MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000300470008-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO,
January 25, 19~t his office in Havana
SOLARZ: I've been on a long trip through South and Central
America: Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico. Now I have come here to put it all
together. I am seeking answers to some puzzling questions.
CASTRO: Just ask the questions or tell us what you have seen.
SOLARZ: This was my first trip to South America. I focused on
political and economic questions, and found the experience very
interesting. The social and economic crisis is creating political
problems, especially in Brazil and Peru. Chile is in for a long hot
winter. The Chileans have a curious custom. When summer comes, they
call off their protest and go to the beach. Once this summer is over,
the movement for democracy will continue.
CASTRO: So they strike during March and April.
SOLARZ: Yes, meanwhile they are at the beach.
CASTRO: Some Brazilians told me about a political rally they were
planning. They had to wait until after Carnival. But 200,000
participated and called for direct elections.
SOLARZ: I am interested in your reactions to events in
Argentina--the collapse of the junta, the elections, and Alfonsin's
emergence as President.
CASTRO: I think this is an important step forward. Recently I
saw a Latin American film festival of historical documentaries here. I
wish you could see them. I can't lend you the films, since they might
be under contract. I asked that the prints be left here. There was a
long and interesting documentary, "The Long Revolution." It depicted
the rise, reforms and fall of Iragoyin (sp?), the first Peron period,
military rule thereafter, then Peron again. What was really
fascinating was the role of the masses of the people, struggling over
major contradicitions. Sometimes the masses moving forward were the
popular masses; sometimes they were reactionaries. The popular
participation was very impressive. Now there is an opportunity, a new
opportunity for the popular masses. Alfonsin got the support of the
middle classes. The workers followed Peron's ideas. The people have
squared accounts with the military. Incredible things happened in
Argentina [in the 1970s]. Peron came back. Isabel was his
vice-president and then succeeded him as president. That was a
disaster. There were the death squads, a sinister group. They wielded
power behind the throne. The Argentine people were looking for
something besides the military and Peronism (which has a left, center,
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a.
and right). They found Alfonsin, who was courageous and ran a good
campaign. The Radicals won after forty years out of power.
SOLARZ: I met with Alfonsin. He's an impressive man. I told him
that the atmosphere in Buenos Aires was like that in Washington in
1933. After a period of political oppression and economic decline, a
leader with firmness and boldness has captured the heart of the nation.
I think if an election were held now, Alfonsin would get sixty to
seventy percent of the vote.
CASTRO: The history of Argenina is of one tragedy after another
inthe midst of economic prosperity. Now there is the possibility of
mass participation. The people won't be satisfied with crumbs.
Alfonsin has two problems. First is the disappeared. It will be
difficult task to please public opinion. There were supposedly 15,000
people missing. Many bodies are appearing every day. It's traumatic.
But there is no-one in jail. Kamps (sp?), who bragged about killing
5,000, is now in jail. Bignone was not as responsible as Kamps, though
he may be somewhat responsible. He presided over the transportation of
the victims. I know the psychology of the masses, who will not forget.
Alfonsin must find and try enough people. He risks disillusioning
people. Why? They are discontent because the trials will be in
military and not civilian courts.
SOLARZ: There is that concern, particularly among the human
rights groups, like the Mothers of the Plaza del Maya, which are
determined that justice be done. But Alfonsin has instituted appeals
to civilian courts.
CASTRO: I think that there are thousands who can be blamed, who
participated. The military was involved in large numbers. It would be
necessary to try several thousands. After such an atrocious crime,
trying eight to ten will not be enough.
SOLARZ: I think that is his plan. He has designated three
categories of people: those who directed the dirty war; those who
committed excesses in the carrying out their orders; and those who
merely followed orders.
CASTRO: What about people who engaged in torture?
SOLARZ: They will be subject to prosecution.
CASTRO: What about those who committed murder.
SOLARZ: They will be subject to prosecution also.
CASTRO: I am looking from a distance. If he doesn't prosecute
enough, the people won't be satisfied. We've had our own experience in
this regard. There were cases of torture before the revolution, and
people don't forget. After we came to power we convicted some
counterrevolutionaries in Ascension for crimes against the people.
Some of those convicted were shot at an execution, but some were only
sentenced to 30 years in jail. There are presently some 200 still in
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Jail. Recently, at the time of our twenty-fifth anniversary, I was
asked to make an analysis to see how many might be released. We
determined that 60 to 70 could be released (they can't go to the US or
to Europe). These individuals were responsible for a number of
killings in the area, and the relatives of the victims are still there.
The murderers had prestige. They will become a political problem. The
people don't forget.
I saw a picture today of Israelis demonstrating in Tel Aviv at the
time of Helmut kohl's visit. Even though he had nothing to do with the
concentration camps, it was as if he had been wearing a Nazi uniform.
People don't forget. I know the masses. The masses don't forget. The
government in Argentina needs to go after a certain number of the
military, or else the people will not be satisfied.
SOLARZ: There is another problem, the possibility that the
campaign will go too far, provoking the military to protect its
institutional integrity and seize power again. Now the army is
demoralized, whipped, and beaten. But if they think that Alfonsin is
moving toward convicting everyone in the army, they may strike back.
It's a delicate situation.
CASTRO: That's true, but the longer Alfonsin waits the worse it
will be. The army people will reorganize and act anyway. He has to
strike now. There can be other repercussions: although there are only
two Argentine military prisoners, the Brazilian military is raising the
specter of revenge in Argentina as a pretext against democratization in
Brazil. The same is true of Uruguay [and Chile--RBI.
SOLARZ: I would like your opinion on the economic difficulties
facing Alfonsin. Argentina has an external debt of $45 billion, the
economy has declined in recent years, and living standards have fallen.
After all this and the years of repression, there are now great hopes
and expectations for an improvement, which are difficult to satisfy.
In the short term, there is a risk of deterioration despite Alfonsin's
merits, his intentions, and the austerity program. His image could
deteriorate. These political ups and downs seem to be characteristic
of Argentina. If the banks and the US government were willing to
cooperate in renegotiating the debt, it would have positive
repercussions, helping Alfonsin to meet external obligations, and in
promoting general economic growth. The question is whether the bankers
will forego profits for the sake of long-term progress.
CASTRO: It seems that the West is not so willing. The World Bank
directors recently announced that it will take years for the Third
World to recover. This has created a decline in lending, and the
countries have to pay $20 billion above what was lent nominally [??:
$20 billion above what the interest would be under normal
conditions??].
SOLARZ: The debt crisis is a problem facing many countries in
Latin America (for example, Brazil, Peru, Chile). I would have thought
that a solution to the debt crisis would be good for both the debtor
countries and the Western banks and governments. There is no way that
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countries like Brazil and Argentina can repay their debts at current
rates of interest and survive.
CASTRO: First of all, I'm happy that a politician of your
position has taken the opportunity to visit South America. The problem
is more complex. Argentina and Peru have their own particular
problems, but their fundamental problem is general and global. There
is a crisis, the solution to which is illusive. But we need to
recognize that the crisis exists. We need to get away from ideology
and prejudice and look at the fact. The problem isn't just in Latin
America, it's in the Third World and industrial world as well.
The symptoms of the crisis are obvious. In Quito recently, there
was a conference attended by representatives of thirty Latin American
countries. It issued a tough economic and political statement,
equivalent to a declaration of war. While that protest was being made,
Helmut Schmidt said in Brussells that Ronald Reagan's policies of
deficits and high interest rates were more dangerous to the West than
the Soviet threat. The Malaysian Prime Minister went to Williamsburg
[??] and said that US policy was unbearable.
There is a world crisis. Each country is trying to save its skin.
As the strongest country the United States is trying to impose a policy
on the others. I have never seen a similar economic situation with
regard to the United States. It's [policy) is universal, affecting and
strangling every country. Moreover, with the arms race and Ronald
Reagan's arms policy, there is unrest and the world feels strangled.
The United States is getting blamed, though it shouldn't be blamed for
everything. But US policy is causing desperation in both the Third
World and the industrialized world. The debts cannot be paid at the
prevailing interest rates. There needs to be a reduction in the debt.
SOLARZ: It is clear that the debtor countries cannot pay. But it
is unrealistic to expect the banks and governments to write off the
loans. Now can we find an approach that is acceptable to both debtors
and creditors?
CASTRO: My conclusion is the system is in crisis. We are
witnessing a new phenomenon. Capital is no longer primarily investment
capital. The share of loan capital is increasing. Finance capital is
creating a crisis situation, a crisis of the capitalist system, of the
world financial system and the world financial order. How can we get
out of this crisis? Noone has the answer. But the crisis will lead to
changes. There is no other way out.
Regarding Latin America, a North America concerned about the
world's present and future must keep Latin America in mind. Latin
America--both the democracies and the military dictatorships are in
crisis. What solution is there for Peru and El Salvador. Venezuala
has fallen into this situation in spite of its immense wealth. The
economic and social situation in Mexico--even with all that oil--is
terrible. The Mexicans tell me how bad the situation is. Venezuala is
only getting $28 per barrel. In Brazil, the economic miracle is no
more. There is a $95 billion debt and serious unemployment. Chile has
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an external debt of $20 billion. Peru doesn't know what to do. It
only has $300 million in reserves. There is a tremendous crisis in
Uruguay, and in Santo Domingo and Jamaica. Are the Cubans, the
Marxist-Leninists of this continent, going to be blamed for all this
trouble?
S,_
What way out is there? There must be changes, deep social
changes. They are inevitable. American politicians have to think
about the changes. They have to face them. The present is like the
eighth month of a pregnancy. I don't know who will deliver the
solution, but changes are inevitable. If I were an American politician
I would not shut my eyes and look at ghosts. In Brazil, for example,
there will be a strategic change. Brazil cannot be treated like
Grenada.
SOLARZ: You're mentioning Brazil prompts me to ask an intruiging
question. Why was there never a revolution in Brazil in spite of the
genuine poverty and the military repression? In Central America,
economic poverty, social inequality, and political repression have led
to revolution. That's the only means of achieving progress. When
poverty and inequality occur in a more open political system,
revolution is less likely, because there are opportunities to work
within the system. Why has there been no significant revolutionary
movement in Brazil?
CASTRO: There wasn't a revolution in Chile in spite of Pinochet.
There wasn't a revolution in Argentina despite the disappeared. And
there hasn't been one in Brazil. In conjunction, the economy is still
up [??].
SOLARZ: Argentina had the Mon.toneros. Chile has the MIR. But
there was no revolutionary movement in Brazil.
CASTRO: Yes there was, but it was crushed. Change is a matter of
life or death. These are long processes, but the objective conditions
are there. We don't know which forces will promote the changes, but
the changes will occur one way or another. The countries cannot
continue the way they are. Consciousness is rising. Brazilians are
demanding a direct election of the president. Chileans are mounting a
mass movement after ten years, almost a general uprising against the
system. They don't believe in [won't accept] repression anymore. In
Peru, who created representative democracy? I've talked to traditional
Latin American politicians. They don't think in the old terms any
more. They think in revolutionary terms.
SOLARZ: Regarding Peru, does Sendero Luminso provide answers?
CASTRO: Sendero is a mystery to everyone. The phenomenon
demonstrates that the economic and social crises is there, but not that
Sendero will have the answers. Peru is a country where you have
democratic politics and a social crisis. There is an elected president
and chamber but they have no solutions to the problems. The problems
will be solved by revolutionary movements. I have talked with Peruvian
politicians, but never to Sendero. We've had no contact with Sendero.
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I've talked to traditional politicians from other countries. They
think only revolution will deal with the profound social and economic
problems.
SOLARZ: We must be talking to different politicians, or they are
saying different things to you and to me. I talked with Barrantes and
Villanueve in Peru. They say that there is a crisis, but they deal
with it through democratic processes. There will be a new government
in 1985. All Peruvian politicians are critical of Sendero Luminoso.
They feel that the revolutionary path would be counterproductive.
CASTRO: When I talk of the revolutionary path, I don't mean the
method of violence. I mean the conviction that profound changes are
necessary in social, economic, and political systems. I don't mean to
refer to Sendero and its approach.
SOLARZ: Are the Sendero people the Pol Pots of Latin America?
G
CASTRO: I believe Sendero is a strange group. I know its Maoist
origins. It had sympathy for the Albanians in the late 1970s. From
public information, we know of its violent methods. I don't have the
information to say whether it's a Pol Pot-style movement. I don't know
how they think. It's too early to label them. But Sendero is the
expression of a social and economic crisis, interwoven with the
character of the Peruvian people. Sendero doesn't make statements, and
we have no relationship with it. It's the only revolutionary group
with which we have no contacts.
SOLARZ: People in Peru say Sendero is as critical of Cuba as it
is with the United States.
CASTRO: It's likely they would make that mistake.
SOLARZ: In Chile, there is tremendous pressure on the Pinochet
government. There is a national consensus that Pinochet has to go.
But there are two different approaches on how to achieve that end. On
the one hand, the Democratic Alliance forces seek change through
peaceful non-violence (demonstrations, general strikes, etc.). They
have rejected the use of violence. On the other hand, the MIR uses the
tactics of violence and terror to destabilize the government. Which
approach do you think is more productive?
CASTRO: Both ways can help. They complement each other. The
peaceful movement is strong and is winning over social sectors which
are afraid of a violent revolution. The MIR has courage. It has faced
Pinochet from the beginning and has produced many martyrs. The
Left--the Socialists and Communists--has conducted the greatest
resistance. The Christian Democrats coexisted for seven to eight years
with the Pinochet regime. It was not until the crises deepened that
the Christian Democrats were moved to active oppostion. We are happy
that all are working together to overthrow Pinochet. Both ways are
good.
SOLARZ: In the democracies of Latin America (Argentina, Peru,
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Colombia, Venezuala, and Brazil once the abertura is completed by
elections), are the social and economic problems solvable by democratic
governments or must they await revolutionary regimes?
CASTRO: The revolutions will not necessarily be like Cuba's.
Nicaragua is trying to conduct revolution along different channels.
They are going to convene elections. Their electoral and political
system is different [from ours], though the aims are the same. Their
solution is not like ours. Military regimes emerged as a defense
against revolution when democracy was in crisis. Then the military was
in crisis and there was a return to constitutional governments. Will
they be able to solve the problem? The military in Peru tried to make
social reforms to prevent the crisis but it was not capable enough.
The Belaunde government is impotent. Can democracy solve the problems?
[No.] What comes after? The military. You have an alternation
between the military and democracy forever. Allende tried to make
changes by a democratic regime but the United States would not let him.
This situation will not go on forever. The people won't accept it.
The traditional means won't solve the problems. Profound social and
economic changes are necessary, either through peaceful means or
violent revolution.
SOLARZ: Democratic governments may be unable to cope, and
revolutionary governments may take power. But will they be able to
solve the crisis if it's a consequence of the crisis of the world
capitalist system. Will the revolutionary governments fail because
they do not have control over their destiny?
CASTRO: That's a good point. It will depend on the countries.
Some have resources. If they manage their resources well, they will
not need assistance. If Cuba had the money Venezuala has, we could do
great things. Argentina has energy, mineral, and agricultural
resources. Brazil could solve its problems. Bolivia would need
assistance. Chile is rich but it needs the management that
revolutionary governments provide. The poorer countries will need
comprehensive assistance.
The systems in North America and Western Europe will be there for
a long period of time. There will be a rotation of governments between
right and left endlessly. These changes can take place in the context
of relative economic abundance. Your unemployed are not like the
unemployed of Brazil and Chile. Your beggars are better off. Those in
poverty [in the US] are reduced minorities. The poor in the Third
World are the majority. The Western world has pooblems: unemployment,
deficits, inflation. Now is is fighting inflation at the expense of
employment and services, but is reducing them from a high level. I
talk to people from 'Portugal, Spain, and France. The problem of
unemployment has driven them to anguish.
For the Western economies to work better, there need to be changes
in the Third World, on which they are ultimately dependent. I remember
a time that China was seen as mad. I thought that it would be a big
market, that there was no reason for hostility on the part of the
United States. Now the US and China are close. The United States will
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have to deal with the Third World in this way. It must face the
necessary changes. Even though there are investments [by Western
countries in the Third World], the Western countries will survive once
the changes occur, just as Holland and Belgium survived without
colonies (even though it was feared that they would not). There were
similar fears about the consequences of the end of slavery. Someday
imperialism will disappear, but the capitalist societies won't be
ruined. They will be more prosperous when all work, produce, and
consume. Where is the business if twenty million Brazilians are out of
work? When will you stop thinking about the present as people in the
past thought about slavery and colonies?
SOLARZ: But in the periods of slavery and colonialism, there was
a conscious commitment to those systems. Do the rich countries have a
commitment to keep Brazilians out of work? Brazil can't pay back the
debt.
CASTRO: You are right that some countries--Sweden and Japan, for
example--do not think like that. But the US Administration thinks like
that and opposes politics, economic, and social changes. That is its
traditional policy. It's a reality.
Take Africa as an example. Who brought the changes in Africa? It
was the military, not the parties--in Ghana, Upper Volta, Nigeria, and
Egypt. It's different from Latin America. Military revolutions have
emerged in Africa. Maybe someday the Latin American militaries can be
instruments of social change, if they are convinced that there is no
way out and that changes are needed.
SOLARZ: I would like to turn now to Central America, a region
that is in a serious crisis with unique characteristics. Central
America is a more immediate problem for the United States and Cuba, one
that is potentially more explosive. The- Contadora group is undertaking
an indigenous approach to the conlict in the hopes of reaching a
negotiated settlement. Do you support the Contadora process and hope
that it will produce concrete results and a reduction of tensions?
CASTRO: We have supported the Contadora group and appreciate its
effort. But we are concerned about the way the policy has developed in
the last few months. Salvador is the bone of contention and the core
of the problem, not Nicaragua. Without a solution to the Salvador
problem, there can be no solution in Central America. Lately, due to
pressures, Contadora has ignored Salvador and not even mentioned it.
SOLARZ: At Panama, there was an agreement in principle on the
reduction of tensions. If the Panama agreement leads to specific
arrangements and concrete realities, it will be a significant
accomplishment. The terms include democratic governments, inventory
and then withdrawal of advisers, pledges of nonintervention, an
inventory of military forces which will be the basis for establishing
an equilibrium of forces, and verification of these actions.
Translating these principles into reality will be difficult. It is not
clear why Salvador must be solved to if such an agreement can be
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CASTRO: All these delcarations are general, abstract norms. They
need to be translated into action. It all depends on what these
provisions would mean for the United States. A non-agression pact
between Nicaragua and Honduras won't solve anything while the US
retains a military presence in Honduras.
SOLARZ: The Panama agreement calls for the withdrawal of advisers
and the abolition of bases. If the United States insists on its
presence in Honduras, there will be no agreement.
CASTRO: Well, if the US is willing to withdraw that changes
matters. Does the agreement presuppose an end to US advisers and
weapons to El Salvador? How can Nicaragua and Salvador reach an
agreement while this US military involvement continues?
SOLARZ: The agreement would require that the US withdraw its
advisers in Salvador and Honduras, and that Nicaragua send home the
advisers there. It would require that no country have foreign bases on
its soil. Nicaragua would not send arms to the FMLN, the US would not
send arms to El Salvador, and Cuba and the Soviet Union would not send
arms to Nicaragua. Contadora calls for an equilibrium of forces.
Obviously, Costa Rica has none to reduce, but the other countries can.
I discussed with D'Escoto the Nicaraguan proposal that it not supply
arms to the FMLN in return for an end to the supply of US arms to
Salvador. That idea was superceded in the Panama agreement, which does
not call for a prohibition on such arms supply relationships. It calls
for an equilibrium of forces. Presumably, if a formula can be found
that is agreeable to all, that might permit each country to receive
arms from other countries as long as it did not alter the equilibrium.
CASTRO: There's a trap there. There is a moral implication that
Nicaragua will give up the right to help the Salvadoran revolutionaries
fighting a genocidal regime, while El Salvador gets US arms. That
constitutes a betrayal of the FMLN by Nicaragua.
Concerning an equilibrium, Nicaragua's potential enemy is not the
other countries of Central America but the United States. What kind of
equilbrium can exist there? If I were the Nicaraguans, I wouldn't
worry about the forces of Honduras or El Salvador. The problem is a US
invasion. For Nicaragua to give up arms to the FMLN while the US
supplies arms to El Salvador is unacceptable.
The bulk of the FMLN's weapons are gotten in battle. In
theoretical terms, however, such an agreement would demoralize
Nicaragua [?? Should it be "the FMLN"?]. Nicaragua made a great
concession when it said it was willing to stop supplying arms if other
countries would too. That is a fair and just approach.
SOLARZ: I had not understood that Nicaragua as willing to forego
weapons from other countries. It was my understanding that it would
abstain from supplying arms to the FMLN but retain the right to get
arms itself. Is Nicaragua willing to stop receiving arms from other
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countries if Salvador doesn't get any?
CASTRO: Yes. That is a great concession, because the US is their
threat. They propose a cessation of weapons transfers and a withdrawal
of forces.
SOLARZ: Let's be practical. It is reasonable to expect countries
to stop supplying arms to other parties within Central America. It is
not reasonable to expect countries to cut themselves off from arms from
outside the region. Otherwise they could not maintain their military
estabilishments. What can be done is to preserve an equilibrium.
CASTRO: I think that could be done for a period of time, for one
or two years. But Nicaragua, in spite of the fact that it sees the US
as its enemy, was willing to [stop supplying arms to the FMLN]. That
implies that other countries should not send weapons to the other
Central American countries.
SOLARZ: You make the important point that the US is a threat to
Nicaragua. There is no way that a country of 3 million people can
balance a country of 220 million. There is one solution to this
imbalance: a US-Nicaraguan agreement, as a complement to Contadora,
whereby the United States would pledge to not interfere in Nicaragua's
internal affairs, and to not provide arms to groups of insurgents in
Nicaragua. That seemed acceptable to the Sandinistas. Do you think
it's acceptable?
CASTRO: The contras are no danger to the Sandinistas. I wouldn't
mind the US supplying the contras. I would have confidence in the
Sandinistas. Let the contras have all the weapons they want. I
wouldn't make that a bargaining point, because Nicaragua and Salvador
aren't comparable. In Salvador, the conflict is an internal war; in
Nicaragua it's external aggression.
SOLARZ: Nicaragua's problem with the contras isn't the threat per
se. The Sandinistas do pay a price in containing them in terms of
money and mobilization. They are better off without the problem. If
we stopped the arms, the contras would wither away.
CASTRO: Would the US betray their moral commitment to the
contras?
SOLARZ: We have a record of betraying our commitments. I agree
that the US is the main threat to Nicaragua. A pledge on our behalf
not to intervene in Nicaragua's internal affairs and to end aid to the
contras would be similar to the pledge the US made to Cuba after the
Missile Crisis of 1962. That has worked for twenty years, and
commitment to the Sandinistas could work too. But even if the US made
such a commitment, establishing an equilibrium of forces would still be
a problem. If Nicaragua decided to develop a military capability
vis-a-vis the United States, it would be a cause for concern on the
part of other Central American countries. Is there a formula for
reducing all forces. so there are no perceived threats?
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CASTRO: The theory that Nicaragua might attack a neighbor is
absurd. It would be suicide. If the Sandinista leaders go mad, they
might launch an invasion of Costa Rica, but they would have no support.
It would be a pretext for an American intervention and the destruction
of the Nicaraguan Revolution. To reach an general agreement is simple:
find a negotiated solution to the Salvador issue, and the other issues
will take care of themselves. Nicaragua will not pay the high price of
having the Salvadoran revolution crushed. The revolutionaries are
strong. They won't surrender. They may resist if they are cut off.
Look first for a solution to the Salvador problem, and that will open
the road for Contadora.
SOLARZ: I want to talk in a minute about a political settlement
in Salvador, about which I've thought a great deal (though probably not
as such as you). But I do want to pursue the point of the equilibrium
of forces. Even If the Salvador question is solved, the problem would
still exist. I agree that it would be crazy for Nicaragua to invade
Costa Rica. The 82nd Airborne would be on the way in twenty-four
hours. Thus there is no military threat. But there is a political
problem. Can you expect that the military authorities in Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatamala to be willing to accept an agreement permitting
Nicaragua to have 50,000 soldiers under arms when they have 20,000 to
25,000? They would insist on a reduction of Nicaragua's forces.
CASTRO: The amount of men you can count on for a military
struggle is not a military problem, it's a political problem, a
question of people 'being willing to take up a gun. If Honduras has an
army of 20,000, it's because that's the number of people willing to
fight. Another solution is to give guns to the workers and the
campesinos. I would be praying that you give weapons to them. That's
a kind of equilibrium I can agree with. In Nicaragua there is
patriotism, revolutionary fervor, and revolutionary spirit. Those are
missing in the other countries.
SOLARZ: If there were a Contadora agreement, with provisions for
no foreign advisers, no foreign bases, non-intervention, plus a US
promise not to aid the contras, why would Nicaragua need such a large
miltiary force?
CASTRO: It wouldn't.
SOLARZ: Would the Sandinistas be willing to reduce their forces?
CASTRO: It makes sense.
SOLARZ: If that is possible, then a Contadora agreement is
possible. If an agreement is possible on the security and political
issues and on US-Nicaraguan relations, then why is a continuation of
the El Salvador conflict an obstacle?
CASTRO: If I were the Sandinistas, I would feel in a difficult
moral position in having to sacrifice the Salvadoran revolutionaries.
SOLARZ: Haven't they already done that in effect, by pledging not
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to supply arms, which the FMLN allegedly doesn't need anyway? Why is
there such a moral sacrifice?
CASTRO: For such an agreement, there needs to be simple
reciprocity on the part of the United States [to end its military
supply of the Salvadoran armed forces]. I am saying what I would do if
I were in the Sandinistas' situation. Why Is the US demanding an end
to the supply of arms [by Nicaragua to the FMLN] if it is not
happening?
SOLARZ: I've been to Nicaragua three times. The first two times
it was clear that the Sandinistas did not intend to have Costa
Rican-style elections or to give up power. This time [three days ago]
I spoke to Carlos Nunez. . . .
CASTRO: And you asked about giving up power if they lost, and he
said yes. They told me about it. "If we lose the elections, we are
not worthy to remain in power." That was a very sincere response.
SOLARZ: I thought Nunez handled himself very well.
CASTRO: They were very pleased with your visit.
SOLARZ: Our ambassador was with me. He said that this was the
most significant discussion he's heard yet from the Sandinistas. I
will report on my conversation when I return to Washington, and I hope
it will have an impact. What Nunez said was meant to assuage the
United States and the other countries of Central America. Do you think
it will facilitate progress in Contadora?
CASTRO: Nunez spoke logically and candidly. You said that before
they were unwilling to have a Costa-Rica style election. Now they have
decided to hold classical, traditional elections--very strange
elections as in Peru, Venezuala--with a direct vote for president.
This is a great challenge. I think their approach is correct, and they
need not fear the challenge. I think they have the people's support
and will win. It is a concession.
SOLARZ: A fundamental change.
CASTRO: It will become a weapon against the United States.
SOLARZ: My question is, what accounts for this change?
CASTRO: I think a whole set of factors are at work. The
Sandinistas face threats and aggression. They need the support from
Latin America, Europe, the Socialist International and public opinion.
They have taken three steps: increased their ability to resist
aggression; made initiatives internationally; and taken a number of
measures domestically to increase unity (the amnesty, and a more
moderate position toward the Church and toward business). This
represents a defense of their revolution. The Sandinistas can do this
because they havethe support of the majority of the population. The
US made a mistake regarding the Sandinistas. If you had left them
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alone, without an embargo, sabotage, and support for the contras, they
would have had to face their revolution alone. They would be-weaker,
with more problems to face in the economic and social sphere. Having
been attacked from the outside, they were able to mobilize public and
national sentiment and have grown stronger as a result. Who better
than I knows the domestic uses to which external aggression can be put?
The United States is strengthening the Nicaraguan revolution. External
threats and aggression increase patriotism, and other problems are
forgotten.
SOLARZ: What you're saying is that Ronald Reagan in the the tenth
member of the Directorate.
CASTRO: Yes, in a way.
SOLARZ: Or the Sandinistas have a mole in the White House. Can
the Sandinista revolution survive without the spread of revolution?
CASTRO: Yes, the spread of revolution is not necessay.
SOLARZ: Do the Sandinistas believe that?
CASTRO: You asked me for my opinion. Look at our situation. We
are not in danger if other countries have arms. We are not thinking of
invading other countries. We are tranquil. But when invasion is a
threat, sometimes revolutionaries go crazy. Take Coard for example.
He started out being ninety percent genius and ten percent crazy but
ended up ten percent genius and ninety percent crazy!
SOLARZ: Let's turn to the political situation in Salvador. The
government of El Salvador wants the guerrillas to lay down their arms
and participate in elections. As long as the death squads exist that
is an absurd proposal. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect
the government to accept an interim government with power sharing.
What is your formula for a political solution?
CASTRO: I think this is the key. Regarding El Salvador, the
revolutionaries are quite strong. In 1981 there were only a few
hundred of them, without experience or unity. Now there are thousands
with great experience, with a mystic (?) fighting experience. They are
invincible. The government forces cannot defeat them. The Kissinger
Report said there were about nine to ten thousand of them. That's
about right, but they have experience. Why hasn't the government
fallen? The government is like a coat on a hanger. As long as the
hanger of US support continues, the coat will continue hanging; once
the hanger is removed, the coat collapses. If there is an American
intervention, however, the war won't be over. The FMLN would hav
support and national spirit.
SOLARZ: There is another problem. If the guerrillas are on the
verge of victory.... . .
CASTRO: I know what you going to say. An imminent victory would
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7-
lead to US Intervention. But Ronald Reagan would not be able to
suppress the resistance. On the other hand, why do the Salvadoran
revolutionaies now want to negotiate if they can win the war? They
know that US intervention would be very costly and destructive, but
they are not afraid to fight if it's necessary. It is not easy to
reach a conclusion about the need to talk. The Cubans and Sandinistas
have be talking a long time. But the Salvadorans are aware of the
costs of a US intervention. They are now more unified and better
equipped. I haven't spoken to the leaders recently. The five leaders
have been in Salvador for awhile. That's good and bad. They would be
willing to have a negotiated solution.
The government forces are demoralized. Many people in the army
are in favor of not having the elections. They are angry with the
elections. They regard then as a disaster which is dividing the
country and polarizing the forces between D'Aubisson and Duarte. They
don't have sympathy for either candidate. They want to cancel the
elections, form a provincial government, and start negotiations with
the guerrillas. The US is probably aware of this. The military is
frustrated with the elections. A political settlement is more likely.
The military is conscious of how much the situation has deteriorated
materially and psychologically.
SOLARZ: I have just come from Salvador. I talked with Vides
Casanova, with Blandon, with Bustillo, with the heads of the security
forces. I didn't pick up a hint of this. I spoke to American military
advisers, to regional commanders of the armed forces, to General
Woerner, and to our intelligence people in Washington. This was not
suggested by anyone.
CASTRO: I cannot present the evidence on this, but remember what
I have said. I wouldn't fabricate it. You'll find out.
CASTRO: I don't mean all. . . . People in key positions would
not dare say this to you or me.
SOLARZ: If the military keeps this to themselves and the
elections proceed, what are the prospects of a settlement on the terms
the FMLN has put forward, since they are strong?
CASTRO: If D'Aubisson wins, I don't know. If Duarte wins, it's
perhaps more likely. But the situation is complicated. If the reports
of polarization are true--that there is an intense, divisive struggle--
then the government is weakened. Disagreements mean that the
Constituent Assembly hasn't worked. The military is terrified with the
prospect of elections. I don't know if the same thing will happen in
Nicaragua [??]. I know what the FMLN thought two years ago. Perhaps
it would be more diplomatic to appear more flexible. I can't talk on
their behalf, but I don't think they will want less than a provisional
government, with positions and not laying down their arms. The
Janauary 1982 proposal was a strategic--not tactical--move,
demonstrating their desire for reforms, for guarantees for the people,
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for elections, and for a mixed economy. It suggested that more radical
change would be postponed.
SOLARZ: There has been one important change recently that may
have had an effect on the FMLN's attitude. That Is the
Administration's intention to ask for a substantial increase in
military aid. In that context, why should the government forces fold
it they think they are going to get more money?
CASTRO: They are demoralized. They can't get people to fight.
It happened here in Cuba. Even though Batista's army was larger than
the Salvadoran forces today, it got demoralized. And the FMLN is
larger and more experienced than we were in 1959.
SOLARZ: There seem to be two options for a political settlement.
The first is an interim government which would create conditions for
the holding of elections after several months. The second is a
provisional government that would not hold elections for several years.
Which of these options does the FMLN want? Is it willing to accept
power sharing with elections soon?
CASTRO: We need to clarify that the Salvadoran military is not
speaking of power sharing. It is talking of cancelling the elections,
forming a provisional government, and beginning negotiations. There is
no easy answer to your question. I don't know how the revolutionaries
think. From my point of view, a provisional government should delay
elections for a while so it can institute reforms. If elections occur
before conditions are right, the old forces reemerge.
SOLARZ: But there is another possibility. Vice-President Bush
has told the government of El Salvador that it has to crack down on the
death squads. This is a very significant development. For two years,
while 30,000 people were killed, Ronald Reagan did nothing. But once
the administration realized that Congress would not provide the money,
they had no choice. Bush's intervention may not work. But if it is
successful, it opens up the possibility of a political settlement based
not on power sharing but on elections with specified guarantees.
CASTRO: I don't think the revolutionaries would accept that.
Elections aren't just elections. They require organizations, parties,
and certain machinery. The FMLN is fighting now. It can't change so
fast. That's unrealistic.
SOLARZ: I would like to turn now to US-Cuban relations. How
desirable would normalization be?
CASTRO: Normalization would be desirable, but it is improbable
with Ronald Reagan as president. His mentality is one of promises and
threats. We do not trust his sincerity. This was obvious concerning
Grenada. I sent a message to the United States on the Saturday before
the invasion. The reply, on Tuesday, informed us of the attack after
it had already started. Then there was another message regarding the
landing of the 82nd Airborne, after it occurred. We do not trust
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Reagan. He is not serious. Even until 1988 we will not trust him.
SOLARZ: You have said that revolution cannot be exported or
prevented. Would a United States promise to normalize relations and
lift the embargo and a Cuban promise to not actively support (that is,
provide material assistance to) revolutionary movements an acceptable
basis for negotiation?
CASTRO: 'Up until now, we have had a militant attitude regarding
revolutionary movements. This is not a question of doctrine but of
practicality. Blockaded as we have been, we have no choice but to
fight. There has been a change: what was previously a total
commitment is now only partial. Relations have improved. We would
pursue norms of mutual respect such as we have with Mexico. Our
activities have declined and our attitude is less militant. Even
though we want revolutions, there is no need to accelerate the process.
Revolution cannot be exported or prevented. It is due-to objective
factors. We have a consistent policy of peaceful coexistence based on
principles of international relations. The only possible exception
would be support for South African patriots. In answer to your
question, we would abide by the principles of international relations
and not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. In the
past, we have responded to actions taken against us--the blockade,
counterrevolutionary activities. We felt an obligation to do so.
SOLARZ: Is it all right for me to say publicly what you have just
told me?
CASTRO: It depends on how you say it. It is better to keep it
off-the-record.because of the press treatment.
SOLARZ: What if I said that normalization on such a basis was
possible?
CASTRO: If you put it in terms of an absoluted respect for non-
interference in the internal affairs of other countries, it's okay.
SOLARZ: Concerning the people who came in the Marcel exodus, some
are technically excludable under US immigration law. Could you take
them back?
CASTRO: That would have to be dealt with in the context of
normalized relations. But it is not a precondition. The United States
demanded unilaterally that we accept them, like a precondition.
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SOLARZ: In Cuba there are a number of political prisoners. If
the US accepted them, would you release them?
I^7
CASTRO: Once we released 2,000 of such prisoners, thinking there
was a commitment to take them. But the United States didn't accept
them. Let's wait until the Democrats are in power.
[Solarz then raised the case of two Cuban Jews, surnamed Mitrani,
whose application to leave Cuba had been stalled inexplicably. Castro
promised that the authorities would look into the case.]
CASTRO: We once released a number of Americans who were in jail
here on drug charges. Then the US government mounted a narcotics-
related propaganda campaign against us. Now we won't release such
people even if we are asked.
SOLARZ: Rest assured that I will never ask you to release a drug
dealer.
CASTRO: We solved the problem of highjackings but the US has
never paid us back.
[Solarz then asked Castro to consider a proposal brought by Bernie
Nussbaum for an American chess club to come and play in Cuba. Castro
promised to do so.)
CASTRO: What's going to happen to all the money the Kissinger
Commission is asking? I think it will be stolen.
SOLARZ: Before it can be stolen, the money has to be authorized
and appropriated. But I seriously doubt that such a large sum will be
approved by the Congress.
CASTRO: I have often thought that if I were in the unpopular
position the United States is in, I would stop being the gendarme of
the world and allow the world to develop. The arms race is crazy: why
invest money in it? Why can't the United States accept the changes?
Why not give the money to countries that can use it? We are a leader
in the field of public health. We are already sending health workers
overseas. Our children have access to pediatric intensive care units.
But look at our limited resources. We are not an oil-producing
country. We are graduating professors but not all are employed (some
are teaching and some are studying). Why is the United States so
afraid of Cuba? The problem is in the type of relations that the US
has with a country like ours. The US wants to buy other countries. It
is only the revolutionary countries will not be bought.
SOLARZ: Cuba has made a number of accomplishments in the last
twenty-five years. Have there been any failures in the revolution?
CASTRO: We have made mistakes, due to our ambitious desire to
jump over stages of development. We have rectified those mistakes. We
have accomplished more than we expected. The mood in the country is
good. We have 4.5 percent growth in 1983. We have good distribution.
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NUSBAUM: Do you think it was wise for the Soviet Union to break
off the nuclear arms talks?
CASTRO: That was the least they could do. Remember how the
United States felt when the Soviets put forty-two missiles in Cuba.
The Soviet reaction to the placement of over five hundred missiles in
Western Europe should be no surprise. Not to break off the talks would
have been to play into Ronald Reagan's hand. Sixty percent of people
polled [in the US?] thought that not enough had been done [to reach an
agreement ??J.
The United States gets nervous with political changes. It feels
an obligation to buy those countries (Cuba and Nicaragua for example).
Why can't the US have relations with countries which have had
revolutions on the basis of mutual respect? You have bought Egypt.
Relations with China are good after years of threats. Why not with
other socialist countries? Why does the US want to be a gendarme? Why
not give the world to the Soviet Union?
SOLARZ: Has Cuba reduced its troops in Ethiopia?
CASTRO: Off the record: we feel that the number of troops in
Ethiopia were no longer necessary and have tried to reduce them. We
have transfered them to Angola, due to aggression from South Africa.
SOLARZ: I understand that you met with leaders of ARDE. Did
anything come of it?
CASTRO: The meeting occurred at their request. It took place at
the time that US actions in Central America were intensifying and that
the FDN was attacking. They wanted to make contact with the
Sandinistas. We told the Sandinistas, but they didn't trust the
contacts and made a decision not to have talks.
SOLARZ: What do you think of Eden Pastore?
CASTRO: He does not have a good political attitude. He's
unstable. He's a caudillo. He is courageous but like a computer. In
1979 he was calculating about the future. Then he went to Guatamala on
a Che-like mission. He ended up as a counterrevolutionary.
SOLARZ: What about Napoleon Duarte?
CASTRO: I don't know him personally. Politically I don't like
SOLARZ: What would have happened had the US not invaded Grenada?
CASTRO: Grenada would have been isolated from all the
revolutionary movements of the world. They would have gotten no help.
They would not have been able to sustain themselves in power. Coard
and Austin destroyed the revolution. As for Cuba, we would have
finished the airport, as we promised to do, and then provided no more
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_c.
help. Our statement at the time of the coup was tough.
SOLARZ: I had mixed feelings about Grenada. I believe that it
was a violation of international law. I spoke out against it, which
was not very popular. On the other hand, I have the impression that
the majority of the Grenadan people welcomed the US Intervention.
CASTRO: They had undergone tremendous trauma because of the
killing. Their nationalistic feeling is not well developed. The
reacted to the killing of Bishop. We will have to see how they feel
about the US intervention later.
That doesn't excuse the United States. It was an easy victory.
The US action was understandable after Vietnam, Iran, and Beirut.
Reagan's action in Grenada can be presented as a political victory.
But what did he gain? What could he do vis-a-vis Nicaragua or Cuba?
We are stronger because of Grenada. We have half a million more
people. . . .[??] When Hitler went into Austria and Czechoslovakia,
the German people were proud. Hitler used patriotism effectively.
SOLARZ: Have you met Andropov?
CASTRO: Yes. He is a serious-minded person. He is composed and
well prepared. He was the best selection possible.
CASTRO: We did as much as possible to help Carter. The Iranians
are to blame for Reagan's victory. They first knocked out Kennedy and
then Carter. I think that perhaps Kennedy would have been a better
candidate. Carter is not blameable for the hostages. We made
gestures. The Mariel issue was solved. Prisoners were released
unilaterally. We sent back highjackers,.-which we had not done before.
US-Cuban relations were much better with Carter. We cannot deal with
Ronald Reagan. We are willing to wait for one year or five years. We
do not have illusions.
[Castro then proposed that Solarz undertake a secret mission (with
the approval of the State Department and Vides Casanova) to meet with
the leaders of the FMLN, to hear their views'directly. Solarz said he
would consider it.]
[The conversation concluded at 10:45 p.m.]
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