A STUDY OF PROVOCATIONS AND HARRASSMENTS AGAINST U. S. CITIZENS IN SOVIET/SATELLITE COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000900110004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: STUDY

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
A STUDY OF PROVOCATIONS
AND HARRASSMENTS AGAINST U. S. CITIZENS
IN SOVIET /SATELLITE COUNTRIES
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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This is the first attempt to conduct a composite study limited to
Provocations and Harassments with the input coming from all affected
members of the intelligence con Triunity. The purpose of this study is to
provide an assist to the individual member Agencies/Depart-.nerts in
preparing their respective Defensive Briefings of personnel being assigned
to Soviet/Satellite countries. Since it is believed that each member Agency!
Department has its own uniqu, problems, no attempt will be remade to pre-
pare a uniform Defensive Briefing paper although the need for such a
briefing is most evident based on the following:
The KGB (and specifically its Second Chief Directorate),
as is well-known, is so organized that no part of Soviet Society
and no individual, indigenous or foreign, escapes its attention.
As the action arm of the ruling party in a one party totalitarian
state, it controls, directly or indirectly, the vast resources
of the state; huge networks of informants penetrate and monitor
the activities of all aspects of society, intellectual circles,
industrial establishments, scientific institutions, persons
travelling abroad or having contacts of any sort abroad. It con-
trols the hotels, the trains, the police, the borders and censor-
ship. The KGB can use the almost unlimited facilities and the
people of the USSR, largely as it chooses since its purpose to
preserve the regime transcends all others. Its own personnel
consider the system as perfect. Within this defensive system
foreigners, as a special danger, get special attention, whether
they are tourists, journalists, scientists, or students. And one
essential point must be kept in mind with foreigners: The KGB's
aim is not primarily to protect the regime against spies, but to
recruit these foreigners as agents.
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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For the purposes of this study it may be considered that the above is
likewise applicable in general to the satellite countries.
It should be noted that the terms of reference which were adhered
to for this study did not include any incidents outside the geographical
limits of the Soviet/Satellite countries. The definitions used for the
purpose of this study are as follows:
PROVOCATION - A .ny action taken against a person,
group or intelligence service to induce
hi:m or it to take self-damaging action.
The provocation operation is most
often the prelude to the recruitment
pitch. The actual recruitment pitch
will not be taken up in this study.
HARASSMENT - Any action taken against a person or
group to prevent or delay the achieve-
ment of the person's or group's objective.
The action may be of an inconsequential
or annoying nature escalating to one of
major proportions. The harassment may
also be a prelude to a provocation.
An analysis of the specific nature of the provocations and harass-
ments reflects that they are as varied in their details and severity as the
imaginations of the Soviet/ Satellite services can make them. Some of
the more interesting examples are set forth briefly as follows:
Provocations
1. The use of sex including heterosexual or homosexual advances
leading to entrapment.
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The attempt to buy or sell items which would be considered
"black marketing. "
3. The offer to buy or exchange local currency for U. S. dollars.
4. The requests from indigenous persons for foreign magazines
and books which the authorities could label politically unsuitable or
pornographic.
5. The recuest to mail or deliver what appears to be an innocuous
envelope, package, manuscript, note, etc.
6. The volunteering; by indigenous persons to commit acts of
espionage, statements suggesting disaffection with the regime, requests
for clandestine meetings, etc.
Harassments
1. The reservations for flights, made in advance, are cancelled at
the last moment.
2. The hotel reservations made in advance are found to be non-
existent upon arrival.
3. The secret police force their way into hotel rooms, physically
restrain occupants and search rooms.
4. The air is let out of tires of vehicles owned by U. S. personnel.
5. The creation of obstructions to prevent the observance of points
of interest while travelling, such as diverting aircraft; during freezing
1\'~?,ie:iiC }"f \l%4it-C?I Ilao'y- ABC`.. J'oklT-od s.\il \C'illdow- of trains, etc.
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6. The individual is detained for questioning by the authorities
and refused the privilege of telephoning his en bassy.
7. The local citizens detain, question, and summon the -militia
because of the alleged presence of an individual in an unauthorized area or for
taking photographs of restricted areas.
8. The surveillance cars bracket in the vehicle of interest', thus
p eventing it from travelling at normal speed.
Or, the whole, there does not seem to be a fixed pattern of timing
seven y to the provocations. Since the establishment of U. S. diplo-
.....d tic representation in the USSR in i 933, and upon the recognition of
Satellite governments in East Europe after World War II, these
,activities have become a fact of life for the U. S. nationals stationed
tr..ere, as well as for the non-official U. S. travelers. During periods
of relative East-West tension, as well as during "thaws" in the Cold
War, the number of harassments and their severity appear to escalate
or to slacken off arbitrarily, often without any apparent reference to
the overall state of Soviet/Satellite - U. S. relations at the ".moment.
In short, the one thing that can be said with any degree of certitude
about the timing of Soviet/ Satellite harassments of U. S. nationals is
that they will continue to occur as an accepted instrument of Soviet/
Satellite policy.
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The purpose of the action is varied but often times may be the
developmental stage of the pre-recruitment assessment. Some of their
objectives may be states as follows:
i. To prevent or obstruct the overt collection effort
of the U. S. military attaches.
2. To lower the morale and efficiency of the men tiers
of the U. S. Official Community.
3. To discover evidence of an illegal nature (particu-
larly intelligence, whether it be by planting or provocation,
on which a criminal charge may be based or an action of
declaring the target "persona non grata. 11
4. To obtain or manufacture derogatory information
about U. S. citizens or organizations which the Soviet and
Communist international press and radio can exploit in the
anti-American propaganda campaign.
5. To discover or fabricate evidence leading to the
arrest and conviction of non-Bloc citizens whose release can
then be offered by the Soviet/Satellite countries in exchange
for Bloc spies sentenced in the Free World.
6. To set up for recruitment by provocation and
entrapment through a real or fabricated blackmail situation.
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7. To rl J4i :.o a re .al-1aZory measure following ar. z c ,ion
by U. S. authorities a`;a.n st a..SSov et/Satellite diplomat for t ie
commission of illegal acz-1v-1t
8. To force the recall or reassignment of skilled U. S.
..:'sonnet, thus causing needless expense and lessening the
electiveness of t7hz U. S. IT:'iasion's effort
1 C.G':.duc iilg this st-,~dy, tae U. S. citizen in the Soviet/Sat'3llite
c '+c a w:::. cony .Cat:red as fa ling into one of iou Cain gories:
1. The
H. The U. S. Governer ei.t civilian off==icial
e'.Sj A.to t:ie area s'CS or TDY.
iii. The sclertLS't/ u inessrran who has access to
clas s".:-ed inlorrnatiori.
IV. ihle non-os:lta.ial visitor such as tourist or
student.
Perhaps the most general observation that can be made with regard
Co the four categories is that Group I is under almost constant surveillance;
Grow;? Ii is generally under surveillance; and Groups III and IV may or may
not be surveilled depending on the status of the individual. Another
Gbc-rvation is that a provocation involving sex is now most often used
against those persons in Groups Ill and IV, whereas a decade ago sexual
a, Broaches were widely employed against Groups l and II. Provocations
involving money exchange, blackmarket activities and induced blackmail
seem to be currently used most &ften with those of Groups I and 11.
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Attached hereto are sanitized reports of provocation or harassment
...cidents directed against i idividuals in the respective group s. T fie actual
country or date is not given since it is the modus operandi tha is important
here and that in itself has not shown signs of ciarigi nd. It must also be
rc::.~i"a".JCred that many of the harassment and provocation e~ ple cited
could be applicable to persons in all four categories reardlss of :sex.
The best defense against the activities of Hostile intelligence
services against Groups I and I.I is to employ the highest possible criteria
and standards for selecting personnel to serve behind the Iron Curtain.
Once selected, the individual should be prepared for his assignment in the
Soviet/ Satellite areas by 'giving him and his dependents a detailed briefing.
ie should be told specifically about tie tactics used by the opposition;
forewarned and advised generally of the course of action to be taken in
resisting them. It should further be conveyed to him that it is in his best
interest to immediately report any attempt of provocation, harassment,
en trapment, recruitment, etc. made against him. Also at this time, try
to dispel any sear or worry t '-.at reporting an entrapment will forever subject
him to security scrutiny. Advise him that the U. S. Authorities recognize
the problems, will assist him and finally that he should not try to handle
the problem himself.
In addition to briefing those persons in Groups I and ITevery effort
should be made to provide those individuals in Group III with a. defensive
briefing prior to their travel to a Soviet/ Satellite country.
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In conclusion, each per son should be apprised of the following with
respect to his personal conduct:
1. Behave more circumspectly than you would
at home.
2. Know the general provisions of those laws affecting day-
to-day living.
3. if arrested, keep insisting upon being placed in
immediate contact with the U. S. Embassy.
4. Be ever alert to the possibility of audio surveillance
in the home, hotel and office as well as to the use of
clandestine photography.
5. Don't over-indulge in the use of alcoholic beverages.
6. Don't compromise yourself with a woman.
7. Don't leave yourself open for homosexual approaches.
8. Don't accept items for mailing or delivery.
9. Don't deal with blackmarketeers or any non-legal
street vendors.
10. Don't comply with a request from an indigenous person
to bring into the country books or magazines which the
authorities could consider as being politically unsuitable
or pornographic.
11. Don't attempt to be a one-man r ruuad a ~Ln
Communism while in their country.
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Category I - The Military Attache
1. A member of the military assigned to the Office of the Military
Attache in an Iron Curtain country reported to his superior upon learning
of a proposed provocation attempt which was to take place against him.
A young, attractive, indigenous female acquaintance and neighbor advised
him that she had been approached by the Secret Police to carry out the
fol .owinig operation. She was to date the man and lure .him to a specific
hotel for the night. She was given a telephone number and code names
with instructions to call one hour prior to their arrival at the hotel. She
was further instructed not to drink; however, she was to induce the
serviceman to drink heavily. The female neighbor was -Instructed to
learn dates and destinations of the serviceman's travels, the names of
individuals who visit his house, and to get to know other members of the
staff with a view toward compromising them. She reportedly was told
that the serviceman had a girl friend across the street from his house
with whom he visited frequently. She was also informed by the police
that the former Assistant Attache had operated a "spy ring" in the city
and that the serviceman was known to have been an assistant.
The provocation did not materialize as the female neighbor made
no attempt to carry it out. She apparently did not believe the stories
told about the serviceman.
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. '0 Sri`
2. During a 2 1/2 hour period one day at the American n:bas y
located in an Iron Curtain country, the Military Attache, who spoke the
local language, had three visits by indigenous personnel.
The first individual who came to the Embassy wanted to cross
he border illegally into Germany. pie has stated that he thought the
Attache would know how to accomplish this and therefore was : olle itillg
his assistance.
The second individual followed shortly thereafter and he handed
the Attache a letter written in the local language. The letter concerned
.e a eged formation of an organization to fight the oppression by the
Cori zunist regime in an effort to obtain true Freedom for the people.
At . c .ec to the letter was a note giving procedures for a clandestine
contact between the Attache and members of the alleged resistance
organization.
The third individual to visit claimed to be a construction worker,
and offered to furnish the Attache with plans of 128 concrete bunkers
around the Capital if they could meet in a "safer place" outside the
Embassy.
In each of the cases the Attache refused to make any commitments
or further contacts and the individuals departed. The Attache immediately
reported the aforesaid approaches to the Ambassador.
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3. U. S. Military Attaches, after having completed a vi: it to
another city in the Iron Curtain country of their assignment, were at the
airport waiting for their flight. It was called ahead of schedule and all
passengers presented their tickets and instead of being led to the air-
plane, were taken to a waiting room. Upon arrival, a Lieutenant
Colonel of the militia announced he had received a tC ii d' v: n advising
that a dangerous criminal was attempti-..g to board the flight. Follow`. ng
the announcement; two of the indigenous passengers were subjected to
a cursory search. Then the militiamen turned to the Attaches who were
shouldered brusquely to a wall and their luggage was forcibly wrenched
from their hands. The proferring of diplomatic cards and passports
with the insistence that diplomatic immunity be respected was waived
aside. The Attaches were then forcibly stripped of all clothing and
searched thoroughly. This event took place in full view of both male
and female passengers. After some time, an announcement was made
that the criminals had been captured; perfunctory apologies were then
offered to the Attaches and the travellers were permitted to continue
on their way.
4. An American Military Attache attended an official reception
given by the Minister of National Defense of an Iron Curtain country.
The affair was well attended by the local Generals and Diplomats. Within
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an hour of the beginning of the reception, most of the Western service
Attaches had departed but the American Attache remained, hoping to
have the opportunity to speak to one of the Generals. It became apparent
after a short time that he would not be permitted to do this when two
lower-ranking officers intended to mono;:.oiize his time. While there,
the Attache ate nothing and confined his drinking to white wine. There-
after, a waiter offered him cognac and when he refused it, the waiter
u ite worried. The waiter offered it to him three times within
be carne Ci
ten minutes, practically imploring that the Attache take a drink. The
Attache noticed that no one else was being offered the cognac, and he
therefore continued to decline. Then one of the officers came up with
two glasses of cognac and proposed a toast with the Attache. This was
repeated within minutes by another officer. Following the second toast
the Attache announced he was leaving. Steps were taken to detain him
but he declined a further invitation and departed. Within thirty minutes
of the last cognac, he was home and in bed. He was reading the newspaper
when without any warning he began to vomit violently. There was no
nausea and absolutely no warning. He was extremely weak and could
not move from the bed to the bathroom. Thirty minutes later the
Attache's strength returned and the following morning his throat was
raw and the palate enlarged and swollen.
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Category II - U. S. Government Official
1. An American official in a post behind the Iron Curtain, while
on a trip to an outlying area of the country, was approached on the
train by a young fey iaie national of that country who asked if she could
sit in the same compart :ent. He allowed her to do so and during the
course of their travel learned that she spoke English and "by chance"
was traveling to the same destination as he. The next day "by chance, " he
again saw her while walking; through a nearby park where they renewed
their acquaintanceship which ultimately developed into an affair. On
subsequent visits to that city, he spent the nights with her in her apart-
ment. On his last visit to that city in the late evening while he was in
her apartment, there was a loud knock at the door; the door broke open in
the best Hollywood fashion and an individual playing the part of an
outraged husband accompanied by another male stormed into the room.
The male companion of the husband put on an act of attempting to restrain
the alleged husband from beating up the American and finally took the
alleged husband and wife into another room where sounds were heard as if
the husband were beating the wife.
In the meantime the friend of the husband came into the bedroom
and proclaimed in a loud voice that he was going to make a phone call.
In a few minutes an officer of the local intelligence service arrived and
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said lie was there to help the American out of the difficulty he was in.
.Le officer asked the America,.-,. if he had been invo ved with any other
females of the country and if he realized that the woman he was wit':
was married. The American answered that he did not know she was
married and had not been involved with any other woman. The officer
then produced an envelope with a large number of compromising photo-
graphs and threw them on the table in front of the American. The photo-
graphs showed the American not only with the woman present but with
other females of the local country. The officer then told the American
that his service had been watching the American for a long time and that
they would help him get out of the trouble he was in if he would cooperate.
The officer proceeded to threaten the American stating that he would
ruin his career and his family by showing the photographs to his employer
and his wife unless the American agreed to cooperate, but this was all
to no avail.
A short time later the American was approached again and more
pictures were produced and more threats made. The American' s reaction
was again negative and he then reported the events to his superiors.
2. An American employee assigned to the United States Embassy
in an Iron Curtain country met an agent of the opposition, a businessman,
soon after his arrival to his post. After six months the American finally
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accepted one of the many invitations from this agent, The American and
the agent had dinner at a restaurant, then went to the agent's hotel room
where the agent had invited two girls to join them. The American was
intimate with one of the girls on this occasion and again under the same
circumstances two months later. Compromising photographs of the
American and the girl were made on both occasions.
Some time later the American met an officer of 'the local service
who was posing as a French businessman. Soon thereafter the latter
invited the American to his plush hotel suite where two girls were waiting.
The American was intimate with one of the two girls on this occasion. As
the American was departing he was called into another room on the same floor
of the hotel where three officers were waiting. The officers interviewed
the American for about fifteen minutes and stated that they were "soliciting
his cooperation." They were aware of the American's plans to retire and
since he would be needing money, they stated that the American could name
his price, placing a stack of American dollars before him. The American
refused the offer and before they could proceed, someone came to the door
and said that the Embassy was calling the American. One of the three
officers drove the American back to the vicinity of the Embassy and said
to him as he left the car: "You'll be sorry if you doublecross us."
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Category 111 - The Scientist/ Businessna n
An employee of a larr-e well known corporation which has classified
c ri racts viz rued an Iron :: country to attend an international rnathe
:at ca cor:a erence. At the c ciusion c, 1 t1-Le conference:, he stayed on in
t'l zz count y to work as an 1' exchLL-.,vee" for zix months. During thl.s time
he aad planned regular visits to see ',s wile and children who were residing
teih porarily in a Western country i;1 Europe.
While in the Iron Curtain country, the bus nessrt?an became aCqua intea
h a nLrnoer of inCtigenous people, one of whom was a taxi driver. The
1" Sze:- able to get the AraieriCa i to trade money from the Western
country where his wire was ioca ted for the local currency. This same
to i driver introduced the American to a young lady with whom he had an
air. Some time.later both the American and the young lady went to a
private doctor for treatmnent of the same madical condition.
gust prior to his planned trip to see his wife, the taxi driver
asked the American to bring back some pornographic material for him.
Although the American knew it was against the law he agreed to do it believing
that he would have no trouble getting it by the Customs Officials since they h "d mace
only cursory searches in the past. On his return, the American's luggage was
given a very thorough inspection and 5 magazines were confiscated. In
seizing the material, the Customs officials had the American sign a document
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acknowledging the aforesaid act. The American had made the observation.
that the Customs man seemed to recognize him and also that he had his
name on a list along with others.
Upon returning to his roomy he received a call from the taxi driver
advising him that he would be arrested soon. He also stated that he had
confessed to the police, the money dealings he had with the American and
;earned that other accusations would be made against him, The American
became worried but did not go to the U. S. Embassy since he did not
believe he would be arrested. At a subsequent time, he did recall having
heard the taxi driver state that he reported to the secret police on a
regular basis.
Shortly thereafter and on the same day that he received the telephone
call, he was arrested and accused of, 1) illegal money exchanging; 2) import-
ing pornography; 3) transmitting VD knowingly; 4) passing unfavorable
propaganda,
During his interrogation he was threatened with 3 years at hard
labor on each count and that he could save himself by working with them.
He was questioned specifically about the security people at the embassy;
the security at his place of employment; did he receive a briefing prior to
his coming to their country; where had he 'Learned to speak their language
so well; what classified work was he involved in; etc. The fourth t; cusation
tiv.as t~ase:s uposii his i~7uxg orit: three copies of the Warren Report.
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Without warning, the interrogation was abruptly ended and they told
him he would be returned to its hotel but that he would have to meet with
them within three days. He was taker; to his "Hotel that night and the next
morning he went to the U. S. Embassy and reported everything. He was
i