U.S./USSR/RELATIONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01070R000200960003-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 27, 2008
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 21, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01070R000200960003-0.pdf197.86 KB
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Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0 ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT 21 November 1983 U.S./USSR/ JENNINGS: ... Tonight, Pierre Salinger reports on the two nations' RELATIONS principal intelligence agencies, the KGB and the CIA. SALINGER: The KCB headquarters on *Drjinski Square in Moscow, the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.--two powerful intelligence organizations pitted in an unrelenting worldwide struggle--the KGB, 500,000 employees, the CIA, 45,000. The KGB, with wide powers operating in secret in a totalitarian state; the CIA, much narrower powers and subject to constant congressional and news media overview. The KGB experts and agents recruiting this information, Internal Security Control; the CIA dominant in electronic espionage, once again engaged in worldwide covert operations. WILLIAM COLBY (Former CIA Director): The KGB doesn't correspond just with CIA; it corresponds with CIA, the FBI, the Board of Police, the state police of all our states, the Treasury, the Secret Service, all of that. SALINGER: More than that, the KGB controls the Soviet army, has- its own army to deal with internal disorders, runs its own prison, and has its own terrorist squad which led the invasion of Afghanistan, murdering Prime Minister Amin and sowing panic in Kabul. The politburo has given the KGB these extensive powers so it can fulfill its primary objective--controlling the internal life of the Soviet Union. LEOPOLD LABEDZ (Journalist): The success of the KGB within the last year has been containment first and then the disruption of the Soviet dissident movement. SALINGER: The KGB also runs a worldwide network of agents assigned to Soviet embassies--news agencies, airline offices, and international organizations like the U.N.--their number one target, the United States and its high technology. It is'an easy target. A Soviet spy can get 95 percent of the information he needs simply by reading publicly available technical journals, many of them printed by the U.S. government. But getting highly sensitive information requires recruiting well-placed U.S. agents. A case study--James Durwood Harper, an agent corrupted by money. According to FBI investigators, Harper, for a long time a Silicon Valley technician, stole reams of top secret military documents at Systems Control, Inc. in Palo Alto, Calif. Harper then sold the documents for $250,000 to a Polish spy, who passed them on to the KGB. The information: how the Minuteman missile could escape a Soviet nuclear attack; the damage to U.S. security: beyond calculation. Another KGB tactic--the use of illegals, or sleepers, highly trained agents planted in Western countries in the hopes they will reach positions of influence and authority. A case study--*Gunther Guillaume, ostensibly an East German refugee in .West Germany--in reality, a top-ranked East German intelligence ,C0A ThrUED' Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0 agent. Guillaume fulfilled the KGB's highest dream--becoming the personal adviser and confidant of German Chancellor Willie Brandt. When Guillaume was unmasked, Brandt had to resign. A KGB priority--disinformation, spreading false information to confuse or influence public opinion outside the Soviet Union. A case study--*Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a KGB agent operating as a Tass correspondent in Tanzania in the '60s. Dzhirkvelov said his assignment was to swing Tanzanian public opinion against the ? U.S. Peace Corps. He did it by bribing a Tanzanian journalist. DZHIRKVELOV:? I can tell you, 'Ask me how much.' I said, '1,000 shillings. I'm made to pay.' He thought a minute, said, 'okay.' SALINGER: The journalist published articles linking the Peace Corps to the CIA; the Peace Corps was thrown out of Tanzania. The European peace movements provide another example of how KGB disinformation works. A case study--Alexi Dumov, a KGB agent and head of the Soviet press agency, *Novesti, in Bern, Switzerland. He was accused, among other things, of organizing this anti-American demonstration. This spring, the Swiss government expelled Dumov and closed the *Novesti office. Dumov is but one of almost 100 Soviet spies who have been expelled from countries around the world this year, 147 of them from France alone. This, ironically, is due more to stepped up KGB efforts to get high technology than to increase Western surveillance. These expulsions have been one of the KGB's major failures, as has the rising number of KGB defectors. The CIA, like the KGB, runs covert operations, engages in disinformation, and recruits agents. The last known high-level penetration of the Soviet government here in 1962 when KGB Col. *Orlai *Synchrovski provided vital information to the United States. during the Cuban missile crisis. But in the 1970s, while the then KGB director Yuri Andropov was vastly improving KGB methods and personnel, the CIA's one secret operation was exposed by the Congress. SEN. FRANK CHURCH (D-Idaho): Does this pistol fire the dart? SALINGER: Secret dart'guns were not the only thing the Church committee revealed. The world heard of CIA covert operations, including the efforts to destabilize the Allende government in Chile, the assassination of *Patrik *Amunda in the Congo, plots to assassinate Fidel Castro, and the CIA's participation in 'Watergate, and internal spying. The Church investigation shattered the CIA. RAY CLINE (Former CIA Deputy, Director for Intelligence): It destroyed its morale; it out its budgets. At least a third of their people disappeared. Carter and Admiral Stansfield Turner fired a great many of the men who were experienced in overseas operations by the CIA. Along with this weakening of the CIA came one of its greatest failures--its inability to accurately analyze the crumbling situation in Iran which led to the fall of the Shah and eventually to the.taking of the American hostages. This humiliation of the United States CQN TUED STAT Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0 and Jimmy Carter helped bring Ronald Reagan to power and provided him with support for rebuilding the CIA. Today, the agency has recovered much of its strength, and CIA covert operations now stretch around the world. Some cases in point--supporting the Moslem rebels in Afghanistan, aiding anti-Khomeini Iranians, arming and training forces opposed to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, backing Pol Pot and other forces seeking to overthrow the Vietnamese-backed government in Cambodia. But it is in intelligence gathering, not covert activity, that the CIA has had its biggest success. The developments of U.S. intelligence satellites in cooperation with the National Security Agency has dramatically improved the ability to penetrate Soviet military activities. WILLIAM COLBY: You can look down into some secret test center in Central Siberia and look inside that place and see what kinds of weapons are being produced at a... whereas, 10 or 15 years ago we wouldn't have had the faintest idea even what it was. SALINGER: So, what is the scorecard in the continuing struggle between the CIA and the KGB? In a way, it is an unequal contest. Because of our open, democratic society, we are easy to penetrate and have more difficulty encountering KGB disinformation around the world. But because of our technical capabilities, the CIA is getting better and better in penetrating the secret Soviet society. The country that maintains the edge in the secret world of spies will have a definitive advantage if there is ever an open conflict between the two powers. Pierre Salinger, ABC News, Langley, Va. Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200960003-0