NICHOLAS M. HORROCK ON MINING NICARAGUAN HARBORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000201170005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 19, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
PROGRAM ? The Fred Fiske Show
DATE April 19, 1984 10:05 P.M.
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STATION WAMU-FM
Washington, D.C.
Nicholas M. Horrock On Mining Nicaraguan Harbors
FRED FISKE: With the debate raging concerning the CIA
involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, with concern
over terrorism mounting, and the argument over the defense budget
on the front burner, we're very pleased to have at our micro-
phones this evening Nicholas M. Horrock, who is national security
correspondent for Newsweek. A veteran of the New York Times,
Nick Horrock headed its Washington investigative team and
directed a series on immigration which won a Pulitzer Prize in
1981. He headed the Newsweek Saigon Bureau during the Vietnam
War, headed its investigative team during the Watergate period,
as well.
We're very pleased to have you with us, Nick. Thanks
for coming.
NICHOLAS-HORROCK: Thank you very much.
FISKE: The current issue of Newsweek has an excellent
story on the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors. It's titled "A
Furor over the Secret War."
HORROCK: Oh, I think badly. They've probably taken two
toes off, at least. Also, I think that a lot of people that I
talk to in the CIA started out wondering whether it's a secret
war. It is undoubtedly one of the best publicized secret wars
we've had. We've had others, of course, in Laos and Africa. But
this time they really seem, with an ill-conceived tactic -- and
most people now look at it and wonder how it was conceived -- an
Material supplle^' - o'-"- T11 o?..,,t, inr n , he r lend fnr fiira nntl rwfwranra nurnnses on v. It may not be reoroduced. sold or oublicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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ill-conceived tactic, to really harm their support for the total
attack to the Sandinistas. And it may, in a way, reflect the
problem of secret decision-making.
Back when Frank Church, who died this week, as you know,
when he was conducting the investigation of the CIA, one thing
that was clear is that the more secret a decision was, the fewer
people got involved, and therefore nobody ever debated it and
said, "This could be a bad idea."
You wonder about that here. You wonder if somebody
didn't say, "Gee whiz. Maybe mining is not such a good idea.
It's going to alienate every maritime nation who has to service
there. It may not be very effective in what we want to do. It
could blow up a ferryboat full of children and be a terrible
image problem." You wonder if that kind of debate...
FISKE: Joseph Kraft points out in his column today it's
the sort of thing you can't keep secret.
HORROCK: Exactly. I mean it's...
FISKE: If mines are going to explode, people are going
to know about it.
HORROCK: In fact, Navy people -- I spent a great deal
of time, as the story unfolded a couple of weeks ago, talking
privately, because they asked to be private, to Navy mining
experts. And mining is basically -- I didn't know this, but it's
basically a psychological weapon, even in wartime. The mines
never get a lot of ships. But the idea is that you want to
persuade the enemy that he can't use this, that there are mines
out there, and his own fear will stop it.
So you have to, in a sense, make noise. There's no
silent way to make it effective. The idea is to have the
explosions come and have the port commanders, or whatever, say,
"Whoops. We can't use this port anymore," to persuade them.
So, it was never secret in the way it's carried out. It
couldn't be.
FISKE: One of the most troubling questions about all of
this is the seeming cavalier attitude on the part of the Admini-
stration, of the CIA Director toward complying with the laws
regarding congressional oversight. I mean even people like
Senator Goldwater was infuriated with the fact that Casey did not
level.
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HORROCK: I don't know. Of course, he says he isn't.
And I really hesitate there because it's a body of law that's
evolving. CIA people believe that their job is to go up and make
a certain report. And they -- Casey personally, and a lot of
other people in the CIA, as I understand it, fe4l, "Look, we want
general approval or disapproval. But once you approve of us
taking a general action, we can't have Congress down there
deciding on our tactics. That we should have the freedom to use
different methodologies."
If you start from that premise, then you can see where
they come to the notion, "Well, why should we talk in detail
about tactic after tactic? If we're going to use this kind of
gun, if we're going to use this kind of secret device."
FISKE: Some merit to that argument.,
HORROCK: That seems to be their position.
The result is, as they go to the Hill, as one man I
talked to privately from the CIA apparatus pointed out, they're a
little like they'll go to the dentist. Everything has to be
drawn out. They're not very willing patients of a committee.
So, if they knowingly went up and lied -- I doubt
that'll be the final reading. I think, more likely, that they
committed a crime of omission.
FISKE: They weren't forthcoming.
HORROCK: They were not forthcoming.
FISKE: Well, obviously, if you're dealing with secret
information, the Congress is in no position to elicit answers.
You know, it's not as though we're discussing the welfare
program, about which everybody knows and everybody has opinions
and can, you know, have a basis for asking questions. But if
you're coming before a committee and you're talking about a
planned secret activity, they have no basis for asking you. It
devolves upon the CIA to be forthcoming.
HORROCK: I think that's essentially correct, except in
one -- there should be sort of one caveat, from my view of
covering both sides. The service on the intelligence committees
is not, as you probably have been told or read, one of the most
popular political things you can do on the Hill. Almost all your
hearings are in secret.
FISKE: It doesn't get any press.
HORROCK: It doesn't get any press. Nobody back in
Vermont, as Pat Leahy likes to point out, really cares. And it
eats up a lot of your time. Most, as you know, of the senators,
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and particularly in the House, are all on several committees.
So, for them to sit down and really work at this job
takes away from other things that they're doing. And I think
that there probably is something to be said by the fact that for
that service there should be some special kind of protection for
senators. Let's say they'd serve three years, they'd be relieved
of some other duties, and then be able to go much harder and much
more critically and dig into things.
Because when Senate committees conduct a special
investigation, all of which we're very familiar with, they have
time and they do dig in and they do ask questions. But no
Administration is forthcoming, even in some -- I mean the
Pentagon goes up all the time, it doesn't quite tell the whole
story. It's job is to sell a program. So I think that something
has to be said for Congress working a little harder at its job of
probing and asking.
They heard the words "mining." They see things happen
in the papers afterwards. They see raids with speedboats. They
see raids with sophisticated aircraft. There have been helicop-
ters. There have been A-37s. The Nicaraguans...
FISKE: Wasn't Casey asked whether Americans were
involved, and he said, "No, it's being done by Latinos"? He told
this to the Senate.
HORROCK: The Q&A, I've never seen. And I don't believe
any of my colleagues have. So I'd like to hold back. I suspect
that he didn't say it was the Contras, which was the way it was
originally reported. But he did not, in any event, make it
clear. And that I'm confident of.
FISKE: He said Latinos. And I suspect what he meant is
that they were manning the speedboats.
FISKE: But the fact that we supplied the speedboats and
supplied the mines and gave them the instructions and patted them
on the heads and said, "Go," you know, he didn't make clear. He
concealed.
HORROCK: And the other thing is, you know, a little
attention ought to be paid for the Latinos. They are not
Contras. The ones who are doing this particular segment of work
are not Nicaraguan. The Contras are rather defined. They're
mostly Nicaraguans ex-Somozistas, Guardsmen from the Somoza era,
some others who report to Adolf Calero and Eden Pastora. But the
men on these boats, as I understand it, are El Salvadorians,
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military men. They're trained. Some of them are Argentines.
There are allegedly some Chileans. These are professional, very
tough, very well-trained commandos who work for money. They're
not there trying to retake -- and they may also have emotional
commitment. But it's my understanding they're professional
commandos. Because the three or four raids, particular the one
that's broke in the past couple of days, which blew up the oil
refinery and capacity, were highly sophisticated jobs, much more
so than what has been the general ability of the Contras to
perform.
FISKE: What's the sum total effect of this going to be?
We've been criticized by our closest allies. We've been embar-
rassed before the world. The Congress, where there was already
some considerable opposition to providing funds to continue the
covert activities, even over funds for El Salvador -- and the
entire operation relates to the war in El Salvador --what is the
sum total effect of this going to be?
HORROCK: In the long run, of the covert war? Or the
mining difficulties?
FISKE: The mining incident as it affects the covert
war, and, in fact, our aid to El Salvador.
HORROCK: Oh, I think it's cost us twice what it has
gotten, because I think it has done exactly -- it has further
weakened the support for -- domestically in Congress, which is
where a good deal of this battle is fought -- for the general
support in El Salvador and against the Sandinista government. So
the mining alone was terribly ill-conceived, from that stand-
point.
But the second thing that's bothersome to us out in the
world, down in Central America, is that it further defines our
position in a kind of inter -- unacceptable international plot,
where we have the nations that we would hope would later negoti-
ate this, the Contadora and the Mexican government, are clearly
against this. We have taken actions which endanger their own
shipping, which endanger the region, and I think really put us in
a very difficult diplomatic position.
And I'm not entirely sure this is a particularly
partisan statement I'm making. It's not a Democrats -- I think a
great many Republicans I've interviewed feel the same thing, that
-- in fact, the whole covert war, when it's looked at in history
five years from now, may not have been at all the way to go to
getting a favorable settlement in Central America. It's been
pushed by the Reagan Administration. It first was to interdict
the arms, which they then admitted they couldn't do. It never
could have done that. That was never possible. The arms
shipment are a trickle and they run through jungles and seas.
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So, really, it's a [unintelligible] to destabilize the Nicaraguan
government, and that hasn't worked., They've been at it 18
months, and they haven't budged them.
FISKE: Some critics of the Administration argue that,
in fact, the Salvadoran rebels are armed largely with weaponry
which they capture from the Salvadorans to whom we provide these
weapons; and that, in fact, a very large portion of their
armaments are sold to them by Salvadoran soldiers.
Do you have any way of knowing how true that is?
HORROCK: Well, a good deal of it is true because,
grudgingly and in rather confused figures, Dr. Fred Ikle, who's
one of the key architects of our Central American policy in the
Pentagon, testified in public session -- I think it was about two
and a half weeks ago -- that 50 percent of the arms in the hands
of the guerrillas come from military forces.
And remember, arms don't get lost every day. So that
that's really -- that means a substantial amount of their
armament accumulated has come from the government, and that the
government loses routinely ten percent of the arms we give them.
Now, that is a substantial number of arms. That's, in fact, a
bigger figure than what the guerrillas seem to be getting.
So that between that and purchases -- which are ill-
defined. We don't know that. And purchases being in third
countries, and not necessarily communist weapons -- it's clear
that the Nicaraguan route is not crucial to the El Salvadorian
advances.
What both sides agree, though, is the ammunition, what
they call consumables, expendables, are the military terms, every
day's ammunition, that is what Nicaragua does supply. That is
harder for the guerrillas to get from the government, because
you've got to get it the day you're running out. It has to be a
steady stream. And that is what the Adminitration says, or
hopes, that the Sandinista attacks would reduce, that pressure.
The fact is, though, that 80 percent of the ammunition
that they get comes from Nicaragua, according to the government.
And that hasn't been reduced in 18 months of effort.
FISKE: What's your view, what do you learn about the
fighting in El Salvador itself? I mean a lot of people have a
very uneasy feeling that we're following a pattern similar to the
pattern of Vietnam, that we keep stepping up the help and the aid
and the assistance and the personnel, and that in spite of the
training of the Salvadoran forces and the assurances that we
receive periodically from our own leaders that they're well-
trained and able to do the job, the reports from the field
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indicate that they're not scoring any great successes.
Do you feel that we are being sucked into quicksand?
HORROCK: A lot of the correspondents back away from the
answer who've been there. Ray Bonner on the New York Times, Rob
Brevard, our man in El Salvador, Lydia Chavez, I think, have come
to that conclusion as they spent time there.
If you look at El Salvador, though, that morass is not
very deep. It's a very tiny country.
The general morass of Central America would be as
devastating to us as Vietnam. You're talking about four count-
ries, an enormous number of people. We'd lose an army trying to
go in there and deal with it.
The Administration gives you a rather positive little
figure, and you can't ignore it. Even though the El Salvadorian
army hasn't beaten the guerrillas, the guerrillas haven't beaten
the El Salvadorian army. So that we've kind of maintained with
our assistance a status quo.
But from everything I read and from talking to the
people that I deal on this end at the Pentagon and State Depart-
ment, the ones I think are objective, at least, there has to be
some fundamental correction in the El Salvadorian government and
correction in the economics of that country. And without that --
it's not a question of just training the El Salvadorian army and
us sending an unlimited amount of arms. That will never work. I
mean there are just -- the human rights issues. There are basic
issues of life, and in that country, which so erode the power of
the people we support, that until those are corrected, there's
sort of an endless guerrilla war before us. And it can't be
beaten by the classical military method.
FISKE: This is an election year. It would be very
debilitating to the Reagan reelection effort for him to pull out
of El Salvador or Nicaragua. The Congress left town without
appropriating the money. The President managed to find it from a
special fund.
Do you see that if in fact the Congress digs its heels
in on Nicaragua, or even El Salvador, that the Reagan Administra-
tion will not find some way to go forward, that the Reagan
Administration, particularly in an election year, might take some
extreme measure to try to administer a final coup, to score a
great victory?
HORROCK: I don't see them trying to score a victory. I
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think that would be terribly risky. I mean these are rational
government officials, by whatever terms a rational one chooses.
So I don't think -- because of the chances of losing.
And I also -- every indication we had when we finished
our work and our reporting last week, as Congress got ready to
leave, is that the recess favors, slowly but surely, the Admini-
stration, in that in the long run, no matter what the rhetoric
you hear, they will fund the basic Nicaraguan covert campaign and
they'll fund the El Salvadorian campaign at the amounts that the
Administration wants; and that what will be lost will be they're
going to bar mining. There won't be any more mining.
But basically, Congress is afraid of being accused of
losing Central America. And that's a strong political -- I mean
it's an election year for many of them, too. So they don't want
to be in the position of going out in October, having two or
three of these countries collapse, and explaining why they didn't
do anything.
By the same token, I would doubt that the President
would make an unusually aggressive move. I think he'd like to
downplay Central America, keep a good status quo, not lose
anything, get himself through his conventions and through the
election. If reelected, he might take very aggressive actions.
You have a sense when you talk to people like Ambassador
Kirkpatrick, Bill Casey, and others that they fervently believe,
right or wrong, that they'd like to be known as the Administra-
tion that maybe reversed communist growth in the Western Hemi-
sphere, even reversed the Cuban government. I mean you just feel
that that's a commitment, emotionally, many of them have made.
FISKE: Do you see any lasting effect, any serious
effect of our refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the World
Court in this matter with Nicaragua?
HORROCK: I gather that there's no legal impact. But
remember, we still do have, or we think we have an image, most
Americans thing we have an image in the world. And when we do
some things like that that are transparently self-serving, and so
forth, we just erode that. We erode -- we're the leader of the
Free World, is what the image we project. And that was an act of
a nation that squibbles and sleazes and so forth. And I'm not
saying that it isn't in our national interest to do so, maybe.
But again, somebody didn't sit down and think out its long-term
-- I think it does erode our image in nations where our image is
important. And that's Western Europe, certain parts of Asia,
countries where we still have a chance of persuading them of our
leadership.
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FISKE: Since you deal with the problem of terrorism and
intelligence, let's talk for a little while, if we can, about the
difficulties with Libya and England. What do you make of all of
that, make of the remarks of Qaddafi today at the press confer-
ence when, you know, he outraged the entire world by blaming the
British for the shooting at their embassy? You know, we're
living in the world of television, and hundreds of millions of
people, I presume, actually saw that take place.
HORROCK: I don't know. I think it's a stymie. I don't
think that we know how -- the "we" being the Western World --know
how to handle a really crazy or a person operating out of the
responsible theme of government: Qaddafi, Idi Amin, who was
quite a different matter. It's really preposterous.
Down through history, we've had nations and leadership
like this. But now, as you point out, on television, their view,
their attitude and the preposterous nature projected all around
the world just like that. How do you deal with them?
You noticed earlier in the week that the President gave
the military permission, in a well-publicized order, to take
preventive action, if you will, if they found out that a terror-
ist act was about to be fomented by a foreign government. But
what does that really mean? I think it's ridiculous. We aren't
going to invade Qaddafi. Are we really going to mount an
invasion because we find out that Libya, before it does it, is
going to take a major terrorist act somewhere? I don't think
it's realistic. I think we did it as a threat. I don't think it
was a well thought-out threat.
But nevertheless, I really -- as you talk to people in
government, this may be one of the most serious things, that
governments are learning to move or changing the way they deal
with one another, in fighting and undercurrent, through this
terrorist method. It's not the first time in history, but it's
.at its peak right now, this government-supported terrorism, where
I project my moves through nameless third parties. So that it's
very hard for the defensive government, ours, the British, and so
forth, to resist. How do they fight back? Do we go bomb seven
Libyan villages? And it's been a quandary in each one of these
incidents. Who do we attack for the Marine battalion headquart-
ers?
Well, it was easy when a gunboat -- if a French gunboat
had shelled the American positions, you go sink the French
gunboat. But it really has them. And you can tell our govern-
ment is really wrestling with this. It's a terribly difficult
problem.
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So, I don't know what's going to flow. You can see that
one thing, at least, in the Western -- that Libya is further
isolating itself. There are some economic sanctions that can be
taken against it. But nevertheless, I mean how -- I haven't seen
one idea...
FISKE: I suppose the economic sanctions would have to
be taken by the other Western nations. We have very little to do
with Libya, economically.
HORROCK: Certainly. And they also have some economic
powers of their own to Western Europe, which uses oil from they
and some of their colleagues in the Mideast. They have to be
cautious.
FISKE: But again, the irrationality of Muammar Qaddafi
has been demonstrated. A great many people, I included, live in
dread of the day that an atomic weapon may come into the hands of
Qaddafi and Libya, because I have no doubt that he's capable of
insane actions. This must be a source of enormous worry to
intelligence and to the Administration.
Is there any possible thing that can be
HORROCK: Well, they do do some things. I mean,
naturally, they try to trace the proliferation of certain kinds
of weapons, not only nuclear. That's one of the reasons that Cap
Weinberger and others are really concerned. One of the most
major concerns in the Pentagon has been the Iran-Iraq war,
because there, into two governments which don't have certain
standards, have become used some very sophisticated chemical
weapons.
Take again Qaddafi. Anybody can produce nerve gas with
a certain amount -- it's not a very -- what are the powers in
Qaddafi's hands with a substantial amount of nerve gas to be used
in a terrorist fashion, not in general warfare? It's terribly
frightening. Nerve gas in a downtown urbanized area like London
would be a devastating attack. So that is an enormous concern.
The only thing that they've really done is to really
smooth up and improve the intelligence relationship between
Western Europe nations and the United States, which was a
significant step. Everybody wasn't taking this seriously ten
years ago or 12 years ago at Munich. And now, at least the
Western nations are of one mind.
There's also some subtle suggestion -- and there's a lot
of debate about this -- that maybe the Eastern nations, Soviets
and so forth, do not, themselves, want to see terrorism go
completely unregulated. They can be victims as well, even though
their governments are better protected than we are.
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FISKE: What course of action remains open to us if
intelligence should report that the Libyans have indeed a nuclear
weapon?
HORROCK: I could see -- in a nuclear weapon, I could
see a very clear discussion emerging between Ronald Reagan,
Margaret Thatcher, Germany, and the French, maybe, depending on
what combination, saying let's go in with parachutists, or
whatever, some kind of swift attack, very much as the Israelis on
Iraq at that point when they saw that plant being developed
beyond a point they thought was possible, and take it out.
Better to take it out and risk some of the other things than to
let him have it. I mean this is a risk assessment you have to
make.
FISKE: But the Israelis were criticized harshly for
that action.
HORROCK: But the fact is they took it out.
FISKE: But you're saying that we, in that position,
would have no alternative but to do the same thing?
HORROCK: Do the same thing. You can stand a lot of
criticism. It doesn't look so nice if you're missing New York.
So I mean it really is -- and I think that's the way the Israelis
feel about it.
FISKE: Now, you mentioned the Iran-Iraq war. Very
worrisome. I saw an interview with CIA Director Casey the other
day. He expressed the view that the Iranians have some advantage
in their greater numbers and weaponry. What happens if Iran
should prevail in that war?
HORROCK: The oil people say it's very serious, not as
directly serious for us as it is for Western Europe, because it
means that a very conservative element of Muslims, all the way
from Syria, stretching down through Iran, this kind of an arc,
would have enormous powers over oil supply, and also over nations
who do not believe, like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and so forth. If
you look at a map, you can see the enormous influence of these
powerful, highly dense countries if that were to be formed. And
so that is a serious concern. Because even though we now have
reduced our needs in Mideast oil, we also are part of an agree-
ment where we pass oil on to other nations if they fall short.
So, from an oil standpoint, energy standpoint, that is
regarded as very serious. And that's the reason that the French
and the others are covertly, as far as we can determine, shipping
arms and balance -- trying to hold the balance in the war.
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FISKE: Are you saying, Nick, that we can't allow Iraq
to lose that war?
HORROCK: Effectively. Yeah. I think that's what
--when we say, "What do we do?" Overtly, I don't know. I think
it would be very -- we're sitting on the edge of the Soviet
Union. Are we going to commit divisions to battling that?
That's ridiculous. We can take certain steps to keep the Straits
of Hormuz open.
But from the standpoint of helping the Iraqis, I think
that we would -- again, this would be covert multination Western
action. Western including Japan. They're a very big player in
this.
FISKE: ..the very real potential of triggering World
War II, doesn't it?
HORROCK: I think the whole Mideast situation does hold
that. I've asked often the question to people at the Pentagon:
What do you think -- where do you think World War II -- because
we think of a concept coming over Europe. Most of them don't
agree. It's a situation like the Mideast, where it's so close,
the Soviets are all involved, we're all mixed up, and we're
suddenly facing each other. And, yeah, I think that's dangerous.
FISKE: ...We're talking to Nichola M. Horrock, who is
national security correspondent for Newsweek....
Good evening.
MAN: ...First of all, I would like to say I really like
what you said about Central America, as one who has been down
there. Have you been down there?
HORROCK: No, sir.
MAN: Well, it sounded like you were, unless you talked
to reporters who had been down there for a long time. I think
what you said was really right on.
But I wanted to ask a question about this question of
atomic terrorism. Have you ever heard of the idea of covertly
implanting nuclear weapons, I mean the Soviet Union doing that in
the United States or the United States doing that in the Soviet
Union?
HORROCK: I've never heard an authoritative report of
that -- that you can hand-carry nuclear weapons [sic]. We can
miniaturize them today so they can fit in small boats, planes, or
vans, and take them into the host country, and they would explode
with zero delivery time.
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And I don't see why it just has to be the Libyans who
are doing this. I mean, after all, the United States is the one
who is producing tens of thousands of new nuclear weapons, you
know, every five years, or whatever. So I'm a little bit more
worried about what the CIA -- I mean if they've got terrorists
down in Nicaragua -- I mean we knew about these Contras when they
were training in Miami. Okay? That was like three years ago.
Remember that?
HORROCK: I certainly do.
MAN: Okay. These guys aren't indigenous guerrillas,
like in El Salvador. These people are paid in dollars, and then
they spread it all around Honduras, and it helps the economy
there and the military there.
HORROCK: Some Contras are paid. We have to grant them
the fact, again, relying on what I think are our reporters there
for Newsweek and others that are independent, that some of them
are indigenous and paid in the sense only of supporting their
families while they fight.
MAN: Well, then if they get the money cut off, they
should be able to continue their just struggle and they should be
capturing areas of Nicaragua, which they have not yet done. I
mean they captured the city for a couple of days, and not they've
already lost it. They have not even tried to occupy any area.
All they're doing is economic sabotage of the oil facilities, the
ports, bombing the civilian airport with a plane that was
registered in McLean, Virginia, for crying out loud.
Is this terrorism by the United States Government that
we are paying for? And you're telling me, everybody's talking to
me about some Libyan crackpots in London? What about the
crackpots in Washington, D.C.?
FISKE: Thank you.
Good evening.
MAN: ...I just got through looking at Alexander Haig on
20/20, and it was really shocking. No, it wasn't shocking to me
'cause I've been following this right along. But it was nice, in
a way, to hear someone come out that was an insider and who's a
hawk really say how amateur the Reagan Administration is. And
the people behind him are just like throwing darts at a board.
They just decide, "Hey, let's try this. Let's try this."
And I think the gentleman you have there is right on
target, of course. He knows what he's talking about.
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I think we made a terrible mistake by not going to the
International Court. I think we're just giving the terrorists --
which I'm a liberal, basically. But everyone has to admit that
this is a real problem. And I think that we're playing right
into their hands.
What do you think about that?
HORROCK: Well, I think that one of the things that
you're putting your hand on is the fact that one of the resist-
ances to terrorism is to be scrupulous in the rule of law. I
mean the anarchy, the resistance to anarchy is to have order. So
when we disregard a World Court or when we use covert means that
is close to something as it appears to be terrorism, that we have
to think about how much that dissolves order among what we would
like to call the civilized nations.
And so there is a point you're making there. We do
change our image drastically and undermine ourselves.
FISKE: Do you agree the whole thing was poorly handled,
the mining thing?
HORROCK: Yes. Personally, I think it was. And I've
talked to -- but even then, I'm no expert on mining or covert
action. But I've certainly talked to a lot of men, some of whom
can't be named, who are professional, who've been involved with
the CIA for a long time as senior officers, as well as covert
operators. And it's a very amateurish effort.
FISKE: Did you read Joe Kraft this morning?
HORROCK: Yes, I did, as a matter of fact.
MAN: What do you think Mr. Reagan -- how do you think
the Chinese will handle him, as far as -- he thinks he's going
there, you know, to use them politically, or whatever. What do
you think they'll try to get? I mean I think they realize the
power they have, you know, the U.S. trying to use them against
the Russians and everything. What do you think they'll do?
FISKE: Any ideas?
HORROCK: Well, as you've probably seen reported, there
are not real clear targets from the trip, the way some of our
trips are, so you won't get a laundry list afterwards. But
anybody who looks at the map of the world knows that we're trying
to nurture a balance which involves having the Chinese at least
an independent third force, if not an ally of ours in the world
balance of power. And that's what he's there to cement.
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FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: Help me out on Central America. I understand that
these were acoustical mines.
HORROCK: Well, you know, there's a lot of debate about
that. And my first information, which I filed in the magazine,
and I believe came from solid sourcing, was that there were
acoustical mines. Every Navy expert I've talked to said, "Why
would they use acoustical mines? They're particularly difficult.
Why not magnetic?"
Then, subsequently, I've seen two other reports. I have
not been able to confirm that they are magnetic. I now have it
suggested to me, just this week, that there were probably two
kinds used by the agency-supported activity. And incidentally,
there was a third and cruder type of mine placed by actual
Contras in a separate set of events.
The mines -- the magnetic -- and I take it from your
call that you have a good sense of the difference -- everybody,
across the board, who has done a lot of minging say magnetic
would have been much better for what they understood the harbors
and approaches would be.
MAN: Well, I really can't claim to know much about
mines. But I had thought that acoustical mines wouldn't sink any
ships. They might scare the heck out of people.
HORROCK: No. That's just a question of the amount of
charge. An acoustical mine goes off because it listen to a
motor; and at a certain point when the motor becomes so loud, it
triggers its mechanism. A magnetic mine goes off because a ship
creates a magnetic field when it moves through the water, and at
a certain point the magnetic field becomes so rich and full that
it detonates the mine. So that's just the detonation devices.
And the way the Navy and others select the use depends on the
bottom, the type of vessels they're going after, and so forth.
But the charge can be as enormous as you want it.
Big Navy mines -- one thing that was interesting about
this, and it shows how few people in the Senate understood, as I
didn't, the sophistication of these techniques -- to kill a ship,
as the Navy guys call it, takes a big mine, to kill a big vessel.
You're talking about a mine that has to be lowered by a derrick.
It's about 500-1000 pounds. That's an average-sized naval mine.
So, when you had a little fast-moving boat with some
guys dumping it off the back who had to do it quickly under
surveillance, you were right away limiting it to a mine that
wouldn't automatically sink a ship. That doesn't mean they
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aren't dangerous. They're going to blow a hole in a ship.
FISKE: As a matter of fact, they damaged six Nicaraguan
vessels and six vessels belonging to five other countries, and
seriously injured ten sailors.
HORROCK: So they were dangerous. And they could have
resulted in a ship sinking as a result of its bad manufacture or
something wrong with its beams.
But bigger mines actually crumple the ship, break it in
half, as the ultimate goal of a big naval mine. And the size of
the charge, as I understand it, determines largely how successful
it's going to be, rather than the listening devices.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I've often wondered whether or not a war like the
one in El Salvador couldn't be fought on a cost-benefit basis, if
that doesn't tickle you. And here's my approach. It seems that
the population of El Salvador is not much greater than Maryland,
I think about three million people. Is that about right?
MAN: And we have spent somewhere in the neighborhood of
about $3 billion down in that neighborhood, which totes up to
about a year's pay for each citizen down there. I'm wondering if
you had a scheme to pay this money out, maybe on a monthly basis,
and sent down a systematized economic scheme, whether or not you
wouldn't be better off trying to buy the peace rather than trying
to fight for it.
HORROCK: I don't think what you say is at all ridicu-
lous. I, personally, have often -- and this is totally personal.
I mean nothing to do with my news assignment. I really think
that you may be on to something.
There are some problems, and I've chatted that up with
guys who've studied, particularly, El Salvador. One of the
problems in El Salvador is that certain people want more of the
country than the others have. And so they would want a bigger
share. And since they control the business and so forth, and
some of them are supporters of that radical right, naturally
they'd try to get an unfair share. So it might not be easy to
effect.
But if often questions you, when we pour -- I always
used to feel this when I was in Vietnam. I'm watching pouring
all thise expensive metal we shipped over there down the country,
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we could have literally set up an annuity for everybody there at
the same price.
We never seem to be able to work that out in world
affairs. I don't know how to do it.
MAN: Well, one of the ways you could do it is in a
method that I've preached for years called packet economics, in
which you'd look at the country as a study and set up an economic
system. And so far as the big boys are concerned down there that
want to get an unfair share, if you come in with the muscle, why
can't you control the scene?
HORROCK: We're traveling a lot of simplifications. One
of the things that I think may be that our approach -- we don't
have a uniform approach in this country. There's a lot of
dispute. There is resistance to -- for instance, the Kissinger
Commission talks about enormous commitment of American aid as one
of their fundamental ways to deal with Central American problem.
But then we say we aren't going to produce that aid until we
create an atmosphere of peace and stability, and that is a
justification for our increased military aid, so an organized
government can do so.
So we have this kind of a chicken-and-an-egg desire.
How do we create the atmosphere in which we then can in a
rational way sit down, as you say, bring our muscle in, if you
will, support the right forces?
There's also dispute, legitimate dispute, about who
should be on top in El Salvador. Duarte seems to be the candi-
date that Americans find most favorable. But nevertheless, I
mean, they are human beings. And when you spend time, as I have,
in a country -- we thought President Thieu was our best candi-
date, but there were many people in Vietnam who thought he was
incredibly corrupt and incredibly bad.
FISKE: And we changed our minds too.
HORROCK: And we changed our minds too. Exactly.
MAN: Isn't it true that of the aid we're sending
presently, a lot of it is being siphoned off by people who are on
our so-called side?
HORROCK: Yes. Absolutely. They're investing it. In
fact, we did a story, and other people have been working hard on
that. There's some investigations by our government. Some of
the money is invested right badk here on their behalf in Miami.
I think, really, you're talking about something a little
bit more fundamental which we really have to do if we're going to
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continue in the world, and that is to work out -- and it has
little to do with partisan politics -- work out a better way to
understand how we're going to operate in the Third World, what
combinations, how we make decisions about who to help and who not
to help.
There's also a notion that Gary Hart's raising, but a
lot of people believe. We make an evaluation of all of our
people operating these countries on the basis of whether they're
communist or non-communist. And we're against what we think our
communist-supported revolutions. But the fact is, many of the
revolutions would exist whether communists -- and they just
happen to be willing to support them. And we've got to make that
separation.
Everybody seems to agree on that except certain elements
of the present Administration. You have to step back. There are
legitimate revolutionary tendencies in El Salvador. There were
in Nicaragua. And to find, identify these and support these
groups -- I don't know why -- is it written someplace that the
Soviet Union is the only people who support poor people's
revolutions? That's ridiculous.
MAN: Certainly not Republicans.
FISKE: Good evening.
MAN: I want to bring up both a practical point on
foreign policy and also a philosophical one. And considering
that our country has such an excellent strategic position in the
world, in that our wealth, despite our recession problems, and
also that we are not close to belligerents, except maybe for
Cuba, you know, that are right next door to us; and yet with all
this, including our big population and all, we're incredibly
ignorant about he rest of the world. Despite the fact that
Americans are the number one in foreign travel, and all, that
apparently 80 percent of us can speak no foreign language, very
few of us have ever lived in a foreign country. And I include in
this those who have been President of the United States. And
people will often be embarrassed among foreigners particularly
Spanish-speaking people, say, "Gee, you know. I feel embar-
rassed. I don't know your language." And one of these foreign-
ers should say, "Well, haven't you -- hasn't Spanish been offered
in your schools?"
And where I live, I live in a neighborhood with a lot of
Asians and Latin Americans. And, of course, a lot of Americans
say,"Well, we don't like all these foreigners coming in here."
And it just seems to me -- I know that in the rest of the world
there are many of these similar attitudes. But here we are, a
big influence in the world, whether we like it or not, and we are
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incredibly ignorant of what's going on. And so are a lot of our
leaders.
FISKE: Okay. No quarrel with that.
Nick, what about William Casey, the CIA Director? The
President is supporting him. There's a tremendous amount of
opposition to him on the Hill, in the media. He's been criti-
cized on a whole variety of counts, not the least of which is his
own personal finances. Senator Sasser described him as arrogant
and confused and unknowing. Is he going to hang on?
HORROCK: Well, I think that, actually, many people,
privately, in the Administration felt he was going to leave
before this happened, not under any duress, but because he had,
in the times I've talked to him, seemed to have a clear idea of
some objectives in taking that job, personal objectives, and that
he didn't want it endlessly. He's had a very interesting career.
Whatever the criticisms are, Bill Casey is not stupid. That is
one of the most misleading -- every once in a while I read
somebody say that, and I don't think they've thought about it
very hard.
Now the President's got a problem, and so does Bill
Casey, a little like Meese. If he were to leave now, for
whatever reason, it would be a retreat. And I don't think that
they want to signal that to the general electorate. So I think
he has sort of job security.
There may come a time when he could say, "Listen, I
think I'm an impediment to the President's foreign policy. I
personally am, for whatever reason. Senators don't have faith in
me. And I think I'll leave." I think Bill Casey, from what I've
been told about him, is the kind of man who would do that.
But right now, I don't think they want to give that sign
of surrender. And I think that means he's going to be here
through the election.
FISKE: What's happened to the CIA? We went through a
period in which the CIA was regarded very, very highly by the
American people, almost like the FBI was for many, many years.
And then, following the revelations that came out during the
Church Committee hearings and other revelations, the CIA suffered
a great tumble in the public perception. It was revised and done
over. Stansfield Turner fired a great many people. The Congress
passed laws and resolutions and safeguards of various sorts. And
it seemed to me that in the last few years the CIA's image had
been resurrected, refurbished somewhat.
Is it now suffering again?
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HORROCK: I think so. I think that was, to me, was the
most -- from the CIA perspective, the most dangerous thing that
happened in this past two- or three-week period. The CIA has had
a lot of problems since the famous Church thing. They didn't
know about the Shah's fall in Iran. Some other things have not
gone well. But basically, they seem to be on a contin --restor-
ing their professionalism. Their recruiting had gone up.
They're very proud of their recruiting figures. They've done a
lot to buoy morale out there.
What it seemed to me that Bill Casey lost in this mining
adventure was the support of the professional -- of some people
in the professional intelligence community who felt that this so
put back the notion of their unrestricted terrorism kind of
activities that it harmed this image. And that's a serious
change. And I think they feel that. I think a lot of profes-
sionals feel.
They also -- like it or dislike it, even though they
lied or didn't lie to Congress, the fact is the perception is
they lied to Congress. I mean look at the editorials. Look'at
what everybody says. And that's difficult because they had
overcome that notion. They were not the automatic liars they had
once been conceived of.
So I think that's serious, in an image way. And I think
that they would have to sit down now and do some rebuilding
again.
FISKE: It's unfortunate, because the road back, the
resurrection of the CIA, if you will, you know, it was a long
painful process.
Good evening.
MAN: I'd like to ask your guest this question. Don't
you think politics should be kept out of the CIA, and promotions
such as what Casey has been doing would be eliminated, and
promotions should be done within by the qualifications of the
people, and not any political concern done?
HORROCK: You mean his appointment as -- since he'd been
campaign manager for Ronald Reagan?
MAN: That's right. That's correct.
HORROCK: Well, that's been a big debate. There's
another side to that, and let me just give it to you for a
second, for whatever you see it's worth.
The President's -- Dick Helms, for instance, was a
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professional CIA employee who rose to the Directorship.
MAN: Yeah, I worked for him.
HORROCK: You did?
MAN: Yes.
HORROCK: Well, there have been people, then, as you
know, who suggested that the President needed to have total
personal confidence in the Director, and that it should be
somebody that he chose that he really knew. So that, therefore,
because he could not be lied to by the Director of CIA.
So that leaves the question, then, do you -- that to
find that kind of person, you have to pick somebody, sometimes,
who's a political partisan.
The idea, as you know, then, since you worked out there,
or may have worked for Dick Helms, they would always try to
offset that by the Deputy, by making him a professional to
balance out.
My personal instincts would be that it should be very
much like the FBI, something like a ten-year civil service
appointment taken out and make it a service agency. Even though
it has a lot to do with our foreign policy, the fact of the
matter is I think that it would be more comfortable a profession-
al agency. But that's a personal opinion. It's a major debate.
MAN: Well, I agree with you on that subject.
FISKE: Thank you, sir.
Good evening.
MAN: Have a question for you, and to try to boil it
down as simply as possible. One thing that has always amazed me,
and I've never fully understood it, it seems that as far as
foreign policy, the Soviet Union will go into a country, a Third
World country, and they go right to the heartland. They go in
with tractors and agricultural equipment and they try to help the
people, they try to help the masses. Whereas the United States
-- and pardon me if I'm being overly simplistic in what appears
to be my observation -- it seems like we totally bypass the
people of the country and go straight tot he top and go right to
the despot and pump millions into this individual's pocket, where
most of it stays there.
I think an example, we did this with Batista, we did it
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with other individuals in Central America. The Shah of Iran, I
think, is an excellent example of what I'm referencing as to my
observation. And when the Shah finally collapsed, the people of
Iran despised us, frankly, I think justifiably, because we hadn't
done a damn thing for them. Everything we had done had been for
the specific despot right at the top.
And I'd be interested to know whether you -- hear your
comment as to how correct you think my observation may be. And
if so, why.
HORROCK: I think that from the end result, you're
obviously correct. We supported Batista and he was not an
attractive figure. We've supported Pinochet in Chile. He's not
an attractive figure. The Shah. They are despots by anybody's
terms.
But on the other hand, we're in a practical problem in
many countries. Number one, we got there first and we dealt with
organized government, did trade. For instance, the Soviets had
almost no trade or influence in Central America. So that they
had to approach second, and the established government was not
going to do business because that was already ours. They had to
look, by their nature -- put aside whether they're proletarian.
They had to look for the outs, because that's who they could do
business with.
The second thing is, they move throughout the world in
terms of labor and other groups, and that's how they end up on
the bottom, if you will.
FISKE: Our time has run out. I want to thank you so
much for coming....
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