SOVIET OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A000600180012-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 20, 1952
• Content Type: SPEECH

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lecture
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INFORM= iOn
NVILT CL JLCTME
by
Mr. Allen W. Dulles
Presented at
The Nstiona1 War College
Washington 25, r. C.
20 ?4arch U52
SE iNFJRMMMATION
59354
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SECUR1i' iiF?~t~11
S VIEr C JLCT1\iLs
(20 March 1952) by
dlr. P llen W. Dulles
PER. PA0Ei I think, gentlean, that continuing, our studies
with joint war; planaiz, it is most timely to have an expert coke
here and talk to us on soviet short and long-torn objectives, and
to give us an estimate cf .oviet cajabilities in attaining those ot-
ectives. All of you who have been engaged in the studies know how
difficult it ie to gauge :oviet intentions Fnd ct.Fabilitic s, and in
doing so, how necessary it is to take into careful consideration
Soviet ideolozy and the characteristics of the ,-ussian reo;..le. To-
dq Mr. Dulles of G.i.i. has come here and is undertaking to assist
us in off' studies with this problem.
As you have read from his biography, tr. Du11es her had a
long and distinguished carter in the ts:te uepartaent, the Ccuncil
on Foreign Ielattoms, in v.
..S. during the war, and new with the
!#t'. Dulles, it is a great pleasure to welcome you here today.
1`t. tULLi? Is General Full, ?.r. rremers of the National
War Colleges It is a great pleasure to be here today. I have often
looked forward to the tine when I would have &n opportunity to address
this august and learned body, but I didn't know that I would have a
subject such sa has been given to re today. 'hen it we,.- first sags est-
edd to se, I indicated to Colonel I-oven that I wa_: quite. inco. ,etent to
handle the. subject, and I have slowly partd it down, bit by .lit, cuttirw,
1 1"* T--1 % IT 1
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off certain of its rn litary angle.. on which I did not feel eo2rre-
tent to speak; still I have left myself quite a tit to cover In
three-quarters of an hour.
Because of the score of the :;ubjcct, i have put down a
few notes that I shall follow pore or less in order to ksaer on the
track and try to tring us to some conclusionF. :4a; I say before 1
start that I am apeakir here an an irxlividuwl rather than trying
to give the party line of C.I.E. or intelligence in general. I will
admit to having read, before I cane here,. the rational estir tee
that covo;r the particular range of the . ub jest I sac to handle, f.rri I
an in accord 4th those estirrwi tt: ; but what I say real go somewhat be-
yond then:.
'oviet objectives and their view of the means for achieving
them can be stated brit fay. They are: the extension of tht --oviet
Cori: t e7stem throughout the world, ty the revolutionary r:,roceSs,
i
sailing with what the Woviet leaders describe as World Revolution.
Soviet theory does not admit of the possibility of a pestGa-
dint stopiins place short of this objective. `there are, of course,
stages. `here is no intermediate basis of final coMrosise. Their
short term ob jectivess involving the piecemeal weakenir aM divldJj
of the oppositions merge into their ultimate aims. No step is taken
if it would endanger the homeland base of the "'oviet revolution sad
its control of the revolutionazy movement.
in x,Y opinions the :"oviet ti" scale is irrdeterminats. The
goal does not have to bs reachtd within any particular period of"wars.
Whet they look to it progress. If they have to tea prise or e+en
CURII ! IN" MA TtO T
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retresat, they tht n seek a t'asi s 'for futurt.
In this re: pect the Soviet ;.irograi differs vitally from
that of ?hes Nazis. 1itt1 r, you reme:"i.er, was in a tremendous hurry.
I h~4 to achieve all of hip ambitions within a very limited ;Period,
and then of course he ftlt his Thousand Year neich would be solidly
anchored. sou may recall the ranting speech tie made to his gencr=-la
just Lefore the attack on oltW, when he pointed out that ht had to
shoe, he couldn't Y. it -- he had to achieve the oL3ectivc.__ duria his
prime of lift.
What mi`ht hap, en if the ?-ovict felt theasel"Ver dcfinit6li
thwarted in carrying 'orwurd with tbtir cboaen revolutiosy tactics
is a question one ought to consider, but I dcn't think it neLds make
is p Fuze at this point. Today we aze not faced with that state of
facts. I ovict techniques are working, in a gray which mw>t satis.i`y even
the tees in the Xremlin. Unfortunately, I see no e&rly likelihood of
a drattic charge in this situation,
I van asked to comment on the comparison Letween voviet
policies a:d Tsarist i,mparialism. I fiw them of quite a different
character. Tsexist aims, though ambitious, were limited and.laxge1
pra tlc.
ThEj had practical ambitions to reach the water seea, the
- ritiaa Gulf, the iediterranaan and the r tlantic, and in the Last,, the
T*U w tea. lhgr had no global c tr? to mi
+' a W of world
'tide ap;, i atioai. In certain reapects the.: uviet forwara march oilows
Of the 1is s of Tsarist ierialism, but I think this is a coirjci
4M O of geography rather than of ideolo,;y.
P`or off'' p:oaganda purposes, it may be ueeful to talk of
at 3 w
Affrot
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3,..et fs eri ltam and co Pre 00 talin to Ivan th Tern It or ~A
the Great,, t nt basically 1 fiat little $lalilaritlr t etwesn the tiro.
As I have suggeat. d above, it is quite unreal to : t _ributs territorial
or time licit tiono to the prW-.a of C*nrruniss as the viet Tier .
It is jut as unreal to do this as it is to suggest that there art
2.iaitations on the red of the ChriCti?rnLith, or for that astRter~.
of any other grea ; religious or philoscFhical concepts. fey just
haven't gceF rr:phical limitation. The oviet prcachcs the in+evitsiility
of world revolution. Ly its very definition, there ie no territorial
I p
limitation.
As Stalin sets forth so clearly in the a roblena of Ler ie to.
it is it ort- nt to distirr?,uik-h ;.-le rly between tactics and over-ail
frq sort of tactical move ray te justified but the as is to
be no change in the strategic goal.
to pick up again rtalin'e robless of Leninism." I aseust rot f
you have read itj if you ha'.n't, you ought to read it. It is juEt
as important, I believe, todsy :; it could have -son i"Aant for us
if we had taken the pains to read "Fein Ka-f" in the '30s. In o"_
nection with the 3rs lin'a recent note touching on German electio
etc. I bar,,. erred t:; run across a p ssagt in the "?'roblem. of Lerai. ss"
that was particularly inttre. tirg. - talin in one of hi. Epeechcc to
the .ilenur of the Cowuni:.t party in 1939 Nas discueainc elections,
"3n 1937 a?`ukhcchev ky, Yakir, U orevich and other
fiendis were sentenet d to Le shat. After th: t, the
elections to the ;T uprere oviet of the :.. . *!-s were
sL -
$ C T ECit .1
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ksldlk~ In these tlectionq, 98.6 percent cl the total
tote was cast for the ovi.t power. 't the tEcinnia
ef 1138 Ecee%olta, rykov, tukhprin r?nd other fiends
Vt3'eseftUlcd to It shot,. After that, the elections
to the ?~t' reme "o%ietr of the 'Union Republics were
held, In these cltetions 99.4 percent of the total
tote was cast for the = owiet power. 'nez't+ are the -.,ym-
t4me of tdtmp iaation," we would lik. to know, and
s this '~lemoz?bliaatloc' not reflected in the re-
~t$ s of the eiectianr ?v
That is really the wzy to run .& c.iq aign.
She idea of a bona fide loci-terw agreement for co-existence
'with thovc who prerch world revolution is non--enae. It eeeter Ilefu1
to the foviet leaders to ex` c_t this icea frog tis-e to tiz i to calm
us down and,, after all, they too recto ,nisc and preach the nc:fd to ca39-
poise on co-?xistence, for r. time. x-ut to their rindr, were is an
Inevitability in F:e downfall of tb t Caritaiit?t Ly tc:m which makes
the concept of co-existence entirely- suuerc'luous. 11iis downfall they
believe cnn be 1 rou, ht about by inter-n:--.1 rcttcnness nd dsc=:y and the
resultant revolt of the ,prolet of the. F tnni~,`: wa.r.
He tight have said this we;.- also on* of the rain j.?tir, osc of t ht-,
atcarl,tion of tht. : alti.c tl t- t:F : .
In the "'t., tc .:partner t booklt;t on j,rew, r ,vi Lt docu-
*ent.-, I was interests : to : ins an ir-traction tha tht tlcr-ar} Furc izn
Office sent out to it. di; lonatic rtpresentativt:s, r:-kin an ork?- rress-
ed tacetin , the w&11 advertie