GRENADA/COUP

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01070R000200920012-4
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 25, 2008
Sequence Number: 
12
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 27, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01070R000200920012-4.pdf38.6 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2008/07/25: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200920012-4 NBC NIGH'T'LY NEWS 27 October 1983 GRENADA/COUP BROKAW: And American intelligence agencies acknowledged today that there was a good deal that they did not know about what was happening in Grenada before the invasion. However, as Marvin- Kalb reports tonight, the administration says that information only provides more justification for the invasion. KALB: Administrations do not usually. like to admit intelligence failures. This one is no exception. But top officials-do admit they were Quite surprised by the size and strength of the Cuban .contingent on Grenada. A CIA estimate said there were 4-600 Cubans on the-island; most of them manual laborers, some- reservists with military experience in Angola. Actually, there were over 1,000, masquerading as construction workers on an airport runway, but in fact serving in a combat engineer brigade--well entrenched and well equipped, even with anti-aircraft weapons that fired at and hit approaching U.S. helicopters. Oddly, the White House acknowledges not an _ intelligence failure, but a total intelligence gap, but still proceeded with the invasion. ROBERT MCFARLANE (National Security Adviser): When you don't have any intelligence resources there at all, uh, something can't fail if it isn't there.. Approved For Release 2008/07/25: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200920012-4