SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A001200080001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

FBI review(s)
completed.
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SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL
AND
AIR REPRESENTATIVES
IN
THE UNITED STATES
Covert Operational Methods
February 1955
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
John Edgar Hoover, Director
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . . i
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
I. RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. General . .. . . . .. 1
B. Potential Agent Material . . . ..... . . . . . . . 2
C. Examination and Development. . . . . . . . . . . 6
D. Motivation and Control . . .. ... .. . ... . . 7
E. Target Assignments . ... . . . . . ... . . . . . . 10
H. COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
A. General . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . . 12
B. Oral Communication. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Personal Contact . . .. . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Telephonic Contact . . . . . . . . .. . . ... 13
C. Visual Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Personal Contact . . . ... .. . . . . . . . . 15
2. United States Mail. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Caches. . . . . ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . 18
4. Signal Points . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 21
III. TRAVEL . . .
.............25
A. General . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 25
B. Modes of Travel . . . . .... . . . . .. . . .. .26
IV. MEETINGS . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . 28
A. General . . . . . . .. . . . ... . ... . .. . 28
B. Time and Frequency. . . a . .. . . . . . . . . . .29
C. Meeting Patterns . . . . . . . . .. .... . .. 31
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PAGE
Chart A
Meeting Patterns, Soviet Military, Naval and Air
Representatives in the United States, 1950-1954
Chart B
City Street Contact With New Soviet Principal
V. SOVIET WEAKNESSES . . . .. . . - S . . . .. . . . . . . . 34
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . - . . .. . . . 34
B. Personal . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
C. Operational. . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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PREFACE
This monograph is concerned with operational methods relating
to the covert intelligence activities of Soviet military, naval and air repre-
sentatives stationed in the United States 1950-1954. The purpose of this
study is not just to develop a perspective of the part played by these repre-
sentatives in the covert intelligence picture, but, more importantly, to
study the nature of their covert operational methods.
The activities under scrutiny are not being viewed as operations
of a particular Soviet intelligence service, but rather as covert intelligence
operations under the cover of the Foreign Relations Section (Otdel Vneshnikh
Snoshenii, OVS) of the Soviet armed forces in the United States.
In order to better understand the nature of this operational
cover, the OVS, we must briefly review some of its features.
Another United States intelligence agency which conducts inquiry
abroad has supplied informatilMn regarding the OVS, which is pertinent to
this study. The OVS of the Soviet armed forces has been in existence for
a number of years and its historical changes have been related to the
organizational changes in the Soviet armed forces.
According to this source, when the Ministry of the Armed Forces
(Ministerstvo Vooruzhennykh Sil, MVS) early in 1946 succeeded the separate
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Commissariats for Defense and Navy, the two Foreign Relations Sections
(OVS) appear to have been consolidated into a single section, the OVS MVS..
In 1950, when the MVS was separated into a Ministry of the Navy and a
Ministry of War, there appeared to be a separate OVS for each ministry.
Since the consolidation of the two services under the Ministry of Defense
(Ministerstvo Oborony, MO) in March 1953, only one OVS has been identified
with this ministry, the OVS MO.
In addition to supplying information regarding the organizational
development of the OVS, the afore-mentioned source has identified the respon-
sibilities of this organization. _ The OVS has responsibilities which may be
characterized as both foreign and domestic.
Domestically, the OVS provides liaison between the various
foreign military, naval and air attaches and the Soviet General Staff. In
this monograph we are concerned only with the foreign or external
responsibilities of the OVS as they apply to our topic.
Little is known concerning the organizational features of the
OVS in the Soviet armed forces since the formation of the Ministry of
Defense (MO) in March 1953. Available information indicates that historically
*The Ministry of the Armed Forces was known as the People's Commissariat
of the Armed Forces (NKVS) for approximately one month prior to the
discarding of the term "Commissariat" by the Soviets in March 1946..
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the OVS has provided a camouflage through which the Soviets could operate
covert and overt intelligence activities in the United States. In order to give
official sanction to certain of its overt functions, the OVS is identified with
the central military organization. In order to provide for its covert, external
intelligence activities, according to our source, the OVS was made responsible
to-the Intelligence Directorate (Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, RU) of the
Soviet armed forces.
With this OVS cover in mind, we approach an inspection of
the operational techniques utilized in covert intelligence operations by
the Soviet military, naval and air representatives stationed in Washington,
D. C., 1950-1954.
This monograph includes no public source data. All of the
material in this study is classified "Confidential" or "Secret."
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 SUMMARY
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United
States during the period covered by this monograph have utilized covert
operational methods to carry out a phase of their intelligence acquisition
efforts. The stigma of their overt identification with the Soviet establish-
ment was neutralized by a system of recruiting and developing indigenous
agents* to substitute for the Soviet agents in the direct acquisition of the
desired data. The area between their intelligence-producing agents or
sources was bridged by communication and travel techniques designed to
secure these operations against counterintelligence efforts.
Although these Soviet activities presented a maze of precautionary
and evasive security tactics, the Soviets have demonstrated personal
and organizational weaknesses which may assist in combating this counter-
intelligence problem.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United
States, under the cover of a Foreign Relations Section (OVS) of the Soviet
armed forces, have engaged in covert intelligence operations.
*Agents who, because of their natural residence in the United States, could
give an innocuous appearance while carrying out Soviet objectives.
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2. In order to carry out their objectives, these Soviet rk)pre-
sentatives have recruited the services of indigenous agents.
3. In the period under consideration, these Soviet representatives
utilized a broad variation of contacts from conservative and well-organized
"spotting" procedures to bold and flimsy contacts during the course of their
overt business and social activities.
4. Mercenary and not ideological lures were utilized to develop
a sustaining motivation for recruits. The actual rewards were short of
Soviet promises.
5. Paralleling the progressive development of. the agent?s
intelligence-producing potential and clandestine operational methods was
the development toward more sensitive target data.
6. Although the Soviets utilized various precautionary and evasive
tactics in connection with their communication and travel, the personal contact
method of communication was widely used.
7. The covert meeting locales of these Soviet representatives and
their agents or potential agents may be classified in the following categories:
City Streets; Restaurants or Hotel Dining Rooms; Automobiles; Isolated Areas
or Parks; Hotel and Building Lobbies; Soviet Residences or Establishments;
Movies; Railroad or Air Terminals; and Addresses of Agents.
8. Soviet personal and organizational weaknesses may assist in
combating this counterintelligence problem..
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I. RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
A. General
Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United
States have utilized their "legal" presence to overtly and directly
acquire a mass of intelligence data. This is but one important phase of
their activity. Several of these representatives have extended their
intelligence acquisition activities to those of a more clandestine nature.
Although their official Soviet positions supplied a "legal"
cover for much of their overt collection activities, this "legal" cover
concurrently served as a deterrent in their attempts to acquire directly
certain sensitive intelligence data. These Soviet representatives have
evidenced a desire to neutralize this deterrent by various means to deceive
information-producing sources. This neutralization was attempted by
various methods, such as misrepresentation, half representation calculated
to indicate an erroneous identification of the Soviet, and outright refusals
or neglect of the Soviet representatives to properly identify themselves.
If these methods of neutralization were ineffectual, there still
remained the more cumbersome and delicate clandestine intelligence
operations. This involved the activation of intelligence-producing sources
through a substitute who had not been identified with the Soviet establishment.
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This substitute in the operations reviewed was personified by agents who,
because of their natural residence in the United States, could give an innocuous
appearance while carrying out Soviet objectives. These agents are frequently
called indigenous agents.
B. Potential Agent Material
A review of the activities within the scope of this study revealed
that, during the early 1950's, the Soviet representatives involved utilized
a more conservative procedure for "spotting" potential recruits. The
potential agent material identified with Soviet recruitment activities was
centered in indigenous persons with whom the Soviets had previous or
current dealings. These dealings were based on both governmental and
commercial relationships. The selection or "spotting" of talent in these
categories did not only supply the Soviet with a possible previous appraisal
of the potential recruit, but also supplied a pretext or cover for necessary
initial contacts.
In early 1951, a former "civilian" employee in the office of the
Soviet military attache was utilized in "spotting" or initial contact functions.
He made initial contact with two persons who had former military liaison
relationships with other Soviet representatives. The pretext utilized by
the Soviet making these initial "spotting" contacts was the delivery of a
gift or message to the potential recruit from the respective former Soviet
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acquaintance. During the course of the pretext contact, the "spotter"
laid the groundwork for subsequent contacts with these persons by still
other Soviet representatives in the United States.
Generally, the operations reviewed indicated that the recruitment
was initiated and developed by the same Soviet. In some instances,there was
not only a pretext for initial contacts, but also an overt basis for a subsequent
"logical" association. A "civilian" employee in the office of the Soviet
naval attache during 1950 was able to utilize a commercial situation as
a means for initial and subsequent "logical" contacts.
Another source of potential agent material were those agents
suggested wittingly or unwittingly by agents already under Soviet control.
In one such instance, the Soviet principal gave the agent specific assignments
with the objective of identifying potential agents or sources in certain
establishments.
More recently, the Soviets under consideration have indicated
a less conservative approach to potential agents. They have attempted
to initiate relationships on the basis of some flimsy common ground.
Two Soviet assistant military attaches, who attended a convention
for radio engineers in March, 1953, demonstrated a rather bold and flimsy
approach. In one instance, upon ascertaining that an exhibitor at the
convention had a Russian name, they immediately started questioning him
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about his background. In addition, they desired to know if this exhibitor
was interested in attending social functions at the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, D. C. Another of their targets involved a person who presented
a technical paper to this convention. After this person identified himself
as a native of Russia, one of the attaches immediately contacted this person
and, after identifying himself as a Soviet representative, asked the person
in question if he would like to talk to him.
During the past year, two Soviet assistant air attaches
attempted to initiate relationships with persons by still another flimsy
method. Their selected common grounds with these persons were in the
nature of claims that they had seen the person at a certain professional
meeting or the potential contact had been suggested to them by another party.
In recent months, these Soviet representatives have been
identified with a variety of "casual" contacts with persons who ostensibly
might be in a position to serve Soviet intelligence interests. Although all
of these contacts have not matured into covert intelligence operations, they
may represent a "spotting" of potential recruits for their covert operations.
The Soviet military, naval and air representatives, all, have
been represented in this "casual" contact activity. In September, 1954,
an employee of the Soviet naval attaches office initiated an acquaintance
with a chemical engineer on a golf course. During this same period, a
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Soviet assistant air attache initiated an acquaintance with an electronics
engineer at a cocktail party given by the embassy of a non-Soviet bloc
country. In addition, this Soviet made a contact with an air museum employee.
In still another field, a Soviet assistant military attache initiated a series of
contacts with an employee of a transportation publication.
During the following month, contacts of this nature continued.
An assistant air attache developed a relationship with an aeronautical
manufacturer's representative. The setting for this initial contact was
a reception at a Soviet satellite embassy. Just before parting, the Soviet
boldly indicated that he expected some information from this individual
the next time they met.
Also in October 1954, an employee of the Soviet naval attache's
office contacted an individual at his home in response to a newspaper
advertisement. The advertisement concerned the sale of radio equipment.
In the period under consideration,. the Soviet representatives
have utilized a broad variation of contacts from conservative and well-
organized "spotting" procedures to bold and flimsy contacts during the
course of their overt business and social activities. In their approaches
to potential agent material, ideological sympathies were not identified
with the motivating considerations. Instead,, the Soviets indicated intelligence
interests in persons who possessed the potentiality of producing specialized
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or sensitive intelligence data.
In connection with the more organized approaches made by
these Soviet representatives, a suitable pretext or cover situation was
present. Although a "spotter" was utilized in some highly organized contacts,
the Soviet representative handling the initial contact was likely to be handling
the subsequent examination and development of the potential recruit.
C. Examination and Development
After the initial contacts and the identification of a common
ground for future relationships, the Soviet representative proceeded
to examine and develop the potentialities of the contact. This was carried
out during the course of an ingratiating social relationship. The examinations
were accomplished during the course of dinner and drinking engagements,
accompanied by small gifts, selected bits of pro-Soviet propaganda, and in
some instances more direct mercenary lures. This technique might well
serve a dual purpose. First, it would tend to neutralize resistance to
questioning. Secondly, it would tend to contribute to a harmonious relation-
ship between the Soviet and his potential agent.
The examination of potential agents by the various Soviet military,
naval and air representatives has not followed any rigid pattern. During
the early contacts with a potential recruit or persons in whom they have
indicated an intelligence interest, the Soviets have developed certain types
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of information. This included background data regarding. the potential agent
and his contacts, his potentialities for producing intelligence data, an
indication of his political feelings, and perhaps an indication of some motivation
and control factors.
Concurrently, there was evidence of Soviet attempts to develop
the potential agent. In addition to developing a stronger relationship with
the potential agent, the Soviets developed the agent's motivation, fuller
potentialities for producing intelligence data, and adjustments to covert
operational methods. The operations considered indicated that a strong
personal relationship might serve as a basis for innocent-appearing
intelligence requests under quasi-clandestine operating conditions. However,
stronger motivation and control factors were developed with the paralleling
development of sensitive intelligence targets and clandestine operating
techniques.
D. Motivation and Control
Closely akin to the examination and development of a potential
agent is the identification and development of motivation and control factors.
Certainly, these factors are important components in a sustained intelligence
operation.
In the activities studied, there was an absence of strong
ideological motivations and control by coercion. Instead, the prime
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motivation and control factors were of a mercenary nature. These mercenary
factors were exhibited in terms of gifts, entertainment and money. However,
the identified mercenary interests were more concentrated in the actual or
promised money payments for services of an intelligence nature.
There were various methods for motivating a stronger interest
on the part of the indigenous agent. In one operation, the Soviet principal
regularly entertained the agent at dinner and plied him with gifts. This
might have given the Soviet some semblance of control over the agent.
However, the real stimulus for motivation suggested by this operation was
the promise of substantial money payments for greater intelligence
accomplishments.
Another Soviet representative used a different technique for
developing an indigenous agent. The Soviet paid the agent substantial
sums for routine services during the first stage of development and made
promises of exorbitant sums for future activities of a more sensitive nature.
A succeeding Soviet principal in the same operation used a technique which
was in direct contradiction of that used by the first principal. Instead of
continuing the liberality of the first principal, the successor continually owed
this agent funds, used delaying tactics to keep from prompt settlement of
accounts with the agent, and even attempted to get the agent to advance
large expenditures to facilitate the acquisition of certain intelligence
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material. The third Soviet principal assumed a compromise position between
these two extremes.
Although some Soviet principals made strong implications or
promises regarding the availability of fantastic subsidies for their agents,
the actual general pattern followed that of a close accounting on a collect-on-
delivery basis. The payment might at first be termed a gift or just identified
as remuneration for expenses. As the operations developed, the payments
might fall into two general categories. The first dealt with expenses incurred
by the indigenous agent in connection with the intelligence operation; the
second, the payment of a reward for services performed. In some instances,
itemized expenses and signed receipts were required of the indigenous agent.
In any event, the actual payments to the agent were always made in cash.
In the early and what might be termed development stage of an
intelligence recruitment, there was evidenced in many instances a parallel-
ing social relationship. This social relationship usually took the form of
dinner engagements. In addition to the drinking and dining which accompanied
many of these relationships, the Soviet might attempt to further ingratiate
himself with the potential agent by presenting gifts and making promises of
materialistic opportunity to insure continued interest of the agent. Although
these features presented more immediate motivations for the agent, some
Soviets were interested in developing a supplemental motivation, a sympathy
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for the Soviet Union. A principal involved in a long-term operation with
an indigenous agent referred his agent to writings of V. I. Lenin, the
Communist revolutionary and Soviet leader, and to the Daily Worker, an
east coast Communist newspaper. Further, this Soviet spoke of "peaceful
coexistence," spoke disparagingly of the way of life in the United States,
and one step further, indulged in comparing life in the United States unfavor-
ably with the Soviet Union.
In some instances in the operations reviewed, the brief
associations between the Soviets and potential recruits did not clearly
indicate the motivating factor of the latter. Whether the initial motivating
factors were curiosity, personal friendship, an unstated ideological sympathy,
or mercenary objectives, the Soviet representatives persistently developed
a mercenary motivation and control.
E. Target Assignments
In making intelligence assignments, the Soviet principal is
ostensibly identifying specific intelligence interests or requirements of
the Soviet Union. The pattern of intelligence assignments may also indicate
another operational consideration, the state of development of the particular
recruit or agent.
In the operations considered, the target assignments involved
two important factors. The first, the scope of the agent's intelligence-
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producing potentialities and secondly, the progressive development of the
agent toward more sensitive target data.
With the development of the agent or potential agent, the Soviet
principal progressively took fuller advantage of the agent's sources or
potential sources. This included professed contacts of the agent who might
conceivably have access to certain data. In exceptional circumstances,
where a suitable pretext was available to the agent, he was requested to
develop new contacts beyond the indicated scope of his potentiality.
P aralleling the progressive development of the agent's
intelligence-producing potential and clandestine operational methods was a
development toward more sensitive target data. In this connection, although
the target requests were not always specific, they generally fell within the
previously identified potentialities of the agent.
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II. COMMUNICATION
A. General
The successful development of intelligence-producing sources
or agents was but one step in the formation of a basic intelligence apparatus.
Next, a medium for traversing the area between the intelligence-producing
source or agent and the Soviet principal was established. Basic media for
accomplishing this were various forms of communication.
Although the operations under consideration did not employ all
forms of communication which have been identified with general Soviet
covert intelligence operations, several methods with interesting variations
have been identified. In order to organize our appraisal of these various
communication media, they are being considered in two categories. They
are first, oral communication and secondly, visual communication.
B. Oral Communication
1. Personal Contact
A simple and basic means of communication utilized by repre-
sentatives of the Soviet armed forces in connection with their covert
intelligence activities was communication by personal contact. This type
of communication became more fully identified with their initial operating
phases of recruiting, examining and developing agent material. Although
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it continued as a method of contact and communication in some operations,
it was accompanied by cumbersome security tactics and signals.
With the development of clandestine intelligence tactics, the
oral communication of complex and detailed security data was not adequate.
It was more frequently utilized to supplement and Interpret data passed
through other forms-of communication. In addition, direct oral communi-
cation during personal contact between the Soviet principal and his agent
remained the frequently used system for smoothing out problems. and
planning covert intelligence operations.
2. Telephonic Contact
Soviet representatives indicated the use of telephonic communi-
cation for intelligence purposes as undesirable. One Soviet principal labeled
this form of communication "dangerous. " Perhaps, as a device for better
control of this communication medium,. the Soviet representatives generally
refused by one pretext or another to supply their agents and contacts with
a means for reaching them telephonically. In some exceptional cases, where
the new agent had prior knowledge of a means to contact the Soviet tele-
phonically, the Soviet specifically instructed or strongly suggested that the
persons involved should not use this form of communication to reach the
Soviet.
*This topic is more fully considered in connection with the topic "Meetings."
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Telephonic communication was utilized by these Soviet repre-
sentatives in connection with the early social phases of their relationships
with potential agent material. However, there were other uses to which this
medium of communication could be adapted in connection with the more
sensitive phases of their operations. These other uses involved the
specialized use of the telephone for oral signals and the transmission of
messages in segments.
An example of the signal device was a telephone call to the agent
from the Soviet principal to indicate whether intelligence data from another
source had been received. If, during the telephone conversation, the
Soviet delivered a pleasant message, it would signal an acknowledgment
that the data had been received. An unpleasant message would signal that
the data had not been received.
In another instance,this signal system was utilized to indicate
whether the agent would be able to consummate the scheduled meeting.
Another technique was to transmit the desired message in
segments. One application of this system was to supplement by one telephone
call a plan which had been partially planned during the course of a previous
personal contact. In one operation, the Soviet and his agent telephonically
discussed the time and date of a proposed meeting. It was unnecessary to
discuss the place of the meeting as it had been agreed on previously. Another
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application of the segment message system was to utilize more than one
telephone call to convey the message. With this arrangement, the first call
night determine the date of the proposed meeting and the second call, the time
and place of the meeting.
Although telephonic contact was frowned upon by these Soviet
representatives, they utilized this medium of communication when-they
were able to maintain a control over the conditions of its use.
C. Visual Communication
1. Personal Contact
As has been previously indicated, oral communication during
the course of personal contact between the Soviet principal and his agent
was not adequate for the communication of complex or detailed intelligence
data. In the course of the operations reviewed, the visual data communi-
cated by the agent to his Soviet principal during the course of personal contact
took the written, printed or photographic form.
Little concern was indicated by the Soviet principals regarding
the possibility that intelligence data might be found on the person of the
agent.. On the contrary, the Soviet principals were quite sensitive to their
own security while in the possession of visual communication data. In
August, 1951 and May, 1953, two different Soviet assistant air attaches
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openly indicated a reluctance to accept printed intelligence data during the
course of a personal contact with their agents. This sensitivity was further
evidenced by hiding written or printed data in their personal clothing, under
a ring, in a shoe or in a small cylindrical container.
This sensitivity was more fully evidenced by the various other
means utilized for communication of visual intelligence data.
2. United States Mail
Soviet interests in this category of communication were
indicated or developed along two lines. One was the developing of "mail
:drops" to act as a "cut out" in the communication relationship between the
Soviet principal and his agent or source. The other development was
along the line of direct communication, but concealing the nature of the
relationship and the content of the message by a prearranged means.
Although Soviet naval and air representatives indicated special
interests in developing "mail drops, " little success was achieved along
this line. This might have been due to the lack of persistent efforts by
these Soviets to successfully develop this technique. More persistent
interest was displayed in a system of direct communication with the
benefit of camouflage.
In August 1950, an employee of the Soviet naval attache's
office, who was operating an indigenous agent, instructed the latter to
*This topic is more fully considered in connection with the topic "Meetings."
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have printed a supply of advertising cards. The following month a system
involving the use of these cards was put into effect. This system involved
direct communication with a Soviet establishment in an innocuous manner.
The communication conveyed previously agreed upon signals to the Soviet
principal.
This innocuous advertising card which was a part of the system
was addressed to the "Naval Attache of the USSR." In order to insure receipt
of the indicated signals on the advertising card, the indigenous agent was re-
quired to mail a second card from a different postal zone. Signals transmitted
with the card would be in the nature of a code letter designating the place
of the meeting or the cache to be utilized for passing intelligence data.
Another signal would be indicated by the postmark on the card. The
meeting would occur on the third day following the date appearing in the
postmark.
This system also provided for communication from the Soviet
to his agent. If the Soviet wished to signal a meeting with the agent, he
would merely send a particular picture post card to him. In the upper
right-hand corner of this card, near the stamp, would appear the coded
letter indicating the place of the proposed meeting. The date in the post-
mark would be utilized as before to indicate the date of the meeting.
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Although the Soviet principal initiating the operation indicated
that the card system worked well for other Soviets, he dropped it as a
failure in connection with this operation. A subsequent Soviet principal
briefly reactivated this idea but only for emergency situations. In the
event of an emergency situation, the indigenous agent would mail a post
card to the Soviet official establishment and signal his request for a meeting
on the following Saturday by merely eliminating certain punctuation from the
-address onAhe card. The Soviet principal could indicate a desire for an
emergency meeting by sending what might appear to be a normal business
letter to his agent. This letter would bear a particular code name for the
sender.
The Soviet use of the mails did not indicate an organized use
of this means for the covert transmission of intelligence data or products,
but rather,. for the transmission of covert operational messages.
3. Caches
Soviet reluctance to utilize the previously indicated avenues
of communication for the transmission of sensitive intelligence data
between the Soviet and his agent was evidenced by the use of labored security
precautions and the development of a cache system. The cache system
provided a relatively secure means for the passage of balky intelligence
data or intelligence products. Ost nsibly this would minimize the danger
of identifying the relationship between the Soviet principal and his agent.
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At the same time,, the cache system might serve as a substitute for other
cumbersome techniques such as encoding voluminous intelligence data.
The cache took two general forms in the operations reviewed.
First, the stationary cache was found as a hole in the ground, a hole in a
stone wall, empty cans deposited near specific fire hydrants, and luggage
lockers at railroad terminals. The other general form, the mobile cache,
was represented in the form of Soviet-owned automobiles.
In August 1950, a Soviet representative advised his indigenous
agent that, due to the tense international situation, it would be better if
they were not seen together. As a substitute to the personal contact form
of communication, this Soviet instituted a cache system. This system
involved the use of two holes in the ground. Each hole was located near
a large east coast city. Intelligence data was to be passed by depositing the
material in one of these holes. Communication regarding the use of these
caches was effected by agreed-upon signals transmitted through the mails.
Almost immediately after this system was devised for this
operation, the Soviet principal modified it. This modification was allegedly
based on the fear that the material placed in the caches by the indigenous
agent might be discovered or damaged by water. This resulted in the cache
being utilized as an alternate system. Under the new plan, the Soviet was
to meet his agent at the looation of the cache to pass the intelligence
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material. If the Soviet did not appear according to plan, the agent was to
place the intelligence data in the cache and depart.
In April;; 1952, another Soviet principal introduced to this
operation a more refined cache system. The Soviet instructed that the
intelligence material should be passed in the form of undeveloped film.
This film was to be wrapped in black paper and further protected by a rubber
covering. In turn, this was to be placed in an empty beer can and deposited
in a hole in a specific stone wall. A subsequent variation of this system
involved placing the cans near particular fire hydrants.
Another form of the stationary cache was the use of railroad
tern nal luggage lockers. The intelligence data would be placed in a suitcase
or portfolio and deposited in a luggage locker. The agent would supply the
locker key to Us Soviet principal. A Soviet would subsequently salvage the.
material from the locker.
Two Soviet principals operating out of the Soviet naval attache's
office during the early 1950's instituted the mobile cache idea in their
covert operations. This system was more adaptable for use on city streets
than the previously indicated stationary systems.
In order to provide the cache, the Soviet principal parked his
automobile and departed from the immediate area. In accordance with
a prearranged plan, the indigenous agent dropped the intelligence data.
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through the open window of the Soviet's parked automobile. The agent
departed from the area without making personal contact with the Soviet.
The second Soviet principal utilized a variation of the automobile
cache. This was necessitated by the communication of a bulky electronic
tube to the Soviet principal. The Soviet prepared for the execution of this
plan by supplying the agent with the necessary automobile keys, the time,
date and place for putting into effect this plan. In accordance with this
prearranged plan, the Soviet parked an automobile and departed from the
area. The indigenous agent subsequently took possession of the automobile,
picked up the electronic tube, parked the automobile at a specific location,
and departed from the area. The automobile and the electronic tube were then
picked up by the Soviets
Although the cache was primarily utilized for passing intelligence
data or intelligence products, it was utilized as a point for passing signals
from the indigenous agent to his Soviet principal. This applied to both the
nDbile and stationary caches.
4. Signal Points
As previously indicated, both oral and visual signals have
been transmitted through the various forms of communication. There were
signals, however, which used media other than those previously considered.
These supplemental media for transmitting signals between the Soviet and
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his agent are being considered at this time in terms of signal points.
The signal points identified in connection with the operations
under consideration have this in common. These points were equally
accessible to the Soviet principal, the indigenous agent and the public
generally. As a practical matter, however, the accessibility of the public
generally to the signal points was inconsequential,. as they could not identify
a specific signal point or the terms of its use.
In one form, signal points may be identified with actual meetings
between the Soviet principal and his indigenous agent. The persons of the
Soviet or his agent, or even an automobile used in connection with the meet-
ing have served as signal points. These signals took the form of blinking
automobile headlights, the smoking of a cigarette or a pipe, or the wearing
of a specific necktie. If, in a hotel dining room, it might take the form of
particular beverages on the Soviets' table.---
F or the most part, the signals used were not identified with the
actual meetings. Instead, they were more concerned with the initiation of
an operational plan and subsequent acknowledgement of its completion.
During the period 1951-52, a Soviet assistant naval attache utilized a system
of marks at designated localities as a' means for signaling meetings. The
agent was to come to Washington,. D. C., from another city and signal his
request for a meeting by marking a letter "V" in blue crayon on a specified
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white fence. This signal had to appear prior to 7 P. M. on a Saturday
evening, as a Soviet representative allegedly checked the signal point at
this time. If this signaling arrangement was appropriately consummated,
the Soviet principal would meet with his agent at a prearranged location on
the same evening.
This system was initiated in July 1951, but a few weeks later
the Soviet principal changed the location of the signal point to a post which
served as a guardrail along a road. In November 1951, this Soviet provided
three different posts which could be utilized as signal points. The agent
could select his meeting locale by the selection of a particular post. By
January 1952, the agent's marking on the signal point was changed to red
and he--was advised that the signal point would be checked daily.
During the succeeding months, this Soviet principal and another
who followed him developed a complex signal point idea. It was no longer
necessary for the agent to come to Washington, D. C., for a signal point.
When the agent had material for delivery to his Soviet principal, he was to
place a small box with a red wrapping in the rear of his automobile in a
manner that made it clearly visible from the outside. Then, he was to park
his automobile at a particular location on a New York City street from 9:30
A. M. tj 9:35 A. M. on Wednesday morning. This signaled the agent's
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intention to pass certain intelligence data by means of previously arranged
cache system.
In order to make certain that the Soviets had retrieved the
intelligence data placed in the cache, the agent was to check a "Manhattan"
telephone directory in a particular tavern. On a certain page of this
directory, the word "Manhattan" was to be underlined to indicate the
successful completion of the arrangement. Another signal point was a
specific public telephone booth. The signal to be given by the Soviet repre-
sentatives consisted of placing the head of a match in a wad of gum and
depositing it on the underside of a shelf in the telephone booth.
In early 1953, an agent's desire for an emergency meeting
could be indicated by parking in a particular area and raising the hood of
his automobile as if he were having motor trouble. This signal was to be
acknowledged by a banana peel at the base of a specified traffic light.
As may be noted from the preceding review, the system of signal
points presents numerous and complex possibilities to facilitate security for
Soviet communication efforts.
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M. TRAVEL
A. General
Both as a supplement and a parallel to the various means of
communication, travel was a vital consideration in connection with these
covert Soviet intelligence operations. Travel provided another medium
for traversing the area between the Soviet military, naval and. air repre-
sentatives in the United States and their intelligence-producing sources and
agents..
The Soviet military, naval and air representatives involved
in covert activities, during the period covered in this monograph, had little
to impede their freedom of travel by any means. If they wished to travel
beyond the radius of twenty-five miles outside their headquarters in
Washington, D. C., they needed only to notify the appropriate United States
Government official forty-eight hours in advance of their intended travel.
Although these Soviets generally utilized travel to shorten the
lines of communication, there were situations in which the contrary was
true. Due to reasons of security or convenience, one extended operation
minimized intercity travel between New York City and Washington, D. C.
by an extension of the organizational apparatus to the New York City area.
Soviet employees of the Soviet delegation to. the United Nations and the
*The Soviet Ambassador was notified of this regulation on March 10, 19.52,
On January 3, 1955, the Soviets were notified of further travel restrictions
in the United States.
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United Nations secretariat were identified with this extended operation.
The Soviet assistant naval attache who handled this operation in the Summer
of 1952 indicated that the shortening of travel lines merely resulted in
further communication problems. The organization in New York City was
not properly communicating the intelligence data to him and this interfered
with the appropriate handling of his indigenous agent.
B. Modes of Travel
Various modes of both public and private transportation
were utilized by these Soviets and their agents. Some of the Soviets
indicated a dislike for particular types of transportation, such as intercity
transportation by airplane or intracity transportation by taxi. However,
generally in the operations reviewed, the automobile was the most common
vehicle of transportation.
The Soviets have utilized auto transportation for convenient
transportation to isolated areas, for transferring heavy or bulky intelligence
material, for conducting some personal contacts between the Soviet and his
agent, and as an instrumentality for conducting evasive security tactics.
The Soviets generally utilized an auto in the lower-price field without
diplomatic identification. The auto utilized in covert activities was
usually registered in the name of one of the Soviets engaged in covert
activities. If he departed from the United States, the auto might be trans-
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ferred to another Soviet in the establishment. The indigenous agents in
these operations utilized their personal and business autos or on Soviet
instructions rented an auto for a specific intelligence contact.
Although some of the Soviets utilized autos,, both as a means
of transportation and a meeting locale, their utilization as a meeting locale
was evaded by some of the more cautious Soviet representatives. The
specific applications of the auto as a meeting locale are considered in more
detail under the topic, "Meetings. "
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IV. MEETINGS
A. General
Under the topic of meetings will be considered the personal
contacts between a Soviet representative and his indigenous agent for the
apparent furtherance of a covert intelligence objective.
The Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United
States have indicated by their actions and statements that meetings as an
operational method presented to them an inherent contradiction. On the
one hand, this operational method was desirable as it supplied the Soviet
representatives with an opportunity to spot, examine, develop and recruit
new intelligence agents. Subsequently, with the establishment of a con-
tinuing operation, the .meeting method supplied a ready medium for discussion
and planning between the Soviet and his agent in furtherance of their venture.
On the other hand, the Soviets indicated a strong contradiction to
this simple and efficient method of communication. This contradiction
was the fear of adequate operational security in connection with these meet-
ings. On some occasion, this fear of insecurity was subtly expressed.
During the course of a delicate early relationship with a potential agent,
a Soviet assistant air attache gave the advice that this potential agent
should not tell anyone about their meetings as some people might mis-
interpret their relationship. More forthright indications were expressed
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by other Soviet representatives who bluntly told their agents that there
might be trouble if they were found together or that they did not want the
FBI to know of their meetings.
A ready recognition of the inherent contradiction involved in
the utilization of meetings as an operational method will assist the reader
in interpreting not only the nature of covert personal contact methods but
also other covert operational methods which relate to the desirability of
utilizing this operational procedure.
B. Time and Frequency
Although there were several variations relating to time and
frequency of the meetings considered, they generally could be included in
two general categories. These might be called regularly scheduled meetings
and spasmodic meetings.
In the cases reviewed, the regularly scheduled meetings were
usually identified with well-established intelligence operations. In one
such operation in early 1952, the Soviet assistant naval attache advised
the agent of a skeleton schedule for the coming year. This schedule provided
for meetings on the first Saturday of March, June, September and December.
However, for the most part, the regularly scheduled meetings were set
up singularly at the time of the preceding meeting. Perhaps to avoid
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forgetting, several of the Soviet representatives handled the scheduling
of the next meeting as the first order of business during their personal
contact.
The spasmodic meeting technique rested upon the Soviet or his
agent successfully communicating to each other their respective desires
to schedule a meeting. Obviously, there had to be some sort of control
exercised by the Soviet in connection with these spasmodic meetings.
One Soviet told his agent that they should meet once a month unless good
reason existed for meeting more frequently. This same Soviet had meet-
ings held in temporary abeyance on another occasion due to the "Korean
situation" in 1950. Other control factors identified were the Soviet repre-
sentative's instruction that he would signal the next meeting, a false
communication to the agent indicating that the Soviet had other business
commitments, or the more frequent failure of the Soviet to appear and
consummate the requested meeting.
This last circumstance made even more important the desirability
of alternate meeting arrangements. One general arrangement was to have
an alternate meeting one week later at the same time. If the first alternate
meeting failed, then the second alternate date would come on the same day
during the next week. In one operation? this was further supplemented by
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providing two different times on the alternate meeting day. The alternate
time came one hour later. Another complexity added to the alternate
meeting picture was the possibility that the alternate meeting might take
place at a different prearranged location.
Other time and frequency factors were noted, such as the
desire of one Soviet to have shorter meetings and the desire of others to
interchange material with their agents under the cover of darkness. Perhaps
more significant was the readiness to meet with the agent when he had
obtained intelligence data.
C. Meeting Patterns
An appraisal of meetings between the Soviet military, naval,
and air representatives in the United States since 1950 suggested the
organization of this material into two categorical considerations. The first
consideration was the progressive development. of stages of the meeting
patterns. The second consideration. was the locales related to the meeting
patterns.
In studying the meeting patterns, the strong influence of security
precautions was noted. This resulted in the following progressive meeting
patterns:
1. Tactics preceding preliminary contacts,
2. Preliminary contacts,
*For- the purposes of this study they are limited to those situations where more
than one contact with the agent occurred on the same date.
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 .T j.w T.
WINDOW. v- %
START _
-11T 1~- T- 111.
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MEETING PATTERNS, SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL AND
AIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-1954
START
J, Qoj$
START
START
START B1OU
IE4 1.
SOVIET RESIDENCES
OR ESTABLISHMENTS
RAILROAD OR
AIR TERMINALS
ADDRESSES OF AGENTS
SEE CHART "B"
TACTICS FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY
OR PRECEDING MAIN CONTACTS
T1, Loll, fi
START
START
-All
11 .11ET
START
11-E 1-11
START "Al
START
g~Tll A. -1-
-111 -IT .11
o~E...oE>E
11 T" .~;T, T~121150101~
START
-IR Pl- 1- .11 I'll
%1U, ~t4lv.1101 "W-1
-1 T11
11-
-El
START
START %
IA-RDP78-03362AO01200080001-7
li ,
TACTICS FOLLOWING
MAIN CONTACTS
CHART
A
11 1.- Px .
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3. Tactics following preliminary or preceding main contacts,
4. Main contacts, and
5. Tactics following main contacts.
These meetings generally were concentrated in the geographic
area including the eastern cities, Washington, D. C. , Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and New York City, New York. The utilization of meeting
locales varied. They included the home city of the agent, the assigned
location of the Soviet, or a location. foreign to both. the agent and the Soviet..
More specifically, the meeting locales related to the meetings under con-
sideration included:
1. City streets,
2. Restaurants or hotel dining rooms,
3. Automobiles,
4. Isolated areas or parks,.
5. Hotel and building lobbies,
6. Soviet residences or establishments,
7. Movies,
8. Railroad or air terminals, and
9. Addresses of agents.
*Significance is considered in terms of a meeting locale or related security
tactics, but not in terms of simply a medium of transportation..
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For those interested in a more detailed appraisal of these
meeting patterns two charts follow. First, Chart A concerns the pro-
gressive development of meeting patterns and the related locales. This
is not to be regarded as a summary of all meetings under study. Instead,
this chart intends to set out the various patterns without repeating such
patterns in the absence of special circumstances which contributed a new
factor to the pattern. Meetings not consummated due to the failure of
either party to appear have not been included in this chart.
Chart A is supplemented by Chart B which illustrates a simple
city street contact between an agent and a new Soviet principal.
A review of these charts may give a basis to the reader for an
understanding of the counterintelligence problems involved in identifying
and covering meetings of this nature.
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 Approved e : IS t. i1v 7 - -7
>o~
Inoo~ SOVIET PRINCIPAL
5:46 P. M.
AGENT MET SOVIET FACE TO FACE A
SECOND TIME.
1. SOVIET GAVE VERBAL RECOGNITION
SIGNAL.
2. AGENT GAVE VERBAL ACKNOWLE00-
MENT.
3. THEY TURNED AND WALKED TOGETHER
TOWARD THE SOUTH.
JL
7 A
J
Cj
I
0
CITY STREET CONTACT
WITH NEW
5:35 P. M.
AGENT MET SOVIET WALKING IN OPPOSITE
DIRECTION.
I. SOVIET WORE SPECIFIC NECKTIE
FOR IDENTIFICATION.
2. PLACED PIPE IN MOUTH AS A REC-
OGNITION SIGNAL.
00~
OOOOhaOL
unu Lq 0
ROUTES OF:
SOVIET PRINCIPAL
.......... COVERT AGENT CONTACT
~...~ SOVIET PRINCIPAL AND
COVERT AGENT CONTACT
TOGETHER
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SECRET
CHART
B
\N, , r4JE]
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V. SOVIET WEAKNESSES
A. General
An examination of the covert Soviet military, naval and air
operations suggested several weaknesses. These weaknesses as a
counterintelligence potential may be considered in two categories. First,
the consideration of personal weaknesses of the various Soviets and
secondly, the organizational weaknesses evidenced by their activities.
B. Personal
The personal weaknesses of note were those which might
modify the effectiveness of their covert operations. Those identified in
these operations were of a nature which might be considered breaches of
discipline or having the potential of compromising the individual Soviet.
An often identified personal weakness was the potential presented
by the excessive and, in some instances, the unorthodox use of intoxicating
drinks. Although the use of intoxicants during the course of covert
meetings might have been designed to assist the Soviets in their relation-
ships with their agents or potential agents, there appeared a valid question
as to whether some of the Soviets had not lost control of its application
to the point of a breach of discipline.
Personal dishonesty, another weakness, was identified with
a long-standing covert operation. One of the Soviet principals carrying
out this operation was openly dishonest to his agent. This Soviet caused
the aa J9e Sj;, too io~f~$ to -6 1860t o qtf actually
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received. This resulted in a situation where the Soviet did not have to
account for certain funds to his superiors. Obviously this gave the agent a
weapon against his Soviet principal.
C. Operational
The more readily identified weaknesses of these Soviets related
to their covert operational procedures. These weaknesses might be grouped
briefly as follows:
1. Confusion in connection with covert meetings.
This weakness resulted in the improper implementation of
planned security precautions or even the inability to consummate
a signaled meeting. Complex meeting techniques, insufficient
or inadequate planning, last minute changes in plans and some
degree of a language barrier between the Soviet and his agent
were weaknesses identified with these operations which might
have been the causes for this confusion.
2. Improper discussions between the Soviet and his agent4
This involved unwarranted discussion of personal matters
relating to other Soviet representatives or operational
weaknesses which did not directly concern the agent. This
weakness was in evidence particularly when the Soviet
principal was unable to cope with an inquiry or operational
criticism of the agent.
3. Immature or unstable reactions during the course of covert
contacts.
On one occasion a Soviet assistant air attache met an agent
in a clandestine manner. However, when the agent passed
intelligence data to the Soviet while walking along the city
street, the Soviet took the data out of the envelope and
openly viewed and discussed the data. An opposite reaction
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SECRET
was displayed in another situation. involving a Soviet
assistant air attache. During the course of a street contact,
the Soviet became flustered when the agent attempted to pass
the previously requested intelligence data. At first the Soviet
refused to accept the data. After walking a short distance,
he became more composed and accepted it.
These weaknesses may be considered not only as fostering
inadequate operational security, but also as having a deteriorating effect on
the confidence and cooperation of the agent.
SECRET
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 Approved For Release CIA-RDP78=03362AO01200080061-L7"
SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL
IN
THE UNITED STATES
OiR VAULT COPY N0.
COVERT OPERATIONAL METHODS
FOR INTERNAL KUBARK USE ONLY
214 Apr. 1956 CI Staff has no objection
to the use of this study by OTR perso
but all copies are to be handled as
registered documents. It is to be
coupletely sanitized if it is planned to
use it for training other than staff
employees.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
John Edgar Hoover, Director
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AND
REPRESENTATIVES
 I3HO3SA-RDP78-03362A001200080001-7
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