BI-WEEKLLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 24, 1966
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Significant Dates /
[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
DEC
6 General Council of World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU-communist), Sofia,
6-9 Dec.
12* Milovan Djilas sentenced to prison (arrested 19 Nov). 1956. TENTH ANNIVERSARY.
14* USSR expelled from League of Nations for unprovoked aggression against Poland
and Finland. 1939.
14 Budapest, World Trade Union Conference to Promote Foreign Trade and Oppose
Monopolistic Discrimination against Underdeveloped Countries. Sponsored by
WFTU (Communist) 14-17 Dec.
19* Vietminh attack on French installations at Haiphong' begins 7 1/2 year war. 1946,.
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
20* Grigory Rasputin murdered; Czarist court and army circles begin plotting removal
of Nicholas 11, foreshadowing February Revolution. 1916. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
20* Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution (CHEKA) established in
USSR, forerunner of GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, and KGB. 1917.
21* Joseph V. Stalin born. 1879.
26* Mao Tse-tung born. 1893.
Late December or early January Congress of International Union of Students (IUS,
Communist front). Warsaw or Mongolia. [NOTE: Possibly to hinder covert action
measures by opponents, IUS has adopted policy of not announcing dates of meet-
ings more than one month ahead.]
JAN
2* Fidel Castro assumes power following Batista's flight. 1959.
8* Charles de Gaulle inaugurated first president of French Fifth Republic. 1959.
15 Conference of Solidarity with Workers of Aden, sponsored by ICATU/WFTU, 15-18
January. Approximately 20 countries participating.
21* V.I. Lenin dies. 1924.
23-3O* In Stalin's purge trials, Karl Radek, Grigory Sokolnikov, two other Old
Bolsheviks imprisoned; 13 others condemned to death. 1937. THIRTIETH ANNI-
VERSARY.
26* Republic of India proclaimed. 1950.
28* Birthday of Jose Marti, leader of Cuban independence struggle. 1853.
30* Adolf Hitler becomes Chancellor of Germany. 1933.
31* German Army at Stalingrad surrenders, World War II. 1943.
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 24 October 1966
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1067 WH. FREE CHOICE FOR PUERTO RICO
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SITUATION: The Communists have long used the subject of alleged
U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico as a theme for their propaganda output,
particularly in Latin America but also in underdeveloped countries of
Africa and Asia. They have claimed that the island is economically ex-
ploited by the United States, that it is used as a vast military base
for aggression against "fraternal nations," that its young men are used
as cannon fodder of American aggression and that the United States is
deliberately wiping out the Puerto Rican cultural heritage in order to
substitute monopoly capitalism in its stead.
These themes were prominently played at the January 1966 Tri-
Continent Conference in Havana where delegates endorsed the "struggle"
of the Puerto Rican Pro-Independence Movement (MPI) and advocated that
it be given "moral, economic, and every other kind of aid." A-represen-
tative of the MPI was appointed to the executive secretariat of the Afro-
Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO), which
was created at the Havana Conference.
A joint U.S.-Puerto Rican Status Committee, appointed in 196+ to
study relations between the continent and the island, issued a report in
August 1966 recommending a plebiscite on the island to determine whether
Puerto Rico should be (1) a commonwealth,(2) a state, or (3) an independent
nation. The proposed plebiscite was ' immediatelyl.abelled a farce by the
AALAPSO and its executive secretariat proclaimed 23 September a day of tri-
continental solidarity with the Puerto Rican "struggle." Castro's Prensa
Latina on 7 September disseminated both the AALAPSO solidarity appeal and
a statement signed by Juan Mari Bras, Secretary General of the MPI, warning
that the imposition of a "spurious and fraudulent plebiscite" might provoke
a civil war. On 8 September Prensa Latina carried an interview with Mari
Bras who indicated that the status committee's report should spur the U.N.
Special Committee on Colonialism to speed up discussion of the Puerto Rican
case. Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa last October had formally requested
that the U.N. Committee inscribe the Puerto Rican case on its agenda --
despite the fact that a U.N. resolution of 27 November 1953 had recognized
that Puerto Rico was a "fully self-governing and autonomous entity" and thus
not subject to the committee's jurisdiction.
The AALAPSO call for a day of solidarity with Puerto Rico was glee-
fully accepted by the Communist nations. Pravda, Moscow, printed an
article on the 23rd, NCNA, Peking, reported "Chinese Mass Organizations
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SJi lT (1067 Cont. )
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Support Puerto Rican Independence," and the Chicom government (though
preoccupied with its domestic troubles) sent a telegram to the MPI an=
noucing its solidarity. As could be expected, Havana also printed arti-
cles, made speeches, and sent telegrams.
In December 1965, Moscow Radio had already said it would make its
microphones available to Puerto Rican "fighters for independence," claim-
ing that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission had prohibited
Puerto Rican radio and TV stations from carrying MPI programs. Conse-
quently, said Radio Moscow, it was "setting up a new section for Puerto
Rican patriots to have their say," and it requested program material
which would be read by Moscow announcers. A Moscow broadcast to Latin
America at the end of August 1966 presented recorded statements by
Puerto Rican opponents of the plebiscite. During the same program con-
tributions were requested to this "feature," although there are no indi-
cations that it has become a regular aspect of Radio Moscow's Latin
American programming.
While Moscow would undoubtedly like to stir up whatever trouble it
can in Puerto Rico by its propaganda activities, it surely knows that
the MPI represents an extremely small element (2-3%) of the island's
population. The real targets of this propaganda output are the other
countries of Latin America plus Africa and Asia. Capitalizing on general
ignorance of the facts of Puerto Rico's real status, Moscow attempts to
use this theme to substantiate its claims of "American capitalist, im-
perialist, colonialist aggression."
In truth, however, Puerto Rico's story is a heartening one for
democracy and for private enterprise and brings credit to the United
States. Its status of "Commonwealth," more accurately rendered by the
Spanish "Estado Libre Asociado" (Free Associated State) came into being
in July 1952. It was largely the creation of Luis Munoz Marin, the
first popularly elected governor of Puerto Rico. Under this relation-
ship Puerto Ricans are responsible for the essential aspects of their
internal government, which is carried out by a governor and a bicameral
legislature. The island enjoys all the economic and financial benefits
of a state, and other provisions of social legislation, but Puerto Ricans
do not pay the Federal income tax.
The economic development of Puerto Rico over the past few decades
is little short of astounding. Since 19+0 the Gross National Product
has soared from a $28.7 million to $2.5 billion and is currently growing
at the rate of 10 percent per annum, a rate matched only by Israel and
Japan. Per capita annual income has increased over seven times, from
$118 to about $900 (the highest Latin American); manufacturing invest-
ment has increased from $26.7 million to $435 million; there are now
over 25,000 automobiles on the island for a population of 2,500,000;
illiteracy has dropped from 35 percent to 13 percent; there are over
23,000 students in the island's universities, compared with 5,000 in
194o.
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. ... (1067 Cont.)
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Withal, the island's economy is still only demi-developed, as pre-
sent Governor Roberto Sanchez Villela put it. A giant's step has been
taken, another remains. Overpopulation is a major problem; the popula-
tion density is one of the highest on earth and is still expanding rapidly.
Even though per capita income is the highest in Latin America, it is
still well below that of Mississippi, the lowest among the 50 states.
At 13 percent, illiteracy is still high.
But the most important fact is that these problems are being solved,
and rapidly.
The Commonwealth status of Puerto Rico was established as the
result of a form of compact approved by both the Congress of the U.S.
and the people of Puerto Rico who, by a large majority, voted on 3 March
1952 in favoref'A Constitution establishing self-government for the island.
However, Commonwealth status is free to evolve to meet the changing
needs of the Puerto Rican people. This was implicit in the establishment
of the U.S.-Puerto Rico Status Committee, and in its recommendation that
a plebiscite be held to enable the people of Puerto Rico to choose between
continuation of their present status, statehood, or complete independence.
Ironically, it is the Communists who are now protesting against holding P.
plebiscite. Apparently they fear that a plebiscite would show their
lack of real support.
An unclassified attachment to this guidance sets forth in somewhat
more detail the recent history of Puerto Rico, its economy and its 25X1C10 b
government.
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~Z 10 7 Cont.)
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used by both sides and played an extensive role in "Vltava." Although
the Hungarian press mentions radiation problems, it downplays the role
of nuclear weapons.
Another notable trend is the pronounced increase in publicity given
to the Warsaw Pact maneuvers. Through 1962 there was virtually no press
coverage of such maneuvers. The 1963 maneuvers near Dresden were reported
after their termination; the reports appeared to be a sheepish confession
that the event, which was well-known to the West, had already taken place.
The 196+ maneuvers near Burgas were given limited publicity partly, it is
believed, because of Soviet sensiti#rity to the poor show that was staged.
In 1965, "October Storm" was broadly publicized before and after the
maneuvers. One reason for this,.increase was to ease the fears of the
populace, who had reacted negatively to the earlier maneuvers in East
Germany. Interestingly, the East German press gave a full outline of the
maneuvers, whereas the central Soviet press suppressed the information on
the use of nuclear weapons. This year, "Vltava's" record flood of Bloc
media output seems to have aimed not only to quiet the fears and impress
the populace of Eastern Europe, but also to convey to the rest of the world
the message that the Warsaw Pact forces are armed with the most modern
means of destruction and are trained to carry out any military assignment.
SovBloc propaganda also called attention to the ability of Bloc forces to
come from some distance to the aid of a Warsaw Pact country under attack,
and to collaborate under complex war conditions.
Hungarian units added political flavor to "Vltava" by the very fact
of participating, which the Soviets managed by staging the maneuvers in
an unlikely location in western Czechoslovakia and by supposing that a
substantial attack would be launched from Austria. Westerners have re-
marked on the "coincidence" between Hungary's first participation in Warsaw
Pact maneuvers outside of Hungary in over 10 years, and the imminent 10th
anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution in which the army proved unreliable
and mutinied. And in the sphere of intra-Bloc politics, the substitution
of Hungary for Poland may have been intended in part to dowr}grade the
widespread impression that the USSR's Eastern European Bloc is divided
into a Northern Tier (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia) and a Southern
Tier (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria).
The selection and phasing of the exercises for "Vltava," as for past
Warsaw Pact maneuvers, were obviously done by the Soviets in conformity
with their own strategic planning.* In one way, by having the Czechs absorb
the brunt of the initial assault and then having reinforcements from the
*Besides this obvious conclusion based on a study of "Vltava," we may cite
Czech CP chief Novotny's complaint about the high cost of staging the maneu-
vers and, implicitly, the complaint that the Czechs didn't get their money's
worth.
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(1068 Cont.)
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USSR and neighboring Satellites transported to Czechoslovakia to push
back the "enemy," the Soviets evidently sought to demonstrate that the
stationing of their own armed forces in all the Satellites was not neces-
sarily required for their defense. The Soviets would thus benefit by
establishing that their forces could not only be freed from assignment
to specific areas, but that they could be speedily deployed for effective
use in many other areas of the world.
In another way, "Vltava" probably will prove helpful to Soviet mili-
tary theorists who for the past year or so have been reappraising military
strategy and doctrine. Some Soviet military writers have raised serious
questions concerning Khrushchev's implicit assumption that while general
war was unlikely, any direct clash between the great powers would inevi-
tably result in an all-out nuclear war. Prominent Soviet theorists tend
to accept the thesis that tactical nuclear weapons might be employed
without inevitably causing general war. Because of the probable vague-
ness of the emerging strategy and doctrine (e.g., what types of nuclear
weapons are contemplated? would they be applied in Europe?) the results
of "Vltava" will probably be put to immediate use by the Soviet military
theorists.
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4
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(1068 Cont.)
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Reference:
Vitanovsky, Major General Vaclav, 0 Soucinnosti (On Combined Arms
Operations) Nase Vojsko (Czech publishing house which produces material
for limited distribution to Czech military officers) Prague, 1963.
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8?F1?p*I (1068. )
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1069 NE,AF. NASSER JAILS YEMENI CABINET
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SITUATION: Nasser,though he has had his ups and downs, has at least
one unique accomplishment to his credit in the field of geopolitics. He
has added a new dimension to the techniques of intervention by his blatant
breach of trust in arresting the former Yemeni cabinet.
Nasser acted through Yemeni President Sallal, as he has done ever
since the Yemeni revolution broke out nearly four years ago. In late
September 1966, Sallal returned to Yemen from nearly a year's leave of
absence in Cairo. His return provoked an immediate showdown: the Cabi-
net, headed by Premier al-Amri, flew to Cairo to demand that Nasser drop
Sallal, whose pro-Egyptian sentiments are anathema to those republicans
who want to assert their independence and seek new peace negotiations with
Yemeni royalists.
While Sallal in Yemen announced the "resignation" of al-Amri and his
cabinet, and the formation of a new strongly pro-UAR cabinet headed by him-
self, the Egyptians in Cairo arrested all the former cabinet who had gone
there to protest the return to Yemen of his protege and handyman.
Sallal has now taken over as Prime Minister as well as President, and
on 23 September announced a new foreign policy for the Yemen Arab Republic,
its principal doctrine being "The Government policy now follows the same
revolutionary line of policy that the UAR pursues."
The UAR's move completely erases any illusions that the Sallal gov-
ernment rests on a popular basis; pressure to change the regime in Yemen
has mounted, and violence including an attempt on Sallal's life on 29
September, has erupted. Widespread arrests of anti.-Egyptian elements in
Yemen, including military commanders, merchants, government officials,
and powerful tribal leaders, have added to the tension and instability.
These actions also raise serious questions as to the extent of Soviet
machinations throughout the Middle East, and the degree to which Nasser
is being used as an advance-man, preparing the ground for the eventual
Sovietization and communization of the area.
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SUL&WO (1069 Cont.)
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At the beginning, the Soviet and Chinese Communist efforts in South
Arabia were distinct and separate from each other and from that of the
UAR. The UAR was the first of these three powers to establish a closer
relationship with Yemen than minimal diplomatic representation. Exploit-
ing the ambitions and weaknesses of the then Crown Prince of Yemen,
Muhammad Badr, Nasser was able to win him over to his own concept of
Arab Unity and Socialism. In 1956, under the advice and guidance of the
UAR, Badr established diplomatic relations with the countries of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc; he also asked for and received economic aid from those coun-
tries, thus spreading an official welcome mat for communist presence in
the Yemen. The UAR, finding Badr difficult to control, decided to develop
a new instrument for its covert action in Yemen -- a policy that resulted
in the September 1962 coup and the establishment of a pro-UAR "Republican"
government under Sallal.
The Soviets were well aware of the subversive role played by the UAR
in the Arabian Peninsula, and helped to assure the UAR's success in Yemen
by supporting the costly military, paramilitary and subversion activities
of the Egyptians.
The willingness of the Soviets to underwrite the efforts of the UAR
in Yemen and the Federation of South Arabia underscores a gradual and
subtle change in the ideological orientation of the UAR, and illustrates
the new relationship that has developed between the Soviet Bloc and the
UAR. Nasser's Arab Socialist Union attained recognition at the 23rd Con-
gress of the CPSU in March 1966 when it was awarded the status of a fra-
ternal party. This change also led Arab communist party leaders to in-
struct their followers that there was no difference between Arab Socialism
and "Scientific Socialism" (i.e., Communism), thus implying that Nasser's
retention of nationalism and religion in Arab Socialism was temporary
window-dressing. Calls for unity and cooperation among "progressive" mass
organizations, such as the Arab Socialist Union, communist parties and ex-
treme socialists, soon spread throughout the Arab world.
The Chicoms have for the most part remained aloof from the Soviet-UAR
presence in Yemen. And to a degree, the Soviets themselves have maintained
a hands-off policy in the political situation in Yemen, leaving this field
to their Egyptian surrogates. However, there is probably no facet of eco-
nomic, military, or political life in the South Arabian Peninsula that is
not affected by the activity of these countries, concentrated in the YAR.
The country with the largest force there is the UAR with approximately
550,000 troops. In addition, the Egyptians have a large number of "advisers"
at all levels of government in the YAR who exert almost absolute control
over the decisions and policies made by the government. The secondary
schools are almost completely staffed by Egyptian teachers, in a position
to influence and indoctrinate the comparatively few students who will be
the future leaders of Yemen. The Soviet Union has approximately 800 offi-
cial personnel, including some 70 military, technical and economic advisors
and 38 persons assigned to the diplomatic mission; the remainder are teachers,
doctors and nurses. The third largest group is that of the Chinese Communists
2
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S.LO- l l (1069 Cont.)
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(over 400) who tend more to remain apart. Like the Soviets, they do
not outwardly appear to be directly involved in the local political
situation. They have not attracted many Yemenis to their ideology,
yet they are working steadily to improve their image among the people
and the government. As their aid projects come to completion, the im-
pact of their presence will be significant. The official missions, and
economic and technical advisors of the Eastern European Bloc countries
add to this powerful Nasserite and Communist presence.
In the YAR, the Egyptians control all propaganda media. Radio
and press releases repeat the official line from Cairo (via MENA, the
official news agency of the UAR) which in turn often mirrors that of
the Soviet Bloc. In addition to MENA, the official Soviet and Chicom
news agencies,TASS and NCNA, are represented in the YAR.
Technically, the last Egyptian troops were to have left Yemen by
the end of September 1966 under a peace agreement signed in August 1965
by President Nasser and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, but this died on
the vine months ago. Instead of evacuation, Egypt's First Vice-President
proclaimed at the end of September 1966 that Cairo's objective was to insti-
tute progress in Yemen and said: "We are ready to stay there 20 years to
achieve this."
But in spite of their overwhelming physical presence, influence in
the government and control over propaganda media, the Egyptians have not
been able to create a favorable impression on the Yemeni. Some Egyptians
are reportedly beginning to worry over this, and complain that when it is
all over they will be forgotten while the Soviets and Chicoms will be re-
membered by the monuments they will have left behind. Egypt's recent 25X1C10 b
Coup-by-Abduction will hardly help.
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1~~ (1069 Cont.)
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Biweekly Propaganda Guidance, dated 23 May 1966, Item 1024; "New
Soviet 'Accommodation' in the Middle East."
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(1069.)
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24 October 196
The alleged "colonialism" of the United States in Puerto Rico has
long been a pet Communist propaganda theme. The Communists have
claimed that the island is economically exploited by the United States,
that its young men are used as cannon fodder of American aggresssion,
and that the United States is deliberately wiping out the Puerto Rican
cultural heritage in order to substitute monopoly capitalism in its
stead.
In October 1965 the Cuban government urged the United Nations to
submit the island's "case" to the UN Special Committee on Colonialism.
The U.S. delegate promptly pointed out that a United Nations resolu-
tion of 27 November 1953 recognized Puerto Rico as "a fully self-
governing and autonomous entity": and thus "not subject" to the com-
mittee's jurisdiction. Furthermore, he pointed out, the Puerto Rican
people themselves freely approved the institution of the Commonwealth
by a large majority in a vote in 1952, and have upheld this stance in
subsequent elections in which candidates for independence have never
won more than a miniscule part of the vote.
The view that Puerto Rico is self-governing and autonomous has
even received some support from Communists. An article in the Yugoslav
newspaper, Politika, on 12 September 1965 said that "very few Puerto
Ricans" considered that there is anything in the links between Puerto
Rico and the United States which "could smell of a colonial relation-
ship." Although the island is not completely independent, it is a
"self-governing Commonwealth" of the United States. It has its gover-
nor who resembles a Prime Minister, while in internal affairs the Puerto
Ricans are practically independent. Calling attention to the remark-
able economic development in recent years, Politika characterized the
island "a compliment to the homeland, a pleasant, cheerful country
where human wishes can be satisfied."
The Communist propaganda charges were renewed at the Tri-Continent
Conference in Havana in January 1966, where the delegates endorsed the
"struggle" of the Puerto Rican Pro-Independence Movement (MPI) and
advocated that it be given "moral, economic, and every other kind of
aid." A representative of the MPI was elected to the executive secre-
tariat of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organiza-
tion (AALAPSO), which was created at the Havana Conference. It was
even claimed at the Tri-Continent Conference that the Puerto Rican
people overwhelmingly reject the war in Vietnam, which was promptly
refuted by a vote in the Commonwealth Legislature approving by a near
unanimous vote (only one against) President Johnson's policy in Viet-
nam.
The facts of the case of Puerto Rico are in stark contrast to the
blatant allegations of the Communist propaganda machine. Indeed, the
realities of the island's economic and political life bear so little
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relationship to the Communist contentions that one wonders why they
should attempt to make such wild claims about it.
Perhaps the most important fact about Puerto Rico's status is that
it was cho=3en bjr the Puerto Rican people themselves. Furthr>r, tii
status question can be reopened by the people when they so cysire.
In August of this year a specially appointed U.S.-Puerto Rico Com-
mission on the Status of Puerto Rico issued a report recommending that
a plebiscite be held on the island to determine whether its people wish
to become one of the United States, to become independent, or to
retain their present status as a Commonwealth.
The Commission (familiarly known as STACOM) was created at the
request of former Puerto Rican Governor Luis Munoz Marin, who was
instrumental in developing the Commonwealth status which was granted
to Puerto Rico on 25 July 1952, after ratification by the Congress of
the U.S. and the people of Puerto Rico. In this system the island is
self-governing within the framework of a permanent association with
the United States based on a common market, common citizenship, fiscal
autonomy, common defense, common currency, and a common loyalty to the
democratic way of life. The Commonwealth status has fostered an eco-
nomic growth which most nations could envy. However, in July 1962
Governor Munoz Marin wrote to President John F. Kennedy: "It seems
clear that the people of Puerto Rico should be consulted again regard-
ing the relationship of its government with the United States." This
appeal resulted in the creation of STACOM to study the political, eco-
nomic antisocial aspects of the island's link with the mainland. The
commission consisted of six members from the U.S., including Senators
Javits and Jackson and Ambassador Pat Harris, and six from Puerto Rico,
including Munoz Marin, Teodoro Moscoso, the former director of the
Alliance for Progress, Gilberto Concepcion de Gracia, president of the
Puerto Rico Independence Party (who resigned from STACOM in May 1966),
and Senator Miguel Garcia Mendez, chairman of the Statehood Republican
party. The Commission's Chairman is James H. Rowe.
The Commission's report, issued after extensive hearings and
investigations, concluded that: "The policy governing the relationship
between the United States and Puerto Rico is and should continue to be
based on the principles of mutual consent and self-determination." It
noted that "an immediate or abrupt change in political status would
involve serious economic risks and dislocations", but added that "these
could be offset by special economic and financial arrangements." The
commission did not indicate a preference for any of the three choices
to be offered in the plebiscite, declaring simply that: "All three
forms of political status -- the commonwealth, statehood and indepen-
dence -- are valid and confer upon the people of Puerto Rico equal
dignity with equality of status and of national citizenship." The
choice, then, is to be made by the Puerto Rican people. If they should
choose a different status than the present one, the new arrangement
would be worked out in mutual agreement with the United States Congress.
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The proposed plebiscite was immediately labelled a farce by the
AALAPSO and its executive secretariat proclaimed 23 September 1966 a
day of "tricontinental solidarity" with the Puerto Rican "struggle."
Castro's Prensa Latina on 7 September disseminated both the AALAPSO
solidarity appeal and a statement signed by Juan Mari Bras, Secretary
General of the MPI, warning that the imposition of a "spurious and
fraudulent plebisicte" might provoke a civil war. The AALAPSO call
for a day of solidarity with Puerto Rico was gleefully accepted by
the Communist nations. Pravda, Moscow, printed an article on the
subject; NCNA, Peking, reported "Chinese Mass Organizations Support
Puerto Rican Independence," and the Chinese Communist government (though
preoccupied with its domestic troubles) sent a telegram to the MPI
announcing its solidarity. As could be expected, Havana also printed
articles, made speeches, and sent numerous telegrams.
A Moscow broadcast to Latin America at the end of August, pre-
senting recorded statements by Puerto Rican opponents of the plebiscite,
asserted that the status commission had recommended a "phony plebiscite,"
and charged the United States with resorting to "dirty maneuvers... to
legalize imperialist domination of the country." Puerto Rican speakers
on the program denounced the plebiscite, one branding it as "Hiterite."
In December 1965, Moscow Radio had already said it would make its
microphones available to Puerto Rican "fighters for independence,"
claiming that the U.S. Government had prohibited Puerto Rican radio
and TV stations from carrying MPI programs. Consequently, said Radio
Moscow, it was "setting up a new section for Puerto Rican patriots to
have their say," and it requested that listeners submit program material
which would be read by Moscow announcers. The Moscow broadcast at
the end of August, already mentioned, again requested contributions
to this "feature" program.
While Moscow undoubtedly would like to stir up whatever trouble
it can in Puerto Rico by its propaganda activities, it surely knows
that the MPI represents an extremely small element of the island's
population. The real targets of this propaganda output are the other
countries of Latin America, plus Africa and Asia. Capitalizing on
general ignorance of the facts of Puerto Rico's real situation, Moscow
attempts to use this theme to substantiate its claims of "American,
capitalist, imperialist, colonialist aggression."
In truth, however, Puerto Rico's story is a heartening one for
democracy and for private enterprise and brings credit to the United
States. Its status of "Commonwealth," more accurately rendered by the
Spanish "Estado Libre Asociado" (Free Associated State) is a unique
creation under the Constitution of the United States. Under this rela-
tionship the Puerto Ricans are responsible for the essential aspects
of their internal government, which is carried out by a governor and a
bicameral legislature. Basically, the island enjoys all the economic
and financial benefits of a state, but Puerto Ricans do not pay the
Federal income tax.
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Cont. )
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The economic development of Puerto Rico is little short of astound-
ing. Since 1940 the Gross National Product has soared from $28.7 mil-
lion to $2.5 billion and is currently growing at the rate of 10 percent
per annum, a rate matched only by Israel and Japan. Per capita annual
income has increased over seven times, from $118 to about $900 (the
highest in Latin America) manufacturing investment has increased from
$26.7 million to $435 million; there are now over 25,000 automobiles
on the island for a population of 2,500,000; illiteracy has dropped
from 35 percent to 13 percent; there are over 23,000 students in the
island's universities, compared with 5,000 in 1940. Over 1,000,000
Puerto Ricans have migrated to the mainland in past years; thus provid-
ing relief to a burgeoning population problem. In recent years, how-
ever, the economic development of Puerto Rico has raised living stand-
ards there to the point that the migration began to reverse itself in
1964 and now the current is slightly in the other direction.
Even with this remarkable success story, which has attracted
attentive visitors from most of the underdeveloped countries of the
world, Puerto Rico's economy is still only ",demi-developed," as present
Governor Roberto Sanchez Villela put it. A giant's step has been
taken, another remains. Overpopulation is a major problem; the popu-
lation density is one of the highest on earth and is still expanding
rapidly. Even though per capita income is the highest in Latin America,
it is still well below that of Mississippi, the lowest among the 50
states.
But the most important fact is that these problems are being
solved, and rapidly, by the Puerto Rican people themselves.
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September 1966
Total Regular Forces* of Warsaw Pact Countries
USSR
3,165,000
Bulgaria
156,000
Czechoslovakia
220,000
East Germany
122,000
Hungary
109,000
Poland
260,000
Rumania
175,000
Total: 4,207,000 Source: The Military Balance
1966-1967, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 1966.
*Includes only army, navy, and air forces; excluded are security and
border troops, and other para-military forces such as members of volun-
tary military support organizations.
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24 October 1966
EAST GERMAN PRESS ACCOUI 1'S OF WARSAW PACT MANEUVER
The closing phases ')f the "Vltava" Warsaw Pact maneuver in
Czechoslovakia, which was.concluded with a parade in Ceske
Budejovice on 25 Septemli?r 1966, received extensive coverage in
the 22, 23, 24, and 25 September 1966 issues of the Berlin part; or--
?gan N:,ues Deutschland. According to the accounts, reported by the
papers s special -correspondent, ,n East German motorized infantry di-
vision from ilalle part ici fated in the maneuver. Oberstleutnant
WEISS is mentioned as Co of an i?ast t::erman unit. Minister of De-
fense Armeegeneral II0M.1XI N, and deputy Defenseministers Ttd nirai
VERNER and Generaloberst =:I;SSL' z were prec;ent. :as observers.
Generalmajor Hari ERNST w-is litstc l ? ; a s4)oke:atnan for the Last Ger-
man forces at the conciu,,:ion of the :x:erc sc. Ob:,rst RAUBTCH was
also on the scene.
The maneuver pitted the "pink" forces against the "green."
Both sides employed nuclear weapons. Fighter aircraft, airborne
troops, mine-dropping helicopters, and armored, antiaircraft, and
engineer units participated in various phases.
Speaking at an international press conference on 23 September,
Czechoslovak Generalmajor Jan VOSTERA from the joint maneuver com-
mand" is quoted in the 24 September 1966 issue of the paper as say-
ing that the maneuver involved "complex problems of operational com-
bat actions by ground forces, Air Force units, and border
troops." He added that the exercise was designed to test "the stat-
rnvaluable
us of training of the staffs andtroops,
aand to nd toegather
legex-
periences. Among other things, w p p
task forces under combat conditions, combined action by the armies
of the participating countries, the operation and planning of com-
.bat actions, and cooperation among the individual service
branches." Additional excerpts describing the action are cited be-
low.
(22 September issue) : "The following situation prevailed on
the second day, at the beginning of the combat action: 'Pink 'had
dropped operational airborne forces in the rear area of 'green'.
They formed a bridgehead, teamed up with advance armored forces,
and secured the landing of additional troop units at a captured air-
field. An operation to gain possession of a crossing at the Vltava
River was decided in favor of the 'pink 'forces; but .they did not
succeed in establishing contact between the airborne division and
the forces of the first echelon (Staffel). Only the advance ele-
ment achieved this goal.
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The actions on the second day began with the employment of
tactical aircraft against the positions of the advance elements of
the 'pink 'motorized infantry regiment, following extensive troop
movements during the preceding night. Territorial defense units en-
gaged the landed enemy airborne troops in combat in the densely for-
ested terrain of the Choustnik Mountain. Suddenly squadron after
squadron of fighter bombers from the 'pink 'forces flew low over
the valley while fighter aircraft, flying in several levels above
them, guarded the air space."
The writer then describes troop landings by helicopter which
are covered by fighter squadrons. An advance detachment is landed
to guard the landing area for successive "pink" forces which will
reinforce the airborne division. Mi-6 helicopters,"flying around
the mountain... before they approach the landing area inthe Talley at
a height of 20-30 meters," land troorr, mortars, recoilless guns,
twin antiaircraft guns, and armored personnel carriers and cross-
country jeeps equipped with antitank guided rockets.
"The precise landing is enthusiastically greeted by,the
maneuver guests. The excellent cooperation between the motorized
infantry battalion of the division from Plzen and the Soviet heli-
copter crews enabled the motorized infantrymen to be combat ready
in a very short time and to take advantage of the success achieved
by the 'pink 'forces the previous day. The battalion penetrated to-
ward the south and, together with other units landed during the ear-
ly morning hours, ensured that the airborne division could join'the
motorized infantry division of the first echelon of the 'pink'
forces."
The next action described takes place on a large hill in the
vicinity of Mnich. The forces fight for possession of a wooded
mountain range to the east. "'Pink 'is unable to move up new re-
serves. 'Green, 'however, can employ two new divisions. 'Pink'
fighter formations now guard the air space. Suddenly we are con-
fronted by a 550-meter long black smoke screen. 'Green 'has demol-
ished an antitank ditch in order to stop an offensive by the oppo-
nent and to bring up their own reserves...."
Fighter bombers subsequently attack the positions of the
"green" forces. Two supersonic bombers eject "nuclear bombs." "A
red fireball.. glows in the positions of the 'green 'following their
explosion on the ground.... With this use of nuclear weapons,
'pink is preparing its offensive."
The writer then renders a description of armored units and par-
atroopers, which spread. out in the valley, attacking the "opponent"
under cover of artillery fire and aircraft overhead. "The other side
tries to attack the ground troops from the air. Immediately,after-
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wards a bitter struggle for air supremacy begins...." Both Soviet
and Czechoslovak pilots participate in this action.
"Meanwhile, the reserves of the 'green 'forces have approached
the front...." The "enemy" quickly takes up a defensive position
and reinforces his antitank defenses. "Helicopters, descending up
to 1 meter,-are laying a nearly 600-meter long mine f.eld as a bar-
rier. From the hills, which they control, and which the 'pink'
forces tried in vain to capture, a Soviet and a Hungarian motor-
ized infantry division, which had been moved up, are attacking.
'Pink 'attacks both groups with nuclear weapons. But the 'green'
troops cannot be stopped. Their commander decides to deliver 2 nu-
clear blows at the enemy positions.
"After hour-long aerial battles, tanks and motorized infantry-
\a nuclear attack, the following happens which might well be typical
for a meeting engagement during the initial phases of a modern war:
Precisely at the boundary be'' ;1 the two itc-k("kitiq foiinarions, tho
,armored units of 'pink 'noun, counter o-ten.;ivc which is sup-
ported by air strikes. }.ui. :~,Icoir l ech :ions of the 'grev-n 'prove
superior. The airborne c psis c:.. Wit tiiQ "pink 'hua been beaten.
'Green 'has forced a cha.scs,. I1 _