LETTER (SANITIZED) FROM PETER SHARFMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001601990038-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: November 28, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD
MORRIS K. UDALL. ARIZ.. CHAIRMAN
TED STEVENS, ALASKA. VICE CHAIRMAN
ORRvi G HATCH. UTAH GEORGE E BROWN, JR.. CALIF.
CHARLES McC MATHIAS. JR. MD. JOHN 0 DINGELL MICH.
EDWARD M KENNEDY. MASS LARRY WARN. JR., KANS.
ERNEST F HOLLINGS, SC. CLARENCE E MILLER, OHIO
CLAIBORNE FELL RI COOPER EVANS. IOWA
JOHN H GIBBONS
Congre z of Njc 11niteb Stati t
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT O
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
office of Legislative Liaison
Room 7BO2
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
JOHN H. GIBBONS
DIRECTOR
ttasutnE uusoN
40-7
November 28, 1984
This letter responds to our telephone conversation today,
in which you confirmed that "senior management" at CIA
(specifically the DDI) had instructed you to reject our requests
for documents, and to seek more information regarding our
requests for meetings. These requests are contained in our
letter of November 20, a copy of which is attached for reference.
I understand that before you feel able to schedule the
requested meetings with CIA analysts regarding Soviet policies
and attitudes towards ballistic missile defense, you want a more
detailed statement of the questions we wish to discuss. We have
drawn up such a list, and it is attached to this letter. Of
course, we are quite aware that most of these questions cannot be
answered with high confidence, and that some of them are
difficult to answer at all. For our purposes, it is just as
important to gauge the degree of uncertainty and gaps in
information which confront American policy-makers as it is to
understand what it is that we do know. It is for this reason,
among others, that we want to talk at least briefly with some of
your most senior analysts.
With regard to the documents we wish to read before these
meetings, I am frankly astonished to encounter a response so
inconsistent with our previous experiences with the Agency. CIA
policy has been that OTA staff can have access to appropriate CIA
documents when these documents are pertinent to an ongoing OTA
assessment approved by the Congressional Technology Assessment
Board. While the CIA has never permitted us to review
intelligence products routinely in order to discover whether some
new development might call for a technology assessment, we have
never before been refused access when the specific need-to-know
was for an existing OTA project. It has been my understanding,
based on conversations wit of your office at the time
(1979-1980) when OTA staff rs received codeword access, that
while CIA would not necessarily give us access to the most
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sensitive material, we could (given a bona fide need-to-know)
review any of the documents that are widely available within the
national security community, and that we might request access to
information in the smaller intelligence compartments on a case-
by-case basis. We have further understood that while CIA was
willing to let OTA have copies of less sensitive collateral
intelligence analyses, we would have to visit CIA headquarters to
read anything codeword and/or sensitive.
On the basis of this understanding, OTA staff members have
from time to time received access to NIEs and to documents of
roughly equivalent sensitivity. For example, in the summer of
1980 Jeremy Kaplan and I reviewed all the volumes of NIE 11-3/8
in the course of OTA's study of XX Missile Basing. In the spring
of 1981, I reviewed a contractor report on Soviet silo design and
silo hardness in support of the same study. Approximately one
year ago, Bruce Blair (the Project Director of our study of
Strategic C31) reviewed sensitive materials relating to Soviet
command, control, communications and intelligence.
You mentioned on the telephone that it is CIA policy to
restrict access to sensitive materials to those Congressional
committees whose duties require such access. This is why our
November 20 letter called attention to the fact that our study of
ballistic. missile defense technology is being carried out at the
request of two Committees (House Armed Services and Senate
Foreign Relations) whose staffs have routine access to sensitive
intelligence materials.
Finally, I call to your attention a provision of Public
Law 92-484, the "Technology Assessment Act of 1972," which
established OTA. Section 6 (d) reads as follows: "The Office
[of Technology Assessment] is authorized to secure directly from
any executive department or agency information, suggestions,
estimates, statistics, and technical assistance for the purpose
of carrying out its functions under this Act. Each such
executive department or agency shall furnish the information,
suggestions, estimates, statistics, and technical assistance
directly to the Office upon its request." You will note the
inclusion of the word "estimates."
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I hope that you will be able to act expeditiously on this
request, in view of the fact that the requesting Committees have
imposed rather tight time constraints upon us. Please call me
(226-2020) if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Peter ar an
Program Ma ager
International Security
and Commerce Program
cc: Alex Gliksman (Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff)
Warren Nelson (House Armed Services Committee staff)
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TecMMOLOSV ASSESMMSNT SOARD . LOUuiH St tot Mum ftiaw
M0 1M L UDALL ANZ. CMMMIAAM OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
TW sTEVENS. MAW. VICE CMAMM1AM
SMMS. IMTCK YfAM MDSSI I. NOM Js.. CUP. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
Clams Mee. N A& JR- No Jail a SSS NCH.
SowAio R L$I $V. M "t I. UL ONO
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OAMOM1E ALL LL cOOMSMMS. IOI A
November 20, 1984
urrice ive Liaison
Room 7802
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
JOHN M. ONISONS
owcrai
As you may recall from my letter of August 10, 1984, we at
OTA are conducting a study of ballistic missile defense for the
House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Our visit to the CIA following that letter was
extremely helpful, and we would like to make at least one more
visit to read certain documents and to confer further with
appropriate CIA personnel. I understand that Dr. Robert Rochlin
telephoned you yesterday about our request.
We would like to meet informa11 with
and any other people you may
suggest, to discuss Soviet policies and attitudes regarding
ballistic missile defense, the ABM Treaty, and strategic arms
control in general. There would be no need for formal briefings.
We would be glad to meet with these p separately or
together, to suit their convenience. invited us to
visit him, and indicated
willingness to meet wi us, u no a es have been fixed as
yet.)
Before holding these discussions, we would like an
opportunity to read appropriate documents, including the six
listed below and any other available CIA reports which cover
Soviet ballistic missile defense activities and policies. If
possible, we would like to arrange to read the documents in the
morning and then meet with CIA experts that afternoon.
"Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense
Initiative (U)"
(12 pp.)
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2
"Soviet Directed-Enera ons: An Overview (U)"
(17 pp.)
SECRET, January 1984.
NIE 11-13-82
NIE 11-3/8-83
Typescript memo on Soviet directed energy responses to the U.S.
Strategic Defense Initiative (Fall 1984). -
The five OTA staff members who would like to make this visit
are as follows:
Gerald L. Epstein
Thomas H. Karas
Robert S. Rochlin
Peter J. Sharfman
Alan H. Shaw
I believe SI/TK clearances for all of them are on file at CIA.
Our preferred dates for this visit are December 3, 6, or 10.
Please phone Dr. Rochlin (226-2021) or me (226-2014) to let us
know whether one of these dates would be satisfactory.
Thank you very much for your help.
Sincerely,
Thomas H. Karas
Project Director
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