CONGRESS/SALVADORAN AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 9, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
PBS MacNElt/LERRER
9 August 198+
CONGRESS/ LEHRER: President Reagan said in a written statement
SALVADORAN AID today, his Central American aid package with a $117
million in military aid to El Salvador is vitally urgent.
He urged Congress to authorize it without further delay.
But since Congress breaks for it's summer recess tomorrow
that doesn't leave much time. And the division between
the House and Senate on the El Salvador issue is a wide
one. The House having passed a version with the special
$117 million out, last night the Senate passing one with
it in. Judy Woodruff reports on the administration's
efforts to win final passage and the debate about it.
Judy.
WOODRUFF: Jim, a joint House-Senate conference committee
is just now sitting down to work to resolve the issue.
And in preparation for that the administration has pulled
Central America, Paul Gorman, have both been up on Capitol
Hill, trying to persuade legislators that the Salvadoran
government is fighting rebels armed by Nicaragua. To back
up those contentions, the State Department yesterday
released, for the first time publicly, what it has been
talking about for months privately. Intelligence films,
taken at night, by planes using night-seeing photographic
equipment. As one example, on the night of July 10, U.S.
intelligence agents, flying in a AC-130 aircraft,
photographed a large shrimp boat and two small boats 10
miles off the coast of El Salvador. The videotape and
narration of that incident that we will show you now were
prepared by the State Department. UNIDENTIFIED ANNOUNCER:
You are now observing the shrimper and the two boats on
low-light television. The shrimper, which is 75 feet in
length, has a smaller boat in tow. It has it's outriggers
extended on both sides, as if to give the appearance of
fishing. It is running with lights on, also to avoid
suspicion. The two smaller boats, both 18 feet in length,
have square-shaped sterns. It is likely that the shrimper
had completed a transfer of material to the two 18 foot
boats just. prior to the arrival of the *'bill kirk.' When
the shrimper realized that. the *'bill kirk' aircraft was
overhead, it began to move away from the smaller boats in
a southwesterly direction, towards open seas. The
shrimper quickly attained high speed, again, not
indicative of normal shrimping procedure. For the time
being, the two 18-foot boats remained in place. Upon the
arrival of the *'bill kirk', the two boats pushed apart
and began to move toward the Salvadoran coast. The boats
quickly attained high speed, estimated at between 20 and
25 knots. On three occasions during the boat's movement
toward shore one of the boats stopped, apparently to check
~nfsnue~
out all the stops to,help make the case that El Salvador
needs extra military aid. The U.S. Ambassador to
Salvador, Thomas Pickering, and the top U.S. general in
Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
 Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
if the *'bill kirk' aircraft was still overhead. During
one such stop, shown here, a crew member of one boat
apparently threw an object overboard. Aircraft crew
members saw this'activity through their night-vision
goggles. When the boats landed on the beach, they were
met by personnel noted on the screen as 'hot spots.' Of
particular note, a crate was apparently off-loaded from
one of the boats on to the shore. We have freeze-framed
the imagery here to better outline the crate, which is
just off the bow of the boat in the center of the screen.
At this location along the southeastern coast of El
Salvador, *'bill kirk' imaged what appeared to be the
formation of a pack-animal train on the beach in the early
morning hours of 11 July. After forming up, the personnel
at the
lead
of the formation led the train inland. The
larger
'hot
spots' you see are probable pack animals, the
smaller
'hot
spots' are personnel. Notice also that the
smaller
'hot
spots' are leading the larger 'hot spots' as
apparently a man would lead a pack animal. Notice also,
the interval that is maintained by the 'hot spots' leaving
the beach at the head of the column.
WOODRUFF: To assess the impact of these intelligence
videotapes and to look at the overall aid prospects for
Central America, we turn to the U.S. Ambassador Thomas
Pickering and to a leading critic of administration policy
in El Salvador, New York Democratic Congressman Stephen
Solarz. First of all, Mr. Ambassador, I think to the
untrained eye a lot of that film looked like little white
blobs and it was kind of hard to make out exactly what it
was. Is this the best evidence that the administration
has. THOMAS\PICKERING: No,--. of course not. At the
introduction to the briefing, we made it clear that no
single piece of evidence presented in a 45-minute
briefing, but the debriefing itself, putting together
pain-stakingly collected bits of information from many
-sources, perhaps as many as 40 or 50 separate pieces of
information, brought together a picture of four incidents
of importance in establishing the fact that the smuggling
of supplies was taking place into El Salvador. The other
important thing to recognize, and it was made clear at the
briefing, perhaps your correspondent missed that, was that
these were pictures taken on a 900 plus line-scan
television, compared with a 500-scan in which they were
shown. Because of technical problems, people don't have
that kind of definition. So the crew that identified
these in the aircraft had approximately twice or perhaps
even more, definition possibilities to understand what
these things were. In addition, of course, it had long
experience in looking at this kind of material and having
it verified on the.ground. So obviously, nothing relates
solely to those fuzzy-definitioned (sic) videotapes.
Cflnunued
Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
 Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
WOODRUFF: So how do you know that what you're saying, the
State Department representative was saying these things
were, were what they were. I mean, the crate, the people,
and whatever the other... PICKERING: Because, as I made
clear, we have pictures taken in the original mode, which
is much clearer, because for technical reasons, the common
television isn't able to reproduce it. Secondly, we've
had long experience in checking against what's happening
on the ground, what happens in the air. So we know what
men look like from the air, we know what animals look like
from the air.
WOODRUFF: All right. Then let me just ask you briefly,
what does it all add up to? What does it prove?
PICKERING: Well, the total briefing, not just this
videotape, which is only part of it, adds up to a great
deal of evidence indicating that supplies move to the
guerrillas over the beaches, perhaps over land corridors;
I'm certainly convinced myself the land corridors are very
important. And we've been able to establish that the
Nicaraguans themselves have admitted participation in this
activity. And we've established with this kind of
material, throughout the whole briefing, that Nicaragua is
a very important point for moving these kinds of arms and
equipment to the rebels, the guerrillas in El Salvador.
WOODRUFF: Congressman Solarz, does this persuade you?
REP.\STEPHEN\SOLARZ (D=N.Y.): I don't think these
pictures, Judy, in and of themselves, prove anything. To
suggest', as you did, that all one can see are a lot of
white blobs, is to imply that it has a degree of
precision, which I think is actually lacking in the
pictures that we just saw. Nevertheless, having said
that, let me say that having looked into the evidence'over
the course of the last several years, I personally believe
that the Nicaraguans are deeply involved in efforts to
provide arms and other forms of material assistance to the
rebels in El Salvador. In that sense, I don't think these
pictures, even if they, in fact, demonstrate what the
State Department claims they demonstrate or show, show us
anything or tell us anything we didn't already know. The
real issue is not whether the Nicaraguans are helping the
rebels in Salvador but what we ought to be doing about it.
WOODRUFF: All right, so then let's move on to that.
Ambassador Pickering, how do these, does this evidence,
the pictures and the rest of it, add up to the case that
you are trying to make to the Congress that all this extra
money is necessary. PICKERING: Well, I'm delighted Steve
agrees with the assessment. We have, I think, no
differences on that score. I think the action on the Hill
Coataue~f
3,
Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
 Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
indicates that people are skeptical about the need for
more assistance for El Salvador at the present time. The
very important point is that you have a scene change in
the government, a,,new president committed to all the
things that we would like to see Salvador committed to
doing and moving in the direction of making changes in El
Salvador in the human rights area, in the area of better
government, in the area of improving their economic
conditions, and for these reasons, we believe he, as the
new president, very much deserves our support. President
Reagan has presented a two-year package and obviously
debate now is how to get that two-year package through
Steve and his colleagues.
WOODRUFF: All right. Mr. Solarz. SOLARZ: The point I
would make, Judy, is that over the course of the last
several years, we've already provided El Salvador with
about $325 million in military assistance. For this year
alone we've given them $126 million in military
assistance, and at the beginning of the next fiscal year,
which starts on Oct. 1, only several weeks from now,
they're scheduled to receive an additional $132 million.
WOODRUFF: But they're asking for $117 million for the
rest of this fiscal year. SOLARZ: On top of the $126
million, they've already gotten and on top of the $132
million they're scheduled to receive as of Oct. 1.
WOODRUFF: And you say they shouldn't get any of the $117
is that it. SOLARZ: I think it would be premature to
provide it.at this time for two reasons. First of all,
we'_ve_.already given El Salvador over 10 times as much
military assistance as the guerrillas have received from
their outside supporters in Nicaragua, in Cuba and
elsewhere.
WOODRUFF: All right, let's stop and ask Ambassador
Pickering. PICKERING: Well, I don't know where Steve
gets his math. Up until that 10-times figure, I tracked
along with him. I don't think there's any way of
establishing that. Everybody knows, of course, that a 10-
to-1 force ratio, perhaps 10-to-1, is required to deal
with guerrillas, whatever that may be. The math is not
important. What we've had here, year after year, is the
Congress dribbling out assistance, keeping Salvador on, in
effect, starvation wages. The president has come in with
a two-year program designed to improve the capacity of the
Salvadoran military to deal with the security situation.
WOODRUFF: But how do you justify this four-fold increase?
Last year the appropriation was $81 million. PICKERING:
Last year the president asked.for $130 million. This year
we have finally succeeded with all the impetus of the
national bipartisan commission report, to,their
Contnuej
Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
 Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0
dis-statement to the president that he urgently needed
this money, he needed an increase, that we are somewhere
below what he asked for last year and well, well, in my
view what we got last year was barely enough to stay
alive. SOLARZ: The figures that I cited,_ Judy, about the
amount of support which has been received by the rebels_in
El Salvador come from our own intelligence agencies. It
is indisputable that we have given far more military
assistance to the government than the guerrillas have
gotten from either Nicaragua or Cuba. Yet, in spite of
that fact, the guerrillas are probably stronger today than
they were a few years ago. The reason I think is,....
WOODRUFF: But that could be an argument for more aid,
couldn't it? SOLZRZ: No, but the main problem. I don't
think so, because the main problem, which the Salvadoran
military has, in my judgement, is not so much a function
of an absence of arms or ammunition. It has to do with
ineffective leadership, with inadequate motivation, with
corruption and the like. And unless they can get their
own act together, I think all of the military assistance
in the world will do them relatively little good.
WOODRUFF: All right, quickly, Mr. Ambassador. PICKERING:
Quickly on that, the Salvadoran military leadership went
through an enormous organizational change in November of
1983. Since then, we have seen forces in the field much
more often, fighting at night, as well as the daytime. In
the period since the first of January right on through to
now, they have dominated by maintaining the initiative,
the battlefield. There is no question at all in my mind
that more assistance is required. It's clearly
demonstrated by all the facts and figures that we have
presented. And now is not the time to undermine a
democratic leader by cutting his assistance.
WOODRUFF: All right, two last quick questions. What do
you think the prospects are, Mr. Congressman, in
conference committee. How much do you think? You think
they'll get something, right? The question is how much.
SOLARZ: I doubt very much the administration will get all
of the additional money it's requested because I think the
House of Representatives, in particular, will want to know
whether there's continued progress in eliminating the
death squads and bringing the security forces under
control.
WOODRUFF: All right, and Mr. Ambassador, what happens if
you don't get everything you asked for, if you only get
part of it? PICKERING: Well, it we don't get all of what
we asked for, obviously the need will continue. That
isn't going to go away because the Congress is not capable
of facing up to the reality at this time.
Approved For Release 2008/09/19: CIA-RDP88-01070R000201320011-0