SOVIET MILITARY POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00831R000100210053-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 140
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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CuMIREX FILE COPY
sovlET
MILITARY
POWER
1984
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SOVIET
1WII]LI~CARY
p~~ER
First Edition
Second Edition
Third Edition
September 1981
March 1983
April 1984
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
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soviET
MILITARY
POWER
1984
The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into
the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps in Soviet Military Power 1984 are not
necessarily authoritative.
The illustrations of Soviet weapons systems introducing each chapter and elsewhere are derived from
various US sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.
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CONTENTS
Chapter I
The Soviet Military Establishment
Chapter II
19
Forces for Global Warfare
Chapter III
49
Theater Forces
Chapter IV
77
Sustainability, Readiness and Mobility
Chapter V
89
Soviet Military-Industrial Complex
Chapter VI
Research and Development
Chapter VII
The Global Challenge
103
113
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PREFACE
"I made two promises to the American people about peace
and security: I promised to restore our neglected defenses in
order to strengthen and preserve the peace, and I promised to
pursue reliable agreements to reduce nuclear weapons. Both
these promises are being kept."
Ronald Reagan
March 1983
For almost 40 years, the United States has remained steadfastly commit-
ted to deterrence and arms reductions. As we enter the mid-1980s, our dual
goals are to enhance the strategic stability contributing to the security of the
United States and our Allies and to obtain genuine and verifiable reductions
to equal levels in nuclear weapons so as to lessen the risk of a war that
neither side could win. In pursuing these goals, we must continue to assess
the threat posed by the growing size and capabilities of the Soviet Union's
Armed Forces. That assessment reveals:
? The USSR has greatly increased its offensive military capability and
has significantly enhanced its ability to conduct military operations
worldwide.
? The Soviet build-up is made possible by a national policy that has con-
sistentlymade military materiel production its highest economic priority.
Underlying Soviet military power is a vast and complex industrial, mobili-
zation and logistics support system designed to focus the resources of the
Soviet State on the capability to wage war. For decades, Soviet industry has
manufactured a broad spectrum of weaponry and military support equip-
ment in staggering quantities-production levels achieved by extremely
large investments of money, raw materials and manpower. Moreover, the
Soviet leadership places the highest priority on the utilization of science and
technology for military purposes, and this, together with exploitation of
Western technology, has sharply eroded the qualitative edge that the West
had used to balance the Soviet lead in numbers of weapons and men.
The Soviet Union has in place a national mobilization system that
penetrates every sector of Soviet life. This includes a logistics system
designed to draw upon all classes of consumable supplies and war reserve
equipment available in the USSR, as well as transport, repair and con-
struction units. It includes a manpower pool to augment the active-duty
Armed Forces and to replace losses.
The Soviets have undertaken extensive logistics preparations both in
designated theaters of military operations throughout the Soviet Union and
beyond Soviet borders. In Eastern Europe, the Western USSR and the Sovi-
et Far East, priority has been given to prestocking critical ammunition and
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military fuel stocks. In Eastern Europe, Soviet logistics depots contain not
only fuel and ammunition but also a great tonnage of military river-crossing
equipment and tactical oil pipeline for which there can be no defensive
justification.
Soviet Military Power 1984 provides a detailed report on the structure of the
Soviet military and its pervasive role, as assigned by the Soviet leadership,
in Soviet society-and how that translates directly into the increasing threat
posed by the USSR's Armed Forces.
Building on the data provided in the First and Second Editions. Soviet
Military Yower 1984 examines key developments in the continuing upgrade ~f
the USSR's Armed Forces.
? Modernization of the fourth-generation SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs nears an
end, while the USSR proceeds with the testing of the fifth-generation SS-X-
24 and SS-X-25 ICBMs. There are no security requirements fcrr the develop-
ment of so large a quantity of strategic nuclear offensive weapons.
? '1"he 25,000-ton TYPHOON-Class strategic ballistic missile submarine,
which in 1983 was conducting test firings of its SS-N-20 missiles, is now ful-
ly operational. And now, another new SLBM, the SS-NX-23, is being tested.
? The Soviet Union has three long-range, land-attack nuclear-armed cruise
missiles nearly deployed-the sea-launched SS-NX-21, the aircraft-launched
AS-X-15 and the ground-launched SSC-X-4-and it is pressing ahead with
the development of more advanced strategic cruise missiles.
? The Soviets now have three manned strategic bombers in development
or production. In addition to the new BLACKJACK long-range strategic
bomber and the BACKFIRE bomber, the USSR has reopened production
lines for the BEAR bomber and is producing a new BEAR H variant assess-
ed to be the initial carrier for the AS-X-15 cruise missile.
? The Soviets have continued to field additional mobile SS-20 launchers,
each with athree-warhead missile and reload. In 1981, Soviet Military Power
reported 2501aunchers; in 1983, the total had risen to 3301aunchers and now
the total is 378 launchers. Construction of new SS-20 facilities in the West-
ern USSR has resumed, even though 243 SS-20 missiles with 729 warheads
and an equal number for refire are already in place opposite NATO.
? New MiG-29/FULCRUM twin-engine fighter interceptors are now being
introduced into Soviet air forces, greatly increasing offensive air capabili-
ties. Additionally, the Su-27/FLANKER is nearing deployment.
? Fast-paced development continues in the Soviet space shuttle program,
which will further increase the flexibility and capability of the USSR's
essentially military manned and unmanned space systems.
? The USSR continues a great investment in strategic and tactical
defenses-with across-the-board upgrading of Soviet air, sea, land and
missile defense forces.
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This report documents the continuing Soviet buildup. To cite an addition-
al example-1983 saw the launching of two new classes of nuclear attack
submarines, increasing to eight the total number of classes of Soviet subma-
rines now in production and contributing to an increasingly capable subma-
rine fleet now nearing 400 units.
Soviet Military Power 1984 includes NATO-Warsaw Pact comparisons and
data on US and Allied forces to place Soviet force developments in clear
perspective. It is useful to remind ourselves that the United States, as a
democracy, regularly makes available full and public reports on US force
developments in such publications as my Annual .Report and the Military
Posture by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The USSR makes
no such reports available on Soviet Forces.
WF; clo see, however, how they are using those forces. The shooting down of
the Korean civilian airliner, with the loss of 2f9 innocent lives, reminds us
of the USSR's willingness to use military force, The store of Soviet weapons
discovered in Grenada reminds us of the USSR's willingness to extend its
military influence. There are other reminders. Since invading Afghanistan 4
years ago, the USSR has established bases within striking distance of the
Persian Gulf oil fields. The Soviets continue to deliver a growing arsenal of
weapons to Syria, Libya, Cuba and Nicaragua. Since 1980, the number of
Soviet personnel in Syria has grown from 2,000 to 7,000; and now, the Soviet
military presence there is underscored by the appearance of well-equipped
air defense units. The USSft's Cuban proxies in Angola and Ethiopia, and
Soviet support to Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, further dramatize grow-
ing Soviet military involvement throughout the world.
A full and clear appreciation of the threat we face provides the basis and
the rationale for our defense program-a program designed to maintain our
course on the two parallel paths to peace. The Soviets have not made that
easy for us. Deterrence, so essential to our survival, will remain a difficult
strategy. Indeed, it is a paradox of deterrence that the longer it succeeds the
less necessary it appears. In arms negotiations, the USSR will repeatedly
test our resolve before responding constructively.
The United States and its Allies have made progress toward restoring the
military balance. We can achieve our twin goals. But to succeed, we must
sustain not only our unity of purpose as a nation, but also our determination
to complete the task we have begun-to restore the strength necessary to
maintain peace with freedom. , ~' ;~ /~
,? ~ /'
`l
Caspar W. Weinberger
April 1984 Secretary of Defense
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Chapter I
The Soviet
Military
Establishment
The role played by the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) is central to the op-
erations of the Soviet military establishment
and to the continuing growth and moderniza-
tion of Soviet military power. The CPSU con-
trols military concepts, resources and senior
personnel. The top Party leadership estab-
lishes military doctrine and approves Soviet
military strategy. The Defense Council, dom-
inated by the Party leadership, controls the
defense budget and. makes the decisions to de-
velop and deploy all major weapon systems.
Senior officers are selected from a Central
Committee list, and all major organizational
changes in the Soviet military are approved
by the Defense Council. Compliance with Party
control of the Soviet military establishment is
exercised by the. Central Committee's uni-
formed political officers through the regular
Party organization in the Armed Forces.
Military Command Structure
The CPSU General Secretary's chairman-
ship of the Defense Council underscores the
Party's dominance over the entire command
structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. Offi-
cially described by the Soviets as part of the
government structure, the USSR Defense
Council is, in reality, the senior and most
critical Party decisionmaking body for all
aspects of national security policy. In peace-
time, its power over the Armed Forces is exer-
cised directly through the Ministry of Defense
and the Soviet General Staff. The Defense
Council's authority covers virtually all major
The SS-X-25 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, one
of two new fifth generation ICBMs being tested
from the Plesetsk rangehead, is likely designed for
mobile deployment increasing Soviet ICBM force
survivability and further enhancing the capabili-
ties of Soviet military power.
Chapter I The Soviet Military Establishment
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military issues. The Defense Council struc-
ture~ encompasses the senior cadre of Soviet
political, military and economic leadership,
which, from the Soviet perspective, is an
essential prerequisite for the rapid and effec-
tive development of Soviet military power.
The primary administrative organ of the
pea{
HOTEL III 130m 6 Tubes SS-N?8+--~
YANKEE-Class
YANKEE 1 130m 16 Tubes SS-N-6-
YANKEE II 130m 12 Tubes SS?N?17
DELTA-Class
DELTA 1 140m 12 Tubes SS-N-B-
MOD
1 2 3
RV's 1 1 2 MRVs
RANGE (KM) 2,400 3,000 3,000
SS-N-5s not shown.
MOD
1 2 1
1 1 1 3 MIRVs
7,800 9,100 3,900 6,500
SS-N-20 SS-NX-23
MOD
2 3 In
1 7 MIRVs 6-9 flight
8,000 6,500 8,300 test
of SSBNs Claea ~JII Ciaea ti Ji
~25m--1 F-t-3m~
~yJJ Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines and Missiles
METERS
15
_I 10
RV's
US *~ :~n7~,OCEAN
3 OHIO`~~~.~r,~ US
. ,-;31aAFAYETT
"?-t~EN. FRAD
modified versions of the SS-NX-23 and the
SS-N-20. Both of these systems are likely to
be more accurate than their predecessors.
The Soviets emphasize redundant and time-
ly command and control for their military
forces, especially those for intercontinental
attack. The Soviets may deploy an extremely
POSEIDON
SLBM C-3
10
4,000
8
7,400
fl~~ and ~?dn?4 SLBM Launcher and Reentry
Vehicle (RVl ?eployment 1968-1984
s,ooo ~ ~ s,ooo
TRIDENT
SLBM C-4
u - -- --- o
1968 1670 19n 1974 1976 1678 1680 1982 1984
low frequency SELF) communications system
that will enable them to contact the SSBNs
under most operating conditions.
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DELTA lil SSBN, equipped with 16 M/RVed SS-N-18 SLBMs.
Strategic Aviation
Current Systems and Force Levels. Soviet
strategic bombers and strike aircraft are con-
trolled by the central Soviet leadership using
five air armies as intermediate commands.
These armies were established to place Soviet
strategic aircraft on a footing in peacetime
that would facilitate the transition to wartime.
These armies are focused on potential conflict
in Europe, Asia and the United States.
Strategic aviation assets include some 170
BEAR and BISON bombers, 235 BACKFIRE
bombers (including 105 BACKFIRE bombers
in Soviet Naval Aviation-. The Soviets also
COMBAT RADIUS IKMI
8,300 5,500
7,300
7,500
8,000
MAX SPEED (KTS)
i"BISON, BADGER, BLINDER
500 1,100
, FB-ttta not shown.
1,200
795
58p
Chapter II Forces for Global Warfare
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have 455 medium-range BLINDER and
BADGER bombers, 450 shorter-range FENC-
ER strike aircraft and 530 tanker, reconnais-
sance and electronic warfare aircraft. The
Soviets have allocated these aircraft among
the five air armies to provide support for
specific theaters of military operations but
also to assure the flexibility to reallocate air-
craft as necessary during wartime. The inter-
continental BEAR and BISON bombers are
available for maritime and Eurasian mis-
sions, and the BACKFIRE is clearly capable
of use against the United States. This flex-
ibility allows the Soviets to focus their
strategic air assets as circumstances dictate.
The Soviets have taken recent steps that
indicate greatly increased interest in the long-
(4~S and S?~IL1T Intercontinental-
Capable Bombars'
Inventory
500 ,
Inventory
r~
USSR (excluding
aircraft assigned
to Naval Aviation)
o?~
0
of ~ '?
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Year
US data include B-52 , FB-111a ;Soviet data include
BEAR, BISON and BACKFIRE.
range strategic bomber. An entirely new vari-
ant of the BEAR bomber (BEAR H~, probably
designed to carry long-range cruise missiles,
is now in production-the first new produc-
tion of a strike version of the BEAR airframe
in over 15 years. In addition, older BEAR air-
to-surface missile (ASM) carrying aircraft are
being reconfigured to carry the newer, super-
BLACKJACK and BACKFIRE Coverage from
Soviet Bases
(2-~IVay Missions)
sonic AS-4 ASM in place of subsonic AS-3s.
Several of these reconfigurations (BEAR G)
have been completed. With the new BEAR H
in series production, the decline in the inven-
tory of BEAR and BISON aircraft character-
istic of recent years has been reversed. The
Soviets today have more bombers operational
than just a few years ago.
The BACKFIRE is the most modern opera-
tional Soviet bomber. The Soviets continue to
produce the aircraft at a rate of about 30 per
year; this production rate is likely to be main-
tained at least through the end of the decade.
The original design has been modified several
times and further modifications are likely to
be made to upgrade aircraft performance. The
BACKFIRE is a long-range aircraft capable
of performing nuclear strike, conventional at-
tack, anti-ship and reconnaissance missions.
Its low-level penetration features make it a
more survivable system than its predeces-
sors. The BACKFIRE has sufficient range/
radius capabilities for it to be employed effec-
tively against the contiguous United States on
high-altitude subsonic missions. Its low-alti-
tude supersonic dash capabilities make it a
formidable weapon in support of military op-
erations in Europe and Asia as well. The
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BACKFIRE can be equipped with a probe to
permit inflight refueling; this would further
increase its range and radius capabilities.
The Soviets have some FENCER strike air-
craft assigned to strategic aviation. The
FENCER is a supersonic, variable-geometry,
all-weather fighter-bomber that first reached
operational status in 1974. Three variants
have been developed, the most recent intro-
duced in 1981. The aircraft is still in produc-
tion, and the number assigned to strategic
aviation is likely to increase by 50 percent
over the next few years.
Force Developments. The new Soviet long-
range bomber-the BLACKJACK-is still in
the flight-test stage of development. The
The Tupo/ev BACKFIRE supersonic bomber is
designed to carry the AS-0 KITCHEN air-to-
surface missile mounted partially in its fuselage,
left and at top. The BACKFIRE can also carry
two wing-mounted AS-4s on the pylons visible in
the photograph at top.
BLACKJACK is larger than the US B-1B,
probably will be somewhat faster and may
have about the same combat radius. This new
bomber could reach operational status in
1987. The BLACKJACK will be capable of
carrying cruise missiles, bombs or a combina-
tion of both. It probably will first replace the
much less capable BISON bomber and then
the BEAR A bomber.
A new aerial-refueling tanker aircraft, based
on the I1-76/ CANDID, has been under devel-
opment for several years. When deployed in
the near future, the new tanker will support
tactical and strategic aircraft and significant-
ly improve the ability of Soviet aircraft to
conduct longer-range operations.
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? ~ ~~ ~"~'
The VICTOR 111 attack submarine could carry the SS-NX-21 cruise missile.
METERS
15
Long-Range Cruise Missiles
~~~~
RANGE IKM1 3,000 3,000 3,000
" In development
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Long-Range Cruise Missiles
Force Developments. The Soviets are devel-
oping five new, long-range cruise missile sys-
tems. Three of these are variants of a small
subsonic, low-altitude cruise missile similar
in design to the US TOMAHAWK. These vari-
ants have a range of about 3,000 kilometers.
The two others are variants of a larger system
probably designed for long-range operations.
This system has no US counterpart.
The three smaller cruise missiles are being
developed for launch from sea-, ground- and
air-based platforms respectively. The sea-
based variant, the SS-NX-21, is small enough
to be fired from standard Soviet torpedo
tubes. Candidate launch platforms for the SS-
NX-21 include: the existing VICTOR III SSN,
a new YANKEE-Class SSN, the new MIKE-
Class SSN (possibly afollow-on to the ALFA-
Class high-speed, deep-diving SSN) and the
new SIERRA-Class SSN (possibly afollow-on
to the VICTOR III. The SS-NX-21 probably
will become operational this year. SS-NX-21s
carried by submarines could be deployed near
US coasts.
The ground-based SSC-X-4 variant of the
small cruise missile may not be ready for op-
erational deployment until about 1985. Its
range and the likelihood that the Soviets will
not deploy the system outside the USSR in-
dicate that its mission will be in support of
theater operations. The system will be mobile
and probably follow operational proce-
dureslike those of the SS-20 LRINF missile.
The air-launched version of this cruise mis-
sile-the AS-X-15-could reach initial opera-
tional status this year on the new BEAR H
ALCM carrier aircraft. The system could also
be deployed on BLACKJACK bombers when
that aircraft reaches operational status. The
combination of the AS-X-15 and the new
BEAR H and BLACKJACK bombers will in-
crease Soviet strategic intercontinental air
power in the late 1980x.
The larger cruise missile, which has not yet
been designated, will have sea- and ground-
based variants. Both the sea- and ground-
based versions could be operational within
the next 2 years.
When first deployed, each of these five
cruise missiles will be fitted with nuclear war-
heads and capable of threatening hardened
targets. Depending on future munitions devel-
opments and the types of guidance systems
incorporated in their designs, they could even-
tually be accurate enough to permit the use of
conventional warheads. With such warheads,
highly accurate cruise missiles would pose a
significant non-nuclear threat to US and
NATO airfields and nuclear weapons in a non-
nuclearconflict.
US Strategic Forces
By mid-1984, US strategic deterrent forces
will consist of:
? 1,000 MINUTEMAN ICBMs,
? 33 TITAN ICBMs,
? 241 B-52G/H model bombers, plus
about 23 aircraft undergoing mainte-
nance and modification,
? 56 FB-111 bombers, plus some five
aircraft undergoing maintenance and
modification,
? 496 POSEIDON (C-3 and C-4) fleet
ballistic launchers, and
? 120 TRIDENT fleet ballistic
launchers.
The historic and continuing objective of US
strategic forces is deterrence of nuclear and
major conventional aggression against the
United States and its Allies. This policy has
preserved nuclear peace for over 38 years and,
in sharp contrast to the Soviet priority ac-
corded nuclear warfighting, is based on the
conviction of all postwar American adminis-
trations that there could be no winners in a
nuclear conflict. Rather, US deterrence policy
seeks to maintain the situation where any po-
tential aggressor sees little to gain and much
to lose in initiating hostilities against the
United States or its Allies. In turn, the main-
tenance of peace through nuclear deterrence
provides the vital opportunity to realize a
complementary and constant US goal of elimi-
nating nuclear weapons from the arsenals of
all states.
To realize these deterrence objectives re-
quires the development, deployment and
maintenance of strategic forces whose size
and characteristics clearly indicate to an op-
ponent that he cannot achieve his politico-mil-
itary objectives either through employment of
nuclear weapons or through political coercion
based on nuclear advantages. Despite these
pressing military requirements, the 1970s saw
the United States exhibit restraint in modern-
izing its strategic forces. This was done to
promote what was hoped to be significant pro-
gress in SALT negotiations. As a result, the
United States did not introduce any new
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ICBMs, SLBMs, SSBN classes or heavy stra-
tegic bombers in the 1972 to 1978 period. The
United States did introduce the Short-Range
Attack Missile (SRAM) to assist strategic
bombers in penetrating the extensive and
growing Soviet air defenses. A limited num-
ber, 66, of FB-111 shorter-range bombers were
also deployed in the 1969-70 period. These de-
velopments were required to maintain the
effectiveness of our bomber force in response
to the Soviet air defense improvements.
The result of the asymmetry in US and Sovi-
et modernization programs has been to erode
the perception of US deterrent capability, and
its continuation could weaken US ability to
maintain peace. To preclude such a possibil-
ity, to restore the real and perceived deterrent
capability of the United States and to resolve
the problems associated with aging US forces,
the President has initiated and the Congress
has supported a comprehensive and inte-
grated strategic modernization program. This
program includes:
? deployment of more survivable and
effective command, control and com-
munications systems,
? development of the new TRIDENT-
II submarine-launched ballistic missile
and continued procurement of TRI-
DENT-Class submarines,
? procurement of 100 B-1B bombers in
the near-term and deployment of the
Advanced Technology Bomber for the
1990s,
? modernization of selected B-52
bombers and introduction of air-
launched cruise missiles into the force,
? deployment of 100 new PEACE-
KEEPER (MX) land-based missiles in
MINUTEMAN silos beginning in 1986,
and
? development of a new, small, single-
warhead ICBM.
Strategic Defense
Strategic defenses are vital to the overall
Soviet strategy for nuclear war. As noted
above, the operations of Soviet defensive and
attack forces are closely coupled; attack stra-
tegies are geared in large part to the reduction
of the defensive burden. In the Soviet concept
of a layered defense, effectiveness is achieved
through multiple types of defensive capabili-
ties compensating for shortcomings in indi-
vidual systems and for the likelihood that
neither offensive strikes nor any one layer of
defense will stop all attacking weapons. The
Soviets have made major improvements in
their deployed strategic defenses and have in-
vested heavily in ABM-related development.
Early Warning
Current Systems and Force Levels. The Sovi-
ets maintain the world's most extensive early
warning system for both ballistic missile and
air defense. Their operational ballistic missile
early-warning system includes a launch detec-
tion satellite network, over-the-horizon radars
and a series of large phased-array radars lo-
cated primarily on the periphery of the USSR.
Their early-warning air surveillance system is
composed of an extensive network of ground-
based radars linked operationally with those
of their Warsaw Pact Allies.
The current Soviet launch detection satel-
lite network is capable of providing about 30
minutes warning of any US ICBM launch, and
of determining the area from which it orig-
inated. The two over-the-horizon radars the
Soviets have directed at the US ICBM fields
also could provide them with 30 minutes war-
ning of an ICBM strike launched from the
United States, but with somewhat less preci-
sion than the satellite network. Working
together, these two early-warning systems can
provide more reliable warning than either
working alone.
The next layer of operational ballistic mis-
sile early warning consists of 11 large HEN
HOUSE detection and tracking radars at six
locations on the periphery of the USSR. These
radars can distinguish the size of an attack,
confirm the warning from the satellite and
over-the-horizon radar systems and provide
some target-tracking data in support of ABM
deployments.
Current Soviet air surveillance radar de-
ployments include more than 7,000 radars of
various types located at about 1,200 sites.
These deployments provide virtually com-
plete coverage at medium to high altitudes
over the USSR and in some areas extends
hundreds of kilometers beyond the borders.
Limited coverage against low-altitude targets
is concentrated in the western USSR and in
high-priority areas elsewhere. Since 1983, the
Soviets have begun to deploy two new air sur-
veillance radars. These radars assist in the
early warning of cruise missile and bomber at-
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tacks and enhance air defense electronic war-
fare capabilities.
Force Developments. Since last year, an
additional new large phased-array radar for
ballistic missile early warning and target-
tracking has been discovered under construc-
tion in Siberia. This brings to six the number
of such radars operational or under construc-
tion in the USSR. This new radar closes the
final gap in the combined HEN HOUSE and
new large-phased array radar early-warning
Coverage of Ballistic Missile Detection
and Tracking Systems
Launch detection satellites
Over?the-horizon radars
Hen House radars
New phased?array radars under construction
Moscow ABM radars
and tracking network. Together, this radar
and the five others like it form an arc of
coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the
northwest, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in
the southwest. HEN HOUSE coverage com-
pletes the circle. The newly identified radar
almost certainly violates the 1972 ABM Trea-
ty in that it is not located on the periphery of
the Soviet Union nor is it pointed outward as
required by the Treaty. The complete network
of these radars, which could provide target
tracking data for ABM deployments beyond
Moscow, probably will be operational by the
late 1980s.
The Soviets may establish a network of sat-
ellites in geostationary orbit designed to pro-
vide timely indications of SLBM launches.
Such a network could be operational by the
end of the decade.
The USSR has a strong research and devel-
opment program to produce new early warn-
ing and other air surveillance radars, as well
as to improve existing systems. More than 20
types of these radars are currently in devel-
opment. In addition, the Soviets are con-
tinuing to deploy improved air surveillance
data systems that can rapidly pass data from
outlying radars through the air surveillance
network to ground-controlled intercept sites
and SAM command posts. These systems will
continue to be deployed until all areas are
equipped with them.
Ballistic Missile Defense
Current Systems and Force Levels. The So-
viets maintain around Moscow the world's
only operational ABM system. This system is
intended to afford a layer of defense for Sovi-
et civil and military command authorities in
the Moscow environs during a nuclear war
rather than blanket protection for the city it-
self. Since 1980, the Soviets have been up-
grading and expanding this system within the
limits of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The original single-layer Moscow ABM sys-
tem included 64 reloadable above-ground
launchers at four complexes for the GALOSH
ABM-1B, six TRY ADD guidance and engage-
ment radars at each complex and the DOG
HOUSE and CAT HOUSE target-tracking ra-
dars south of Moscow. The Soviets are up-
grading this system to the 100 launchers
permitted under the Treaty. When completed,
the new system will be a two-layer defense
composed of silo-based long-range modified
GALOSH interceptors designed to engage tar-
gets outside the atmosphere; silo-based high-
acceleration interceptors designed to engage
targets within the atmosphere; associated en-
gagement and guidance radars; and a new
large radar at Pushkino designed to control
ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers
may be reloadable. The new Moscow defenses
are likely to reach fully operational status in
the late 1980s.
Force Developments. The USSR has an im-
proving potential for large-scale deployment
of modernized ABM defenses well beyond the
100-launcher ABM Treaty limits. Widespread
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The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, early-warning and ballistic missile target-
tracking radar at Pechora. An identical radar in the Central USSR almost certainly violates the 1972
ABM Treaty.
ABM deployment to protect important target
areas in the USSR could be accomplished
within the next 10 years. The Soviets have de-
veloped arapidly deployable ABM system for
which sites could be built in months instead of
years. A typical site would consist of engage-
ment radars, guidance radars, above-ground
launchers and the high-acceleration intercep-
tor. The new, large phased-array radars under
construction in the USSR along with the HEN
HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, CAT HOUSE and
possibly the Pushkino radars appear to be de-
signed to provide support for such a wide-
spread ABM defense system. The Soviets
seem to have placed themselves in a position
to field relatively quickly a nationwide ABM
system should they decide to do so.
In addition, the Soviets are deploying one
surface-to-air missile system, the SA-10, and
are flight-testing another, the mobile SA-X-12.
The SA-X-12 is both a tactical SAM and anti-
tactical ballistic missile. Both the SA-10 and
SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept
some types of US strategic ballistic missiles
as well. These systems could, if properly sup-
ported, add significant point-target coverage
to awide-spread ABM deployment.
Soviet-directed energy development pro-
grams involve future ABM as well as anti-
satellite and air-defense weapons concepts.
By the late 1980s, the Soviets could have pro-
totypes for ground-based lasers for ballistic
missile defense. The many difficulties in
fielding an operational system will require
much development time, and initial opera-
tional deployment is not likely in this century.
Ground- and space-based particle beam
weapons for ballistic missile defense will be
more difficult to develop than lasers. Never-
theless, the Soviets have a vigorous program
underway for particle beam development and
could have a prototype space-based system
ready for testing in the late 1990s.
Antisatellite Systems
Current Systems and Force Levels. Since
1971, the Soviets have had the capability to
attack satellites in near-earth orbit with a
ground-based orbital interceptor. Using a
radar sensor and apellet-type warhead, the in-
terceptor can attack a target in various orbits
during its first two revolutions. An intercept
during the first orbit would reduce the time
available for a target satellite to take evasive
action. The interceptor can reach targets or-
biting at more than 5,000 kilometers, but it
probably is intended for high priority satel-
lites at lower altitudes. The antisatellite inter-
ceptor is launched from Tyuratam where two
launch pads and storage space for additional
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GALOSH anti-ballistic missile interceptors fitted on 64 surface launchers around Moscow, above left
are being replaced by silo-based exoatmospheric and endoatmosphe-ic ABMs, shown du-ing launch
sequence at bottom.
interceptors and launch vehicles are avail-
able. Several interceptors could be launched
each day from each of the pads. In addition to
the orbital interceptor, the Soviets have two
ground-based test lasers that could be used
against satellites. The Soviets also have the
technological capability to conduct electronic
warfare against space systems.
Force Developments. Emerging directed
energy technologies are seen by the Soviets as
offering greater promise for future anti-
satellite application than further development
of orbital interceptors equipped with conven-
tional warheads. The Soviets could deploy an-
tisatellite lasers to several ground sites in the
next 10 years or they could deploy laser-
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This directed-energy RFtD site at the Sary Shagan proving ground in the central USSR could provide
some anti-satellite capabilities today and possibly ABM prototype testing in the future.
equipped satellites either available for launch
on command or maintained in orbit, or could
deploy both. Such systems would have signif-
icant advantages over a conventional orbital
interceptor. These include longer-range, multi-
shot capabilities and a greater capacity to
overcome the target's defensive measures.
The Soviets could test a prototype laser
antisatellite weapon as soon as the late 1980x.
Initial operational capability could be achiev-
ed between the early- and mid-1990s.
Since the early 1970s, the Soviets have had
a research program to explore the technical
feasibility of a particle beam weapon in space.
A prototype space-based particle beam weap-
on intended only to disrupt satellite electronic
equipment could be tested in the early 1990s.
One designed to destroy the satellites could be
tested in space in the mid-1990x.
Air Defense
Current Systems and Force Levels. The So-
viets have deployed massive strategic air de-
fense forces that currently have excellent
.,.capabilities against aircraft flying at medium
and high altitudes but much less capability
against low-flying aircraft and cruise mis-
siles. Soviet air defenses, however, are in the
initial stages of a major overhaul geared en-
tirely to fielding an integrated air defense
system much more capable of low-altitude op-
erations. This overhaul includes the partial
integration of strategic and tactical air de-
fenses; the upgrading of early-warning and air
surveillance capabilities; the deployment of
more efficient data transmission systems; and
the development and initial deployment of
Interceptor aircraft bases
Strategic SAM concentrations- `'~'"
new aircraft, associated air-to-air missiles,
surface-to-air missiles and an airborne warn-
ing and control system (AWACS).
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MiG-25/FOXBAT E Interceptor.
Currently, the Soviets have some 1,200 air
defense interceptors and nearly 10,000 SAM
launchers at over 900 sites dedicated to stra-
tegic territorial air defense. An additional
2,000 interceptors and some 1,800 tactical
SAMs are deployed within the USSR's bor-
ders and could be made available for terri-
torial defense.
Older FOXBAT aircraft are being upgraded
to the FOXBAT E configuration giving them
somewhat better look-down radar capabili-
ties. More importantly, however, the new
MiG-31/FOXHOUND interceptor, the first
true look-down/shoot-down-capable aircraft
in the Soviet inventory, is being introduced.
The FOXHOUND aircraft is comparable in
size to the US F-14. Over 50 of these aircraft
are now operational.
The new multiple altitude SA-10 SAM, first
deployed in 1980, is now operational at some
40 sites with nearly 350 launchers and four
SA-lOs per launcher. In addition, SA-5 de-
ployment continues at a very slow pace within
the USSR. The most significant SA-5 deploy-
ments have occurred outside the USSR in
Eastern Europe, Mongolia and Syria.
Force Developments. Virtually all of the So-
viet air defense development programs now
underway are geared to overcoming a long-
standing vulnerability to low-altitude air
attack. Two new fighter interceptors-the Su-
27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM-
have true look-down/shoot-down capabilities.
The FULCRUM is a single-seat, twin engine
fighter similar in size to the US F-16. It was
first deployed earlier this year. The FLANK-
ER is larger than the FULCRUM and is about
the same size as the US F-15. It, too, :is a
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METERS SA-1
12 n
A
RANGE IKMI 50
SA-10 SA-X?12
SA?11 n
~ I
.EFFECTIVE LOW-TO- MEDIUM- MEDIUM- LOWTO-
ALTITUDE MEDIUM MEDIUM MEDIUM TO-HIGH TO-HIGH MEDIUM
METERS
75
0
RANGEIKMI
EFFECTIVE
ALTITUDE
NIKE
HERCULES
LOW-TO- LOW-TO- LOW-TO-
LOW LOW HIGH MEDIUM HIGH LOW
IMPROVED
HAWK
MEDIUM-TO-
HIGH
single-seat, twin-engine fighter, and it could
be operationally deployed this year or next.
Both have been designed to be highly maneu-
verable, air-to-air combat aircraft.
These two aircraft and the FOXHOUND are
likely to operate under certain circumstances
with the new I1-76/MAINSTAY Airborne
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) air-
craft. The MAINSTAY will substantially im-
prove Soviet capabilities for early warning
and air combat command and control. It will
provide the Soviets with the capability over
land and water to detect aircraft and cruise
missile targets flying at low altitudes. The
MAINSTAY could be used to help direct
fighter operations over European and Asian
battlefields and to enhance air surveillance
and defense of the USSR. Four of these air-
crafthave been built. The MAINSTAY should
be operational this year; an annual production
rate of about five aircraft is likely.
The three new Soviet fighter-interceptors
are equipped with two new air-to-air mis-
siles-the AA-9 designed for the FOXHOUND
and the AA-X-10 designed for the FULCRUM
and the FLANKER. The AA-9 is a long-range
missile that can be used against low-flying air-
craft; the AA-X-10 is a medium-range missile
with similar capabilities.
In keeping with their drive toward mobility
as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets
are developing a mobile version of the SA-10
SAM. This mobile version could be used to
support Soviet theater forces, but, perhaps
more importantly, if deployed with the terri-
torial defense forces, it would allow the Sovi-
ets to change the location of those SA-lOs in
the USSR. The mobile SA-10 could be opera-
tional by 1985.
The Soviets have efforts underway to devel-
op at least three types of high-energy laser
weapons for air defense. These include lasers
intended for defense of high-value strategic
targets in the USSR, those for point defense of
CHAPARRAL
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?~G~ Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
Tu-128
FIDDLER B
MiG?29 MiG-31 '
YaK-28 MiG-23 FULCRUM .FOXHOUND
FIREBAR.. FLOGGER B/G
SPEEDIKTS)
RADIUS (KM-
ARMAMENT
WINGSPAN (MI
1,82,5
1,200
1,350
950
1,080
1,350
1,350
1,375
1,450
1,000
1,150
1,250
900
1,300
800
1,500
4 AAMs
2 AAMs
8 AAMs
4 AAMs
2 AAMs
B AAMs
6 AAMs
8 AAMs
14
9
14
18
12
8lswept)
12
14
Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft
r. _-..0-..:-._:--
F-706A
DELTA DART
SPEED (KTS) 1,150
i RADIUS IKMI 925
I ARMAMENT 5 AAMs
WINGSPAN (MI 12
ships at sea and theater-forces air defense.
Following past practice, the Soviets are likely
to deploy air-defense lasers to complement
rather than replace interceptors and SAMs.
The territorial-defense laser is probably in at
least the prototype stage of development and
could be operational between the mid- to-late
1980s. It most likely will be deployed in con-
junction with SAMs in a point defense role.
Since the two systems would have different
attributes and vulnerabilities, they would pro-
vide mutual support. The shipborne lasers
probably will not be operational until after
the end of the decade. The theater-force lasers
may be operational sometime sooner and are
likely to be capable of structurally damaging
aircraft at close ranges and producing electro-
optical and eye damage at greater distances.
In addition, the Soviets have underway a de-
velopment program for an airborne laser. As-
suming a successful development effort,
limited initial deployment could begin in the
early 1990s. Such a laser platform could have
Interceptor Aircraft Radar Capability
F OU
(LOGGER B
FOXHOUND
fULGRUM
FLANKER
FLOGGER 6
FLOGGER G
FOXBAT E
FRESCO
FARMER
FISHPOT
FIREBAR
FIDDLER
(LOGGER B
FLAGON
FLOGGER G
FOXBAT
FoxiaaT E
FIREBAR
FIDDLER
FLAGON
FLAGON
Range only
radar
Limited
lookdown
1988 estimate
True lookdown/
shootdown
missions including antisatellite defense, pro-
tection of high-value airborne assets and
cruise-missile defense.
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Passive Defense
Soviet passive defense preparations have
been underway in earnest for some 30 years,
and have, over time, expanded from the pro-
tection of such vital entities as the national
Party and government leadership and Armed
Forces, to embrace the territorial leadership,
national economy and general population.
The Soviets regard passive defense as an es-
sential ingredient of their overall military
posture and their war planning. In conjunc-
tion with active forces, the Soviets plan for
their passive defense program to ensure the
survival and wartime continuity of:
? Soviet leadership,
? military command and control,
war-supporting industrial production
and services, and
~ the essential workforce and protec-
tion of as much of the general popula-
tion as possible.
As this program has expanded, elements of it
have been designated by the Soviets as "civil
defense." Use of this term in its normal West-
ern context does not convey the full scope of
Soviet Civil Defense.
Extensive planning for the transition of the
entire State and economy to a wartime pos-
ture has been fundamental to Soviet passive
defense preparations. The Soviet General
Staff and Civil Defense officials have super-
vised the development of special organiza-
tions and procedures to implement quickly
the transition to war and have emphasized the
mobilization and protection of all national
resources essential to the successful prosecu-
tion of war and recovery.
The senior Soviet military establishment
has also supervised the 30-year program to
construct hardened command posts and sur-
vivable communications for key military com-
manders and civilian managers at all levels of
the Party and government. Likewise, protec-
tive hardening, dispersal and wartime produc-
tion plans for Soviet industry have all been
coordinated with the wartime requirements of
the military and supervised by Civil Defense
personnel. The protection of the general popu-
lation through evacuation procedures and ex-
tensive sheltering in or near urban areas is the
most visible aspect of the passive defense
program.
Soviet Civil Defense Management. These
passive defense programs reflect the Soviet
concept of the system in its wartime mode.
The wartime management system would be a
militarized system of national administration
in which peacetime government bodies be-
come Civil Defense components under direct
military subordination. This would extend to
Soviet territorial administration at all levels
and to specialized functional components
such as industrial, transport, power and com-
munications ministries. Soviet authorities at
all levels would serve as uniformed chiefs of
Civil Defense and command their respective
organizations in a military capacity. Soviet
Civil Defense thus serves both as a vehicle to
administer peacetime preparations and train-
ing and as the infrastructure that would knit
together civil and military bodies in their
unified wartime management systems.
Continuity of Leadership Functions. Soviet
commanders and managers at all levels of the
Party and government are provided hardened
alternate command posts located well away
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from urban centers. This comprehensive and
redundant system, composed of more than
1,500 hardened facilities with special commu-
nications, is patterned after similar capabili-
ties afforded the Armed Forces. More than
175,000 key personnel throughout the system
are believed to be equipped with such alter-
nate facilities in addition to the many deep
bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities.
Stability of .the Wartime Economy. Soviet
passive defense efforts include measures to
maintain essential production and services
even during a nuclear war. Elaborate plans
have been set for the full mobilization of the
national economy in support of the war effort
and the conversion to wartime production. Re-
serves of vital materials are maintained,
many in hardened underground structures.
Redundant industrial facilities have been
built and are in active production. Industrial
and other economic facilities have been equip-
ped with blast shelters for the workforce, and
detailed procedures have been developed for
the relocation of selected plants and equip-
ment. By ensuring the survival of essential
workers, the Soviets intend to reconstitute
vital production programs using those indus-
trial components that can be redirected or
salvaged after attack.
North American Defense Forces
US and Canadian interceptor forces assign-
ed to the North American Aerospace Defense
(NORAD) Command maintain continuous
ground alert at sites around the periphery of
the United States and Canada. Alert aircraft
intercept and identify unknown intruders. In
a crisis, the Air Force, Navy and Marine
Corps would provide additional interceptors.
Supported by AWACS aircraft, these forces
could provide a limited defense against
bomber attacks.
To meet the increasing Soviet bomber and
ALCM threats, US interceptor squadrons as-
signed to NORAD are being equipped with
newer, more advanced F-15 and F-16 aircraft.
These modern fighters will provide alook-
down/shoot-down capability to detect and
engage enemy bombers penetrating at low al-
titudes. The Canadians are upgrading their
air defense forces with the CF-18. Joint US
and Canadian programmed improvements to
long-range surveillance include modern mi-
crowave radars for the Distant Early Warning
line and over-the-horizon back-scatter radars
looking east, west and south.
Soviet space-oriented military systems pose
an unacceptable threat to the land, sea and air
forces of the United States. Soviet satellites
probably have the capability to support tar-
geting of Soviet anti-ship cruise missiles
launched against US surface ships. The US
anti-satellite (ASAT) program, centering on
the Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle, is part
of our response to this and similar threats. At
the same time, we are continuing to examine
the potential basis for negotiating ASAT arms
control agreements.
Finally, the United States has called for a
research program to explore the possibility of
strengthening deterrence by taking advantage
of recent advances in technology that could,
in the long term, provide an effective defense
against ballistic missiles. The effort focuses
on existing research programs in five technol-
ogy areas that offer the greatest promise.
Given the extensive Soviet efforts in this
area, the US program is a prudent and neces-
sary hedge against the possibility of unilater-
al Soviet deployment of an advanced system
capable of effectively countering Western
ballistic missiles. Such a unilateral Soviet
deployment -added to the USSR's impres-
sive air and passive defense capabilities -
would jeopardize deterrence because the US
would no longer be able to pose a credible
threat of retaliation to a Soviet attack.
Nuclear Stockpiles
Since the first Soviet nuclear explosion on
August 29, 1949, the Soviet stockpile of nu-
clear warheads has grown steadily, primarily
in the area of offensive weapons. In contrast,
the US stockpile was one-third higher in 1967
than it is today. In addition, as a result of two
landmark NATO decisions in 1979 and 1983,
the nuclear stockpile in Europe will decline by
one-third from its 19791eve1.
The USSR's nuclear weapons program has
shown diversity and sophistication. Today,
Soviet nuclear warheads include a full spec-
trum of fission and thermonuclear designs us-
ing uranium, plutonium and tritium, with
weapons yields up to multimegaton. The pre-
ponderance of these weapons is assigned to
strategic offensive forces. Because of MIRV-
ing, the megatonnage in the Soviet arsenal
leveled in the early seventies, and then began
to drop. However, with the deployment of new
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Soviet Military Power 1983 reported the development of a small Soviet space plane. Shown at left and
above is the recovery of a scale model of that plane after orbit and splash-down in the Indian Ocean.
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A6ew MSS and ~c~nc~tt Space launch Vehicles
HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE
MEDIUM-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE"
HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE"
HEAVY-LIFT
LAUNCH VEHICLE"
LIFT-OFF WEIGHT IKGI
2,220,114
400,000
1,500,000
WITH 6 OR MORE
STRAP-ON
BOOSTERS
LIFT-OFF THRUST IKGS-
6,925,000
1,300,000
4-6,000,000
8.9,000,000
PAYLOAD TO 180 KILOMETERS lKG1
95,000+
15,000+
95.000+
150;000
nuclear weapons systems their stockpile meg-
atonnagehas again started to rise.
The Soviet nuclear energy and weapons
development program and its associated in-
dustrial base are characterized by a highly
centralized control structure. The ministry
controlling nuclear weapons development and
production is in charge of all nuclear materi-
als, reactors and weapons research and devel-
opment (R&D) as well as production. Since the
ministry controls virtually all facilities relat-
ed to the nuclear industry, reactor utilization
can be unilaterally altered to satisfy military
requirements, regardless of the military or
130,000 Shuttle
payload capacity)
commercial nature of the particular reactor
facility.
Finally, during the past two decades, the
number of workers and the amount of floor
space of the Soviet nuclear weapons research
and development facilities have exhibited
constant growth. Manpower devoted to nu-
clear R&D probably exceeds 30,000 employ-
ees and is comprised of the best scientists,
mathematicians, engineers and technicians
Soviet academia can produce. Their R&D ef-
forts are supported by an active nuclear test
program conducted at the Novaya Zemlya and
Semipalitinsk nuclear test sites.
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The Soviet Space Program
Soviet Military Power 1983 outlined the ex-
pansion into space of the Soviet quest for mili-
tary superiority. During the ensuing year, the
Soviets have made progress toward their dual
military objectives of global support to mili-
tary forces and denial of enemy employment
of space during wartime. In addition, progress
has been made toward the two other key objec-
tives of enhancing the influence and prestige
of the USSR and contributing to the Soviet
economy. There has been no change in the
heavy Soviet emphasis on the military appli-
cations of space, reflecting their view, noted
as early as two decades ago in the classified
Soviet military publication, Military Thought,
that "the mastering of space [is] a prerequi-
sitefor achieving victory in war."
Since last year, the Soviet developmental
~ programs for providing a family of new space
launch vehicles and reusable spacecraft suit-
able for military and civil purposes have come
into sharper focus. Significant new launch
and support facilities at Tyuratam are near-
ingcompletion. Some of these should be ready
this year or next to support initial testing of
new launch vehicles. These vehicles include a
space transportation system (STS, that in
many respects copies the design of the US
space shuttle, a new heavy-lift launch vehicle
based on the core rockets of the STS and a
new medium-lift launch vehicle that is evi-
dently designed for high launch rates. The
new spacecraft include a space shuttle that
differs from the US shuttle only in the respect
that the main engines are not on the orbiter, a
small space plane that could be a test vehicle
or a scale version of a military space plane,
and a space tug that would be used in space to
move equipment and supplies from one orbit
to another. The Soviet shuttle could be first
tested in the mid-to-late 1980s. The space
plane scale model has already been tested
three times, and the space tug probably will
reach operational status late in the 1980s.
In addition, the Soviets evidently intend to
continue using their many types of opera-
tional space launch vehicles for at least
another decade. This current family of vehi-
cles, which supports a space effort of 100 or
more launches per year, combinQd with the
new generation of systems, indicates that the
Soviets will be able by the mid- to-late 1980s
to increase significantly their space program The SL-4 space launch vehicle is the workhorse
both in numbers and payload weight. In this of the current Soviet manned space program.
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The Soviets have announced plans to have a large, permanently manned space station orbiting the
earth in the 1990s. This station, which would serve military purposes, could appear as shown in this
artist's depiction.
regard, the new heavy-lift vehicle is estimated
to have the capability to place payloads
weighing upwards of 330,000 pounds into low-
earth orbit. This is about seven times more
than the largest operational Soviet booster
can deliver today, and about five times the
maximum US capability. Despite the obvious
civil and scientific uses to which these capa-
bilities could be put, the Soviets will continue,
as in the past, to devote most of their future
space program to military purposes.
Military systems now account for more than
70 percent of Soviet space launches. Another
20 percent have combined military-civil appli-
cation, with less than 10 percent devoted to
purely civil/scientific activities. Very little of
their effort is devoted to programs that have
economic benefit.
The Soviets routinely conduct about four to
five times as many space launches per year as
the United States. This is necessitated pri-
marily by the shorter system lifetimes and
poorer reliability of most Soviet satellites.
The fact that they routinely operate this way
in peacetime, however, gives them an inher-
ently greater capability to increase rapidly
the number of military satellites in orbit and
to replace lost or damaged satellites as long as
launch facilities are intact.
The US and USSR currently maintain about
the same number of operational satellites in
orbit, 110 to 120. The Soviet inventory of op-
erational space systems provides the capabil-
ity to perform the following military functions:
? reconnaissance and surveillance,
? command, control and
communications,
? ICBM launch detection and attack
warning,
? strategic and tactical targeting,
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? navigational support,
? meteorological support, and
? antisatellite operations.
The Soviets have satellites that are de-
signed to perform naval surveillance and tar-
geting missions. These satellites are strictly
military systems intended to support Soviet
naval operations against large surface ships
and other surface ship formations.
The Soviets have a deployed antisatellite
weapon system that is capable of attacking
satellites in low-to-medium earth orbits. The
intercontinental warfare section of this
chapter has addressed Soviet antisatellite and
other space-oriented weapons programs in
some detail. Recent Soviet proposals to ban
all ASAT tests and future deployments of
ASAT weapons are intended to put the United
States at a disadvantage in this area. It is im-
portant to note that the proposed treaty does
not prevent developing and deploying ad-
vanced ground-based weapons-such as high
energy lasers-that could be used in an anti-
satellite role.
Estimated Dollar Costs of
the Soviet Space Program
N .._._... _._.... ... _.. N
~ AND CONSTRUCTION ~
0 0
to 10
m m
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
? Estimates represent cost in constant 1981 dollars for the US to
replicate known Soviet development and procurement of space
systems. Launch and operation costs are not included.
The Soviets continue to pursue their mann-
ed space programs maintaining in orbit the
SALYUT space station, which is manned dur-
ing most of the year. This gives the Soviets
the capability to perform a variety of func-
tions from space, including military R&D and
the use of man to augment their other recon-
naissance and surveillance efforts. A larger,
permanently manned space station, expected
during the next decade, will significantly in-
crease their in-orbit operations capabilities.
This station could be used as a stepping stone
to interplanetary exploration and the estab-
lishment of bases on other planetary bodies.
The Soviets, however, are more likely to use
such a station to perform command and con-
trol, reconnaissance and targeting functions.
During wartime, it could perform these func-
tions and more offensively oriented missions
as well. The Soviets believe in the military
utility of maintaining cosmonauts in orbit.
Over the next 10 years, therefore, the Soviets
are likely to develop primarily for military
purposes:
? a permanently manned SKYLAB-
size space station to be operational in
the next 2-3 years with a 6- to 12-person
crew, and
? a very large modular space station,
to be operational by the early- to-mid-
1990s, which could house as many as
100 personnel.
By all measures, the Soviet level of effort
devoted to space in the 1980s is increasing sig-
nificantly over the activities noted in the
1970s. The projected yearly rate of growth of
the Soviet space program is expected to out-
pace both the annual rate of growth in overall
Soviet military spending and that of the Sovi-
et gross national product (GNP) for a number
of years to come.
The Soviets have embarked upon a long-
term, broad-based effort to expand their oper-
ational military capability in space. A major
Soviet objective is to expand warfighting ca-
pability in space and achieve a measure of su-
periority in that arena. Their technological
base is strengthening and is being enhanced
by technology transfer from the West. Their
launch capability is increasing with the devel-
opment of new facilities and booster systems.
They continue to operate the world's only op-
erational antisatellite system, while they test
and develop more sophisticated space weap-
onry. It is clear the Soviets are striving to in-
tegrate their space systems with the rest of
their Armed Forces to ensure superior mili-
tary capabilities in all arenas.
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forces are being modernized with high-per-
theaters of military operations (TVDs-. Soviet
planning for the Western theater, encompas-
sing all of Europe, envisions three continental
,~~~''"~' ~ x ~`' ? ' ~ TVDs-Northwestern, Western and South-
~~ , ,a
' ~~`? ' ' ~~ ~`~?~' western-and two maritime, Arctic and Atlan-
`. ~ ~ ~ tic. This organizational concept enables
J ~ "w ', ~ ``` military planners to formulate military strat-
' ~~~ ~, ~' ;; ~ egy and tactics to achieve political objectives
;~;~ ~?~~,~,,~< `' in the geographic region, taking into consider-
. r~~~ ~,
~~~~" . ~z~~, ~~? ~"~~; ation the capabilities of the missiles, aircraft,
"`" '? i ,~ ' ~ ~~ ships and ground forces at their disposal. The
w ,~ ~ F _