MILITARY HAZARDOUS PAY DIFFERENTIALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03578A000600030006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: STUDY

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MILITARY HAZARDOUS FAY D7FFMtWTIAtS
I Nature of Hazardous Duty Pay
Recognition of Hazardous Duty Pay Principle
A. Private Industry - Additional compensation for the performance of exception-
ally risky positions is a well recognized principle of wage and salary administration
in private industry. Many companies are cognizant that positions have a high in-
cidence of mortality, disability and occupational disease create a serious problem
of recruitment and a moral responsibility. Accordingly, they have provided ad-
ditional remuneration in order to make risk positions more attractive and to com-
pensate for job-incurred disabilities. Although separate pay allowances for risk
are infrequently provided, except in a few industries, the principle of additional
pay for hazardous work is often recognized in private employment, either informally
or formally in job evaluation programs, as an important element in the determination
of basic compensation rates. The most widely used industrial job evaluation pattern,
formulated by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association, contains eleven
compensable factors, two of which specifically allow for risk. The factors are
undesirable working conditions and unavoidable hazards.
B. Federal Service - In Federal employment, positions which entail accident and
health risks are additionally compensated in a number of ways. The principal method
employed is the consideration by individual agencies of risk as an allocation factor
in classifying positions or writing class specifications. Second, payments of dif-
ferentials to certain ungraded employees for hazardous work is permitted, and a few
agencies, notably the Army and Navy, have resorted to
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laborers for the performance of irregular, manual tasks. These differentials are
relatively unimportant in scope, in frequency of use, and in their applicability to
general government duties.
Third, territorial post allowances and special privileges of retirement and
leave which are granted to citizen employees outside the U. S. are predicated in
part upon the principle of additional payment for hazardous conditions. Adverse lo-
cal conditions such as excessive weather and climate, dangerous transportation fa-
cilities, remoteness from medical and food accommodations, and location in undevel-
oped., uncivilized or hostile areas are circumstances which jeopardize the health,
safety and well-being of personnel. Although the CSC has established mandatory ter-
ritorial post allowances for citizen employees in a number of U. S. islands, admin-
istrative agencies are authorized to request the extension of employeest allowances
where privations are a normal feature of the jobs. The performance of hazardous or
unpleasant work is not the only Justification for post allowances, but it is one of
the more prominent reasons.
Whereas hazardous differentials paid to ungraded craftsmen and laborers are
for occupational risks, foreign post differentials are largely for situational or
area conditions. Separate compensation thus is justified in terms of both the haz-
ard element in a job and the risks attached to employment in a given area.
Fourth, hazardous pay differentials are paid in the Federal service to military
personnel. Mere hardship and peril endured by military employees in peacetime, or
war time, do not constitute grounds for payment of hazardous differentials since, in
accordance with the recommendations of the Defense Establishment,.statutory authori-
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zation for differentials has been prescribed only for specific types of military
duty. Consequently, military hazardous pay differentials have a limited, precise
meaning, connoting payments for the following types of military activity: (1)
aerial flight duty by crewmen, (2) aerial flight duty by non-crewmen, (3) submarine
duty, (4) glider flight duty, (5) parachute jumping duty, (6) duty involving con-
tacts with lepers, (7) demolition duty, (8) duty at submarine-escape-training tanks,
(9) duty at the Navy Deep Sea Diving School or the Navy Experimental Diving Unit,
and (10) deep sea diving operations.
Theory of Hazardous Fay
The brief for hazardous duty pay in Federal employment is characterized by the
following factors: (1) additional compensation to alleviate the ordeals of risky
work is a social and moral responsibility, (2) additional emolument is desirable in
a sound personnel program of recruitment incentives for certain hazardous positions,
(3) additional pay for hazardous work is a traditional principle in public and pri-
vate employment, although it is usually embedded in basic compensation rates, geo-
graphic differentials and leave and retirement policies, and (4) the term "hazardous
pay differentials" essentially refers in the Federal service to special pay allow-
ances for specified categories of military duty.
The administrative difficulties inherent in hazardous pay and the limited
meaning of hazardous pay differentials in the Federal Government would probably
impede efforts to establish hazardous differentials in civilian agencies.]
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For a discussion of the administrative problems which are e involved Civil Service
a government-wide hazardous differential pay sy , tertib-
ce
Commission, Report on Additional Compensation for Hazardous Employment, pp.
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If, however, the validity of the concept of greater remuneration for hazardous work
is conceded, the issue becomes basically a question of method. What compensation
plan is most conducive to a fair compensation for both regular and hazardous duties
of a job? What method will best permit the recruitment and retention of personnel
for risk positions? For the good of the general civil service, a standard policy
of treating hazardous duties as an allocation factor in setting basic pay rates is
a practical solution since hazardous positions are infrequent and occasional in
most of the agencies. But the feasibility of attempting to systematically apply
this policy in an agency having a large number of hazardous positions or in a se-
curity agency is questionable. Hazardous differentials appear to be more appropri-
ate in such agencies because they could be uniformly applied., would collate hazards
and remuneration and would be tangible incentives to recruitment. The history and
experience of hazardous pay in the military service substantiates this conclusion.
II Hazardous Duty Pay in the Defense Establishment
Compatibility of Hazardous Duty PAZ with Basic Military Pay Policy
It may seem paradoxical that provisions for hazardous duty pay were included
in the Military Career Compensation At of 191+9, the statute which prescribes cur-
rent military pay policy, in view of the fact that Congress regarded special pays
as one of the major obstructions to an adequate military compensation system. The
reasons why hazardous duty differentials were retained when several other special
payments were eliminated by the Art are not fully comprehensible in terms of the
.merits of risk pay alone. These reasons entail, as well, an appreciation of the
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underlying principles and conditions which motivated the general reform of the mili-
tary pay system and of the role of hazardous pay in the revision.
A. General and Hazardous Pay Principles of Hook Commission are Bases of Mili-
tary Pay Policy - A civilian advisory commission was appointed in early 1948 to make
an inclusive study of military pay, allowances, retirement and other benefits in the
Defense Establishment. After a year of intensive study the so-called Hook Commission
submitted recommendations for the first over-all pay and benefits policy that had
been prepared for the military service since 1908. In the interval, 1908-19+8,
approximately a dozen modifications of the pay system had been effected., but the
piecemeal approach created serious discriminations and inequities.
The large number of special pays and allowances was one of the two major prob-
lems which the Hook Commission considered. The variable eligibility of servicemen
for these emoluments, based upon such conditions as number of dependencies, length
of service, and location of duty, created serious overlappings in the total amounts
of compensation paid to enlisted men and officers. For example, recruits with max-
imum eligibility for special pays and allowances could receive as much compensation
as a captain, and a colonel could receive as much pay as a brigadier general. The
Commission&s investigations disclosed serious problems of recruitment, resignations,
morale, and promotional incentives.
The second major problem that confronted the study group was the disparity be-
tween the compensation paid to military officers and the salaries paid for compar-
able managerial talent in private industry. The lure of lucrative salaries in pri-
vate employment had actuated by 1948 an alarming number of resignations of trained
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Members of the Commission were: Mr. Charles R. Hook, Father John J.
Cavanaugh, I1o$aR ( 0 Q8 APREWB,030SiA 00030006-8
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NOW
officers, and. the Defense Establishment was menaced by the problem of dwindling
leadership. The Commission viewed with particular apprehension the impact of de-
clining enlistments and resignations of junior officers upon the availability of
future leadership.
As a consequence of these conditions the group was fundamentally concerned in
developing an incentive pay philosophy which would induce men to make a career of
the military service. Thus, the pay policy developed by the Hook Commission was es-
sentially an incentive plan designed to attract competent servicemen, to retain them
after they had been trained and to induce them to actively aspire and seek positions
of leadership. Two basic pay principles were enunciated by the Commission as the
bases for attaining an incentive program--namely, rates of compensation should be
commensurate to the levels of difficulty and responsibility of work, and military
pay should be correlated to remuneration in private employment. The first objective
was implemented institutionally (1) by the establishment of new pay schedules which
clearly differentiated rates of pay for each of the grades and (2) by the elimina-
tion of serveral special pays and allowances including: furlough travel pay, mes-
senger's pay, stenographerts pay, mailmants pay, aide's pay, workmanship and gunnery
pay, special awards pay, wartime combat pay and family allowances. To effectuate
the second objective, the Commission recommended higher levels of officer pay, for
all but the top grades, in order to approximate scales of pay for private manage-
ment. Of the three special pays recommended by the Hook Commission, hazardous dif-
ferentials, physicians pay, and sea and foreign duty pay, only hazardous duty pay
was completely endorsed in principle. Originally opposed to sea and foreign duty dJFrrr>1411
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the Commission conceded its advisability after the Defense Establishment had pleaded
for its retention. The Commission advocated a differential for doctors and dentists
solely as a temporary incentive, and it hoped that future conditions would permit
abolition of the payment. Hazardous duty pay, however, was justified as an integral
part of a well-rounded., permanent incentive program.
From the outset, most Congressmen were receptive, some enthusiastically, to the
military career compensation bill which incorporated the proposals of the Hook Com-
mission Report. Congress was impressed by the inclusive nature of the Commission's
recommendations, by the prodigious effort which the group had expended in preparing
its report and by the realistic solutions which it had developed in accordance with
defined objectives. The Congress was also aware of the defections of the antiquated
pay structure of the military service and of the necessity for rectifying these de-
ficiencies.
B. Principal Reasons for Con sessional Approval of Hazardous Pay Recommenda-
tions - Since the hazardous pay section was promoted as an integral part of the ca-
reer compensation reform bill, it did not occasion serious congressional opposition.
The relative ease in which the hazardous pay recommendations were enacted is further
explained by the following reasons: (1) hazardous duty pay is a traditional pay pol-
icy of the Armed Forces, dating from 1913, (2) the hazardous pay recommendations of
the Hook Commission essentially continued the pre-existing system of hazardous dif-
ferentials, and only two additional relatively unimportant items were added to the
hazardous duty list, and (3) the Hook Commission recommended a reduction in the
flight and submarine duty pay of general and flag officers and proposed an over-all
decrease in hazardous duty payments of approximately thirteen million dollars.
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Needless to say, the recommendation for reducing the differential pay of the top
brass made the whole section on hazardous pay more attractive.
The Hook Commission's Hazardous Pay Proposals
A. Policy Considerations - The views of the Commission on the desirability of
hazardous differentials are more significant to proponents of hazardous pay than
are its recommendations on the types of and rates for hazardous military duties. In
this connection the Commission unanimously recommended that individuals who in peace
time voluntarily perform operations which involve more than ordinary risk and danger
should be compensated. It was upon the basis of this conviction that the Commission
surveyed employments in the military service to ascertain which duties deserve spec-
ial compensation. The report is also notable for the emphasis which was placed upon
hazardous differentials as incentive compensation rather than as a financial cushion
for disability. The Commission asserted, "Close examination of the nature of haz-
ardous duty and the expressed or implied reasons for accepting risks indicated that
the incentive to engage and remain in hazardous occupations provided a more realis-
tic and practical basis for determining the rates of special pay than the theory of
recompense or replacement. The recompense or replacement concept, although promoted
for many years as the sole argument for hazardous pay was found wanting for several
reasons."' This statement places the stress where it belongs. Implicit in the old
concept is the idea that a hazard must frequently maim or kill in order to warrant
differential compensation, whereas in fact relatively few military duties impose in
peacetime a marked threat to life or dismemberment. Proposing the payment of haz-
3f Advisory Commission on Service Pay, Career Compensation for Uniform Forces
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ardous pay differentials as a technique of recruitment centers on the basic problem
of how to get a competent employee to assume a risky or undesirable task and how to
keep him on the job. This is the crux of the problem for agencies that must uti-
lize special recruitment methods in order to secure responsible, qualified employees
for hazardous or odious activities.
Other policy decisions of the Commission which are pertinent to a general dis-
cussion of hazardous differentials include: (1) only one increment of hazardous pay
should be granted to a given individual, (2) payment of hazardous differentials
should be on a monthly basis, (3) differentials should be paid only for hazardous
duties which are assigned to employees by a competent supervisor, (if) a personnel
policy board should be established within the Office of the Secretary to recommend
additions to and deletions from the list of hazardous duties, (5) the President
should be empowered in wartime to increase or decrease the list of hazardous duties
and to designate compensable hazardous areas, (6) special compensation should be set
at a sufficiently low ratio so that basic compensation will be regarded as the prim-
ary pay, and (7) some disparity in differential rates should be provided for em-
ployees of different pay grades.
B. Recommendations for Types and Rates of Compensable Hazards
Compensation Hazard Monthly Rate
(1) For crew members in aerial flight Brig. Gen.-Gen. $100
and submarine duty Colonel 210
Lt. Colonel 180
Major 150
Capt. 120
let Lt. 110
2nd Lt. 100
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Warrant Officers 1-4?
Enlisted Personnel 7
100
75
6
67.50
5
60
4
52.50
3
45
2
37.50
1
30
(2) For aerial flight duty by non-
crewmen, glider flight duty, parachute Officers $100
Jumping, contact with lepere,demoli- Enlisted
tion work, duty at submarine-escape Personnel 50
training-tank, duty at Naval Deep Sea
Diving School or Navy Experimental
Diving Unit.
(3) For deep sea diving by enlisted men $5 to $30, as
(for diving in depths over 90 feet, prescribed by
an additional payment of $5 per hour Secretary
of operational time was recommended)
C. Analysis of the Proposals - Of the above list of compensable hazardous
duties only two recommendations were new proposals - differentials for demolition
of explosives and for contact with lepers. At the time of the recommendations, ap-
proximately thirty employees were to be covered by the differential for demolition
work and a few hundred employees, by the latter. Furthermore, in advocating a lep-
rosy differential the Hook Commission was following the precedent of the Public
Health Service, which had for some time paid a differential to its commissioned of-
ficers for this purpose.
The major change in the previous hazardous duty pay system recommended by the
Hook Commission was its proposal for the payment of flight and submarine duty pay in
flat sum amounts graduated by grades in lieu of the old method of a 50% differential
of base pay. The Commission considered this method to be superior to either a flat
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sum payment for all grades or the previous payment of a fixed percentage of base
pay. It opposed the percentage system because of its pyramiding effects, especial-
ly since desk generals who occasionally flew were frequent recipients of the pay-
ment. It, however, was convinced that hazardous compensation is essentially an in-
centive payment and that a nominal amount would be insufficient to attract higher-
salaried officers. Accordingly, it proposed hazardous duty pay schedules which
combined elements of both concepts. The Commission's suggestion had the effect of
reducing flight and submarine payments to approximately 37% of base pay for person-
nel in grades up to brigadier general and of reducing hazard differentials for
generals and flag officers to 23%-28% of their base pay. Second lieutenants were
granted a small increase. Members of the Hook Commission took the position that
top-ranking officers should be discouraged from flying since their principal value
to the service is management, not active participation in hazardous duties.
The Commission's justification for recommending higher rates of pay for flight
and submarine duty differentials than for the other classes of hazardous pay has
sufficiently broad application to be worth reviewing. Flight and submarine duties
were depicted as hazardous career occupations, whereas the other activities were
variously represented not to be particularly hazardous or to be performed (1) for
occasional periods, (2) for short intervals, (3) for a limited number of years, or
(4) by youthful personnel. The Commission alleged that the third most important
type of hazardous duty, parachute jumping, should not be paid as large a differen-
tial as the amounts paid for flight and submarine duty because the activity is per-
formed only for 7 to 8 years by men in their twenties. This contention is based
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upon the suppositions that parachute jumping is not a career position and that the
incenti'e need is less, since paratroopers are largely young men in lower ranks.
Although the group presented statistics showing parachute jumping results in fewer
deaths than aerial flight duty, such a comparison cannot be made between parachute
and submarine duty. Yet the Commission recommended the same rate of hazardous pay
for submarine duty as for flight duty. The basic point is really the issue of in-
centive. Placement submarine operations are less hazardous than parachute jumping,
but inducing trained personnel to make a career of submarine duty is a more diffi-
cult problem than attaining paratroopers -- thus, a higher differential was recom-
mended for submarine duty.
Another significant change proposed by the Commission on the previous military
hazardous pay system was its recommendation that the President be given authority
to increase in time of war the number of compensable hazards and hazardous areas.
LeZislative Amendments of the Hazardous Pay Section
Few motions were submitted to amend the section of the Career Bill containing
the Hook Commission hazardous pay proposals. The provision in the bill which em-
powered the President to prescribe additional hazardous differentials in war time
was deleted since the Congress regarded this proposal to be an intrusion upon its
authority.Y Increasing the amount of flight and submarine pay for generals and
flag officers from $100, the amount recommended. by the Hook Commission, to $150
was the second amendment of the hazardous pay section. The chain of events which
led to this increase is somewhat complicated. The bill as originally reported to
the House was recommitted because the total cost of the legislation was regarded as
Vie Fob
and Rep. Cole Cons. RecoQ'
81 Cong. 16t seas. p. 1609)
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excessive. The House Armed Services Committee reduced the proposed basic compen-
sation rates 10% for general officers and 5% for other officers. Confronted with
the possibility that the change might entail a decrease in existing total compen-
sation paid to general officers, the Committee offset a portion of the reduction
in the proposed basic rates by increasing the rate of flight and submarine pay for
generals from $100 to $210 a month. The Senate Armed Services Committee acceded
to the opposition generated by the House Committee amendment by changing the dif-
ferential to $150 a month. The Congress approved the Senate version.
None of the House amendments on hazardous pay were successful, and no floor
motions were introduced in the Senate.
Congressional Opposition to the Hazardous Pay Provisions
Opposition to the disparity in differentials for officers and enlisted men was
the only major substantive objection voiced against the hazardous duty pay pro-
visions. This issue figured in the argument on the amendments described above and
it was virtually the only basis for certain amendments that were proposed in the
House, none of which were successful. These amendments were: (1) the Furcolo
amendment -- that a flat sum of $30 a month be paid to both officers and enlisted
men for hazardous duties; (2) the Ford amendment -- that hazardous duty payments
to military personnel be abolished; (3) the Furcolo and Bennett amendments -- that
a flat sum of $50 a month be paid to both officers and enlisted men for hazardous
duties, and (4+) the Sutton amendment -- that commissioned officers be paid $100 a
month for hazardous duties; warrant officers, $75 a month; and enlisted men, $50 a
month.
There was a slight disposition by a few of these opponents to question whether
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pay for hazardous duties is in fact hazardous pay or incentive pay, but such questions
were superficially raised. The opponents of the hazardous pay section of the bill
did not criticize hazardous pay per so but merely challenged the graduated systems of
rates. In fact, there is no evidence of an attack against the desirability of haz-
ardous duty differentials in any of the congressional hearings, reports or debates.
The thesis for equality was primarily based upon the truism that the value of human
life and the anguish of human suffering are neither assessable nor compensable upon
grounds of rank and salary status./ House backers of the hazardous pay section re-
torted that the gradient payments of enlisted men and officers were based on incentive
needs and obviously were not designed to impute differential human values. Perhaps
more rational, but nevertheless imperfectly developed, was the opposition argument
that unequal hazardous duty payments produce a demoralizing effect upon enlisted men
and junior officers. The critics likewise contended that hazardous pay would offer
greater incentive if it were paid to junior officers since they undertake most of the
risky positions.
Secondary arguments which were advanced against the hazardous pay provisions
(1) flight pay is not necessary in order to attract flyers (Rep.
Tockett, Con . Record, 191+9, p. 777. ~/);
(2) the chief employee benefit in hazardous employment is adequate
insurance, not differential pay; and
View was mainly expounded by Rep. Furcolo; See con g. Record, 191+9, pp. 6575,
6751+, 7770.
In this and the following section the names of certain Congressmen are bracketed
with the arguments on hazardous pay which they promoted. These references are
limited to active orde agoc~~/0>~1Aa88 this
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1~ NNW
(3) flight duty pay to senior officers is wasteful and will not
provide an incentive to Junior officers. (Rep. Bates, Con. Record,
191.9, p. 6559).
Arguments for Hazardous Pay Presented in Congress
A. Incentive Argument - As has been indicated the incentive argument was the
principal theoretical justification of hazardous pay. In the congressional dis-
cussions the statutory term, hazardous pay, was ordinarily used to describe payments
for hazardous duties, but recourse was had to the broader term, incentive pay, when
questions were raised regarding the purpose of and necessity for payment of hazardous
differentials. Admiral Fechteler stated to the House Committee that the term haz-
ardous pay is partly a misnomer and that the purpose of a differential for underwater
demolition work is to secure volunteers for this type of activity. Representative
Kilday, Chairman of the subcommittee which held hearings on the career bill and floor
leader of the House debate, elaborated upon the purpose of compensation for flight
duty. He likewise asserted that hazardous pay is a misnomer and explained that the
term had been retained in the law for a long time. He concluded that the proper
term is incentive pay and that the purpose of hazardous duty differentials is to at-
tract men to do risky work. Certainly, the comment has even greater applicability
to the remainder of the military compensable hazardous duties. Some other phase --
such as incentive pay for hazardous and unpleasant duties -- probably would have been
more representative of the views of the Congress, the Hook Commission and the Defense
Establishment. The shift in theoretical emphasis to incentive pay gained acceptance
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Statements to this effect were made by various Congressmen include Reps. Kilday,
Johnson, Williams, Brooks and Senator Chapman.
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in Congress because the need for incentive payments was well documented. The Hook,
Commission Report and the Senate and House hearings (over 2300 pages) contain data
creating strong presumptions (1) that there is a priori need for competent flyers,
submarine crewmen, etc. and (2) that competent personnel are attainable by incentive
payments.
B. Other Arguments - Most of the other practical and theoretical arguments
presented to Congress in support of hazardous differentials are of limited general
interest since the statements are channelized expressions of the need for hazardous
pay in the specified military employments. Certain of the Justifications, however,
are relevant to a general study of hazardous pay, for they pertain to the kinds of
problems which would have to be explicitly treated in recommendations for hazardous
duty pay in civilian employment. Furthermore, they provide by indirection some in-
sight to the attitudes of Congress toward hazardous differentials. These arguments
are briefly stated below.
(1) The national security requires the use of superior personnel by
the Defense Department, and hazardous differentials are essential
in achieving this purpose.
(2) Two types of hazardous duties may be delineated -- direct hazards
and career hazards. The latter type is the physical, mental and
emotional impairments which results from a prolonged period of
cumulative stresses and strains. Career hazards cannot be measured
accurately but figure prominently in employee decisions to accept
and remain in hazardous employment. An adequate system of compensa-
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tion must take this type of hazard into account. (Rep. Williams,
Cong. Record, 191+9, p. 6572.)
(3) As military officers grow older and assume more responsible positions
of leadership within the, service they become less attracted by the
incentive effects of hazardous duty pay. Increasing family pressures
and responsibilities are major factors which increase the reluctance
of older employees to accept risks and unpleasant duties. Increasing
the rate of hazardous duty pay of officers in the higher grades is
advocated as a compensatory offset to declining personal interest.
(Sen. Chapman, Cong. Record, 1949, p. 13200.)
(1.) Eliminating hazardous duty differentials would have a disastrous
effect on morale. (Rep. Johnson, Con Record, 191+9, p. 7669;
Rep. Kilday, p. 7774; Senator Chapman, p. 13199.)
(5)
Surveys of the sentiment of experienced flyers indicate that flight
duty pay is the major reason why veteran pilots remain in the service,
after flying becomes routine to them and external pressuz s increase.
The argument suggests that the payment of a hazardous differential is
a principal method of combating the problems of turnover and loss of
leadership in the Air Corps. (Rep. Williams, C n . Record, 199,
p. 6572.)
(6) The President should have authority to extend the list of compensable
hazardous duties and to'designate hazardous duty pay for specific
areas in war time sinn9 hazardous conditions in a future war cannot
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be anticipated in a statutory schedule.
(7) The payment of a higher rate of compensation for flight and submarine
duty than for other hazardous duties is defensible because the former
positions are performed by highly trained technicians. Other hazard-
ous employments requiring less skill do not necessitate as high a
monetary incentive. (Hook Commission view defended by members of
the Armed Services Committees.)
(8) Graduated rates in hazardous pay should be prescribed for the various
grades of officers and enlisted personnel in order to provide an in-
centive to promotion.
(9) Military personnel of the higher grades should be paid a higher rate
of hazardous duty pay than personnel of the lower grades because the
attractiveness of a fixed sum incentive payment bears an inverse
relation to the amount of basic compensation earned. (Rep. Kilday,
Cam. Record, 1919, p. 6751.)
(10) In pure theory there is no military occupation worthy of a differen-
tial in war time since military service is a general risk. Suspension
of hazardous duty pay in wartime, however, is impracticable.
(11) Actuarial studies indicate that the life expectancy of an air officer
is twelve years less than that of a ground officer; consequently, the
payment of a flight differential would only equalize the aggregate
compensation received by these groups of military personnel. (Rep.
Johnson, Con t. Record, 1919, p. 6558.)
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 Approved For Railease 2002/05/08 : CIA-RDP78-03578A 6600030006-8
(12) Previous parachute and glider duty payments of $100 for officers and
$50 for enlisted men have proved to be satisfactory inducements and,
therefore, should be retained.
(13) A leprosy differential should be paid not because it is hazardous
but because people regard it to be a risk employment.
(14) All of the major foreign countries provide a differential for aerial
flight duty.
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