AIR WAR COLLEGE STUDIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A001800100002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 72
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1954
• Content Type: STUDY

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THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Air War College Studies
COLONEL ROBERT J. GOEWEY, USAF
COLONEL NICHOLAS T. PERKINS, USAF
COLONEL WILLIAM J. CAIN, USAF
DR. EUGENE M. EMME
COLONEL CLANTON W. WILLIAMS USAF, Editor
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THE AIR WAR
COLLEGE STUDIES
THE Air War College of the United States Air Force is the insti-
tution which is probably in the best position in the world to
receive, discuss, evaluate, and disseminate thinking on air
power. The College is engaged in a program of study, teaching,
and research in matters of vital interest to a dynamic and pro-
gressive air force. Its student body, Graduate Study Group,
faculty, and lecturers all are engaged in this enterprise. The
College originates ideas and studies opinions, hypotheses, and
concepts originating both within itself and from external
sources. It synthesizes knowledge thus gained into doctrine
and principles for the proper employment of air power.
We feel that it is our duty to extend the results of this think-
ing beyond our own walls. Ideally we should keep all United
States Air Force officers informed of the best and the latest
thinking on air power as expressed in the Air War College.
Perhaps some day that ideal may be realized, but for the
present, security restrictions and budget limitations force us
to accept a much more modest program. We propose to select
some of the most important documents and lectures, as they
are produced at the Air War College, and make these available
to a selected group of Air Force officers.
Our purpose in initating the Air War College Study series on
even this modest scale is to advance knowledge of air power and
to assist the development of doctrine generally throughout the
United States Air Force.
(I-- . 'aez~~~
R. C. WILSON
Major General, USAF
Commandant
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Views or opinions expressed or implied in this pub-
lication are those of the author and are not to be
construed as carrying official sanction of the De-
partment of the Air Force or of the Air University.
For official use by personnel of the Armed Forces
only. Property of the United States Government. Not
to be reproduced in whole or in part without per-
mission from Headquarters, Air University, Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama.
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 for official use only
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white House
STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
1952, 1954
COLONEL WENDELL E. LITTLE, USAR
Introduction by the Editor
AIR WAR COLLEGE STUDIES
NUMBER TWO
Air University Press
Air University
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for official use only
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Published
in July 1954
by
Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base
Alabama
Established in Headquarters Air University, 1 October 1953,
to Advance
the Science of Air Power
BRIGADIER GENERAL DALE O. SMITH, Director of Education, A.U.
COLONEL R. J. GOEWEY, Vice Commandant, Air War College
COLONEL ANTHONY G. HUNTER, Vice Commandant, AC&SS
COLONEL JOHN R. MCGRAW, V/Comdt, USAF School of Aviation Medicine
COLONEL A. M. MUSGROVE, Vice Commandant, USAF Institute of Technology
COLONEL E. W. NAPIER, Vice Commandant, AFROTC
COLONEL N. T. PERKINS, Deputy for Evaluation, Air War College
COLONEL T. R. AYLESWORTH, AC/S, Plans and Operations, A.U.
COLONEL WILLIAM H. FREDERICK, Air University Secretary
DR. ALBERT F. SIMPSON, The Air Force Historian, Research Studies Institute
LT. COL. KENNETH F. GANTZ, Editor, A.U. Quarterly Review, Chief, AU Press
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CONTENTS
FOREWORD By Major General R. C. Wilson, Commandant,
Air War College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Viii
INTRODUCTION By the Editor, Air War College Studies . . . . . ix
U.S. MACHINERY FOR INTEGRATION OF
POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES, 1952
1. Need for Merger of Politico-Military Policies . 3
2. Origin and Function of NSC . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Structure and Operating Procedure . . . . . . . 13
4. A Fundamental Problem . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. The Voice of the Military in National Strategy . . 16
6. A Single Voice of Authority . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. The Overseas Command Problem . . . . . . . . 19
8. The Psychological Strategy Board . . . . . . . 20
9. Some Defects of the NSC . . . . . . . . . . . 23
10. The Organizational Structure of the NSC . . . 25
11. The NSC Staff Director . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
12. Transfer of the PSB Staff to the NSC . . . . . . 30
13. The Command Post and the President's Chain
of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
14. A New National Staff vs. Improving the Existing
NSC Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
15. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
ADDENDUM, 1954
1. Revitalization of the NSC . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2. Strengthening of the NSC Staff . . . . . . . . 53
3. The Planning Board in the Process of
Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4. Implementation of National Security Policies . . . 56
5. The Chain of Command from the President to
the Overseas Stations . . . . . . . . . . . 60
6. Synopsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
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WHEN, during the spring of 1953, the Air War College stu-
dents read digests of their theses before the assembled col-
lege, one such presentation "brought down the house." The
applause was in part appreciation for a piece of research
well done and a general agreement with the findings; it was
also an expression of exasperation, which feeling was fairly
general, especially among airmen. This is the thesis upon
which that presentation was based.
The basic paper was a study of our top-rung machinery
for making grand strategy under President Truman and
was completed just as a new administration was taking
over. The Air War College was anxious to learn what prog-
ress had been made during the first year of the Eisenhower
administration. It, therefore, asked "Tex" Little to write an
addendum to his original thesis.
The two in combination are here published in the belief
that the study should be made available to others.
The reader will not be satisfied, for the story is not com-
plete. But he will be pleased to note real progress.
R. C. WILSON
Major General, USAF
Commandant
1 April 1954
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INTRODUCTION
BY THE EDITOR
THE United States, at the conclusion of its "tumultuous de-
mobilization" in 1945-46, found itself in a dilemma. As it
contemplated its postwar posture among nations, it was
torn between conflicting desire and duty.
There was a deep seated desire to be free of international
responsibility. There was a persistent longing for "the good
old days" of isolated security, when Britain did the worrying
about "balance of power," and when the young United
States enjoyed protection afforded by intervening seas upon
which rode only friendly navies. But this protection was now
gone-gone indeed long before those awesome events took
place at Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, and Bikini. Yet, despite
the purport of those events, the nostalgic yearning persisted
-affecting foreign policy.
There was at the same time a stabbing conscience which
disturbingly said, "Get on with winning the peace! You
must! This time you must! " And the young giant of the
West, the "Arsenal of Democracy" in all that that term
connotes, knew that it should be about its business of vigor-
ously promoting freedom, justice, and socio-economic prog-
ress "everywhere in the world." Here too was a persistent
force-a persistent call to duty.
Could this exasperating dilemma-this conflict between
desire and duty-be resolved by compromise? Was there not
some middle ground between isolationism and internation-
alism, some place where Uncle Sam might acknowledge his
obligation to the Four Freedoms while following a policy of
"live and let live"? Could he not buy some time while the
dust of World War II settled? Would this not, after all, be
the wisest course to follow?
Here public opinion divided; indeed, it fragmented. The
people looked to Washington. And Washington looked back
to the people. It always had. But now public opinion was
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x WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
quite difficult to gauge. Most people were saying nothing.
They simply could not reach national decisions on interna-
tional affairs because they did not know enough. This very
dilemma created from among the people a school of neo-
isolationists who did express themselves. On the other hand,
there were those who were convinced that a negative ap-
proach to international responsibility had never succeeded.
"Compromise between conflicting desire and duty can be no
more than an expedient," they contended, "a dangerous
expedient."
This latter element of the people pointed more or less
frantically at the specter of a militant, amoral Marxist-
Leninist-Stalinism stalking Mother Earth. They pleaded with
their fellow democrats to awaken to the true significance of
Russian communism. "Temporizing on our part," this ele-
ment of the people held, "can be but a show of weakness. The
Russians are the greatest chess players on earth. In every
move they make they are showing their appreciation of the
idiom that an offense is the best defense. But this is no mere
chess match; the stakes in this contest are the sum-total of
all that we hold dear., What is your plan, Washington? Can
you get off the purely defensive? What is your grand strat-
egy? Who is making U:S. grand strategy anyway? The State
Department? The Pentagon? The White House?"
The people as a whole still looked to Washington. And
Washington looked back to the people.
Eventually, in July 1947, there appeared in Foreign Affairs
an article by "X," entitled "Sources of Soviet Conduct." In
this anonymous piece, the planning staff of the U.S. State
Department appeared to be sending up a trial balloon. Yet
here, for all its timorous appearance, was a pronouncement
of what this State Department group thought should be
United States foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet plan of ac-
tion. We would "firmly contain" Russian communism until it
should give up its ambitions and wither away. The people
read reproductions of X's article in popular publications.
Some raised eyebrows; others frowned; most shrugged and
went about their chosen occupations.
At this point, had we space here to spare, a chronology of
the Cold War, beginning prior to 1947, should be reviewed.
The "ebbings and flowings" of the Communist movement
would be shown. It quickly would be seen that like all other
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INTRODUCTION xi
tyrannical forces in history there were no ebbs-no retreats
on any front-except before the use of physical force or the
definite threat or ultimatum to employ violence.
In this chronology there would appear some red-letter
dates. Among them would be those having to do with the
Berlin Blockade, the Greek "guerrilla war," the Truman Doc-
trine, the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet action in
the UN, the demise of freedom in Czechoslovakia, the Mar-
shall Plan, NATO, EDC, the Korean War, and wars in Indo-
China and Malaya. Scattered throughout would be items
having to do with consolidation of Communist conquests in
Central Europe and in Asia. The chronology would contain
also the red-letter dates which designated the shocking an-
nouncements that Soviet scientists had exploded atom bombs
and then a thermonuclear device.
These latter items, with the accompanying talk about
"kilotons" and then "megatons" and "megadeaths," seemed
for a time to have had a stunning effect upon American pub-
lic opinion. All this-all these complications-all the various
probabilities-all the horrible possibilities! The people looked
to Washington....
If there had developed an immediate postwar dilemma, it
was all the more compounded now, for everything else was
compounded. The United States was slowly but surely being
forced against its will to take a stand-to plan carefully a
strong foreign policy and to plan to be able to take quick
violent action should such become necessary in the imple-
mentation of that policy. The United States wanted just to
"live and let live;" it found that that was no longer possible.
It preferred to "muddle through" international problems;
now it began to realize that it had been dragged into a
diplomatic struggle of unprecedented significance. It had
always loved the looseness of its democratic structure, and
it wanted to remain "free and easy." Now, challenged by
totalitarian rigid efficiency, it was being forced to centralize
authority. Only thus could it move quickly and effectively to
parry, to spar, to block, to counterattack.
Meantime, how much of a counterattack would the people
stand for? How much was necessary? Just enough to con-
tinue to "firmly contain" as in the case of Korea? But then
what of Indo-China where we were not very firmly containing?
And what of the Red threat to Thailand and Burma and
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Kit WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
Malaya? One could count a full dozen prospective "brush
fires" along the southern borders of the Red Heartland, and
any of them could become as bloody an affair as had been the
indecisive Korean War.
And there was a large part of Europe yet unconquered by
the Reds. It was American determination that it should re-
main unconquered.
How much manpower was available for this kind of a
foreign policy? How much training would be required?
Would universal military training be necessary? How much
materiel would it take to equip all the people required to
man this multithousand-mile-long peripheral Maginot Line?
And how long would this program remain in effect? Mean-
time, what would be happening to the American economy?
What would be happening to bourgeois democracy here and
elsewhere? Was not economic blood-letting a part of the
Communist program expressed as early as 1850 in Karl
Marx's Address From the Central Authority? Are not an-
swers to these basic questions found in scores of more recent
Communist pronouncements of intent such as that in Sta-
lin's 1939 Report to the Eighteenth Party Congress when he
stated (in a different but applicable context) that Commu-
nist expansion would be pursued until after "the capitalist
encirclement is liquidated and a socialist encirclement takes
its place"? Were they not answered as recently as 5 October
1952 in Malenkov's Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress?
Then he said:
"Comrades, the Soviet state is no longer a lone oasis surrounded
by capitalist countries. We are moving forward together with the
great Chinese people (prolonged applause), together with the many
millions of the People's Democracies and the German Democratic
Republic. (Prolonged applause.) . .. .
There is no force in the world that can halt the advance of
Soviet society. Our cause is invincible. We must keep our hand
firmly on the helm and steer our course undeterred by provocation
or intimidation." (Loud and prolonged applause.)
In the face of this inexorable challenge, the United States
was being forced to re-examine its policy of "firm contain-
ment." It had to do this in conjunction with a re-evaluation
of hard military facts. This must be dictated not by service
bias but by cold logic. Inevitably the United States was being
forced toward abandonment of the temporizing "balanced-
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INTRODUCTION xiii
force concept" and toward creation of an absolutely invinci-
ble air power. Invincibility here of necessity implied the hold-
ing and supplying of advanced air bases. Invincibility, in the
face of Soviet obduracy, dictated that this air power should
mean: capability of delivering anywhere the post-absolute
weapon.
But who was to make a decision or a series of decisions
here? One thinks of all the major factors: Soviet intentions
and actions, United States economy, military capabilities,
and the desires and intentions of our Allies.
There is a myriad of other unresolved questions-all re-
lated-some more closely than others. Most of them revolve
(clockwise) around the bulging membrane of the Russo-
Marxian zygote: What about Japan and her future? What
about Chiang Kai-shek and Formosa? What of trade with
Communist China? And of the recognition of the "Chinese
People's Republic" and its being gi'en a seat with veto
power in the United Nations? What are we going to do about
Southeast Asia? And what about our relations with India?
And Pakistan? And the whole of the Southwest Pacific?
What are we going to do if the Russians, through the Tudeh
Party, yet take over Iran? What about the whole of the
Middle East-its oil, its Arab-Jewish controversy, its Suez
Canal problem, its championing of nationalist aspirations
along the North African littoral with its naval and Strategic
Air Command bases? And there are the thousand-and-one
problems of the European and British areas. Finally, lest we
forget, there is the Western Hemisphere, from Patagonia to
Guatemala to Thule.
And there is Eniwetok! And one thinks of prospective
megadeaths! !
And there is an appalling lack of intelligence on what is
transpiring behind the Iron Curtain! But there are Soviet
strategic bomber bases.
And what about our own information security problem?
All this and more too.
The people, of necessity, are confused. They are over-
whelmed.
They have only one choice now. Like trusting children
they must place all this business-foreign policy, strategy,
and executive action-in the hands of their experts.
They look to Washington....
But to whom in Washington?
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U.S. Machinery
for Integration of
Politico-Military Policies
in 1952
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1. NEED FOR MERGER OF
POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES
H ISTORICALLY, at least up to the end of World War II, the
United States made a black-and-white distinction be-
tween peace and war. It produced diplomats for conducting
international relations in time of peace and military leaders
for planning and conducting campaigns in time of war.'
There was no machinery to insure the proper balance of em-
phasis among military and political considerations of na-
tional strategy. It was almost traditional for those who con-
ducted our foreign policy to speak from potential rather
than actual military strength-in-being. In many cases our
potential strength was not even indigenous; we were de-
pending on some external friendly force or we were bluffing
or perhaps both. Surely, in 1823, Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams and the President promulgated the Monroe
Doctrine in the full knowledge that we could not enforce its
letter or spirit in case of challenge. They were gambling
largely on the known attitude of George Canning and the
British Parliament. More than a century later, when we had
an unmistakable political obligation to defend the Philip-
pines against all comers, our military planners worked on
the assumption that we could not even hold Corregidor
against a determined assault.
This tradition of separation of politico-military considera-
tions plus the habit of speaking from potential rather than
actual military strength-in-being may have stood us in good
stead in the past. Surely we have enjoyed a large measure
of good luck in our foreign dealings. But the facts of life
'The following is from the U.S. Military Academy textbook, World's Military History,
by West Point's late Professor ,W 949)m A1940 . edition, ( parr rrisburg: Military Service Publish-
Ing Company, 1931, 1935,
is to be noted that war begins when the diplomats have failed. This is the point
most often not considered. When the diplomat, the statesman, the executive have
soldiers unable bhandle the le to prevent military the situation they step a the field. should step aside) and let the
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4 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
suddenly have undergone a drastic mutation produced by
atomic fission and fusion. Faced squarely with this techno-
logical revolution, and with Kremlin theory and practice, two
factors in the conduct of United States foreign affairs stand
out in bold relief: diplomats can no longer ignore the mili-
tary facts of life; and our military leaders, despite a strong
tradition to the contrary, must henceforth assume their
share of responsibility for diplomacy.2
The traditional American concept of a black-and-white
distinction between peace and war was reflected in the or-
ganizational structure of our Federal Government in the
early 1940's. There was no machinery for integration of
political and military considerations of grand strategy-
only one overworked man who simply could not carry this
great burden alone. In the early stages of World War II
the diplomatic arm of the Government virtually abdicated
its powers and responsibilities to the politically untrained
military leaders. This failure to integrate politico-military
policies was illustrated tragically at Yalta when the Presi-
dent, heeding an exclusively styptic military judgment, vir-
tually handed Eastern Asia to the Kremlin.
In 1945, as the war in Europe drew to a close, Soviet troops
raced for Prague and Berlin, symbols of political prestige,
while our highest military officers were loath to hazard
American lives for purely political purposes. General Brad-
ley in his memoirs had this to say of the British insistence
that the Americans take Berlin before the Russians : "As
soldiers we looked naively on this British inclination to com-
plicate the war with political foresight and' nonmilitary ob-
jectives."3 Can it be that our military leaders, of all people,
failed to appreciate the true significance of Karl von Clause-
witz's dictum (now trite) that war is the continuation of
policy by other means? 4 This question is all the more pointed
2For interesting discussions of this or immediately related subjects cf: William H.
Hessler, Operation Survival, New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1949; Col. G. C. Reinhardt,
and Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, "The need for a National Staff," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 78, July 1952; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Lessons of World War II's
Mistakes," Commentary, October 1952; B. H. Liddell-Hart, The Revolution in Warfare,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947; and Paul G. Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won,
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1951.
8Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1951, p. 536.
4The opening paragraph of Colonel Joseph I. Greene's "Forward" to the Infantry Jour-
nal Press's edition of Karl von Clausewitz, On War: Washington, 1950, p. xi, follows:
An acquaintance who knew books but not the Army once asked me why On
War, by Karl von Clausewitz, was not a standard textbook, or at least a book
of required reference, at the Command and General Staff School and the
Army War College. The fact was that the courses at these institutions dealt
mainly with the warfare of the future in terms of present thought on war,
rather than with wars of the past, and that even the classics of military his-
tory were little used in the instruction. But I could say that these two highest
schools of our Army, and the equivalent schools of other nations were in a
sense themselves an application of the ideas and methods of Karl von Clause-
wltz as expressed in this book, which 1s his major work.
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NEED FOR POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES 5
in the face of Churchill's continuous insistence on the politi-
cal significance of military action. He knew from long ex-
perience that wars are means to political ends; and military
victory, if it is to bear political fruits, must be shaped to
those ends.5
Lack of wisdom at the peace table conferences has been
blamed for failure to secure a "just and lasting peace"; but,
in truth, the seeds of future wars are sown by the conduct of
the fighting prior to the peace talks. As war draws to a close
the primary function of the military becomes more political
in nature, and at times such considerations should outweigh
technical military aspects. This is true because the condi-
tions under which the physical fighting stops tend to dictate
or control the relative power positions at the peace confer-
ences, and the terms of the military armistice often become
permanent.
Prior to and during World War II there was no American
machinery for the integration of all the military and political
aspects of a single grand strategy. That the President felt the
need for such assistance is illustrated by his complaint after
the Casablanca Conference that "No member of the Joint Chief
of Staff knows how to plan ahead in other than military af-
fairs." If Roosevelt had had an organization to serve up for his
approval well-thought-out answers to the many politico-mili-
tary questions, it is possible that some of the more obvious
(in retrospect) errors of the last war could have been avoided.
For example, Stalin seems to have been better advised on
the unfortunate formula of "unconditional surrender" than
was Roosevelt.6
It may be argued also that, on combined politico-military
grounds, an Allied invasion of the Balkans should have been
undertaken.? The U.S. Joint Chiefs opposed Churchill's re-
peated pressure for such operations on purely military
grounds, and Stalin strongly objected for reasons that be-
came apparent at the end of the war.8 In fact, the Soviets
conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign in the United
States to prevent an Allied campaign up through the Bal-
kans. The American strategy in Europe during World War
II actually opened up all of Eastern Europe to seizure of the
a Cf. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Co.,
1948, Chapter 20; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War-Triumph and Tragedy,
Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953, Chapter 8.
'Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York, Harper, 1950, p. 782.
'For example: Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe. New York: Harper, 1952,
p. 453.
'Sherwood, op. cit., p. 780.
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Soviet armies. The great defeats suffered by the West in the
first two years of the Cold War (1945-1947) were ordained by
the United States decision to fight the Germans in France
instead of grabbing as much of Central and Eastern Europe
as possible by an attack through the Balkans. Seeking sim-
ply to annihilate the enemy, we quite forgot that the pur-
pose of war is to create a more tolerable and stable equilib-
rium in the world community than that which existed
before resort to armed conflict had occurred. The basic fact
is that the United States had no integrated political-military
strategy during or at the end of World War II, and conse-
quently has been forced to handle almost all the postwar
problems on an ad hoc basis. Even the Marshall Plan was
essentially an ad hoc solution for what we hoped would be a
temporary problem.
The examples of a demonstrated lack of an integrated
American position on world strategy can be cited almost
indefinitely. But, more important, our tendency to separate
world strategy into neat and separate packages-one for
each department of the Government-has contributed to
our failure to show a full understanding of the nature of in-
ternational conflict. Such conflict goes on continuously, and
all forms of human behavior are involved. The shadings be-
tween peace and war and the instruments used by nations
to achieve or to preserve power are becoming increasingly in-
distinct. We realized, three or four years too late, our own
naivete at the end of World War II when the nation deliber-
ately disintegrated its military forces with almost no voice
raised in protest. This was because we failed to understand
that after the defeat of the Axis the struggle would
only be continued in different forms and with new power
relationships.
It is not a strained concept to suggest that the existence of
a well-trained group of politico-military strategists, properly
placed in the American government, might have provided
more enlightenment, or at least the basic doctrine and
knowledge which would have enabled a wise President to
assert his historic role as both an awakener of public opinion
and an initiator of bold policies.9 Historically the nation's
'Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy" in Aspects of American
Government, London: The Hansard Society, 1950, p. 113.
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NEED FOR POLITICO-MILITARY POLICIES 7
organization for national defense has been so shackled in
the grip of the past that only threat of grave catastrophe
could release it.10 The urgency of finding a solution to this
problem was emphasized in the immediate postwar period
by the cold facts of our responsibility for world leadership
in a bipolar world. Victory awaited that side which should
make the best use of its substance. A terrible defeat was the
alternative.
It was to satisfy the crying need for a merger of political
(including socio-economic factors) and military policies that
the National Security Council (NSC) was brought into exist-
ence by the National Defense Act of 1947.
2. ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF NSC
T HE National Security Council's origin is found in the
United States cabinet, in the kitchen cabinet, and in
SWNCC. This latter, "State, War, Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee," was a World War II expedient which had proved
itself under fire to be worthy of preservation.* Strengthened
and elevated, this agency might indeed supplant the cabinet
in the performance of one function-the formulation of
foreign policy.
The "integration of domestic, foreign and military policies
relating to National Security" is the stated purpose of NSC.
These are the words of the act of Congress which brought
NSC into existence. Actually the Council can be just a co-
ordinating board or it can be an all-powerful grand-strategy
planning sanctum sanctorum. That is for the President to
say! Otto Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff, Washington: Infantry
Journal Press, 1946, p. 569.
coordinating Coca on" SWNCC became known as SANACC (State, Army, Navy, Air
Coo
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.apA lhtis
The Vice President. Alban W. Barkley
The Secretary of State ....._.Dean G. Acheson
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
The Secretary of Defense ........ Robert A. Lovett
The Director for Mutual Security ....W. Averell Harriman
INrEUIGENCE AGENCY
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The Chairman, Nationnr Security Itreoums Board... Vacant
(Jack O. Gorrie 1951)
UITERDEPARTMENTAL
Director of Central intelligence
AOthers at the direction of the President, including always the.
INTElLIGENCE CONFERENCE
Director, Federal Bormu of Investigation
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N
Bradley
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the Secretary
,
.
Walter Bedell Smith
of State for ReseariL and Intelligence
Executive Secretary:
Director of Naval Intelligence,
A civilian appointed by the Prudent
General Staff, U.S. Army
to head the NBC Staff
James S
Jr
Lay
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director Of Intelligence. Neadquarters,
.........
.
.
,
U.S. Air poser
INTRNDEPARTAENFAL
Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy
COMMiTREE ON INTERNAL SECURrrr
Commission
Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence
Group, Joint Start
Members are desguated by the president sa Chairman of the
Council, based upon the eomicntion of one individual each by:
The Secretary of Seale
The Secretary of Defense
The Director for Mutual Security
The Chairman ' National Security Resources Boned
The Secretary of the Trasury
The Director of Defense MoNaaRan
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
The Director of Central Intelligence
Others at the direction of the Preselect
Tiro staff is headed by the Executive Secretary
and headed by a Coordinator
to waist the Senior NSC
Staff on a full-time basis
Special consultants or spatial mmmrttam are
designated by the Pt etdent or the Council for
special projects or studies.
The Under Secretary of State David E. E. Brace
The Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Footer
The Director of Central IntNtigmre W. B. smith
Representatives of the heads of other departments
and agencies of the Government as may be
determined by the Board, e.g. representative of JCS
Director: Designated by the President to head the
staff of the Hoard
Officials designated by
the respective members
of the Senior NSC Staff
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t
y
na~ca
Ezeeutire Secretary Eaaeuti're?`Secreta~ry
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W..Averell Harriman
Mutual Security
Jack O. Garrie
N.S.R.B.
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A `
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William ~. Foster
G ':
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"~ N
r
"Walter B. Srnitth ~
L ~.,
L
~, S
G` T
~ R
N A
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Heneral ~f the I~,rxny
~xtxar N. Bradley
dGeaxw Hoyt S. Yandenl~erg
~[1t31 William M. Fechtelex
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3. STRUCTURE AND
OPERATING PROCEDURE
TxE organization structure and functions of Mr. Truman's
NSC are shown in Chart 1. The membership consists of
the President, as chairman, the Vice-President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Mutual Se-
curity, the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board, and other secretaries and under secretaries of depart-
ments when appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. It is to be noted that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB)
are two important organizations which are directly suba~rdi-
nate to the National Security Council. The Senior NSC Staff,
headed by the Executive Secretary of the Council, functions
to coordinate the development of an integrated warking
group position on the basis of the views of the various agen-
cies concerned. To the extent that agreements are reached
by the working group, they are normally ratified by the
Council at a regular meeting; otherwise the Council may
attempt to resolve disagreements. Failing in this, the case
goes to the President for decision.
The members of the Senior NSC Staff are themselves the
designated representatives of the several members of the
Council, so that the members of the Senior Staff are the al-
ternates (on the working level) of the legal members of the
Council. Members of the Senior Staff serve NSC as an "addi-
tional duty." They owe their primary loyalty to 'their own
departments or agencies-not to the NSC. The full-time staff
hired by and working for the NSC is relatively -small and
overshadowed by the partisans of the departments. The per-
sonnel resources of the Council are limited, both as to the
number of full-time people available and as to the direct in-
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14 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
terest and authority of the part-time workers to function as
a true National Staff.
The first Executive Secretary of the Council, Mr. Sidney
Souers, felt that he should "never take sides on any policy
issue, since this would jeopardize his role as a neutral co-
ordinator."11 The modus operandi was to "keep the subject
under discussion until the disputes are resolved."12 These
operating methods continued under President Truman with-
out substantial change. This no dobut insures full. considera-
tion of all possible viewpoints, but it also stagnates the de-
cision-making process except where the President personally
steps in. A policy decision taken without adequate discussion
and consideration can hurt grievously; but it is equally
wrong, especially for a nation looked to for world leadership,
to lose situations by default of any policy. The latter has
been more damaging than the former in the peace efforts of
this nation during the past decade.
There is no doubt that the NSG has worked better than
any previous organization established for the same purpose.
It is probably the "mast orderly and effective policy-making
process the country has ever :had."13 Its merit is judged,
not in terms of how well it has integrated politico-military
strategy, but on the fact that it has functioned at all in this
heretofore neglected field. In-any event, the problems facing
America today are more demanding than at any time in
history, and the effectiveness of its organization to win the
peace must be judged in the light of today's situation of
Cold War (with at least one "hot spot") waged by the
U.S.S.R. with a completely integrated ideology bent on world
domination. With this requirement we may turn to an
examination of some of the organizational arrangements of
the NSC and haw these affect its ability to accomplish its all-
important job.
uThe New York Tlmes Magazine, April 24, 1949, p. 61.
~z8ee U.S. News and World Report, April 2, 1948, p. 43.
13JOhn Fischer, Master Plan, U.S.A., New York: Harper, 1951.
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4. A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
xExE is a basic and fundamental problem facing the Na-
tional Security Council. It is, in fact, a collegiate struc-
ture. That is, authority is vested in the group as a whole.
But in actual operation its chairman, the President, has had
so many other demands on his time that the Council has
been without a real full-time boss. Without strong full-time
leadership, each department representative on NSC tends to
hold back problems or issues that he can dispose of unilater-
ally (to his own satisfaction) . Even after "decisions" are
reached by the Council, each agency is largely its own judge
of what is to be done about them. Some of the problems cited
later in this paper will illustrate unilateral action by both
the Departments of State and Defense. The current (1952)
system of follow-up used by the staff of the NSC is limited to
the perfunctory requirement of a status report from the
"action" departments. This has the virtue of making the
several departments conscious of their responsibility for na-
tional unity through NSC. But it does not mean that NSC
has yet been cloaked with real authority.
The typically American tendency a~f high officials to re-
gard their prime responsibility as performance of their own
narrow function-at whatever cost to the over-all objectives
of the nation-has been evident in the NSC. The system of
departmentalism in the United States Government is so em-
bedded that department. heads tend to feel no accountability
for over-all policy on activities affecting other. depart-
ments.14 Such segmentation of interest is frequently in con-
flict with the President's responsibility for the whole public
interest. This conflict is all the more dangerous in the ab-
sence of strong leadership from the President. It is the con-
tention of some writers that the "lack of intellectual leader-
14For excellent discussion of thla point. see: Herman M11es Somers. Presidential
Agency. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 215.
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16 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
ship" by President Truman has left the Council "in desperate
need of compelling, farsighted leadership." ~ s Whether or
not this charge is fully justified it appears to be a fact that
there is a fundamental problem in NSC which is yet to be
resolved. Some method of subordinating selfish department
interests to overriding national interests must be found. This
weakness of the U.S. cabinet system (as contrasted with the
British system) should not be perpetuated in the promising
NSC.
5. THE VOICE OF THE MILITARY IN
NATIONAL STRATEGY
THAT the views of the nation's top military men should
have weight in strategic decisions of the NSC is without
question. The military plans of the JCS must be designed to
execute the military aspects of the over-all strategic policies
and programs fol`mulated by the NSC. Conversely, national
policies and indeed the whale pasture of the nation's foreign
programs must reflect military strength in the appropriate
form.
Just what that military strength is, or what it must be to
offset a prospective enemy's military strength, is a question
which should be answered by our top military chiefs. There
is one viewpoint that their answer should be unanimous. In
opposition is the viewpoint that unanimity here might well
involve compromise so "watered down" that weakness is
bound to result. This opposing viewpoint would call for full
expression of service bias before NSC far its decision as to
which of several alternatives should be implemented.
Meantime, the problem exists, and JCS representation in
NSC is faulty. Neither its representatives on the Senior NSC
Staff nor the Chairman himself (as able individuals as they
may be personally) can speak for and fully commit this
ls,lohn Fischer, op, oil., p. 43.
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VOICE OF THE MILITARY IN NATIONAL STRATEGY 17
collegiate body which more than often actually has na col-
legiate opinion.
Competent Washington observers have characterized the
JCS representative as a "Russian" delegate. He can only say
in effect: "The views expressed here are of interest to the
JCS and I shall report them to that body. When the JCS has
considered the matter I shall make its position available to
you." 1 s The trouble is that the JCS consideration and deci-
sion is taken in the sanctuary of the Pentagon insulated
from nonmilitary persons who "cannot understand fully the
military problems. involved" and is usually a flat position
which none but the entire collegiate body itself can change.
The JCS has no doubt suffered for want of guidance from
the NSC, but the latter has also suffered from a certain
aloofness on the part of the JCS.17 The ritualism of JCS pro-
cedures, the general mysticism that surrounds that body,
and the attitude on the part of some of its staff that only the
JCS can possibly understand "military" problems has not
endeared the "Pentagon's College of Cardinals" to some of
the "civilian" agencies in Washington who are necessarily
concerned with politico-military strategy, planning, -and
operation.
Contrary to our tendency toward separation of au-
thority and responsibility in governmental affairs, it must
now be clear that "under modern conditions military ques-
tions. are so interwoven with economic, political, social, and
technological phenomena that it is doubtful if one can. speak
of a purely military strategy."1 s As Clausewitz pointed out,
a purely military judgment is "unpermissible and even harm-
ful."19 Especially in recent years we have come to realize
that only "over-all guidance can coordinate global warfare
fought as bitterly in the realms of ideas or economics and in
the `underground' as in the ceaseless clash of armed
forces."2
ieThie opinion has been expressed to the writer by sn important Washington official
WhoFhaGseLVasie BiglGovernment NeweYork: oWhitt esey 1949, P.d279.e Senior NSC $ta8.
isEdward M. Earle, Mskere of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1944, p. xi.
zaReinha dt snd Kintn en op.acltwp. 722 t ff. infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 69 .
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6. A SINGLE VOICE OF AUTHORITY
AMERICA'S position of world leadership in an era of cold
war has emphasized the fact that those who must speak
for the nation, whether in uniform or mufti, must speak for
the nation as a whole. Nothing vitiates confidence in our
ability to lead more than uncoordinated statements and
actions which may be contradictory when applied to a sin-
gle country abroad. United States military commanders
overseas cannot avoid political considerations. In some cases
they have become the political spokesman as well as the
military executors of United States foreign policy. This is,
of course, a violation of the theory of civilian control. In the
United States, representatives of the State Department are
often faced with. decisions which should be based upon mili-
tary factors. Such decisions, having been made, in turn af-
fect the military arrangements of our Government and the
resultant dearth of authoritative and integrated long-range
policies and plans does not ease the work of either eur top
military or diplomatic officials.
National, no less than military, unity of command is es-
sential to control the resources of the nation-resources
which are required for hot or cold war. Such authority is
actually vested in the President, either as the military com-
mander in chief or as the political head of the nation. But
there is no single strong staff to assist the President in the
supremely important task of achieving national unity of
command. There is a superabundance of staff .elements in
Washington; but in all that great maze, a strong integrated
national staff is not available to put the final picture toL
gether in such form that the President can act on it with
effective results.
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7. THE OVERSEAS COMMAND PROBLEM
Paiox to the days of large-scale foreign aid, when the only
American troops in foreign countries were part of the at-
tach~ system, the United States ambassador to a foreign
government was clearly the senior representative of the Gov-
ernment, and he alone spoke as the representative of the
President. In recent years, with the appearance of other high
officials to administer economic aid and with military thea-
ter commanders ensconced in the same country or city, ques-
tions arose as to the relative positions and relationships of
the American officials in various foreign countries. In the
same way that we refused to allow political considerations
to interfere with military operations during the war, there
has been a reluctance on the part of economic specialists
to permit political considerations to "violate" the autonomy
of economic operations of the Mutual Security Agency
(MSA) .21
The problem of overseas administration of the Depart-
ments of State and Defense and of the MSA was aired in the
Senate hearings on the Mutual Security Act of 1951. During
these hearings Senator Lodge complained that the NSC
should coordinate the activities of the operating agencies
and fit them into our foreign policies instead of leaving the
job to a separate interdepartmental coordinating group
known as the International Security Affairs Committee
(ISAC). The ISAC had been created by executive order of
the President to coordinate certain overseas operations and
to fit them into foreign policies. The Senate hearings show
that the committee was less than a complete success.a2
As finally enacted, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 placed
2i_Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Lessons of World War II's Mistakes," Commentary,
October, 1952.
22Hearings beYore the Committee on Foreign Relations and Military Services On S-1 ,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.
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20 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
the Director of MSA on the NSG and required the President
"to prescribe procedures to assure coordination .. .under
the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission." This, of
course, did not solve the problem but did recognize it and
directed the President to take the necessary action. But
the problem has not been solved. As late as December 1952,
a Congressional committee noted "the relative poor coordina-
tion, and in some instances, virtually warfare, ...between
the United States policy officials in a country representing
our Mutual Security Agency and the United. States ambassa-
dor."23 The report further stated that foreign Governments
often do not know to whom to turn if they get conflicting
words from two men of equal or relatively equal rank.
8. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL S'T'RATEGY BOARD
xE current [January, 1953-Ed.] national effort vis-a-vis
the Soviets is in two parts: to conduct a cold war, and to
prepare for a general war. Responsible officials, including
President Eise3~hower [just inaugurated.-Ed.], have con-
tended that the Cold War properly conducted is a "chance
to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can
quite literally save the peace."24 It has been contended that
the Cold War, now upon us, holds our fate perhaps even
more than the shooting war everyone dreads.25 But for a
chance of success in the Cold War, our foreign policy must be
adapted to a cold-war strategy that is unified and coherent 2e
In an effort to achieve coordination of the disparate re-
sources of the departments and agencies responsible for va-
rious psychological operations, the Psychological Strategy
Board (PSB) was created by executive directive of 4 April
1951. In simple terms the PSB was to be a sort of general
staff to plan and supervise the conduct of the cold war,
ssThe New York Tlmes, December 7, 1952, p. 81.
s~The New York Tlmea, January 11, 1953, p. 1.
ssHeesler, op. ciL., p. 17.
asThe New York Tlmes, January 11, 1983, p. 1.
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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD 21
leaving to the Pentagon the responsibility for plans and
preparations for a general war. One of the basic reasons for
creating the Board was that no other point in the Govern-
ment could provide the coordination and guidance for the
efforts that had sprung up in several departments of the
Government to imitate the Soviets by use of psychological
and ether forms of unorthodox warfare in support of our
national policies.
The PSB consists of the Undersecretary of State, the Un-
dersecretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA) , and operates under a staff director
who is responsible for the day-by-day work of the Board.
Within the Departments of State and Defense and in the CIA
are staff elements to backstap and support the members of
the PSB when wearing their PSB hats as distinguished from
those related to their normal duties. The concept of the
membership of the Board was that its members would be
men who enjoyed such prestige that the operating agencies
would consider guidance approved by the Board as being
mandatory. This was justified on the basis that the major
psychological operations are conducted by either the De-
partment of State, the Department of Defense, or the CIA,
the undersecretaries of which (or the director in the case of
CIA) , constitute the membership of the Board. But prestige
alone has not been enough. Nobody on the Board is satisfied
that the job is being done as effectively as it might if a full-
time staff were concentrating on it under the direction of
a competent chief with direct access to the Chief Executive.zz
The original concept was that the PSB would start where
the NSC left off, the former promulgating broad national
policies and the latter adopting specific objectives, lines of
action, and programs. To the extent that the NSC has failed
to do its job, the PSB must either substitute its own policies
or stagnate. In practice it is difllcult to distinguish between
the actual functions of the two agencies. This similarity is
supported by the fact that, for the most part, the same offi-
cials of State, Defense, or CIA deal with the psychological-
warfare problems being considered by NSC or the PSB; the
latter is, in effect, another echelon concerned with part of
the over-all problem. And the nature of the primary problem
of the PSB (cold war) is such that specific programs and
$*Ibid., p. 53, eol. 2.
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22 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
lines of action can only be adopted within the framework
of definite national objectives and policies which are the re-
sponsibility of the NSC.
The directive creating the PSB limited it to planning, co-
ordinating, and promulgating national guidance for psycho-
logical operations (which were to be conducted by other
operating agencies) and to evaluating .the national psycho-
logical warfare effort. Under its first director, Gordon Gray,
the former Secretary of the Army, the Board got off to a good
start and initially confined itself to its. primary tasks. As
the staff grew, and especially after Gray resigned to resume
the presidency of the University of North Carolina, the temp-
tation to get closer to "operations" at the expense of the
more difficult mundane job of digging out, weighing, and
formulating basic psychological programs, seemed to get
the best of the staff. It is much more interesting to "run
operations" in the psychological-warfare field than it is to do
the mean, tough job of forging out realistic doctrine, con-
cepts, and plans in consonance with the foreign policies and
the military posture of the nation. The current director of
the PSB has a real job to force his staff to develop and allo-
cate the guns and "ammo" of -the cold war and to let others
"pull the triggers."
The Board soon experienced some of the same difficulties
as the NSC in getting its "decisionns" executed. Although the
Undersecretary of Defense is a member o~f the PSB, the JCS
does not feel bound to accept decisions of the Board that are
"military in nature." The JCS has been jealous in guarding
its exclusive channel of command to the overseas theater
commanders, so that decisions of the Board that may require
the attention or action of theater commanders must be re-
considered de novo by the JCS. Small wonder that Washing-
ton is full of overworked staff oflicers busily preparing the
"position" of their agency on matters that have been "de-
cided" weeks before.
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9. SOME DEFECTS OF THE NSC
xE essential fact is that the NSC, which is the key agency
Tin the entire security structure for the United States, has
not fully accomplished its purpose. It has undoubtedly been
of value in achieving politico-military integration in con-
trast to the dearth of integration prior to 1947. But its ac-
complishments are largely limited to dealing with matters
of immediate urgency, and it has not provided the operating
departments with comprehensive guidance in the form of
clear statements. of current or long-range policies.2 a As a
result, the President is seriously handicapped in carrying out
his responsibilities to recommend a balanced and comprehen-
sive security program to Congress and the people.ss
An example of failure to attain a single strategic position
for the nation concerns our relations with Formosa. In 1948,
as a result of events on the mainland of China, the JCS
decided that Formosa was of strategic importance to the
United States.30 But there were no available troops to defend
the island, so the JCS told the State Department that
Formosa must be held by diplomatic means until troops
could be made available. The State Department was unwill-
ing to commit United States prestige to the defense of For-
mosa because it was too obvious that any strong diplomatic
language designed to keep the Chinese Communists out of
Formosa was to bluff.31 So the world's most modern nation
floundered along for months without any machinery to re-
solve its policies and strategies on what, in terms of world
affairs, should not have been among its more difficult
problems.
The NSC has given attention to the need for increasing
2sGervasi, op. cit., p. 276.
zeU.B. Newa and World Report, December 23, 1949, p. 36.
a~Honorable Dean Rusk, lecture delivered to the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama, October 13, 1962.
a1Loc. cit.
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24 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
the priority of America's effort in the cold war. But it has
not provided the guidance or impetus required to launch
this effort on a scale comparable to that of the enemy, much
less of proportions sufficient to win. The American concept
of "open covenants openly arrived at" has made us slow to
adopt some of the covert methods which are the basic tactics
of the enemy. Our concepts of a free press have made us
slow to realize that the subversion of influential foreign
newspapers, in order to influence policy, has become almost
standard procedure in modern diplomacy.32 But despite
these- difficulties there must be more positive and less ab-
stract guidance from our top strategic planners. It is not
enough to say "roll back the iron curtain;" those-who must
plan and direct the complicated and interrelated cold war
operations must have more of the "What," the "Where," the
"When," and the "Haw" in the same manner as these
guidances are characteristic of military plans for general
war. Such guidance must come from the NSC since these
operations require synchronized support and action by sev-
eral departments of the Government.
There is great danger in the failure to equip the president
with the assistance he needs to act responsibly and effec-
tively. We cannot afford to rely on "Great Men" who can
meet their responsibilities without adequate assistance and
organizational equipment. The stakes are too high. We must
provide the tools and machinery to minimize the possibility
of paralysis at the center of the Government.33 The need to
improve existing machinery is recognized by such states-
men as Bernard Baruch who, in a lecture at the Air War
College in March 1950, emphasized the need for a general
staff for the President to "develop a global strategy for
peace-making." Mr. Baruch declared that our greatest single
need was fora "GHQ for the whole of the Cold War." He felt
that the NSC members were already overworked and could
not meet this need. In the lead editorial on 28 November 1952,
The Washington Post commented that "the overhauling of
the National Security Council is one of the most pressing ad-
ministrative problems awaiting General Eisenhower in
January."
aaRobert $trauaz-HUpi:,. and Stefan T. Possc~ny, International 8elationa. New YorlC:
Mcoraw Hill. 1960, pp. 363 ff.
aaCf. Somers, op. oit., p. 233.
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10. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF THE NSC
('~aGaxiznTioxaL structure alone will never insure effective
v results. On the other hand, aclear-cut plan of organi-
zation can make a hard job easier and, more to the point
here, a seemingly hopeless job capable of a degree of direc-
tion and control otherwise impossible. On the question of
the relative importance of good organization or good people,
former Secretary of the Interior Ickes is credited with. the
best quote : "having both you can't miss - - -; with only ane
you are seriously handicapped - - -; without either - - -God
help you."34 The caliber of personnel of an organization and
a large measure of the organization's effectiveness must re-
flect leadership. This is especially true of the NSC. From
the White House must come the spark of interest, intellectual
leadership, and drive that will create an atmosphere of ac-
tion in which vital decisions can be made and executed.
Apart from intellectual leadership there is a real require-
ment for the clarification of the purpose, functions, and the
internal structure and operating procedures of-the NSC. It is
almost universally recognized that James S. Lay, Jr., the
present Executive Secretary of the NSC, has- done a fine
job within the framework of his currently prescribed duties.
Keeping the interested parties informed of the workings of
the Council and coordinating the papers that flow in and
out of the Senior Stafl are extremely important. But the
machinery should be strengthened so that the best possible
brains are put on the most vital issues-sa that decisions are
made after fullest consideration of all factors. Equally
important, once decisions are made, there should be adequate
follow-up and enforcement to ensure that every segment of
=or4Wa~o1Wsahjngtari I(#o ernmrent Printing Offices1943. Manaal, Petroleum Administrator
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26 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAIfING MACHINERY
the Government supports national doctrine and policies.
On organizational concepts the NSC could well take a page
from the JCS and the PSB by enlarging the responsibilities
and changing the title of its executive Secretary. Because of
the wide range of functions of the NSC, no single department
or man, other than the President himself, should be in com-
plete control. But an arrangement more effective than the
existing system is required to pull together and integrate
conflicting interests, to follow up deci~ion.s and required ac-
tions in the name of the President, and continually to assess
and evaluate on the broadest possible level the over-all.
foreign and military policies of the Government.
11. THE NSC STAFF DIRECTOR
ITHIN the- framework of policy approved by the NSC,
its Staff Director (a title suggested as more appropriate
than Executive Secretary) should be allowed a high degree
of initiative to act promptly and flexibly in execution of the
Council's decisions. He should, for such purposes, report
directly to the President and have the prestige that comes
from working out of the President's office. The Director
should be capable of action and decision within his authority,
but he must also be methodical in the direction of long-
range planning by his staff. He should be subordinate to the
members of the NSC in their policy-making role, but he
should have the full authority of the President to follow
up and enforce decisions of the Council and to evaluate re-
sults achieved by all departments of the Government includ-
ing those headed by Council members.
The position of Staff Director of the NSC requires infinite
tact and resourcefulness. He must be effective without being
autocratic; he must recognize that conflicts of ideas are
healthy and may be the sources of new approaches to diffi-
cult problems; yet he must do all possible to force timely
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decisions. He must avoid the two-edged sword of allowing
the departments to feel that he has usurped some of their
normal responsibilities, or of allowing himself to be sub-
merged in the details of solving problems brought to him for
solution.35 The position of the NSC Staff Director must be
more responsible and, therefore, more authoritative than that
of an ordinary secretary of a general staff. He would be
the executive head of the nation's most important general
staff. This staff would not absa~rb any of the prerogatives of
the President as Commander-in-Chief. It owes its existence
to the fact that size and complexity of organization and the
substantive problems involved make it impossible for one
person or collegiate group of persons to do all the planning,
coordinating, and supervising required to get proper results.
As a general rule the- NSC Staff should confine itself to
policy formulation and the development of over-all national
strategy. It should not be drawn into activities which can
properly be accomplished by the operating departments and
agencies, but it must provide authoritative guidance on a
medium and, if possible, a low level of abstraction. The Staff
should have the following functions which cannot be dele-
gated to operating agencies
a. The formulation of national objectives and national,
foreign, and military policies.
b. The development and promulgation of coordinated
world-wide and regional strategy and programs designed to
achieve the national objectives. (Of course, the resources of
all departments should be utilized and not duplicated by the
NSC Staff, but there should be no questions as to the au-
thority and responsibility of the NSC Staff to produce this
requirement.)
c. Research and analysis as required. This includes specific
items as directed by the Council as well as other items as
determined by the NSC Staff Director to be appropriate for
consideration by the Council. Research facilities of every
department of the Government must be open and available
for this purpose.
d. The NSC Staff Director should function as the Executive
Secretary of the Council only while it is in session. He should
assist the chairman in conducting the meetings by coordi-
nating and. preparing the agenda and by recommending
acct. ~omere, op. cit., p. 227.
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28 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-1VIAKING MACHINERY
solutions and decisions for consideration by the Council.
e. General guidance and direction to the detailed planning
and programming of the departments and agencies.
f. Promulgation of decisions of the Council and follow up
with the "action" departments to insure prompt and effec-
tive action. This follow-up is in the name of the President
in his capacity as the chairman of the Council and should
insure that the departments are responsive to discipline
from the White House.
g. Continual evaluatia~n and appraisal from an over-all
point of view of "objectives, commitments, and risks of the
United States in relation to our actual and potential power
for the purpose of making recommendations to the Presi-
dent"-(as required by the Act creating the NSC).
h. Other duties related to the functions of the Council as
directed by the President.
The major job of the NSC Staff is planning on the na-
tional level, that is, the formulation of national objectives,
strategies, policies, and programs as guidance to the
operating agencies. The planning function might be accom-
plished by organizing the NSC Staff into two major groups.
The two major groups may be .called the Objectives or
Strategy Group and the Plans and Programs Group. The
Strategy Group should sit at the call of the Director and be.
chaired by him. Its permanent membership should consist
of the best planning brains of the Government and a small
group of professionally-skilled full-time consultants drawn
from private life. In addition, regional and functional spe-
cialists may sit with the Group as required by the subject
of discussion. From the Strategy Group the most imagi-
native and constructive thinking should emerge. It is here.
that the national objectives and strategies are considered
as a whole, and the framework is produced upon which
further building can be designed without destruction of the
building's foundation.
Once long-range national objectives and strategies are
formulated and approved by the Council, intermediate ob~
jectives are adopted; and strategic moves to attain them
are set in motion and continuously followed. At this point
the Plans and Programs Group should take the initiative.
The bulk of the PSB staff, supplemented by strength on the
military side, might well flt into this group whose main job
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THE NSC STAFF DIRECTOR 29
it would be to transpose the broad language of national ob-
jectives and strategy into realistic guidance, devoid of ab-
stractions and generalities, which will control the operating
departments and agencies. Closely related to, if not a part
of this Group, should be the follow-up function-a sine qua
non to effective performance.
Additional details as to the composition, size, and
operating methods of the NSC Staff are beyond the scope of
this paper. It is clear that full-time effort should replace
some of the part-time arrangements now in effect. Strong
direction and follow-up, within approved policies, rather
than coordination among the departments, should set the
tone of the Staff Director and his staff. To accomplish these
duties the strength of the NSC Staff must be increased both
in quality and quantity. But the strengthening of the NSC
Staff should not result in another echelon between the
President and the actual points of operation. Rather, there
should be less layering and certainly no increase in total
personnel concerned with these matters.
The NSC Staff should consolidate under a manageable
arrangement the many and diverse staff elements~ome of
which are now deep in the bowels of State, Defense, and
other departments-that under present conditions are work-
ing hard on the functions that can more effectively be
handled at the NSC level. The difference will be that instead
of writing great volumes of staff papers on the "position"
of their ofllce vis-a-vis a particular problem, they may now
turn attention to the position of the United States Govern-
ment as a whole on the same matters. Washington has seen
too many staff papers representing the position of a particu-
lar agency or office on a particular problem and too few staff
papers outlining the over-all posture of the United States
Government. Of course, the latter are infinitely more diffi-
cult to produce, but this difficulty is rarely lessened by in-
creasing the volume of papers of the former type.
The proposal to create the position of Staff Director of the
NSC and to give him the means and authority to make the
Council a more useful tool of the President is no doubt sub-
ject to the familiar objection that too much authority is
given to one man. The same arguments raised against the
creation of the General Staff of the Army in 1903 will no
doubt be raised against this proposal. In fact the arguments
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30 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
against the General Staff some fifty years ago ring familiar
with today's arguments against any greater degree of unifi-
cation of the armed services a~r a proposal to put strength
and teeth in the NSC. a ~ There is nothing so dear to vested
interests as weakness and indecision on the part of anyone
with higher authority. The hearings on the National Security
Act of 1947 gave ample evidence of a fear of the concentra-
tion of great power in one individual. Congress seemed to
feel that no one individual is as well-qualified as a group to
make decisions. Each member of that group would, of course,
be trained in one of the different types of problems in-
volved.~7 Unfortunately, our problems are not divisible into
neat separate components corresponding to the extent of
authority we are willing to entrust to one man, and deci-
sions rather than extended considerations are required for
existence of the nation in the second half of the twentieth
century. Furthermore such objections ignore the constitu-
tional authority of the President. The Chief Executive may
never divest himself of ultimate responsibility, but he may
certainly delegate authority.. Efficiency requires that he do
so. The President is also duty-bound either to reassign or re-
assume that delegated authority should it be disabused.
12. TRANSFER OF THE PSB STAFF
TO THE NSC
i'rx the strengthening of the staff of the NSC in the
manner indicated, its functions will overlap many of
the present functions of the PSB which was created in part
because the NSC did not meet the requirements for national
guidance in the increasingly important field of psychological
warfare. In order for the PSB to function it has. been neces-
zflNelsan, op. cit., p. 569 ff. For excellent discussion of related subJect. see Col Richard
P. Klocko, An Air Force Concept of Soint Command, which Ss Air War College Studies
No. 1 (Confldentiall, Maxwell Air Force Ease, Alabama: Air University Press, 1954.-Ed.
s~Lt. Colonel Roy C. Heflebower, "UnlRCation and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Thesis,
Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1949.
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TRANSFER OF THE PSB STAFF TO THE NSC 31
sary for its staff to duplicate and in some cases substitute
its efforts for the vacuum left by lack of action or decision
by the NSC. This was necessary in order for the PSB staff
to form a basis for further development of policies and pro-
grams in the psychological-warfare field. Thus, the actual
work of the two agencies is at least partially merged in
practice, although the organizational chart (Chart 1)
clearly shows the PSB as separate from the NSC.
Especially during a period of conventional military build-
up, cold-war operations are the primary methods of attaining
the nation's objectives and should be directed from the
highest levels. of the Governme~t.38 While a national mili-
tary staff may be justifiably separate from the over-all na-
tional star, the same is not true as to a separate staff for
cold-war efforts. It follows that the PSB might well be abol-
ished and its functions assumed by the NSC. Adjustments
as to the assignment and use of the present staff persa~nnel
of the PSB can be made on the basis of detailed studies of
the requirements for the revitalized NSC Staff. Obviously, to
the extent that administrative and housekeeping functions
of the PSB (such as space, personnel, external relationships,
etc., which seem to require such a high proportion of the
time of Washington executives) are duplicated in the NSC,
merger should result in an increase in efficiency with less
personnel.
The total job of formulating national objectives, strategies,
and policies can be done better and cheaper by locating it at
the level of decision, and by merging all staff elements of
the entire Government concerned with such matters with
the clear mandate that once decisions are made the ap-
proved programs will be executed without the mass of
"position papers" for each affected agency with which Wash-
ington is now afflicted. The statutory position of the NSC
puts it in a better pa~sition to get its decisions accepted by
the military than did the Executive Order status of the PSB
.which, as we have seen, tends to be ignored by the JCS in
cases. of disagreement.
The history of the creation of the PSB is a good illustra-
tion of why so many boards, commissions, ad hoc commit-
tees, etc., exist in Washington. The basic defect was the lack
asFor an interesting discussion of this point, see James T3urnham, The Coming De-
feat o[ Communism. New York: John Day, 1950, p. 243, ff.
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32 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-bfAKING MACHINERY
of performance on the part of the NSC. There was a felt
need for guidance and evaluatioli of the national cold-war
effort. Being unable to get action at the NSC level, the agen-
cies most concerned with the problem proposed and secured
approval far creation of an additional agency to do that
part of the job in which they were most interested. But the
substitution of the Under Secretaries of State and Defense for
the secretaries of those departments, and the addition of
the Director of-the CIA as a member carry no magic. Indeed,
they comprised one step further removed from the decision-
making level, and their time is almost as fully occupied with
normal duties of the departments as are their chiefs. The
Director of CIA is, of course, in a position to act for and
commit his agency but properly he has been hesitant to fill
in blank policies which are the responsibility of his supe-
rior-the NSC. In any event the nature of the decisions that
must be taken by the Nation's cold-war general staff are
such that direct access to the President is required. This was
recognized. in General Eisenhower's San Francisco speech of
8 October 1952.3 a
13. THE COMMAND POST AND THE
PRESIDENT'S CHAIN OF COMMAND
s is pointed out above, the problem of overseas organi-
zation of the United States Government has been recog-
nized, and the President has been required by the Military
Security Act of 1951 to "prescribe procedure to assure coor-
dination" of foreign, military, economic, and diplomatic
activities. It is too much to expect that complete harmony
will exist between military theater commanders and State
Department diplomats overseas who receive their guidance
through different channels and sources which are not
properly integrated at home. An American theater com-
saTLe New York Tlmes, January 11, 19b3, p. 1.
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rs
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of I?efense
The Director of Mutuat Security
The Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Others at the direction of the Presdent.
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
JCS
~1'l3ER
DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENQFS
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34 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
mander has greater latitude than has the theater com-
mander of any other nation. TI-~e closest historical approxi-
mation to him is the Roman proconsul." The theater
commander's role in time of wa:r far exceeds his obligations
to the JCS for military operations. He is, in fact, the repre-
sentative of the President of the United States, and overseas
he carries a full projection of the executive function of the
United States Government. ~ ~ While the maj or function of the
theater commander may be military, this official should not
be regarded as under the exclusive command of the military
fountainhead which is the JCS.
Should the NSC Staff be changed into a true national
staff, the President would be immeasurably assisted in
carrying out his dual role as the nation's military com-
mander in chief and its political head. By designating the
NSC as his national command post the President could use
the NSC Stafl as a vital taol in achieving national unity of
command, including military, economic, and political forces.
Under such a national command structure-see Chart 2-
the State and Defense Departments would continue to super-
vise and guide the activities of both our foreign diplomatic
missions and our theater comrrianciers within the policies
established by the NSC. In fact only minor procedural
changes are required, but it is important for all to under-
stand that the responsibilities of thc~ departments are those
of functional staffs or executive agents of the President and
not as commanders o~f any overseas element. Orders to over-
seas elements initiated by any agency of the Government
should pass through the State or Defense departmental
machinery, depending upon which department has execu-
tive-action responsibility for the activity abroad. But such
orders are those of the President, even though issued by one
or more of his stail elements (departments) . For example,
guidance to theater commanders on political matters are
not only the right, but the urgent duty of the State Depart-
ment, and the same applies to other Washington agencies
which have primary responsibility for a segment of the
nation's policies and activities.
The ultimate responsibility for coordination of guidance
and direction to the overseas elements belongs to the Presi-
*"Rienhardt and Kintner, op. cit., p. 727.
+~LOC. cit.
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COMMAND POST-PRESIDENT'S COMMAND CHAIN 35
dent. To assist him in this responsibility he should use the
NSC Staff which services his National Command Post. The
Staff should monitor the more important directives issued
by the departments and work out appropriate adjustments
to insure consonance. Departments should coordinate among
themselves as much as possible, but in case of differences
that cannot be resolved between the parties in the national
interest, the case should go to the NSC Staff for decision. In
this manner the alternatives of no decision or watered-down
compromises can be avoided.
American ambassadors to foreign countries are appointed
by and represent the person of the President of the United
States. The State Department has properly assumed the re-
sponsibility for guiding and directing the foreign missions,
and orders from the Secretary of State are accepted abroad
as orders from the President. With the indistinction be-
tween peace and war and between political and military
policies and decisions, it is important to insure ca~mplete
integration of the President's conduct of foreign affairs and
his responsibilities as military commander in chief.
Orders to overseas stations, especially in the cold war,
usually involve related and mutually supporting actions by
both State and Defense. These departments have control of
the overseas logistical support bases required for an activity
on a major scale. Hence it is vitally important that coor-
dinated instructions go out to theater commanders and
military missions through the JCS, and to diplomatic mis-
sions through the State Department. Timely coordinated
instructions which are not watered-down compromises can
rarely be produced by two coequal departments, each re-
sponsible for different national objectives. But an efficient
NSC Staff can assure such production.
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14. A NEW NATIONAL STAFF VS.
IMPROVING THE EXISTING NSC STAFF
ANUMBER of students of the problem have advocated a
new national staff or program coordinator to serve the
President exclusively.4 z These proposals seem to follow the
Franklin D. Roosevelt theory of adding another organiza-
tional element above the ailing agency without considering
the alternative of carving out the deadwood and bolstering
up an otherwise sound structure.
In opposition to this proposal it may be stated that we
need the best-possible men to head the Departments of State
and Defense-not second-best men. Top-flight men would
tolerate only a limited amount of control and direction on
subjects which are largely their own responsibility. They
would take orders from the President, but they would not
want to be subordinated to some "deputy president."
But no department head may properly object to thorough
consideration of recommendations made by a body such as
the NSC Staff, especially when he knows that he will have a
chance to speak his piece before a decision is made. Neither
can there be valid objections to the establishment of any
machinery the President may desire when that machinery is
designed to force decisions instead of consideration on mat-
ters where inaction may be worse than the wrong action.
Also, follow-up by the NSC Director and his staff, on behalf
of the President, to enforce the Council's decisions and to
evaluate the results thereof cannot be subject to rational
objection by any cabinet officer.
It does not seem necessary, then, to create a separate
national staff reporting directly and solely to the President.
However, if experience should demonstrate that subordi-
`aAere aee Somers, op. cit., p. 237, ff.
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A NEW NATIONAL STAFF? 37
nation of the NSC Staff Director to the policy control of the
NSC members tends to perpetuate consideration and pr~e-
v.ent decisions on a timely basis, then the NSC Staff Director
should be made responsible solely to the President. If cabinet
members cannot place the over-all interest of the nation
above the interest of their own departments, their own con-
trol over national policies and strategy will then have to be
weakened.
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15. SUMMARY
xE most serious defect of our traditional conduct o~f for-
eign policy has been the lack of coordination of political,
economic, psychological, and military policies. We fought
two world wars without giving much thought to the relation
between the kind of military victory we were planning to win
and the political settlement that would follow. In the latest
one, which was a war of movement, our concentration on
purely military objectives did help to win the wars quickly,
cheaply, and thoroughly. But this military efficiency was
achieved at the expense of larger postwar considerations.
Under modern conditions military questions are so inter-
woven with economic, political, and social phenomena that
it is doubtful that a purely military strategy exists. In re-
cent years we have come to realize that only over-all guid-
ance can coordinate global war. For such war is fought as
bitterly in the realm. of ideas, and in the field of economics,
and in underground activity, as it is in the actual clash of
military forces. Yet, despite the larger number of staff ele-
ments in Washington, there is no adequate national staff
to integrate all national policies into a single grand strategy
for the nation.
The NSC, created in 1947 in recognition of the need for
integration of political and military policies of the nation,
has functioned better than any previous organization de-
signed for this purpose. That it has functioned at all sets it
apart from earlier efforts. Its accomplishments are largely
in dealing with matters of immediate urgency rather than
in the provision of comprehensive and definite guidance.
This is largely due to three factors: 1) the collegiate struc-
ture of the Council; 2) the absence of full-time aggressive
leadership; and 3) the lack of adequate follow-up procedure.
The procedures followed by the Executive Secretary of the
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SUMMARY
Council are designed to insure-full consideration of all pos-
sible viewpoints. But at this writing it is to be observed that
consideration does not mean decision. At the NSC level,
decisions are normally taken only by unanimo~t~s agreement
of the council members or they are not taken at all. Policy
decisions taken without adequate consideration may hurt
grievously, but it is equally wrong, especially for a nation
looked to for world leadership, to lose ground by default.
There is no excuse for pure negligence-for failing to pro-
duce an adequate national policy or program to meet inter-
national issues.
The Psychological Strategy Board was established as a
general staff for direction of the cold war. In its present
form the PSB is one step further removed from the President
than is the NSC. The decisions made by the nation's cold-war
general staff -must be taken at the highest level of the Gov-
ernment. It is the conviction of this observer that the PSB
should be abolished and its functions transferred to a revita-
lized and reinforced NSC.
The effectiveness of the NSC can be improved by
strengthening and increasing the authority of the NSC
Staff. It must be able to achieve decisions on a timely basis
that are not so watered down by compromise as to be worth-
less as guidance to the operating departments and agencies.
The NSC Staff Director should function as a direct assistant
to the President. Within the framework of approved policies,
he should monitor the President's chains of command to the
overseas stations (military and diplomatic) to insure con-
sonance between the political posture of the nation and its
military capabilities. He should actively follow up on the
"action" departments, to insure that policies and programs
are being executed, and to evaluate the results achieved
against national objectives.
As this paper is completed (mid-January 1953) there is no
doubt that the nation's newly elected leader is thoroughly
aware of the nature of the conflict in which we are engaged
in the second half of the twentieth century. There is an indi-
cation that he realizes the necessity for decisive coordinated
action on the part of the United States. General Eisen-
hower's San Francisco speech of 8 October 1952 called for a
revitalized National Security Council to develop a unified
and coherent cold-war strategy. The able Robert Cutler, who
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40 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
assisted in writing the San Francisco speech (against a
background of frustrating experiences as the Deputy Di-
rector of the PSB Staff), has been announced as one of the
White House administrative .assistants in the new adminis-
tration. Out of General Eisenhower's own experience at top-
level command should spring a new expression of appreci-
ation for the necessity-for timely decisions and guidance to
the operating agencies, as the new administration, civilian
and military, moves toward the making of grand strategy.
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Addendum,
1954
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ADDENDUM
-rxE basic paper above was undertaken in the fall of 1952
1 and completed in the early weeks of 1953. It pointed up
the need for integration of our politico-military policies; it
described the operating methods and procedures of the NSC
and related agencies under President Truman; and it made
certain recommendations or suggestions for improvement.
This addendum, written in January 1954, draws some com-
parisons between the recommendations made in the basic
paper and developments made during the year which fol-
lowed. The weaknesses of the NSC were becoming quite
widely recognized at the time the basic paper was written.
Doubtless, some corrective action would have been taken
irrespective of the results of the national elections of No-
vember 1952.* Now, a year later, it is gratifying to note con-
siderable improvement in that process of our Government
which produces national security policies; but it must be
noted also that the NSC machinery for implementing those
national security policies is yet to be perfected.
The major recommendations in the basic paper were:
a. To revitalize the NSC; to strengthen the NSC Staff and
create the position of NSC Staff Director with direct s,:,~?~ss
to the President and with responsibility and authority to
make the Council a more useful tool of the President.
b. To strengthen the decision-making process of the NSC-
the Strategy Group of the NSC Staff.
c. To strengthen the implementation and follow-up proce-
dures of NSC and to transfer the Phychological Strategy
Board to the NSC Staff as paxt of its Plans and Program
Group.
d. To clarify the chain of command from the President to
our foreign, diplomatic, and military posts.
The progress made during the first year of the Eisenhower
administration toward satisfying the needs pointed up in
these recommendations is discussed seriatim below.
able toea memberoofe the White House aecretarlat 1n (early Februarye1953&$ Ed.j a avail-
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1. REVITALIZATION OF THE NSC
xE attention and interest given to the machinery for the
development of national security policies has been one of
the significant features of President Eisenhower's first year
in office. Not only have the procedures of the National
Security Council been revamped, but the active interest and
participation of the President as chairman of the NSC
meetings and his reliance on this body as one of his primary
tools has set the tone for interest and participation by the
heads of the member departments and agencies. The Vice-
President is assuming a significant role in the work of the
Council. There is a current standing rule that all members
and each advisor to the NSC will attend the weekly meetings
in person. Presidential clearance is required for any
substitution.
In addition to the statutory members, i.e. the President,
the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense; plus
the Director of Foreign Operations Administration (who
supersedes the old Director of Mutual Security) , and the Di-
rector of Defense Mobilization (who supersedes the old Chair-
man of the National Security Resources Board) , one im-
portant-very important-voice has been added to NSC
deliberations. tt is that of the Secretary of the Treasury who
has been added as a "permanent-request" member of the
council.
The President's cabinet, already somewhat shorn of its
responsibilities in foreign affairs, surrendered nearly all rem-
nants in this area to the seven-man NSC.
In this shift in responsibility there have been made some
significant changes in the organizational structure of the
White House strategy-making machinery. These are discussed
below.
Immediately it must be noted, as it was in the basic paper,
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REVITALIZATION OF THE NSC 45
that organizational structure is one thing; the personalities
of those who fill "T/O slots" is another. It is not the purpose
of this paper to attempt to characterize the individuals in-
volved, but some mention of personality traits is inescapable.
The dominating contagion of the Eisenhower personality
has supplied a type of leadership to the Council that had
been missing before. The President's knowledge of how to
create and use a staff has been a major factor in the revitali-
zation of the National Security Council. The firm but pleasr
ant Eisenhower, who welded the diverse national and service
interests at SHAPE into a functioning unit, has met a similar
challenge in the NSC. How well he is succeeding in this task
will have an important bearing a~n the future, not only of
this nation, but of western civilization itself.
The problem of diverse interests of the member depart-
ments of the NSC has not, and perhaps never can be com-
pletely resolved, but it is being subordinated to wider con-
'siderations. This is due in part to the President's leadership,
but also to the ground rules which the NSC obviously has
adopted for the guidance of its own members. Under these
rules merpbers of the Council are advisors to the President
in their own personal right rather than as representatives of
their respective departments or agencies. These members are
enjoined to seek statesmanlike solutions rather than com-
promises of departmental positions. The Council obviously
has likewise imposed or urged the same ground rules upon its
subordinate or advisory agencies such as the Planning Board
of NSC, the new Operations Coordinating Board, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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 Ad Hoc Committees
and Consultants
Special Committees:
Atomic Energ}?, etc.
Advisory Committees~-
Intelligence,
Internal Security, etc.
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The ?resident Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Vice President Richard M. Nixon
The Secretary of Stale Sohn F. Dulles
The Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson
The Director of
Foreign Operations Administratior, Harold E. Stasser;
(supersedes Director of Mutual Security)
The Director of
Office of Defense Mobiliration .Arthur 9. Flemming
(supersedes Chairman of NSRB)
also:
Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey
The Office of the Executive Secretary (Nominated by members of the Council
(Old NSC Senior Staff) and appointed by the President)
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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
THF; OPERATIONS
COORDINATING
BOARD
U.S. INFORMATION
AGENCY
 A~~~~ved Fc~r Rele~e Qt~'~~9 ;CIA E~P'~=t~~~''~t~~~~~~~~
~pgei~~ ~#~~~t~~ e:
+~ t~,~ ~l'~~~~'~~at ~~
l~~~?~~xa1 ?~~~~
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t;harle$ E. Wilson
Defense
Arthur S. Flemming
onn~
Harald E. Stassen
ion.
George M. Humphrey
Treasury
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Executive Secretary Deputy
Executive Secretary
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J
O
AdTn. APtnAT W. tGA(l2?I'Q
Gen. Matthew 18. R,iagway
~~~+ Dunes--- - ~-- ~-- -~ - ---Lt: _Gen_ Ch~arl~s P ~Ca~e~t ,
 Approved: For.Release 2001/0$/29 : ClA-RDP78-04718A001800100A02-1
~arod ~. Lassen
~~~` ~~~
Y7..~~4~kso~ Elmer ~. ,'~t~at?
Trea~ittian~~~~3tibpre+entatlYG ~"~s~uu~~ve ~f&ae~
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 Approved Far Release:2Q01t08/29 :CIA-RDP78-047'1$AU?1811?`1?Ot?i12,~` ?'
NSC PLAI~TN'ING ` $(~AR,U
Robert Cutler R,~bert R. S6wii
Fir~nk C. l~Tash
llefet-~e
Elbert P. Tuttle
~ra~,s.~r~+:,
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NSC PLANNING IIUARD
Robert W. Porter
iF'areign Operations Administration
~llilliam- Y. Elliott
Office of Defense Mobilisation
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2. STRENGTHENING OF THE NSC STAFF
cGrrxFicaxT steps were taken in 1953 toward the creation of
S a true National Staff as a part of the NSC organization.
The recommended position of NSC Staff Director has in ef-
fect been created. Specifically the title given to this director
is Special Assistant to the President for National. Security
Affairs. This, in fact, denotes a position of even higher pres-
tige and strength than that proposed in the basic paper.
Again, it is worth noting not only the position but the per-
sonality of the incumbent. The President appointed to this
key job Robert Cutler, a Boston lawyer-banker. This able
man, who had risen to the rank of Brigadier Gexieral during
wartime service, is a charming, vigorous bachelor who de-
votes full time to his job. As a key member of the White
House official family, he has constant direct access to the
President, and apparently enjoys the latter's complete
confidence.
The Special Assistant to the President for National Se-
curity Affairs is the NSC's executive officer. He is also Chair-
man of the highly important Planning Board which replaced
the old Senior NSC Staff. He personally briefs the
President. With the Tatter's approval he fixes the agenda of
the Council meetings. He does not preside at any Council
meeting, but he sits at the apex of the machinery of the
Council, just beneath the Council itself. There he is in a
position to influence strongly both the policy-making process
(as Chairman of the Planning Board) and the progress of
implementation of policies (by receiving the reports of the
Operations Coordinating Board) . In addition he supervises
(but is not a member of) the permanent staff of the NSC
under the Executive Secretary.
James S. Lay, Jr., who served as Executive Secretary of the
NSC under President Truman, has been continued with the
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54 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
same title under the new administration. Mr. Lay and his
small staff, the Office of the Executive Secretary, have be-
come the permanent secretariat of the Council. They, unlike
the members of the Planning Board, are civil service em-
ployees and are unaffected by change in administration. The
duties of this secretariat are just what the term implies: it
assists the NSC to do its work by assuming responsibility for
office facilities, internal budgets and personnel matters. It
does not try to make policies; it is an important part of
the machinery used by the Planning Board and the Council
in policy formulation. The important job of processing the
papers (agenda, records of action, status. reports, etc.) which
are the life-blood of the work of the NSC falls squarely upon
the Executive Secretary to the Council. He is the official
channel of communications for the NSC.
The Planning Board and The Office of the Executive Secre-
tary are the principal elements of the Council's internal or-
ganization. (See Chart No. 3.) In addition to certain advisory
committees, the machinery of the Council includes
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military ad-
visors.
b. The Central Intelligence Agency as the intelligence ad-
visor.
c. The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) which re-
ports to the Council on the "integrated implementation of
national security policies."
d. The U.S. Information Agency which reports to the NSC
(or in accordance with the President's specific directives) .
As regards the recommendations in the basic paper for or-
ganization of the NSC Staff into two main elements, it is
clear that the functions of the Planning Board follow closely
those suggested for the Strategy Group. There is no clear
counterpart to the recommended Plans and Program Group,
although the functions of the OCB are developing along
similar lines. This development is discussed below under the
heading, "Implementation of National Security Policies."
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3. THE PLANNING BOARD IN
THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING
HE creation of the Planning Board has been a major
step in strengthening the decision-making process of the
NSC. The duties of the Planning Board include the advance
spadework for the development of appropriate NSC policies
in draft form for consideration by the Council. As in the
Council itself, the problem of diverse interest of the member
departments is under reasonable control in the Board. The
members of the Board are nominated by the heads of the
member departments or agencies of the NSC, but the ap-
pointment to the Board is made by the President. This tends
to direct the primary loyalties, not to the separate depart-
ments, but to the over-all national interest in the form of
the NSC. Members of the Planning Board-are usually on the
Assistant Secretary level of authority.
The work of the Planning Board is the principal duty of
its members. No other duty may interfere. Nevertheless, one
of the obvious ground rules for the nomination and appoint-
ment of a Planning Board member is that he shall have the
personal confidence of the head of the member department
or agency and the authority of such head to use its re-
sources to perform appropriate board functions.. In addition,
the Board member must have an unbreakable engagement to
brief the head of his department or agency before every
Council meeting as to the background of the problems that
will appear on the agenda.
Instead of the old Senior NSC Staff method of "keeping
the subject under discussion until the disputes are resolved"
the new system calls for a full and earnest exchange of con-
flicting opinions subject to the overriding objective of pro-
ducing atruly national policy. Conflicting viewpoints are
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5B WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
not necessarily submerged or eliminated. Under current
practice, the Planning Board may present the NSC with a
number of alternatives, or certain unresolved paints may be
included in papers .that go to the NSC for discussion. Out of
the discussion of tine alternatives, agreement often comes.
on one or a combination of such .policies or courses of action.
The philosophy of the new NSC is to face up to the major
world issues with an attitude of decision. This usually re-
sults in elimination or at least reconciliation of conflicting
points of view.
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
OF the two major functions of the NSC, decision-making
and the programming or implementation of decisions,
the former naturally receives primary attention from the
new administration. Yet the latter, in the long run, is just
as vital to national security. It is hard enough to meet
squarely the difficult problems of national security with ap-
propriate policies and courses of action. It is physically far
more difficult to program and execute such policies against
the hard internal realities of budget, manpower, and mate-
riel limitations as well as the external factors of Kremlin
aggression and autocratic effectiveness. These functions then
are inseparable-the "Siamese twins" of national security.
Neither may be neglected.
.One of the prescribed duties of the President's Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, in his capacity of
executive officer of the NSC, is to bring to the attention of
the President, with recommendations for apprapriate action,
lack of progress on the part of an agency in carrying out a
particular policy assigned to it. The Special Assistant would
not bother the President here unless he had found it to be
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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY POLICIES 57
impossible to expedite performance at the Planning Baa,rd
level. This prescribed procedure seems to give the Council's
executive officer sufficient authority to inspect, require re-
ports, and to follow up the execution of approved policies.
-The machinery of follow-up is beginning to function, but it
has not been in effect long enough to permit a complete
evaluation of its effectiveness..
Inclltded with the document announcement of the Presi-
dent's approval of an NSC proposed policy are directives for
implementation of that policy. These are forwarded to ap-
propriate departments and .agencies. In cases where mare
than one agency is concerned (the majority of cases), the
President designates a coordinating agency which is respon-
sible for: (1) notifying all departments of the actions for
which each. is responsible; (2) insuring that such actions. are
taken in a coordinated manner; and (3) transmitting prog-
ress reports on implementation. The Operations Coordina-
ting Board established by Executive Order No. 10483, is
normally designated as this coordinating agency. The pri-
mary purpose of the Board is to "insure coordinated imple-
mentation of national security policies." For policies assigned
for coordination, the Board is directed to advise with the
departments and agencies concerned as to operational plan-
ning responsibilities, the coordination of interdepartmental
aspects of such plans, and their execution in such manner
as to make the fullest contribution to national security ob-
jectives. In addition, the Board may initiate new proposals
for action in appropriate circumstances.
The membership of the Operations Coordinating Board is
as follows: Under-Secretary of State, chairman; the Deputy
Secretary of Defense; the Director of the Foreign Operations
Administration; the Director of Central Intelligence; and a
representative of the President. The latter official, C. D. Jack-
son (former editor of Fortune) , is known in Washington as
the "President's assistant for Cold War." Although the
Board normally reports to the President through the NSC
machinery, Mr. Jackson's membership thereon provides di-
rect access to the Chief Executive in appropriate cases.*
Of great importance to the functioning of the Board in
recent months is its executive officer, a position occupied by
? [Mr. Jackson resigned his post on the White House stall in early March 1954. No
successor had been appointed as this went to press.-Ed.l
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58 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
Elmer Staats, formerly with the Bureau of the Budget.
Within a short time after Staats' arrival in November 1953,
there was a discernible improvement in the functioning of
the Board's internal machinery. He has been largely respon-
sible for the orderly development of the procedures to make
the Board an effective instrument.
The executive order establishing the Operations Coordinat-
ing Board also abolished the old Psychological Strategy
Board and directed the former to wind up the ,outstanding
affairs of the latter. The effect of this order was to transfer
the personnel, files, and other assets of the PSB to the OCB.
Initially the operating procedures of the OCB followed the
panel system of the PSB whereby representatives of the sev-
eral agencies met periodically to produce additional papers
which duplicated, at least in part, the national intelligence
estimates as well as some of the staff studies of the Plan-
ning Board_ of the NSC. By December 1953, however, the
OCB had adopted its own internal operating procedures
pointed more directly at its job of "integrated implementa-
tion" of national security policies.
For each of the NSC papers wherein the President desig-
nates the OCB as the coordinating agency, the current pro
cedure provides for the appointment of a "Working Group"
of representatives of the affected agencies. Normally the
"Working Group" is chaired by the representative of the
agency having the most direct interest. The executive secre-
tary of the working group is furnished from the staff of the
OCB. The Operations Coordinating Board issues "Standing
Instructions far Working Groups." These specify the jobs
of the several working groups as they proceed toward imple-
mentation of national policy. The instructions make clear
that the responsibility for operations implementing these
NSC policies remains with the agencies concerned. The
working group is the mechanism through which is conducted
such inter-agency coordination and reporting on NSC policies
as require unusual or nonrouti:ne development beyond a
single department. The number and duration of meetings of
the working groups are held to a minimum, informal con-
tacts between members being encouraged as the normal
method of doing business.
The reason for the establishment of the working groups,
then, was to make clear which agency had what respo~nsibili-
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IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY POLICIES 59
ties under the- concerned NSC policy. Each working group
seeks "completeness of and mutual support among the
agency programs developed in response to such responsi-
bilities and the timely and coordinated execution of such
programs in such manner as to make the fullest contribution
to national security." The working groups are apparently in-
tended to be the channel of operational reporting by the
responsible agencies on the status, manner, and degree of
implementation of NSC policies. The OCB then consolidates
such reports and transmits them to the NSC at appropriate
times.
The OCB has made a good start toward accomplishing its
purposes. Its membership, at the undersecretary level, is
appropriate to its function of "implementation" in contrast
to top- level membership of the NSC which is responsible for
"policy making." Its standard instructions for working
groups is a significant advance over the old panel system of
the PSB. _
But the working group can hardly insure "completeness of
and mutual support among agency operational programs"
in the absence of some over-all framework in the form of an
outline of a "National Plan" into which document each
agency can set forth its programs of action. Development of
such an outline is distinct from the job of the Planning
Board of the NSC (which is concerned with the development
of policy) . Rather the compilation of such an outline would
be the responsibility of OCB (which is concerned with imple-
mentatia~n of policy) . This national plan would be quite dis-
tinct from a summary of national policy. It would in effect
be a broad outline of planned procedures for carrying out
the sum-total of national policy.
Admittedly the compiling of such a master plan would be
quite difficult. Yet such is badly needed; and the continuous
revision of such a national plan would also be needed. This
process of continuous revision would be of primary assistance
in limiting overlap and duplication and in filling in gaps.
With a coversheet produced by the OCB, using the plans of
the member agencies as tabs, the resultant document would
be a "national plan of action" for a specific period of time
(preferably a fiscal year).
The national plan would provide a proper basis against
which the "mutual support among agency operational pro-
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60 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAIfING MACHINERY
grams" could be judged. Such a document would eliminate
many of the ad hoc procedures and provide for a more com-
plete utilization of national assets. This might also facilitate
the development of a national command post for the Presi-
dent as suggested in the basic paper.
5. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE OVERSEAS STATIONS
AS a corollary to transforming the NSC Staff into a true
National Staff, the basic paper suggested that the Presi-
dent's command line should run directly from the White
House to the overseas diplomatic posts and to theater ca~m-
manders. This would place the departments in. Washington
in a staff position with the NSC Staff as the coordinator.
Obviously, this could be done only with a greatly strength-
ened National Staff. There have been no developments in
Washington during 1953 along these lines. Under the present
arrangements the Secretaries of Defense and State and the
Director of Foreign Operations Administration have their
separate command lines to their separate field installations.
However, joint field trips by the Secretary of State and the
Director of Foreign Operations Administration have elimi-
nated some of the duplication. Also, the increasing effective-
ness of the OCB will serve to insure that the lines do not get
crossed in the overseas station. With the various working
groups of the OCB in daily informal contact, a mechanism
now exists to iron out some of the difficulties that so often
made us appear confused to our foreign friends.
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6. SYNOPSIS
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S campaign pledge of 1952 to re-
vitalize the NSC has been carried out. His personal in-
terest and leadership is reflected in the increased attention
given to the formulation of national security policies by the
other members of the Council. The Staff and the operating
machinery of the Council have been strengthened. The key
personality, aside from the President himself, is energetic
Robert Cutler, the Council's executive officer and chairman
of the Planning Board. Significant progress has been made
in the submersion of the interests of the member depart-
ments into the wider interests of the Council.
The problem of insuring the implementation or execution
of national security policies has also received attention. The
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was created by Execu-
tive Order for the purpose of insuring coordinated implemen-
tation of national security policies. The OCB inherited the
personnel and other assets of the old Psychological Strategy
Board (PSB) . By the end of 1953 the OCB had devela~ped its
own procedures and was in the process of organizing working
groups of staff personnel from each of the agencies con-
cerned with execution of national security policies. While
OCB may be contemplating creation of "National Plans,"
over-all government-wide Mans to insure integrated execu-
tion of policy, there has been no announcement of intention
to take such a broad approach to the problem. Yet, the
members of the working groups can hardly insure "com-
pleteness of and mutual support among agency operational
programs" in the absence of some over-all framework of at
least an outline of a National Plan into which each agency
can design and fit its own program.
In final analysis, as this critique goes to press, it must be
noted that during the first year of the Eisenhower adminis-
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62 WHITE HOUSE STRATEGY-MAKING MACHINERY
tration substantial improvement was made in the processes
whereby our national security policies are formulated. The
Cabinet faded in significance before a revitalized NSC. The
NSC organization structure was improved and vigorous men
appointed to key staff positions. What immediately remains
to be done is a similar strengthening of the processes where-
by those policies are to be implemented-a comparable im-
provement in the machinery for achieving coordinated
action.
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for official use only