Report on Status of Operational Security
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78-04007A000500020042-9
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 11, 1998
Sequence Number:
42
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 7, 1949
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP78-04007A000500020042-9.pdf | 158.15 KB |
Body:
ApproviNgicwspelpase2,00 O*08,:,CIA-,RDP78.1WW00500020042-9
CONFIDENTIM.
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7 November 1949
MEUORANDUU TO THE DIRECTM OF CENT AAL INTELLIGENCE.-
SUBJECT: Report on Status of Operational Security
1. I feel that the continuing responsibilities of the I&S Staff
for advice to you on formulation of security po1ie2,- I-wit:ire a brief
.report on the current status. of "Operational Security". TheOpera-
? tional Security of CIA is deteriorating rapidly.. I believe that im-
mediate remedial action is required.
2. While the Personnel, ?hysioal, and Information Security of
the Agency continues to improve and may be considered excellent, sound
Operational Security is gained through command channels and can be ?
attained only, if all operations receive ceNrefUl overall. coordination:
and control in both the planning and implementation phases. -
.34. Examples of the lack of this overall control, as it effects -
security, may be cited as follows: .
a. No coordination in planning nor in execution between
? clandestine intelligence projects (OSO)and clandestine opera
tionel projects (OPC); which is in some oases tending to com-
promise both.
b. Confused andlaultiple overlap between OSO, OPC, and 00/C
in approaching and dealing with intelligence sources--such as
aliens, agents, consultants, and foreign agencies, which is tending
? to threaten or ?blow" sources. or to make such persons too familiar
with our operation.
c. Grave dangers arising when overall policies are lacking
in the establishment of cover in both the training and field phases,
and the transition of individuals through various types of cover.
8. While CB responsibility has been given to one Assistant
Director, it is difficult to implement due to the necessity of im-
pressing CB controls and guidance on parallel offices.
e. . There is a need for better intra-CIA operational pro-: '
oedure in the working relationships between the collectors of
clandestine intelligence and the producers of finished intel-
ligence. While Operational SecUrity demands a certain amount
of isolation one from the others.overallsecurity is weakendd by
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Approved ForNiv*V001/08/08 : CIA-RDP78-0 07A0005M20042-9
the lack of guidance from one 'category of intelligence operations
to the other; such as sound requirements to collectors and on the
other hend sound CE guidance to evaluators and producers. ?
4. I realize that higher re4hority has prevented you from central?
izing clandestine operations. However, pending decision as to the extent
of your authority over OPC and in view of the threatened compromise to the
security of the whole clandestine effort, I believe your legal responsibility
for protection of sources permits you to adopt certain positive controls.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
I therefore recommend that you activate in the Di rioter office
an Operations Control Staff. This staff should be composed of three
senior Intelligence Officials, plus necessary minimum assistants. .
. These officials should be arbitrarily chosen from. present- Chiefs of
Area Bremehes in order to insure the highest qualified persons available. -
I would suggest selecting one each from OSO, On, and ORE.
The functions of the Operations Control Staff would be to exercise
in your name the broad control and coordination necessary to avoid the
conditions mentioned. above... It would insure thet clandestine operations
or aIl,types:would:be.kept at a: high degree of security and efficiency'.
SHEFFIELD EDWARD
Colonel, We
Chief Inspection and Security Staff:
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/0814 ? 78-04007A000500020042-9
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