National Intelligence Survey Program

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05597A000200010039-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 27, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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27 April 1973
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT National Intelligence Survey Program
REFERENCE DDI Memorandum of 6 April 1973,
same subject
1. This memorandum is submitted as a basis for discussion
and decision affecting the National Intelligence Survey program.
2. The National Intelligence Survey program is an interagency
effort conducted under the auspices of USIB and the general guidance
of the NIS Committee. Contributors are DIA and five components of
CIA. Editing, coordination, and processing functions are under the
Director, OBGI, who also serves as Chairman of the NIS Committee.
(Tab A provides details. )
3. The NIS program was set up by NSCID No. 3 in 1948 to con-
solidate a number of overlapping basic research activities and to fulfill
a national requirement for coordinated, up-to-date, readily available,
basic intelligence. Coverage was to be worldwide and detailed. The
original goals were never fully achieved.
4. For years, the NIS program has been under continuing critical
scrutiny. At its high-water mark (1959), the program included 60
detailed topical sections published separately on 100 different countries
at a cost of approximately annually. Since then, the program
has changed significantly in scope, area coverage, content, emphasis,
and magnitude. At present, all detailed sections but one are eliminated
and the program is concentrated on a newly conceived and formatted
General Survey published at the rate of 30 per year and the Factbook,
Classified by 019641
Exempt from g,-a:;ral declassification
schedule of E.O. o:.einption category:
`?'56 (1), (2), (3.), or (ti) (circle one armore)
vow
Automatically c'oc1a;;sif ied on
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u dated twice each year, at an estimated cost in FY 1973
The new General Survey emphasizes high-quality production
and analysis. (Tab B, USIB-D-51. 1 /20, 19 May 1972, "Restructuring
of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Program" and graphic,
Attrition of NIS Detailed Sections. )
5. At inception the primary aim of the NIS was to serve high-
level readers concerned with the development of foreign policy and
military planning and operations. Such high-level readers were not
directly reached. However, the General Survey has attracted a wide
and varied readership of middle and lower ranking military and civilian
officials. They use it in preparing briefings and studies for the top
echelons and for background, general reference, planning, area ori-
entation, and training purposes. Private research organizations doing
contract work for the U. S. Government -- such as Battelle, Nuclear
Utility Services, Westinghouse, and RAND -- also make regular use
of the NIS.
6. Some general conclusions concerning the audience may be
drawn from a major User Survey conducted in 1969 and from more
recent general experience. (Tab C - Summary of User Survey;
Tab D - Copy of User Survey Questionnaire; Tab E - Selected List
of Users.)
a. The NIS publications are used more extensively
in the field than in Washington because of the lack of other
comprehensive sources.
b. The DoD makes the most use of the NIS.
c. The users tend to have greatest interest in those
parts of the NIS not related directly to their missions;
i. e. , military use of political, economic, and sociological
chapters and Embassy use of General Surveys on countries
other than the host country.
d. Users consider the greatest advantages of the NIS
to be its accuracy, comprehensiveness, availability, and
the fact that it is authoritative, i. e. , coordinated basic
intelligence. Major criticisms are too little detail, the
lack of an index, and the tendency of the political and eco-
nomic chapters to become outdated.
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e. With the detailed sections phased out and the General
Survey reoriented, the specialist in search of specific data
is being served less well, but usefulness to the generalist
has increased. There has been an increase in higher level
readers.
7. Con ?A clesources rgeciNgQA113 A the NIS program ~5X1A1a
declined from in FY 1970 to in FY
1973. CIA resource s2 %1a against the program declined from-
million in FY 1970 to in FY 1973. (Tab F provides
a further breakdown of costs. )
8. Certain basic questions arise in considering the future of
the NIS.
a. Should CIA co, i.nue to support as a service of
common concern a basic intelligence program that serves
a large and important but_primarily middle echelon reader-
ship? The program is a viable community effort. It is
demonstrably useful to a wide range of regular users, but
no one of them is directly involved in making major policy
decisions at the White House and the NSC Staff level.
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b. Are the advantages of a coordinated interagency, or
"national", basic intelligence program worth the additional
management and production problems and costs to CIA?
The Agency is not the main user of the NIS, yet in FY 1973
it will bear or approximately 75%, of
the estimated production costs. The review, coordination,
and processing problems inherent in a "national" basic intel-
ligence program require extra effort and manpower. The
advantages are that interagency review and coordination do
improve the final product, and a "national" intelligence publi-
cation has greater credibility and acceptability community-wide
than single-agency products. If the NIS were not available, a
number of USIB agencies and CIA components probably would
feel it necessary to produce basic intelligence individually and
independently. This would invite duplication and uneven quality
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and coverage. However, a unilateral (CIA) basic intelli-
gence publication given wide dissemination might hold back
duplication and meet minimum needs. Any savings in a
unilateral program would depend primarily on the coverage
and scope of the effort.
c. What should be the size and scope of a basic intel-
ligence program? Intelligence agencies and components
must develop and maintain data banks in order to fulfill
their missions. The NIS is a structured program for
developing, refining, maintaining, publishing and dis-
seminating those parts of their data bases that have wide
usefulness. The costs of a basic intelligence program,
whether it is a coordinated interagency effort or a unilateral
single-agency effort, depend primarily on the extent of
coverage, the frequency of updating, the amount of detail
included, and the quality of the analysis and of the publica-
tion. Good cases, from one point of view or another, can
be made for almost any level of activity and amount of detail.
Originally the goal was "universal and encyclopedic coverage".
The criteria now used is "broad usefulness". NIS coverage
and detail, as noted above, have been reduced greatly in
recent years, in response to resource reductions. Only
recently -- i. e. , 1972 -- have reductions in the program
been the result of a conscious effort to determine an optimum
minimum level of area coverage and detail. The options that
follow suggest possible program levels.
d. How much should be done "in-house" and how much
by contract? NIS experience with external contractors has
been favorable. The Society (Commerce), and Science
chapters and parts of the Telecommunications
section are being done by contractors.
Contracts are useful when participating agencies either
lack the desired levels of expertise or data, or when they
consider the work useful but of a lower priority than other
production requirements claiming the same resources.
Production for the NIS by external contract costs approxi-
mately 20% more per man-year than in-house production
costs charged against the program. It has advantages. The
contract analyst is committed to the NIS and works full time
on it. His production usually is more dependable and of more
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even quality than that of in-house analysts assigned NIS
chapters. The NIS manager has greater control. of produc-
tion resources when dealing with contractors than when
dealing with other CIA production offices. The Economy
chapter could be done by contractors without major problems,
building on to a three-man OBGI economic contract group
in Department of Commerce that now helps review economic
chapters. Contracting out the Government and Politics
chapter does not seem promising. To be of use, the chapter
must speak frankly about the political dynamics of a country
and, therefore, must use the classified information and itself
be classified. That means access to Agency files. In addition,
a qualified contract group would have to be assembled -- not
an easy task -- oriented, and carefully supervised for some
time before it could begin to produce effectively.
9. A great many options could be devised, and an infinite number
of variations are possible. The following are sufficiently different
from one another to facilitate consideration of the broader questions
concerning the future of the NIS program. A decision to end the pro-
gram or to reduce significant';r its area coverage or scope would require
USIB action. (Tab G provides methodology for estimating dollar costs
and man-year requirements for the options. Tab H displays compara-
tive dollar and man-year costs for all the following options. )
Option A: Leave the program as it is.
Clearly, the program cannot remain unchanged
because of the pinch on DDI resources and the traditionally low priority
assigned to it in the Directorate. The coverage (124 countries) and 25X1A1a
maintenance cycle (30 General Surveys per year) require substantial
resources. The estimated FY 1973 cost to the DDI is
including 95 people. External contracts cost an additional
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Option B: Continue the NIS program on its present
organizational and operational basis, but
streamline production procedures and reduce
the scope and extent of the program.
Arrangements for further streamlining production procedures
are under way. The present hound-by-chapter format provides new
flexibility which will ease problems in coordination, processing, and
updating. The scope and extent of the program could be reduced to
various levels, with accompanying reductions in costs. There is a
point of reduction at which the remainder is but a token program of
little or no practical usefulness.
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Option B(1):
Limit General Survey coverage to about 75
countries (rather than the present 124) produced at a rate
of 20 per year (rather than the present 30). The Science
and the Intelligence and Security chapters could be dropped
at the option of the producers. Establish a 2-3 year main-
tenance cycle for a high-priority group of 20-22 countries
and maintain the remainder on 3-4 year cycles. (Present
average maintenance overall is 2 1/2 years.) Factbook
would remain, updated semiannual) . DDI resource require-
ments would be approximately 66 DDI and 18
contract man-years. Printing costs would be approximately
Option B(2):
Reduce General Survey coverage to 40 countries,
produced at a rate of 10 per year, and cover by Country
Profile only an additional 35 or 40 countries produced at
10 per year. Costs would be approximately
42 DDI and 10 contract man-years. Printing costs would
be about
These options provide significant savings in money and man-
power and would free some OCI and OER assets for higher priority
missions. The NIS mechanism would remain intact and the program
would continue to provide coordinated, basic intelligence on a selection
of countries of both high and mid priority interest. The Factbook would
continue to provide minimum essential information on a worldwide basis,
and the OCI Handbook would be dropped.
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On the other hand, the Agency would still be tied to con-
siderable extent to community considerations in production procedures
and scheduling. Coordination would still consume time and effort. The
general management function, exercised by OBGI, vo uld still face the
problem of running a complex and diverse program without control of
the production resources.
The program, under Option B(2), would approach the token
effort level, but would still be of some use.
Option C: Maintain a "national" program to produce
coordinated basic intelligence, reduce the
coverage and scope of the program, centralize
in OBGI responsibility for all non-DIA produc-
tion, and make greater use of external contractors.
This option could be exercised at various levels
of coverage. It is presented at two levels, corresponding to Options
B(1) and (2). The Factbook would continue as at present, and the OCI
Handbook would be dropped. Coverage would be a mix of higher and
lower priority countries; DCID 1/2 would provide general guidance.
The Science and Military Geography chapters
and the Oceanography detailed section would be dropped. The Country
Profile and Government and Politics chapters would be produced by
OBGI. The Society and The Economy chapters would be done under
contract by the Department of Commerce, supervised by OBGI. DIA
would produce the Transportation and Telecommunications chapter,
reorganizing it to include geographic data affecting strategic mobility.
The chapter would have a longer maintenance cycle; production would be
10 per year. DIA would continue to produce Armed Forces chapter. DDO
could continue to produce the Intelligence and Security chapter at their
option.
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Option C(1):
Coverage would be limited to 75 countries;
production rate would be 20 per year. Costs to DDI would
be 49 man-years and for external contracts.
Printing costs would be about 25X1A1a
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option C(2):
Coverage would be 40 countries, production
rate would be 10 per year, and cover by Country Profile
only an additional 35-40 countries at rate of 10 per year.
Costs to DDI would be 40 man-years and for
external contracts. Printing costs would be about-
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Option C(1) would be a viable and widely useful program.
Several important advantages are inherent in this option. It would give
the program greater central management and control; it would free OCI
and OER of the burden of NIS production responsibilities; and the publi-
cations would have the wide acceptability of "national" basic intelligence.
DDI manpower devoted to the NIS would be reduced almost 50%; dollar
costs to the Agency for contract and printing would also be reduced from
present levels.
On the other hand, this option would result in partial duplica-
tion of skills, effort, and files between OBGI and OCI -- to the extent of
10-12 analysts -- and OCI would have the task of substantive review of
the OBGI-produced manuscripts.
Option C(2) would provide a further reduction in costs and
have the advantages and disadvantages inherent in C(l), except that the
reduced coverage and scope would result in a much less useful program.
Option D: Abolish the NIS, and maintain, at some
predetermined minimum resource commit-
ment, a unilateral CIA effort to produce
basic intelligence at minimum levels on
political, economic, sociological, and
military topics.
DDI resource commitment of 30 man-years is
suggested for this option. The OCI Handbook, now compiled largely as
a byproduct of the OCI NIS effort, might become the vehicle. The Hand-
book program includes 147 countries and territories. Topical coverage
would need to be expanded three- to four-fold to meet general consumer
needs for basic intelligence. The rate at which the new publication would
be produced and maintained would depend upon the degree of thoroughness,
accuracy, and analysis, and upon the extent of continuing commitment to
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the effort feasible in current-intelligence oriented production offices.
OCI, OER, and OSR contributions would need to be coordinated by a
small, central Publication Staff in OBGI or elsewhere. The level of
production might fall within the 15-40 per year range.
An activity of this type and scope conducted with
an investment of 30 man-years would be the least one could do and still
claim to be attempting to fulfill some part of a CIA and a community
need for basic intelligence. Dollar costs for printing and contracts (if
any) would not be great. This Handbook approach would provide some-
what more useful information than the NIS Factbook but.it is doubtful
that there would be sufficient difference to justify continuing the Factbook.
In addition, community contributions to the Factbook -- particularly from
the Department of Defense, Department of State, and the Department of
Commerce contractor, which make up 40 to 50% of the Factbook coverage
-- might no longer be forthcoming under a unilateral CIA effort.
DIA probably would oppose this option as inade-
quate to DoD's minimum needs. Savings, community-wide, would depend
upon the extent and nature of effort other members of the community
would feel required to meet their basic intelligence needs.
Option E: Abolish the program with no provision for
producing and disseminating basic intelligence.
This option does not seem desirable because
basic intelligence in some available form is essential to all members
of the intelligence community. If the existing central community struc-
ture for producing, publishing, and disseminating it were dismantled,
departmental products of uneven quality and coverage would tend to
proliferate. Any savings in total resources (either community or CIA)
would depend on the scope of the various individual follow-on programs,
the nature of their publications, and the extent of dissemination.
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JOHN KERRY KIN
(,;Director
Basic and Geographic Intelligence
Attachments: 8
TAB A - NIS Participation
TAB B - USIB-D-51. 1/20, Restructuring of the NIS Program
TAB C - Summary of 1969 User Survey
TAB D - NIS User Questionnaire
TAB E - Selected Representative Users
TAB F - NIS Program Costs - 9 -
TAB G - Methodology
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