I HAVE BEEN REQUESTED TO GIVE SOMETHING LIKE THE ATTACHED TO TIME MAGAZINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001404060075-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: May 11, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approved For Release 2008/08/05 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001404060075-8
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
CI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
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tt
6
DOA
7
DDO
8
DDSBT
9
Chm/NIC
l0
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
t3
D/EEO
14
D/Pers
15
D/OEA
16
C/PAD/OEA
17
SA/IA
18
AO/DCI
19
C/IPD/OIS
20
21
22
SUSPENSE +~ +~ inn ~ ~ try
Gate
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Approved For Release 2008/08/05 :CIA-RDP88B00443R001404060075-8
 Approved For Release 2008/08/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001404060075-8
11 May 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
83-25~
1. I have been requested to give something like the attached to TIME
magazine. I'd like:
a. to see if you can improve it, and
b. to get your ideas.
2. Trying to be cautious
bland and obscure. I'd like your ideas on beefing it up.
3. I attach also the correspondence I have on this subject. I am
inclined to prefer a statement to answering specific questions, although
the question route can be made okay by reframing and trimming down questions.
William J. Casey
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SECRET
11 May 1983
Every President since FDR has authorized assistance to people resisting
oppressive foreign governments where deemed to be threatened.
Today, there exists a justification for this kind of activity over and
above our convictions and concerns about human rights and individual freedom.
Our national security is threatened by aggressive tactics being employed by
the Soviet Union, its allies and proxies, to overthrow the governments of
small friendly countries and convert them into actual or potential hostile
bases. Some combination of Soviet, Cuban, Vietnamese and Libyan aggression
against small countries has, over recent years, placed Soviet power on China's
southern flank and created actual or potential bases 500 miles closer to the
oil of the Middle East and created bases within striking distance of major
choke points in the sea lanes of the world and on our doorstep in Central America
and the Caribbean.
The Soviets or their proxies gain these positions by the use of propaganda,
subversion and terrorism to destabilize governments, the training and organization
of insurgents, the rapid supply of weapons and the provision of direction in
the use of sophisticated tactics, command, control and communications capabilities.
When radical governments came to power the Soviets directly or through their
surrogates help establish an internal-security structure to ensure that any
challenge from within can be stamped out. Sometimes this worked, as in
Ethiopia and Angola, and sometimes there was not enough time, as in Jamaica.
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SECRET
This strategy has worked to consolidate power in all of Indo-China,
establish new radical regimes in Ethiopia, Angola and Nicaragua, gain
possession of Afghanistan, a Russian goal for over a century, establish
Cuban control of Grenada, a strategic island in the Caribbean. It is
presently establishing and supporting an active insurgency in El Salvador
against an elected government, supporting revolutionary violence in Honduras
and Guatemala, putting pro-Western regimes under siege in Chad and the Sudan,
and, in a variety of ways, threatening them elsewhere.
In Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua radical
governments imposed or supported by some combination of Soviet, Vietnamese,
Libyan, Cuban or Nicaraguan power find themselves facing the organized
resistance of people unwilling to accept permanent loss of their rights and
heritage. This resistance is usually assisted by the people and governments
of neighboring countries which consider themselves threatened by the same
kind of aggressive force which they witnessed take over a once friendly
neighbor.
What is a nation to do if a country finds its national security first
threatened and then diminished as it witnesses hostile nations forcibly
establish and aggressively advance its power and influence in nearby countries?
It can try to reduce and abate the danger by diplomacy, economic assistance
and similar means. If that fails, it becomes necessary to take more ultimately
forcible measures to protect the national interest. At that point, a national
leader will look for alternatives between sending a diplomatic note and sending
in the Marines.
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SECRET
The United States has traditionally been ready to provide friendly
governments with arms to defend themselves against external aggression or
externally supported aggression with intelligence, communications, training
and mobility to keep up with the hit-and-run tactics used by externally
supported insurgent forces. We can introduce an element of stability into
the Third World by helping small countries develop those skills and capabilities,
and we can do this for a fraction of our foreign aid budget. After all,
governments cannot achieve the economic and social objectives of our foreign
aid until they're able to control and combat internal disruption. Social
progress does not come in the middle of civil war.
Today, our national security interests and the tranquility of countries
in our immediate neighborhood is being threatened from Cuba and Nicaragua.
Those countries have for some years been covertly sending weapons and trained
men into El Salvador and Honduras to overthrow elected governments, as well
as into Guatemala and Costa Rica.
It is not in our interest to help offset this by working to help those
who seek to push aggressor and hostile governments to a more peaceful course.
It will certainly send an ominous signal if the Congress should act to cut
off support for this kind of activity which it has authorized and funded
and thereby gives a free hand to Cuba and Nicaragua to pour into E1 Salvador
whatever is needed to overthrow an elected government while protecting the
imrediate aggressor from the opposition of its own people to that course.
The result may be that the only way to avoid or counter a Communist base
in Central America will be to involve our own troops.
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