THE CONTENT OF INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A000600100002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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The
CONTENT OF
INTELLIGENCE
A Digest from
Strategic Intelligence
by Sherman Kent
Z~ 978 a
- ---------------
(K)
: ? s. `xt??: :.+3 "To: IS S C
Copyright 1949
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Chapter 1
This paper deals with "high-level foreign positive intelligence;" short
for the knowledge our state must possess of other states to assure itself
that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail from sheer ig-
norance. Upon this knowledge we base our high-level national policy to-
ward the states of the world.
Notice all knowledge of our domestic scene is left out (the sort which
lies behind the police function). Foreign positive intelligence is truly "for-
eign" in purpose, scope, and substance. The word "positive" denotes that
this intelligence is neither counter-intelligence nor counter-espionage de-
signed to uncover domestically-produced traitors or imported foreign agents.
The words "high-level" exclude operational, tactical, and combat intelli-
gence.
How describe this kind of knowledge ?
I have adopted a functional approach. It starts from the premise
that our state, in order to survive in a world of competing states, must have
two kinds or areas of policy. The one is its own self-initiated, positive,
outgoing policy, undertaken in the interests of a better and more secure world
order and a higher degree of national prosperity. The other is its defensive-
protective policy necessarily undertaken to oppose those policies of other
states which are inimical to our national aspirations, better called our policy
for national security.
Consider our positive policy first. To be effective, its framers,
planners, and implementers must be able to select the proper instrument
of persuasion from a long list of possibles, i.e., should one select a reso-
lution in the UN? diplomacy? political and economic inducement? threat?
force? or some combination of these instruments?
Now neither this selection nor its subsequent application can be made
without reference to the other fellow, the other country. Hence, before policy
leaders take any action they would be well advised to know:
how the other country is going to receive the selected policy and
what it is prepared to use to counter it;
what the other country lacks in the way of countering force, i.e., its
specific vulnerabilities;
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what it is doing to array its protective force;
and
what it is doing, or indeed can do, to mend its specific vulnerabili-
ties.
It follows that our policy leaders must know many things about other
countries as objective entities:
For example:
a. The physiques of these countries; their natural topography and
environment and the structures which man has added (his cities,
his agricultural and industrial enterprises, his transportation
facilities, and so on);
b. -their people - how many; how they are settled; how occupied;
c. the status of the arts, sciences, and technologies of these people
(and I would include in this the status of their armed forces);
d. the character of their political systems, their economies, their
social groupings, their codes of morality, and the dynamic in-
terrelations which prevail among all these.
Now consider, secondly, our defensive-protective policy - that of
national security. Here our policy leaders must make constant provision
for the positive aggressive policies of other states. Some of these policies
we will regard as hostile to our interest. Some we must block; some, we
may meet half way. To frame and operate our policy we must know the
nature and weight of the instrumentalities which these other countries can
place behind their own policies, and we must know the direction those policies
are likely to take. We must know this so that we will not be taken by sur-
prise; so that we will be in defensive or offensive readiness when the policy
is launched. When such things are known, you know much about the other
country's strate4ic stature and something of its probable intentions.
It can be seen from the foregoing that the first class of information
required is-essentially descriptive and reportorial; descriptive of relatively
changeless things like terrain, hydrography, and climate; descriptive of
changeable things like population; of more transient phenomena such as
governmental or economic structures.
The second class of information deals with the future, its possibilities
and probabilities: how another country may shape its internal forces to
service its foreign policy or strategy; how it may try to use these strengths
against us; when, where, and with what effectiveness. This is speculative
and evaluative.
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Now we perceive the statics, the dynamics, and the potentials of other
countries; perceive the established things, the presently going-on things,
and probable things of the future. Taken together these make up the sub-
ject matter of high-level foreign positive intelligence, or as I shall call it
henceforth - strategic intelligence.
In the following pages I will set forth the substantive content of stra -
tegic intelligence in its three basic forms: the basic descriptive element,
the current reportorial element, and the speculative-evaluative element.
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Chapter 2
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT: THE BASIC
DESCRIPTIVE ELEMENT
The descriptive element of strategic intelligence is what gives mean-
ing to day by day change and the groundwork without which speculation into
the future is meaningless.
In the recent war the belligerents compiled encyclopedias on coun-
tries they fought, planned to occupy, or swing into their orbits. The basic
aim was to provide the strategic planner with enough knowledge of a country
to make calculation's on its attributes as a zone of combat. Actually they
served a hundred uses, by no means all of which were solely military. A
survey of the table of contents of a typical German book will indicate its
scope:
I. General Background. Location. Frontiers. Area. History. Gov-
ernmental and Administrative Structure.
II. Character of the Country. Surface Forms. Soils. Ground Cover.
Climate. Water Supply.
III. People. iationalities, language attitudes. Population distribu-
tion. -Settlement. Health. Structure of -society.
IV. Economic? Agriculture. Industry. Trade and Commerce. Mining.
Fisheries.
V. Transportation. Railroads. Roads. Ports. Airfields. Inland
Waterways.
VI. Military Geography. (]Detailed regional breakdown).
VII. Military Establishment in Being. Army: Order of Battle, Fixed
Defenses, Military Installations, Supply. Navy: Order of Battle,
The Fleet, Naval Shore Installations, Nava][ Air, Supply. Air:
Order of Battle, Military Aircraft, Air Installations (see List of
Airdromes, etc., Special Appendix), Lighter than air, Supply.
VIII. Special Appendixes. Biographical data on key figures of the gov-
ernment. Local geographical terminology. Descriptions of rivers,
lakes, canals. List and specifications of electric power plants.
Description of roads. List of airdromes and most important land-
ing grounds. List of main telephone and telegraph lines. Money,
weight, and measures. Beaches (as for amphibious military oper-
ations).
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A table of contents is the bare bones; it does not reveal the character
and bulk of the surrounding tissue. The knowledge which lies behind a simple
one-word entry is encyclopedic.
Take "transportation" and consider its details. The road section
begins with a map; then follows a kilometer-by-kilometer log of the main
routes, with observations on surface, width, grades, curves, fills, cuts, and
bridges; thenfollows an overall appreciation of the route under survey. These
seemingly endless data have been assembled to permit the transportation
man to make the calculation: What speed may the largest and heaviest
vehicle maintain from A to B and how many such vehicles may pass at that
speed before the road (and in consequence the vehicles) will start disinte-
grating?
Consider another category, "ports". Here there is: area of pro-
tected water, depth (at low water ordinary spring tides), dockage and depth
at dockside, cranes, transportation for clearing docks and harbor area,
warehousing and storage, harbor craft, local stevedoring situation, bunker--
age, watering, and repair facilities. All these and many more things - all
of them in considerable detail - you must know before you can plan effective
use of the port. Most of these things you can find out; some are not learned
because no one asked the right question.
,For example, the transportation officer responsible for debarking
our men and equipment in the port of Algiers was well supplied with the
most detailed knowledge, but still intelligence failed him. It did not tell that
virtually every square yard of dock space was jam-packed with enormous
barrels of wine and equally large and unhandy bales of straw.
One on the officer's duties was to unload and move a number of fighter
aircraft to nearby Maison Blanche airdrome in the shortest time. If the
fully assembled planes could be off -loaded and wheeled down the docks, clear
the harbor area, and down the highway, he would have loaded them on ship--
deck ready to fly. But he was not sure of the width of the streets along his
itineraries and so he removed the wings. If intelligence had anticipated such
a requirement, the officer might have saved some time. At least one route
proved amply wide for the job.
Now, to close this most condensed presentation, consider a final
item--the operational airfield. First it must be analyzed from the point of
view of how well it might serve the purposes of a potential enemy. What is
its exact location and its location relative to other airfields and supply
centers? What is its elevation above sea level? What supply facilities does
it enjoy? Its place in the transport and communications net, in the electric
power grid; the character of its shops and hangars, barracks; its fuel, lubri-
cant and munitions storage facilities? What planes can it accommodate and
how many (length and type of runways, taxiways, revetments, hard-stands,
dispersal areas) ? What hazards to air navigation does it present? What
protecting AA positions and smoke installations does it have ?
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This same field might be analyzed as to its suceptibility to attack:
what. are its identifying characteristics from the air? what camouflage is
used. or may be anticipated? how vulnerable and how recuperable are its
installations if subjected to bombardment?
Again the field might be analyzed from the point of view of use if
captured. Can the machine shope, if taken unscathed, be used for one's own
plans? Can the revetments and hard-stands? If not, how much must they
be modified, etc.?
The little set forth above could be blown-up to many pages as other
knowledge requirements were elaborated. Let it suffice, however, to illus-
trate the scope, depth, and complexity of knowledge merely to serve one as-
pect of war making. I now indicate the substantive character of three other
aspects of wartime intelligence, that of strategic air bombardment, of polit-
and economic warfare, and of military government.
Strategic Bombardment
The crux of strategic bombardment intelligence is target selection.
Assuming urgency, you must select those sectors of the enemy's war ma-
chine whose destruction will most significantly, rapidly, and permanently
weaken his striking power. Since there may be several such sectors, and
-since they all cannot be destroyed in a single raid (even with the A-bomb)
you must not only identify such targets, but you must arrange them in order
of importance.
These most vulnerable areas cannotbe picked out from less vulner-
able areas until a great deal is known about the enemy's entire way of life
and his entire way of making war.
Before the planes went off on their first mission of systematic de-
struction, the planners for the bombardment of Germany had to know a very
great deal about the airframe, aircraft--engine and aircraft-component pro-
duction, the production of ball bearings, of synthetic-rubber, and of oil. More-
over, before they decided that these sectors were the ones whose destruc-
tion would give them the most significant, rapid and permanent weakening of
German war-making capacity they had to know a very great deal about other
sectors.
Still more descriptive knowledge was required to carry out the attack.
Our bombers were to bomb structures that the enemy was trying hard to con-
ceal from ken, camera, and eyesight. Their pinpoint location, susceptibility
to high explosive and incendiary, the ease with which they could be repaired,
was more descriptive knowledge for which strategic intelligence and oper-
ational intelligence were responsible.
Political andEcono:nic Warfare
A great deal of war, i.e., political and economic warfare, is un-
orthodox. It is fought with unconventional weapons. In these warfares you
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try to do two things: weaken the enemy's will and capacity to resist, and
strengthen your own and your friends' will and capacity to win. In their
politer guises both of these warfares are employed as instrumentalities of
the grand strategy of peace; and both have their own intelligence require-
ments in war and peace.
These two warfares encompass a wide range of possible activities
directed at a wide range of objectives. On the political side we may start
with international alliances of friendships to be strengthened or strained
and international animosities to be smoothed over or aggravated.
There is a wide range of potential targets: first of all the armed
forces of the opponent and their morale. Then there are the political dis-
sidents, maladjusted social groups, the under-privileged, self-conscious
minorities, labor leaders, gold-star mothers, pacifists, angry housewives,
emergent messiahs, gullible or corruptible officers of government, and a
hundred other categories of the misinformed, displeased, annoyed, unsatis-
fied, and outraged elements of the population.
The instrumentalities which total war suggests in the exploitation of
these targets are numerous and may be as thoroughly unlovely as shooting
war itself. Begin at the gentle end, truth itself - truth purveyed openly by
radio of known origin, by newspapers in miniature form (delivered by air--
craft). Then comes the distorted truth which we call open propaganda, and
withwhichwe associate the names of Lord Haw Haw, Axis Sally, Tokyo Rose,
and the Japanese artist who designed fulsome five-color depictions of what
the "Yanks" were doing to the wives of Australian soldiers. Next, is what
is termed black propaganda, that which purports to come from dissident
elements within the enemy's own population, but which is really carried on
in great secrecy from the outside. Sometimes black propaganda is done by
radio, sometimes by .leaflet, fake newspaper, forged letter, or by any means
occurring to perverse ingenuity.
Then there are other instruments which can be employed only by
penetrating enemy lines. This group leads off with the rumor invented and
passed along by word of mouth, it includes subornation of perjury, intimi-
dation, subversion, bribery, blackmail, sabotage in all its aspects, kidnaping,
booby trapping, assassination, ambush, the franc tireur, and the underground
army. It includes the clandestine delivery of the tools of the calling: the
undercover personnel, the printing press and radio set, the poison, the ex-
plosives, the incendiary substances, and the small arms and supplies for the
thugs, guerrillas, and para-military formations.
The instrumentalities of economic warfare are simon-pure by com-
parison. In one idiom they consist of the carrot and the stick, or in Pro-
fessor Viner's inversion, the Big Stick and the Sugar Stick. Translated into
technical idiom they involve: blockade, preclusive purchase, freezing of
funds, boycott, embargo, and the black list on the one hand, and subsidies,
loans, bilateral trade, barter, and purchasing agreements on the other.
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Before calculations of risk, effort, and effectiveness can be made,
all phases of one's enemies' polity, society, and economy must be understood,
their vulnerabilities appraised, and methods of pressure selected. A political
warfare as deadly as the Germans used in Europe and as the Japanese used
in the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia was based upon a large
amount of accurate descriptive knowledge.
Military Government
The war over, our responsibilities continued in the civil activities
of the military government of occupied territory. The Army-Navy Manual
of Military Government and Civil Affairs which "states the principles which
serve as a general guide. . . (to the exercise of) military government and
control of civil affairs in territory occupied by forces of the United States"
lists the occupant's responsibilities in twenty-three named and one miscel-
laneous category.
The degree of the occupant's responsibility is circumscribed by the
nature of his mission, i.e., he will try to run the country with an eye merely
to the prevention of those evidences of dissatisfaction: "disease and unrest,"
as the formula goes. Even so the responsibilities are large; so large that
they cannot be undertaken without a very careful evaluation of objectives,
formulation of policy, and a great deal of highly detailed planning. Here is
another legitimate demand upon the descriptive element of intelligence: the
nature of the society, polity, and economy, i.e., new encyclopedias. This
time they cover new aspects of familiar ground. They deal with government
not as something tobe subverted by political warfare, nor with physical plant
as something to be bombed. They must deal with government and industry
as things which the occupant must conserve for his own use. Not the data
necessary to blow up a railroad or run one's own military trains over it;
but such things as its indigenous management and how it may be put back on
its feet.
In the foregoing pages I touch upon certain omnibus studies which
serve the strategic requirement:, of war and shade off into post-war. Two
more kinds of encyclopedia are typical of peacemaking and peace itself.
The first can be called the peace handbook, the second the general purpose
survey.
At the end of World War I, the British delegation came to Paris
equipped with any number of little blue books. Sponsored by the Foreign
Office and used by the delegates, they were what might be called a peace-
maker's Baedeker. In short, terse paragraphs, and appendixes containing
the most important documents of state, treaties, etc., they aimed to supply
the minimal needs of officials charged with drafting the treaties. A brief of
the contents of the two volumes on Austria-Hungary will indicate the general
substance of the work.
The study is first broken down according to seven regional com-
ponents of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: 1. Austria-Hungary.
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2. Bohemia and Moravia. 3. Slovakia. 4. Austrian Silesia. 5. Bukovina.
Transylvania and the Banat. 7. Hungarian Ruthenia. Within each of the
regional sections there is a breakdown by subject. The section on Bohemia
and Moravia ran to 109 standard-size pages. No one who read them could
have remained ignorant of the main ethnic and economic problems which
beset the men responsible for drawing the western frontiers of the new
Czechoslovakia, and one who read them would acquit himself better at the
peace table.
There were many other handbooks in the series. The book on France
has along and detailed section on Alsace-Lorraine; the one on Germany has
sections on Silesia, the Kiel Canal and Heliogoland, and the Colonies; the one
on Turkey, an excellent treatment of the Straits question; and there is a.
short study on the Yugoslav Movement.
Could there be such a thing as a general-purpose handbook of peace-
time? Yes. It would be similar to some of the encyclopedias already de-
scribed.
The foregoing forms of the basic descriptive element are broadest
in one dimension and likely to be shallower in the other. Two other forms
are worthy of mention: they are the narrow and deep study, and "spot infor-
mation." Since many of the examples of the past pages were taken from a.
war context, these next will be taken from that of peacetime.
The Narrow-Deep Study
The national peacetime objectives of this country are numerous and
the grand strategy to attain them a many-faceted affair. Everywhere one
looks in the world a national objective is on the block. In the New York Times
for a day taken at random there were between fifty and sixty news items of
concern to officials of our federal government. The items touched fourteen
sovereign states, three dependent areas, five areas under U. S. Occupation
and five subjects of importance all the way across the UN board.
Under Secretary of State Clayton, appeared, according to one of these
news items, before the House Foreign Relations Committee to explain and
defend a request for 350 million dollars for continuing UNRRA functions.
One of the beneficiaries would be China. Mr. Clayton emphasized that the
distribution of relief wouldbe rigidly supervised and controlled by the United
States. It was in our power to do something in defense of our objectives and
interests in China. What kinds of knowledge should Mr. Clayton have had?
First and foremost he should know how many people there were in
China and how many of them were starving. Then he would have his own
notion of the size of the calamity. Were 2 per cent starving or 15 percent?
Next he should know if the starvation of x per cent of the Chinese was some-
thing, that happened every year, or if it was something happening because of
special post-war conditions. He would wish to know this to decide the basic
question - is there any use trying to feed the Chinese? For if Chinese were
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chronically unable to produce enough food or amass sufficient foreign ex-
change to import foreign food, was there any point in taking China on as a
permanent charge? If this were true, and a healthy, unified and democratic
China one of our national objectives, should we not perhaps go about it in
another way?
But assuming that Mr. Clayton knew that f amine was not chronic, what
other things should he know? He should know how much food of what kinds
wouldbe necessary; how food was normally distributed in China and if these
distribution systems were partially to blame for the famine. If they were,
he should know how their faults could be overcome and whether or not that
task in itself would be too large to underwrite. He should also know what
kinds of food were acceptable to the Chinese. Even seriously undernourished
people are astonishingly choosey about the staples of their diet, as was proved
after the last war. He should know - assuming the Chinese insisted upon
rice - if the world rice market was able to deliver in exchange for dollars.
He should know, as far as possible, what internal and international conse-
quences might follow a successful operation.
One can imagine Mr. Clayton armed with a study which answered all
thesequestions and many more. It would require much work, for such know-
ledge will not be lying around in neat bundles.
Spot Intelligence
There is a category of strategic intelligence that the trade calls "spot
intelligence," or "Information ]Please," or "Ask Mr. Foster." What it
supplies is usually iron answer to some innocent-sounding question like: What
side of the road do cars run on in lPetsamo? What is the best map of southern
Arabia? What is the depth of water (LWOST) alongside the Jete'e Trans-
versale of Casablanca? What are the characteristics of domestic electrical
current in Sidney? How much copper came out of the Bor mines in 1937?
How good is the water supply in Hong Kong? When did Lombardo-Toledano
last go to Venezuela? What are the administrative units of the USSR?
With this sore: of question, there are others answerable only by maps,
diagrams or plans and photographs. The descriptive element must stock
such items or know where to find them. Distasteful as "spot intelligence"
is to strategic intelligence, it is one of the items which must be kept in stock.
In conclusion, it can be seen that in order for us "to assure our-
selves that our cause will not suffer nor our policies fail because they are
ill-informed" our intelligence organizations must be prepared to describe
a large number of phenomena. They must be prepared for more than this
however. Description involves stopping the clock and the clock cannot be
stopped. It goes on: and descriptions of yesterday's things are out of date
tomorrow. To remedy this defect, a second element of intelligence is essen-
tial. This is the current reportorial element which aims at keeping certain
descriptions up to date.
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Chapter 3
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT: THE CURRENT REPORTORIAL ELEMENT
The phenomena of life which appear in encyclopedias can be regarded
as frozen in mid-passage. The obvious fact, however, is that practically
nothing stands completely still, and that the most important characteristic
of existence is change. The requirements of grand strategy must everlast-
ingly take into account this fact of change. Keeping track of change is the
function of "current reporting."
It is worth making the point that change moves through many-way
streets, and that there are many kinds of change. For example, it is as im-
portant to know that the military establishment of apotential enemy is being
demobilized as it is to know that it is being built up or merely reoriented
around a new weapon or a tactical concept. It is as important to know when
the level of prosperity in a friendly country is rising as it is to know that it
is going on the rocks; as important to know the emergence of a friendly gov-
ernment in a hitherto hostile state as it is to know the downfall of a hither-
to friendly government. In fact tie direction of change is a matter of high-
est significance.
If the current reportorial phase of intelligence is to do the job; if an
important part of intelligence is the observation of day-by-day developments
what phenomena should be put under "surveillance"?
The following categories, although rather arbitrary, are usual:
1. Personalities. The basic-descriptive element will have chron-
icled in its biographical encyclopedias and files the names of people who were
important. The reportorial element must keep track of the present goings,
comings and liaisons of these people. More important, it must pry beneath
the surface to discover the emergent figures of tomorrow. Who knows the
leader of the French Communist Party in 1960? The head of the Soviet Union
in 1955? Who will be the chief of staff of the Yugoslav air force? The
leaders of a divided Palestine? Who will be president of Lever Brothers or
United Chemical? The director of the Pavlov Institute and leader of the
Latin American Confederation of Labor? These men are alive at this mo-.
ment. Where are they? What are they doing? What sort of people are they?
The future is by no means free to nominate such officials by random
choice. The chances are that the future must select from a fairly narrow
slate of candidates. At this moment they are the comers in business, the
military, the trade union movement; in politics, the arts (let us not forget
Paderewski), education, and the conspiratorial underground). The job is to
find these emergent leaders and watch their progress so that as revolutions
brew and deaths approach, the human replacements may be known.
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An intelligence operation to do its job on men must know their char-
acter and ambitions, their opinions, their weaknesses, the influences which
they can exert, and the influences 'before which they are frail. It must know
their friends and relatives, and the political, economic, and social milieu in
which they move. Only by knowing such matters can the dimensions of leader-
ship be glimpsed and can one guess at the change toward which the new leader
will strive when he comes to power.
2. Geographic. There are already descriptions of the physiques of
other countries. Current reporting must continuously improve and extend
these descriptions. Not merely must :it chronicle the changes that man is
making, but also it should be abreast of the widening horizons of geophysical
knowledge. What can be observed in such matters as erosion rates, the
silting of rivers and harbors, weather, beaches, water power sites and
supplies of drinking water. What is being discovered in the fields of hydro-
graphy, geodesy, and geology.
3. Military. The armed force-in-being, as outlined in the preceding
chapter, has been carefully described as of a certain date. The reportorial
element has the task of keeping track of developments within the establish-
ment:. It must know of new legislation which will set the size and quality of
the force. It must keep track of recruitment policies and their success and
failure; changes in training enlisted men and officers. It must know devel-
opments in the training of troops, the social strata from which the corps of
officers is recruited, the economic status of men and officers. No matter
what the difficulties, it must try to keep track of those changes which the
other country properly regards as its own military secrets: such things as
new fighting ships, new types of aircraft, new weapons of horrendous sorts,
new devices for improving fighting efficiency, changes in morale and in the
loyalty of the force in its regional, political, religious, and nationalistic
orientation.
4. Economic. The handbooks have stopped the economic machine at
a certain point in time and described it. The reportorial element has the
task of keeping track of current developments. It must note the emergence
of new economic doctrines and theories - for purposes of example I cite a
range which lies between Keynesian theory, down through Ham and Eggs, to
the Technocrats. It must keep careful track of changes in the housekeeping
side of the armed forces, administrative reorganizations, and the like, and
it must note changes in government economic policy-policy affecting industry,
the organization of business, agriculture, banking and finance, and foreign
trade. It must know the changes which are occuring in the size and distri-
bution of national wealth and income, of changes in the standard of living,
wages, and employment. It must watch for new crops and the developments
of new methods of agriculture, changes in farm machinery, land use, ferti-
lizers, reclamation projects, and so on. It must follow the discovery of new
industrial processes, the emergence of new industries, and the sinking of
new mines; the development of new utilities and the extensions of those al-
ready established. It must follow changes in the techniques of distribution,
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new transport routes and changes in the inventory of vehicles (autos and
trucks, locomotives and cars, transport aircraft) canal boats, and merchant
shipping). Perhaps most important in the age of atomic fission, it must note
discoveries in new natural resources, notably the discovery of high-grade
uranium deposits.
5. Political. The reportorial element must pay strictest attention
to basic constitutional change and events such as those which have occurred
in the past in France and Italy. It must observe how political power blocs
are lining up on significant issues, and how they may be splitting into factions,
disintegrating into other groups, or joining them en bloc. It must watch
changes in the political doctrines of these groups; changes in relationship
among the central, regional and local political authorities, and the major
shifts in policy toward domestic, foreign, colonial, and imperial problems.
It must follow new legislation which will make political expression either
more free or less free. It must watch national and local election results for
the emergent political figures. It must follow new pressure groups and other
organizations capable of political influence from outside of party framework.
It must know of new governmental and administrative techniques.
6. Social. Perhaps the most important single social phenomenon that
the reporting element must watch is population. It must watch: its growth
or decline, and its rates of growth and decline; changes in its age groups,
its occupational groups, and consumer groups. It must watch for changes
in distribution between city and country, and between regions. It must take
note of migrations within and emigration from the country, and until time
and permanent residence envelops them, it must have an eagle eye on dis-
placed persons. There will also be changes in the social structure. What
groups are emerging to social and economic eminence, what groups or
classes of groups are sinking? What are the developments within the labor
orce? Its changes in size and structure, and above all how it is organiz-
ing, and under what leadership, in its struggle with management? What is
happening to church membership; who is joining clubs and what kind of clubs;
who is founding new lodges, secret societies, and cooperatives?
Intelligence, must also know a large number of other things about
the society, such as changes in the way of living, development of new housing,
changes in the home economy and family diversions. It must be aware of
changes in taste, manners, and fashions. It must follow the program of
educational institutions of all levels, and worry almost as much about the
changing content of the elementary history textbooks as it must about changes
in the curricula of the highest graduate and professional schools. It must
concern itself with government policy toward education at all levels and with
changes in the relationship between government and non-governmental organ-
izations, such as the churches, the trade unions, the clubs and societies.
It must know of the changing relationship among minority groups within
cultural, social, and economic groups; and it must watch for the changes in
the statutory and judge-made law, which in turn change the course of human
behavior throughout the population pyramid.
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7. Moral. Within the wide range of morals the reportorial element
must heed changes in the basic doctrines of life: the waxing or waning of
religion, of patriotism and nationalism, of belief and confidence in the ruling
order and the national myths. It must know of change in popular attitudes
toward the purge of undesirables, the nationalization of private property,
party government, civil marriage, lay education, rights of minorities, uni-
versal military training, to hit a few of the high spots.
8. Scientific-Technological. Since much of the world-to-be will be
the product of science and technology, the reportorial element must watch
these with sharpness. It must know of significant developments in mathe-
matics, physics, chemistry, zoology, geography, oceanography, climatology
and astronomy. It must know what is happening in the realm of the social
sciences. What are the students of sociology, economics, psychology, law,
and history, coming up with? What new ideas are they getting that will some
day have the influence of the discoveries of Locke, Rousseau, Darwin, Pavlov,
Freud, or Haushofer? What is happening in the medical schools and the
clinics; what are the new diagnoses, the new remedies, the new treatments?
What is going on in the realm of communications: the telephone, the tele-
graph, the submarine cable, and above all, radio? What is happening in the
world of cartography? What new areas and phenomena are being charted on
the map? What new purposes are old theories being applied to, what new
uses for old materials? How are any or all of these being applied to arma-
ments ?
The preceding paragraphs cover a staggeringly large area of human
activities. I have written them to portray the dimensions of subject matter
and not as an exhortation to the reportorial force to keep every square inch
of it under active and systematic observation. It should be thought of as de-
scribing most of the real and many of the potential responsibilities of the
reporting function. The question which at once arises is what fragments of
the enormous whole are actually to be put and kept under scrutiny. The only
answer is no answer - namely: only such fragments as are positively ger-
mane to national problems which are now up or appear to be coming.
The reporting element constantly adds freshness to the content of
the basic descriptive element. It does more than this, for in keeping static
knowledge up-to-date it maintains a bridge between the descriptive and what
I have called the speculative-evaluative elements - a bridge between the
past and the future.
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Chapter 4
SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT: THE SPECULATIVE-EVALUATIVE
ELEMENT
To introduce this most important and complicated element of strategic
intelligence a few obvious facts are worth restatement.
Our world is very largely composed of separate sovereign states, and
the contact of the United States with it ranges from the most pacific to the
most belligerent. By many and diverse means we try to promote a better
world order. We undertake agreements reached in the UN; bilateral and
multilateral agreements with other states and groups of states; we exert
pressures in behalf of world well-being and our own security; and we go to
war. In carrying out this enormously complicated business we must be fore-
sighted. We should be prepared and well girded for the future; we must not
be caught off balance by the unexpected.
The problem of this chapter is the analysis of what the United States
must know in order to be foresighted. This knowledge is far more specula-
tive than that discussed in the last two chapters. Obtaining it puts a high
premium on the seeker's power of evaluation and reasoned extrapolation.
That is why I have called it the speculative-evaluative element of strategic
intelligence.
What knowled4e should the U. S. have about the future of other states
in order to have the requisite foresihht?
Create a hypothetical state, Great Frusina.
About Great Frusina the United States should know two things:
(1) Whatis her strategic stature, (2) whatareher specific vulnerabilities
which qualify that strategic stature? If the United States can answer these
two questions, it will be in a fair way to answer the next: What courses of
action will Great Frusina be likely (a) to tnt ttate herself, and (b) to take up
in response to courses of action initiated elsewhere. The problem here is
to put the finger on the kind of knowledge and the method we must employ
before we can produce the answers. Such identification cannot proceed until
at least two terms of recent coinage (strategic stature and specific vulnera-
bility) are given more precision and definition.
Strategic Stature
By strategic stature is meant the influence Great Frusina can exert
in an international situation in which the United States has a grand strategic
interest. This statement is broad by intention. Byinternational situation I
mean any of the differences of opinion, misunderstandings, disputes, or dis-
locations among states which may have a bearing on world security and which
therefore may affect Great Frusina's security and material welfare. Given
the oneness of the contemporary world, there will be little unrelated to that
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security and welfare, and consequently many areas in which Great Frusina
will wish to exert her influence. By influence I mean all those instrumen-
talities that states employ in peacetime or wartime--influence through moral
suasion, propaganda, political and economic threats, inducements, and actual
penalties; through acts of reprisal (in the non-technical sense); threats of
hostility, and war itself. Strategic stature is thus the sum total of sugar
sticks and big sticks which Great Frusina possesses, to which mustbe added
her will to use them and her adeptness in applying them.
To get at strategic stature there are a number of things you must
know,. The first is the probable "Objective situation" within which Great
Frusimna may be expected to exert: influence or throw weight. Ever-present
in the objective situation are the elements of geographical location and time.
There are other elements. To cite a few-for purposes of illustration-is to
list such intangibles as the degree of gravity involved; the nation's popular
assessment of that gravity; the degree of its acceptance of the sacrifices it
must make; the power line-up, that is, on what friends and on how much
support can Great Frusina count; and what friendly support can its opponents
muster.
The elements hinted at above, i?e., the geographical position of the
contestants, the time factor, or the power line-up often, in themselves, deter-
mine the eventual outcome of a dispute in interest. The crisis passes. But
many times these elements do not. rule. Then there are two more things you
must know beforeyou can gauge Great Frusina's strategic: stature. The first
of these is the weight, applicability, and effectiveness of Great Frusina's
non-milt tars i ns t rumenta l t t t es of policy and strategy. The second is Great
Frusina's war potential.
By Great Frusina's non-military instrumentalities are meant those
levers which lie between such a simple device as a properly worded and de-
livered formal note of objection or invitation, and such a complicated and
dangerous device as an embargo, blockade, or other stringent economic
sanction. Also are meant such things as telling Cuba we dared not continue
shipping thereapeuti.c narcotics to her as long as she afforded haven to
Lucky Luciano, well known to us as a, dope peddler and general bad egg, whom
one of our states had been at great expense to catch, indict, convict, jail, and
later deport to Italy. We did not want Luciano in our backyard and we used
a mild non-military instrumentality to get him out.
The Soviet's use of the Comintern and now the Corainform, the para-
phernalia of party infiltration and front organizations, state trading, and even
the World Federation of Trade Unions are comparable devices. Great Frusina
will push such levers, pull such strings, and manipulate such needles and
ice-picks. Knowledge of their weight, applicability, and effectiveness con-
stitutes part of the knowledge necessary to estimate her strategic stature.
By war potenj:ial is meant the possible power to make war. It may
be useful in talking of war potential to distinguish between Great Frusina's
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actual military force in betn4 and her mobi l izable mt l ttary force. This dis-
tinction is artificial because even the force in being is not fully prepared to
get up and go at a moment's notice. It must be topped off, so to speak, by
the issuance of battle equipment, completion of arrangements for supply and
auxiliary services, moving up to the lire of attack, etc. But even though
much of the force needs to be topped off, there are likely to be units which
are completely mobilized and ready to start shooting. Hence the distinction.
Now the problem before us is this. Given asituation, forseeable or
in being, what must intelligence know of it, of the non-mil i tary instrumen-
tal i t ies, the force in be in4, and the war potent ial of Great Frusina so that an
evaluation can be made of her strategic stature.
The s i tuat ion: Realize that it has not yet arisen and that the first
big question for intelligence is to imagine what it will be like when it does
arise. To sharpen the imagination, intelligence must have a great deal of
the descriptive and reportorial knowledge discussed in previous chapters.
For example, it must know a great deal about Great Frusina's foreign re-
lations, and the apparent grand strategic plan within which she is working,
and it must have some sort of rational basis for calculation of the time
factor. Intelligence's reportorial staff must have kept the organization
fully informed as they watched clandestinely and overtly, so that the spec-
ulative take-off will be from the most advanced point on the runway and the
flight of imagination on that course which will prove to be in the truest di-
rection.
It is perhaps worth mention here that calculations on strategic stat-
ure which are not based on some anticipated, imagined, or rationally
assumed situation are not likely to be meaningful. There can be no such
thing as a calculable national potential - potential for the achievement of
goals by peaceful or warlike means - so long as the calculation proceeds in
a vacuum. Only when you fix the adversary, the time, place and the probable
means to be used can the calculation have point.
The non-militarrj instrumentalities: Knowledge is based on what
intelligence has been able to find out about Great Frusina's inner stability
and strength and the ways she has conducted her international business in
the past. Which instrumentalities will she use and with what weight and
effectiveness will she use them? Intelligence may hope to possess the re-
quisite knowledge only as it has studied Great Frusina deeply and system-
atically; has been able to transmute itself into the Great Frusinan foreign
minister and see from his particular perspective. This knowledge, ideally
is coldly objective and factual; is accurate, complete, and up to the moment..
In actual practice it is often none of these things. Certain phenomena
elude description. Maybe they are supersecret and have been successfully
concealed from sight - like the Japanese shallow-water torpedo. Maybe
they have gone unnoticed for a multitude of reasons, for example, the beaches
of a number of South Pacific islands. Maybe the published descriptions have
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been lost. Faced with the necessity, intelligence inevitably falls back upon
the sort of description which is a small speculation in itself; an interpolation
between two known and related phenomena; or an extrapolation from an
established base, a pure deduction, or a depiction from analogy.
War potential: First, your know]ledge of the partly and wholly mobi-
lized force in being will have been supplied by the people who report such
matters: the military, naval, and air attaches, sent openly to Great Frusina,
who are permitted to know certain fairly large brackets of data about Great
Frusi.na's military establishment. Great Frusina permits this in exchange
for similar knowledge from the countries to which she sends her own military
attaches. As a general proposition every country knows a great deal about
all other countries" forces in being and a great deal -about most of their
weapons. What they are likely not to know about are the new and secret
weapons which even Great Frusina's own troops have not been permitted to
practice with and learn.
To ascertain Great Frusina's war potential is a very large order.
Were it not the single most important element in Great Frusina's strategic
stature and an absolute must, intelligence would never attempt the calcu-
lation. But in as much as naked power;, or the threat of it, is all-too often
the force which decides, it is mandatory that Great Frusina's opponents have
some reasoned estimate of this potential.
This computation which intelligence must attempt involves an answer
to the following prodigious question: What amount of active military power,
or better, lethal energy, can Great; Frusina dig out of herself; how many men
and how well trained to fight on ground, in air, and sea; armed with what
weapons of modern combat which Great Frusina can produce in what amounts
of time; and finally how much suchforce can she project to the most strate-
gically advantageous or necessary battleground and maintain there?
To answer such a question intelligence must know many facts and it
must know a method of combining them. In short, it must arrange its know-
ledge as Great Frusina's General Staff and her Office of Production Manage-
ment will normally have arranged its facts before they made their fateful
decision. At no place in the intelligence operation is the professional train-
ing of the intelligence producer of more importance. The job of synthesis
upon which he is embarking is one which requires the very highest compe-
tence in one or more of the sciences of politics, economics, geography, and
the military art. He should not even undertake it unless he has an easy
familiarity with the literature and techniques of the relevant disciplines.
Without giving the impression that you have all the facts when you
have a line-up of Great Frusina's key resources, let me name them.
The first is her geographical location, the quality and extent of her
terrain. Next is her population, especially that part of it which lies in the
age bracket 17 to 45, and qualitatively -speaking, its health, vigor, and degree
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of general and technical education. Thirdly are the raw materials and power
sources she possesses or has unequivocal access to: mineral (including
uranium), forest and fishery resources, water power, etc. Fourth are food
stuffs and feeds; next, standing industrial plant and the means of distributing
the finished product. Sixth is the transportation net and the inventory of
vehicles; seventh, the political structure of the state and its stability; eighth,
the social structure and the inventory of virtues which the population possess -
es; ninth, the moral quality of the people and the kind of values for which they
are prepared to make sacrifices. Sometimes this list is shortened and some-
times it is spun out, as anyone can see it might be, to fill pages and pages.
But intelligence must also be aware of the process of mobilization
and what it involves. Mobilization is in essence a matter of internal adjust-
ment or readjustment. A country organized for the welfare and security of
its citizens must now put security way out in front and welf are an appropriate
distance in the rear.
Mobilization means that a large percentage of the most productive
age group - the men and women between 17 and 45 - are put into uniform
and taught to use the complicated and expensive implements of war. Before
the process is completed this group may be 10% or even more of the total
population, In terms of food, shelter, clothing, medical care, transportation,
communications, insurance and the tools of war it may be supported at a
higher average level than was required in civil life. There must be adjust-
ments. What adjustments? How successful is Great Frusina likely to be
in making them? These two questions are the points of departure for gauging
the net effectiveness of mobilization.
All adjustments must take place within Great Frusina's po i i t y. Even
though her government may be as dictatorial as Hitler's in 1936, there still
must be political loin-girding. The less concentrated the political power,
the greater must be that adjustment.
The next adjustment which the new government must initiate and
supervise is in Great Frusina's economy. Here there are at least three
things intelligence must know before it begins its analysis. (1) the amount
of fat on the economy (2) the amount of slack in the economy and (3) the
flexibility of which the economy is capable.
By fat, I mean such things as Britain had at the start of World War
II: extensive external assets, a large merchant. marine, access to necessary
raw materials and the credits to buy them without going into current pro-
duction, a large and up-to-date supply of capital equipment, a large inventory
of finished goods, a national diet of three to four thousand calories per day,
etc. Important elements of German fat existed in the excess capacity of ma-
chine tools, a large amount of brand new plant and new housing. The Italians
had practically no fat, indeed little enough lean.
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By slack, I rnean such things as the 40-hour week, twelve to sixteen
years of education :for youth, small proportion of women in the labor force,
unemployment of both labor and capital, only partial utilization of equipment,
etc.
By flex i b i l i i;y, I mean the capacity of the economy to beat plowshares
and pruning hooks into swords, and that in jig time; the ability of technicians
to make typewriter factories over into machine gun factories, and put the
manufacturers of dry breakfastfood into the shell-fuse business; the ability
to make synthetics from scratch where the natural sources have dried up.
As adjustments take place within. the economy what must intelligence
know to gauge the extent and results of the shake-up?
It must know how enlargements in standing capital equipment, power
resources, and in the labor force are being contrived; how strategically-
necessary raw materials are being stockpiled; andfor those in short supply,
what success is attending the development of substitutes. It must know how
speedily and efficiently heavy industry is being changed over from the manu-
facture of the machines of peace to the engines of war, and how deftly light
industry is being shifted from consumer durables to shell fuses, range
finders, radar components, and small arms. It must know these things - in
so far as they may be known or estimated - and hundreds like them. Then
it mustbe able to gauge how well the government is allocating raw materials,
making its contracts with private enterprise, financing essential blocks of
war industry, arranging for the equitable distribution of consumer goods,
and curbing inflation; i.e., it must know how tolerable the government is able
to make an otherwise intolerable life to the civilians who must produce the
implements of war, suffer its economic hardships, bear its tragedies and
still be denied the incentives of active participation.
None of these things can be, known in the same way that one can know
the number of miles of paved street in City X or the number of -sugar beet
refineries in County Y. Intelligence must have far more than a checklist of
capital goods, labor force, and raw materials; it must have a great deal of
general wisdom about the capacity of Great Frusina to pull these resourses
together, the strength of its political authority, its unity and resolve, its
managerial competence. The intelligence worker must have a willingness
to transmute himself into the Great Frusinan who is boss of mobilization,
who realizes that the issues are those of national survival and who may pull
any trick in the book - dirty, unorthodox, "unsound" in classical terms, and
illegal - if it will gel: him results.
The third adjustment attendant upon mobilization is the social adjust-
ment. Intelligence must know how the people will adjust to the loss of luxu-
ries, amenities, and even necessities; how they will react to poorer if not
less food, less clothing, more crowded living conditions, and less civil liberty;
how they will take the departure of their young people, the disruption of
families and family businesses, and the grim prospect of casualties. Few
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of these things can be positively known. Intelligence must settle for approx-
imations which emerge from devious methods of inquiry. If it cannot find
out exactly how people are reacting to rationing, it may find indirect evidence
by following such things as changes in government rationing regulations.
These may be available in the newspapers mnd may indicate in so many words
that the black market is booming or that civilian compliance is high. One
cannot stress too heavily the importance of the indirect approach where the
direct is impossible, nor can one overstress the fact that devising the indirect
approach - "formulation of the method" it would be called informal terms -.
is itself an act of intelligence and an essential part of the process.
The last adjustment which Great Frusinans must make and of which
intelligence must take note are those within the code of their national Mora i i t y,
within their established values of good and bad. Here, perhaps, are some of
the most difficult tasks which intelligence must face and some of the most
important to solve. On the assumption the t all the accepted moral values of
life in peacetime are not values which will forward victory in war, the
problem for the government is to alter these values or remodel them. The
problem for intelligence is to anticipate how the people will react to these
attempts. Let us suppose that Great Frusinans were brought up on the mes-
sage of Jesus, how easily will they make the transition to a war morality
where all evil things are pragmatically, at least, justified? How many people
are going to be pacifists or conscientious objectors, and if any large number,
how will their point of view affect the success of mobilization? Or suppose
Great Frusinans, like some Orientals, appear to view the business of staying
alive with indifference; as soldiers do not expect to survive war, indeed often
seem to welcome death, what can intelligence discern in this attitude which
will qualify its overall guess on war potential? A correct estimate along
these lines, for instance, would have told us much about the long-range capabi-
lities of Japan's air force.
The preceding pages have been addressed to these questions of mobi-
lization: What adjustments must Great Frusina accomplish in turning from
peaceful pursuits to preparations for the use of armed power? The second
question is yet to be answered. It is: How successful is she likely to be?
Here you must try to simulate Great Frusinans own appraisal of the
s ttuat ion against which she is prepared to mobilize. How do the elements
of time and space (geographical relationships) shape up in Great Frusina's
probable calculations? Has she the time to prepare, and once mobilized can
she expect to project her military power to a spot on the earth where it will
do some good?
Against this background you will again consider what I have called
the fat, the slack, and flexibility of the economy. You will reassess the skill
and will of Great Frusina to plan, coordinate, and implement the huge job of
mobilization. You will reconsider its probable performance with the civilian
economy. Will it do a good job; will the citizens realize it? Will they be
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able to see results commensurate with their efforts and sacrifices, or will
things appear to be as bad as the gloomy ones have predicted?
When the speculative element of strategic intelligence knows and
correctly assesses these things - drawing heavily for basic data from the
descriptive and reportorial elements - it is in a fair way to know the di-
mens:ions of Great Frusina's strategic stature.
Specific Vulnerability
In speculations about Great Frusina's future it is not enough merely
to analyze and add up her strategic assets. There are subtractions to be
made? The negative quantities are what I am calling her specific vulnera-
bilities.
By these words I do not mean the general indefensibility of her
frontier or the destructibility of her cities, or any other such thing that may
be common to a great many states and may constitute a broad strategic
weakness against which a strong opponent may direct his general attack.
Assuming that Great Frusina is one of the world's strongest powers and
that frontal attack with any of the non-military or military instruments of
grand strategy is too costly to contemplate, perhaps she possesses soft
spots the exploitation of which will yield results disproportionate to the
outlay of efforts. If she has such soft spots she has what: I am calling spe-
cific vulnerabilities. The problem is: What must you know to know the
location and nature of Great Frusina's specific vulnerabilities?
The answer to this question is that you must have the kinds of en-
cyclopedic knowledge described in the last. two chapters; and from that select,
by analytical processes, those facets of life of Great Frusina which are vul-
nerable to the psychological, political, economic, and military weapons you
may possess.
During World War II we identified and misidentified a large number
of specific vulnerabilities of our enemies. Unquestionably our correct identi-
fications hastened the victory. Among the readiest examples of successful
selection was in the strategic air bombardment of German synthetic oil and
aircraft production and on the Hokkaido-Honshu coal ferries.
Peacetime affords as many examples as wartime of specific vulnera-
bilities and of their exploitation by the non-military instrumentalities of
grand strategy. For instance; the Soviet Union's ambivalent position on the
western frontiers of Poland. To the Poles, the U.S.S.R. was saying, "We
assure you the Oder-Neisse line," and to the Germans in the Soviet-occupied
zone whose support the Soviets were earnestly seeking, the U.S.S.R. was
saying, "As agreed at Yalta, the Oder-Neisse line is not a closed issue."
Mr. B yrnes in his Stuttgart speech of September 1946 exploited this vulnera-
bility to the hilt. When he asked the Russians if they had decided how this
frontier would be fixed he forced them to close a decision they wished to keep
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open. It will be recalled that the Russians had to forsake the comfortable
double position and reassure the Poles, thus losing support in Germany.
This was precisely Mr. Byrnes's plan.
Probable Courses of Action: Estimates
If you have knowledge of Great Frusina's strategic stature, knowledge
of her specific vulnerabilities and how she may view them, and knowledge
of the stature and vulnerabilities of other states party to the situation, you
are in a fair way to be able to predict her probable courses of action.
To strengthen the reliability of your prediction you should possess
two additional packages of knowledge. First, you should know about the
courses of action which Great Frusina has followed in the past. Does the
history of her foreign policy reveal a pattern which she will adhere to? Has
she followed certain lines of international behavior for so long that they have
hardened into traditions with proven survival value. Or are they myths
founded in irrationality? Will these traditions or myths exert an influence -
even though an illogical influence-upon her probable present course of action'?
Has Great Frusina an old friend with whom she will never break; has she
had over the years a real need for an "eastern ally"; has she a traditional
"life-line of empire" to maintain, or the urge for "ice-free ports"? Know-
ledge of this order is important but must be used with caution. For while
the force of tradition is strong, the present moment may be the very one in
which Great Frusina is girding herself to break with the past.
Second: you should know, as closely as such things may be known,
how Great Frusinans are estimating their own stature. She is not immune
to errors in judgment (neither were Germany and Japan in World War II)
and is capable of overestimating her own chances of success, and under-
estimating the strength of her opponents.
One may say in summary that if intelligence is armed with the various
kinds of knowledge which I have discussed in this chapter, and if it commands
the welter of fact which lies behind them, intelligence ought to be able to make
shrewd guesses - estimates, they are generally called - as to what Great
Frusina, or any other country is likely to do in any circumstance whatsoever.
In such fashion intelligence-can have a reasoned opinion on what
policies any country is likely to initiate within the next year. Intelligence
should be able to estimate the chances of nationalization of a particular
British industry in the next six months and the effect such a move would
have on Britain's balance of payments. Likewise intelligence should be able
to estimate another country's reaction to outside stimuli. What for instance,
would be the probable reactions of the U.S.S.R. to an arrangement whereby
the U.S. secured rights to the naval and air facilities of Mers el Kebir,
Bizerta, Malta, Cyprus, and Alexandria? What would they be to a violent
swing to the left of the British Labor Party or the emergence of Communist
Party control in France?
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B of ore leaving this subject; the question should be asked: how valuable
is the "knowledge" which emerges from this element of strategic intelligence ?
Are the so-called "estimates" of any value? My answer is Yes, they are of
very great value if they are soundly based in reliable descriptive data, re-
liable reporting, and proceed from careful analysis. The value may not be
an absolute and ultimate one; the speculative evaluation or estimate may not
be exactly accurate;, but if individual lives and the national security are -at
stake I would prefer the indexes of strategic -stature, specific vulnerability,
and probable courses of action as they emerge from this phase of strategic
intelligence to the indexes afforded by the only alternative, i.e., the crystal
ball. In actual fact, many a speculative estimate has been astonishingly close
to what actually came to pass. The social sciences have by no means yet
attained the precision of the natural sciences; they may never do so. But in
spite of the profound methodological problems which they face they have
advanced prodigiously in the last fifty years. Their accomplishments are
large not merely in the area of description but more importantly in the area
of prognosis. If the record did not read thus, this pamphlet most emphati-
cally would not have contained a chapter or, this element of the long-range
intelligence job.
A Note on Capabilities
Although this discussion has faced up to the possibility of war and
the mobilization of armed power, and although I have drawn many illus-
trations from wartime, it has so far been cased in a context - and hope --- of
peace. It has been written as if we were directing our peacetime policy to-
ward maintenance of peace and national security, but at the same time we
were remembering that we might be thrust into a war which we must win.
The question may be put: What happens to the speculative-evaluative ele-
ment of strategic intelligence and how are our speculations changed, by the
introduction of a state of war? The answer is, our speculations change in
emphasis and direction, but not in fundamentals.
For example, the components of strategic stature are somewhat
altered. To begin w'.ith, the situa.t ion may wellbe much clearer now. We are
in it! There is a larger degree of certainty in the time factor. We are likely
to be able to discern much more clearly the geographical-spatial elements
and foresee exactly the place or places of major and diversionary attack.
The line-up of allies and enemies willbe much clearer though we may never
be able to call the turn exactly.
Next, although the enemy is still using his non-military elements of
grand strategy, they have been converted into quasi-military instruments.
Political pressures and inducements are used with gloves off and become
political and psychological warfare. The economic big stick and sugar -stick
become the implements of economic warfare.
The armed establishment inbeing i-s now the already-mobilized frac-
tion plus what was robilized during the emergency period. The big question
with respect to military power is now referred to as the country's capabi t i ties,
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i.e., a state's ability to achieve a given ob jective expressed in time and force
requirements. Where the enemy's objective is precisely defined - viz., to
contain an amphibious operation (Normandy), or capture a vital strategic ob-
jective (Stalingrad), or destroy by aerial bombardment his opponent's ability
to stay in the war (the first blitz of London or the V -weapon attack), or destroy
his merchant marine (the Atlantic campaign), abroader and more explanatory
definition is permissible. In this context we might say that "capabilities"
means the amount of armed force (ground, naval, and air power) that the
enemy can mount and maintain at maximum operational activity, without
undue damage to over-all strategic commitments, without overstraining or
ruining the home war economy, and without shattering the staying power of
the polity and society.
Thus the problem of peacetime war "potential" becomes the problem
of maintenance of the armedforce at the level of maximum operational activ-
ity. Nearly all the f actors are still very much in the calculation which intelli-
gence made in peace, but since the war is on, the word "potential" might well
be dropped.
Specific vulnerabilities are, if anything, of intensified importance
and their identification one of the major tasks of intelligence. They should
be exploited with all effective and available weapons, and will be defended
with all the skill, ruse, and strength the enemy can muster.
Our side will be calculating the courses of action open to the enemy
(our estimate of his capabilities). Military doctrine shys away from trying
to put the finger on the one course of action the enemy is most likely to take.
Rather it prefers to narrow down the alternatives. In an estimate or evalu-
ation of these alternative courses of action, the military formula known as the
"estimate of the situation" is used. Roughly speaking, this formula runs as
follows: (1) knowledge of the environment, i.e., the terrain, weather and
climate, hydrography, logistics, etc., (2) knowledge of the enemy's strength
and the disposition of his forces. (3) knowledge of one's own forces, (4) pro-
bable courses of action open to the enemy. The courses of action will lie
primarily in the field of military operations, but secondarily and scarcely
less importantly in the fields of political and economic relations.
To sum up: to make an estimate of enemy capab i l i ty in wartime you.
must have possession of the main categories of knowledge needed to gauge
what I called the strategic stature, and specific vulnerabilities of peacetime.
To get at probable courses of act ion you have to know much the same sort
of thing you needed for estimating probable courses of action in peacetime.
In totting up these similarities we must not forget one very large
dissimilarity. In peacetime it is not too difficult a task to come by the sort
of basic knowledge you must have to make these speculations (the U.S.S.R.
excepted). But during a war, when the enemy knows full well the importance
of keeping you in ignorance, acquiring the basic knowledge is quite another
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matter. It can be had, and much of it through perfectly overt channels, but
the effort necessary to get it has been multiplied many times.
Throughout this chapter in discussing the speculative knowledge
content of strategic 'intelligence, I may have given the impression that it is
a common commodity to be had for gathering. If I have given this impression,
I wish to correct it. Speculative knowledge is not common and it is not to
be had for the gathering. It is the rarest ingredient in the output of intelli-
gence and is produced only by the most competent students this country poss-
esses. It requires of its producers that they be masters of the subject
matter, impartial in the presence of new evidence, ingenious in the develop-
ment of research techniques, imaginative in their hypotheses, sharp in the
analysis of their own predilections or prejudices, and skillful in the presen-
tation of their conclusions. It requires the best in professional training, the
highest intellectual integrity, and a vary large amount of worldly wisdom
which is that subtle knowledge which comes from a set of well-stocked and
well-ordered brain cells.
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