LETTER TO THE HONORABLE ALLEN DULLES FROM L. D. BATTLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000800100014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 7, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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WABHINOTON 29. D. C.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET ENCLOSURE
MEMORANDUM
FOR: The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
FROM: L. D. Battle ~-'~
Executive Secretary
I enclose for your information a
copy of Ambassador Merchant's report on
his recent mission to Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
Enclosure:
Cy of Amb. Merchant's
report, 11/16/61.
SECRET ENCLOSURE
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ASSIST-~:QT SECRETARY i
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`i':~e Secretary 1'l.ATE: November lb, 1961
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THRc7iJGli: A?~~t~ - Phillips Talbott-
FROT~i: Livingston T. Merchant ~~ f `~~~
SUBJECT: Conclusions and Recommendations Resulting from my Visit to
Pakistan and Afghanistan from Oct. 19 to Nov. 8, 1961, as
the Personal Representative of the President of the United
States for the Exercise of his Good Offices in Connection
with the Stoppage of Trs.nsit Traffic to and from Afghanistan
through Pakistan.
Tt seems to me unnecessary to surmnarize my numerous reports to you
during; the ?period of my mission. Accordingly, I am confining this final
report to my conclusions and recommendations for the future with respect
to this problem. What follows reflects my oral report to you and later
to President Kennedy at the White House on the afternoon of November 10,
during which call. Mr. Talbot was also present.
For convenience sake I am attaching a record of my itinerary (Tab A)
and a chronological listing of my reports by telegram and despatch from
the area (Tab B).
T3efore setting forth my conclusions, I might usefu].Iry record the
character of my reception in the two countries.
Tn Pakistan, President Ayub, Foreign Minister Qadir, and all offi-
cials t~rith whom I talked treated me with extreme cordiality and friendli-
ness t:nroughout. President Ayub and Mr. Qadir, however, from the outset
were frank in saying that, greatly as they appreciated President Kennedy's
friendly interest in this matter, they considered the timing of the Presi-
dent's offer of good offices and my consequent visit to be premature.
They expressed the fear that this would be interpreted by the Afghans
as uxi~.ue anxiety on the part of the United States and would lead to
increased rather than lessened intransigence on the part of the Afghans.
Nonetheless, they expressed the desire loyally to cooperate with the
United States and in good faith attempt to make my mission a success.
I was received in Afghanistan by the King, the Prime Minister, and
the Foreign Minister with equal warmth and friendliness. A11 of them
seemed genuinely grateful for this mark of President Kennedy's personal
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interest in Afghanistan. Froi7 the outset they made clear that whatever
tYic; OU~:COme of my mission, thk.y would always remember with pleasure
receiving me as the President's personal representative.
I did :ny utmost during tre course of my time spent in the two coun-
tries and in my final talks with both governments to assure that my
failure to achieve any concrete result neither ended the continuing
exercise of good offices in the matter by President Kennedy nor in
any way diminished the understanding and friendship on the part of
the United States for each country. I do not believe that my visit,
in fact, worsened in arty way the situation as I found it or impaired
our relationship with either government.
1. Wise and desirable as it was to seek to deal with the problem
of transit in isol.a.tion, the fact is that the transit traffic through
:Pakistan and the modalities under which it moves are inextricabltiy
involved in the attitudes and policies of Pakistan and Afghanistan,
respectively, with regard to the "Pushtunistan" question. This fact
accounts for the Lack of total frankness as to underlying motives and
attitudes which I found in my talks with both parties. It underlies,
for example, the willingness of the Government of Pakistan to go to
some inconvenience and even expense to shift physically the point of
delivery for transit goods from Peshawar, the traditional railhead, to
the Afghan border or at least as far as the Khyber Pass. Simi]arly,
though for different reasons, it underlies the Afghan refusal to con-
si8.er such an arrangement, notwithstanding the fact that convenience,
the simplifying of paper work, and the rational operation of transit
traffic through one country to another all argue forcefully for such
an arrangement for shipment in bond. The Afghans regard the Durand
Line as dividing Afghanistan from "occupied Pushtunistan" and not as
its border with Pakistan. However, all logistic sense is on the side
of a border delivery point on the Peshawar route under physical arrange-
ments directly comparable to those already in existence on the Chaman
route.
2. I do not believe that Afghanistan, either by choice or by
the present degree of its exposure to Soviet infiltration and influ-
ence, has yet reached the point of no return as an independent country,
free from .alignment t~rt.th the Soviet bloc. Neither do I believe that
in a few months the Afghans will be irretrievably lost, even if the
stoppage of transit traffic through Pakistan continues for that period
tirith the resultant reduction of visible American presence and the vir-
tual elimination of commercial contact with the free world. A permanent
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closu_re of the transit route through Pakistan or its blockage for a year
ox'r~ore would, however, give the Soviets a virtually free field in which
to operate their highly sophisticated, many faceted apparati for gaining
control and, as a consequence, reduce arty later chance or opportunity
for us to help Afghanistan recover genuine independence.
3? Pakistan is a stout ally of the United States, effectively
coo~~erating with us in many areas of the greatest importance to our
own national security. It is consequently my strong view that we
should never pursue policies with respect to Afghanistan which would
undermine the loyalty and reliability of Pakistan as an alZ,y.
l+. I found, or in some cases sensed, certain miscalculations
and illusions in the background'of the policies of each government.
These I sought to dispel, I believe with some success. With respect
to Afghanistan, they were:
a. That the United States was so attached to its aid
program to Afghanistan either for its own sake or because of its
desire to call and raise any aid offer by the Soviets to any neutral
country that it would put sufficient pressure on the Government of
Pakistan to force the reopening of the transit traffic on Afghan
terms;
b. That if the present prospect of no immediate reopening
of the transit route through Pakistan forces the United States to
reduce or el~ninate its economic aid program to Afghanistan, the
progres,r the major share of the b7.~.me. If they have not, in fact, perversely
~~nd for reasons of face block~.dc:d themselves, at least they have stub-
i~ornly .refused to test the public assurances and protestations by the
Government of Pakistan of its ~.rillingness to permit the actual movement
os~ frei_~ht on the transit routa. 1~Ioreover, I consider that the only
sirnifica.n~t concessions made with a view to arriving at a workable
modus vivendi on transit came from the Pakistanis.
7? That a solution to this problem through the continuing exercise
of good offices by the United States is by no means hopeless. I think
'chat my talks sharpened the issues, improved the basis for devising an
effective formula, and are currently forcing both governments seriously
to re-examine their respective policies in the matter. The passage of
a little time (and I am thinking in terms of three or four weeks) now
seems to me an essential element in preparing the ground for the second,
and, I would hope, successful effort for us to play an effective role in
solving this problem.
1. That our good offices in the next round be exercised through
Ambassadors Rountree and Byroade in a concerted approach, each to the
government to which he is accredited, along lines to be devised by the
Department in consultation with our two Ambassadors.
2. That we not contemplate penalizing the Government of Pakistan
in the treatment we give it in respect to aid or in arty other area but
SRCRET
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that bre continue to leave them in no doubt that we seriously disagree
with the wisdom of their current tactics for dealing with Afghanistan
however complete],y we share a common purpose and objective.
~. That we similarly continue to deal in friendly fashion with
the Af;;hans .
1E. That we promptly reach decisions with respect to the size and
character of our existing economic aid program to Afghanistan on the
assumption that the transit route through Karachi is unlikely to b~
reopened earlier than 'two or three months hence. I strongly believe
we should keep going as much of the program as can be logistically
supported, without extravagant transport costs, either by air or by
tho route through Iran via Pdeshed. This will entail a pxo~ect by
project review on which the recommendations of Ambassador Byroade and
the USOM in Kabul will be of great value. Some projects may necessi-
tate cancellation; others may be susceptible to mothballing; still
others now in the last stages of completion might be feasibly carried
to conclusion, even at considerable added transport cost. Certainly,
programs such as in the educational field, where people rather than
tonnage are important, should be maintained and extended as opportuni-
ties can be developed. Ambassador Byroade should be kept currently
informed of decisions in process in Washington so that he is enabled
to keep the Afghan Government currently apprised of the sad, progressive
and inexorable consequences of the blocked transit route.
5. That we not give, under existing circumstances, consideration
to the construction, at U. S. Government expense, of a new rail or road
xoute into Afghanistan through Iran. For the decades ahead and on the
twin assumptions that Afghanistan shows an effective desire to remain
free and survives the dangerous phase through which it is now passing,
the creation of such a third mayor route of access makes sense. Under
current conditions, hawever, it Trrould be a reckless project for the
United States to support. It could neither come into operation in
time to deal tirith the .crisis now hovering over Afghanistan nor would
a start on its construction contribute to putting pressure on either
Afghanistan or Pakistan to get the Karachi route reopened.
6. That serious thought be given to urging the Federal Republic
of Germany to use the Soviet overland transit route to Afghanistan for
the shipment of materials necessary for the various German projects
scheduled or underway in Afghanistan. Despite obvious unattractive
political aspects of doing this, it would at least keep some substan-
tial Western economic presence in Afghanistan.
7. That no
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7? Tl-iat no Presidential r,~essa~e to ~},*ub or the King or both be
sent, at least until the tactics for the next assault on the problem
h:~,ve been detei~nined.
In cor_clusion, it goes without saying thwt I have been honored
bar tl~e confid~ance you and the ~r?esident have shown by having desig-
n