Fourth Annual Report of the Security Committee

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000800080009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 30, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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IBSEC-AR /4
30 April 1963
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT : Fourth Annual Report of the Security Committee
There is attached for the consideration of the Board the Fourth
Annual Report of the Security Committee. This report covers the
activities of the Security Committee from 26 April 1962 through 30 April
1963.
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Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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IBSEC-AR/4
30 April 1963
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
Fourth Annual Report
1. AUTHORIZATION
The USIB Security Committee operates under DCID 1/11 (New
Series), dated 24 March 1959.
II. PERIOD COVERED
This report covers activities during the period 26 April 1962 through
30 April 1963.
III. OBSERVATIONS
The past year has shown the continued recognition of the com-
munity security responsibilities which all USIB member agencies
equally share.
The USIB Policy Statement, issued on 18 July 1962, described
later herein, sets forth the need for closer coordination and exchange
of pertinent information among the security and counterintelligence
Group I
Excluded from automatic
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declassification
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components. The USIB paper on the foreign travel of individuals
possessing. special security clearances issued on 1 April 1963, which
is also described later herein, similarly expresses coordinating
responsibilities upon each USIB member agency.
It is felt that security problems which affect more than one USIB
member have been effectively resolved through coordinated action of
the Committee and this serves to promote uniform security practices
and procedures among the USIB member departments and agencies.
The problem of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelli-
gence remains a matter of continuing concern. Considerable effort
has been expended in those instances where it appears that an un-
authorized disclosure may have occurred.
IV. ACTIVITIES
A. Implementation of Recommendations of the Joint Study Group
Report on "Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States Govern-
ment, ":dated.... December 1960.
Recommendation No. 18
Recommendation No. 18 of the Joint Study Group states that the
Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on
the important area of counterintelligence and security of overseas
personnel and installations.
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The Committee conducted an extensive review of existing policy
governing; counterintelligence and the security of overseas personnel
and installations. Such policy was found to be adequate. The Com-
mittee found; however, that the security and counterintelligence com-
ponents of the USIB member agencies with overseas responsibilities
should maintain closer coordination and liaison in order to ensure the
timely development and exchange of pertinent counterintelligence and
security information. In order to properly "focus community attention"
on this problem, the Committee felt that a Policy Statement by the
United States Intelligence Board was necessary to define more ade-
quately the mutual security and counterintelligence responsibilities
shared by the USIB members engaged in overseas activities.
The USIB approved the "Policy Statement Concerning Counter-
intelligence and Security Responsibilities" on 18 July 1962 (USIB-D-
1. 5/24). The Policy Statement affirmed that there must be an exchange of
pertinent information and as close coordination as possible among the
security and counterintelligence components of those USIB departments
and agencies having overseas responsibilities in order that the hostile
threat may be adequately assessed and effective countermeasures taken.
The USIB Policy Statement requested USIB member departments and
agencies to review as they deemed appropriate their existing programs,
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regulations, practices and procedures concerning counterintelli-
gence and personnel and physical security.
A "Guide of Practices and Procedures for Counterintelligence
and Security of Overseas Personnel and Installations" was issued as
an attachment to the Policy Statement for utilization by the depart-
ments and agencies in the over-all review. It was suggested that re-
vision of existing programs, regulations, practices and procedures
be made wherever applicable and appropriate to ensure a more effec-
tive system for the protection of personnel and installations overseas.
B. Procedures for Foreign Travel of Personnel Possessing
Special Security Clearances (USIB-D-9.6/6 of I April 1963).
The USIB, at its meeting on 19 September 1962 (USIB-M-234)
directed the Security Committee to review the existing regulations
and procedures, including pertinent provisions of DCID No. 6/3,
which are intended to control foreign travel for personnel possess-
ing special security clearances. This was later defined to specifi-
cally include procedures for COMINT, T, K-H and systems 25X1A2d2
of compartmented intelligence. The study was coordinated with the
SIGINT Committee.
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The Security Committee reaffirmed that official assignment and
private travel to denied areas of persons cleared for sensitive intelli-
gence involves certain degrees of risk in the protection of classified
intelligence information involved. The risk results from a deliberate
program of surveillance, provocation, entrapment and blackmail di-
rected by denied area governments against U. S. nationals.
The Committee found that DCID 6/3 as now written provides
adequate policy guidance for the control of foreign travel by persons
indoctrinated for COMINT and no amendments or interpretations by
USIB are necessary at this time.
The travel of personnel to denied areas involves three categories
of personnel; namely, Government personnel, consultants to Govern-
ment and contractor personnel. Each agency has established proce-
dures governing foreign travel. Foreign travel of Government person-
nel does not present any problem due to the control which the Government
can exercise. However, consultant and contractor personnel are of
concern due to the nature of the employment relationship to the U. S.
Government which limits direct control. A particular problem
involving consultants and contractor personnel is their employment
relationship in a sensitive capacity, in many instances, with more
than one Government agency.
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The Committee found that there was a lack of coordination
among the departments and agencies in approving foreign travel.
A particular consultant or contractor employee could be granted
approval for foreign travel by one department even though he was
in a sensitive contractual capacity with another agency which had
not been notified of the foreign travel. This lack of coordination
also did not permit the total access to sensitive intelligence to be
assessed against the risks involved.
To ensure coordination among the agencies and departments
in foreign travel, particularly as concerns compartmented sensi-
tive intelligence, the Committee recommended that prior to approv-
ing foreign travel, an agency should check the indices of the USIB
Secretariat, for contractor personnel possessing COMINT, and
the indices of the Special Security Center for intelligence commun-
ity personnel possessing T, K-H and clearances.
The Committee also recommended that an individual should
be given a security briefing upon departure and debriefing upon
return where foreign travel has been approved. Departments and
agencies should also be notified promptly through USIB of any indi-
vidual who disregards the denial of a travel request and proceeds
abroad to a denied area.
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C. Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Intelligence Informa-
tion,
During the past year numerous articles have been reviewed as
possible unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. Appro-
priate inquiries have been conducted through the Secretariat of the
Security Committee and analyses furnished to the Director of Central
Intelligence as appropriate. In addition, other USIB member depart-
ments and agencies have been advised as appropriate. Procedures
are continually being improved wherein reported unauthorized dis-
closures may be promptly reported and appropriate inquiries con-
ducted on a timely basis.
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