ABC NIGHTLINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01070R000200860010-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 6, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
ABC NIGHTLINE
6 September 1983
KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel and this is Nightline. Gennadi\Gerasimov is a
Soviet political analyst and political commentator for the Soviet News Agency Novosti.
He is with us tonight live from Moscow. Ambassador\Jeane\Kirkoatrick is the United
States representative at the United Nations. She is with us tonight live from New
York. Our topic: today's acknowledgment by the Soviet Union that it did indeed, in
the Soviets' words, 'terminate' Korean Air Lines Flight 007.
KOPPEL: The Soviets have finally admitted in very circumspect language that their
military did indeed shoot down that Korean airliner. But why remains something of a_
mystery. The Soviets charge that the plane was involved in some kind of U.S.
espionage attempt. That may sound compelling in Moscow, but here in Washington, even
among officials of previous administrations with no love for Ronald Reagan, the charge
is dismissed as unconvincing. There is believed to be little or nothing that could be
learned through the use of that Korean 747 that couldn't be more efficiently learned
through satellites, listening posts or military reconnaissance aircraft, which would
seem to suggest that the Soviets are guilty of incredible brutality, unbelievable
incompetence, or possibly both. Joining us live now to discuss those possibilities or
some others I may have overlooked are, from New York, Washington's ambassador to the
United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and from Moscow, Gennadi Gerasimov, analyst and
commentator for the Soviet news agency Novosti. Mr. Gerasimov, I would assume that
you have some other explanation. Why was the plane shot down? GENNADI GERA.SIMOV
(Soviet Political Analyst): Well, the plane was shot down because it was in the
Soviet airspace and the pilot didn't know it was, it was a civilian air, airliner.
KOPPEL: Does it surprise you to learn that there have been some Soviet aircraft in
American airspace and they have not been'shot down for the simple reason that most
civilized nations do not do that, especially when dealing with a civilian aircraft?
GERASIMOV: Well, I don't about the cases that the Soviet airlines were, uh, were,
ur.-, un-, unidentified and, uh, were stopped in American airspace. I don't know about
this accident. The problem with it with this particular accident is that the, the
Soviet pilot didn't recognize that it was a civilian plane. And it was, uh, over, as
they say in the, uh, the statement of the Soviet government which was announced
yesterday, the plane was over, and now I cuote from, uh, Pravda newspaper, uh, 'the
most .=portant base of strategic forces of the Soviet Union.'
KOPPEL: hr. Gerasimov... GERASIMOV: Maybe this is the explanation.
KOPPEL: Uh, I'm no pilot and obviously no expert on the silhouettes of aircraft, but
I suspect that... GERASIMOV: Well, the Soviet Union...
KOPPEL: I suspect that even you would know the difference between a 747, uh, and, uh,
a reconnaissance aircraft. They don't look anything like each other, at least not by
visual sightings. GERASIMOV: I don't know how the, how the reconnaissance, uh,
RC-135...
KOPPEL: ...135. It looks very much like a Boeing 707. GERASIMOV: I don't know how
it looks like. Uh, I do know how Boeing 747 looks like. I was flying on it. But,
i 1NL1ED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
uh, as they say, our military people, uh, say, uh, that, uh, the radar signature, as
they call it, is the same.
KOPPEL: Yes. That, that... GERASIMOV: So on radar screen it was the same.
KOPPEL: On the radar screens I think you're probably correct, because I've heard the
same thing from -American specialists. But your pilots, the pilots of the SU-15s, the
pilots of the MiG 23s, they, uh, had this plane in visual sighting. They were only,
uh. : believe I heard the pilot say in the tapes that we've heard, only two kilometers
away on a fairly bright, moonlit night. One would assume that a professional military
pilot could tell the difference. CEPASIMOV: Well, the, the plane was behaving very
strangely, and, uh, yesterday on, uh, Soviet TV I asked, uh, your president, uh, uh,
six questions, and one of then was why the behavior of the plane was so strange. It
didn't answer, uh, radio, radio. It didn't follow the, uh, the maneuvers of Soviet
planes. So it was behaving as if it was, uh, something very strange, a spy plane, and
it was over very sensitive area. All this is very unfortunate, by the way. Uh, the
whole thing that happened. But, uh, uh, to begin with, which number one was, why it
could deviate, uh, into Soviet airspace. It's the most modern plane civil aviation,
and, uh, many pilots who use this plane, they say it is technically next to impossible
to, to lose your way, to to say, there on this particular plane. so, uh, the Soviet
side maybe was thinking that it was a, an intentional flight over Soviet territory.
KOPPEL: Even if it were, fir. Gerasimov, and in a, moment, uh, 1, I assume first of all
that when you say that you asked the questions of President Reagan, these are more or
less rhetorical questions which you would like to have answered by the U.S.
government. in a moment I'll pose a couple of those questions, if you like, to
Ambassador Kirkpatrick. But let me just ask you one final question, uh, and we will
be coming back to you later in the broadcast, but for the moment, one final question.
Let us assume, and I don't think there's zany argument, that the 747 was indeed over
Soviet territory way beyond your border. Nevertheless it was a civilian aircraft with
269 civilian passengers. One would assume that your military would take some care in
distinguishing between that kind of an aircraft and military reconnaissance plane.
Simply because it's over Soviet airspace doesn't, one would think, give the Soviet
Union the right to shoot the plane down. CERASIMOV: Well, the Soviet government
issued several statements, uh, a series of them, and, uh, from the very beginning to
the last statement, un, it is that, that they didn't identify the plane at the moment
cf this ;n- tuna e accident. y didn't ide_nt_t it as a civilian ` e _y s plaza. And the
Soviet government expressed twice, expressed its regret and deep sorrow for the loss
of life.
KOPPEL: Actually, the Soviet government has issued a number of statements over the
last few days, some of which seen to contradict the earlier statements. Today, only
five days after the plane was shot down, for the first time your government decided
that indeed it did shoot down the plane. Why did they take so long to find that out?-
GERASI?;OV: Well, if you read our statements before that, uh, it was tacitly there
that, for instance...
KOPPEL: Well, it said the plane disappeared. GERASIMOV: uh, disappeared...
KOPPEL: ...as though it, as though it were an act of God. GERASl OV: The Soviet
government expressed its regret for the loss of life. But you see, maybe it was a
kind of... First of all, maybe they were gathering information. And second, maybe it
was a kind of waiting for the American'side to say something. And for instance, your
colvznvvEnn
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
11.
side was silent about your spy plane being in the area for several days. So you
see,
maybe we're waiting for something else to develop.
KOPPEL: Why, uh, Kr. Gerasimov, since the, uh, American reconnaissance plane was
flying in international airspace, why was it necessary to wait for the American
government to acknowledge that? GERASIhOV: Well, uh, that I don't know the answer to
that question. Maybe, you see, we knew from the very beginning that there were two
planes in the air. And, uh, the observation was established, uh, to both planes, so
to say. Excuse my English. Uh, but we didn't say it in the beginning, so we kept {
this particular piece of information until the American side admitted. So maybe this
explains why we were a little bit late with the latest statement.
KOPPEL: Uh, you were talking about your government having tacitly admitted that it
shot down the plane. The fact that it has expressed regrets, is that like a tacit
apology? GERASI?SOV: It's not an apology. See, it's, uh, for us, the whole
unfortunate episode is, uh, looks completely different. Uh, my government secs in
this very big provocation because, as maybe I will have time in this to enumerate six
points of mine, uh, because of these six points we think that it was an intentional
flight over Soviet territory by a civilian plane which was also a spy plane. And the
purpose of it was, first, if it succeeds, to see if it's possible to use civilian
planes for spy purposes, and second, if it fails, as it really did, then to raise hell
and to use it for undermining the international situation, to use it for, to use it to
prove again that your government, your administration is right, uh, in its cause of
place through threats and its harsh attitude toward the Soviet Union, uh, with these
barbarians, as your president put.it. So to use it for political purposes, uh, to
undermine the international situation.
RODPEL: All right, Mr. Gerasimov, that's just one of many interesting paints that we
will indeed have a chance to discuss a little bit further. In a moment we'll turn to
the United Nations Security Council where today Ambassador Kirkpatrick charged the
Soviets with calculated actions that shocked the world, and where today the United
State= played tape recordings of the Soviet pilots during the final moments of Korean i
Ai Lines Flight 007. And we'll talk with Ambassador Kirkpatrick. (Partial playing
of the tapes referred to above)
D? L:
Ambassador Jenne Kirkpatrick is with us i.n New York. It was she who today
spearheaded the U.S. diplomatic assault on the .Soviet attack on that Korean airliner.
_::C. in a moment we'll be talking to ?sirs. Kirkpatrick live. WThc provoked whom in the
ces;ruct:on of the Korean airliner went before the Security Council of the United
Nations today. U.S. Ambassador Kirkpatrick played a recording, illustrated with video
tape, of the Soviet fighter pilot's communication with his ground control bef ore he
fired the missile that terminated Flight 007. It was, as Marilyn Berger reports,
reminiscent of a similar episode nearly 21 years ago when Ambassador Adlai Stephenson
confronted the Russians with U.S. evidence and demanded an explanation.
(Videotape of Adlai Stephenson addressing the Security Council) ADLA1 STEPHENSON
(U.S. Ambassador to UN): All right, sir, let me ask you one simple Question. Do you,
Ambassador Zorin, deny that the USSR has placed and is placing medium- and
_ntermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no. Don't wait for the
translation, yes or no? VALERIAN ZORIN (USSR Ambassador to UN) (through translator):
I'= not an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a
cuestion that is put to me in the fashion in which prosecutor does. In due course,
sir, you will have your reply. STEPHENSON: I'm prepared to wait for my answer until
hell freezes over if that's your decision.
,
, AM ,TLVLTED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
BERCER: Today in one of the most':dramatic meetings held in the Security Council since
that exchange 21 years ago, U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, unlike her predecessor
Adlai Stephenson chose not to wait until hell freezes over for an answer from the
Soviet Union, this time about the ill-fated Korean airliner. She provided it videotape
with the answers. JEANE KIRKPATRICK (U.S. Ambassador to UN): On this tape you will
hear the voices of pilots of Soviet interceptors which included three SU-15 *Flagons
and one ?:iC-23 *Flogger, including the SU-15 pilot who pulled the trigger which
released the missile which destroyed the Korean Air Lines Flight 007. (The words of
the Soviet pilot are heard in Russian and are being translated into English. Screen
displays the transmission both in English and in Russian) PILOT: The target's strobe
light is blinking. I see it visually and on radar. The target isn't responding to
IFF. The A.N.O. (Air Navigation Lights) are burning. The strobe light is flashing.
I've already approached the target to a distance of about two kilometers. The target
is decreasing speed. I'm dropping back, now I will try a rocket. I'm closing on the
target. I'm in lock-on. I've executed the launch. The target is destroyed. I'm
breaking off attack.
BERGrK: Those voices demonstrated that the Korean plane's lights were flashing when
the Russians said its lights were off, that it was staying on course and decreasing
its speed when the Russians insist it was trying to avoid pursuit, and contradicted a
Soviet allegation that the Russian pilots could not see the plane because of poor
visibility. This morning, Soviet ambassador Oleg Troyanovsky was still repeating the
party line. But it was yesterday's party line, already being contradicted in Moscow
practically at the moment he spoke., At first he refused to acknowledge that Russian
fighters had-shot down a Korean airliner. Then, in the afternoon, when he got word
that Moscow had admitted downing the plane, Troyanovsky had an excuse prepared. OLEG
(;;SSR Ambassador to UN) (through translator) : The Soviet pilots, in
stopping the actions of the intruder plane, could not know that it was a civilian
aircraft. It was flying without navigation lights in the height of night in
conditions of bad visibility and was not answering the signals.
BERGER: Then Korean ambassador Kim accused the Soviet Union of inventing lies, saying
that no one could confuse the Korean 747 for an American reconnaissance jet. A*SB.
"YUNG WON RIy (South Korean Rep. to UN): Unless the Soviet fighter pilot, uh,
exclusively recruited only from those with seriously defective eyesight, itis
impossib a to imagine that they could have mistaken one plane for the other.
.:rG a council that has resounded for years with anti-American rhetorics the
words :ad suddenly changed. harilyn Berger for Nightline at the United Nations.
KOPPEL: Joining us live now from New York, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. hrs.
Kirkpatrick, do you have any idea yet, five days after the fact, why that Korean
airliner was so far off course? JEANS KIRKPATRICK (U.S. Ambassador to UN): No, we
don't. The fact is, there are really only two possibilities. We know that it had
three computerized navigational devices and either there was a human error in
programming those computers or else there was a mechanical failure. But we really
don't know and I don't suppose we ever will know. One of the many problems about the
Soviet behavior is that they're not permitting either us or the Japanese or the
Koreans or anybody to assist in the search mission to try to retrieve any of the kinds
of evidence that might give us some answers to that. You know, even today the Soviets
have never shared the black box which would have helped explain the 1978 Korean Air
Line disaster.
CQI VED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200860010-3
s
KOPPEL: What you're referring to 'is back in '78 when they shot down another Korean...
KIRK?ATRICK: Fight .
KOPPEL: ..airliner. That, that one crashed on the ice and only two people were killed. KIRKPATRICK: Exactly.
KOPPEL: Let, let we ask you, because if there is any aspect to this story about which I
the L.nerican audience might be queasy with regard to its own government's activity, is the delay in admitting that there was an RC-135 American reconnaissance plane iit
the area. Why did it take so long for the administration to admit that? KIRKPATRICK:
.actually there wasn't an American aerial reconnaissance in the area...
KOPPEL: Not when it was shot down. But it was in the area before that. KIRKPATRICK:
Right. Well, it depends on what you mean by 'in the area,' because as I made clear
today and as the president made clear, when the Korean airliner was shot down, the
Korean airliner was shot down over Soviet airspace. The U.S. aerial reconnaissance
was never near Soviet... Well, it was never in Soviet airspace or, or even brushed the
edges of it, really. When the Korean, airliner was shot down the American aerial
reocnnaissance plane had already landed an hour earlier, 1,500 miles away. So, I
don't know, you know, I just don't think you call that 'in the area,' in fact.
KOPPEL: No, not anymore. But we know, because you and others in the administration
have told us, that that reconnaissance plane was, in point of fact, in the same
vicinity as the Korean 747 during the two and a half hours. at some point during that
two-and-a-half-hour period, uh, during which the Soviets were in fact tracking the
plane. KIRKPATRICK: Well, at the beginning, actually, of the two-and-a-half-hour
period when, befcr e they were over Soviet airspace at a.11. And the Soviets knew that
there were two planes. We just heard that frog the other guest on your show. The
Soviets knew perfectly well that there were two planes there, so there never was
really any confusion about whether there was a, you know, whether there were two
planes, or... We never were in the area that they were pursuing or shooting down
anybody. It's, uh, it literally wasn't relevant.
KOP?EL: I an told by, by, by specialists in the field that sometimes large commercial
aircraft like that 747 are, in effect, used for shielding a reco=nnaissance plane from
enenv radar tracking, that they're for. for nasking. in effect. Is that true?
We. . I don't know, I'n net an expert .n that field. If
you say
sC^E::DES. :'m sure that's not the case here because the Korean airliner was on a
course which is an abso-... should... The route that it was flying and should've
staved cn is a route that is, uh, absolutely routine and flown by dozens of flights,
literally.
KOP?EL: But of course it wasn't on that route. KIRKPATRICK: No, but it was in the
beginning, and it was in, at a point that it, for example, uh, tracked, was
intersected with the American aerial reconnaissance. The American aerial
reconnaissance plane was on, again, on a routine route which it tries to verify SALT,
uh, verfication, SALT treaty verification. Uh,and as I understand it, in any case,
the Soviets know what our aerial reconnaissance flight courses are, just as we know
what theirs are, and so there just would.n't've been any question at all of
s
confusion about that. The Soviets understood that there were two planes there very
briefly in international airspace. They know what our routes are, they knew what the
other routes were.
CONTINUED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
KOPPEL: All right. We've gotta take a break, Madame Ambassador. When we return
we'll resume our live discussion with Soviet political analyst Gennadi Gerasimov in
Moscow and with UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick in New York.
KOPPEL: Joining us once again live from Moscow, Genaddi Gerasimov, political
commentator for the Soviet news agency Novosti. hr. Gerasmiov, let me try again.
Your government. has conceded that it shot the plane down. It has expressed regrets
that it happened. Is anyone prepared to acknowledge yet that a mistake was made?
GERASI'SOV: You see, the pilot was acting according to his instructions. So, I'm not
sure that anybody is prepared. And the responsibility, as we see, lies with somebody
who sent this spy plane into our airspace.
KOPPEL: Now, you're going to have to explain that, if you would, is somewhat greater
detail, because I don't know that any evidence has been presented yet--perhaps you'll
present the first of it tonight--that this was indeed a spy plane. GERASIMOV: Well,
I don't have direct evidence. I have questions which were not answered, and two of
then were already touched upon by, by Mrs. Ambassador. And one is there is no answer
to the question why this plane, which is as I have said tehnicaly superior and have
navigation systems, several of the=, why this plane was, had this deviation from the
usual course. The question is not answered. The second question about the second
plane, I don't think the answer is satisfactory, because it, well, you may say it's a
routine flight. But at some point it was in the same area, and of course it could
c-cmplicate the picture for Soviet military authorities in the region.
KOPPEL: Well, let me just stop you for one moment, hr. Gerasimov, because, sh, as
A..;;zas sailor Kirkpatrick indicated a moment ago, we have a number of treaties between
our two countries, and 1 order to verify that each side is adhering to the terms of
those treaties, each country is entitled to pursue what are called I believe national
means of varification. GERASMIOV: Right.
KOPPEL: that refers to satellites. GERASIMOV: That's correct.
K0P?~L: It refers to reconnaissance aircraft. Sc, you know very well that these
kinds of reconnaissance aircraft are in Your area, and you also know the commercial
aircraft flying in the area. It seems to be an enormous leap of logic to be able to
go frc= one to the shooting down of another. GERASIX0V: Well. I don't dispute that,
a_ _.'.at there are national means cf var.:icat_on. But i`'# C thing t0
~ aE use
sa e'_.tes, w,-;-, c' are perms ttec, or maybe to use planes far of- :rom the Soviet
airspace. And it's quite another thing to use this particular reason to send. the spy
planes into the Soviet territory, which happens sometimes, you Z-2 incident and
others. I don't think....
KOPPEL: This was what 23 years ago, 24 years ago? GERASIMOV: Still I remember.
KOP?2L. It still rankles with the Soviet Union. I guess then it's +ra? Ir to point out
that this is the second time the Soviet Union has shot do., a commercial airliner in
only five years. Is that an accident? GERASIMOV: Well, but it's not an accident
because it was just, there were many, zany circumstances put together and the presence
of an additional Spy plane in the region was one of the=. And, ah, it was close to
the commercial airliner. And I don't think that it is a rule in civil aviation to
escort civil airlines with military ones.
KC??EL: Ambassador Kirkpatrick? GERASIMOV: And this was the case. KIRKPATRICK:
Its just appalling. It's like saying that a plane that lands in Chicago an hour in
.CONTINUED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
/I
advance of one that lands i.n San Francisco could be, as it were, legitimately confused
wi tbeing, having been in the air at one point an hour and a half before over Omaha
or something. GERASI1iOV: I an not saying that, ah, there was a confusion there.
KIRKPATRICK: it's, ah, you know, and furthermore I think the Soviets keep tryin....
KOPPEL: Mr. Gerasimov, if you'd be good enough to let the ambassador finish first,
then I'll give you an opportunity to respond. KIRKPATRICK: You know I think that the
Soviets.... G RASIhOV: I'm not saving, well.... KIRKPATRICK: I think that the
Soviet Union is trying to call the Korean airliner a spy plane. And we know it was
over Soviet territory. We know it strayed over Soviet territory. And by calling it a
spy ;lane again and again and again to leave an impression that they, you know, that
:here's some reason to believe it was a spy plane, when. there's absolutely no reason
to believe that at all, anymore than any other commercial airliner. GERASIfOV: You
see, you, you must imagine the situation and the duration. It was for two hours and a
half. And during this two hours and a half there were plenty of incidents of
complications, and one of then was that your reconnaissance plane met somewhere in the
area or just immediately before the Korean airliner entered the Soviet airspace, met
with your spy plane, who was detected by Soviet radar.
KOPPEL: You see, fir. Gerasimov, that's.... GERASLMOV: I'm not say that there was a
case of mistaken identity. I'm saying that is just one of the complications which are
coming to the whole picture. The other complications.....
KOP?EL: Now,. i guess one of the, one of the complications that that troubles me, hr.
Gerasimov, is if for example the Soviet SU-15 had shot down the 747 at the same time
that it was in the region with the reconnaissance plane, one might, I suppose, by, by
torturing logic just a little big, be able to excuse the act. But it didn't happen
until about an hour and a half later when the plane had long since landed at another
air base in Alaska. Now, how do you.... GERAS IMOV: It didn't....
ROPPEL: Now do you use the one to justify the other. GERASIMOV? I know that. I
didn'?t invalidate my argument, which is that it was one of the complications which
came into the picture.
KOFFEL. Tell us about some of the other complications. maybe, maybe they'll be a
little more compelling. GERASIhOV: Yes, the other complication. I mentioned the
._rst one.. .he l,iane straying of course. Now, the other public, eomplicatloa that
to ran..^.e did.n?: answer, didn't answer on the radio or iron the ground and fro= the
Soviet ;ilcts. he didn't answer. he didn't follow the m..a.neuvers. So, he's, it's
behavior could look very strange for a Soviet pilot. This, a.h, so, the third
co=lication is that. as I mentioned, the plane was over extremely sensitive area.
KOPPEL: All right, 1r. Gerasimov, if you'll forgive me, excuse me, we have to take a
break for just a moment. I'll be back with you and with hrs. Kirkpatrick in just a
moment.
KOPPEL: With us again now from our New York studies, the united States Ambassdor to
the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick and in Ncscow, Soviet political analyst, Gennadi Gerasimov.
hadam LSbassador, mr . Gerasimov raised, an interesting point a moment ago. Why do you
thin!: it was that the Korean plane did not answer Soviet inquiries, or whre there any
Soviet inquires? KIRKPAIRICK: We don't know that there were any Soviet inquiries at
all. We don have any, nothing on the tape suggests that there were Soviet inquiries
to .he plane during the 20 minutes, roughly, 50 minutes that it was, before it was
l '?N7EVLED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
destroyed. We, we think that theSoviet plane don't have the standard inter 'I
national
emergency frequency.
KOPPEL: Because.... KIRKPATRICK: Which would have enabled them to contact the
Korean airline: in fact.
KOPPEL: Why is.that? I mean, why do they not.... KIRKPATRICK: Well, we think the
reason is that they fear that Soviet pilots might defect, Wight use that international
emergency frequency to establish contact with other people and defect. In any case,
we don't think they have it. GERASIMOV: May I make a point of order here?
KItRKPATRICK: But we, just a minute please. We also, we have no evidence, the tape
shows no seroius effort at all to identify the Korean airliner or show the ground
raising no ouestions about what kind of a plane it is, and the Soviet interceptor
fighters raising no questions really about who it is. It simply shows them tracking
and deciding to destroy and destroying. And that maybe is the most shocking thing of
all about the tape, is the lack of concern about who it was they were trying to blast
out of the sky.
KOPPEL: Go ahead, hr. Garasimov. GERASIMOV: Well, first of all, I would like to
mention that though your president said in his speech that Soviet fighter planes are
not equipped with this particular radio which works on this special save length, one
to point point five megahertz. They, actually they are equipped, and it was mentioned
in the statement made by the Soviet government. So, it's just the statement of fact.
So, they had this particular facility, and they used it, I suppose.
KOPPEL: vr.... KIRKPA;RICK: Well, actually, they didn't, if I may say so. If, ah, }
because we do have
e
f
l
li
bi
p
r
y r e
a
ect
e electronic tape recordings of the conversations
from the Soviet pilots, and they did not make such inquiries.
KOPPEL: I'll tell you what, let me, let me put the question in another say, ?jr.
Gerasimov.' I would assume that the Soviet government has access to tape recorders
also and presumably they would have tapes of those conversations. It would be very
dramatic if the Soviet government produced those tapes. Do you think they have them?
GEPASIMOV: That I don't really know. I simply don't know. But you see, we had this
accident in action, so to say, for two hours and 2-half. And with modern
comunications, it was pretty easy for somebody somewhere in Washington or Tokyo to
to e the teie hone receiver and to call hoscow and to ex-.lain the s:hole t ing and
why w*-,v the hotline was not used in this particular case to stop this tragedy.
KOPPEL: You think this is an appropriate use for the hotline? I mean, first of all,
I'm not sure that the tapes had made their way all the way back to the, to the
decision-making people in Washington before the plane was shot down. But I su
os
pp
e
more to the point, hr. Gerasimov, is that no one in Washington would have thought that
your government was going to shoot the plane down. You think that might be a reason
for not calling them? GERASIMOV: Ah, you see, if the information was there that the
plane was over the Soviet territory, I guess it's a valid reason to use any
ccm=un.cation link available.
KOPPEL: Let me ask the question..... GERASIMOV: Do you see, and it....
KOPPE_: Let me ask the question very bluntly, hr. Gerasimov, ah. GERA S1 0V: Yes.
KOPPEL: Now that you know that it was indeed a civilian aircraft, now that you know
that 2d9 civilians died, do you think it was appropriate to shoot it down? GERASIhOV:
rQNZTNUED
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200860010-3
Of course not. I would say it in this way, that if the Soviet pilot knew for sure it
was not a spy plane, it was a civilian plane, he had to try again to, to land it and
but then, I saw the plane was behaving very strangely maneuvering and didn't want to
follow the orders. And that's why he assumed that it was a spy plane.. Also, I would
like to add that there is information now which was not there but which is now
available after this accident, that the commercial airlines are routinely used for
gathering information. And in the beginning of the program it was mentioned by you
that we have satellites, so why worry about planes.
KOP?_-_': Well, we have satellites and reconnaissance aircraft. GERP,SIMOV: Yes.
KOP?ZL: So. why worry about a commercial aircraft. GrRASIMOV: I'm not, I am not a
specialist in the field, but I've read in your newspapers and in our newspapers that
even though you have very good satellites, planes are even better for some details of
reconnaissance business. And they are used, commercial airlines, over friendly
countries to the United States, they are supplied with certain, ah, certain equipment,
spy equipment near a military base somewhere. I guess it's...(inaudible). I don't
know.
KOPPEL: Mrs. Kirkpatrick, it, it seems like a direct charge. You want to respond to
it? KIRKPATRICK: No, of course. I mean, absolutely not. The United States would
not, would not even consider, would not even consider using commercial airliners that
carry passengers for any kind of intelligence gather of reconnaissance information.
That's just an outrageous, absolute fabrication, which again is just designed to
justify what was a perfectly brutal decision on the part of the Soviet Union to shoot
down an airplane, which either it knew was a commercial airliner carrying 269
passengers or it didn't know and it simply didn't care whom it shot dog,^... You know,
there are some agreed upon international standards about what countries should do in
case they find an airliner that's strayed over their territory. They should try to
identify it: They should take every measure. If they think it's serious, then they
should try to escort it out of their territory or force it to land, in an extreme
case..' The Soviets simply did none of those things. They just, you know, they
followed a policy of shoot now, identify later.
KOFPSL: Mr. Gerasimov? GERASIMOV: Well, I, 1 think one of the questions which also
can be raised when we discuss this unfortunate episode is who profits from the whole
._-:g' . nd certainly not .he Soviets are. KIRK?ATRICK: No one profits from the
^G E t ing. nd I mean tis 1s a pure unadulterated tragedy in whith ?.69 people lost
tne:_ :ves, lr, which a great many families are bereaved. No one profats at all.
G=RAS';OV: but to where lies the responsibility for this, Madam Ambassador: Pnd if
we're.... KIRKFATRICK: The responsibility lies with whomever shot down the plane. I
think that's quite clear. G:RASIMOV: ?,gybe responsibility lies with those who sent
it into the Soviet airspace over very sensitive territory.
KOP?:.'L: ur. Gerasimov, we're gonna have to take a break again, but before we do, I, I
must ask you, you keep repeating the same rather "incidious suggestion that that was a
spy plane. And I've asked you now on a couple of occasions, let me ask you one more
time, what evidence other than just the, ah, I suppose the somewhat soothing effect
that it has to you and to your colleagues to make the charge, what evidence do you
have to support that charge? GLRASIMO.V: Well', I've already said, said so, answered
you several questions.
KO?P=L: You've asked a answered of questions, but you've provided no evidence, and
I'm asking you if there is any evidence, any concrete evidence to suggest that that
COQ
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-01070R000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
plane was being used for espionage? C RESI?SOV: There are certain unanswered
cuest:cns. There is no very hard evidence.
KO?al:: All right. Fine. Why don't we stop on that point for the moment, then? And
we'll continue our discussion in a moment.
K0?P=: (Nightline Joined in progress)...how long will it be, what has to happen
before that can be in a. in a somewhat pleasanter (sic) atmosphere? RIRfipATRICK:
Well. I. vou know, I don't know. I can tell you that I've talked to a number of, of
==er:cap technical experts, military and civilian and others, federal aviation
Officials and so forth, about what needs to be done in order to try to make sure thaw
no such tragic occurrence happens again. That's our goal. Our goal above all is to
try to make certain that no, that this never happens again.. There's general view
among our technical experts that we don't really need new regulations, -so such as we
need implementation of the regulations that exist. There is an international board,
which makes both rules and recommendations. And apparently most nations abide by
those rules and recommendations and the Soviets don't. And the, the first and
foremost goal would have to try to be to persuade the Soviets to live by civilized
rules of behavior. And we need, we need to get them to change the notion that because
an airliner is lost or strays into Soviet territory it oughta be shot down Or it's
their sovereign right to shoot it down is really shocking. There's no nation in the
world that, ah, believes that.
ROPPEL: Let us assume for a moment, Madan Ambassdor, that ?r. Gerasimav in Moscow is
an accurate-barometer, that he reflects the Soviet government. I'.IRRPA7-JKICR. Ub hub.
l:0?P=:: Do you derive from anything he has said this evening the conclusion that
anything is likely to change? KIRKPETRICK: I'm afraid I don't. And I also noted
with real disappointment and dismay today' that when the Soviet government finally did
admit that.they had shot down the airliner, and that was five days later, they also
said.that -it was appropriate and it was carrying out an order and that it was
im lementing a new law which had just been put on the Soviet books in the last year,
realer seeming to affirm their right to shoot down any creature or Vehicle that strays
into their airspace. That's very discouraging for the rest of us, I e think.
Geras:mov, would it be fair to assume that any commerical airliner that
strays into Soviet airspace Way be assumed to by Vol:. ? s
to be
involved somehow
es:'.'cnage and therefore is sub. ect to being shot dou*r,. or would You like to amend that
it SLIDE way? G=r. SIh0N': i Cu^.'t like this business of shooting planes CaCwT,. An r;
I
must a phasize that hadan A=bassador is mistaken when she mentioned that it is just a
lie that commerical airlines are not used for espionage purposes. First of all, the
Soviet authorities say that, that they know about this. And I have no reason to
disbelieve them. And second, I read about it in American press, for instance, San
Francisco examiner. ;mod in this particular article, am official from Pentagon was
Quoting, who said something like this, that it's dangerous business because innocent
people are involved.
0??.. Well, must say I'ID, I'm moved by your addition tG the accuracy of the
r.erican press. b'Jt I assure you that there are more articles in the American press
these days that are condemning the Soviet Union for what has happened than these that
excuse _,. GEn-.SIMOV: I can imagine that.
.COllrrEV ZED
/0
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
K0PPE'_: A.nd I, i.... GSRSSI*f0V: But I would like to make this maybe, while
point, while
approaching the end of the program, and I would like to make this point. Let's
imagine, was it possible, this particular accident, was it possible, if--that's a very
big if--we had good relations and we trusted each other, so, I think this particular
airline, with its unfortunate number, 007, was shot down, it was because it was a
victim of the Cold War. If we had good relations, if we trusted each other, of
course, this couldn't really happen.
hOP?SL: but maybe.... GERASI*SOV: The underlying course, the underlying course of
the wee thing is the ;nternaticnal tension and 'he unrcrturate side, very
unfortunate side-effect of this particular catastrophe is that it is being used to
increase this international tension even further, which is no good.
ROPPEL: It may be of some small comfort to you, hLr. Gerasimov, when I tell you that
indeed Soviet aircraft and other aircraft from the Communist blot have strayed over
the United States during this period of great tension, as you describe it. And they
have not been shot down. It is only your government that has chosen to respond that
way. But let me turn to the question... GEFJ.SI?;OV: They didn't identify....
KIRKP.TRICK: They've also been shot down, they've also strayed over Japanese airspace
and never been shot down and many other nations' airspace and never been shot down.
GERASIMOV: They're identified as such, as civilian airline.
KOPPEL: No, no, no, we're talking also about military aircraft. Some of your
military aircraft have actually flown into U.S. airspace. That, too, has appeared in
the American press. I'm surprised you haven't read it. And they were not shot down.
They were simply escorted out of the area, and indeed, some of the commercial
airliners, they were denied certain rights for I believe, Madam fimbassador, 60 days,
wasn't it: KIRKPATRICK: That's right. '
KOPPEL: Now, let me, let me ask you, hr. Gerasimov, the question that I addressed to
'hrs. Kirkpatrick a moment ago. Where do you think, given the way things stand right
now and given the apparent reluctance of the Soviet Union to apologize, sere do you
think U.S.-Soviet relaticns are headed? G=RJSIhOV: Well, they are at a very low
pcint indeed. - d as general secretary of the United Nations said recently. lie's not
... Pcrtugal or was in Portugal two or thee days ago. he said something along these
_ines. this articular accident OL'
C not be used to aggravate .ri
t - sh 1 s ternat~onal
ens . en . ..-C. - air eady very Gad.
r'1') d. think it 's p very good :.C51' lC^ to approach
E ^.C.E :nfc:-tn a a thing. because, you see, i_ we are ?oing on a collision course,
.n..Eases te danger of a .big nuclear c04.~ron at_C: where
-~ _ , there will be no
inners. tie underlying course of the whole thing is international tension. and if
we... i,Rr.P :TRICK: The underlying cause of the whole thing was the Soviet proclivity
for using violence and then lying about it. GERhSI';OV: So, let, you are, you are
entitled to your opinion. but ay opinion is the underlying cause is Soviet-American
tension, and we must try somehow to go back to the years detente when we can trust
each other more. ;nd then these accidents will never happen.
I:C`hr. Gerasimov, let me dust--you're ri:&ht we are moving . g she end of this
:cgram--~Ut let me tie up a few loose ends if I ma
, y Who gave the order, was it the
......pry or was that order confirmed by civilians in Moscow? GERASIhOV,
Sorry?
1CPP_-. hhc gave the order to shoot down the ;lane? Was that a purely military
order. a .ccal. a regional ccnmander? GERiSIhOV: According, accord.-:n&, according to
CL;- _nfCrnat.Gn, .oval authorities.
LONTEVVF-D
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3
K0??EL: Without referring it back to hoscow this, this decision was made? ._ GERASI2i0V:
It is not mentioned in the statement, as afar as 1 know. I wasn't there on the scene,
but in. the statement of the.-Soviet government, it mentioned that the local authorities
decided after, after failing to get into contact with this plane.
K0??EL: Let me turn to you in your capacity as an analyst and a commentator. From
what you know of the Soviet heirarchy and the military structure, do. you think it is
firer that this would have been done by a local commander at the local level? Or
oor.'t you think this would have been bumped up to a somewhat higher command?
GE:.:_SIM0V: I don't really know. But I can imagine it was done on a local basis. It
was a tonight, (sic) and, and I don't know really. I think it's quite possible.
R0?PEL: There has been a demand made by President Reagan, as you know, for
compensation to be paid to the victims. You think that'll ever happen? Gr SIMOV:
Well, I'm not a legal expert, and, ah.:..
R0P?EL. To the families of the victims, I should say. GERASI2'SOV: The position of my
govern is that the responsibility lies with those for sending this plane into the
Soviet airspace. I don't know how the government will decide this legal aspect of the
situation.
KO?PEL: Yrs. Kirkpatrick, a closing comment from you, please. KIRP3ATRICK: I think
it's very sad that the Soviet government even now can't admit the possibility that an
airline strayed into their territory and got, as it were, lost there. They didn't
know where they were. There's a classical response to that and that's to help out..
You know the ship at sea that's off course or the airliner that strays. And there's a
civilized response to it. And there's a civilized response, even if you're
suspicious. rand we very deeply regret that the Soviet union has, even when it did not
have civilized response, it had a very brutal, barbarous response. And even after
havi g had the time to think it over, thinks it did the right thing in cooly murdering
those 269 people.
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP88-0107OR000200860010-3