence
Analysis, hereinafter called the Commission.
The Commission and Its Perspective
2. The Commission is composed of a chairman and three,.members. The
Chairman is a former senior CIA official now serving as a consultant to
the DCI and conversant, therefore, with developments in the Intelligence
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
Community over the past two and one half years. The other three members,
of the Commission are retired officials, one from the FBI, one from the
Department of Defense and one from the CIA, who, during their careers in
their respective agencies, were directly and deeply involved with all
aspects of counterintelligence operations, analysis and programming. All
three members have retired within the past two to three years. Their
appointment to the Commission gave them access to current developments in
the counterintelligence community and thus placed them in a unique
position to compare the status of the Community as it existed at the time
of their departure to its present status. The members of the Commission
were polygraphed before assuming their duties. This fact was made known
to the Community and had beneficial effects on the conduct of the
Commission's interviews and its access.
The Commission's Methodology
3. Within the context of its charter, the Commission focused on
certain topics of counterintelligence interest (outlined in following
paragraphs) and measured the progress the Community had made against
those topics over the three-year period 1980-1983. The Commission was
given full access to all studies produced in the three-year period on the
topics in which it expressed interest and interviewed over twenty-five
current and former intelligence officers involved in those topics.
Finally, the Commission reviewed the in-depth report prepared for the DCI
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0 ; I
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
by the Intelligence Community Staff on "how best to meet the needs of the,
Government for multidisciplinary counterintelligence analysis" and
found that it provides a good description of the efforts made by the
Community on a departmental basis to meet departmental multidisciplinary
threat analysis requirements. The Commission disagrees, however, with the
Intelligence Community Staff's recommendation that no changes are needed
in the Community structure to meet the national requirements for multi-
disciplinary analysis of the threat and detection of deception.
Topics of Concern to the Commission
4. The Commission focused its attention on the following topics:
(a) Definitions: Counterintelligence and Multidisciplinary
Counterintelligence Analysis.
(b) Status of Multidisciplinary Analysis.
(c) Hostile Strategic Deception through technical means.
(d) Dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence
information.
(e) Countermeasures.
(f) "Active Measures."
(g) Structure of the Community.
Findings
5. General: Based on its interviews and reviews of pertinent
studies, the Commission concluded that the Intelligence Community has
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0 j I
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
made measurable progress in the past three years in promoting the use of
the multidisciplinary analytical approach in the Community. It is now
the accepted methodology in the analytical community. This improvement
is due in considerable measure to the confluence of three separate
factors. (a) The declared interest of this Administration in improving
the intelligence and counterintelligence capacity of the Community; (b)
The continued interest and support of the Senate Oversight Committee in
the development of the multidisciplinary analytical approach; and (c) The
interest in and support of the concept by the present leadership of the
Intelligence Community. This improvement is reflected in closer working
relationships among analysts of the various components of the Intelli-
gence Community, the establishment of interagency committees and task
forces to examine and report on specific subjects of intelligence
interest, the development of new components charged directly with
responsibility for monitoring deceptive tactics of the USSR and its
satellites, and the creation within the NSC structure of interagency
groups charged with addressing and resolving problems encountered by the
counterintelligence countermeasures community.
6. Specific Findings.
While the Commission noted marked improvement in the recognition 'by
the Intelligence Community of the multidisciplinary analytical approach
it also found that the Community continues to be troubled by difficulties,
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
which affect its performance. Confusion exists in the terminology used,
to determine the responsibilities and authority of agencies concerned
with the threat to the United. States from hostile intelligence activity.
The words counterintelligence, counterespionage and countermeasures are
used with overlapping and confusing implications. Subsequent paragraphs
outline our views and findings on the specific topics we examined.
(a) Definitions: Counterintelligence and Multi-
disciplinary Counterintelligence Analysis. Since 1975
successive Administrations through executive pronouncements
have excluded from the definition of counterintelligence
those security measures taken by U.S. Government components
to protect U.S. interests against the foreign threat. Only
counterespionage was included in the official definition.
As a result, the perception that counterespionage and
counterintelligence were synonyms became ensconced in the
Community. Thus, protective measures taken by components
of the Community to protect U.S. interests from other forms
of the threat, e.g., technical means, were excluded from
the definition of counterintelligence and as a result those
measures are placed outside the counterintelligence
community and its programs.
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
SECRET
Understandably measures to ensure physical and personnel
security were also excluded. The definitional problem
persists in that portion of the community primarily
concerned with counterespionage (counter-Humint).
Obviously, analysis of one kind or another takes place at
every level of the operational and estimating process.
What the Commission is concerned with is the collective
capability of U.S. agencies to analyze the threat to U.S.
security from all kinds and sources of foreign intelligence
activity and U.S. vulnerability to these threats.
(b) Multidisciplinary Analysis. The Commission has
reviewed all the data provided and through independent
interviews and briefings has satisfied itself that a
respectable commitment has already been made by the
Community to the kind of multidisciplinary analysis with
which the Commission is concerned. The large volume of
multidisciplinary analytical products now available attest
to our conclusion that the all-source approach to analysis
is firmly established in those entities in CIA, FBI, DIA,
and in each of the military departments which provide
6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0 f
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
counterintelligence support for sensitive activities most
threatened by the clusters of hostile intelligence systems
arrayed against us. The majority of the efforts relating
directly to the protection of sensitive activities takes
place, appropriately we think, within the Department of
Defense. We were impressed with the professionalism of the
multidisciplinary analytical support given to certain
categories
Requirements
for multidisciplinary analysis by CI organizations are
directed at educating commanders and managers and at
assessing US vulnerabilities to hostile intelligence
threats, in support of operational security needs. For the
most part they are not directed at analyzing hostile
deception. Where the latter analytical effort now occurs
is outside the CI community, namely in dedicated units
within positive intelligence collection agencies (CIA, DIA,
NSA). At present, except on an ad hoc basis, the latter
efforts appear to lack adequate coordination or direction.
(c) Hostile Strategic Deception Through Technical Means.
Because of the importance of this topic the Commission
focused considerable attention on it. At the outset we
distinguished deception practiced by hostile forces through
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
the use of human sources from that in which technical
collection systems are utilized. The former type of
deception was and continues to be the province of the
counterespionage analysts. The Commission found that the
establishment of the bona fides of human sources is a
matter under continuing examination by counterespionage
analysts on a multidisciplinary basis. The responsibility
for deception by technical means rests on the shoulders of
substantive analysts concerned with positive intelligence
production with occasional, albeit important, assistance
from the counterespionage specialists. The Commission was
particularly concerned with deception through technical
means. The Commission found an increased awareness on the
part of the analysts at all echelons of the analytical
process of the possibility of deception being practiced by
hostile forces. The minds of analysts are no longer as set
as they once were. Many realize that the possibility of
deception is ever present and look for signs of it. This
is a significant departure from the attitude which
prevailed even a few years ago. The Commission found that
new organizational components have been established during
the past two years at NSA, DIA, military departments, and
in the Directorate of Intelligence at CIA all of which are
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0 j I
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
focusing specifically on the deception problem in a variety
of technical collection systems. We also found senior
interagency, multidisciplinary task forces concentrating on
the subject of Soviet deception and security compromises of
our technical collection systems. Finally, we note that an
NIE, the first ever on the subject of hostile deception, is
in the process of being drafted.
(d) Dissemination of intelligence and counterintelligence
information: It is a truism to state that the final product
of any analytical effort must, in the last analysis, be
based on the intelligence and counterintelligence
information made available to the analysts. It has been
the experience of the Commission that analysts working on
substantive studies and estimates have complained over the
years, with good reason on occasions, that vital intelli-
gence, particularly from human sources, has been withheld
from them. The Commission reexamined the problem and
believes that a conscious effort is being made today to get
critical human intelligence to the analysts, notwithstanding
the fact that such action may represent some risk to the
human source. Balancing the responsibilities of the
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
collectors of intelligence to protect sources and methods
against the unlimited appetite of the analysts for more and
more intelligence is an unending struggle. In any event
the coordination process involved in the production of
finished intelligence helps insure that sensitive-source
information is factored into analytical conclusions.
(e) Countermeasures: (i) All-source threat analysis
becomes a sterile mental exercise unless it results in
action designed to counter the threat. Countermeasures
steps taken to protect against the threat are inextricably
interwoven with the threat analysis. Countermeasures,
however, are not the responsibility of the counterintel-
ligence discipline. This fact has never been adequately
understood outside the counterintelligence community with
the result that intelligence losses because of inadequate
countermeasures are invariably mislabeled as counterintel-
ligence failures. This in turn has led to a loss of
confidence in the counterintelligence community. The
Commission found that the present leadership of the
Intelligence Community has taken steps to improve the
effectiveness of countermeasures. The creation of the
IG/CM (Interagency Group on Countermeasures) within the NSC
complex and the recent formation"of the NOAC (National
10
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
SECRET
Operations Security Advisory Committee) as a working
committee of the IG/CM constitute, in the opinion of the
Commission, important steps in the right direction. Recent
developments emphasize the need for more effective action
in this field. (ii) The Commission believes that special
mention should be made of the manner in which the Defense
Department handles perceived threats to "vital systems."
Although countermeasures generally have not received
appropriate attention and support in the past, the
protection given certain "vital systems" identified as
"special access programs" has been an outstanding
exception. For selected vital systems analysts have
defined the threat on a multidisciplinary basis and
assessed the hostile capabilities. Counterintelligence
officers assigned to the "vital system" project evaluate
intelligence to identify existing vulnerabilities and have
assisted project managers in adopting specific
countermeasures whose effectiveness is constantly probed
and checked within the framework of hostile capabilities as
defined by the analysts. Similar multidisciplinary efforts
are also made for some other sensitive installations and
11
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
SECRET
projects to enhance their security posture. Broader use of
this approach, however, should be made by the appropriate
officials of the Defense Department to correct deficiencies
revealed by recent countermeasures lapses.
(f) Active Measures. The Commission considers "active
measures" (as defined by the KGB) to fall within the broad
definition of counterintelligence. As we noted earlier,
strategic deception is a matter of concern to the Community
and is handled separately from other active measures such
as, front groups, agents of influence, media manipulation,
forgeries, etc. The latter forms of "active measures" fall
within the purview of the "Interagency Working Group on
Active Measures," chaired by a representative of the
Department of State. The analysis necessary to identify
the "active measures" is performed by the analytical
elements of the Community either on a single or interagency
basis. The results are forwarded to the working group,
which decides on counteraction. The execution of the
counteraction in most instances consists of exposure to the
public and this action is primarily entrusted to the
Department of State. In the view of the Commission, the
12
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
operations of the Interagency Working Group reflect an
excellent example of interagency, multidisciplinary
analytical, counteraction performance.
(g) The Community Structure - Multidisciplinary Threat
Analysis and Strategic Deception Through Technical Means:
The Commission found that the majority of the multidisci-
plinary analytical work now being done on the hostile
intelligence threat is being done on a departmental basis
in response to departmental requirements. This effort is
valuable and should be continued. National requirements
for multidisciplinary threat analyses and deception
detection are met by ad hoc interagency committees or task
forces. In the Commission's view, there is nothing
inherently wrong with these latter approaches for the short
term and for specific problems. What the ad hoc committee
or task force approach does not provide is continuity in
thinking and analysis. Nor does it contribute to the
effective establishment of an interdisciplinary data base.
In the opinion of the Commission the time has come for the
Intelligence Community to accept some structural changes
designed to remedy the shortcomings of the ad hoc approach.
13
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
7. Recommendations.
(a) Structural Changes. During the course of its work,
the Commission was presented with a number of proposals
from concerned individuals both from within and outside the
Intelligence Community for changes in the structure
designed to improve the multidisciplinary analytical
approach to the threat and deception problems. The
proposals ranged from the establishment of a 30-person
multidisciplinary analytical group sited outside of the
existing establishment to the maintenance of the status
quo. After considering all proposals, the Commission,
recommends the establishment of an Office of "National
Intelligence Officer for Threat and Strategic I Deception
Analysis." This NIO should be supported by a permanent
staff of
analysts to include all disciplines and,
where necessary, drawn from components of the Intelligence
Community on a 2-3 year rotational basis. These analysts
must be ensured continuing and unrestricted access to the
data bases of their disciplines at the agencies whence they
were drawn. Among the tasks to be assigned this permanent
staff will be (i) the preparation of an annual multidisci-
A 14
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
plinary hostile intelligence threat assessment report, (ii)
the coordination of multidisciplinary threat analyses and
production efforts within the Community in order to avoid
duplication and fill gaps, (iii) the analytical review of
all major findings made by other components of the
Community concerning hostile strategic deception, (iv) the
support of departmental tailored threat assessments for
vital systems and other important R&D undertakings, (v) the
continuing assessment of hostile intelligence capabilities
of all disciplines, (vi) the preparation of damage
assessments on compromised US collection systems, and (vii)
other ad hoc assignments requiring national level
multidisciplinary analysis. The NIO for Threat and
Deception Analysis would chair a new Interagency Committee
on Deception Analysis, would also participate in the work
of the Interagency Working Group on Active Measures as well
as be represented on the Imagery and SIGINT/MASINT Subcom-
mittees. At the discretion of the NIO, special interagency
task forces could be assembled for the study of specific
problems. As an NIO, he would have direct access to the
DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community.
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
The mix of permanent staff, with permanent committees or
groups, and the authority to organize special interagency
ad hoc task forces provides a high degree of flexibility to
the NIO enabling him to handle most contingencies. By
locating this research unit in the Intelligence Community,
we ensure continued access to the necessary data bases and
permit maximum interface between staff members of the
research group and the balance of the analytical
community. Finally, placing the staff under an NIO
reporting to the DCI'ensures it the necessary degree of
independence. There are usually two major obstacles that
obstruct all efforts to reorganize: "turf" and "people."
The Commission believes that "turf" should not be a major
obstacle in this instance because the Community has already
started moving in the direction we are proposing. In
effect what we are calling for is greater focus and
acceleration of the process. The "people" problem can only
be solved by the leadership of the Community and is beyond
the purview of the Commission. A chart depicting the
organizational structure we are proposing is attached.
16
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
(b) Countermeasures. The importance of operations
security follow-through actions to meet the hostile
intelligence threat cannot be overemphasized. The
Commission applauds the formation of the Interagency Group
on Countermeasures (IG/CM) under the NSC's SIG(I) and the
recent action to form a working level interdepartmental
committee under the IG/CM known as NOAC (National
Operations Security Advisory Committee). This latter
group, chaired by a senior Defense Department
representative, fills a definite need. The Commission
believes that this Committee should adopt an aggressive
approach for identifying OPSEC gaps and other problems
rather than awaiting issues to be selected and brought to
them for consideration. The IG/CM should take appropriate
action to see that this is done. The Intelligence
Community should not have to wait for a Congressional
inquiry before being galvanized into taking action to
correct widely perceived security weaknesses. The NOAC can
profitably fill this role in a constructive, mutually
beneficial manner without the confrontational overtones
17
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
SECRET
that often become attached to "outside" inquiries.
Moreover, we believe an important OPSEC issue need not have
multi-agency implications to warrant NOAC attention. For
example, a security lapse in industry, while primarily
within the jurisdiction of the Defense Industrial Security
Program, obviously transcends the narrow jurisdictional
question and can affect the entire national security
establishment. An important espionage case, with clear
countermeasure lessons-to-be-learned, merits broad
Community participation and concern.
(c) Career Paths for Counterintelligence Analysts. The
quality of analytical work depends to a large extent on the
quality of the analysts. The Commission believes,
therefore, that positive steps must be taken to provide
better training and career opportunities for senior
analysts. These steps should be aimed at cutting through
the conventional wisdom that all senior analysts must be
generalists, or that they must have filled certain
managerial posts to progress into positions of senior
status. The importance of achieving high grade analytical
products mandates that personnel management provide for
18
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
long-term training of analysts and give them career goals
that will transcend the GS-14 or 15 level. While not all
analysts would expect to achieve top status, those clearly
motivated and devoted to excellence should not be stymied
because they have not served in a management post normally
thought of as the requisite"ticket punching" for career
progression.
ross. Chairman
XembW
19
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0
SECRET
SIG (I)
DCI
DDC I
IG/CI I I IG/CM
INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCERS
COUNCIL
i
NIO for HOSTILE THREAT
& DECEPTION ANALYSIS f-------~
INTERAGENCY DECEPTION
ANALYSIS COMMITTEE
IMAGERY REVIEW
SUBCOMMITTEE
SIGINT/MASINT
REVIEW
SUBCOMMITTEE
ACTIVE MEASURES
WORKING GROUP
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000701330027-0