BACKGROUND PAPER: NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00831R000100210054-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: July 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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COMIREX FILE COPY
BACKGROUND PAPER:
NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP
AND
SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION
Gulf of Mexico
Pacific Ocean
Caribbean Sea
Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense
July 18, 1984
Washington. D.C.
''-) Atlantic Ocean
Miami
6 ~)
It - The Bahamas
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BACKGROUND PAPER:
NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP
AND
SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION
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SUMMARY
The Sandinista leaders of Nicaragua have sought to project
an image of themselves as "nationalist revolutionaries."
Unfortunately for their immediate neighbors, the day-to-day
reality of the Sandinistas' behavior does not match the moderate
image that many who live far from the reality still perceive.
This report examines Sandinista words and actions from the July
19, 1979, seizure of power to the present, particularly as they
relate to Nicaragua's military power, ties to Cuba and other
communist countries, and relations with guerrillas and
subversive groups in neighboring countries.
The picture that emerges is troubling. The Sandinista
leaders understood in 1979 that their plans for establishing a
Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Nicaragua would arouse
resistance among their neighbors and in the United States. They
also knew that blatant revelation of their Marxist-Leninist
orientation would tend to reduce the amount of aid they could
expect from the West. During visits of Westerners to Managua
and in their own travels abroad, the Sandinistas masked their
real intentions. Nevertheless, they have worked quietly and
steadily toward their objectives of building the power of the
state security apparatus, building the strongest armed forces in
Central America, and becoming a center for exporting subversion
to Nicaragua's neighbors. The Sandinistas believed that they
would have to expand their revolution to the rest of Central
America or see it defeated. They chose expansion.
In less than five years the Sandinistas have built the
largest and best equipped military force in Central America.
About 240 tanks and armored vehicles, surface-to-air missiles,
152mm howitzers and 122mm multiple rocket launchers give it a
mobility and firepower capacity unmatched in the region.
(Honduras, for example, has a total of 16 armored vehicles.)
Nicaragua has a 48,800-man armed force. A total of about
100,000 men have been trained and could be mobilized rapidly.
The rapid growth of Nicaraguan military strength could not
have been possible without the help of about 3,000 Cuban
military-security advisers, some of whom are deeply involved in
the decision-making process in Nicaragua. A total of about
9,000 Cubans are in Nicaragua. In addition, the Soviet Union,
East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and
Libya have military and/or civilian advisers in Nicaragua.
Also, international groups, including the PLO, Argentine
Montoneros, Uruguayan Tupamaros, and the Basque ETA all have
offices or representatives in Nicaragua.
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The subversive system that seeks to destabilize neighboring
democratic governments includes communications centers for
Salvadoran guerrillas, safehouses, arms depots, vehicle shops,
training camps for guerrillas, and assistance in transporting
military supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas via air, land, and
sea. El Salvador has been the principal target of guerrillas
and Nicaraguan-sponsored subversion, but Costa Rica and Honduras
have also been subjected to armed attacks, bombings, attempted
assassinations and other violent activity.
The threat from Nicaragua to the democratic governments of
Central America and the support system Nicaragua maintains for
guerrillas are all the more formidable because behind Nicaragua,
providing support, are Cuba and the Soviet Union.
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NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP
AND
SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION
Sandinista Strategy in 1979: Two Faces to the World
The Largest Armed Force in Central America 8
Nicaragua's Armor Units and Artillery:
An Offensive Capability?
The Sandinista Directorate's Marxist-Leninist Nature and
Close Ties with Communist Governments
Creation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN)
The Nicaraguan Supply Operations for the Salvadoran
Guerrillas
Sources of FMLN Armaments
Training, Communications, and Staging of the FMLN
The Honduran Front
Introducing Political Violence into Costa Rica
The International Connection
The Significance of the Subversive Network
Conclusions
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Introduction
When the Sandinistas and other anti-Somoza Nicaraguans
seized power in Nicaragua in July 1979, people in the United
States and elsewhere tended to believe Sandinista public
pledges to have genuine democracy in Nicaragua and to live at
peace with neighboring countries. Nicaragua's clear need at
the time was to restore its economic health so that its people
could begin to enjoy a better life. Its neighbors were not
hostile; indeed two of them--Panama and Costa Rica--had helped
in the struggle against the Somoza regime. In 1979 and 1980,
the U.S. Government, as evidence of its good will, granted
Nicaragua the largest economic assistance program provided to
any Central American country at that time.
The Sandinista leaders tried initially to maintain a
moderate image in the United States and elsewhere in the
Western world. In the two months before taking power in July
1979, Sandinista leaders in various public pronouncements
pledged adherence to non-alignment in foreign policy and
pledged to hold elections, to guarantee human rights, and to
permit private enterprise to continue.1 In their early
meetings with U.S. Administration officials, members of the
Congress, and non-government groups, the Sandinistas sought to
portray their regime as non-aligned and not patterned after
Cuba or the Soviet Union.
Evidence that the Sandinistas have not lived up to their
original promises has steadily mounted. Step by step, they
have become a menace to their neighbors and to the Nicaraguan
people. Although most Central Americans no longer harbor
illusions about the Sandinistas,2 some people in the United
States and elsewhere still think of the Sandinistas as
1"Nicaraguan Rebels Soften Stand on National Guard," New
York Times, July 12, 1979, p. A-14.
2A public opinion poll, commissioned by the U.S.
Information Agency, was conducted by an experienced Costa Rican
affiliate of Gallup International in 1983. Using standard
Gallup sampling and questioning procedures, the poll was
carried out in the capitals of El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Costa Rica. (Nicaragua does not permit
independent public opinion surveys.) The results of the poll
suggest that Nicaragua is perceived as a military threat by the
people of neighboring countries, and Cuba is seen as a tool of
the Soviet Union. Both countries are viewed as destabilizing
the area, especially by respondents in Costa Rica and
Honduras. For full results of the survey, and notes on
methodology, see the November 20-24, 1983, editions of La
Nacion International, San Jose, Costa Rica.
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idealistic and nationalistic revolutionaries. This view is
illusory. Behind the facade of friendship and moderation very
different plans were being made, despite the honeymoon the
Sandinista leaders were enjoying with the democratic world. In
just under five years the pattern of their actions and policies
shows an image very different from what they sought to project
in 1979.
In his weekly radio address of April 14, 1984, President
Reagan noted that:
? Central America has become the stage for a bold
attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua to
install communism, by force, throughout this
hemisphere.
? Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador are being
threatened by a Soviet-bloc and Cuban-supported
Sandinista army and security force in Nicaragua that
has grown from about 10,000 under the previous
government, to more than 100,000 in less than five
years.
? In 1983 the Soviet bloc delivered over $100 million
in military hardware. The Sandinistas have
established a powerful force of artillery, multiple
rocket-launchers, and tanks in an arsenal that
exceeds that of the other countries in the region.
? Our friends in the region face subversion from across
their borders that undermines their democratic
development and wrecks their economies. This
subversion has been felt by all of Nicaragua's
neighbors.
? El Salvador, struggling to hold democratic elections
and improve the conditions of its people, has been
the main target of Nicaragua's covert aggression.
? The region also contains millions of people who want
and deserve to be free. We cannot turn our backs on
this crisis at our doorstep. Nearly 23 years ago
President Kennedy warned against the threat of
communist penetration in our hemisphere.
The following report elaborates on two of the three aspects
of Sandinista behavior mentioned by President Reagan: the arms
build-up and export of subversion to other countries in the
region, and the Cuban/Soviet involvement in both of these
areas. (The third area is that of internal repression.)
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The public record of the past five years in Central America
contains extensive evidence of the Sandinista military build-up,
links to the Cubans and other communist countries, and support
for guerrillas. We have cited Sandinista documents, press
reports, and interviews with captured guerrillas and defectors
in preparing this report, but intelligence sources also have
provided thousands of pieces of information that support the
conclusions in this report. We have not, however, cited
specific intelligence reports because of the potential
consequences of revealing sources and methods. Statistics
provided herein, such as the number of tanks in the Sandinista
arsenal, are based on intelligence information, unless specific
sources are identified.
The availability of enough supplies and money to keep
10,000 guerrillas fighting in El Salvador is in itself strong
evidence of outside support. What has been lacking in the past
has been a systematic compilation of available evidence. In
this report we provide details--and a framework--for analyzing
the Nicaraguan military build-up and support for subversion in
Central America. There is little in this report that alone is
sensational, but the sum total adds up to a composite picture of
Nicaragua's involvement as a support system for advancing
communism in Central America.
Privately the Sandinistas and Castro have admitted their
involvement to diplomats and others. During an interview in
1982 with Stephen S. Rosenfeld of the Washington Post,
Nicaragua's Foreign minister admitted that arms and supplies
were flowing through Nicaragua to Salvadoran guerrillas but he
denied that the flow was "substantial" and that it was
authorized.3
The body of intelligence documenting Nicaraguan and Cuban
involvement in subversion and support for guerrillas active in
Central America has been reviewed by the Senate and House Select
Intelligence Committees. In May 1983, the House Intelligence
Committee, after reviewing the intelligence-based evidence and
finding it convincing, reported:
3Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Sandinistas Call it War,"
Washington Post, March 8, 1982, p. A-13.
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It is not popular support that sustains the
insurgents. As will be discussed later, this
insurgency depends for its life blood--arms,
ammunition, financing, logistics and
command-and-control facilities--upon outside
assistance from Nicaragua and Cuba. This
Nicaraguan-Cuban contribution to the Salvadoran
insurgency is longstanding. It began shortly after
the overthrow of Somoza in July 1979. It has
provided--by land, sea and air--the great bulk of
military equipment and support received by the
.insurgents.4
Evidence obtained from intelligence continues to reveal
Nicaraguan involvement in providing Salvadoran guerrilla groups
with material, command and control support, and safe haven.
Sandinista Strategy in 1979: Two Faces to the World
When the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN)
was mounting its struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, its
leaders were careful to present: themselves to the public and
governments of the Western world as "nationalist
revolutionaries" struggling against a right-wing dictatorship,
somewhat reminiscent of the "Robin Hood" image that Fidel
Castro tried to project 20 years earlier. Indeed, Castro, who
in restrospect apparently felt that he had shown his true
Marxist-Leninist colors too early after his seizure of power,
consistently advised the Sandinista leaders to go slow in
showing their Marxism-Leninism to avoid scaring Western donors
and provoking a strong United States reaction before their
4U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, Report to Accompany H.R. 2760, 98th Cong., 1st
Session, 1983, Rept. 98-122, Part 1, p. 2.
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rule could be consolidated. He also advised them to
consolidate their revolution quickly. Sandinista leaders made
strenuous efforts to get a broad array of international
backing. They travelled repeatedly to the United States to
lobby in favor of the large economic assistance package that
the Carter Administration had presented to Congress. They
sought to convince United States Government and private sector
leaders of their moderate nature.5
It is now clear that the strategy of the hardline Marxist-
Leninists among the Sandinistas was one of deceiving the
outside world. They knew that their policies would eventually
generate resistance from their neighbors and the United
States. But in the meantime they were deliberately seeking to
cultivate favor and support among sympathetic people in the
U.S. Government, Congress, private sector, religious community,
and others both to hide their true nature and to delay eventual
alienation. Reportedly the Sandinistas hoped that a confused
and deeply divided American public opinion would immobilize
United States policy responses toward Nicaragua as the
Sandinistas built up their military power, supported subversion
and guerrillas in neighboring countries, and installed the
internal security apparatus of a totalitarian state.6
Most of the Sandinista rank and file, and some former
Sandinista leaders, such as Eden Pastora Gomez, or Commander
Zero as he is popularly known, appear to be genuine
nationalists. But the nine members of the Sandinista National
Directorate, the center of power in Nicaragua today, are all
Marxist-Leninists. Soon after the July 19, 1979, victory, the
non-communist leaders and supporters of the revolution began to
be put aside by the Marxists. The issue was clear: The nine
comandantes had begun, slowly but surely, to establish a
Marxist-Leninist regime. Had the world been listening earlier,
it might have anticipated the Sandinistas' intentions. One of
the founders of the Sandinista movement, Carlos Fonseca Amador,
5For a more complete analysis of Nicaraguan strategy,
see Ernest Evans, "Revolutionary Movements in Central America:
The Development of a New Strategy," Howard J. Wiarda, ed., Rift
and Revolution (Wash., D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1984) pp. 177-180.
61bid.
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sent a message to the 1971 Congress of the Soviet Communist
Party in which he referred to the FSLN as "the successor of
the Bolshevik October revolution" and went on to state that
"the ideals of the immortal Lenin are a guiding star in the
struggle."7
From the outset, the Sandinista leaders in private
regarded the United States as an enemy. This was evident in
the Sandinistas' first major policy and planning document,
prepared two months after their July 19, 1979, seizure of
power.. In that document they identified the United States as
the "rabid enemy" of peoples struggling for "national
liberation" and referred to the Nicaraguan middle class as the
"traitorous bourgeoisie." Although the document focused on
consolidating their power internally, it also discussed
strengthening the Central American, Latin American, and
worldwide revolution.8
Arturo Cruz Sequeira, a Sandinista government official
who was intimately familiar with the thinking of the top FSLN
leadership, confirms that, given the Sandinistas' long-term
revolutionary goals for the region, conflict with Nicaragua's
neighbors and the United States was inevitable:
According to the National Directorate, a region as small
as Central America allowed, for only one of two options: a
revolutionary solution for the entire region, given the
"ripple effect" of the Nicaraguan revolution, or the
eventual defeat of Nicaragua. Thus, the detente with
Honduras at the beginning of the revolution could only be
temporary. To the comandantes, it was not even certain
that friendly relations would continue with Costa Rica
and Panama. The new Nicaragua could not expect favorable
inter-national public opinion indefinitely. The
Nicaraguan advance toward socialism, and the country's
7"Central America's Guerrillas Aren't 'Robin Hoods,'"
Human Events, March 31, 1979, p. 16.
8This 36-page document, formally titled "Analysis of
the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista Peoples'
Revolution," dated October 5, 1979, is also known as the
"72-Hour Document." It reported in detail on an extraordinary
meeting September 21-23, 1979, of the top leadership of the
Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). It outlined
the situation.in Nicaragua and the world as the Sandinista
leaders saw it and set forth their plans for consolidating the
revolution.
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ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba would, sooner or later,
alienate the European social democrats, American liberals,
and even regional governments such as Venezuela and
Mexico.9
The Sandinistas constantly seek to portray the build-up of
their armed forces as a reaction to the policies of the Reagan
Administration and to the Nicaraguan opposition. The truth is
quite different. The Sandinistas were launched on their present
path long before 1981. Many Nicaraguans who now oppose the
Sandinistas were active in the struggle against Somoza and tried
to collaborate with the Sandinistas during the post-1979 period.
Some of the present anti-Sandinista leaders who were members of
the post-1979 leadership--Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora are
examples--did not oppose the Sandinistas until the military
build-up was well underway and the Sandinistas showed no
intention of allowing a democratic system, including peaceful
opposition, to develop.
In an Op-Ed article written for the New York Times, in
mid-1982, Eden Pastora outlined the reasons he broke with the
Sandinistas:
I left the Government in mid-1981. I had tried in vain
to convince the Sandinista leaders of the need to
adhere to the principles of the revolution. As the
situation continued to deteriorate I began in April
this year (1982] to speak out publicly against
Nicaragua's new dictatorship....
To ensure its control over the nation, the Directorate
has set up a powerful secret police apparatus with the
help of foreigners, most of them East German or Cuban
agents. This local version of the Gestapo spies on
citizens and arrests those it deems enemies of the
state. Today in Nicaragua there is terror where there
was once bright hope.10
9Arturo Cruz Sequeira, "The Origins of Sandinista
Foreign Policy," in Robert S. Leiken, ed., Central America:
Anatomy of Conflict (Wash., D.C.: Pergamon Institute,
Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1984), p. 104. (Cruz Sequeira
is the son of Arturo Jose Cruz Parros, former junta member
and later Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States.)
10"Tyranny of Far Left or Far Right? Nicaraguan Sees
Another Choice," New York Times, July 14, 1982, p. A-23.
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The Largest Armed Force in Central America
An immediate priority of the Sandinistas after
July 19, 1979, was to transform their guerrilla force of about
6,000 men into a conventional army and concurrently to develop
large militia and reserve forces. The "72-hour Document" of
October 1979 made clear the Sandinista intention to build a
powerful military force.
After nearly five years of effort, the Sandinistas have
increased the number of their troops on active duty--army, air
force, navy, active reserves, and militia--to some 48,800.11
In addition, they are continuing to expand the militia and have
enacted a nationwide universal military service law. All told,
the armed strength available to Nicaragua, if fully mobilized
and including the reserves, is over 100,000.
Concurrently, with the rapid increase in the number of men
under arms, the Sandinistas have more than doubled the number
of major military installations. The configuration of most of
these installations clearly indicates the Soviet/Cuban
influence. Dozens of smaller military facilities have also
been built or converted from former civilian use.
Nicaragua's Armor Units and Artillery: An Offensive Capability?
Nicaragua now has about 100 Soviet medium tanks
(T-54,/T-55), over 20 light amphibious tanks (PT-76), and 120
other armored vehicles. Two deliveries of tanks and APCs on
Bulgarian ships this year have more than doubled the size of
Nicaragua's tank and mechanized forces since May 1983.12 By
contrast, Honduras has 16 armored reconnaissance vehicles.
These are not amphibious and cannot carry personnel other than
crew members. Costa Rica has no army, much less any tanks, and
El Salvador, while having a few dozen armored personnel
carriers, does not have tanks. Nicaragua also has increased
l1The National Guard of Anastasio Somoza numbered about
7,500 in peacetime and about 14,000 at the height of the
1978-79 civil war.
12"More Soviet Weapons Landed in Nicaragua", Washington
Times, June 5, 1984, p. A-1.
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its inventory of other military vehicles sharply. During the
first six months of 1984, the U.S. Government noted the arrival
in Nicaragua of over 200 military trucks, about 300 jeeps, plus
smaller numbers of other vehicles and spare parts. In 1983,
Nicaragua received nearly 500 trucks, over 500 jeeps, and about
100 other vehicles. East Germany alone.has provided more than
1,000 trucks since 1980. The Soviets have supplied at least
six heavy ferries to give additional amphibious mobility to the
Nicaraguan armed forces. With these ferries, the
non-amphibious tanks could be taken across rivers or other
bodies of water.
We have confirmed the deployment of almost 50 Soviet 152mm
and 122mm howitzers in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have
received at least 24 122mm multiple rocket launchers from
Soviet-bloc suppliers. The rocket launchers and howitzers, in
addition to the 240 tanks and armored vehicles, give Nicaragua
a firepower and mobility unmatched in the region, and the
amphibious ferries provide a water-crossing capability for the
armor force.13
Until 1982, Soviet deliveries of weapons to the
Sandinistas were made primarily via Algeria, from which they
were transshipped on commercial cargo vessels, perhaps to mask
Moscow's deep involvement in Nicaragua. Since late 1982,
however, arms shipments from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria have
been primarily in their own and other bloc country ships.
The Sandinista Air Arm
In addition to the land forces build-up, the Sandinistas
have put together the foundation for a strong air force. They
have about 120 Soviet-made anti-aircraft guns and at least 700
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. They have about ten MI-8
helicopters and six AN-2 light transport aircraft received from
the Soviet bloc. Despite initial Soviet and Sandinista claims
that the helicopters were for civilian use, they have been
armed and camouflaged and are flying military missions against
the anti-Sandinista and Indian insurgents.
13Nicaragua's neighbors cannot help but note that parts
of their borders with Nicaragua are demarked by rivers and that
in other places rivers run close to the frontiers and would
have to be forded in the event of a Nicaraguan attack.
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The Sandinistas have received four Italian-made trainer/
tactical support aircraft, we believe from Libya. These
airplanes are armed with machine guns and have been used in
combat operations against anti-Sandinistas. They also have
received helicopters from Libya, and about 20 Libyan pilots and
mechanics. The Sandinistas have formed a new airborne special
troop battalion. Two Soviet-made AN-26 transport planes arrived
in April 1983.
Preparations for using Soviet fighter aircraft in Nicaragua
have been underway for more than three years. In 1980, a first
group of Nicaraguans reportedly was sent to Eastern Europe for
flight training in MiGs. Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) pilots and mechanics have been in Nicaragua, reportedly to
provide assistance to the Nicaraguan Air Force. Aircraft
revetments to handle high-performance military aircraft have
been completed at Sandino airfield outside Managua, and runway
extensions and improvements continue at Puerto Cabezas. A new
military airfield at Punta Huete, when completed, will have the
longest runway in Central America (3,200 meters), and will be
capable of receiving any aircraft in the Soviet inventory. (See
photo.)
Thus a basis has been laid for the receipt of modern jet
fighters and for accommodating large military planes, such as
heavy transport planes and Soviet "Backfire" bombers. If
Nicaragua were to receive MiG fighters, the Sandinistas could
rapidly develop a formidable air force. A Nicaraguan defector
who had been part of the Sandinista security apparatus provided
information on the Sandinistas' consideration of the acquisition
of Soviet MiG fighter aircraft. In discussing the arms
build-up, he said: "There are already assigned MiGs waiting in
Cuba. Nicaraguan pilots who will graduate from schools in
Bulgaria will fly the MiGs."14
A more recent indication that the delivery of MiGs remains
a possibility was a statement by junta leader Daniel Ortega, on
June 1.0, 1984, that Nicaraguan pilots are being trained to fly
14Excerpt from Washington Post interviews with Miguel Bolanos
Hunter, at the Heritage Foundation, June 16-17, 1983. For
statements from Defense Minister Humberto Ortega in 1982 saying that
Nicaragua was pushing forward with plans to acquire Soviet MiG or
French. Mirage fighters, see "Nicaragua Says It Seeks Soviet, French
Planes," Washington Post, July 29, 1982, p. A-1, A-24.
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both MiGs and Mirage fighter aircraft.15 This was followed
June 12 by an editorial in the pro-government El Nuevo Diario,
stating that the Sandinista National Directorate "had resolved"
to use high performance combat aircraft. Undoubtedly, any
delivery of MiGs to Nicaragua would arouse deep concern among
Nicaragua's neighbors and the United'States.
The Cuban Presence and Involvement
The pervasiveness of the Cuban presence led Alfonso Robelo,
a former member of the Sandinista junta, to refer to Nicaragua
as "an occupied country... where no crucial decision is taken
without the approval of the Cubans."
Approximately 9,000 Cubans are now in Nicaragua. Of these,
some 3,000 are military and security personnel attached to the
Nicaraguan armed forces and to internal security and
intelligence organizations, from the general staff down to
individual battalions. The rapid build-up of Nicaraguan
military strength from 1979 to the present could not have been
possible without the presence of the Cuban military/security
advisers and large-scale arms and equipment shipments from the
Soviet Union. Other Soviet-bloc governments, radical regimes
such as Libya, and groups including the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), have also made significant contributions to
the growth and training of Nicaragua's armed forces.
Although only about 3,000 of the Cubans in Nicaragua are
assigned directly to military/security positions, many others
have had military training and could be mobilized to form part
of an armed force, just as happened in Grenada. For example,
the 2,000 Cubans sent to Nicaragua in mid-1982 have been given
basic military training. Cubans are involved in virtually every
Nicaraguan Government agency and in activities such as teaching,
medicine, and participation in mass organizations.16
15Reported in the daily Barricada, Managua, Nicaragua,
June 11, 1984.
16For a description from public sources of the extent of Cuban
influence in Nicaragua from the perspective of an ex-Sandinista
security official, see the transcript of Miguel Bolanos Hunter's
testimony, October 19, 1983, before the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, as well as Bolanos' interview
with the Washington Post at the Heritage Foundation, June 16-17,
1983. Information on Cuban activities from a different source, a
captured Salvadoran guerrilla leader, is contained in "Cuba Directs
Salvador Insurgency, Former Guerrilla Lieutenant Says," New York
Times, July 28, 1983, p. A-10.
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The Sandinista Directorate's Marxist-Leninist Nature and Close
Ties with Communist Governments
The Sandinista government represents the first triumph of
the generation of Latin American guerrilla fighters trained and
unified by Fidel Castro. The ideological orientation and
backgrounds of key Sandinista leaders leave no question as to
why the ideals of Lenin are a "guiding star" in their struggle.
Tomas Borge Martinez, Nicaragua's interior minister, who
received indoctrination and guerrilla instruction in Cuba,
became "General Coordinator" of the FSLN guerrilla
organization. Thenceforth, Borge was the key liaison with
Cuba. Other beneficiaries of instruction in Cuba on guerrilla
tactics and ideology include the brothers Humberto and Daniel
Ortega Saavedra, Defense Minister and Coordinator of the
government junta, respectively, and Henry Ruiz Hernandez,
Planning Minister.
In early 1979, the FSLN was composed of three groups. One
of these contained some democratic elements. Castro,
dissatisfied with the lack of coordination between the groups,
wanted a unified FSLN command structure. To accomplish this--as
well as the hidden agenda of strengthening the Marxist-Leninist
elements of the FSLN--Castro called Borge and the Ortegas to
several meetings in Havana. Non-Marxist-Leninist FSLN members
were excluded. The message Castro delivered at these meetings
was that a unified command structure would have to be formed
prior to the FSLN's receiving additional Cuban assistance.
The unification of the Sandinista forces in March and April
1979 coincided with the end of Carlos Andres Perez' tenure as
President of Venezuela. Under Perez, the Sandinistas had
received the bulk of their logistical support from Venezuela via
Panama.. In the spring of 1979, Cuba became the Sandinistas'
primary supplier of military assistance, acting through a
logistics network set up near the northern Costa Rican city of
Liberia. At least 21 Cuban aircraft loaded with weapons and
ammunition flew directly from Cuba to Llano Grande Airport in
Liberia. This logistical support was important to the
Sandinistas. It enabled them to take advantage of the Somoza
government's increasingly widespread unpopularity by pushing for
77
a military victory over the disintegrating National Guard.1
17See report of the Special. Committee of the Legislative
Assembly of Costa Rica on Arms Traffic, May 14, 1981.
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Immediately after the Sandinistas and other anti-Somoza
Nicaraguans seized power in July 1979, with the general support
of the populace, more Cuban advisers arrived in Managua. (A
limited number of Cubans were already in Nicaragua assisting
the FSLN clandestinely.) Panamanian offers of military
advisers were rejected. In less than two years, about 600
Cuban military advisers were introduced into Nicaragua, despite
the protests of many non-Marxist leaders who fought with the
Sandinistas against Somoza. Through intelligence sources, the
U.S. Government learned that one of Castro's most experienced
high-ranking officers, General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez, was sent
to Nicaragua in June 1983 to oversee the arms build-up and
strengthen the overall Cuban role. Ochoa had previously
supervised Cuban military activities in Angola and
Ethiopia.18 According to Nicaraguan defectors and other
sources, Cubans have been assigned to key ministries within the
Sandinista government, including Interior and Defense. The
Cuban influence extends beyond participation in the Nicaraguan
security and training apparatus.
In the opinion of at least two Sovietologists, the triumph
of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua signaled a milestone in what
Moscow considered the progressive transformation of the
Caribbean basin, perhaps equal in importance to the victory of
Castro in Cuba. In both cases, according to the same analysts,
the United States was perceived by the Soviets as suffering
humiliating political defeat.19 Evidence of the importance
of Nicaragua is reflected in the following excerpt from a
memorandum of conversation between Soviet Army Chief of Staff
Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov and the Grenadian Army Chief of
Staff: "The Marshal said that over two decades ago, there was
only Cuba in Latin America; today there are Nicaraggua, Grenada,
and a serious battle is going on in El Salvador."20
18For more information on General Arnaldo Ochoa Sanchez
see "Cuban Commander in Nicaragua Post," New York Times,
June 19, 1983, pp. A-1, A-10.
19See Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Soviet
Strategy and Policies in the Caribbean Basin," Howard J.
Wiarda, ed., Rift and Revolution (Wash., D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984), pp.
197-247.
20March 10, 1983, memorandum of conversation between
Soviet Army Chief of General Staff Marshal .Nikolai V. Ogarkov
and Grenadian Army Chief of Staff Einstein Louison, who was
then in the Soviet Union for training.
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Military and/or civilian advisers from the Soviet Union,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Libya, and East
Germany are also active in Nicaragua, albeit in smaller numbers
than the Cubans. Their apparent mission is to build a
Sandinista-controlled political apparatus and to expand
Nicaragua's military and security forces to unprecedented levels.
Crucial to the Central American support system for
subversion in Nicaragua are the officers and representatives of
guerrilla and subversive groups from elsewhere in Latin America,
as well as from the Middle East and Africa. These include the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Argentina's Montoneros,
Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), Spain's
separatist Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), and Uruguay's
Tupamaros. Their numbers are small. The PLO office, equivalent
in status to a diplomatic mission, helped to train the Sandinista
Air Force and serviced military aircraft. NOTE: Although
activities initiated by the PLO in the period 1980-82 have
continued, its severe reversal in southern Lebanon in 1982 and
subsequent events in the Middle East apparently prevented the
initiation of new activities during 1983 and 1984.
Montonero leader Mario Firmenich frequently traveled to
Nicaragua and other Central American countries prior to his
arrest in Brazil in February 1984.21 One of his lieutenants,
Estela Caloni, operated safehouses and propaganda facilities for
the Montoneros in Managua during 1983.2 Caloni also held a
job in the Nicaraguan Government's press office. Nicaraguan
defectors report that veteran Argentine and Chilean guerrillas
serve as instructors at Cuban-staffed training camps for
guerrillas from El Salvador and other Central American countries,
further confirming the fact that the Sandinistas have turned
Nicaragua into a center for insurgency in Central America.
Members of these international organizations are suspected of
having participated in assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and
other violence in neighboring countries, particularly Costa Rica.
21Firmenich has been detained in Rio de Janeiro, pending a
Brazilian Supreme Court decision on an Argentine government
extradition request. We understand that a decision was made
during the week of June 17, 1984, to honor the Argentine
request.
22Miguel Bolanos Hunter interviews with the Washington
Post, June 16-17, 1983, at the Heritage Foundation, and
discussions at the State Department, November 1983.
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Creation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
Anti-government guerrillas in El Salvador are directed by the
Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN). Cuban and
Nicaraguan involvement with the FMLN's main components and
leadership cadres in El Salvador predates the Sandinista rise in
Nicaragua.23 By July 1979, Cuba had trained over 200 guerrillas
of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) faction of the FMLN in
guerrilla warfare tactics.24 Ferman Cienfuegos, leader of
another Salvadoran group, the Armed Forces of National Resistance
(FARN), which engaged in an extensive kidnapping campaign against
the Salvadoran and foreign business community, also met regularly
with Cuban intelligence officers.
During a visit to Mexico in May 1979, Fidel Castro declared
that "Nicaragua and El Salvador will soon fall to guerrilla
forces" and their governments will "take their place in the trash
heap of history."25 At that time the FSLN victory was all but
assured in Nicaragua, and terrorist activity (which preceded
full-scale guerrilla war) in El Salvador was reaching its
peak.26 However, with the launching of agrarian, banking, and
export sector reforms in El Salvador, the leftist groups realized
that the political ground had been cut from beneath them, and by
June 1980 they had turned to war.
23Before the FMLN was formed in 1980, there were five
smaller, independent Salvadoran guerrilla organizations. These
continue as distinct entities but under the umbrella of the FMLN.
The FMLN is named after Farabundo Marti, a Salvadoran communist of
the 1930s who for a time fought alongside Augusto Sandino in
Nicaragua. Sandino, however, who was a nationalist, not a
Marxist, expelled Farabundo Marti from his forces because of
Marti's communist orientation.
24Miguel Bolanos Hunter discussion at the State Department,
November 1983; also see Chicago Tribune, June 27 and July 1, 1979,
for reporting on Cuban involvement.
25Reported on NBC Evening News, May 18, 1979, and in "Will
El Salvador Be the Next to Fall?" Human Events, August 11, 1979.
26Prior to 1980 the five Salvadoran Marxist-Leninist
factions focused on terrorist activities, such as bombing of
public buildings (including supermarkets), bank robberies,
assassinations, and kidnappings for ransom. This effort, which
was centered primarily in urban areas, focused on terrorizing the
populace, raising funds for the guerrilla treasury, and setting
the stage for widespread guerrilla warfare.
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Just as Cuba had done earlier with the Sandinistas, it
conditioned training and material support for the five
Salvadoran guerrilla groups on the formation of a unified
front. Feelings between groups on the Salvadoran extreme left
were antagonistic. Traditionally they had engaged in violent
infighting which sometimes resulted in assassinations within
the guerrilla groups, but they unified to gain Castro's
support. In May 1980, following meetings the previous month of
Salvadoran revolutionary leaders, including Cayetano Carpio of
the Frente Popular de Liberacion (FPL) and Communist Party
Chairman Shafik Handal, as well as top Sandinista and Cuban
officials, the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) was
created. It encompassed both the political and military arms
of the guerrilla alliance.27 In October 1980, the five
guerrilla factions, loosely coordinated under the DRU, took a
step toward closer unity by forming the FMLN.28
One of the top leaders of the Salvadoran guerrillas,
Joaquin Villalobos, in mid-1980 explained the role of Cuba in
the Salvadoran revolution to one of his chief field commanders)
Alejandro Montenegro. Montenegro, who was captured in mid-1982
27Events surrounding the formation of the FMLN were
described in Shafik Handal's diary, which was among documents
captured by the Salvadoran army in 1980. As early as 1979 the
close working relations between Cubans, Sandinistas, and
Salvadoran guerrilla groups were becoming clear. The Cubans
were training both the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerrilla
cadre and providing large-scale shipments of arms to the
former. Also the Salvadoran guerrillas were helping the
Sandinistas. For example, during the 1979 kidnapping of
Israeli honorary consul and leading coffee exporter in El
Salvador, Ernesto Liebes, the FARN demanded that part of the
ransom for his release be deposited in FSLN bank accounts in
Costa Rica.
28The political front for the FMLN is the Frente
Democratico Revolucionario (FDR), which was formed in April
1980. It includes three tiny non-communist parties as well as
representatives of the Marxist--oriented guerrilla groups. The
democratic elements of the FDR have no voice in the DRU, which
makes decisions affecting the conduct of the war and the
overall political strategy for the FMLN. The FDR's primary
role is to serve as a non-communist facade in the FMLN's
relations with democratic groups abroad.
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in Honduras, quoted Villalobos as saying, "We have to recognize
that the Cubans are the fulcrum of the revolution in Latin
America." According to Montenegro, in order to unify the
diverse guerrilla functions, the Cubans even sanctioned
assassinations within the guerrilla groups: "A top leader in
Managua killed in the 1980-1981 period was Ernesto Jovel, a
FARN (Armed Forces of National Resistance) chief. The Cubans
killed him because he always openly opposed Cuba's plans. His
plane exploded while he was on the way to Costa Rica."29
During an interview with the New York Times, Montenegro
further underlined the Cuban role: "From the political and
military point of view, all the decisions that the DRU
took--from the strategic sense, from the military sense--were
done in coordination with the Cubans. For example, in November
1980, when guerrilla leaders met in Havana, the military plan
for the final offensive in January 1981 was authorized by the
Cubans."30
The Nicaraguan support structure for the Salvadoran DRU
has been incorporated into the FSLN's party structure and state
apparatus. The "Comision Politica," headed by FSLN national
coordinator Bayardo Arce, is in charge of facilitating
propaganda and diplomatic support for the Salvadoran
guerrillas. Nicaraguan military support for the FMLN is
coordinated through the "Comision Militar," which is composed
of Cuban and Nicaraguan staff officers working with Salvadoran
29Montenegro interview with State Department officials,
March 12, 1984. NOTE: The circumstances surrounding Jovel's
death were deliberately obscured by the FMLN leadership.
First, they announced that he had been killed in the war in El
Salvador. Their next release said he had been killed in an
automobile accident. Finally, they acknowledged that he had
been killed in a plane crash, alleging that he had been enroute
to Panama. Montenegro's allegation that the Cubans had Jovel
killed appears to be the version accepted privately within the
guerrilla leadership. We have no information from outside the
guerrilla leadership to corroborate the. allegation that the
Cubans planned Jovel's aircraft accident.
30"Cuba Directs Salvador Insurgency, Former Salvadoran
Guerrilla Says," New York Times, July 28, 1983, p. A-10.
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guerrilla leaders based in Manaqua.31 This body operates out of
the Ministry of Defense in Managua under the control of Defense
Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra. Joaquin Cuadra, the
Cuban-trained Sandinista Army Chief of Staff, directs the
day-to-day supervision of the "Comision Militar."
The Nicaraguan Supply Operations for the Salvadoran Guerrillas
Arms shipments through Nicaragua to Salvadoran guerrillas
increased dramatically after the formation of the DRU in
June 1980. Communist governments and other "revolutionary"
sponsors abroad began to send Western-made weapons, including M-16
rifles? through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas. To
accelerate donations of arms for the so-called "final offensive,"
which was launched in January 1981, Cuba and other Soviet-bloc
countries also agreed to replace any arms that the Sandinistas
donated ,32
The rate and composition of the supply flow to guerrillas in
El Salvador has varied, depending on a number of factors. During
the initial rapid build-up from November 1980 to January 1981,
arms and ammunition made up much of the shipments and the flow in
arms was heavy. Since then, the Salvadoran guerrillas and their
mentors in Managua have varied the flow of arms and supplies,
depending on their tactical requirements and the interdiction
efforts they have encountered. Throughout, there has been a
steady flow of ammunition, explosives, medicines, and clothing.
There have also been sporadic increases in the movement of
guerrilla weapons to meet the demands of planned offensives or the
organization of new guerrilla groups.
The supply network between Nicaragua and El Salvador follows
various routes. Deliveries routinely go by land, using Honduran
territory, and by air and sea. Questioned by the New York Times
about the arms flow from Nicaragua, former guerrilla Commander
Montenegro said that the guerrilla units under his command in 1981
and 1982 in San Salvador and north of the city received nearly all
of their arms from Nicaragua. They received monthly
31.Miguel Bolanos Hunter interviews at the Heritage
Foundation with the Washington Post, June 16-17, 1983. For more
information on the Nicaraguan Government's linkages with and
support. for Salvadoran guerrillas and the direct Cuban role in
these activities, as well as Cuban controlling influence in
certain aspects of the Nicaraguan state security apparatus, see
the transcript of Bolanos' October 19, 1983, testimony before the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
32Ibid.
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shipments, mostly via the overland route through Honduras in
specially designed trucks. Montenegro said that guerrilla
commanders were under orders from their commander in chief (in
Nicaragua) to give false information when asked about arms
supplies, i.e., that the arms were captured or purchased when
in fact they had come from Managua.33
Vessels disguised as fishing boats leave from Nicaragua's
northwestern coast and then transfer arms to large motorized
canoes which ply the myriad bays and inlets of El Salvador's
southeast coast. Two active Nicaraguan transshipment points
for delivery of military supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas were
attacked and damaged by anti-Sandinista forces in September
1983. These were located at La Concha in Estero de Padre
Ramos, 40 km NW of Corinto, and at Potosi on the Gulf of
Fonseca. Western reporters visited La Concha.34 A
radio-equipped warehouse and boat facility disguised as a
fishing cooperative served as a center of arms trafficking on
the island. Local fishermen reported seeing wooden crates
being unloaded from military vehicles and put into
motor-powered launches. The site was littered with empty
ammunition boxes.
Arms continue to be shipped from points in Nicaragua
across the Gulf of Fonseca to southeastern El Salvador. The
Salvadoran Government has had some success in disrupting the
internal Salvadoran part of the supply network. For example,
on May 21, 1984, two Salvadoran patrol teams in the Isla
Montecristo area near the Lempa River delta engaged a small
group of guerrillas in an exchange of fire, killing two
guerrillas and capturing one. Acting on information provided
by the prisoner, on May 25 the Salvadoran army raided a
guerrilla camp north of where the prisoner had been captured.
After a stiff fight, the camp was taken and destroyed. The
camp's main purpose had been to serve as a link in the supply
route from Nicaragua. Thirty-four large canoes were captured.
33See Hedrick Smith's "A Former Salvadoran Rebel Chief
Tells of Arms From Nicaragua," New York Times, July 12, 1984,
p. A-10. This article also includes Montenegro's description
of the supplies received, and the overland routes used by the
trucks.
34"Base for Ferrying Arms to El Salvador Found in
Nicaragua," Washington Post, September 21, 1983, pp. A-29,
A-31. NOTE: La Concha is also named La Pelota.
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Among the documents found at the site were maps of the coastal
area depicting guerrilla-controlled supply routes. (See guerrilla
map.) Once weapons and supplies are landed in southeastern
El Salvador, they are transported along trails, primarily by
backpack, to the northern war zones. Recent reports indicate that
young Salvadorans forced into service with the guerrillas are
being used to carry arms as their initial duty in the guerrilla
ranks.35
Honduran authorities have occasionally interdicted some
weapons passing overland through Honduras from Nicaragua to
El Salvador. A dramatic interdiction occurred in January 1981,
when a refrigerated trailer truck from Nicaragua, passing through
Honduras on its way to El Salvador, was found to be carrying more
than 100 M-16 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition,
including rockets and mortar shells, in its hollowed roof. The
guerrillas are using a combination of automobiles, small vans,
trucks, mules, and people with backpacks for transporting arms
overland. A group of Salvadoran guerrillas were caught by
Honduran authorities in March 1983 with arms and a map tracing a
route from Nicaraguan through Honduras to El Salvador.
(Photograph of weapons captured are at the end of this report.)
Also the Hondurans have succeeded in locating safehouses and
breaking up some groups including Honduran and Salvadoran
guerrillas (see pp. 26-29). A former Nicaraguan security official
reported in 1983 that arms were also transported through Mexico
and Guatemala to the Salvadoran guerrillas. He also said that
increased reliance was being placed on small aircraft to fly
supplies from Nicaragua to El Salvador.36
Salvadoran military and civilian observers have frequently
sighted light aircraft flying from Nicaragua. The number of such
flights increases significantly prior to major guerrilla
operations. Some of these flights originated at an airstrip on a
former sugar plantation at Papalonal, north of Managua.
35"Rebels Use Harsher Methods: Guerrillas Recruit Youths
by Force in Salvadoran Town," Washington Post, June 18, 1984, pp.
A-1, A--19. Radio Cadena, San Salvador, (0025 GMT, May 28, 1984)
provided details on how guerrillas use children as young as 10
years old as couriers. From March 1 to June 9, 1984, the FMLN
reportedly forcibly recruited over 1,500 individuals. As a
response to these activities, the Salvadoran Catholic Church has
demanded that the guerrillas assume a more respectful attitude
toward the civilian population.
36'Miguel Bolanos Hunter, discussions at the State
Department, November 1983.
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The main drop points are located in guerrilla-controlled areas
of Morazan Province in northeastern El Salvador. In addition
to dropping material by parachute, the planes land on roads,
highways, and dirt airstrips for offloading. Many of the crew
members for these arms flights are foreign nationals, recruited
for the airborne supply operations by Jose Trejos, a Costa
Rican who organized air delivery of weapons for the Sandinistas
while they were fighting Somoza. He was identified by Bolanos
Hunter-as the technical coordinator for the Sandinista airlift
to guerrillas in El Salvador.37
The collaboration of Nicaragua with Cuba and other
suppliers of arms for Central American guerrillas, particularly
Nicaragua's active participation in providing logistical
support and the free use of its territory for smuggling of
military supplies, haste been of immeasurable help to guerrillas
in the region. Bolanos Hunter maintains that the FMLN in El
Salvador in 1983 was far better armed than the Sandinistas were
in Nicaragua in mid-1979, just prior to taking power.38
American reporters, interviewing Western European and
Latin American diplomats in Nicaragua during April 1984, were
told that the Nicaraguan Government is continuing to send
military equipment to the Salvadoran insurgents and to operate
training camps for them inside Nicaragua. One European
diplomat in Managua was quoted: "I believe support for the
revolutionaries in El Salvador is continuing and that it is
very important to the Sandinistas."39
Sources of FMLN Armaments
In mid-1980, an FMLN delegation led by Salvadoran
Communist Party chairman Shafik Handal visited Cuba, the Soviet
Union, Vietnam, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ethiopia
to obtain arms for use in El Salvador. Soviet officials helped
to arrange for large-scale shipment of U.S. arms, most of which
had been captured by Vietnamese forces. These arms were shipped
37Ibid.
381bid.
39"Salvador Rebels Still Said To Get Nicaraguan Aid,"
New York Times, April 11, 1984, pp. A-1, A-8.
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first to Cuba, then airlifted to Nicaragua for subsequent
shipment to the guerrillas in El Salvador.40 This
arrangement disguised the Soviet-bloc origin of the weapons and
helped lend credence to FMLN propaganda that the guerrillas arm
themselves with weapons captured from the Salvadoran Army or
bought. on the black market. Many of the M-16s captured from or
turned over by guerrillas to the El Salvador Government still
bear serial numbers indicating that they had been shipped to
Vietnam by the U.S. during the conflict there. Others have had
the serial numbers filed off to hide their origin. Former
guerrilla leader Montenegro, speaking of the arms that the
guerrillas began receiving in December 1980, said: "After that
the majority of arms was given by Vietnam, American M-16s. The
arms came from Vietnam to Havana. Havana to Managua. Managua
to El Salvador." 41
In addition to Vietnam, Montenegro also identified
Algeria, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua as
suppliers of arms.42 Grenades used by Salvadoran guerrillas
are of Soviet-bloc origin, and some military equipment captured
from the guerrillas bears markings in Amharic, a language
native only to Ethiopia.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) also has
helped ship arms to Salvadoran guerrillas. In January 1982,
PLO leader Yasser Arafat boasted publicly of the PLO's links to
the Salvadoran guerrillas: "We [PLO] have connections with all
revolutionary movements throughout the world, in Salvador,
Nicaragua--and I reiterate Salvador--and elsewhere in the
40This information and a detailed account of Handal's
meetings during his trip were obtained from Handal's diary,
which was among documents captured in San Salvador in December
1980. For more details, see Background Paper: Central America,
released by the Departments of State and Defense, Washington,
D.C., May 27, 1983.
41"Cuba Directs Salvadoran. Insurgency, Former Salvadoran
Guerrilla Says," New York Times-, July 28, 1983, p. A-10.
42Another public reference to Algeria as a source of
arms t:o revolutionaries in Central America is contained in
Christopher Dickey, "PLO's Nicaragua Office Dealing in Military
Expertise," Houston Chronicle, June 4, 1982, Sec. 1, p. 12.
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world."43 Again the same month, he was quoted in Beirut's As
Safir as saying his group had sent 4pilots to Nicaragua and
guerrilla fighters to El Salvador.
Libya also has shipped arms to Nicaragua. It is likely
that a portion of this material was destined for El Salvador.
Guerrilla leader Cayetano Carpio, leader of the FPL faction,was
visiting Libya when his FPL colleague, Melida Anaya Montes, was
murdered in Managua by other FPL members in a power
struggle.45 In April 1983, Brazilian authorities seized four
Libyan transport aircraft (three Soviet-made Ilyushins, and one
U.S.-made C-130) that had stopped in Brazil while en route to
Nicaragua with nearly 100 tons of armaments, labeled as
"medical supplies." Some Libyan arms shipments subsequently
arrived in Nicaragua, including one flight that, according to
the Trinidad press, was denied permission to refuel in Trinidad
and Tobago on August 23, 1983.
Training, Communications, and Staging of the FMLN
Salvadoran President Alvaro Magana told a Spanish
newspaper on December 22, 1983, that "armed subversion has but
one launching pad: Nicaragua. While Nicaragua draws the
attention of the world by saying that for two years they have
been on the verge of being invaded, they have not ceased for
one instant to invade our country."
The close ties between the Sandinista leaders and
Salvadoran guerrilla leaders are well known. Events
surrounding the deaths in Managua of Salvadoran guerrilla
leaders in April 1983 provided public confirmation of the
presence of top guerrilla leaders in Nicaragua and of their
close relationship with the Sandinista leadership. In the
April 6 announcement of the stabbing death of Nelida Anaya
Montes, the second in command of the Salvadoran FPL forces, the
43Arafat speech before the General Confederation of
Palestinian Writers, quoted in "Arafat Says PLO Aids Foreign
Guerrilla Units," Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1982, p. 4.
44"PLO's Nicaragua Office Dealing in Military
Expertise," Houston Chronicle, June 4, 1982, Sec. 1, p. 12.
45"Key Salvadoran Rebel Leader Kills Himself," New York
Times, April 21, 1983, pp. A-1, A-24.
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Nicaraguan Minister of Interior revealed her permanent residence
in Managua.46 Carpio's death on April 12, allegedly by
suicide, was made public by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior
at the request of the Salvadoran guerrillas.47
Captured guerrillas and Nicaraguan defectors have confirmed
that central command and control, training, communications, and
other support activities were established for Salvadoran
guerrillas in Nicaragua. After the Grenada events in late 1983,
the Sandinistas allowed rumors to spread that the guerrilla
command and control center would leave Nicaragua. Immediately
thereafter, some of the FDR politicians departed, but there is no
indication that the guerrilla leaders or their command center
were transferred.
Safehouses are maintained in Managua for the exclusive use
of the FMLN. Guerrillas posing as refugees are funneled into
these installations through Sandinista front organizations such
as the Comite de Solidaridad con la Lucha Salvadorena. At these
safehouses FMLN members rest and receive medical treatment. They
often are assigned there to await new instructions or
arrangements for special training at guerrilla camps elsewhere in
Nicaragua or in Cuba.48
A former Salvadoran guerrilla commander described how
instructions were passed to guerrilla field units in El Salvador
through the network of FMLN communications facilities in
Nicaragua. Several of these facilities were located in northwest
Nicaragua. One or possibly two of these communication facilities
46For press reporting on these dramatic events, see:
"Salvadoran Rebel Leader Assassinated in Nicaragua," Washington
Post, April 7, 1983, pp. A-30; "Nicaragua Warns Honduras on
Raids," New York Times, April 10, 1983, pp. A-1, A-16; and "Key
Salvadoran Rebel Leader Kills Himself," Washington Post, April
21, 1983, pp. A-1, A-24.
47On April 21, 1983, Barricada, the official organ of the
FSLN, announced the death of Carpio with the front page headline
"Muere Marcial, Pero El Salvador Vencera ("Marcial Dies, but El
Salvador Will Triumph"). Under the headline is a photo of Daniel
Ortega and Tomas Borge standing next to the Salvadoran guerrilla
(FPL) banner, which displays the Soviet hammer and sickle. (See
photo.)
48Montenegro interview at State Department, March 12, 1984.
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were attacked on February 2 and 3, 1984, by aircraft of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).49 Another radio was near
the outskirts of Managua in a residential area at the end of
Via Panama. Its high frequency transmitters had long antennae
that could be seen from the Pan American Highway; it was moved
to a more secluded location after authorities concluded it had
become too visible.50
At least three military camps in Nicaragua have been used
exclusively as training areas for Salvadoran guerrillas.51
They include the base of Ostional in the southern province of
Rivas, a converted National Guard camp in northwestern
Nicaragua close to the River Tamarindo, and the camp of
Tamagas, about 20 kilometers outside Managua. These training
facilities have been operated by Cuban military personnel
serving as instructors and administrative staff. The direct
Nicaraguan presence has been limited to one representative
officer and the camps' security forces. In the Tamagas camp,
FMLN guerrillas undergo special instruction in sabotage
techniques. The camp has been run by a Cuban major who trained
the FMLN team that carried out the January 1982 assault on the
Salvadoran Air Force base of Ilopango during which the major
part of El Salvador's military aircraft were destroyed.
Alejandro Montenegro, who commanded that attack, later revealed
details of his team's training in Tamagas as well as prior
guerrilla instruction in Cuba.52
49Credit for the attack was claimed by FDN leader Adolfo
Calero during a press conference in Washington, D.C. See
"Chairman of the Contras," Washington Post, February 4, 1984,
p. C-1.
50Montenegro interview at State Department, March 12,
51Miguel Bolanos Hunter discussion at the State
Department, November 1983.
52Montenegro interview at State Department, March 12,
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The Honduran Front
Honduras as well as El Salvador became a target for
extension of Marxist-Leninist subversion in Central America
immediately after the Sandinistas' July 1979 victory in
Nicaragua and long before the anti-Sandinistas began their
operations. This has been confirmed by captured guerrillas and
Nicaraguan defectors. The following excerpt from the
transcript of Miguel Bolanos Hunter's June 1983 interview with
the Washington Post (at the Heritage Foundation) indicates that
Honduras was already a Sandinista target in 1979:
When I was an assistant to Cuadra [Joaquin Cuadra,
Vice Minister of Defense of the Nicaraguan Government
and Chief of the General Staff of the Sandinista
Army] in 1979, a month after the triumph, I was able
to witness five or six Soviet generals that were his
advisors. They looked at a map of Nicaragua and
Honduras. The map outlined symbols of men and
airplanes and where they were. Also outlined were
the Sandinista forces and the number of people
necessary to become a force. From that time on we
began to study how to use confrontations with
Honduras. We looked at the real possibilities....
The plan was to beat Honduras.
The saga of the late Honduran guerrilla leader, Jose
Antonio Reyes Mata, illustrates the collaboration between
Honduran guerrillas and the Nicaraguan and Cuban Governments.
Reyes Mata, a long-time Honduran communist leader, led a group
which in April 1980 kidnapped Arnold Quiros, an American who
was Vice President of Texaco's Caribbean operations. The
effort failed when Reyes and his men lost their way enroute to
a safehouse and were captured by Honduran authorities. Reyes
was later released as part of an amnesty decreed by the newly
elected Honduran President, Roberto Suazo Cordova. Reyes
proceeded to Nicaragua and then to Cuba.
In March 1981, a group called "Cinchoneros" hijacked a
U.S.-bound Honduran airlines flight and diverted it to
Managua. They threatened to blow it up with all the passengers
and crew on board unless the Honduran Government released 15
prisoners, including 13 Salvadoran FMLN members who had been
captured in Honduras while smuggling arms for guerrilla
operations in El Salvador. Honduran government officials were
denied access to the radio control tower of Managua's airport
during the episode. The Nicaraguans also turned down a
Honduran request to launch a commando mission to recover the
aircraft. The Honduran Government was ultimately forced to
accede to the hijackers' demands, freeing two Hondurans with
the 13 Salvadorans and flying them to Cuba.
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In late 1983, Reyes Mata was back in Honduras again as
leader of a 96-member guerrilla group column with the objective
of establishing a rural guerrilla base (a "foco") in the
Department of Olancho. The group had returned to Nicaragua
from Cuba where they had been given training. In Nicaragua
they were equipped with guerrilla gear, including two rifles
each, and then were infiltrated into Honduras carrying their
equipment with them. The second rifle given to each man was
provided in anticipation of finding and equipping new recruits
in Honduras.
Honduran authorities were alerted to the plan by
guerrillas who defected when they entered Honduras from
Nicaragua, and by peasants living in the area. Honduran
guerrilla defectors, who participated in the attempt to
establish the base, told interviewers that they were duped into
going to Nicaragua in October 1981 with promises of
agricultural and mechanical schooling. Instead, they were sent
to Cuba where they received guerrilla instruction for nine
months at Camp P-30, run by the Cuban Ministry of Interior's
Department of Special Operations, in Pinar del Rio Province.
They were sent back to Nicaragua in September 1982 and were
quartered at a safehouse in Managua before infiltrating back
into Honduras as part of the 96-member guerrilla group.
According to the defectors, some of the group attempted to
desert in Nicaragua and were imprisoned by Sandinista
security. Their group was the advance element of a larger
force designed to operate in four Honduran provinces, using a
network of logistical bases in the rural highlands. Air drops
of arms and supplies had been promised to the Honduran
insurgents by Nicaragua.53 But supplies did not materialize
in time to save the operation in Olancho, where Reyes was
killed.
The guerrillas had more success in other violent actions
in Honduras. One of the country's leading bankers, Paul
.Vinelli of the Banco Atlantida, was kidnapped-in 1981 and held
for a ransom of more than $1 million. The leader of that
operation was reported in the Honduran press to be a Salvadoran
guerrilla trained in Nicaragua.
53For a detailed press account of the operation in
Olancho, including descriptions of how Hondurans had been sent
abroad to Nicaragua and Cuba for guerrilla training, see
"Honduran Army Defeats Cuban-Trained Rebel Unit," Washington
Post, November 22, 1983, pp. A-1, A-14.
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By late 1981, the Salvadoran ERP had formed a joint
Salvadoran/Honduran military and political command in
Tegucigalpa. The unified command directed a military organi-
zation of 50 persons, 15 of whom were Salvadorans. The command
was led and dominated by Salvadorans but had some Honduran
leaders in secondary positions to give the impression of a
joint organization. On July 4, 1.982, the Salvadoran ERP
sabotaged the main power station in Tegucigalpa and on
August 4, 1982, bombed various U.S. businesses, including IBM
and Air Florida. The ERP attributed the operations to a
"phantom" Honduran group to confuse local authorities. A
Salvadoran guerrilla captured in Honduras admitted to helping
in the sabotage of the Tegucigalpa power station and the IBM
attack. He had obtained explosives from Nicaragua and
transported them to Tegucigalpa in concealed containers in a
truck modified for arms trafficking in Nicaraguan guerrilla
workshops.
The arms for these operations were brought from Nicaragua
by the Salvadoran FMLN. Before being deposited at various
hiding places, the weapons were processed through a "logistical
center for war material transformation" located in a farm house
on the outskirts of Tegucigalpa. Police also arrested four
Salvadoran FMLN operatives who were in Tegucigalpa at the time
of the attack, including Comandante Alejandro Montenegro.54
As it did in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Cuba (now working
with Nicaragua) has tried to develop a unified guerrilla
movement. in Honduras. Training of Honduran guerrillas was
already underway in 1979. In March 1983, Honduran guerrilla
organizations merged into the National Unity Directorate of the
Revolutionary Movement of Honduras (DNU-MRH), just as the
Nicaraguan and Salvadoran guerrilla groups had formed unified
commands to receive Cuban backing.55 Guerrillas who
subsequently defected from this group estimated that at least
250 Hondurans had been recruited to go to Nicaragua for
guerrilla training in March 1983. Some also were sent to Cuba.
54Background Paper: Central America, Departments of
State and Defense, Washington, D.C., May 27, 1983.
55The Frente Morazanista de Liberacion Hondureno (FMLH),
the "Cinchoneros" Peoples' Revolutionary Union Popular
Liberation Movement (URP/MPL), and the Central American
Workers' Revolutionary Party (PRTC) issued a joint message
which announced the armed struggle against the Government of
Honduras. See "Honduras: Proclama de Lucha Armada Contra el
Gobierno," Barricada, Managua, Nicaragua, April 21, 1983.
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Another consequence of Nicaraguan actions against Honduras
has been the danger to vehicles travelling inside Honduras near
the frontier. Attacks on vehicles seldom draw media attention
except when foreigners are the victims. For example, in June
1983,.two American journalists were killed while travelling on
a Honduran road which had been mined by Sandinista troops. 56
Introducing Political Violence into Costa Rica
Even Costa Rica, which had supported the Sandinistas and
other Nicaraguans in the struggle against the Somoza regime,
has become a target of what the Sandinistas call "revolutionary
internationalism." That small country, one of the most stable
democracies in Latin America, is particularly vulnerable to the
Nicaraguan threat. Since 1981, it has experienced sporadic
terrorist acts including bombings, kidnappings, and other
attacks, some of which have been traced to Nicaragua, and
others to the Salvadoran guerrilla factions. Commenting in
January 1984 on the threat from Nicaragua, Costa Rican
President Luis Alberto Monge said: "I never thought I would
say, as I,do now, that we would have it worse in four years [of
Sandinismol than in 40 years of Somoza."57
Intelligence sources have reported for some time that a
small number of Costa Rican leftists are fighting alongside
Sandinista troops against the Nicaraguan rebels. Some of them
are reportedly Cuban-trained and, according to a U.S. journalist
who visited Costa Rica recently, some Costa Ricans believe they
will return to Costa Rica to begin guerrilla activity when the
time is right.58
Underlying Costa Rican concerns are a number of violent
incidents, including shootings, kidnappings, and bombings. For
example, in July 1981, Costa Rican authorities intercepted six
heavily armed men who had entered the country from Nicaragua.
56"Honduran Says Land Mine Killed 2 U.S. Newsmen,"
Washington Post, June 30, 1983, p. A-35.
57Syndicated Columnist Georgie Anne Geyer, "Central
America Faces up to Sandinista Expansion," Washington Times,
January 10, 1984, p. 2C.
581bid.
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Their stated objective was to seize the Guatemalan Embassy and
hold the ambassador hostage in order to demand the release of
prisoners convicted of violent terrorist acts in Guatemala.
The six-man team, equipped with grenades and submachine guns,
included two Nicaraguans affiliated with the Sandinista Front,
a Salvadoran, two Guatemalans, and a Mexican.
In .1982, a group of Salvadoran guerrillas and one
Nicaraguan in San Jose attempted to kidnap expatriate
Salvadoran businessman Roberto Palomo Salazar and Japanese
corporate executive Tetsuji Kosuga, the San Jose representative
of the Matsushita Electric Corporation. Kosuga was mortally
wounded in the attempt, and the Matsushita Corporation pulled
all of its personnel out of Costa Rica. The two incidents
caused sufficient concern to provoke uncertainty in the climate
for private investment.59 Press reports of June 1984
indicate new threats of similar foreign-supported violence in
Costa Rica.60
In July 1982, the same week that Honduran airlines (SAHSA)
offices were bombed in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, a bomb exploded
at the SAHSA office in San Jose. Costa Rica's
investigation into the bombing implicated a Colombian M-19
member who had been recruited by Nicaraguan Embassy officials
in Costa Rica. Two Nicaraguan diplomats were expelled from
Costa Rica as a result. The Costa Rican government expelled
these Nicaraguan diplomats after the M-19 member had
demonstrated his connections with the Embassy by arranging a
clandestine meeting with one of the diplomats, whom the Costa
Ricans detained on the spot.
At the same time, the Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Soviet media
had embarked upon a campaign seeking to portray democratic
Costa Rica as a dictatorship. With reference to this campaign,
President Monge stated: "The Communist Party international
59During the initial stages of insurgent activity in
El Salvador, one of the groups operating in San Salvador, the
Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), which today forms
part of the FMLN, employed similar tactics to drive the
Japanese textile firm INSICA out of El Salvador. FARN abducted
two of INSICA's local managers and killed the company's
president, Fujio Matsumoto.
60"Threatened U.S. Executives Are Said To Leave Costa
Rica," New York Times, June 21, 1984, p. A-4.
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campaign has been to place Costa Rica as an aggressor nation,
and many in the Socialist International have taken this up.
And we do not even have an army. While we see ourselves as a
country under attack, we are being pictured as a country with
the U.S. against Nicaragua."61
The Central American subversive network has also used
Costa Rican territory for receiving and transshipping arms and
supplies to Salvadoran guerrillas. For example, on March 15,
1982, Costa Rican security forces raided a San Jose safehouse
and captured nine suspected subversives along with a large
supply of weapons, material, and vehicles. Those captured
included four Salvadorans, two Nicaraguans, a Chilean, a Costa
Rican, and an Argentine. An Argentine Montonero, the group's
commander, admitted that the weapons were to have been
delivered to insurgents in El Salvador prior to the March 20,
1982, election. The passport of one of the Salvadorans showed
Costa Rican entry stamps indicating at least 15 trips to Costa
Rica, presumably for the purpose of picking up arms and
ammunition and for other guerrilla liaison work.62 The
multinational composition of this group is further evidence of
how the international subversive network centered in Nicaragua
functions and enjoys support from leftists throughout the
region.63
Since exiled Nicaraguan opponents of the Sandinista regime
established the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), the
government in Managua has dispatched agents to Costa Rica to
assassinate ARDE leaders. On June 26, 1983, a former
61Syndicated columnist Georgie Anne Geyer, "Costa Rica
President Must Contend with Chaos After Nicaragua Revolt,"
Columbia Missourian, January 5, 1984.
62Among the arms and other material captured during the
March 11, 1982, raid in San Jose were: about 175 weapons
(including about 70 M-16s, 50 of which were traceable to
Vietnam), fragmentation grenades and a grenade launcher,
homemade bombs, dynamite and ammunition, 500 combat uniforms
and gas masks, 13 vehicles (Mercedes Benzes and BMWs) with
hidden compartments for arms concealment, blank travel papers
and drivers' licenses, passports (Costa Rican and Ecuadorean),
airport/immigration seals from more than 30 countries, and a
printing press for producing false documents.
63For extensive reporting on this incident, see La
Nacion, San Jose, Costa Rica, March 16-21, 1982.
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Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Health, Rodrigo Cuadra, accompanied
by an undercover agent of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of
State Security (DGSE), Francisco Martinez, entered Costa Rica
to meet with ARDE leaders Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo. The
two officials pretended to be Nicaraguan Government defectors
seeking to join ARDE, and had arranged to speak with Robelo and
Pastora. Cuadra and Martinez were carrying a time bomb hidden
in an attache case which they planned to leave with the ARDE
leaders once their meeting was concluded. However, apparently
because of an error in setting the timer, the device exploded
in their car on June 29, killing Cuadra and critically wounding
Martinez.64
Hector Frances, an Argentine citizen who reportedly was
working with Nicaraguan insurgents elsewhere in Central
America, was kidnapped on the streets of San Jose, Costa Rica,
where his wife resided. Subsequently, Nicaraguan official
television paraded a haggard Frances before the cameras to
confess to a litany of anti-Sandinista activity. Frances has
not been seen since the TV show.
The 1982 kidnapping of Kaveh Yazdani, an Iranian emigre
who resided in San Jose, illustrates the manner in which Costa
Rica is buffeted by regional insurgencies which respect no
borders. Yazdani was kidnapped by Salvadoran guerrillas
(including, however, at least one Nicaraguan citizen) of the
FARN faction of the FMLN on January 8, 1982. He had no
connection to the Salvadoran conflict, and was apparently
chosen solely as a means to raise money--his father was very
wealthy. Although no direct Nicaraguan Government involvement
in the kidnapping has ever been proven, during the year in
which Yazdani was held, representatives of his family met at
least twice in Managua with the Salvadoran guerrillas to
discuss the ransom payments needed to keep his captors from
murdering him. This is another example of Nicaraguan safehaven
for the FMLN.
On March 17, 1981, a small Costa Rican group which called
itself La Familia blew up an American Embassy vehicle carrying
three marine guards and a Costa Rican driver who were
proceeding to the Embassy to stand watch. In this first attack
on a marine guard detail, one marine--who still suffers from
64"Bomb Kills Nicaraguan in Costa Rica," Washington
Post, June 30, 1983, p. A-35.
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the wounds--was gravely injured. The others escaped with minor
injuries. La Familia was a group of middle-class youths with
links to the Salvadoran FMLN. They had been recruited by exiles
from the Montonero and Tupamaro groups who had taken up residence
in Costa Rica. Subsequently, La Familia murdered several
policemen and even a taxi driver before the group was broken up
and members charged and convicted by the Costa Rican courts.
This splinter group was an offshoot of the Marxist-Leninist
splinter party called the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo
(MRP), whose leadership had ties to both Cuba and Nicaragua.
The International Connection
In September 1983, Costa Rican police arrested Gregorio
Jimenez Morales, a member of the Spanish Basque separatist
organization ETA.65 Costa Rican authorities concluded that
Jimenez, using the alias of "Lorenzo Avila Teijon," had been
instructed by the Nicaraguan Government to assassinate Eden
Pastora.66 At the moment of his capture, Jimenez was sketching
a map outlining various approaches to Pastora's home. He had
entered Costa Rica from Nicaragua in May 1983 and remains in
detention in San Jose awaiting a ruling on an extradition request
by the Spanish Government.67
The Costa Ricans reportedly had been warned about the
presence of ETA operatives in Central America by Spanish
authorities through INTERPOL.68 While the Sandinista
government was denying any connection with either Jimenez or the
ETA, Nicaragua's official press was reporting the formation
65According to an article in El Pais, Madrid, Spain, on
January 13, 1984, ETA's first guerrilla cadre or members of its
"rama militar" (military branch) were trained in 1964 at training
camps in Cuba. The Basque organization has carried out extensive
campaigns of violence in Spain for more than twenty years.
66"Cien Etarras en Nicaragua," Cambio 16, Madrid, Spain,
October 3, 1983, p. 22.
67Jimenez, who joined ETA in 1979, was highly trained and
experienced in handling explosives. He had carried out several
actions in Spain during 1981, including the destruction of
electric power facilities in the northern Spanish city of
Besain. Pursued by Spanish police, Jimenez escaped into France
in February 1982 and made his way through Cuba to Nicaragua.
68"Cien Etarras en Nicaragua," Cambio 16, Madrid, Spain,
October 3, 1983, p. 29.
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of a "Basque Brigade" in Nicaragua to help with the coffee
harvest. A Spanish weekly, Cambio 16, reported in October 1983
that over 100 ETA members were present in Nicaragua, serving as
instructors at guerrilla bases .69 Spain's leading daily,
El Pais, maintains that ETA runs an office for forging
documents in Managua.70
The Cambio 16 article, in describing ETA and Sandinista
linkages, stated that the ETA has a recruiting station, called
"Team International," in Mexico City. The station allegedly is
directed by a Palestinian described as the right arm of Abu
Nidal, chief of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (FPLP). According to the article, the FPLP executes
"dirty work" for the Sandinista regime in Latin America.
Allegedly this office made the initial contacts for the
Sandinistas with the Argentine Montoneros and the Chileans who
assassinated Anastasio Somoza in Paraguay.71
Costa Rican authorities suspect that international
terrorists were responsible for the May 30, 1984, assassination
attempt on Eden Pastora near the Costa Rican/Nicaraguan
border. In this action, four people--an American reporter, a
Costa Rican TV cameraman, and two members of Pastora's rebel
group--were killed, and 27 others, including Pastora, were
wounded.72 (A significant aspect of the Pastora
assassination attempt was that the Sandinista radio announced
that the device was made of plastic explosive several hours
before anyone in Costa Rica had determined the nature of the
explosive.)
ETA has also been linked to the Salvadoran FMLN.
According to Alejandro Montenegro, ETA operatives in Nicaragua
entered into an agreement in 1979 with one of the FMLN's main
69lbid.
70"Un Comando de ETA Intento Asasinar en 1983 al
Ministro de Defensa de El Salvador, Segun Informe del
Gobierno," El Pais, January 13, 1984, Madrid, Spain, p. 11.
71"Cien Etarras en Nicaragua," Cambio 16, Madrid, Spain,
October 3, 1983, p. 22.
72For two accounts of the status of the Costa Rican
investigation into the bombing see "Basque Terrorist Sought in
Attack on Nicaragua Rebel," Miami Herald, June 8, 1984, p. 14A,
and "Costa Rican Officials Admit Mistakes in Bombing Probe,"
Miami Herald, June 14, 1984, p. 24A.
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components, the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP), to provide
training and personnel for guerrilla operations in El Salvador.
ETA also reportedly delivered $250,000 to the ERP and contributed
an assassination team to target top government officials in San
Salvador. ETA operatives were reportedly involved in two abortive
attempts on Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia's
life in 1982 and 1983.73
The Significance of the Subversive Network
Nicaragua, by itself, without its international revolutionary
ambitions, would not necessarily be a serious threat to any of its
neighbors--except perhaps in the military sense--since its
military force is the largest and the only one in the region with
a large number of tanks and armored vehicles. But what magnifies
the Nicaraguan threat to its neighbors are the resources of an
international subversive network that operates with Nicaragua as a
nerve center. Along with Nicaragua, a key element of the network
is Cuba and, behind it, the Soviet Union. The linkages extend to
other communist governments of the Eastern bloc, including
Vietnam, to the radical regimes of Libya and Ethiopia, and to
international groups such as the PLO, the Basque ETA, the
Argentine Montoneros, and Uruguayan Tupamaros. The collaboration
and joint action (which was shown in some of the incidents
described herein) lends a credibility to Nicaraguan threats. One
example is Nicaragua's suspected use of "internationalists" in
assassinations of Nicaraguan opposition leaders in Costa Rica.
Another example is the team of Argentine and Chilean assassins who
killed Anastasio Somoza in Paraguay in 1980. Intelligence
reports, apparently shown to the press at the time, indicated that
"the Nicaraguan Government had in fact been involved up to its
neck in planning and financing Somoza's murder."74
Thus, in attacking their enemies the Sandinistas can rely
upon the resources of other members of the subversive network
centered in Nicaragua. Assassinations can be accomplished through
,one of the international groups without seemingly involving
Nicaragua. They can also use the powerful Cuban/Soviet propaganda
machines to advance their efforts.
73"Un Comando de ETA Intento Asasinar en 1983 al Ministro de
Defensa de El Salvador, Segun Informe del Gobierno," El Pais,
January 13, 1984, Madrid, Spain. Also confirmed in Montenegro
interview with State Department officials, March 12, 1984.
74See Cord Meyer's "Somoza's Difficult Ghost," The Washington
Star, October 18, 1980, p. A-11. Also see "Cien Etarras en
Nicaragua," Cambio 16, Madrid, Spain, October 3, 1983, pp. 22-28,
for a description of Sandinista, Basque, and Montonero linkages.
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Conclusions
o The Central American democracies face serious
threats from forces within and outside the Central
American region.
o Since 1.979, Nicaragua has provided a support base
for groups attempting to destabilize and, in some
cases, overthrow neighboring governments.
o Nicaragua's Sandinista leaders, beginning in 1979,
understood that their plans for establishing a
dictatorship in Nicaragua and for expanding the
revolution would bring opposition from their
neighbors and the United States, and eventually
alienate democratic socialists in Europe.
o They sought to delay the process of alienation by
concealing their true intentions and their
Marxism-Leninism by adopting a gradualist approach
for implementing communism in Nicaragua.
? In 1979 they began to plan for the largest and best
equipped armed forces in Central America, for a
Cuban/Soviet style internal security apparatus, and
for cooperation with the Cubans and others in
supporting guerrilla movements.
? The Sandinistas now have almost 49,000 men on active
duty, and an additional 50,000 men who could be
mobilized.
? Nicaragua now has over 120 Soviet-made tanks and 120
other armored vehicles. No comparable armored force
exists elsewhere in the Central American region.
? The infrastructure for a formidable air force is
developing rapidly in Nicaragua.
? This rapid growth of military strength would not
have been possible without the help of some 3,000
Cuban military/security advisers, some of whom are
deeply involved in the decision-making process in
Nicaragua. (A total of about 9,000 Cubans are in
Nicaragua.)
? Not only Cuba, but also the Soviet Union, East
Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary, have or have had military and/or civilian
advisers in Nicaragua.
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? Some international groups, including the Argentine
Montoneros, Uruguayan Tupamaros, and the Basque ETA,
have a presence in Nicaragua and form part of the
support system for subversion in Central America.
? Cuba has played a crucial role in unifying and
supporting the guerrilla groups of El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala.
? Guerrilla and Sandinista defectors maintain that the
Nicaraguan regime provides the Salvadoran guerrillas
communications centers, safehouses, storage of arms,
shops for vehicles, and transportation of military
supplies.
? Costa Rican and Honduran authorities have exposed
Nicaraguan diplomats directly involved with
guerrillas and terrorists.
? Most military supplies used by Salvadoran guerrillas
and similar groups in Honduras and Costa Rica are
provided by communist-bloc countries and by
countries such as Ethiopia and Libya.
? Training of Central American guerrillas has taken
place in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Vietnam.
? Because of the subversive system involving a number
of governments and terrorist organizations centered
in Nicaragua, the Sandinista Government is able to
threaten neighboring countries and to carry out the
threats, indirectly, through one or other of the
organizations.
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Iq
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This photo, from the Sandinista newspaper "Barricada", shows the Sandinista leaders
Daniel Ortega and Tomas Borge at the funeral of Salvadoran guerrilla leader Cayetano
Carpio in Managua, Nicaragua, in April 1983. The flag with the hammer and sickle is that of
the FPL, the guerrilla faction Cayetano Carpio headed.
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Salvadoran guerrilla poster proclaiming "Revolution or Death! The Armed People
Will Triumph!"
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A central focus of the Nicaraguan-backed guerrillas has been the destruction of the
Salvadoran economic infrastructure.
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