LETTER TO HONORABLE GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB FROM JOHN S. WARNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 84
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: April 8, 1960
• Content Type: LETTER

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699
$ April 1960
Honorable Glenard P. Y.ipscom
House of Representatives
Washington as, D. C.
Dear Mr. Lipscomb:
During the Director's absence from the city your letter
of April 4 was ret'erte4 to me. I know I can speak for r. L `les
when I say that he too enjoyed the S.O.S. breakfast on Larch
I know he enjoys meeting with such groups and particularly in 4u0
an informal manner.
As you know. the smatter of publication of classified inf
tier in the public press is of concern to Mr. Deli** and many t then
is official circles. I believe the Appropriations Hearings bef re Vi
Defense Subcommittee an March 24. 1944. which you enclose4,
illustrate one aspect of this problem. This parttcnlar item % t l bw
brought to Mr. des' attention upon his return.
On behalf of the Director I would like to express his thanks
for your continued interest in the Agency. As in the past. it y
believe we can be of any assistance at any time please 4 not
hesitate to call on as.
Sincerely.
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
/l - i)Gi
2 - Leg. C. - Subject
i- _Q Chrono.
OGC/ LC:JSW :mks (7 April 60)
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Jahn S. Warn r
Legislative Counsel
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STAT
 GLENARD P. LJPSCOftproved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-gc,%IMII-rEvi
Qongreo of the Entteb'tateo
3ouge of Repregentatibeg
Aoinaton, M. C.
April 4, 1960
Honorable Allen Dulles, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
APPROPRIATIONS
suewMN1TTEK6:
DEFEN 36
STATE_ JUSTICE. JI DI MARY
It was a real pleasure to listen to your discussion
with the S.O.S. at breakfast on Wednesday morning, March 30th:.
I always enjoy your very analytical approach to the great
problems which confront you.
During the discussion the matter of the publica-
tion of classified information in the public press was
brought up. Perhaps you have already had the opportunity
to review the hearings which were held before the Appropri-
ations Subcommittee on Defense on March 24, 1960, but in the
event you have not, I would like to call to your attention t e
testimony on page /1 of the printed copy of these hearings.
Again, may I express my thanks for the time that you
so generously spend with us at the S.O.S. breakfasts.
Sincerely yours,
Glenard P. p comb
Member of Congress
GPL:bl
Enclosure
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California
ROBERT L. F. SIRES, Florida
W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama
JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas
GERALD R. FORD, Ja., Michigan
HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York
MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin
GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
WILLIAM E, MINSHALL, Ohio
KEITH THOMSON, Wyoming
REAPPRAISAL OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM
REVISIONS IN 1960 AND 1961 AIR FORCE PROGRAMS
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1961
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
GEORGE! H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman
HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama
JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas
GERALD R. FORD, Ja., Michigan
HAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York
MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin
GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
WILLIAM E. NINSHALL, Ohio
KEITH TIIOMSON, Wyoming
0
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1900
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
CLARENCE CANNON, Missouri, Chairman
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas
HARRY R. SHEPPARD, California
ALBERT THOMAS, Texas
MICIIAET, J. KIRWAN, Ohio
W. F. NORRELL, Arkansas
JAMIE L. WRITTEN, Mississippi
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama.
JOHN J. ROONEY, New York
J. VAUGHAN GARY, Virginia
JOHN E. FOGARTY, Rhode Island
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
PRINCE H. PRESTON, Georgia
OTT O E. PASSMAN, Louisiana
LOUIS C. RABAUT, Michigan
SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
FRED MARSHALL, Minnesota
JOHN J. RILEY, South Carolina
Jolt L. EVINS, Tennessee
JOHN F. SHELLEY, California
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Mass~ichuse
DON MAGNUSON, Wasiington
JOHN '.i'ABER, New York
BEN F. JENSEN, Iowa
ii:. CARL ANDERSEN, Minnesota
WALT HORAN, Washington
GORDON C \NFIELD, New Jersey
IVOR I). FENTON, Pennsylvania
GERALD R. FORD, JR., Michigan
IIAROLD C. OSTERTAG, New York:
FRANK T. BOW, Ohio
CHARLES RAPER JONAS, North Carolina
MELVIN R. LAIRD, Wisconsin
ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan
GLENARD 1'. LIPSCOMB, California
JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona
JO1IN it. PILLION, New York
PHIL WEAVER, Nebraska
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio
KEITH THONISON, Wyoming
ROBERT H. MICIIEL, Illinois
SILVIO 0. CONTE, Massachusetts
WILLIAM 11. NATCHER, Kentucky
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
WINFIELD K. DENTON, Indiana
TOM STEED, Oklahoma
HUGH Q. ALEXANDER, North Carolina
ALFRED E. SANTANGELO, New York
7OSEPII M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois
KENNETH SPRANELE, Clerk and Stag Director
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
FOR 1961
THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 1960.
REAPPRAISAL. OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM
REVISIONS IN 1960 AND 1961 AIR FORCE PROGRAMS
WITNESSES
GEN. THOMAS D. WHITE, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
MAJ. GEN. H. M. ESTES, JR., ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE
MAJ. GEN. B. K. HOLLOWAY, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL RE-
QUIREMENTS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR
FORCE
MAJ. GEN. R. J. FRIEDMAN, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER
OF THE AIR FORCE
HON. LYLE S. GARLOCK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)
MAJ. GEN. H. C. DONNELLY, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE
MAJ. GEN. B. J. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF, PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE
COL. D. L. CROW, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER OF
THE AIR FORCE
COL. E. B. RASMESSEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
LT. COL. FRED H. DIETRICH, CHIEF, MISSILE SECTION, WEAPONS
BRANCH, AIR DEFENSE DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF OPERA-
TIONAL REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE
BRIG. GEN. R. H. CURTIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR. REAL PROP-
ERTY, DIRECTORATE OF CIVIL ENGINEERING, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF, OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE
MR. L. C. MEYER, CHIEF, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND MISSILE
DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER
Mr. MAHON. Secretary Garlock, General White, we are pleased
to have you and your associates before the committee this morning.
We understand that you have very significant statements to make.
We understand that there have been some tentative changes in im-
portant programs. Whether or not they have been finalized, I do not
know. You will, of course, give us that information.
We realize that this business of defense is a fast-moving business
and that decisions made yesterday may not necessarily be the best
decisions today. We have to react to the situations which exist; we
have to react to facts as they are and not as we might want them to
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be. There is much uncertainty in this whole picture, and no one
can know with complete assurance just. what should be done in each
and every instance.
I wish you would proceed in your own way to present your pro-
posals.
General WIIrrE. Thank you, sir. I. have a prepared statement with
which to lead off, if I may.
Mr. MAHON. We will not interrupt you.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF CHIEF OP STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE
General WHITE. Mr. Chairman and. members of the committee,
first of all, I would like to express my appreciation to the committee
for this opportunity to further discuss the Air Force's fiscal year 1961
budget estimates.
I am here to request your consideration of a substantial adjustment
to the President's fiscal year 1961 budget request. The Department
of Defense has approved my presentation of these recommendations
today; however, the Department of Defense is not yet prepared to
approve our recommended addenda in substance.
Mr. Chairman, you will note that I have made a change from the
prepared script and have used the word "addenda" in place of the
word "revisions." The reason is that these recommendations have
been made by the Department of the Air Force and the Department
of Defense has approved the deducts but has not approved "addenda"
in substance DOT) has only approved the,addenda for presentation.
REASONS FOR PRESENTATION PRIOR TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROVAL OF REVISED PROGRAM
Mr. MAIIoN. I would think it appropriate to state that there had
been. an indication from the Department of Defense through Deputy
Secretary Douglas that it would be desirable for us to postpone this
hearing a few days in order to perhaps get a more authoritative report
from the Bureau of the Budget, but we are concluding our hearings
soon. We must get busy with important decisions as to what, we
want to do, so we could hardly afford to mark time. Moreover, Mr.
Sheppard and some of the other members of the committee are hevily
engaged in the bill on military construction.
Furthermore, as I understand it, You are going, as our country's
representative, to a. meeting in the Middle East, at Teheran.
General WHITE. Yes, sir.
Mr. MAIION. Under the circumstances, I told Secretary Douglas
that it did not seem desirable to try to postpone this meeting until after
Secretary Gates returned. from the NATO meeting he is attending,
which I understand will be concluded in. early April. I think we all
understand the problem to which you make reference.
CHANGES IN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
General WHITE. First, I am recommending major changes in the
air defense system we had previously programed. These revisions
result in an overall program reduction in the fiscal year 1961 budget
on the. order of $500 million. Second., I further propose that in order
to expedite the improvement of our overall military posture certain
critical projects be substituted.
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Specifically, my recommendations are :
(a) Reorient the air defense ground environment system by can-
celing the SAGE super combat (--enter program.
(b) Further limit the BOMARC B program.
(c) Adjust our all defense programs to assure earlier completion
of the revised system.
(d) Expand our intercontinental ballistic missile program.
(e) Improve our fighter-interceptor force.
(f) Accelerate space and ground systems to provide warning against
ballistic missile attack.
Attached to your copy of my prepared statement is a summary list-
ing of the fall-outs and of the recommended add-ons, as well as the
program dollars associated therewith.
I will discuss briefly why this revised program is advisable and the
advantages we expect to gain for national security. Members of my
staff will cover the specific changes in detail in their presentations
to follow.
Three primary objectives will be attained by the actions we are
recommending today. These are : (1) More timely completion of an
improved defense against the air breathing threat; (2) acceleration
of systems designed to provide ballistic missile warning; and (3) an
improved deterrent posture.
The revised air defense system will have capabilities substantially
greater than those we currently possess. These will be obtained
through significant improvements in the capabilities of our Century
series interceptors and modernization of our current radar coverage.
The units in the. revised BOMARC program will be concentrated to
strengthen the area defense of the industrial Northeast. In addition,
the completed air defense system will be operational at least 2 years
earlier than the system it replaces.
We would accelerate our systems to provide ballistic missile warn-
ing under this proposal.
To improve our overall deterrent posture, we propose an expanded
ATLAS program and additional funds for the MINUTEMAN pro-
gram.
In conclusion, I should like to give this committee my earliest
opinion that the proposal I have discussed today represents a signifi-
cant step toward improving our existing air defenses and enhancing
our future deterrent posture.
General Estes will, at your pleasure, continue to give more details
of the changes in the system which we propose, to be followed by
General Holloway, who will discuss the additions we propose, and
finally General Friedman will be prepared to discuss the budgetary
aspects of these changes.
Mr. MAHON. Proceed, General Estes.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
OPERATIONS, U.S. AIR FORCE
Maj. Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., was born at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., September
18, 1914. He received his commission after his graduation from the U.S. Mili-
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4
t:a.ry Academy in 1936. In July 1.939 he began flying training and after graduat-
ing from primary and advanced flying schools was rated a pilot and trans-
ferred to the Air Corps on March 23, 1940. During the Korean conflict, General
Estes was assigned as vice commander of the Far East Air Forces Bomber
Command, in which capacity he served from. March 1951 until July 1951.
Throughout his career General Estes has been closely associated with strategic
and atomic test operations. In October 1952 he was designated commander, Air
Task Group 7.4, Joint Task Force 7 for the atomic test known as Operation
Castle. In August 1954 he was assigned to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio, and at that location became assistant deputy commander for weapon sys-
tems, Headquarters, Air Research and Development Command. On August 15,
1957, he was reassigned to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D .C., as
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Air Defense Systems- with further assignment
with the headquarters, in May 1958, as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Opera-
tions, which position, he holds at the present time. General Estes has been
awarded the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying
Cross, American Defense Service Medal, American Campaign Medal, World War
II Victory Medal, Occupational Medal for Germany and Japan, Korean Service
Medal, National Defense Medal, the United Nations Service Medal, Air Medal
with one oak leaf cluster, and Czechoslovakian War Cross.
(The prepared statement of General Estes follows:)
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, General White has covered the
overall changes that we are recommending In ear fiscal year 1961 budget. As
he mentioned, we are proposing very substantial changes in our program for
defense against manned aircraft. The purpose of my presentation is to cover
these changes in air defense in more detail and to compare the program origi-
nally presented to you with that which we are now recommending.
In order to refresh your memory, 1 will begin by showing in simplified form
the sequence of events that occurs in conducting air defense. As an enemy
aircraft, approaches the country, the first function that must occur, of course, is
that of detection. This is accomplished primarily by the use of radar and is
illustrated by these figures on this first chart (chart No. 1). Having detected
an aircraft approaching the country, the nett functional step is to determine
whether it is, in fact, an enemy aircraft or a friendly aircraft. This function
is called that of identification and is performed by a combination of steps.
The final determination is made by the air defense commander with the aid of
the electronic computers in the SAGE' direction centers shown here. Assum-
ing the incoming aircraft to have been identified as hostile, the next functional
step is that of determining the most effective weapon to use and issuing instruc-
tions for that weapon to begin. the interception. This function we call control,
and it is also performed in the SAGE direction centers. It is, of course, neces-
sary to communicate continuously with the interceptors after they are launched
in order to insure actual interception. 'this requires communications from
ground to air and is our next functional area.. Finally, the actual interception
and destruction occurs, using one or more of the weapons available to the air
defense system. Therefore, our final function is that of interception.
In order to preserve an orderly sequence, our presentation will be made in
this same order by the functions of detection, identification, control, communica-
tions, and interception.
[Beginning first with detection, you will recall that this function is performed
by a variety of equipments using radar techniques. Most of these radars are
installed on ground sites. This type of radar provides for detection of rela-
tively high-flying aircraft and is supplemented by a larger number of smaller
radars whose purpose is to detect low-flying objects. These smaller radars are
called "gap fillers." In order to extend the range at which we are able to first
detect aircraft over the seaward approaches, we also have radars mounted
in aircraft. These are called "airborne early warning and control aircraft."
I am sure that you can appreciate that these equipments are, in essence, the
eyes and ears of our whole defense system and, consequently, must be of the
highest possible reliability and performance. For the past few years we have
been engaged in a major program to upgrade the radar system. Because of the
high importance of achieving very effective and reliable detection, our revision
of the air defense program does not materially change our previous radar pro-
grain.
The next functional area is that of identification. Procurement of ground
and airborne equipment for this function. has been completed with prior year
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funds. No appreciable change is being made to these installations in our recom-
mended program.
The next area--that of control-is performed primarily by the SAGE coin-
puter system, with which, I am sure, you are all familiar. You will recall that
when we applied the SAGE computers to air defense, the United States was
divided into a number of operational sectors. In each air defense sector is
located a direction center equipped with a large electronic computer. Also
located in each division is a combat center where the division commander super-
vises the air defense battle over the entire division area. The program sup-
ported by our original fiscal year 1961 budget called for completion of the direc-
tion centers and three of the combat centers, and in addition, a number of her-
dened facilities called supercombat centers, which would have been deployed
throughout the United States and southern Canada. As stated by General
White, we are recommending today that this program be deleted. With the
deletion of the super combat centers, it is obvious that certain rearrangements
to the SAGE system are necessary. Cancellation of super combat centers also
leaves us without division headquarters facilities for three divisions. However,
with some modification of already built facilities, we plan to alleviate this defi-
ciency. Since our recommended program is much reduced, it is expected to be
completed earlier
The next function that I will cover is that of communications. As I stated
previously, these are the communications required to direct the weapons to their
target and consist of ground radio installations connected to the SAGE control
centers. Equipment for these stations has all been placed on procurement with
prior year funds. Construction of some of the stations and antennas remains
to be funded in the fiscal year 1961 budget. As you would expect, these stations
are deployed throughout the air defense system wherever the associated weapons
are deployed. Asa result of the changes in types and deployment of weapons that
I will cover shortly, it is possible to reduce to some extent the number of com-
munication stations required.
This completes my discussion of the functions that are performed on the ground
in air defense. I will now discuss the all important function of interception.
The primary weapons to accomplish the interceptor function are the F-102,
the F-101B, the F-106, and BO VIARC.
The F-102 is a delta wing, single place, all weather interceptor currently armed
with a GAR-1 and GAR-2 FALCON missiles. The F-102 can operate at 50,000
feet at speed up over mach 1. In 1961 this aircraft will be equipped with un-
proved armament.
Recommended changes are to reduce this program by a small number of squad-
rons in fiscal year 1961. These squadrons are to be phased into the Air National
Guard in the same time period. Also recomended as add-on's to our current
program are certain modifications.
Another of our manned interceptors is the F-101B. This is a two place, two
engine, all weather interceptor armed with MB-1 nuclear rockets and with
FALCON missiles. The F-101B can operate above 50,000 feet at speed up to
1,200 miles per hours. There are no changes recommended in the number of
operational units or aircraft for this portion of the program. However, there are
aicraft modifications and improvements recommended.
Another one of our interceptors is the P-106--a delta wing, single place, all
weather interceptor armed with nuclear rockets and GAR-3 and GAR-4 FALCON
missiles. The F-106 holds the current world's speed record for operational
aircraft of 1,525.9 miles per hour.
No changes are recommended to the composition of this force. However, as
shown for the previous interceptors, there are certain modifications and improve-
ments recommended as add-on's to our current program. These include modifica-
tions required to standardize the F-106 fleet.
Also, we have the BOMARC surface-to-air missile. This is a supersonic
nuclear armed missile capable of defense against hostile aircraft and cruise-type
missiles.
It is recommended that the BOMARC "B" portion of this program be reduced.
The deployments planned for the current program and the area coverage which
these weapons will provide is depicted by a series of charts. In order to indicate
the contemplated capability of all weapons currently planned for allocation
to CINCNORAD control, I show:
(a) First the location and coverage of the NIKE-HERCULES batteries.
(b) The BOMARC program.
(c) The location of manned interceptor squadrons of the regular force.
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(d) The location of the manned interceptor squadrons of the Air National
G card.
(e) The coverage provided by BOMARC.
(f) The coverage provided by the manned interceptors.
The deployments and resultant coverage which can be provided with the
recommended weapons is indicated by these charts. With the exception of
ItOMARC the deployments to be shown are intended as illustrative deployments
only. NOMAD has not completed detailed studies required to determine optimum
deployments for this revised family of weapons.
(a) The NIKE-HERCULES deployment is identical to that shown with the
current program.
(U) The operating locations provided by the reduced BOMARC program.
(c) The location of the married interceptor squadrons of the regular force.
(d) The location of the Air National Guard manned interceptors.
(e) The coverage provided by the reduced BOMARC program.
(f) And, lastly, the coverage provided by the manned interceptor forces.
This concludes this portion of the presentation. General Holloway will cover
recommended program additions.
GENERAL ESTES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it
is my purpose to amplify General White's remarks by covering for
you in some detail a comparison between. the program which we have
recommended for air defense and that which we now propose. Al-
though this committee is certainly well informed on air defense, I
think it might be worth while to refresh your memory first on the
major functions that we perform in air defeense in conducting an
intercept, because it is of these functions that I will speak of the air
defense system. I will break it down into each function.
With our air defense system, obviously our first function is that of
detection. We must insure that we have a target to begin with.
Through the various radar devices, which are, shown pictorially on
this chart, we perform this function of detection. This is done by
various equipments using radar techniques.
The second function is that of identification, as shown here. This
function is conducted essentially by the electronic devices which we
have airborne and on the ground, which query each other to determine
whether the aircraft involved is friend or foe. Furthermore, through
the use of the electronic computers in the direction centers, the sector
commander correlates flight plans from the FAA with the informa-
tion he has on the aircraft coming in on its track. By this means
lie determines whether the aircraft is friend or foe.
Having determined that the aircraft is hostile, he then dispatches
a weapon on the track of the target. During this period we refer
to what we know as control. This is to say that the weapon must
be controlled on its course toward intercept. This it does by means
of continuing to obtain radar information on the track of the air-
craft and through the use of the electronic computers in the direction
centers the weapon directors are able to control the aircraft toward
the target.
The next function during the time that the interceptor is on its
way to its target, it must be given constant course direction. This is
accomplished by the ground-air communications we have as shown
here. The final function is that of interception with the weapon
actually being vectored to an intercept with its target.
Now, under each of these four headings-detection, identification,
control, communications, and interception--I will discuss our present
program and the changes that are related to it.
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DETECTION
The first function is detection. As I have said previously, this
function is performed by a variety of equipments using radar tech-
niques. The main backbone of the detection force is the heavy radars,
which are, for the main part, located on around-based station. This
is a typical station, this is known as an FPS--24 modern radar sta-
tion. Now, in addition to those radars, which do the job mainly at
medium and high altitudes, reaching way out, getting targets far
in advance, we require smaller radars known as gap fillers, of which
this is a picture, which are located in between the heavy radars. They
provide the low-altitude coverage below the lobe of the heavy radar
and in-between lobes of consecutive heavy radars.
In addition to this, we require information out over the ocean areas
of approaching targets, particularly at low altitudes. For this pur-
pose we put radars in aircraft. This is typical of one, a Lockheed
aircraft known as the RC121D, which is our airborne early warning
and control vehicle.
All of these equipments which I have just discussed are vitally im-
portant to air defense. If you do not have modernized or compe-
tent radars, you obviously have no air defense capability at all.
Therefore, we consider the part of the system which I am discussing
now, detection, as the most vital part of the system.
We attempted various fixes on these radars to improve their elec-
tronics countermeasure countering capability, but these are not en-
tirely successful, particularly against the advanced electronics counter-
measures we expect in the future.
Therefore, we have been involved in the past few years in a program
of modernization of these radars, the heavy radar of which I showed
you a picture a moment ago, FPS--24, is one of those mdern, curreptly
designed radars, which will provide us the modernization we have to
have. These radars are not only far superior in range, altitude,
resolution, but they have designed into them means to counter elec-
tronics countermeasures.
This program has the unfortunate name of frequency diversity. I
am afraid that people have not understood exactly what that terns
means and, therefore, do not understand that the real purpose of it
is to modernize the. radars we have available in this country.
Now, the coverage which the program we recommended to you in
this budget will provide is as shown here. The orange on the chart
is essentially coverage which is contemplated to be provided by present-
day types of radars. There are differences between these types of
radars. The radars up on the DEW line are far superior to some of
the radars shown in orange on these areas.
The red represents the coverage which will be provided by the mod-
ernized radars as they become available. Off the coasts in red is the
coverage that will be provided by the airborne early warning and the
control aircraft.
Now, in our revised program the change is as shown here. There
is one thing T should mention. You also see some green areas on the
chart, this area and over here. These are additional extensions to the
DEW line which are provided by Navy airborne early warning and
control aircraft as well as by some non-NATO radars that are in-
stalled here in Iceland.
53292-60--2
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The flip that I just took off the chart shows the reduction in coverage
in this area and on the west coast, which is possible in airborne early
warning and control coverage due to modifications in the weapons
program, which I will discuss l ust a little bit later.
Furthermore, within the interior of the United States there are
certain radars which I have just taken off here which we believe pos-
sibly can be decommissioned. They are older-type radars. We are
currently discussing this with Norad and believe these radars can be
taken out.
This then, as shown on this chart,, is the final coverage that we will
have from radar under our proposed reduction.
This chart shows the phasing by fiscal year of the detection pro-
gram as it would have come in according to the program which we
have submitted to you already. In each year it shows how much of the
program. would be completed by that year. As you can see, the pro-
gram would complete with the final few percentage out here in ---.
The next chart shows the revisions which we recommend in our
proposed program.. We slide some of the program further forward
so as to get these modernized radars in a little bit earlier throughout
the program. However, essentially the final completion, the last
few radars, still come into the program in --.
The next area, sir, is identification. On this chart you see the
geographical distribution of 236 ground stations that provide the
querying transmission system to the electronic equipment on board
the aircraft to determine whether it is friend or foe. All of these
sites have been previously funded out of previous fiscal years. They
are installed.
In the event we deactivate the radars in the center of the country
that I mentioned a few moments ago, certain of these sites will not
be required and can be deactivated. There are some 32 sites in this
part of the country that will be deactivated in the event that the
radars which I mentioned are decommissioned.
Some years ago when we applied the SAGE computer to.Air De-
fense for purposes of air defense, we divided the United States into
several geographical areas. The heavy lines which you see on the
chart are what we know as Air Defense divisions or, as Norad calls
then, Air Defense regions. The dotted lines represent air defense
sectors.
In each of these sectors there is a direction center from which the
sector commander directs the air battle within the sector. In each
division there is a combat center from which the division commander
supervises the overall air battle and allocates weapons to the various
sector commanders.
As far as the direction center is concerned, this is a photograph
of a direction center building. The computer equipment, the various
displays, the sector commander, and the weapon and intercept direc-
tors are inside this building.
Our original program that we submitted to you in 1961 called for
20 of these sector direction centers and 3 combat centers located with-
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in these yellow areas. In addition to this, this was the original SAGE
program, which was not to have automatic SAGE control.
This chart shows the phasing of the total of eight supercombat cen-
ters as they would have come into the program in accordance with our
initial 1961 recommendations to you. As you can see, the program
would have been completed in 1964. For a variety of reasons con-
structionwise, as well as difficulties in integrating this entire system,
in our recent, analysis of this program we feel that quite probably
this date would have slipped further out toward 1965 or fiscal year
1966. As you can see, therefore, this tremendous system would have
been considerably late in coming in.
Our proposed program, therefore, has as its purpose, as General
White stated, getting in a system against the threat at the earliest
possible date. This will provide 98 percent completion of the pro-
gram in . The remaining 2 percent represents completion of
the sector up in Canada so that the entire system will be com-
plete in .
Mr. MAHION. General Estes, is it proposed that these charts be
placed in the record or not?
General EsT.s. You have them, sir, already in the material.
Mr. MAHON. But is this sort of information to be included in our
printed record or is it secret?
General FRIEDMAN. I think we will have to examine each of them.
We certainly would want to give some indication in support of the
committee's approval or disapproval, as the case may be. I am not,
prepared to state right now, Mr. Chairman, that they could go in
exactly as they are, but certainly I believe we can provide a picturo
that explains the change.
Mr. MATION. We do not want any information in the printed record
that should not be there. Of course, this chart here is very meaning-
ful. If we should have an early printin of this hearing, we want to
bear in mind the difficulties involved with respect to clearance.
General Esrrs. We will immediately examine that, sir, and do the
best we can in providing charts which can be published in the record.
The next area, sir, is communications. This shows a total of 154
ground-air transmitter sites that were included in the program sub-
mitted to you in this fiscal year 1961 budget. These sites are what is
known as time division data link sites. They provide automatic con-
tact between the SAGE centers and the BOMARC as well as the
fighter-interceptors. They work with the data link equipment that is
on board our fighter-interceptors and the BOMARC.
Due to changes in the weapon distribution and employment and
the types of weapons, as well as due to some of the changes which I
mentioned earlier with reference to taking out some of these interior
radars, this is the communications distribution which we recommend
in our proposed revision of the program. This will be a reduction. to
144 sites from 154.
The schedule for this program is as shown on this chart. This is
the way it would have been for the 154 sites in our initial program
and the flip an the chart shows how the program will complete with
the reduced number of time division data link sites.
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Mr. ATAHOK. You will. complete the program in ?
General ESTES. That is correct, sir. This is largely due to the fact
that you are reducing the number of sites.
From here I would like to go to the, problem of interception and talk
about our various weapons. The first weapon is the F-102. Tlris is
a picture of it. This aircraft is a Delta wing, single place. It is an
all-weather interceptor, currently armed with the Falcon missile-
namely, with the GAR-1 and GAP-2.
The F-102 can operate up to 50,000 feet and at speeds at the maxi-
mum up over mach 1. In the GAR-1 and GAP Z-21) missiles,
which this aircraft now carries, will be replaced by a missile which
will. be known as the GAR-11, which is a guided nuclear weapon with
a very small nuclear yield. This will tremendously increase the capa-
bility of this F-102 aircraft.
The current program is as shown here. I would like to remark to
the committee, sir, if you attempt to compare these various figures for
total F--102's, which I have shown on this chart, with information
which may have been submitted to you by General Friedman, you will
not find that they directly compare. These are programed operational
aircraft in operational units, as I display them here. You appreciate
the fact that in addition to this we have aircraft in depots undergoing
modifications; we have command support and attrition aircraft that
are not shown here, but these are the operational aircraft in opera-
tional. units.
I: should also mention, sir, that in the light blue I am showing the
aircraft which are overseas. The dark blue represents the F--102 air-
craft as programed to be in the North American air defense system.
Currently there are ---- in. the program to round out through
squadrons. Our recommendations on the F-102, sir, are that
in fiscal year 1961 all of the, aircraft which we planned for our inven-
tory start phasing out, of our inventory to the Air National Guard,
and that the green line here shows the. buildup for Air Defense and
Air National Guard units equipped. with F-102's.
As you recognize, the Guard is largely equipped now with F-fees and
other such aircraft. It has been our purpose here to attempt to bring
the Guard fully into the Air Defense act, and utilize the services in
which they are most competent.
Our recommended program shows the various squadrons which will
be in the U.S. inventory in red. (Discussion off the recor(l.) The
remainder of the squadrons phase into the Guard.
The reason for the disparity in figures, if you add these up here, is
because the additional aircraft than T mentioned that we have in depots
carving back from overseas, et cetera, become. available to fill up these
Guard units. So the F-102's, as far as the T-SAF inventory under our
proposed revision, will phase out the units going into the Guard.
With reference to the 102, we intend in our program to complete
certain. modifications. The first is to complete the installation of time
division data link, the electronic equipments of time division data
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link, in all of the F-102 aircraft, so that the communications sites that
I showed you a moment ago can communicate automatically with these
F-102 aircraft.
We have this installed in practically the entire fleet now. All this
does is to install it in the rest of the fleet so that the Guard aircraft
can operate with the same communications system that our regular
Air Force aircraft will be operating with.
The second modification is to improve the low level kill capability
of these aircraft. Right now, because of problems of radar clutter
which the aircraft radar and missile see, it is difficult to achieve an
assured intercept at low levels. Our purpose here, and as you will
see in the other weapons which I mention a little bit later, we intend
to improve this low level kill capability.
The next is the F-101-B, a picture of which is shown here. This
aircraft, as you can see, is two-place. It has a pilot and a radar op-
erator and, further, it is two-engine.
This aircraft has the MB-1 rocket, not these two which are shown
here (indicating).
This is the reverse side. These are FALCON rockets but in addi-
tion to the armament door it carries an MB-1 nuclear rocket known
as the GENIE. This aircraft can operate up to 50,000 feet and it
can go to a speed of 1,200 miles per hour. The current program is
as shown here. There will be a maximum point of squadrons
phasing down to - because of attrition by the end of the 1964
time period.
We do not propose any change in this program for these aircraft
in our revision. This is a fine interceptor and is doing a good job.
As you can see by the overlay, the program remains exactly the
same in our revised recommendation as it did in the ori- nal. There
is one exception to that as shown on the next chart, which is the im-
provement modifications we intend for the F-101-B. As is the. case
with the F-102 this aircraft did not fully get the time division data
link installation in production. We will complete; equipping the fleet
with that and, furthermore, this aircraft:, because it is going to be one
of the backbone interceptors in the, fleet, for some time to come, must
have further improvements in capability.
We intend first to provide certain improvements which will give it,
a greater ability to counter electronic countermeasures. These are
mainly modifications to the fire control system and they do not do
anything to the aircraft itself. They are modifications to the fire
control system and radar on the aircraft to give it a better capability
to counter electronic countermeasures.
Secondly, we intend to improve the nuclear kill capability of this
aircraft and as we get further out, in the program, the MB-1 rocket,
although nuclear, is not the system we would like to have on the
F-101-B.
The reason is that as time goes on, any potential enemy has a better
electronic countermeasure capability and it. becomes extremely diffi-
cult to get range information to utilize the MB-1 nuclear rocket and
you have got to have precise. range information. Therefore, we in-
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tend to equip this aircraft with the GAR-11 missile I mentioned for
the F-102 in place of the MB--1 in this later time period.
This will give us a much greater assurance of nuclear kill.
Finally, we want to improve its low level capability by the same
modification as on the F-102.
General Holloway is going to talk in more detail about some of these
in reference to add-ons, but 1 will say that a very considerable number
of modifications are involved in this IECC'M modification of the
F-101-I3.
The third aircraft is the. F-106 and a picture of that is shown here.
This is a single engine aircraft, single place, all weather. This is
the aircraft that currently holds the world speed record of 1,525.9
miles per hour. This is a very fast airplane.
The next chart shows our current program of building up to through
squadrons at the maximum point and phasing down because
of attrition by the end of the --- time period. As with the
F-101-B, as the overlay shows, we do not contemplate any change in
this program. As with the F-101-B, there is one exception to that
and that is in terms of modifications we intend to provide.
This airplane is an extremely complex airplane and as it has gone
into production and out into the inventory, we have found that we
needed a number of modifications to bring it up to design standards.
Therefore, the final aircraft coining off of the production line will
incorporate all of these modifications. This being a very potent
weapons system, we want to go back and pick up all of the modifica-
tions that were incorporated in production on those aircraft that got
out of production before we had the modifications, before we had the
fixes complete. In other words, we want to standardize the F-106
fleet.
Acain, we want to get time division data links in those aircraft
whi.c i did not get them in production. We want to improve the
capability of this aircraft electronic-counter-measures-wise and do it
by providing a better low-level kill capability.
The next chart shows BOMARC and this is the operational
BOMARC in a shelter at McGuire Air Force Base.
The next chart shows the BOMARC program as it was presented in
the 1961 budget projected. There would have been seven A squadrons
and I would like to make a point clear here so we all know what we
are talking about when we refer to squadrons. The squadrons of
the IM-99-A of the initial BOMARC have a unit equipment of
missiles. There are --- of these squadrons in the program but they
are located on five bases.
The first two bases had two unit equipment squadrons on the
base.
In the B program we intended, when we presented the 1961 pro-
gram, to have a total of --- of these ---- unit equipped squad-
rons. These would be located on a total of 16 bases so that we had,
with the inclusion of the A bases that were included, all bases at
missiles. The program buildup is as shown here so that at the end of
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the program we would have had operational BOMARCS in-
cluding both A's and B's. The breakdown here would have been
A missiles and B missiles. The revised program which
we are recommending to the committee is as shown here.
At the end of the program there would be the A missiles
which are already going on pad arid operational B missiles.
It would reduce the B program from 29 squadrons of the type I men-
tioned a moment ago down to - . It would reduce the total
number of bases on which BOMARC would be deployed from 1S
down to .
The next chart shows you a summary of what interceptors we
would have had on the blue line against time versus the number of
interceptors that we will now have with the revised program. For ex-
ample, in 1963, including all the BOMARCS and fighter interceptor;;,
we would have had total interceptors.
Mr. MAHON. In referring to interceptors, I believe you have made
it clear that you are referring to aircraft and missiles?
General EsTrs. Aircraft and missiles.
Mr. MAlION. You are counting an aircraft as one unit and a mis
silo as one unit? You are considering them to be equal in your
evaluation?
General Es' r s. That is correct.
In that connotation, there would be total interceptors in 1.963.
In the Regular Air Force program we have shown you there would
be interceptors in the same time period. However, the total
number of interceptors in the North American Air Defense System
would be up at this point (indicating) because of the build-uup
of the F-102 and the Air National Guard which I mentioned earlier,
which is represented here (indicating):
The total actually drops then including the Guard.
I would like to show you by means of a couple of charts here the
differences between what the NORAD weapons capability would have
been under,our fiscal year 1961 proposal and then what they would be
under the proposal as revised.
On this chart we have shown the locations and the coverage of the
139 NIKE batteries that are included in the NORAD system. Obvi-
ously, this is not part of our program but you have got to show this as
a part of the total coverage.
The second chart shows the 18 locations in green for the BOMARC.
The next overlay shows the squadrons of the Regular Force in the
yellow dots.
The next chart shows the 37 locations of the current Air National
Guard squadrons.
The next chart shows the coverage which would have been provided
by the 18 BOMARC locations.
You would have had this much air defense coverage with it
(indicating).
The final chart shows the coverage that would have been provided
by the fighter interceptors, both. the 37 squadrons of the Guard and
the squadrons in the Regular Air Force.
This is the total coverage capability that would have been available
within the NORAD system.
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Obviously, the darker areas here indicate t hat you have got more
coverage in that area due to the BOMARC and the- fighters. These
areas show where you would just have fighters and the purple dots
show what you would have in fighter and NIKE-HERCULES
coverage.
The next chart shows how this is modified. by our revised program.
We will have the same 139 NIKE batteries located here (indicat-
ing). In discussing this point, I would like. to mention that what
I am going to show you is how it would look if the Air Force were
deploying the fighters in this particular program. Obviously, the
question of deployment is a question that is up to General Kuter.
I am showing you a representative deployment and the coverage
you would get from it. If General Kuter wants to shift the fighters
around--
Mr. MAHON. Would you please identify General Kuter for the
record?
General Es ,s. He is the commander of the North American Air
Defense Command.
The purple dots are still the locations and the coverage of the
NIKE-HERCULES.
The next chart shows the sites in the reduced BOMARC program
in this area in green [indicating].
I would mention that with reference to these sites and with ref-
erence to the proposed operational missiles, we would tell General
Kuter that these are the sites we are talking about so we would not
construct sites in other parts of the country. He can deploy the mis-
siles however he so desires on these particular sites which have been
constructed.
The next chart shows the reduced squadrons of USAF interceptors
in the orange dots.
Finally, these dots show the same location as at present for the Air
National Guard squadrons. The coverage which would be provided
by I3OMARC in the locations is as shown here [indicating].
Finally, the coverage from the reduced fighter interceptor squad-
rons, plus I3OMAR.C, plus HERCULES, that will be available with
our revised program is as shown here.
Mr. MATrON. Would you please take off that last overlay and let
us look at it again ? Talk about that a little further, General.
General Es-ms. As T have shown, there are locations of
BOMARC which start down here [indicating] at Langley and go
urn through the Canadian sites through Bangor, Maine, in the United
States and through the two Canadian sites and out to Duluth, which
is the westernmost site.
These will provide coverage in the area as is shown here
indicating].
Mr. MATror. Is that the whole BOMARC program for the future
as recommended today?
General Es-rrs. In -our revised program this is the entirety of the
B OMA RC program.
Mr. MAHON. We will talk about that later.
Proceed.
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General EsTEs. To put back on the other flip, this then is the final
total coverage which the commander of NORAD would have available
to him under our revised program.
This completes my material, sir.
Next is General Holloway who will talk to you about the recom-
mended additions to our program in place of the air defense cancella-
tions which we have mentioned.
TOTAL FUND REDUCTIONS IN PROPOSED PROGRAM
Mr. MAHON. General Friedman, please refresh our minds at this
point on approximately how much money will be freed, so to speak,
from the original 1961 budget program as heretofore presented to us
by the proposed changes presented today.
General FRIEDMNMAN. Yes, sir.
The reductions which General Estes has indicated would represent
a decrease in requirement for new obligating authority in the amount
of $516.7 million. The addenda which General Holloway will dis-
cuss would require an increase in new obligating authority in the
amount of $393 million. Considering both fiscal years the net result
in terms of new obligating authority, compared to the President's
budget submission, would effect a reduction-net savings-of $138.7
million. If you just made a simple subtraction of the two larger
figures that I have given you, it would indicate a decrease in NOA
requirement of $123.7 million.
However, certain of these reductions took place in fiscal year 1960,
against appropriations already enacted. The net savings there would
be $15 million. In total, then, the President's budget could be reduced
in the amount of $138.7 million.
Mr. MAHON. You mean the President's fiscal year 1961 budget which
was presented in January could be reduced in that amount if we
followed precisely this new recommendation of the Air Force?
General FRIEDMAN. That is correct.
Mr. MAHON. I think that is clear enough, but we will have a fur-
ther statement from you later.
Proceed.
General HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, for the sake of brevity and to
maximize the time for questions, I would like to read my statement.
Mr. MAIION. You read very well. Proceed.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS,
USAF
BI0ORAPI3ICAL SKETCH OF WITNESS
General Holloway was born in Knoxville, Tenn., on September 1, 1912. He
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1937, from California Institute
of Technology (aero engineering) in 1941, Air Command and Staff School in
1947, and the National War College in 1951.
He received his pilot rating in 1938, and held various assignments in fighter
units, including Chenault's Flying Tigers, which he joined in 1942 and com-
manded as the 23d Pursuit Group early in 1943. Since World War II he has
been assigned as Director of Air Defense and Director of Plans, Headquarters,
ADC ; Deputy Commander of the 9th and 12th Air Forces ; and he has held
Pentagon assignments in flans, Research, and Development, and Requirements.
He assumed his present duty in July 1959.
General Holloway is credited with 13 enemy aircraft destroyed during World
War II in 110 combat missions. His decorations include the Silver Star, Legion
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of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross with Oak Leaf
Cluster, Air Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Commendation Medal with
Oak Leaf Cluster, Chinese Order of the Sacred Tripod, and Chinese Pilot Wings.
He is a command pilot with over 4.500 flying hours.
GENERAL HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chai.i-man and members of the committee,
the Air Force is proposing some additions as priority items for im-
proving our national defense. As brought out by General White,
some of these additions are tailored principally toward aircraft or
airborne missile defenses, some toward ICBM defenses, and some
toward increased offensive strength. I will give, first, a resumi of the
current program; second, the changes or additions proposed; and,
third, the net effects realized.
The first and foremost conclusion to be reached in considering the
package of recommended changes just. presented by General Estes is
that the responsibilities of our manned interceptors have appreciably
increased. The F-101's, F-102's, and F-106's are our area defense
weapons, and these are the weapons which must, insofar as possible,
fill our requirements. There is quite abit that. can be done to improve
the capability of these aircraft to do this job, and these things can be
done for relatively modest costs.
The F-101B and the F-106 will remain in the inventory for many
years.
The ASG-18 long-range pulse doppler radar and GAR-9 air-to-air
missile have been under development since 1956. These two sub-
systems, originally programed for the F-108, are the heart of the long-
range interceptor concept and represent; a tremendous improvement
over present fire-control systems and missiles. The fire-control system
has the capability of detecting a B-47 type target head on at very long
range. This long range plus the ability to search from very low to
very high altitudes would allow us to locate targets with only crude
DEW line information, or to operate in areas where the ground
environment has been degraded.
The GAR-9 missile is being developed to insure a high degree of
kill capability against targets detected by the ASG-18. This missile
can be launched at targets from both. low and high altitudes and can
kill at long range. Firing from high altitudes, this missile attains
a. velocity of many times the speed of sound and will be effective
against targets flying at great speeds.
Fire control. systems and air-to-air missiles have historically been
the pacing items in the development of air defense interceptors. A
substantial effort was expended in the development of these two sub-
systems before the F-108 was canceled. Development has continued
on a reduced scale, and to date we. have accumulated over hours
of operating time on the radar, of which --- hours was airborne in.
R-2i and T-29 test aircraft. We consider it extremely wise to con-
tinue this program on a modest basis.
BALLISTIC TTTSSILE EARLY WARNING
Turning now to those efforts which we propose for improving our
defenses against ballistic missiles, we would like to accelerate the
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ballistic missile early warning system to the greatest, practicable ex-
tent. This chart shows conditions of ICBM warning coverage with
and without the third site. The solid red areas are those parts of the
United States which will receive no warning of missiles launched frti,m
the cross-hatched areas. One depicts a low trajectory attack and the
other a medium trajectory attack. With site III completing the sys-
tem, all of the United States will be afforded warning, as indicated
on the left block of the vugraph.
Because of our concern over the phasing of the threat relative to
the implementation of our ballistic missile detection system, we Dive
studied the program to determine what expediting action is possible.
Here is shown what we are buying for the additional funds e?e-
quested. The costs are mainly in additional labor and, as indicated,
represented expedited construction, emplacement and integgration, and
test of the electronic components. Advanced training schedules and
certain airlift requirements are also included.
The primary objectives of the Discoverer program are to develop
components, subsystems, and satellite system reliability; also, to de-
sign, develop and demonstrate the ancillary equipment that goes with
orbiting vehicles.
The biscoverer is contributing directly to two of the Nation's most
important programs, in addition to supplying design data for oilier
space programs. The contributions made to the SAMOS and MIDAS
efforts by DISCOVERER are basic airframe, attitude control, com-
mand and program functions, orbit ejection, and recovery techniques..
We need to provide additional THOR boosters and Arena vehicles
for further development of components or systems to used in a
space environment. The Air Force has provided funds to protect
the lead time for both the Department of Defense and NASA future
THOR booster requirements.
The DISCOVERER program is of vital importance to continueAl
development of MIDAS.
It became apparent in 1958 that the advancement in IR detection
capabilities warranted the priority development of a satellite-based
ICBM detection system. MIDAS will provide instantaneous warning
of individual ICBM launches. MIDAS will provide the United
States with a highly reliable ICBM attack alarm system.
The infrared sensing devices will detect the launching of any ballistic,
missile as soon as it gets above approximately 50,000 feet, and will re-
lay this detection to a ground readout station for immediate relaying
to the appropriate users. This system will provide continuous sur-
veillance of the entire U.S.S.R. The warning time available from
Midas will be appreciably greater than that afforded by BMEWS.
This will provide time to start count downs, scramble the airborne re-
taliatory forces, alert the active and civil defenses, and alert BMEWS
for verification of attack.
The current program as reflected in our present budget provides for
R. &. D. launches at low altitude from the AMR. The first of these
was launched on February 26, 1960, with a failure in the separation
mechanism between the first and second stages.
This completes the aerospace defense items which we are recorn-
mending.
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I will now discuss improvements we propose for our offensive forces.
We recommend changing the configuration of some of our ATLAS
squadrons. You see the effects of these changes depicted here in re-
lation to the overall program.
Beginning at the left, the first five columns indicate designation, loca-
tion, hardness, operational date, and the number of missiles on launch-
ers under the present schedule. The next column, in red, indicates
the number of missiles on launchers under this proposal, and in the last
column are shown the dates the squadrons will he completely equipped
if these dates differ from presently programed operational dates.
Funds to be programed in fiscal year 1960 will cover costs of exca-
vation, and building brick and mortar facilities to include launchers,
launch operations buildings, and related real installations. The re-
maining funds will be programed in fiscal year 1961 for missiles,
ground support equipment, installation, and equipment checkout.
In using funds for ATLAS in this way. we are getting the same
number of missiles on launchers that we would get by building addi-
tional squadrons; however, since no new squadron support facilities
are required, this increase in force strength is being obtained more
economically than it would be if totally new squadrons were pur-
chased. This addition to the force, as you can see, comes very appro-
priately in the critical time period.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my delineation of the additions pro-
posed.
Mr. MAHON. We will proceed. with General Friedman's statement.
He will relate this proposed change in programs to dollars. General
White and the others have covered the broad outlines, but you will
give us the details, will you not?
General FRIEDMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
GENERAL STATEMENT OF DIRECTOR of BUDGET, U.S. AIR FORCE
General FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
the purpose of my presentation is to discuss the fiscal aspects of the
program
program changes which have been discussed by General White in
terms, and by General Estes and General Holloway in some
detail.
Summary of changes
] NCillions]
Fiscal year
Fiscal near
1960
1961
Current Programs-------------------------------------------------------
$2,807.0
$2, 793.2
Revised programs-----------------------------------------------------------
2, 792.0
2,669.5
-15.0
-123.7
The air defense programs and missile and space programs in-
volved in these adjustments total more than two and one half billion
in both fiscal year 1960 and fiscal year 1961. In fiscal year 1960, the
effect of air defense net reductions of $116.8 million and missile,
missile warning, and space program increases of $131.8 million is
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an overall program reduction of $15 million. Funds in this amount,
if not otherwise reprogramed in the meantime, would be available
to offset in part our fiscal year 1961 or fiscal year 1962 requirements,
thereby reducing the new obligational authority request for either
year.
For fiscal year 1961, the air defense program net reduction ag-
gregates $516.5 million. Offsetting against this amount the $393
million additive requirements for missiles, missile warning, and space
programs leaves us a net reduction of $123.7 million in program re-
quirements-and in new obligational authority required-for fiscal
year 1961.
With the committee's permission, I will touch upon each of the
major program segments involved in these adjustments and state the
dollar effect of each adjustment.
BOMARC program
[millions]
Fiscal year
1960
Current program------------------------------------------------------------
Revised program------------------------------- ----------------------------
The greatest single program adjustment is in the BOMARC pro-
gram, which reflects a downward adjustment of $381 million in fiscal
year 1961 in the "Missile Procurement" appropriation. As was stated
earlier, this is predicated upon a decision to curtail BOMABC B
production.
$394.1
394.1
Fiscal year
1961
$421.5
40.4
-381.1
SAGE program
[Millions]
Current program------------------------------------------------------------
Revised program ------------------------------------------------------------
Ad]ustments----------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
1960
$280.2
138.4
Fiscal year
1961
$235.2
102.8
-132.4
Another quite substantial adjustment is in the SAGE program.
This is comprised of reductions of $141.8 million in fiscal year 1960
and $132.4 million in fiscal year 1961. Both the military construction
and the other procurement segments of the program are involved in
both years' adjustments.
Identification and control program
[ Nrillions]
Fiscal year
1960
-Current program------------------------------------------------------------
Revised program ------------------------------------------------------------
Ad]ustments----------------------------------------------------------
$31.8
28. 5
Fiscal year
1961
$18.3
15.5
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The identification and control program reflects decreases of $3.3
million in the current year and $2.8 million in fiscal year 1.961. Both
military construction and other procurement are affected. These
amounts derive from reductions in certain equipments in these pro-
grams.
interceptor improvement program
[Millions]
Fiscal year
Fiscal year
1960
1961
Current program-.. ---------------------------------- ---------------------
$109. 8
$96.9
Revised program-----------------------------------------------------------
108. 1
232.6
-1.7
}
135.7
In the interceptor improvement program, which involves the F--101,
F-102, F-106, and GAR,-11 programs, we reduce the fiscal year 1.960
programs for military construction by $1.7 million, and in the fiscal
year 1961 programs we propose a decrease of $11.5 million in military
construction and an increase of $136.2 mil lion in aircraft procurement,
fora net program increase of $134 million.
The decreases in military constructionrepreseiit facilities which fall
out as a result of changes in force structure. The increases in fiscal
year 1961 relate to modifications to improve the effectiveness of these
defensive weapon systems.
Surveillance program
[Millions]
Fiscal year
Fiscal year
1960
1961
Current program-----------------------------------------------------------1
$95.6 I
$130.3
Revised program----------------------------------------------------------
96.9
145.7
Adjustments ----------------------------------------------------------
+1.3
+15.4
In the surveillance program we propose to increase the fiscal year
1960 program by $1.3 million and the fiscal year 1961 program by $15.4
million. All of the adjustments involved are in the "Other procure-
ment" appropriation. The fiscal year 1960 increase derives from price
adjustments while the increase. in fiscal year 1961 provides for restora-
tion of radar items which had slipped from the fiscal year 1960 pro-
gram due to production difficulties.
R1TEW program
[Millions]
Fiscal year
Fiscal year
1960
1961
Current program --------------------------------------------------- .---------
$257.1
$107.3
Revised program------------------------------------------------------------
272.0
134.9
X14.9
+27.6
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In the ballistic missile. early warning system we propose to make
$14.9 million more available in the current year and request an addi-
tional $27.6 million'in the budget year, fiscal year 1961. These addi-
tional funds will be used to advance the initial operational capability
dates of the second and third sites. They will buy us vitally needed
time in this field, about ntontlis in the case of site No. 2, alid
an estimated - - mouths for site No. 3. Both "Military construc-
tion" and "Other pro ttrement" funds are involved.
GAR-31ASG-18 program
[Millions]
Fiscal year Fiscal year
1960 1961
Current program --------------------------------------------
Revised program------------------------------ -------------
Adjustments ----------------------------------------------------------
$t I
---- }-15
Provision is made for continuation in fiscal year 1961, in the amount
of $15 million, of the GAR-9/ASG-18 program, which had been
scheduled for termination after fiscal year 1960.
Space program
[M illtons]
Fiscal year
Fiscal year
1960
1961
Current program
---------------------------------------------------
-
$298.9
$333.0
------
--
Revised program-----------------------------------------------------------
324. 5
308.8
+35. 8
In the space program, which embraces the DISCOVERER,
MIDAS, and SAMOS programs, we plan on increasing the fiscal
year 1960 program by $25.6 million and the budget year program by
$35.8 million, all in the R.D.T. & E. appropriation. The increased
funding includes provision for additional research and development
firings of the DISCOVERER series of satellites. These provide the
engineering and test bases required for the MIDAS and SAMOS
programs which will exploit the early warning and reconnaissance
satellite capabilities which are so vital in the ballistic missile era.
The bulk of the fiscal year 1960 increase is related to the high priority
MIDAS program.
ATLAS program
[Millions]
Fiscal year
Fisc'sl year
1960
1361
Current program----------------------------------------------------------
$987. 2
$1,1101. 6
Revised program -----------------------------------------------------------
1,077.2
1,137.6
Adlustments------------------------------------ ----------------------
+136.U
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The adjustments proposed in the ATLAS program have the effect
of increasing the current fiscal year 1960 program by $90 million, all
in "Military construction," and increasing the fiscal year 1961 program
by $136 million, all in "Missile procurement." These additional. funds
are required to increase the number of missiles per squadron at a
significantly lower cost.
MINUTEMAN program
tMillioncl
Current prosram-------------------------------- ---- -------------
Revised pro"ram------------------------------------------------------------
Adjustments-------------------------------------------------- .......
I fiscal year
1960
$343. 2
343. 2
Fiscal year
1961
An increase of $27 million in the fiscal year 1961 MINUTEMAN
program is proposed for some production facilities expansion and for
additional effort in the research and development tasks associated with
the mobile MINUTEMAN development program.
These funds will allow additional reliability testing and additional
component engineering effort, as well as enlarging approaches on
ground support equipment and launch equipment for the mobile con-
cept. In addition, these funds will provide for further definitive
testing of missile trains and associated equipment in relation to
operation and targeting of this system.
To recap, the net effect of these several adjustments is to reduce
the obligational authority requirements for fiscal year 1960 by $15
million and for fiscal year 1961 by $123.7 million, or a total reduction
of $138.7 million for the 2 years.
These are the net results of numerous adjustments between and
among appropriation accounts and as between the 2 fiscal years.
Without going into details at this time--although they can be made
available to the committee, if desired--I can state that the necessary
adjustments are possible through combinations of (1) adjusting the
carry forward of old procurement funds as, authorized by the terms of
the fiscal year 1960 procurement accounts language; (2) by repro-
graming within appropriations; (3) through transfers authorized by
the OSI) emergency fund language, as broadened by section 633--this
will be the first time we used section 633, we had not had to use that
special authority before; (4) and by deferring some items from fiscal
year 1960 to fiscal year 1961.
The adjustments which have been presented have little or no effect
on overall Air Force net expenditures for the 2 fiscal years involved.
The net result of all of these adjustments can be expressed as
decreases of $95.7 million. in "Aircraft procurement" and $43 million
in "Other procurement." These amounts could be .deducted from the
fiscal year 1961. appropriation requests and still leave us the capability
to make the program adjustments which have been discussed.
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Mr. MAHON. Gentlemen, earlier in the year when most of you ap-
r ared before us and we discussed various programs, the committee,
think, made known its desire to accelerate the intercontinental bal-
listic missile program as much as reasonably possible during the so-
called critical time period of 1960-63. It seems to me that you have
submitted a program which will accelerate the ATLAS program to a
limited extent during this critical period.
We have all been tremendously interested in the MIDAS, SAMOS,
and other satellite programs. The acceleration you propose in those
fields seems to be a step in the right direction.
Last year we provided you with an appropriation of $87 million,
I believe, above the budget in an effort to accelerate what appears to
be in many ways a better weapon than the ATLAS or the TITAN;
namely, the MINUTEMAN. As I understand it, in your revised
program you propose some additional acceleration of the MINUTE-
MAN.
How much is the money involved?
General FEUCDMMAN. In the amount of $27 million, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. That all seems to be good.
There has been considerable concern an the part of the committee
in regard to air defense. Some of the members have had one view,
others have had a different view. There has been some confusion and
a great deal of interest, and on the part of some members of the com-
mittee much disappointment and unhappiness over certain features of
the air defense program.
I think it would be fair, if there is no objection, to place in the record
at this point some paragraphs from our committee report of last year
in. regard to air defense. Then we do not need to belabor that ques-
tion further.
(The material referred to follows:)
[P. 14, H. Rept, No. 408, Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1960]
A primary objective of the defense program is to deter war. All facets of our
defense program, the capabilities of each service down to the last man, play a
role in this great effort. Inasmuch as a complete defense against a potential
foe is practically unattainable, and that is especially true today, there is com-
mon agreement that an overwhelming offensive capability is the best defense.
Our military program has been patterned in that direction for years. This is sot
to say that no effort has been made or should be made to attain a good defensive
posture. Indeed, our offensive power must never be left open to destruction
from surprise attack. Protection against such an eventuality is the primary role
of our air defense forces.
In an effort to protect our offensive retaliatory forces, as well as the popula-
tion centers of the Nation, we have spent over the past 10 years in the area of $29
billion. This includes radar warning networks, fighter aircraft and antiair-
craft missiles-the entire air defense package. Proposals have been made and
are under study within the Defense Department which could increase this total
spending to about $49 billion by 1963. A detailed listing of what the system
entails would be of little value for our purposes here. Generally, however, the
system now in being can be described as encompassing (a) early warning radar
networks and radar coverage of most of the United States tied into the elec-
63292-60--4
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Ironic computer control centers of the semiautomatic ground environment sys-
tem known as SAGE, (b) hundreds of supersonic tighter aircraft stationed
throughout the Nation, and (c) NIKP4 antiaircraft batteries surrounding most
major target areas. The so-called BOMAR(" antiaircraft missile defense system,
and ability to combat the ICBM or even to detect its approach, is yet to come.
By the end of fiscal year 1959, we will have expended or committed for
expenditure nearly $3,700 million for NIKE-AJAX and NIKE-HERCULES air
defense missile systems. By the end of fiscal year 1959, we will have expended or
committed for expenditure approximately 81,900 million on the BOMARC air
defense missile system. The above figures for both missiles are all inclusive,
including direct assignable costs for military personnel and operating expense.
The NIKE is an Army program ; the BOMARC is an Air Force program. In
addition, the 1960 budget contains estimates amounting to nearly $1 billion
for these two missile systems. This, of course.. is only a part of the total
overall air defense budget, and if all programs are approved the cost curve
is projected to rise sharply. Coupled with the air defense program is the
increasingly important anti-ICBM program, including an ICBM early warning
system. This will add additional billions to the expense involved.
The question naturally arises--wherein lies the greater threat. and what is
to be done about it? Systems are under construction to provide for early warning
of intercontinental ballistic missile attack. Actual defense presents a much more
difficult problem. This problem is being attacked and the commitee is providing
additional funds for advance procurement in order to speed along the NIKE-
ZETTS anti-ICBM missile program. Development takes time and there is little
more that can be done for the present. We have a number of competing systems,
however, for defense against aircraft, Great progress has been made in aircraft
warning systems, in fighter interceptor aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles,
and in the development of ground-to-air mitsilcs, such as the BOMA.RC and the
NIKE-IERCULES. The problem in this area may well he that we have too
many possibilities, or too many services involved. Competing systems supported
by enthusiastic industrial and service advocates tend to create confusion and un-
certainty. Great promises, often somewhat nebuiious but calculated to get sup-
port and contract awards. are held out by the advocates of all systems.
The availability of more than one promising possibility frequently makes it
necessary to pick and choose, often an extremely technical and difficult process.
Iu the air defense area. we have a very definite problem of this tvne in the
competing concepts behind the BOMARC and the NIKE-IERCULE$ ground-
to-air missiles.
The BOMARC air defense missile system has been under development for
many years. The first missile was test fired in 1952 and still none are in opera-
tional units. This missile is designed to intereept attacking aircraft at much
greater distances from the target area than the NIKE-HERCULES missile.
The greater range capability which is sought for the JROMARC has added com-
plexity and additional cost to the missile. However, because of the greater
range planned for the BOMARC over the HERCULES missile, and therefore the
fewer number of missiles required to defend a given target area, it is not
definitely known which system would be the more expensive in the long run.
The committee, in the light of all the uncertainties, is unable to make such a
cost determination at this time.
The. official position of the Department of Defense is that we need both the
NIKE-HERCULES and the BOMARC missiles. This conclusion may be correct
but the entire issue is clouded by the claims and counter claims of representa-
tives of the individual services. Billions of taxpayers' dollars are involved in
this controversy. It is believed that a. final decision in this area can only be
made after a careful military analysis. Admittedly the issues: involved are
extremely complex and difficult to resolve. An immediate reexamination of the
whole problem at the highest level is urgently required. The committee requests
that such action be taken.
The committee in a further effort to focus attention upon the necessity for
an early decision on the air defense missile controversy has made a sharp re-
duction in funds requested for the BOMARC missile system. The budget re-
quest for the BOMARC missile for production. development, test and evaluation
totaled $447,300,000. Of this amount, $84,606.000 is for test and evaluation.
The committee has reduced funds for production by $162,700,000. This is not
claimed as a long-range saving. The committee would be willing to appropriate
the full budget estimate and more if it had full confidence in the proposed
BOMARC missile-if it had the assurance that the system would actually work.
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The contractor for this missile has already received over a period of years com-
mitments in excess of $1,100 million. Before further commitments and expendi-
tures pile up, a new hard look should be given to the proposed BOMARC and
the whole air defense problem.
The so-called Furnas Committee, at the request of the, Department of Defense.
has recently completed a study of the BOMARC. The committee gave the
BOMARC approval with certain important reservations. By the terms of Its
directive from the Department of Defense, the Furnas committee did not give
full consideration to NIKE-IIERCULES, fighter aircraft, and other important
air defense factors in making the study. The study as a result is inadequate
and not conclusive with respect to the overall air defense picture.
It should be observed that neither the NIKE-HERCULES nor the proposed
BOMARC are capable of combatting the ICBM or even missiles of the ROUND
DOG type launched at targets from distant aircraft. We are spending vast
sums on air defense. It is time to reexamine what we are getting for our
money.
Mr. MABON. You have made some rather significant recommenda-
tions in this field of air defense. We have not had an opportunity
to examine them in detail. Of course, we are not in a position to
commit ourselves with reference to what our views and recommenda-
tions will be when we submit the: Department of Defense appropria-
tion bill to the House of Representatives for consideration within a
few weeks.
In other words, I have no authority as chairman of the subcommit-
tee to say that eitlier your original program as submitted in Jamiary
or your revised program completely meets with the approval of the
committee.
I want to commend you for having a further look at this whole
picture. I had assumed that the Army, Navy, and Air.Force kept
all military programs under constant review. I have felt, however,
through the years, that the services have not been sufficiently flexible
and responsive to changing conditions.
The most obvious question here, General Wliite and Mr. Garlock,
is this: If this is such a wonderful idea which you present today, why
did you not come to the Capitol in January and present us with this
money-saving, defense-improving, eye-catching, more attractive pro-
gram? Will you please comment on that?
General WunTE. I will to the extent of my ability, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is a very cogent question.
I think the -No. 1 point to make is that the technology and the
enemy threat. are constantly changing. I think it is fair to state it
takes time, maybe too much time, for some of the implications to seep
into all the brains that have to work on these things. It is also very
cogent, in my opinion, that somewhat of a revolution took place in the
air defense field under the Department of Defense master air defense
plan just 6 or 8 months ago. That took some time to digest.
Mr. MArroN. You are referring now to the so-called master plan
which was approved last summer and which to some extent grew out
of hearings and discussions pertaining to the Department of Defense
appropriation bill last year?
General WrirTE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MAaox. All right proceed.
General WurTE. Another factor which I think has a very big bear-
ing on it is that actually the responsible commanders-and you get
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into quite an involved situation when you come into this-the actual
responsible commanders of the air defense of the United States report
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force;
This is true of all unified commands.
Somebody has to step up to these problems, and it devolves in a
military sense upon the Chief of Staff of the service to take the
initiative, and sometimes perhaps-I will later state the position of
CINCNORAD on this-to step up and in many ways overrule him
in the light of the overall picture-the integrated threat; the moneys
available; the weapons systems which are present and forthcoming;
and in the light of other threats. That, in. effect, is one reason that
this may seem to have been somewhat late.
I would point out, however, without any attempt to be defensive
in the matter, that we have stated on numerous occasions that these
things are under review, and it does take time to evaluate and work
out the plans and equate, them to dollars and deployment.
In addition to those items, we have the Joint Chiefs of Staff
machinery through which we must work.
All of these things have been worked on. All of them have taken
time. We have stepped up to this problem from the point of view
of the Air Staff and, of course, my own, to cut through some of the
inhibitions, some, in my opinion-for want of a better word--"cling-
ing" to concepts. While I recognize the threat of the air-breathing
bomber exists as of today as the most important, most deadly threat
against this Nation, it is quite obvious that the intercontinental bal-
listic missile is to become the predominant threat to this Nation.
I do not downgrade the manned bomber threat, but of the two sys-
tems, the ICBM will, in my opinion, become the dominant one.
We are trying here, within the President's budget, to shift our
emphasis to give us a good air defense earlier than we would have
had it and to put some of the moneys on systems which will better
meet the future as we see it. In line with that, we are going to
strengthen our offensive capability. As you know, it is my opinion-
and has long been Air Force strategy-that offense is the best defense.
All. of those things together, plus the space systems which are for
the future, as well as having a very direct bearing on the ICBM
warning threat, are the integrations.
I think with that statement I should tell you where each of the
various echelons stands on our proposals, because there is more to it
than just. my initial statement.
I should of course first state that the Secretary of the Air Force
approves both our recommended cutbacks and our recommended
addenda.
I should next state that the Commander in ,Chief NORAD does not
agree completely with our recommendations. I can cite you some
of his particular programs that he would like to see continued in
greater numbers and at greater cost than we have in this program.
OPINION OF GENERAL KUTER ON NEW AIR DEFENSE PROGRAM
Mr. MAIioN. The Commander in Chief of the North American Air
Defense Command does not fully agree with this package which you
have presented here?
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General WiHTE. He does not, no, sir.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the cancellation of the
super combat centers and the cutbacks in the BOMARC. The De-
partment of Defense has approved the cutbacks and has stated its
approval of my presenting to you our recommendations for the ad-
denda, but is not prepared at this time to state its complete concur-
rence with those items which are add-ons or which are substitutions.
Mr. MAHON. Do you foresee that we will be notified of DOD
approval?
Mr. GARLOCK. I assume as soon as Mr. Gates gets back from Europe,
it will be taken up with him and you will be advised very promptly
of his position on this matter. It is his absence from the country
which prevents our presenting the Department of Defense position
at this time.
Mr. FORD. Does SAC approve of the add-ons?
General WFIITE. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. I wanted the picture complete as to who has disapproved
and who has approved in the several commands.
Mr. MAHON. I would prefer not to yield too much, because I want
everyone to have an opportunity to interrogate.
Mr. FLOOD. I want to ask just this. This is not personal because
you have not been a part of this. Have you been permitted also by
the administration Olympians to say to us that it is no longer lese
majesty for a Member of Congress to question the Defense Depart-
ment budget, and that it is no longer considered that we are aiding
and abetting, the enemy if we publicly declare our doubts? I am. just
wondering if you have been commissioned to permit us to go that far.
You have not been particeps criminis to this operation, but 60 days
ago it was made very clear that it was presumptuous and impertinent
for us to do what you all have been doing. That is rhetorical. I will
answer that myself.
General WHITE. It has been my impression that the Congress not
only does, but is entitled to say what it thinks. I might say it usually
does. I think a fair expression is that some of the things which have
been said by this committee and elsewhere have unquestionably had
an influence on at least my steeling myself to come up to make this
kind of change.
Mr. FLOOD. We have been flying in the faces of the gods, you know.
We were concerned about whether the wax on our wings would crash
us to the ground.
Mr. MAHON. Just how unhappy are the people in the North Amer-
ican Air Defense Command with the proposed reduction in air de-
fense programs? They would be the best witnesses on this but we
shall probably not have an opportunity to hear them. You have
talked with them about this matter. What are their views?
General WHITE. Sir, I would have to start with this type of answer
as a preliminary : I have never encountered a major commander yet
who wanted to give anything up. I think that is basic to all of them.
No commander ever wants to give anything up as long as he can justify
utility for it. I think General Muter is one of the most competent
officers we have. He has done a superb job as Commander in Chief
of the North American Air Defense Command. Now-in more direct
response--I will give you some of the items which he feels he needs to
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have an ideal defense. He has studied these in increments of annual
cost of $5.5 billion down to $4 billion annual cost.
In general, he has maintained the BOMARC program at its full
strength. In fact, he has added. At $5.5 billion lie has asked that
there be ---- BOMARC missiles in the progran i.
Mr. MAIION. In other words, he does not want to reduce the
B()MARC program as you have recommended.
General Wrlrrr;. That is correct, sir. Also, he does not want to can-
cel the supercombat centers.
Mr. MAn0N. All right.
General Wnri :. He wants to build up the NIKE-ZETTS to the maxi-
mum capacity possible. He wants to mainl ain----
Mr. MAHON. I do not know what you mean by that. You mean he
wants to go into the operational production?
General Wsirrt~:. That is correct, sir. He carries that right on down
to his lowest level of $4 billion.
He wants to maintain the fighter-interceptors at the full current
strength without the transfers to the National Guard.
He wants to reinstate the F--108.
How he does all of that with those figures we have not figured out,
because almost from cursory inspection I do not think it can be done.
Nevertheless, those are his major items. I do not think of any others
that come from the top of my head right away.
I should point out that in our program we would stipulate the two
major things, the cancellation of the supercombat centers, the cutback
of the. BOA [ARC, and then the details of all the rest of the progr. am, of
which there are many additions, such as the very significant improve-
ment to the fighter-interceptors. I am sure he welcomes that. The
new radars he welcomes.
The point I am trying to make here is that the detailed disposition
of what remains in the program would be almost entirely up to him.
Mr. MAITON. I assume that General Kuter opposed the cancellation
of the F-108.
General Wince. Yes, sir, and would like to reinstate it.
Jr. IM.unox. Since he is the field commander and should know most
about this, how have you brought yourself to the decision that lie should
be overruled in these tremendously important and expensive pro-
grams ?
General WHrrEE. It. is a very difficult thing. As the Chief of Staff of
the service which has cognizance of the budget, I have to consider the
requirements of SAC, of the Tactical Air Command, of MATS, and
the general support, of the, Air Force. When we are given certain
guidelines for the budget, things must fall out. As I stated, I believe,
before this committee, to address myself directly to the F-108, I feel
that a long-range interceptor is of very great importance, but I was
told that we could only develop one manned aircraft, and as between
the F-108 and the B-70, after great self-introspection I came up with
the belief that the B-70 was the more important.
Mr. MAHQN. We will not get into that field, although it is pertinent.
Who proposed the changes you have presented? Have you done
some studying and some restudying of the plans and programs? Have
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General Estes and others made any special surveys? Why have you
reached these conclusions at this point?
General WiirrE. Sonia time ago, Mr. Chairman, I think I originated
the idea that we could have a better overall security position by mak-
ing certain changes in the defense program. I gave the job to Gen-
eral Estes who, with I think approximately 100 other officers, worked
day and night for many weeks in producing a number of solutions tp
this problem. WVe studied them very carefully. Also-
(Off the record.)
POSITION OF SECRFT. RY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Mr. MAHON. This is not just the proposal of General White and hi$
staff, but it represents the idea of others. To what extent does it rep-
resent the views of the Secretary of Defense or of the Def ense Depart-
ment as such, and to what extent does it represent the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff '?
General Wrirn.- I will take the last one first, if I may. The Joint.
Chiefs of Staff have approved the two major elements; the cancella-
tion of the super combat centers and the cutback in the BOMARC.
The complete briefing was not given to the Joint Chiefs of Staf
because they felt they were familiar enough with the problem to take
action without a detailed briefing, because they keep abreast of these
things.
Mr. MAI-ION. Are they solidly behind you
General WIIrc s. Yes.
Mr. MAIION (continuing). In this proposed addition and change. in
configuration of the A it Force budget and program?
General WIIrrE. 'Pie additions' have not been referred to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff because that is a service consideration.
(Off the record.)
Mr. MAIroN. You are recommending actions here which have to do
with the destiny and the survival of the Nation. We have a_ lot, at
stake. We had a briefing yesterday in which we were discussing
estimates of what an all-out atomic exchange would cost in human
lives, so we are not playing with some trivial matter here, as you and
I and all. present, well know. I want to be sure that this proposal
has been very, very well considered and that it represents the best
judgment which you have been able to bring to bear in the executive
branch of the Government.
General WHITE. I have stated the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Department of Defense have approved the cutbacks and the cancel-
lations stipulated, and at least the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
Dr. York and others have gone through the same process that I did
when I arrived at my decision to make this recommendation to the
Department of Defense.
Mr. MAHON. They are on your team in this matter?
General WI?rrr. I feel sure they are, sir.
Mr. MAIION. General Estes, you and a considerable number of Air
Force officers have worked on this problem of air defense. Have you
worked on it actively in recent weeks? Tell us of your deliberations.
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General ESTES. All right, sir, I shall.
As General White outlined earlier, during the latter part of last
year, in attempting to respond to the Department of Defense master
plan which you mentioned for the record, the major members of the
same group who have prepared the material to which General White
has been referring were deeply involved in a determination of how
best to meet the master air defense plan. submitted by the OSD. Ob-
viously, many portions of this were not completed by them. They
were referred to us for detailed completion.
Essentially, the members of that group worked on the effort at
that time, and then worked with members of the Air Research and
Development Command, the Air Materiel Command, our special tech-
nical advisory organization at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massa-
chusetts, known as ADSID/MITRE, and we drew upon technical
information from members of the Air Defense Command. We did
not ask them specifically for their detailed ideas for the very simple
reason we knew already their ideas would not coincide with ours
with reference to reductions, but we drew upon their technical knowl-
edge of air defense as necessary in our studies.
As General White has said, approximately 100 various technicians
from all these organizations were assembled early in February.
We went through in minute detail the exact technical status of every
single component of the air defense system. Our purpose was to
determine whether or not we could in fact meet the schedule, both
moneywise and timewise, which we had set for ourselves with ref-
erence to each of these components.
Our purpose subsequently, after that detailed examination, was to
examine every possible alternative to produce an air defense system
against the threat to which General White has referred, at the earliest
possible time period with the minimum possible dollars.
As General White has said, we carne up with on the order of six
different alternatives as to how this could be done.
Mr. MArrON. When did you come up with these?
General EsrEs. I believe, sir, if memory serves me correctly, this
was around. the 12th or 15th of February. * It was approximately that
period, sir. Mid-February, let me say, without specifying the exact
date.
Mr. MAHON. What has happened since that time?
General EsrEs. Subsequent to detailed discussion of this entire ma-
terial with General White and his deputies, we briefed General Kuter,
commander of the North American Air Defense Command, General
Atkinson, the commander of the U.S. Air Defense Command, and
members of their staffs. Of course we briefed our own Secretary and
the Under Secretary and their staffs.
Mr. MAHON. If necessary, elaborate that for the record, but I want
to ask one further question.
Just how well did you tie in all of these studies and briefings and
deliberations with General Kuter, commander of the North Amer-
ican Air Defense Command? Has he really been in this act and
has he had a chance to present his views adequately to the officials
here in Washington?
General WrhITE. May I answer that, please.
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General Kuter gave me his comments in writing. He was queried
by the Joint (111iiefs of Staff on these two major items and sent in
his reply.
Mr. MAIHON. Have you anything further on that, General Estes?
General ESTES. Only to say, sir, we have briefed members of the
OSD staff. As you know, Dr. York's staff has been conducting sim-
ilar studies on air defense, and they are very familiar with the ma-
terial on which we have been working.
(Off the record.)
Mr. MAIHON. Tliank you very much, gentlemen. We will see you
at 2 o'clock.
AFTERNOON SESSION
We shall resiuiie our hearing. The actions which are recommended
here today by the Air Force have implications which affect the overall
defense posture of the United States. It seems to me that actions of
this type should not be recommended without consideration havMi g
been given them by all the services through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Did the Joint Chiefs study the overall implications of these ro-
posals and did the Joint Chiefs approve these proposals? I' am
speaking specifically of the reductions in the program.
General WllrrE. Tito Joint Chiefs of Staff looked at these specific
proposals as to cutbacks, but within the context of purely Air Force
programs. There was not a triservice look across the board. There
was no comparison of whether it was better to cut out something iii
the Army or Navy or Marines and leave the full BOMARC program
or supercombat centers in.
Mr. MAIION. Was there any consideration given with respect to
the impact of this proposal on the NIKE-HERCULES program?
General WHITE. To this degree only: That presumably General
Kuter will ask for any compensating weapon systems in other service
budgets. Ile has asked to maintain the NIKE-HERCULES, as I
understand it, under his proposals about where they are, but with
this change lie may well ask for more NIKE-HERCULES.
Mr. ATnIioN. That eould be true
General Willrr;. That could be true.
Mr. MAHON. The Joint Chiefs should not sit idly by and see a big
hole pulled in our defense structure.
General WiirrE. I am sure they have no intention of doing that, sir.
Mr. MA1EON. If this proposal had that effect, would it have come.
here under these circumstances?
General Wirim. It would not.
Mr. MAHON. The President submitted to us in January a Defense,
Department budget. The total dollars have not been changed dras-
tically, though there is a reduction in this proposal. Nevertheless,
the program has been clianged quite markedly.
It seems to me that we would have, before this is over, an approval
by the Budget Bureau and by the President in an amendment to the
budget.
General Wuri'E. I aiu sure that it is fortlicoming, sir. That is thee
point where I stated OSl) was not prepared to give approval to the
substance of the addenda.
53292- CO -- 5
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Mr. MAIION. Do you assume, then, that the Secretary of Defense will
probably work out these arrangements upon his return from Europe?
General WHITE. I know it is being actively worked on as of the
present.
Mr. MAiioN. All right. I have before me the final sheet of your
statement, General White. You give the reductions and then you give
the add-on. Do ,you suppose that it would be better to subtract more
money from the BOMARC program? We have downgraded it as
one of our weapon systems in this proposal you make. Is the remain-
ing BOMARC program a face-saving thing? Should we step com-
pletely out of this picture?
General WHITE. Not in any respect, Mr. Chairman. That is cer-
tainly a very proper and, I may say, searching question. We would
not recommended that any BOMARC's be in th is program if we did not
have the utmost confidence that the system is going to work. To take
the BOMARC's out would really leave a serious gap in our defensive
system.
As I stated earlier, CINCNORAD does not even approve of this
cutback. Some of the money in the BOMALW program is applied
to fighter-interceptors. If nothing were done, we would really have
a defective air defense system, in my opinion. The money that could
be saved by complete cancellation of the BOAARC program would
not buy interceptors or other types of defense, in anywhere near the
quantities needed, that would be as effective.
Mr. MA~EloN. The word "SAGE" a few years ago was more or less
a magic word. That is semiautomatic ground environment. It was a
great word and we had great plans for it. It has not, apparently,
progressed as had been planned, so now you propose this $132 million
reduction.
Is it wise to downgrade the SAGE system, to make it soft, and
so forth?
General WHITE. The SAGE system, of course, continues in exist-
ence, but we do not build these supercombat centers which, if I am
not mistaken, were a subsequent development in which it was pro-
posed that certain of these advanced type SAGE computers be placed
m hardened positions, hardened to pounds per square inch.
(Statement off the record.)
General WRITE. You can carry this on ad infinitum and practically
put the entire national wealth in this thing bee?ause if you harden your
centers, to, say, a thousand pounds per square inch, then, your fighter
fields, your subsidiary communications, your BOMARC's, whatever
von have, also would have to be. hardened because they equally could
l)e destroyed. This way we do not, I think, now expend this money
for something which we foresee will not really pay off. We do con-
t Tune the SAGE. Remember, however, it will be susceptible to break-
down into regional controls. So, if one part goes out, at least you
have the other part to continue to operate.
I am getting into some technical aspects, but I think General Estes
could elaborate in more definitive terms than I have.
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Mr. MAHON. General Estes, do you feel that the SAGE system, as
contemplated in this presentation today, will be a highly significant
and important, part of our defense mechanism?
General EsrEs. I do, indeed, sir, or I would not recommend it.
Mr. MArrON. Do you think we are going to get considerable value
for our money with the SAGE system as now envisioned?
General ESTES. I (lo, sir.
Mr. MAIION. General Friedman, at this point in the record I wish
you would place approximately the amount of money which has been
provided to date and that which is included in this new proposal for
the entire SAGE system and give us a paragraph as to just what
the SAGE system does.
General FRIEDMAN. We will do that, sir.
(The information to be supplied follows:)
Program per President's fiscal year 1961
budget---------------------------------
Proposed amended program_______________
Construction and equipment program requirements
(in millions)
Fiseel year
1959 and
prior years
$1, 165.9
1, 105.9
Fiscal year
1960
$280.2
138.4
Fiscal year
1961
$235.2
102.8
Balance to
completion
$291.6
166.9
$1, 072.9
1, 574.9
- -398.9
The proposed amended SAGE system will provide a semiautomatic ground
environment for the detection, identification, control, communications, and inter-
ception of air-breathing weapons in designated areas of the United States. and
Canada.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
Mr. MAIION. Yes.
QUESTION AS TO SAVINGS FROM CANCELLING 130MARC PROGRAM.
Mr. ANDREWS. General Estes, you stated that you needed or would
get BOMARCS. I believe General White stated we had
and you want ilew ones and that will wind up the
BOMARC program.
General ESTES. Yes, sir.
Mr. ANDREWS. Could ,you tell site haw much will cost, or how
much could be saved if the whole program were stricken now?
General Ful-Eu L\N. If you were to cancel the entire program, this
would net a savings on the order of $250 million. We have made a
reduction, as we indicate, of $381 million. There was $421.5 million
already in the budget. This leaves about $-10 million to carry on,
clean u the GSE and otherwise settle out the program.
Mr. ANr uIws. The saving would be
General FRI DMAN. About $250 million.
Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.
Mr. SIKES. May I ask a question at that point?
Mr. MAIION. Yes.
Mr. SINES. Could you recapture all of the $250 million?
General FrUEDMAN. Yes, sir; that is net-sustaining the cancella-
tion costs.
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Mr. SIKFS. What could you use for a weapon as a substitute for the
BOMARC in the areas where you have programed BOMARC as an
air defense weapon?
General FRIEDMAN. I would prefer to have General Estes answer
that, sir.
General ESTES. Mr. Sikes, I did not want to use my own judgment
on this particular point and, therefore, I sent a message to our Air
Defense Command and explained to them the extent of the cutback
which we have just been discussing here and pointed out to them
the approximate amount of savings which would be realized if we went
for a zero BOMARC-B program, as expressed by General Friedman
a moment ago.
I asked the Air Defense Command to examine this and to deter-
mine what alternate weapon could be put in and whether or not that
alternate weapon for the amount of money would be the equivalent
military capability.
I further asked them if they would check their answer with the
headquarters of NORAD, with the Commander of North American
Air Defense Command, and then send me a reply.
Their reply stated essentially that they did not under any circum-
stances consider that they could purchase for the amount of money
General Friedman has just mentioned enough fighter-interceptors-
that is the only weapon you could put in in. place of these BOMARC
squadrons to be the military equivalent of the squadrons of
IBOMARC's which we have me:ntioned earlier. 28 UE, equiv-
alents. They stated in essence in their opinion. on the basis of the
assumptions they had made with reference to the competence required
in the area, that they believed they would have. to purchase fighters
wi a 1-for-1 basis to equal the same military equivalent. This would
be a dollar cost far in excess of the savings we. have discussed.
Mr. SIKEs. Could you make an estimate of the dollar cost?
General FRIPDTTAN. I think a good rule-of-thumb, assuming you
are going to buy the F-106, which is probably the one you would buy
if you were talking about the same time period, it would cost you-
including development, attrition, and everything else-on the order
of about $4.4 million for the fighter, the 106., and $3.2 million-inchud-
iug your test and research missiles-for the BOMARC.
In other words, it would be about $4 million per article to replace
it on a 1-for-1 basis. So it would cost you about $1 billion total
to go the fighter route. These costs are on a historical basis. To be
more realistic we should consider that development costs are behind
us. I will provide for the record here what these costs would be on.
the basis of simply procuring additional aircraft.
(The matter referred to follows:)
The eosts for substituting --- F-106s for the same. number of 13OMARC R
Would total approximately $900 million eompared to the $460 million for this
number of BOMARC B's. Neither of these amounts include development costs.
Mr. SIKEC. What. is the comparative time of availability of the two
systems? Which would be available earlier?
General. ESTER. T do not think there would be a great deal of differ-
ence, sir. The 101 line is still open. The 106 line ends in . I do
not know about the leadtime.
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Assuming that the 101 and 106 lines are both open, there would be a
gap but some of it could be made up by extra funds, I would feel you
have about an 18-month leadtime to get started. I can provide for the
record here costing data for some alternative that would price out
somewhere near the added $250 million saving which General Fried-
man mentioned.
(The matter referred to follows:)
Alternative 1: Three additional squadrons of F-101B aircraft can be provided
for approximately $242 million with aircraft deliveries starting in January 1:162.
Alternative 2: Three additional squadrons of F-106 aircraft can be provided
at a cost of $300 million with aircraft deliveries starting in January 1962.
Mr. FORD. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. MArroN. Mr. Ford.
Mr. Foxn. If you cancel BOMARC--B now, the statement has been
made you would recover $250 million.
General FRIEDMAN. That is right, sir. This is in addition to the
$381 million that our proposal contemplates.
Mr. FoRD. How much would you have spent on BOMARC-B that
would have no return whatsoever?
General FRiEDMAN. I can get that in just a moment.
Mr. FORD. Give use a round figure. I am certain it is substantial.
General FRIEDMAN. Yes, it is substantial. On the BOM ARC- B,
procurement of which started in fiscal year 1958-and we are involved
through fiscal year 1960= since we have essentially cut off procurement
from the 1961 budget-it would have been about $800 million in pro-
gram value. I would say some $700 to $750 million of that is prob-
ably expended as of now.
Mr. WHITTEN. General White, during World War II, shortly after
Pearl Harbor, for some months thereafter, here around the Capitol on
top of most of the buildings you could see these mounted guns. I do
not know whether it gave any sense of security to Members and others,
but finally one of our colleagues went up to see and they were wooden.
It would not hurt anything in case we had been under attack and
if they contributed to the Congress' sense of security, perhaps it was all
right. I
If have heard the testimony right about BOMARC, at the present
time it is in fact an unproven weapon system with high hopes after
one or two tests that folks kind of indicate may be all right-to release
this information showing that you are going to have BOMARC around
these eastern highly populous areas, is that some more of this wooden-
guns-on-the-Capitol business as it stands now, as subtracting from that
your high hope as to what this weapon system might do in the future?
General WirrTL. _1 do not see any relationship. This is a weapon
system that is going to work. The wooden gun never would work, I
am sure.
Mr. WIIITTEN. As of this time you just have high hopes; is that
right ?
General Wjin s. As of this time we have a great deal of scientific
and test background which makes those hopes rational.
Mr. WrrrTTLN. How many things have you had in the past that
you did phase out where your hopes came to naught in your experience
at high level?
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General WIIITE. I can think of some weapon systems which we did
not purchase, not necessarily because they did not work out but because
something else better came along.
Mr. WHH'TEN. I am just going to ask one question but to point out a
whole lot of things here. Secretary Sharp was before this committee
a few weeks ago asking us to go along with purchasing five planes,
I believe, from Lockheed. It is the third time the Air Force has been
in here to try to get a committee to go along with a contract with
Lockheed for such planes.
One time they needed the planes for executive, use, another time they
needed them for another use. They got them neither time. He finally
let the matter come out on the table when he said somebody in the Air
Force indicated to Lockheed and McDonnell that if they had compe-
tition on a certain type of plane, the Department likely would need
some. So the Air Force felt that since they had had that discussion,
apparently orally, there was some obligation to buy at least enough
of the planes to justify what Lockheed spent without any contract
whatsoever.
On the face of it, it looks to me as though there is possibly an
element of that in this BOMARC.
General WHITE. There is absolutely none, sir.
Mr. FLOOD. There is something else, Mr. Chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. MAHON. Will Canada continue the use of the BOMARC
missile?
General WHITE. Yes, sir ; they very much wish to.
Mr. WHiTTEN. I would not want to charge that, but I want the
record to show that from the press the last couple months this matter
has not been completely outside of political discussion in this coun-
try, this matter of defense.
General Wiiim :. I can only say, Mr. Whitten, that we have high
confidence in this weapon system and that it is a. very important part
of our area air defense.
Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman; I want to be sure I heard the answer
to your question about Canada. I)id I understand you to say that
Canada does want to use the BOMARC in its defense system and is,
in fact, preparing to do so?
General WHITE. That is correct.
Mr. MAHON. In short, it is Canada's plan to continue with some
considerable dependence upon the BOMARC system?
General WHrra. That is right.
Mr. MAHON. It is the plan of this Government to continue with
some dependence upon the BOMARC system. You are phasing out
the system insofar as requesting appropriations is concerned. You
have reduced your appropriation request in the fiscal 1961 budget for
BOMARC substantially.
General FRIEDMAN. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MAITON. How much money do you now request for BOMARC?
General FnuWMAN. There will be about $40 million left. The
President's budget contains an amount of $421.5 million for procure-
ment of BOMARC. We are reducing that, by $381.1 million.
Mr. MAHON. So there is still some financing for BOMARC but
relatively little money as compared with your January request; is
tliat right?
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General FRIEDMA\. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MA-TON. What will there be in 1962 according to present plans
for the BOMAPC missile?
General FRIEDMAN. Fiscal year 1961 would finalize our procure-
ment, Mr. Chairmaii-except for follow-on spares.
Mr. MAHON. You might have some construction problems, or
would you?
General FREEDMAN. No, sir.
Mr. MAHON. I want to explore this matter a little further with
respect to the additions. As I said this morning, I feel very
strongly that we ought to do more about the airborne alert. I real-
ize there is some money in the current budget for fiscal 1961 for pre-
paring for an airborne alert, but it surprises me that in this revision
of your program you did not allocate more money to the airborne
alert. I think it was a big mistake, and-I am speaking only for
myself-I do not understand why you failed to do this.
I say that is especially trite in view of the fact that you made some
reductions. If we can save money, we want to save it, millions or bil-
lions, but we want it well-balanced defense program and are concerned
about not being caught off balance during the next 2 or 3 years, which
are very significant years.
Another thing I do not understand it all is why, in view of the
fact that you freed some money through this adjustment, that you
did not undertake to do something about the problem of airlift.
General Le.mnitzer tells us he is getting together with the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, General White, and that he has some hopes
we may work something out. Here is an opportunity to work some-
thing out and nobody tries to do anything about it.
I would just like to know why, in making this revision, which is
certainly quite major you did not do something about these things
which seem to me to be very high priority. Will you speak to that,
General White?
General Wiirri. Yes, sir. May I refer to the airborne alert first?
Mr. MAHoN. All right.
General Whir%. The decision on the part of the Secretary of De-
fense was made very recently on that subject, and there was "t differ-
ence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the level of airborne alert. I had
my full opportunity to present my side of the case, as has General
Power. The Department of Defense ruled against my position on it,
and it would have been a futile exercise to bring it up to them and
expect approval for additional funds for the airborne alert. That
is a decision, insofar as the Department of Defense is concerned, which
has been taken.
Moreover, section 612 of last year's appropriation act, as I under-
stand it, intends that if the Department of Defense and the Presi-
dent determine that more fiords are required for the airborne alert,
the Congress has granted them the authority to go ahead with it.
Mr. MArroN. You have the authority but you would not actually
have the money unless you took it from something else or incurred a
deficiency.
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/?9 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9
Mr. GARLOCIi. We would assume if we got Presidential approval we
'would also get approval for a deficiency.
General WirrrE. That is the answer on that.,
VIr. Fr.oon. You mean if Congress is in session.
Mr. GARLOCK. We have the right in general law to run it deficiency.
Mr. MATRON. Whether Congress is in session or not.
Mr. FLOOD. I am speaking to the point of Congress being in session
or not. This can come before or after, but, to act without our being
here is interesting.
General WTTrrEP. On the airlift, Mr. Chairman, I subscribe to Gen-
eral Lemnitzer's statement that the Air Force and the Army have
reached certain agreementsto attempt to get; more airlift.
In this particular instance. the first problem was to not gut the air
defense but to improve our existing air defense and still save some
money in order to improve the future aspects of air defense against the
TCBM threat. On that basis our first priority in putting addenda
here was in the air defense field.
The second was that. I believed that the ATLAS add-ons take prior-
ity over airlift at this time, particularly in view of the fact that, if you
will note, the expenditures are what have limited us to the items that
we have put up for addenda. There is actually more NOA available
as between the proposed changes and the President's budget than there
are expenditures available.
We did go to the Department of Defense with a request for addi-
tional programs and authorization-additional changes-to make up
the full NOA. That list did include a request for additional airlift.
Mr. MAHON. It me get this clear : The add-ons which you have
presented us today are not all the -add-ons you requested of the De-
partment of Defense in connection with this presentation?
General WHITE. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MAxox. What was the stumbling block with these additions
and why did you not get the funds and approval, or do you know?
General Wtimi . Yes, sir; I know. It is an expenditure problem.
We must abide, by Service, as to the expenditures that can be made in
any given fiscal year.
Mr. MAxox. Is your expenditure limitation for fiscal year 1961
$18.6 billion?
General FRIEDMAN. $18.6 billion; yes, sir.
General WHITE. These addenda bring us up to that figure.
Mr. MAHON. Were you not already up to that point?
General FRIEDMAN. We were. But, on a comparable basis--al-
though we dropped out some $500 million and we put in $300 million--
the space programs and the missile programs spend out at a higher
rate than the types of programs which we dehcted. Therefore, on
an expenditure basis we net out.. The point is that we cannot use the
additional $140 million without exceeding the $18.6 billion expendi-
ture.
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/303.9CIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9
. :ADDENDA REQUESTED VERSUS ADDENDA APPROVED
Mr. MASON. I would like for you to place in the record at this point
Just what you asked for in this addenda as compared to what you
have. presented here.
General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.
(The information follows : )
Addenda requested versus addenda approved
[Millions]
Requested
Atlas -------------------------------------------
Space------------------------------------------
sMEWS............... ? ---------------
Rocket development _________-_-_______________
Minuteman-------------------- - -- - - ---- -- - ---
OAR-9/A60-18---------------------- ----
MATS MOD (on-sheltprocurement)-----_----
Interceptorimprovement ------------- --------
C-130-B---- ------------------------------
Cadin---
Surveillance____________________________________
1960 new
1961 now
1960 new
1961 new
obligational
obligational
obligational
obligational
authority
authority
authority
authority
90.0
136.0
1 90.0
136.0
25.6
45.8
28.6
35.8
14.9
27.6
14.9
27.6
4.0
12.0
0
0
47.7
27.0
0
16.0
16.0
0
75.0
0
0
136.2
136.2
0
32.0
0
1.0
0
so
0
1.3
16.4
1.3
15.4
+138.8
+131.8
I Construction authorization required.
2 No amount included, but approval of item was contemplated.
Mr. MAIION. I have this pa e before me and I would like for you
to have it before you, Genera Friedman. You might handle these
figures, if you like.
I am looking at "Interceptor improvement," $136.2 million.
million.
Is that what you asked for? Was that your request?
General FRIEDMAN. That was our request.
Mr. MAIION. Surveillance, $15.4 million.
General FRIEDMAN. That is correct.
Mr. MAIION. BMEWS, $27.6 million.
General FRIEDMAN. That is what we asked for.
Mr. MAIION. GAR.-9, and so forth, $15 million.
General FRIEDMAN. That coincides with our request.
Mr. MAIION. Space, $35.8 million.
General FRIEDMAN. We requested $45.8 million.
Mr. MAIION. ATLAS, $136 million. Is that what you asked for?
General FRIEDMAN. It is, sir.
Mr. MAJION. That will give you how many additional ATLAS?
Mr. GARLOCK. For the record, we still hav'e a problem with Mr.
Sheppard's Committee on Military Construction. That is being
handled there and we will take that up then.
Mr. MAIION. You can discuss that with Mr. Sheppard in a few
minutes.
You got all you asked for and you' ot;" Approval, tentative ap-
proval, for - wldtf you asked for, in all othese programs:
Whit about MINUTE"MAN?_
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/304cPIA-RDP80BO1676R000900030049-9
General FRIEDMAN. For the MINUTEMAN, we asked for an
amount of $20.7 million more in our initial discussions than is, shown
in the addenda here.
Mr. MAI3ON. Why was it reduced?
General FRIEDMAN. It was reduced on the basis which General
White discussed, that this appeared to be the maximum funds we
could apply and still remain within the expenditures reflected in the
President's Budget.
General WHITE. May I put it this way : The list that you have
read adds up to the amount of expenditures which we have deleted
by our proposed changes.
Mr. MAnox. I seethe point.
General WHITE. We have the Department of Defense authoriza-
tion to-state that we have made these recommendations to them. The
other recommendations which you are now pursuing do not have that
same degree of Department of Defense approval.
Under questioning `I am certain that we can state what the addi-
tions were; however, there is that distinction.
Mr. MAHON. That is exactly what I am trying to get from you
now, a statement of what you sought, if you sought anything, in addi-
tion to the ';addenda which we have ,lust .counted: here.
You explained the MINUTEMAN.
General WHITE. The lower MINUTEMAN -figure is within the
addenda.
Mr. MAHON. Within the,spending ceiling?
General WHITE. Yes.
I think General Friedman is more facile with figures than I am.
General FRIEDMAN. To go down the list, sir, we asked for $715 mil-
lion for modernization of MATS.
Mr. MAIION. You did ask?
General FRIEDMAN. We did ask.
Mr. MAnox. What would you do with that money?
General FRIEDMAN. It is not included in. the list.
Mr. MAHON. I know, but you asked for it and you must have asked
for it for a purpose.
General FRIEDMAN. What did we want to do with it ?
Mr. MAHON. Yes, sir.
General FRIEDMAN. I thought you asked what did I do with it.
Mr. MAHON. What would you do with it?
General FRIEDMAN. General Holloway will respond.
General HOLLOWAY. We asked for that as a part of our overall re-
quirement of $128 million to buy two squadrons' worth of off-the-
shelf-type aircraft that would be modified to the minimum extent
necessary to do the MATS job. The type of aircraft under con-
sideration, we do not have'a final selective position on it. It would
probably be either the cargo version of the KG135, the CL-44
Canadian aircraft, or the DC-8, sir.'
Mr. MAHION. This would be the area you would spend $75 mil-
lion on?
General HOLLOWAY. That is correct.
On the estimates we have, it appears that we could get- the first of
these aircraft, and there would be a total. of 37 of them including at-
trition, to be exact, in 1962.
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Mr. MAHON. In fiscal year 1962 you will be able to. get these
aircraft?
General HOLLOWAY. Starting to get them.
Mr. MAIION. If you will not be spending the money in fiscal year
1961, why would the expenditure limitation deter you here?
General HOLLOWAY. No, sir; I am sorry.
This is when they would be realized in the inventory and it would
require expenditure of 1961 money.
General FRIEDMAN. You would really have to
Mr. GARLOCK. As soon as the contractor has his first payroll, we
have to start reimbursing him.
Mr. MAHON. What else was included in this package. when it was
presented to the Department of Defense?
General FRIEDMAN. We requested an amount of $40 million for
DISCOVERER. The addendum which we are presenting today,
with DOD approval, contains $30 million.
We had requested an increase for the C-130B aircraft-which is the
troop carrier aircraft assigned to TAC-to raise the production rate
from two to three per month. This required an additional $32 million.
Mr. MAIION. Is this the sort of thing that General Lemnitzer wants
done, General White?
General WRITE. Yes, sir.
Mr. MAIHON. Mr. Mendel Rivers of the Armed Services Committee
is very much concerned about this and lie has held some hearings on
it and is going to appear before this committee next week.
Insofar as I know, this is the kind of thing that the friends of airlift
want done, and yet the Defense Department is not requesting it
apparently.
General WRITE. It is exactly the kind of thing, and I might say
we want them, too, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. What else?
General FRIEDMAN. Only one other item.
We requested $12 million to pursue an accelerated program of rocket
development.
I think General Holloway might explain that..
Mr. MAHON. What do you mean?
General HOLLOWAY. One of the tremendous expense items we fore-
see in the future, in both missiles and space, is the cost of rocket
boosters. They are very expensive. The nozzles, for example, are
made of the highest quality materials. They have to be cut to eery
fine tolerances, and all in all they are the most expensive. There is
enough research to date to indicate that it is possible, and, in fact,
it appears quite feasible, to make rocket motors that are on an order
of magnitude cheaper than the ones we have today.
For example, if you could make a nozzle out of an ablative material,
such as the nose cone of a missile, that would still work but would
deteriorate at such a rate that it still is workable until the burnout
point. It would probably cost a tenth or less than what the current
nozzles cost.
There are other areas, such as variable geometry of nozzles through
a sort of parametric spike, that might be preset or ultimately auto-
mated in flight. This would enable you to build one basic rocket
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/49: CIA-RDP80BO1676ROO0900030049-9
motor design that would have, a tremendous number of applications,
and this would be a cheap way to get flexibility.
There are a lot of areas like this that we feel would save a tremendous
amount of money in the future as we go into space, if we get a little
more research and development money to accelerate it now.
That is the nature of this request.
Mr. MA iox. General Friedman, will you place in the record a
statement of where all of these add-on funds, which are included in
your submission today, would fit in the appropriation bill structure?
General FRIEDMAN. We will be happy to do that.
(The information follows:)
Air defense reorientation sainniary of adjustments by appropriation
[Millions of dollars]
Fiscal year 1960 n8w obligational
autho;lty
Present
program
Aircraft procurement---------
89.2
Missile procurement ----_____-
1,338.4
Military construction ---------
517.9
Researcb, development, test,
and evaluation______________
351.1
Other procurement___________
510.4
2,807.0
Fiscal year 1961 new obligations].
authority
Revised
program
Present
program
Revised
program
89.2
81.9
218.1
136.2
1
338
4
1
824
7
1
546
7
--278
0
,
.
557.9
-------40.0
,
.
166.8
,
.
146.1
.
-20.7
376.7
25.6
296.4
407.2
110.8
429.8
-80.6
423.4
351.4
-72.0
2,792.0
2, 793. 2
--123.7
Mr. MAIION. Will you also give us information at this point in the
record as to where these items would fit into your program insofar as
appropriation language is concerned, if they should be approved?
General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.
(The information follows:)
The program adjustments which were discussed would not require any changes
in appropriation language. These changes could be accommodated within the
terms of the appropriation language and general provisions which are now in
effect and as proposed in the President's budget for fiscal year 1961.
Mr. MAIION. Will you also state- what the situation was with re-
spect to your original fiscal 1961 submission with regard to this
addenda which is included and the addenda which you sought to have
included in your submission here in recent weeks to the Secretary of
Defense?
General FRIED 1:AN. Yes, sir.
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(The information follows:)
Addenda requested versus addenda approved
[Millions of dollars]
President's
fiscal year
1961 budget I
Addenda
requested
Addenda
approved
ATLAS -------------- -------------------------- --------------
991.2
136.0
136.0
Space------------------------------------------- --------------
316.0
45.8
35.8
BMEWS------------ --- -----------------------------------
107.3
27.6
27.6
Rocket development --------------------------------_-_------
MINUTEMAN------ ---------------------------------------
23.7
389.4
12.0
47.7
----------87.0
Gar-9/ASO-18-----------------------------------------------
--------------
15.0
15.0
MATS MOD (on shelf procurement) -------------------------
Interceptor improvement----- _-----------------------------
---------81.9
75:0
136.2
---------136.2
C-130-B------------- ----------------------------------------
70.4
32.0
Surveillance --------- --------------------------------------
92.9
15.4
15.4
Total ---------------------------------------------------
393.0
'Excludes military construction.
Mr. MAHON. As suggested this morning, Mr. Sheppard, as chairman
of the Military Construction Subcommittee, along with Mr. Sikes,
Mr. Whitten, and Mr. Laird, in addition to their work on this commit-
tee., also have an important responsibility in connection with the pro-
gram for military construction. Construction is involved in ways
which I do not fully understand at this point, but as agreed to this
morning, I will recognize Mr. Sheppard for 30 minutes and then I will
recognize Mr. Ford, following which we will proceed in the regular
order.
Mr. FLOOD. That is going to make it 10 minutes to 4?
Mr. MAHON. We also agreed that we will stay here until we get
this completed this afternoon.
Mr. SHEPPARD. General Friedman, this morning I think you gave
an answer to the question I am going to ask, but I would like to have
it in here so that my questions will be in sequence and continuity.
I think your statement was that the total add-ons, as such, came to
approximately $400 million; is that correct?
General FREEDMAN. It was $393 million, sir, in new obligating
authority.
Mr. SHEPPARD. The total of all of the add-ons?
General FRIEDMAN. That is correct.
General WLIITE. All of the add-ons that fall within the expenditure
limitation.
Mr. SrHEPPARD. It is my understanding, and this has been discussed
in different ways here this morning but I would like to get it clear in
my mind at the moment, that insofar as the total clearance for presenta-
tion to this committee is concerned of the program you are presenting
presently, the reductions, yes; add-ons, question mark.
Is that a correct or an incorrect interpretation
General WrrmTE. Add-ons to the extent of equaling the expenditures
approved by the Department of the Air Force for us to- present to this
committee. The add-ons that the chairman asked about, which equal
the amount of NOA, have not been approved even for presentation
to the committee by the Department of Defense.
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I would put it this wa.y : The Department of Defense has been silent
on the subject.
Mr. SIIErrARD. And would obviously follow a different type of
presentation than the one you are presently making because of your
reprograming possibilities and potentialities; is that right?
General FRIEDMAN. That is correct.
Mr. SIIEPPARD. What will be the effect of your present proposal on
the military construction requirement in the presently funded pro-
gram that is pending before our committee that has jurisdiction over
construction?
General FRIEDMAN. As Mr. Garlock indicated, there will be a prob-
lem insofar as authorization is concerned. However, Mr. Sheppard,
we were able, by an adjustment to programs, to hold to the amounts
contained in the President's budget for military construction. That
is $740 million including all accounts, and $725 million for the regular
Air Force specifically.
In other words, there was no change in NOA. There will be some
change, however, in program composition which would be discussed
in detail with your subcommittee.
Mr. SIIEPPARD. Have you pursued this situation in the changing of
your requirements, moneywise, in your construction bill so that, there
is no question of compatibility or detrimental reflections on the other
services' construction requirements?
General FRIEDMAN. We do not know, sir: the only possibility is that
which was raised by General White this morning insofar as General
Kilter's position with regard to NIKE-HERCT?LES. I do not know
that there would be any other possible impact on the other services
than the one on the NIKE-IIER.CITLES.
General WHITE. This would be a new problem. I ain quite confi-
dent that anything we have in the public works side of this would not
have any impingement on any other service.
Mr. SHEPPARD. What was the basis for your decision to stop
BOMARC with the last site? What. was the basis of the decision
to stop at that particular place?
General WHITE. I suppose it really was money, Mr. Sheppard.
We had to figure out the most economical place to make these cut-
backs in order to have the money, we hoped, to go on to these other
programs which we feel, in the overall context, will provide a better
military posture for the Nation.
Mr. GARLOCK. It is a combination of where we happened to stand
in the production of missiles and where we happened to stand in con-
struction. This could not help have a bearing on this.
General Estes said these sites are all in the Northeast, if you recall.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Are you going to be in a position, when you appear
before the Military Construction Subcommittee, to give the members
of that committee a rather firm answer as to the acquiescence in this
program in its entirety and firmness? I do not think from a practical
standpoint you have gone all the way upstairs yet.
General WITITE. Yes, sir; we have, but upstairs has not gone all
the way yet. That is the difference.
Mr. SIIErrARV. I do not want to be unnecessarily political, and
that is not my point of view, but in press releases and declarations,
the President of the United States has said that he knows what he
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is talking about when it conies to the military. In the absence of his
voicing his particular and personal concept of this situation at the
moment, I obviously have to take the position that we are still unde-
fined to that degree, is that right?
General WHITE. I am confident that the Department of Defense
will be able to clear this up.
Mr. SHEPPARD. I have confidence in the President., too, but at the
moment neither you nor I have sampled that confidence, have we?
General `BITE. We cannot go beyond where we are.
Mr. SHEPPARD. He may take your judgment 100 percent but I have
known him to refuse to take the judgment of others; have you not?
General WaiTn. That has occurred.
Mr. SHEPPARD. That is a problem until it is finalized and cleared
up ? is that correct?
4eneral WHITE. Yes.
Mr. SHEPPARD. It occurs to me, gentlemen-and I tried to elicit this
in responses in the presentation very carefully this morning-in this
particular presentation you are presently addressing yourselves to,
if it is consummated this puts a definite approval on the BOMARC
as a. good missile?
General WHITE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHEPPARD. That is it?
General WIHTE. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHEPPARD. What has been your experience with the testing
program for BOMARC A and B since you were last before this com-
mittee? What is your particular attitude at the, moment as compared
to what your attitude was then? There obviously must be some
change which has not been brought out to my satisfaction, and which
I would like an answer to.
General WHITE. We have here Colonel Dietrich who can discuss
that in detail.
Mr. ShIEPPAR.D. Very well, whomever you desire.
Colonel DIE?riztoH. May I ask your permission to give a short briefing
before we get into the question and answer? Then I will be glad to
try and answer the questions you have.
Mr. SHErrARD. What was that comment? I did not get your answer
to that.
Colonel DIFTracn. With your permission, I would like to give a
presentation very briefly winch summarizes the flight test program for
the A and B missile system.
Mr. FLOOD. Wait a minute. This is not right.
Mr. SIRES. The witness is answering the question.
Mr. FLOOD. I know he is answering the question but who runs this
committee, an Air Force lieutenant colonel or the members?
Mr. SIRES. Customarily the principal witness may defer to other
witnesses in our hearings.
Mr. FLOOD. I object, Mr. Chairman, because for 3 months we have
decided that we are going to have a special hearing on BOMARC.
Mr. MAHON. And we are going to leave a hearing on BOMARC.
Mr. FLOOD. Again?
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Mr. MAxoN. Yes.
Mr. FLOOD. Fine. I love that.
Mr. SIIErPARD. In your response to the question I have just raised,
you are going to present a chart and briefing to the committee later
that will answer my questions?
Colonel I IETRICH. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHE:rrARD. All right.
I wish you would insert in the record the percentage of completions
and expenditures to date on each of the BOMARC sites and the esti-
mated cost of canceling the remaining work at each site.
General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.
(The information requested follows:)
BOAT A /?C sites completed and under contract
Percent
complete
(Apr. 1,
1960)
Curr
work
estim
(thous
ent
ing
ate
ands)
Cancellation
costs (thou-
sands)
Recoup
(thousands)
srcGuire---------------------------------------
$1
3.6390
$13,690
0
Aufiolk--------------------------------? ---
1
3, 190
13,190
0
Otis------------------------------- ---------
7,610
7
610
0
1)0w
7,750
,
7,750
0
Langley (Site 1)----------------------?----
6.060
6,000
0
(Site 2)------------------------------
2.700
2,170
$530
Kincheloe------------------------------------
3,840
3
240
600
Dulnth
3.800
,
3,230
570
Niagara --------------------------------- ......
3,840
3, 270
570
1'nine-------------
3,040
2,480
500
Adair------------------------------------
3,000
21780
220
Travis--------------------------
-----
V
d
b
3,340
1, 990
1, 150
an
en
erg
--- ------------------------
3,000
2,440
560
Mr. SHEPPAR.D. When did you let the contracts for the last four sites,
if you have done so?
(The information requested follows:)
Sites for which no construction contracts have been awarded:
Fiscal year: Site
1959-------------------------------------------------- Malmstrom.
1959----------------------------------------- ------- Glasgow.
1959 -------------------------------------------------- Minot.
1961-------------------------------------------------- Charleston.
Last four sites for which construction contracts were awarded:
1959------------------------------------------------------------------
Paine-------------
Aug. 4,1959
Aug.
1959-------------------------------------------------`----------
Adair- -----------
Do.
1`'4159 -------------------------------------------------------------------
Travis ------------
-----------
Oct. 28,1959
1959-----------------------------------------------------------'---------
Vandenberg-------
Vandenberg -------
Aug. 3,1959
Mr. GARLOCK. The last four we let were on the west coast and we
will give you the dates when we let those contracts.
Mr. WAIT rEN. Will you. yield to me briefly to ask him if he means
by that that you have some authorization but have not let them?
Mr. GArr.ocic. Yes. We have additional site authorizations and
money where we have not let any contracts.
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Mr. SHF;PPARD. In the letting of those contracts, was your A. & E.
work perfected at the time you let the contracts, and, if so, to, what
degree?
General CuRTIN. I am sorry but. I did not hear.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Read the question, please.
(The question was read.)
Mr. SIIEPPARD. Perhaps the word "perfected" should be supplanted
by the word "definitized" so you could use the contract procedure for
some degree of understanding without going into an explanation of
what will be done without a, lot of change orders and so forth.
General CuRTIN. Yes, Mr. Sheppard.
The A. & E. work was definitized to permit orderly progress of the
work to the standard we hope to achieve in all construction.
Mr. SHEPPARD. All right; that is your answer and you are respon-
sible for it. I anl. not.
General CuRTIN. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHEPPARD. What recoupments would be possible if the last four
sites were stopped as of now?
General CuRTIN. The last four sites for which contracts have been
let?
Mr. SIIEPPARD, The gentleman on your right said we let four on the
west coast and those are the ones we are addressing ourselves to exclu-
sively at the moment.
General CuRTIN. Itow much money can be saved?
Mr. SHEPPARD. That is right.
General CuRTIN. I cannot give you a precise figure but I can give
you an order of magnitude.
I suspect that the savings will be an average of up to $600,000
per site, sir.
Mr. SIIEPPARD. In other words, those sites have proceeded in their
construction completeness to that degree?
General CURTIN. T am now trying to estimate what the contractor
will buy out on a negotiated basis. Usually we get taken pretty badly
on this.
Mr. SIIEPPARD. I can go along with that.
EFFECT OF PROPOSED REVISIONS OR OTIIEP. ASPECTS OF AIR DEFENSE PROGRAMME
This particular presentation this morning, General White, is in-
triguing to me, in a way. I am not being critical at all, but I ant
thoroughly curious about the whole situation. What is the ultimate
going to be?
To me this more or less punches right in the middle of your so-
called air defense program and changes the complete philosophy-
perhaps I should not say "complete" but I will say "proportion-
ately"-and to a large degree changes the complexion of the decisions
made in this particular field up until, we will say, this presentation.
It really switches the entire technique, does it not?
General WIIrrE. I do not think it is as radical as that, Mr. Shep-
pard. It does takw funds from defense against the air-breathing
threat. as presented in the basic 1961 budget to produce a lower level
than planned under that program for defense against the air-breath-
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ing threat, but provides a better than existing defense at an earlier
period, and by virtue of the savings proposes to put the funds on
what we consider to be against higher risks.
Mr. Sr3EPPARD. This also goes beyond the abilities of the BOMARC
itself, or any missile of like character as far as that is concerned.
This is now influencing what I understand to be a large portion of our
communication requirements as heretofore presented and definitely
indicated as necessary.
(general Wiirrs. Communications, sir?
Mr. SHEPPARD. Yes. I am talking about; your SAGE operation.
Mr. GARLOCK. SAGE operations and large communications.
As a matter of fact, we have special authority for entering into these
lease agreements with the telephone companies. We have not made
any evaluation as to the extent to which this change may modify that
particular cost.
Mr. SHF,1.'PARD. Insofar as we know at the moment, this has not been
shaken down to the degree where you feel justified in saying to this
committee that it is going to have any effect of diminishing or
increasing?
Mr. GARLOCii. It would have to diminish. It is a case of how much.
Mr. SHEPPARD. To what degree are we downgrading that so-called
communications requirement as against the total communications re-
quirement as heretofore justified before the committee?
Mr. GARLOCri. I am premising my statement on the basis that there
will be less in dollars. Every time you take out a radar or any other
installation of that kind that has to be connected with another place,
you have taken out the fixed communication line we had to have with
it. That would not necessarily have any effect on the overall com-
rnunications problem; it would not necessarily.
If you remember, on that area on that that showed white with no
radars--well, when we had planned to put radars and all of those
things in there, we would have had to put in communications which
would have been associated just with this system but would not have
been associated with any other commands and control communications
for general use.
Mr. SHEPPARD. In other words, in dropping out what is being de-
leted from the SAGE program at the moment, this, then, is not
going to have any detrimental effect upon your so-called communica-
tions system that previously was justified before this committee as
being an intense requirement for backup purposes and operational
purposes?
Mr. GARr.oari. That is my opinion, but I would rather have my
cohorts in uniform comment on that.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Whoever wishes to answer that.
General ESTES. I would say that is correct. It has no impact on
tali at.
Mr. FLOOD. I do not understand the question and answer.
If I understand the question, I do not believe the answer.
Mr. SIrEPPARD. My question was predicated upon the following: We
have all sat here and listened to the story on SAGE requirements.
The requirements for what? Backup and operational requirements.
That, is the way it was presented and conveyed, as I recall.
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We needed tliis as a secondary requirement. And now, by backing
out of it, what are we losing in the communication aspect? The gen-
tleman said "Nothing."
Mr. FLOOD. Is that right? Is that what you said?
General EsTES. In the SAGE system we are talking about putting
in, there are communication requirements for those centers that have
direct connections wtih radars, direct connections between centers and
direct connections from centers to combat centers and direct connec-
tions to Norad. In addition to those regular circuits, there are alter-
nate routings if you lose one line, so you have another line. Those
are backup lines. Then there are certain engineered circuits you
can call out if you require further backup.
In the supercombat center program, which we are recommending
be deleted, you would have had to provide additional communications
to those centers in addition to the communications you had otherwise.
Mr. FLOOD. I know all of that, but I think what Mr. Sheppard im-
plied was that if all of that is true, why did you ask for it in the first
place?
General WnrrE. To go with the supercombat centers we previously
asked for.
General ESTEs. That is required for SAGE and is still going to be
there. It has to be there. It. has to be there for the supercombat ce--
ters and that all comes out.
Mr. FLOOD. I do not want to cause any trouble with this thing.
Forgot that I brought it up.
Mr. Rmu pARD. What you have done here is to eliminate your so-
called hardened Norad headquarters approach that heretofore you
were interested in securing?
General WnrT>. That is correct.
Mr. SmWPARD. That ties right back again into what you are talk-
ing about because there were component parts in the hardened opera-
tion. At least, that is my interpretation of all of the testimony f
have heard.
General Esms. The hardened communications associated with the
hardened combat center would go out.
Mr. SH EPPARD. You are dropping this out and SAGE?
General EsTES. As far as the supercombat center is concerned.
General WinTE. Associated combat centers drop.
Mr. SrrEPPARD. What are you going to do on the Colorado situation
You have about a million dollar road running up the hill to nowhere.
What is going to happen?
General WHITE. We intend not to build it as of now.
Mr. Srrr;PPnED. That falls out with all other so-called hardened
headquarter presentations we have had heretofore?
General WnmTis. Hardened ones; yes, sir.
This is in the air defense field we are talking about.
Mr. S7[1:PPARD. General White, I know that is true, but insofar as
you know in your requirements as of the moment, your answer is
correct.
Now, if we come along later on--and I am not quarreling with it at
all-and if there is something unforeseen at the moment which de-
velops, you might possibly use it, but as of the moment the answer
is "No" ?
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General Wriiz '. That is correct.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Because that falls by the wayside, the rest of them
do?
General WniTE. That is correct.
Mr. SFnErr_Ann. What do you propose to do about the so-called
CADIN communications system for which you are presently request-
ing funds in this year's program?
General ESTES. The CADIN package, remains essentially the same,
Mr. Sheppard.
This will certainly require some modification of the C.ADIN
package.
It is impossible, however, to state overnight what those modifica
tions will be. It will be necessary for the Canadians and NORAD
jointly to review this entire CADIN package.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like
to deviate from construction and go back to other matter for a moment.
General White, you have many airplanes constantly flying with
some in use for detection and other purposes. It would occur to me
that when. you have trouble with them, it is most important for you
people to locate, that plane immediately.
General WHITE. Correct.
Mr. SHEPPARD. In fact, it is equally important that you locate it
immediately whether it is in a military category or in some other
passenger-carrying civilian craft, or whatnot?
General Wrr'vi . Yes, sir.
Mr. SrrEPPARD. At the moment, do you have any estimate what the
average cost is when you send out search planes to locate a downed
plane? Has there been any reasonable assumption as to the cost factor
involved?
General FRIEDAIAN. No, sir. This would be very difficult. It would
depend on the type of plane and the number of hours in search. The
closest you could come to it, Mr. Chairman, would be to take a hypo-
thetical case and say that if it is of a C-47 type, it would normally
cost on the order of $100 per flying hour-to include maintenance,
overhaul, fuel and oil, and other direct costs. This is about as close
as we could come today.
General WHITE. I would put it another way, if I might. I think
that is true, too. I think, if you like, we could take. some actual cases
and perhaps trace down what the costs were. They vary widely
according to the type of action, location, and so on.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Based upon some responses I received in the field
when I was recently making a survey and your people were very
gracious and courteous in their responses, the general estimate for any
search that runs over 24 hours would be $150,000 to $200,000. That
was an estimate.
General WrirrE. Even in this day and age, that seems high to rite.
Flying hours are expensive. Personnel pay would be included. We
make contracts and quick arrangements to get ambulances, doctors,
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and all the rest of it, to the scene of the accident if they are available.
On an emergency basis, I am sure the costs are extra high.
Mr. SHEPPARD. Of course, there are many ramifications here aside
from the dollar. None of us can set a price upon a human life, and
nobody intends to. It is a very unfortunate situation.
Getting to the basis of this thing, I have been advised by the military
people with whom I have talked in various different locations that
the more rapidly that you, the military, can determine that plane's
physical location where it cracks up, the better it is for you and every-
body else.
General WiiITE. There is no question about that.
Mr. SHEPPARD. If you could determine it within, let us say, 15 min-
utes after the plane went down, would you consider it would be an
advisable thing to do if the expenditure was within the bounds of
reason?
General WxiTE. We are assuming that this is something that really
works and within reasonable costs. I would say it was very desirable
and a thing that we would owe to our people and to the Nation.
Mr. SUEPPARD. I am very glad to hear you say that because you
already have, and the Government has bought and paid for, at least
75 percent of research and development, what is known now, without
having an official name hung onto it, as the plane down locator. It
is a beeping device that goes off on water and land. It has been tested
and it works. The item itself is a very light payload thing, not any-
thing which will create an extra weight problem. The device can
be put on the plane at a conservative estimate for less than $7,000. It
is my understanding that we have four requirements indicated in that
field. With the tremendous responsibility you in the military have,
not only in locating these planes but locating people, irrespective of
who may be making it, why are we not interested in doing this?
General WiirrE. I believe we are investigating this.
Mr. SHEPPARD. You have not been expressing a view from any
source for the last 11 months. It has been operational. It has been
tested on water and it has been tested on land by the military itself.
General WRITE. I have only general knowledge that there is such
a system and that our R. & D. people are aware of it.
Mr. SHEPPARD. We have so many other things that are important.
They are all important, but it seems to me here is an item which some-
body is overlooking, and I am wondering whether we find ourselves
in a position dollar-wise that we just cannot afford to look at things
like that. Yet when you look at a situation of this character and
something else over here that we are procuring, the difference between
the two is so outstanding it makes it very difficult to understand.
We have had people lost in Air Force and in other military air-
craft, and it has taken us a long time to find them. I should think,
insofar as the immediate locating of those planes, you people want
to get your hands on them as fast as you can. Is that right or wrong `?
General WiirrE. I would have to say, Mr. Sheppard, it is like tTie
Government insuring itself. I am sure we would have to consider
how many aircraft are not located within so many minutes, what is the
incidence of that, and then weigh it against the cost to complete it.
You would have to have one in every aircraft in the inventory. I can
only say that I will now have a look at it myself.
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Mr. SHFPI>Ann. I am calling it to your attention for that purpose.
As I say, I have no interest in the situation other than I have seen it
operate. The military have produced their own pictures of its opera-
tion, both on land and on water. There is no question that. it is avail-
able and almost an off-the-shelf operation. I think it merits a lot of
consideration.
Mr. Chairman, I have some other questions, but they have already
been answered to a reasonable. degree through your inquiry, and I. do
not want to take any more time.
(Off the record.)
Mr. MAxox. Mr. Ford.
1ir. Foxe. Mr. Chairman, since January the Secretary of Defense,
the various civilian Secretaries, the Chiefs and others, have submitted
justifications for the 1961 budget. Throughout the hearings it has
been indicated that when new information was available on pro-
grams, we would hear from them if there were certain breakthroughs
which justified revisions in the program or programs as submitted to
us originally for fiscal year 1961. It always has been my feeling that
rigidity based upon stubbornness is completely indefensible, and that
flexibility based on new information is very commendable.
I gather the impression here that the Air Force is taking the route
of flexibility based on new information. Is that the basis for this
presentation, General White?
General Wm'FF. Mr. Ford, I have to downgrade that a little bit. It
is not based so much on new information as it is, let us say, new
concepts based on better studies. There are new inputs. That alone
has had a great bearing on our decision to recommend that the super-
combat centers be cut back. So it is a combination of both. I think a
fair statement would have to include, in addition, greater study and an
opportunity to have digested and analyzed the master air defense plan
inipl ications.
Mr. FORD. The original 1961 fiscal year budget was put together
more or less starting in September of 1959, and submitted to the Con-
gross in January.
General WIITTF. That is correct, sir.
Mr. FORD. The net result is that 5 or 6 or 7 months have passed. by
between the inception of the fiscal year budget in its original form and
what is before us today.
General WHITE. That is correct.
Mr. FORD. If you had had the information in September-October
1959 that you have today, would you have come up with this kind of
program that we have before us now, rather than the original 1961
budget program?
General Wirrn,. That is a, difficult, thing to give a categorical answer
to. I would say something approximating this might well have been
the plan rather than the one we have submitted. The master air
defense plan really was it considerable change, and it just took time to
adjust our thinking to it., to convince certain people that further
changes could be made to the overall benefit of our national security.
Then we had the various steps, such as the briefing of NOI1AD, the
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Joint Chiefs, and the Department of Defense angles, all of which have
taken time.
Mr. FORD. Basically, you would have made the same decisions in
the fall of 1951) that you are making now if you had this information
and had the benefit of these studies?
General WHITE. That is correct, sir. I would. say, had we made the
analysis we have made starting in December, I think it was -bad we
made the same analysis in September that we made in December, I
think we would have come somewhat close to this same position.
NEED FOR IMrROVE[? DETERRENT CAPABILITY
Mr. FORD. It has always been the Air Force philosophy, as I under-
stand it, that an overpowering offense is a great, if not the greatest,
deterrent to auuy war, all out or limited.
General Wi Irrr:.. That is correct, sir.
Mr. FORD. I assume it is the Air Force's position that if you bolster
.your offense, you can afford to take perhaps a little different view of
what you need. In the way of a defensive capability. Is that correct?
General WHITE. of course, our philosophy is based on the fact
that offense is the best defense. First, we must have, a deterrent, so
we hope we do not have a war. But we must not only provide the
offense to be sure that we can prevail if war does come, but we must
blunt the enemy's attack to what I would term the limit of the law
of diminishing returns. That is very difficult to define in this sitna-
tion. I cannot begin to do it. But I am perfectly certain that the
subject of air defense could absorb the national budget, and you still
could not guarantee 100-percent defense. So, in the final analysis, it
is a matter of judgment at what level you balance out between offense
and a minimum adequate defense.
Mr. FORD. As I look over the listing here of those items on the
addenda, a vast majority of the increases are in the offensive
capability.
General WRITE. Dollarwise, that is true, with the exception of the
interceptor improvements, which we feel are a vital part of this
whole program, because if that fell out, the program, in my opinion,
would not give us an adequate measure of defense.
Mr. FORD. The net result is that if the addenda is approved both
by the Congress and the Executive, your offensive capability will be
increased.
General WHITE. It will be increased.
Mr. FORD. If we increase our offensive capability, under the theory
of the Air Force that is an increase in our deterrent capability.
General WHITE. Yes, sir.
Mr. FORD. That in itself will not make General Muter feel any bet-
ter because he has had some revisions in his program. Nevertheless,
from the overall point of view of the country, you think it is a sound
program ?
Gbeneral. WurrE. I do. That expresses it exactly. General Kilter
is charged with one thing and, to put it hypothetically, had it been
the other way around and as a result of analyses we felt, something
should be taken off SAC and put on Air Defense, I am sure General
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Power would have been very unhappy about that. It is exactly the
same type of thing.
Mr. Foxe. Can the committee assume that the items listed here
in the addenda group are the ones which the Air Force is recom-
mending as of the highest priority when you relate those listed. here
with those three or four which were eliminated or slightly reduced?
General WHITE. It is my best judgment, sir, that these repre-
sent the highest priority items within the dollars stated.
Mr. Foxe. As has been testified, you are going to have cutbacks
in BOMARC and SAGE. Are you going to lose any money by these
changes? Will there be any substantial cancellation costs because
of the changes or revisions in the programs?
General WIrITE. One occurs to me right away. As Mr. Sheppard
has indicated, there are some BOMARC sites which are partially
constructed now which under the new program will not be com-
pleted, and that will be a complete loss. I do not think the dollar
value is very high, but as far as I know, it will be a complete loss.
Mr. MAHON. You can. approximate, it at this point in the record.
General FRIEDMAN. Very well.
Mr. SIRES. As I recall it, we funded 15 BOMARC sites in the fiscal
1959 and prior programs.
Mr. GARLOCK. We have not contracted for them as yet.
Mr. SIKES. Now you propose to have ---. Relate the difference
between the 15 and the presently planned , will you?
General FRIEDMAN. How much per site?
General C'uRTIN. About $6 million per site including augmenta-
tions.
General FRIEDMAN. About $12 to $14 million would be the differ-
ence, I understand, in the program.
Mr. SIKES. Have you contracted for any of the sites above --?
Mr. GARLOCK. Two.
General FRIEDMAN. Have we contracted for any above the
General WHITE. How many BOMARC sites have we contracted
for as of now?
Mr. SIRES. Above
General CIIRTIN. Two above . That makes a total of sites.
Mr. GARLOCK. The answer is correct.
There are four sites under contract on the west coast. They run
from Washington down to California.
Mr. SIKES. It would be well if you submitted a statement showing
exactly what the situation is, the number of sites and the money we
shall pick up as a result of this change, if any.
Mr. FORD. I am not sure the question has been asked and a. response
given, but I think we ought to show not only the BOMARC cancella-
tion costs if this program. materializes,. but also the SAGE super-
center cancellation costs if this program is executed. In other words,
we want the full picture.
General FRIEDMAN. We will give that for both systems, sir.
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(The information requested follows:)
Costs of amended programs versus fiscal year 1961 budget request-Development,
construction, and equipment program requirements
[In millions]
BOMARO
Fiscal year
Fiscal year
Fiscal year
Balance to
1959 and
1960
1961
comple-
Total
prior years
Lion
Program per President's fiscal year 1961
budget ----------------------------------
$1,799.4
$394.1
$421.5
$451.3
$3,086.3
Proposed amended program---------------
1,777.4
394.1
40.4
0
2,211.9
Difference---------------------------
' -22.0
0
-381.1
451.3
-854.4
Program per President's fiscal year 1961
budget----------------------------------
$1,165.9
$280.2
$235.2
$291.6
$1,972.9
Proposed amended program---------------
1,165.9
138.4
102.8
166.9
1,574.0
Difference---------------------------
0
-141.8
-132.4
-124.7
-398.9
I Represents savings against fiscal year 1959 and prior amounts as contained in fiscal year 1961 President's
budget. This amount ($22 million) is Included in current line item reprograming of the military construo-
tion programI
Cancellation costs for the SAGE supercenter program are only associated with
the preplanning and design of the centers. It is estimated at this time that less
than $500,000 would be involved.
Mr. FoRD. It has been indicated that under this program you will
procure operational BOMARC B's. The suggestion has been
made by one of the committee that perhaps even those missiles should
not be procured; that, it might be wiser to procure interceptors in re-
placement. The testimony has indicated that those interceptors, if
procured, would cost about $4 million per aircraft.
General FRIEDMAN. That is correct, sir.
Mr. FORD. For the record, what would be the total cost of those
interceptors if they were rocured?
General FRIEDMAN. Ifpyou were to procure them on a one-for-one
basis, it would be slightly over a billion dollars. Therefore, if the
savings in the BOMAR.C was of the order of $250 million, as I indi-
cated before, you would have a net increase in requirements of some-
thing on the order of $750 million.
Mr. FORD. As I recall the testimony of General Estes, or General
White, you have to procure interceptors on a one-for-one basis.
General ESTES. That is the opinion of the Air Defense Command, as
checked with NORAD.
Mr. FLOOD. You mean missile per plane? Just missiles? Weapons
system? You mean missile? Is that your question? Missiles?
Mr. FORD. The statement was made that we would have to procure
a plane to replace a missile.
Mr. FLOOD. Oh. Just so I know. A plane for a missile.
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR ROCK ST DEVELOPMENT
Mr. FORD. (general Hollowvay, you indicated that $12 million had
been requested in rocket development. It did not make the grade,
priority wise, in this list before us. How much is there in the R. & D.
budget currently for rocket. development for fiscal 1961?
General HOLLOWAY. I do not know exactly, sir. We would have to
furnish that.
General FRLEnM N. It, is about. $24 million, Mr. Meyer tells me.
Mr. Fo1ID. In other words, there is $24 million in the current 1961
budget program. The $12 million was over and above that?
General FRIED_MAN. That is correct.
I would like for the record to indicate what kinds of rocket develop-
ments we have already in the fiscal year 1961 budget.
(The information to be furnished follows:)
The amount in the current budget for rocket development in fiscal. year
]361 is:
Liquid rocket technology ---------------------------------------- $11,490,000
Solid rocket technology---------------------------------------- 12, 24O2., 000
Total rocket development----------------------------------- 23, 692, 000
Mr. Foa n. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
(Off the record. )
Mr. MAnoN. I recognize Mr. Sikes for 15 minutes.
Mr. SIKES. It is my understanding that the sums which have been
listed previously do not affect? the BOMARC test program, the. R. & I).
program.
General WIIrrE. No, sir.
Mr. Slurs. Is it planned to continue the R. & D. or testing program
on BOMARC even if this operational cutback in BOMARC is
approved?
General W.IrrE. That is correct. The full test program. will
continue.
Mr. SIDES. What do you propose to buy with the $40.5 million that
is still. included in the *)MARC program for fiscal 1961?
Mr. MEYER. $19.5 million of that is for completion of the. develop-
ment program, and the balance is procurement of ground support
equipment--cleaning up the squadron equipment.
Mr. SIDES. How much of the BOMA.RC program is now available
and operational?
General Esa:Es. I have a chart, Mr. Sikes, which we can give you
on it.
Mr. SIDES. May we see it?
General Es'r>s. Colonel Dietrich has the exact figures, and I would
prefer to have him give you the exact figures. We have just gotten
the latest information on it, and I would like him to show it to you,
if we may.
EXISTING BOMARC A CAPABILITY
Colonel Diirnucx (slide). Mr. Sikes, the five bases containing the
BOMARC A missile are listed here. The combat-ready missiles at
these sites are listed. over here. These are the missiles on hand at
these sites, and those which are combat ready.
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Mr. SIKES. We do have a substantial capability in BOMARC A at
this time. That is an important fact.
Colonel DramTcTT. Yes, sir. One site has a substantial capability.
It is not fully operational ready. It is nonscheduled to become op-
erational ready until May. These are initial operational capability
dates when we have one missile on the site, checked out and ready-to
r. This schedule was mat as indicated by the diamond on Septeln-
r 1 at McGuire. The December date was met at Suffolk. At the
present time we have combat-ready missile. They are process-
ing them in at about
Mr. STKES. All right., what is the situation on the others?
Colonel DIETRTCTr. We have had about a month's slippage in the
operational capability of these two bases.
Mr. SncEs. When do you expect those two to be operational ? The
one at Otis, Mass., will be operational when?
Colonel DTnmIdH. Actually, it is the --
Mr. STxrs. When is Dow, Maine to be operational?
Colonel DTETiucn. Dow is to ~e operational
General ESTns. Those are initial operational dates.
Colonel DIETRICH. At Langley, the first operational missile will be
ready to go .
Mr. STKES. Woultl that capability in five existing bases be lost if
you were to cancel the entire BOMARC program?
Mr. Gang OCK. It would be almost impossible to cancel that because
the missiles are almost all complete and the construction is complete.
We have not proposed any cancellation of "A" and none of the figures
we have given here have assumed any cutoff of the A program. I
am sure if you examine it you will find it is so far down the road
that it is almost impossible to stop it.
Mr. SiKEs. Then such cancellation would be a very unwise thing
to contemplate, both from the standpoint of costs and needed defense.
Mr. GAr.LOCK. Yes, sir.
Mr. SncrS. What is the situation in Canada? Do you know how
far toward operational capability they have progressed .
General ESTES. Yes, sir. The Canadian sites are not supposed to
become operational until --- because they have no A missiles.
They are. entirely 13 missiles. The Canadians--I believe this figure
is essentially correct, sir-are about percent complete with the
construction of their first site, which is . They have not yet
started construction on their second site.
Mr. SrKES. They have notified you, I believe you stated, that they
intend to continue with the BOMARC B program.
General ESTES. They have, sir.
Mr. STKES. Where is their BOMARC B testing being done?
General EsTES. It is being done as a part of our program, sir.
Mr. SIKES. They benefit from our test program. They do not have
an R. & D. program of their own.
General WxrrE. They are dependent on us for the BOMARC pro-
grain insofar as testing and development are concerned.
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VULNERABILITY OF "SOFT" CONTROL SITES
Mr. SINES. To what extent are you disturbed about vulnerability
from the soft configurations which we will have if we eliminate the
hardened complexes which you propose to eliminate?
General ESTES. Obviously, sir, it would be preferable to have an
extremely hard center that you knew would survive a missile attack.
As General White pointed'out in his testimony earlier, if you do
this, then you have to go for hardening the whole system, and the costs
become astronomical. What we have tried to do, therefore, in our
analysis, is to provide a manual backup to the soft SAGE. There
is already a backup in the SAGE system itself. If one center is
knocked out, the two adjacent centers can pick up that area. If two
centers are knocked out, we have recommended for NORAD's study
putting a limited number of individuals on what we call a firehouse
manning concept at certain selected radar sites, of these modernized
radars that I have mentioned, and further, that they establish five
similarly manned manual. divisions. These would not be located in
the same area as the SAGE centers themselves. In the event, then,
that the SAGE center at any particular area were eliminated, you
would still have certainly a very considerably degraded capability,
but nonetheless still a capability to conduct an air battle with inter-
ceptors. This is one of the reasons for the recommended improve-
ment in the fighter-interceptors.
Mr. SINES. What substantially, other than hardening will you lose
from the SAGE system as,a result of the cuts which are proposed?
EFFECT OF CHANGES ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL CAPABILITY
General ESTES. You lose capacity as well, sir. Furthermore, you
will lose an ability to operate with the FAA in flight planning, na-
tional air traffic control, to the degree that we would have been able
to accomplish with the. supercombat centers in the future, the
FSQ7-A computer, as it is known.
Mr. SINES. Do you still feel you will have a substantial and effective
operational capability?
General ESTES. As far as air defense is concerned, yes, Sir. As far
as FAA is concerned, I have talked with Mr. Quesada about this.
He understands the situation and recognizes that we must immediately
sit down to devise a new plan for national air traffic control.
Mr. SINES. Is that new plan likely to run into such a substantial
sum that there will actually be no savings?
General ESTES. Insofar as the FAA request is concerned, sir?
Mr. SINES. Yes.
General ESTES. Mr. Sikes, I cannot answer that, Sir, because we
have not yet had the opportunity to work with Mr. Quesada's people
and, therefore, I have no real basis for giving you a factual answer.
Mr. SINES. You have given us the anticipated savings in fiscal 1960
and fiscal 1961.. Are there 1959 and prior savings in this program as
you have outlined it?
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/30 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9
General FRIEDMAN. No, sir; there are not. We have projected out
on a basis through completion, and it is our estimate this plan would
run about $2 billion less cumulatively over the period than the plan
we are proposing today.
Mr. SiKES. Is R. & D. money included? I think you might well
provide a summary for the record, if it would be preferable to do
that.
General FRIEDMAN. We shall be happy to do that, sir. We can
show you the long-range cost on both plans and the difference.
Mr. SIKES. Are the savings in R. & D. money included in the pro-
gram you have presented to us, or is that an additional amount?
General FRIEDMAN. The figures I have given you cut across all ap-
propriations. As I indicated to the chairman, I would give you a
breakdown by appropriation.
(The information requested follows:)
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 Approved For Release 2002/10/386 CIA-RDP80B01676R000900030049-9
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