1947

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000300010034-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 1, 1947
• Content Type: MEMO

194 7
1. Security Division - Proposed T/O and Organization
Ii, Activation of Executive for Inspection and Security 3
Organization and T/O - Executive for Inspection and Security 4
IV. Responsibilities
I&S and OSO (Special SecurityO
Security Control Staff
Physical Security Branch
Investigations Branch
Inspection and Audit Branch
Related Responsibilities (Technical
and Censorship)
Relations with FBI
VI. Initial Security Activities -- I&S
Area Security Officers
Top Secret Control Survey
Security Regulations
Security Clearances and Loyalty Board
Space
Inspection and Audit
Secrecy Agreements Revision
Non-IAB Security
Congressional Interest in CIG/CIA
VII Contact Branch, 00
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2?
28i
29
30
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VLti "BIB000
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1. Security Division - Proposed T/O and Organizati
1. in January 1947, OCD recommended that the proposed
Office of Security be activated by 15 February 1947. It based its
position on the increasing number of security problems, the
variegated CIG housing arrangements, and the takeover of FBIB and
the Washington Document Center. It also recommended that immediate
steps should be taken to obtain the services of an officer for the billet
of Assistant Director of Security or Deputy Assistant, or both, and
that upon activion the Office function temporarily under
Acting Assistant Chief, Security Branch, OCD. I
Z. On 21 January 1947, the Executive Director informed both
ICAPS and OCD that the DCI did not contemplate activation of the
Office of Security until "our legal legislative status has been more
fully determined. " The Executive Director continued that there was
no objection to forming a nucleus for the Office, but cautioned that
hiring should be limited to key personnel as there was always the
possibility it would not be activated.
Also in early 1947, re;pared a proposed
T/O and organizational chart for the Security Division which was
submitted on 25 February 1947 to the Executive for P&A, after it
was coordinated with
Special Security Section, OSO. 2 In it he requested approximately
1
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employees to staff an organizational structure that would have sup-
ported OSO and the CIG. Organizationally, the Security Division
would have had a Records, Investigations and Physical Security
Section; OSO would have had a Special Operations Section supported
by Investigations and Physical units. Of the requested 0 employees,;
25X9A2 Mwould have been assigned to staff the Special Security Section and
the remainder would have been for the Security Division.
Shortly after the Security Division's proposals were sub- ,'
mitted to the Executive for P. A., the Advisor for Management, ICAP,
person of
conducted a
ed "reconnaissance
survey" of the Security Division's T/O. On ll March 1947.
reported to ICAPS that the Special Operations Section, as proposed and
activated, duplicated the functions of the other operations of the
Security Division and that "
administrative control" of
4
the Special
Operations Section was "very tenuous. "
On the same date, the Advisor for Management, ICAPS,
forwarded the T/O to the Assistant Executive Director and included
the comments that he remained of the opinion that "adequate security
could be maintained in an office of this nature under a combined
-ith stronger central control and less duplication of
personnel" and that he saw no reason why investigations of individuals
to be employed in the Washington office of Special Operations should
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not continue to be made by the FBI.4
6. proposals resulted in Brigadier General
E. K. Wright, DDCI, advising
on 31 March 1947,
that "pending certain organizational changes being considered by the
Director, It does not seem desirable to consider the (Security Division's
25X1A9a 4
T/0) plan at this time. 11 This information was relayed by Colonel
o the Executive for P. A. and action on this matter was held
in abeyance.
IL Activation of Executive for Ins ectian and Security
1. By the spring 1947 it was evident that CIA would be of-
ficially established In the immediate future. On 18 June 1947 CIG
audit and security, Including security policy service, for CIG. The
same order transferred practically all the functions of the Security
Branch, OCD to the Executive for I&S, and "postponed indefinitely"
the establishment of an Office of Security. The latter announcemeni
was obviously intended to end further speculation that an Office of
Security would be established along the guidelines OCD had proposed
in 1946.
activated the position of Executive for Inspections
and Security and made it responsible for providing overall inspection,
25X1A 2. On 1 July 1947, was relieved an
and rFarne Executive for I&S, 6 and in
3
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M. Or
Lion and T/O
Execut
e for ms
1. In order to strengthen the Executive for I&S, a T/O of
8
25X9A2 ^ personnel was approved for FY 1948 on 9 July 1947? While the
approved T/O was approximately the same as originally requested
25X1A9a by the functions of I&S were enlarged and the
organizational structure, which had been informally activated, in
r
Audit Division
part, in June, included the Security Branch, the Inspection and Audit
Branch, the Security Control Staff, 9 and an Administrative Office.
Four divisions were subordinate to the Branches, namely, the
physical Security and Investigative Divisions, and the Inspection and
ants
. Shortly thereafter, the Executive for I&S rearranged the
organizational structure to appear as shown below:
6
Executive for I&S
t
ection Audit Investigations Physical Security
~,.Qp
Branch Branch Branch Security Control
Branch Staff
Appraisal Records Liaison
Division Division Division
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the Executive for i&S was given additional
stature in October 1947 when the chain of command was changed so
6
that it reported to the DCI through the Executive Director.
4. After taking over the c'tiess as Executive for I&S and
control of the Security Divisions P&A, the Executive for~
r
Colonel Edwards, reported to the Executive Director in Novembe
that the lack of an approved T/C? and clearly defined policies had
caused the following deficiencies:
(1) Shortage of personnel.
(2) Proper planning and establishment of
priorities.
ed for establishment of clear.-cut priorities
for security investigations.
(4) Lack of accurate records and files because
of insufficient personae
(5) Security policy and security operations
greatly lacked coordination in that functions had be
parate CIC offices and the Chief, Security Division
as well as Chief, Security Policy Branch, were
hampered by having to follow involved channels to
accomplish coordination.
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.~ .
NOW
(6) No security monitoring in maintenance had
been given to the handling of classified information,
including Top Secret control procedures.
(7) No
onitoring system had been established
for telephone conversations..
Security officers had not been designated within
all offices.
The Executive for I&S also reported that personnel on duty in the
Security Division were of a "very high quality . . . (and) had ac-
complished as much as was possible . , . "
By December 1946, the informal T/O of the Security
Division had increased to Memployees and with the approval to in-
ease the T/O to= in mid-194-7, the Executive for I&S recruited
qualified people to fill key positions. Personnel on duty or recruited
during this phase of the development of I&S Included
IV. Responsibilities
1. When the Special Security Section was transferred to OSO,
an agreement was reached with OSO which delineated the Security
responsibilities of I&S and OS4.10 Briefly, I&S was responsible to
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the DCI for overall security pbllcies and regul
CIO including
the personal security of all CIG personnel on vouchered funds at home
and abroad with the exception that the Assistant Director, OSO, was
required to review the security of all 050 staff personnel and to
maintain personal and physical security within 0SO to I&S was also
responsible for all security files, less active covert and semi-covert;
liaison on personal security of employees with the FBI and LAB agencies;
the audit of special funds and such other audits as were ordered by
the DCI; and further it performed the function of the IG.
2. The AD/SO was responsible for; the personal security of
all, covert and semi-covert personnel and all overseas GS0 personnel;
day-to-day maintenance of personal and physical security
establishment and maintenance of a field rove
050;
benefit of 054 and when requested other offices of CIG; personal and
physical security of all 0S0 instal ations abroad subject to inspections
specifically directed by the DCI; maintenance
security for all of CIG except the local telephone system; etc.
Security Control Staff
(1) The first Chief of the SCS was the former
hief of the Security Branch, GCD,
Jr.; he was followed by is
November 1947 and late 0
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(2) The SCS formulated security policies
provide for the safeguarding of classified informa-
tion and the security of intelligence; prescribed CIA
security policies relative to the collection and dis-
semination of classified materials and liaison relations
with Federal departments and agencies; provided
guidance for various external research projects; and
approved, from a security standpoint, various personal
activities of CIA employees such as publication of
manuscripts, speeches, outside employments, etc. 6
4. Physical Security Branch
Initially the Physical Security Branch, under its
chief, ^
25X1A security of all
was responsible for the
except those in
volving OSO, to prevent unauthorized access to, or
compromise of, all CIA activities; prepared and enforced
security regulations an required for all domestic Agency
activities, except ?S0; initiated and maintained a system
25X1A of pass control for all
assistance of OSO; maintained and supervised guards to
protect Agency installations; maintained and supervised
except 0SO; indoctrinated all new
employees, except those of 050; interviewed all personnel,
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except those of OSO; and termination of employments;
changed all safe combinations, except those of OSO,
and maintained file of combinations, investigated files,
lost classified documents, notations, etc,., except OSO, etc. 2
Investigations Branch
1) The first chief of the Investigations Branch was
(2) The Branch was responsible for the investigation
and clearance of all personnel being processed for ass
meat to the Agency, except those assigned to OSO; reviewed
personal history statements to determine eligibility, re-
viewed investigative reports and recommended action;
processed name and company checks as required by 00 and
such name checks as were required to clear applicants other
than those of OSO.2
6. Inspection and Audit Branch
(1) The existence of this Branch under the Executive
for I&S was the result of the DCI'a decision which was based
on the immediate need for a centralized Audit and Inspection
e Investigations conducted by FBI for CIA until January 1948.
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Staff and the recognition that to establish these activities
as separate staffs or offices would take some time to
accomplish.
By August 1947i plane for the Audit and inspection
Branch had been formulated and on the 12th of August, the
Executive for I&S advised that, in addition to
ignment, he would be designated Acting Deputy
"A" and in this capacity would "supervise the buildup and
9
cr anization of both the Inspection and Audit Branches.
(3) In the same memorandum the Executive for I&S
advised that the primary function of the Inspection Branch would
pection trips desired by the ICI to OSO installations
abroad a
e inspections of CIA propel
ty,
equipment,
supplies and the procurement program. He directed that "the
files, reports and recommendations" of the Branch were
"highly restricted" and were not to be made available to any
person outside of the Branch except the Director, the Executive
Director or the Executive for I&S.
(4) In regard to the Audit Branch, the Executive for
I&S stated that the priority task of the Branch would be to
audit CIG and 4S0 funds. He instructed that it would have a
"definite curtain" about it, and placed the same restrictions
on its activities as had been established for the Inspection
25X1A90
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activity.
7. Related Responsibilities - Technical and Censorship
(1) CIA and other IAB members were well aware
of technical threat posed by hostile audio penetrations in
1947. For example, on I July 1947, the DCI notified Mr.
25X1A9a that information had been received which
indicated contrived active attempts may have been made
to penetrate the physical security of American missions
and offices abroad. He suggested that all overseas missions
should be advised to "check for the presence of microphones
10
and attempts to open safes and lockers." However, the
first step by CIA to establish an inspection capability to
detect and prevent such penetrations was accomplished under
what was termed "preventive telephone monitoring. 1610
(2) In o
e preventive telephone
monitoring responsibility and related dviiees, the one
k-stenographer was added to the T/t7 of the Physical
s
Security Branch in August 1947.11 Later, Mr. Henry
25X1A9a -was recruited to fill this position.
(3) As enentioned previously, +OCD contemplated the
establishment of a Censorship Branch as part of the Office
of Security. OCD's concept was that the Branch, as
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it
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Federal censorship policies and procedures for imple-
m.ent+rtion in the event of emergency or waxy. On 8
September 1947, the Executive for I&S requested that a
policy determination, be made by the DCI relative to
censorship planning and on 9 September 19,17 was informed
that the DCI had decided against initiation of censorship
planning. 12 The Director's reasoning in regard to
censorship planning was made known on 25 March 1947
when the DDCI advised OCD that "the Director's interest
in delay of aggressive consideration of censorship planning"
was based on the "present status of personnel and organizatio
and the danger of becoming involved In "non-pressing activitie
(4) This proved to be a wise decision for although censor-
ship, an envisaged at the time, had an intelligence value,
action by the Agency along this line at that; time could have
been incorrectly Interpreted by other Federal activities,
including the FBI.
V. Relations With the FBI
1. When the FBI agreed In November 19415 to conduct In-
vestigations of applicants for overt GIG positions, It was mutually
understood that CIG would refer requests for investigations at the
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rate of approximately 100 cases a mouth at a cost to GIG of
$100. 00 a case, and that the Bureau would complete the investiga-
13
tions in approximately two weeks. However, on. 8 January 1947,
the Director, FBI, notified the DCI that the number of investigations
referred to it was considerably more than 100 and in view of this,
the Bureau felt a 30-day period would be a more practical basis of
relationship. 13
2. In the meantime, the DCI had advised Mr. Hoover, FBI,
on 31 December 1946 that CIG was prepared to accept transfer of
responsibilities in Latin America according to a schedule that opened
with on 20 January 1947 and ended
14 April of the same year. 13
3. At this point in time, CIG-FBI relations appeared to be
cordial with CIG being most circumspect in its dealings with the
FBI. However, on 30 September 1947, Mr. Hoover formally
advised the DCI, without advance warning, that "in view of Executive
Directives and action taken by the Congress of they United States,
additional responsibilities have been placed on the Federal Bureau
of Investigation which make it impossible for this Bureau to continue
the present arrangement which exists between the Central Intelligence
Agency and the FBI for the conduct of applicant investigations.
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continued that the CIA "should be ready to assume all responsibility
l4
for (CIA applicant) investigations on 15 October 1947. "
4. The DCI replied to the FBI on 3 October and requested
the FBI to reconsider its original decision or to at least postpone
the effective date until the National Security Council had time to re-
view his memorandum, a copy of which was attached. In this
memorandum, the DCI described the effect the FBI termination of
ssttgations would have on CIA and be concluded that should the
decision of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
discontinue his service to this Agency stand, it Is requested that:
"a. The National Security Council authorize the
CIA to establish a
vestigative unit on a nation-
wide basis and provide it with the essential facilities and
authority to meet the standards of investigation expected
of and established by the FBI. We should also be given
a directive providing the same standing in government for
the results of our investigations of CIA applicants and
personnel now accorded to the FBI Investigations.
"b. The FBI be instructed by the President to make
personnel investigations for the CIA on the basis of our
current agreement for a further 6 months' period in order
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that our personnel procurement program may not be
completely blocked with the resultant inability of the
CIA to meet its responsibilities in connection with the
national security. "
5. Following the above, the FBI extended;. the 15 October
deadline to 15 November 1947, and then to l January 1948. On 18
November 1947, the DCI sent a letter to Mr. Hoover which was pre-
pared in draft by the Executive for I&S. While the Intent of the letter
was to restore normal FBI-CIA relations, it also contained an
interesting statement which described the "political climate" of the
day. The statement follows:
"Our mission is the foreign intelligence one. We
certainly do not wish to build up, even for the purpose of
investigating our own candidates, an organization which
could even be accused of duplicating or overlapping the
function of the FBI, as a!
I the very fact
that there exists in our investigative files the FBI reports
on myself . . . is a protection to the Government and my-
self. This is in accord with the democratic process of
checks and balances and dispells all accusations of
'Gestapo' to either of our Agencies."
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 25X1A
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He expressed his regrets
that the procedure had not been brought to the attention of the FBI
and pointed out that it had been cancelled. 4
9. Also, on 14 November 1947, Colonel Edwards and Mr.
formalized that contacts with the Justice Department would be through
the and
1
and CIA contacts would be through
a. Following up on his earlier memorandum to the
Executive Director in which he noted the deficiencies
that existed in the Security Division, the Executive for
VI. Initial Security Activities Executive for I&S
1. Area Security Officers
I&S prepared CIG
which was issued
5 August 1947. This memorandum instructed that all
Assistant Directors and Staff heads would appoint a SSecurity
Officer who would be responsible to the office concerned
for insuring compliance with CIG security, regulations and
policies. 16 It stipulated that the names of those selected
had to be submitted to the Executive for I&S within one week,
that the grades of the individuals involved should not be
below grade CAF-9 or P-3, and that such personnel not
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with their duties and responsibilities and to ensure that in
the performance of their, duties they operated within the
b. In addition, the Executive for I&S Initiated a
program of holding frequent meetings with these (non-
career) security officers in order to familiarise them
have access to Personnel Security files of CIG personne;
25X1A parameters of CIG
While not directly
related to the above, I?IG had Special Security Officers
starting in 1946. These officers included
13 D
1
17 January 1947; an
2, '`op Secret Control Survey
a. Another activity that required the
eceam
6
V
1946 to
immediate attention
of I&S was the Top Secret control system in effect in CIG in /
1947. Between 23 July and 18 November 1947, a
urvey was
made of the system within several offices and staff sections
impractical, and frequently involved the loss of time and
created excessive paper work; and, the lack of a well
operations; that full compliance with regulations
of the Agency. Briefly, the survey found no indication of
deliberate or malicious mishandling of Top Secret material
even though in some instances cognizant deviation from
regulations was freely admitted because of efficiency in
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ed and authoritative supervision had resulted in
handling of Top Secret material,
particularly in regard to receipts, logo and transstnis
b. The report contained a number of recommendations
which were incorporated into a memorandum for the various
Assistant Directors as well as the Executive Director, and
the Executive for A&M, dated 12 November 1947. 19 Significant
sections of this memorandum Poll
"(1) Certain basic changes in the overall Top
Secret control procedures are demanded by the current
operational requirements of CIA. These changes affect
the fundamental organization of Top Secret control within
CIA and the manner in which this organization is integrated
with the Special Distribution Section of Central Records.
"(2) SIDS In not acting as a truly centralized control
for the handling of T. S. material and due to operational
requirements, can never perform the function as
originally conceived.
U(3) It is the conviction of this office that Top Secret
control procedures must be decentralized to five or
control points, but retaining 8D$ as the office of record
and audit.
19
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R1 (4) An operational plan for the control of T. S.
to be prepared by Chief, Security Control Staff,
Executive for I &S, the T. S. Control Officer, CIA,
and representatives of Agency offices concerned.."
n connection with the development of an operational
plan, the memo contained a suggested line of approach and
named the Chief, Security Control Staff as, the senior member.
3. Securi. Regulations o`r4 4~
a. The updating of the 1946 Security Regulations also
received priority attention following the establishment of the
Executive for I&S. Although the 1946 Regulations were
adequate for that period, they contained salient weaknesses,
particularly in regard to the storage and safeguarding of
classified documents, and the security of buildings and
installations. In connection with the latter, ICAPS and others
had indicated earlier that the badge system should be revised
and that a new badge system should be devised and implemented.
b. The second issue of Security Regulations, dated
15 August 1947 contained positive action relative to the
aforementioned weaknesses.. of particular Importance to
the security of CIA activities, was the Implementation of a
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new badge system which limited access to buildings as
follows..
Green Bordered Badges - Permitted access
~e.rl YY Y .1~1 YY.wYY1.1 to all CIG buildings (except 050).
Yellow Bordered Badges - Permitted access
to all CIG Buildings except Administration
and Que Buildings.
Green Bordered Badges Stamped "Courier" -
Permitted access to all CIG Buildings.
Green and Yellow 5a d,Lea with Green Bands across
VY.I iY^ rnYr..w~y~11Y~w~
Upper Left Hand Corner - Permitted access to
Signal Center, Communications Division,
South Building.
Red Bordered Limited Badge - Permitted access
to CIO Buildings and areas specifically
described thereon.
In addition, the regulations established more rigid
procedures regarding the admittance and control of official
visitors and the admittance of employees to buildings after
hours. The regulations also clearly stated that casual or
social visitors would not be permitted and required that
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official visitors be escorted at all tines.
d. Unfortunately neither the 1946 nor 1947 Security
Regulations established a penalty system covering security
violations. However, by October 1947 the thinking on this
subject within I&S had progressed to the point where Mr.
Assistant to the Executive Director
requested by I&S to provide some basic guidelines on a
penalty system.'
suggested that the first,
second, and third offense system be established and he
recommended that the penalty for the second violation should
be a three-day suspension without pay, and the third violation
should result in the individual, being separated from CIA or
returned to his or her sponsoring activity.
e. Needless to say, s suggestions were
not accepted and they are mentioned here. merely to show the
attitude that prevailed in the youthful CIA. A more realistic
security violation penalty system was established in
September 1951.
4. Security Clearances and Loyalty Board
Prior to the issuance of CIG it
was proposed that personnel detailed to CIG should be
preferably second generation Americans who would be
1v /
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security cleared on the basis of a "four-way check;"
namely, MID, ONI, FBI, and the local police of the
individual's home town. 20 This proposal was submitted
to CPS for further consideration and study., During the
course of the study CPS consulted with other departments
involved in the assignment of personnel to CIG and valuable
uidance was obtained from the FBI, General Clarke of MIS,
m
1 ?~
and R. L. Bannerman, Department of State. 20 CPS ac_ /
complished its assigned task quickly and an 8 May 1946,
25X1A CIG Policy on Clearance of Personnel with
CIG" became effective,
h_ Along the same line- one of the manor impediments
to the personnel procurement program of CIG was the time 41-Y
involved in the conduct of background investigations on pro-
spective employees. At one point in 1946, there were 240
cases on hand and this figure did not include FBIS and Wash-
ington Document Center personnel. Because of this, a
priority system for investigations was set up in December
1946. The system established four categories; namely,
Priority One - new employees; Two - selected individuals of
FBIS and the Washington Document Center but not to exceed
individuals for each unit who were to be used as contacts;
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Three - remainder of the Washington Document Center.
c. The priority system did not prove entirely sati
factory, particularly to FBIB. and in April 1947, the DDCI
requested that the Security Branch, GCD investigate the
feasibility of establishing three to five security standards
CIG personnel, dependent upon the location of the offices
and the positions to which personnel would be assigned, with
21
out lowering security standards per se.
d. Later discussions with
FBIB#
vealed that FBIB had encountered difficulty in recruittol
employees because of the time it took to complete an investiga-
tton. To allevia
e this situation,
proposed that
FBIB be permitted to employ personnel for a period of 90 to
22
120 days during which time investigations could be completed.
e, proposals resulted in FBIB being
nted authority to hire certain personnel, under specified
conditions, for non-sensitive positions where there would be
no access to classified material and to hire personnel on a
short term basis (120 days) under the same conditions. 22
The subject of three to five security clearances was
fly put. to rest in August 1947 when the Executive for I&3,
a result of information received indirectly from Captain
=advised the Executive Director that in view of the
~5X1~9a
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DCI's desire no action would be taken on this matter.22
Had such a proposal been approved and implemented,
undoubtedly would have caused a considerable increase In
personnel security problems at a time when the Executive
for I&S was Ill equipped to handle them.
g. CIG authorities were aware of the., Congressio
egard to the loyalty of Government employees
and the personnel security problems that would have to be
resolved when FBIS and the Washington Document Center
were incorporated into CIG. In addition, at that time the
DCI lacked the legal authority to remove security risks.
In view of this, a Personnel Loyalty Board for the Central
Intelligence Group, under the authority of Executive Order
9835 of 21 March 1947, was established on 16 April 1947.23
25X1A h. of 31) April 1947,
25X1 A designated
as Chair matt of this Board and
his tour of duty as such terminated 31 May 1947.24
1. CIG's attention to the matter of establishing strigent
clearance criteria and a Loyalty Board was most timely as
is evidenced by the Director' a comment, reported by the
AD/OCD on 13 May 1947,. that certain members of Congress
were in a general way very favorable toward CIG, but they
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were concerned over the number of "Pinks" in Govern
ment and they reminded him that he would have to "clear
25
urther, on 21 May 1947? W. Pforehe
aative and Liaison Officer. reported to CIG authoritie
that George Moore, Chief Counsel, House Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service had advised that he (Moore) was
in receipt of a list of names of FBIS personnel whose loyalty
26
was open to question.
5.
ft-ace
a. By March 1447, CIG had. felt the need for a per
structure to house its facilities. At that time, G. C. Marsha
Secretary of State, informed the CIG that it would have to
25X1A -.cate the
27 Fu
response to an earlier request, the Bureau of the Budget
advised the DCI on 22 April 1947 that it foresaw no hope for
the assignment of a fireproof building for the exclusive use of
the CIG.
b. The DCI, however, continued to emphasize the need
for a structure and on 16 July sent a letter to Major Gene
P. B. Fleming, U. S. A. , F. W. A. , in which he pointed out
security and safety problems involved in the use of
Z6
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+6.
temporary structures and requested a self-contained
27
advised the Executive Director on 5 September 1947,
building such as the Railroad Retirement Building.
c. Writing on the same subject, the Executive for I&S
ong other things. that the Imports
of bits and pieces of offices each requiring guards will soon
amount to such an enormous figure to equal the actual rent o
realized that the cost to CIG of each single guard post is over
i
$10, 000 per annum, it can be seen that the continuous addition*
not be overemphasized. He pointed out, "If it is fully
olving the wide
dispersion of CIG in many buildings and "pieces" of buildings
a really suitable building. In addition, most present
9
buildings are serious fire and burglarly hazards . .'}
and Audit
In connection with the activities of the Inepec
Branch, on 15 September 1947, th
lye for I&S informed
the DCI that the Director of OSO had reported that there existed
a serious morale and administrative problem in the Near East
and had requested an inspector from I&S accompany the Chief
of the Communications Branch on a visit to these installations.
Identified as the inspector who, on the return
p, would also visit the FBIB installation at
urther information available.
9*
27
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Also, early in 1948. Colonel Edwards made an inspection
trip of FE installations. 28
b. To forestall any questions arising regardin
conducting such inspections, on 23 September 1947 the
Executive for I&S suggested to the Executive for A&M that
fictions of I&S be amended to read:
"Conducts such staff visits and inspections
intelligence operations of the CIA as may be neces-
sary to keep the Director informed of the mal
of implementation of the approved plans, policies,
9
and procedures of CIA. "
c. On the same date the Executive Director advised
offices that he would arrange for operational inspections
through the Executive for I&S and management surveys through
the Executive for A&M.
d. Later, on December 15. 1947, the DCI instructed the
Executive for I&S that on or about 15 January 1948 an audit
should be made of special funds allocated to Special Operations
and after completion a similar audit should be made of
Special Funds, CIA. The DCI advised the Executive for I&S
to "exercise extraordinary security" measures to ensure that
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all records and files incident to the audit were kept
29
separate from the other records of X&S.
7. Secrecy Agreement Revision
The first secrecy agreement utilised by CIG was based
on the U. S. Civil Service Oath of Office, Affida
Declaration of Appointee and the Oath of Office of U. 9
order to impress new employees of CIO with the importance
of maintaining security even following termination and to
provide the CIG and later CIA with a formidable appearing
document, a revised secrecy agreement was approved in
April 1947, and this agreement is still used today by the Agency.
8. Non-lAB Security
Prior to the activation of the Executive for I&S, the
Security Branch, OCD, made security studies of IAB and non-
IAB agencies to determine if the facilities of these activities
were adequate from a security viewpoint for discussion and
retention of classified intelligence material. Some of the
vities that were approved in 1947 by the Security Branch
included the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Export-Import Bank,
and the Interior Department.
b. In April 1947, the Branch prepared a series of contacf
security policy memoranda relating to the establishment of
29
{
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 Approved For Release 2001/04/24: CIA-RDP78-04007AO00300010034-1
contact with agencies outs de of the IAB group; namely,
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Trade Com-
mission and the Labor Department. 5 However, by July
1947, OCD's role in regard to contact security was clearly
defined in CIO
of 11 July
1947. The memorandum directed the Executive for I&S to
issue a series of consecutively number contact memoranda
that contained the rules and restrictions covering all contacts
with non-lAB asencies and this task was started In August of
the same year.
c. in addition to the above, the LOCI advised the AD/CCD
on 9 July 1947 that in regard to security policy for the die
ssemination of written intelligence material to departments
and agencies other than IAB agencies. OCI3 was authorized
to decide the need for dissemination but the facilities of the
Executive for I&5 would be used as required. 32
9. Congressional and Other Interest In CIA Activities
and Personnel
a. The early activities of C
CIO were of particular
Interest to members of Congress, other U. S. departments
and offices, and private individuals. In this connection, the
files contain a number of Congressioml requests for inform
tion about CIA, and in particular, the perso
ength of
30
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the Agency. All of these letters were tactfully rejected
on the basis that compliance would not have been in the best
interests of the security of the United States. 9 One
reply made by the DCI to Senator H. Byrd on 15 December
1947, contained the at
he NIA bad instructed
essential security reasons the strength of the CIA
would not be released for publication. The reply continued that
"two senior officials of the Bureau of the Budget had been
specially cleared for this purpose. ti
b. By the end of 1947 special security arrangements'
had been
Civil Service Commis
Treasury Department, the General Accounting off
Federal Works Agency to afford pertinent CIA informattot
9
security protection and control.
1. Contact Branch, 00
1. The 0SC and I&S agreement relative to Security responsi-
bilities permitted I&S to concentrate on establishing security policy,
procedures and standards for the remainder of CIG. As can be seen,
progress was made in practically all of these fields.
2. At the same time, the Contact Branch, 00, presented
many problems for I&S for resolution, particularly since it bad
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 Some of the salient problems that arose in 1947 are set forth in
the following paragraphs.
3. Prior to the activation of I&S, the Contact Branch had
acted as its own contact security clearing authority. It received
background information obtained from the files of the FBI, State
Department Army, Navy and CIG, and on the basis of this informs-
company. In order to tighten up this procedure, 00, with the con-
eurrence of ICS, established the position of name-check security
officer in September 1947. At the same time. 00 also defined for
its field activities what it termed "info" cases as being ones where
sufficient information had been developed to recommend special
handling by the Contact Branch as such info might have been obtained
from the aforementioned files. 00 indicated that an informal ar-
rangement had been made with I&S to release "info" to the name-
check security officer who, in turn, would pass the "info" to 00
33
4. Although the definition of "info" cases and the establish-
ment of a name-check security officer represented progress, the
Contact Branch still evaluated information and reached a deter-
mination as to whether a potential source was "clear" or was subject
to "security limitations. " In view of this.: a study was made of the
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 security aspects of certain Contact Branch procedures in December
1947. 34 it substantiated the above, and also found in part:
Name checks were initiated by Contact Branch,
00, sent to I&S which, in turn, forwarded the request to
the FBI.
b. The FBI results were
d to 00 and in
some instances they were supplemented by information
from I&S files.
c. IkS was not normally consulted with reference
to the evaluation.
Results of FBI name checks were retained in
The Reference Center, Executive for A
maintained files of intelligence sources which also
indicated whether a source bad been cleared or informa-
derogatory nature had been developed.
Name checks as conducted were inadequate.
The same study recommended that all requests for name
nd transmitted to the Executive for I&S
e necessary action;
that the Executive for I&S would provide the Branch with a security
evaluation in each case on the basis of information received from the
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the Branch would keep the Reference Center advised of all name
checks requested and the evaluation received.
6. The Executive for X&S agreed in principle with the re-
sults of the study but cautioned that "complete implementation
FBI and such other information as was available to I&S; and
34
eve to be evolved gradually." By early January 1948,
preliminary discussions on this matter had been held with 00, and
the Chief, Security Control Staff reported that the proposals received
an "excellent reception. '"34 He also added that under'the existing
procedure the Contact Branch requested 200 name checks per week
and that this l as resulted in
questionable returne because o
rge volume and the
d
then indicated that this
umber might be reduced to twenty if the Contact Branch would limit
number of I&S personnel.
equests for name checks to those of Immediate interest only.
necessary would require the addition of four Liaison Office
two Appraisers to the Investigative Division."
He concluded that to provide the "investigative and e
7. Discussions continued with 00 through February and Mar
and on 22 March 1948, the Acting Executive, I&S,
submitted a memorandum to 00 setting forth the basic guidelines
uniforn standards and procedures for the security
3!
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cedurees adhered essentially to the original ones presented by the
Chief, Security Control Staff to the Executive for l&S, and on
2 April 1948, the AD/00 advised IS that 00 accepted the "general
work" for name check security clearance. 0010 only exception
was that it did not consider it feasible to reduce the number of name
checks to twenty per week. It felt that this figure should be flexible
with every effort exerted to hold it to the minimum.
IX. FBIB
1. The FBIB also presented security problems other than
personnel to both the Security Branch, OCD, ant the Executive for
Among them was a request for guidance relative to whether or
not the fact that FBIB had overseas stations operating for CIG was
considered to be classified information. This natter was referred
to the DCI who decided in December 1946 that such information was
36
not classified and that F"BIB activities were considered overt.
This decision was modified in June of 1947 to limit the use
of the name, Central Intelligence Group, in connection with FBIB
installations, perso
id activities to those incidents wherein
such reformation was necessary or advisable to advance the official
mission of FBIB. The use of Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
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MW
U. S. Monitoring Postwas preferred as an alternative, and later
the Acting Executive Director approved the use of the name, FBIS,
36
etc.
Security guidelines were prepared by I&S for the use o
and around this time I&S informed FBI
that the responsibility for the security of its overseas activities
36
should be placed upon the Chief of each installation.
For example, meetings bad been hold with PBA authorities
1. Security Activities
a. By the end of 1947, I&S had handled a number of
Security matters that covered a wide range of subjects.
ive to obtaining higher caliber guard personnel to be
used exclusively for the guarding of CIA buildings in the
Washington area; security procedures and guidelines had
been prepared on the release of intelligence material to
Congresst a survey had been made of security procedures
involved in the interrogations and presentations of U. S.
Government officials who had returned from overseas
assignments for the purpose of obtaining intelligence informa-
tion; revised procedures had been established for the
handling of anonymous and crank letters,,
36
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b. As of December 1947, the number of buildings
that housed CIA activities had increased guards
had been obtained from PBA to protect these activities. I
Also, in November 1947, the Inspection and Audit Branch
conducted its first inspection. 10
Credentials
The lack of approved GIG/CIA credentials hampered
the early liaison activities and although several proposals
en made to appropriate authorities regarding the use of
credentials, CIG/CIA personnel were instructed to either
use their identification (building) pass or to make prior ar-
rangements by telephone. 37 However, some progress was
made on this subject in October 1947 when the Contact Offices
were activated and
the heads of these offices were issued "letters of introduction"
that also could be used for identification. Such letters were
made accountable documents that were subject to inspection
regarding their use and security by the Executive for I&S.
This progress, however, was not adequate for in July 1948,
Chief, Liaison Branch, OCD, met with
SCS, and again emphasized that the lack of
formal identification was a hinderance to OCD's liaison.
activity.
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25X1~6a
I
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3. Polygraph
Toward the end of 1947, I&S became interested in
the use of the polygraph as an aid in the security clearance
procedure. Prior to this the U. S. Army had completed a
study on the use of "lie detectors" as an investigative
technique. The study concluded that it was not a proven
technique, that the experience of the examiner was the most
important factor in arriving at a satisfactory and reliable
test, and that the operators should have experience in psychology,
physiology, and methods of interrogation and investigation. It
recommended that GIG be authorized to purchase two Keeler
polygraph units and that two regular Army, officers be sent to
Keeler' a for training.
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,use
cam
e.c'so,to
xt"ts r-
tic 9eb ~`'~ * . AUK
-. ;I ,9
u0s
2I*
S4,? 14 -
40
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 Approved For R(*ase 2091/04/24: CIA- DE78-04007AQQP300010034-1
22. CIG and OCD, Job No. 57-420, Box I
23. CIG Memorandum, Agency Archives
24. CIG Letters of Instruction, Agency Archives
25. General' a Tuesday Conference, Job No. 57-420, Box 6
26. Legislative File, Job No. 54-207, Box 1
27. Space and Equipment, Job No. 54-207, Box 1
28. "S" Job No. 54-207, Box 2
29. Funds, Job No. 54-207, Box 1
30. Subject Files, Job No. 60.247. Box 1
31. Policy Memorandum., Job No. 60-242, Box 1
32. Dissemination Non-LAB, Job No. 60-242, Box 3
33. Contacts - Confidential (00), Job No. 60-242, Box 1
34. Contact Division, Job No. 60-242, Box 3
35. Contact Division, Job No. 60-242, Box 1
36. FBID-FBIS, Job No. 60-242, Box 4
37.-, Identification Credentials, Job No. 57-420, Box 2
38. Investigation & Investigative Techniques, Job No. 57-420, Box 2
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