MEDIA LINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 21, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 1999/08 24 : CIA- FDP1-( 3061A000400070002-0
----------------
edia Lines
Ni
UAR Press Adept in Use of Captions and Headlines for Propaganda. A
sampling of the Cairo press during a recent week illustrates the use of
headlines and captions in making propaganda points. The following ex-
amples were among those noted:
a. The miscaption. The weekly review, AL MUSSAWAR, on 22 October
carried an Associated Press photo of U.S. soldiers interrogat-
ing bound Viet Cong prisoners above the caption: "This is how
U.S. Cavalry troops (the First Division), in search of Viet
Cong troops. question Vietnamese villagers: they throw them,
with their hands tied, into the rice fields, hoping they will
furnish information about the 'rebels'".
b. The editorialized caption. AL GOMHOURIA, a well-known daily,
in its 20 October edition captioned a photograph of President
Johnson shaking hands with New Zealanders out to greet him at
the airport on his recent Asian trip: ".Johnson Feigns Humane-
ness; photo shows him shaking hands with a child across airport
fence in New Zealand".
c. The slanted headline. Another large Cairo daily, AL AHRAM, on
18 October headlined the commencement of President Johnson's
Asian trip as follows: "Johnson Starts Asian Trip Amidst
Threats to Assassinate Him".
The Cairo press carried no editorials on President Johnson's trip, but
as one observer noted, "With such headlines, who needs editorials?"
(Unclassified)
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
(Media Lines.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIIP-RDP78-03061AO00400070002-0
Briefly Noted 00000'
George Stalin Reported to be Police
Kennan SPY
To T&ZZ
AZZ In the "Periscope" column of
its 7 November 1966 issue
(see Press Comment, 8 Nov 66) NEWS-
WEEK magazine reports that former
Ambassador George Kennan has found new
evidence to prove that Stalin was once
a Tsarist police agent. Kennan, now
at the Institute for Advanced Studies
at Princeton, has discovered that the
passport Stalin used to attend a
party congress in Stockholm in 1906
was issued by the secret police, and
also that Stalin disclosed at a party
seminar in 1920 that he had been a
Tsarist agent; a theoretical magazine
reporting this disappeared from Sov-
iet libraries, and the other partici-
pants in the session, together with
Stalin's close associates in the 1906-
1912 period, were all liquidated in
the 1920's. NEWSWEEK reports that
Kennan will publish his findings soon.
This is not the first time that
Stalin has been reported to have been
a police spy (see: STALIN'S GHOST
SECRET by Isaac D. Levine, New York,
Coward-McCann, 1956. 126 pp.) but Ken-
nan appears to have uncovered new
evidence, and his own stature as a
former Ambassador and well-known his-
torian'-- together with the fact that
he has lately been a critic of the
U.S. government -- will probably
attract considerable publicity to his
story when and if it is published.
The NEWSWEEK report may be used
as a basis for short editorial com-
ment, pending the full publication of
the story. The 50th Anniversary
commemorations next year will pro-
vide good pegs for discussions of
Stalin's secret past. The point
to be stressed is not so much
Stalin's misdeeds as an individual
-- many of these were fully re-
vealed in Khrushchev's famous
Secret Speech in 1956 -- but that
an individual like Stalin could
take over the CPSU and rule the
Soviet Union and the World Com-
munist movement for many years.
Certainly no Bolshevik would have
considered a one-time police spy
within the party to be qualified
to lead the party; Stalin, how-
ever, was able to keep this infor-
mation from most of the Bolsheviks
and to eliminate those who found
out. Since there is no control
over the leadership of a Communist
party once it is in power, not
even by the party itself, the rest
of the world must see to it that
Communist parties do not come to
power in the first place.
"Guerrilla" Cuban Radio Incites
Broadcast Violent Revolution.
Series
Radio Havana, on
8 October, inaugurated weekly
broadcasts in English of a program
called simply, "Guerrilla". The
series provides rundowns on guer-
rilla activities in Africa, Asia
and Latin America, and according
to its sponsors, promotes "tri-
continental solidarity". Half of
the initial program, which lasted
32 minutes, was devoted to the
situation in Colombia, which was
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
T (Briefly Noted Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/OhA-RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
cited as offering a good example "of
the armed struggle of the people."
The remainder of the program included
brief reports from Vietnam, Indonesia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Angola,
Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Peru,
Venezuela and Guatemala. For more than
a year, Havana Radio has been appeal-
ing for violent revolution, and the
new "Guerrilla" series indicates a
reinforcement of that policy. (unclas-
sified)
Conference 1936 French Popular
"Manifested Front Studied at CP
Proletarian Conference
Internation-
alism" A so-called "interna-
tional scientific con-
ference" devoted to the history of the
development of the Popular Front in
1936 and the activity of the late
Secretary General of the French Com-
munist Party (PCF), Maurice Thorez,
was held in Paris from 24 to 29 Octo-
ber. In addition to the PCF, delega-
tions from the CPs of Austria, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Poland,
Rumania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia
attended the conference, according to
a 31 October TASS report.
The report on the conference in
the 3 November issue of the PCF daily
newspaper, L'HUMANITE, notes the par-
ticipation of delegates from parties
and institutes of history in 19 Euro-
pean and Latin American countries.
L'HUMANITE also reports (see unclassi-
fied attachment) that not only was the
French experience analyzed at the con-
ference but attention was also devoted
to experiences in Italy, Spain, Chile,
and elsewhere.
Also attached is another article
by Georges Cogniot, a member of the
PCF Central Committee. (Cogniot not
only authored the article in
L'HUMANITE but also gave the con-
cluding speech at the Paris con-
ference, which the Soviet news
agency summarized thus: "In the
last 30 years there have been big
changes in the world, but the les-
sons of the Popular Front are still
topical. Judging by its composi-
tion and the content of the proceed-
ings the conference was a mani-
festation of proletarian interna-
tionalism." TASS also notes that
a coreport was delivered by P.N.
Pospelov, director of the Insti-
tute of Marxism-Leninism at the
CPSU Central Committee.)
Note in the concluding section
of the Cogniot article in the August
issue of the WORLD MARXIST REVIEW
(the English edition of the inter-
national
journal for all Soviet-
oriented
CP's) the statement: "The
lessons
of
the epoch-making experi-
ence of
the
Popular Front, if due
account
is
taken of the dictates
of our time, have lost none of
their significance. What was then
an alliance of the working class
and the middle strata now takes the
form of the unity of all anti-
monopoly forces against the finan-
cial oligarchy and its instrument
-- one-man rule." (The latter is
a typical CP veiled attack against
the domestic policies of President
De Gaulle while openly espousing
certain of his foreign policies
which complement those of the World
Communist Movement.)
For futher details of how the
PCF uses the Popular Front theme
see BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE
Item No. 1021 of 23 May 1966, "New
Opportunities for French Communists".
How this is used on an international
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
(Briefly Noted Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: IA- 8-03061A000400070002-0
scale is demonstrated in COMMUNIST
TEXTS of 10 August 1966, an analysis
of the WORLD MARXIST REVIEW article
entitled "Unity of Action Is a Vital
Need of Our Time."
Communist Russell Mock Trial Beset
Media by Difficulties
Coverage
Wanes Just before the first
closed session of the
Vietnam "war crimes tribunal" pro-
posed by the Bertrand Russell Peace
Foundation (BRPF) was scheduled to
be held (13-16 November in London),
Russell announced that three African
presidents -- Julius Myerere of
Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
and Leopold Senghor of Senegal --
had withdrawn their support of the
Foundation's projects. At the same
time, Communist media around the
world were paying less and less
attention to it.
The North Vietnamese radio and
press did not refer to it in connec-
tion with a large-scale propaganda
campaign devoted to the documents
and films released 31 October by
the Hanoi-created Commission for
Investigation of U.S. Imperialist
War Crimes in Vietnam; other Commu-
nist media, reporting press confer-
ences held by North Vietnamese repre-
sentatives in other world capitals,
as well as statements of support for
North Vietnam's independent initia-
tive in this regard, were similarly
silent about the BRPF proposal. The
FRENCH PRESS AGENCY (AFP) correspon-
dent in Hanoi reported on 7 November
that the arrival of top BRPF official
Ralph Schoenman in North Vietnam
three days earlier had not even been
mentioned in the North Vietnamese
press.
The French Government radio on
7 November broadcast an interview
with Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese
Government's Delegate General in
Paris. In answer to a question about
the Russell initiative, to hold a
"tribunal" in London, he gave this
noncommittal reply: "If Lord Ber-
trand Russell has had the idea of
convoking an international tribunal
to denounce and condemn the war
crimes committed by the United States
in Vietnam, this will be only just....
On our part, if we find that it is
time to denounce and to condemn the
war crimes, it is up to all the
people of the world, including the
American people, to join their ef-
forts to those of our people to halt
the arm of the greatest criminals
in history and to make sure that the
crimes committed against peace and
humanity are not repeated against
other peoples in other countries."
Peking media continues to ignore
the BRPF proposal. Two items from
other Communist sources, on the
other hand, disclose further compli-
cations for the "tribunal" organizers:
On 1 November the Yugoslav news
agency TANYUG reported that profes-
sors and students of the University
of Ljubljana had "condemned" the
President of the Slovene Academy of
Science Josip Vidmar "because he
declined to cooperate in the commit-
tee assisting Russell's court for war
crimes in Vietnam."
In London, former left-wing MP
Fenner Brockway announced on 4 Novem-
ber that the British Council for
Peace in Vietnam was sponsoring an
international juridical commission
to hear evidence about the war, and
that it was not connected with the
Russell "tribunal." According to a
*(See page 7, 17 Nov PRESS COMMENT.)
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CI~~A-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
(Briefly Noted Cont.)
 Approved For Release I 9 A-RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
brief TASS report, Lord Brockway said
"he had sent a letter to Lord Russell
calling for joint actions." The Sov-
iet news agency added without comment:
"Russell put forth an idea for set-
ting up an international tribunal to
deal with the American war crimes in
Vietnam."
Prior to the London BRPF meet-
ing there were indications that the
original idea of holding a mock trial
of U.S. leaders was being altered to
make the subsequent sessions, still
scheduled for February or March next
year at some not yet confirmed site,
resemble more a "commission of in-
quiry."
Our position remains that no pub-
licity for the "tribunal" is still
the best line to follow. Statements
that there is every indication that
the Communists may be dropping or
ignoring the BRPF, despite their ap-
parent validity, could very well be
counterproductive since they might
lend an air of some respectability to
the Russell group.
The most plausible explanation
of Communist media behavior in this
connection is that the Communists pre-
fer to advance their offensive against
U.S. "war criminals" along three in-
dependent tracks: Hanoi's investiga-
tion for Communist and anti-U.S. left-
ist audiences, Russell's "tribunal"
for non-Communists and intelligentsia
of the Free World, and Brockway's for
old-line pacifists.
To Convene Will Soviet Writers
or not --- Meet?
One of the most dramatic
and significant cultural-political
events of 1966 could take place in
mid-December when the oft-postponed
4th Writers' Congress is to con-
vene in Moscow. Alternatively,
that Congress could be as dull and
uneventful as were the Congresses
of the CPSU last March and the
Komsomol in May. The outcome of
the Writers' Congress will depend
upon the strength and audacity of
the liberal forces of protest and
the counter-weight of the regime's
mechanisms for imposing conformity
to "socialist realism."
The struggle between the re-
gime (represented by orthodox wri-
ters and officials) and the weakly
organized but articulate liberal
writers whose most significant
works are published in NOVY MIR
(NEW WORLD) was one-sided in favor
of the former during the early
part of 1966 as the Sinyavsky-
Daniel trial and sentencing in
February was followed up by blasts
in the conservative press. Since
mid-1966, however, the liberals
have emerged more frequently from
their virtual silence. The Con-
gress, therefore, may pit the two
forces against one another in a
stirring battle for control and
the right of freer expression.
The Soviets can hardly post-
pone the Congress once again, even
though they realize it may prove
embarrassing to them. If they do,
we treat the postponement as a
glaring admission of no confidence
in the regime's ability to let
writers express themselves openly
in public and as evidence of the
regime's awareness tha the crea-
tive intelligentsia are alienated.
If the proceedings of the Congress
are scantily reported, we specu-
late widely on the issues and
arguments behind the scenes which
almost certainly will have been
suppressed. If some Soviet writers
Approved For Release 1999/OSW24 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
OIr (Briefly Noted Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24P78-03061 A000400070002-0
break through in print with state-
ments condemning the bonds of regime
control over literature, we applaud
them and encourage the Free World's
press to give them every practicable
encouragement. In any eventuality,
we contrast the suppression of liter-
ary expression in the USSR with the
freedoms existing in most Free World
countries and, furthermore, we register
our regret that the Soviet controls are
depriving the world of the talented Rus-
sians' valuable literary production.
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
S f"M (Briefly Noted)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: b A-? b 78-03061A000400070002-0
Questionnaire
TO ALL FIELD ADDRESSES: In the past we have sent questionnaires several times
to the field on the use of our BPG's, and your responses have materially aided
us in our effort to meet your propaganda needs. Our last questionnaire was
sent in 1963, and since that time several changes have been made in the BPG's.
Will you, therefore, please fill out this form and return it within one week?
(FYI, this is the last in our current series of questionnaires.)
25X1A2d1
TO: Chief,
VIA: Chief, Division
FROM: COS (COB)
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance Issue #202, dated 24 October 1966
A. This Station (Base) utilized Guidance Items in subject issue as follows:
(Use checks: If item not received, please cross out the item number)
ITEM NUMBERS*
1067 1068 1069
1. Articles (editorials, news, other
printed material -- if more than
one, give total).
2. Broadcasts, speeches, other non-
printed uses.
3. Discussing with Liaison, other
local individuals.
4. Showing, discussing with State
Dept. or other U.S. officials.
5. Background info for general
functions of your position.
*lo 67 WH, Free Choice for Puerto Rico; 1068, "Vltava": Warsaw Pact 1966
Maneuvers Unprecedented in Scope; 1069 NE,AF., Nasser Jails Yemeni Cabinet.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
? ^[t fi tT (Questionnaire Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999' CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
B. "Propagandist's Guide to World Communist Affairs" and unclassified Chrono-
logy.
1. Do you usually find the classified Guide of value in treating and exploit-
ing Communist developments? Yes No Comment:
2. Last Spring the Guide was changed from a bi-weekly survey of Communist
dissensions to a monthly survey of over-all world Communist developments,
not limited to dissensions. Has this change made the Guide more or less
useful for your purposes? More_ Less__ No change- Comment:
3. Have you used the unclassified Chronology accompanying the Guides by:
1) Passing it to agents? Yes_ No 2) other (explain):
4+. Have you used the French or Spanish translation of the Chronology?
French_ Spanish.-.
C. Unclassified Attachments.
1. Have you passed any of the un'61assified attachments to BPG #202 to agents?
Yes No Which attachments?
2. Do you consider the. number of unclassified attachments to be generally:
too few enough_ too many, Other comment on attachments:
D. Subject matter.
1. Are the subjects covered generally pertinent to your mission? Yes
No Comment:
2. (For stations not receiving all BPG items:) Among items you do not receive,
are there any you would like? If yes please specify:
3. Relative to your needs, and thinking back over the BPG's of the last year
or so, do you find. any major subjects which are not being covered? If
yes, please specify:
E. General Comments: (If more space is needed attach additional sheets.)
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
(Questionnaire.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: &h*-M78-03061A00d4d'070b 2j(Y66
1075. PARLIAMENTARY OPPORTUNITY FOR
THE, NETHERLANDS COMMUNIST PARTY
25X1C10b
SITUATION: (Unclassified) In response to a formal request from
the leader of the four-member Parliamentary group of the Communist Party
of the Netherlands (CPN), the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parlia-
ment on 4 October 1966 voted 80 to 47 to admit Communist deputies to
membership on the Chamber's Permanent Committees on Defense and Foreign
Affairs. This is the first time such admission has been authorized since
the 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia.
Only three members of the Catholic People's Party (KVP) -- coalition
government leaders -- voted against admission of the Communists to these
committees. The proposal was also supported by the Pacifist Socialist
Party, Farmers Party, Christian Historical Union, and about half of the
Labor Party members. An article in the Socialist daily HET PAROOL com-
mented that the KVP gave their almost unanimous vote because of an evi-
dent Party decision that this action would be in line with the Vatican
lead in "bridge building" to the East.(Note: the coalition Cabinet led
by KVP Premier Cals fell ten days later on an unrelated issue.)
Largely because of the almost unanimously adverse Netherlands press
comment (see unclassified attachment), the Permanent Committees on Defense
and Foreign Affairs have voted to organize subcommittees to handle confi-
dential matters; CPN members will be excluded from these subcommittees.
While there are only four CPN representatives in the 150-member
Second Chamber (and only one in the 75-member First Chamber), this advance
in status of the CPN domestically is best viewed in the overall context of
efforts by Communist parties throughout the NATO area to gain respectability
and wield greater influence,tasks re-emphasized in the goals listed at the
9-11 May 1966 conference of the West European Communist Parties held in
Vienna (see BPG items #1026, 1033, 1036, and 1043, which discuss how this
has affected other countries).
Even before the Vienna conference, CPN plans for gaining more influ-
ence in Netherlands politics were spelled out in an article in POLITIEK
EN CULTUUR, the CPN's monthly theoretical organ, by Mrs. van Ommeren-
Averink, Central Committee member and CPN Parliamentary representative.
She wrote in the March 1966 issue:
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
~ (1075 Cont.)
 Approved For Release I 9 IA-RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
"The CPN is concentrating its efforts principally on its national
obligations. We place the most emphasis on unity and collaborate
with all progressive forces in the Netherlands. We are open to
whatever is possible in the way of agreements and cooperation for
commonly held objectives, and with parties and groups that have
either striven with us in the past or are still doing so. The
commonly pursued demonstrations against the forms of a multilateral
European force and for solidarity with Vietnam are examples of this
desire. Cooperation has increased between Socialist and Communist
workers and others. By intensifying the cooperation between Social-
ism and Communism the perspectives are opened to bring about in the
future the gradual decrease and the ultimate elimination of any
division in the worker's movement in the Netherlands,"
Thus Mrs. van Ommeren-Averink reiterated the CPN's intention to use
the tactics of the United Front.
On 22 April 1966, the CPN daily newspaper DE WAARHEID ("The Truth")
carried a report on the previous evening's meeting of the Central Com-
mittee in Amsterdam, at which CPN Chairman Paul de Groot spoke about the
XXIII Congress of the CPSU. De Groot stressed another tactical line
popular among European CPs, that of claiming to be basically a nationalist
party, free from entangling direction from the seats of the World Commu-
nist Movement. Denying that his Party was turning away from Moscow and
seeking alignment with Peking as had been claimed in the "bourgeois" press,
he declared:
"The CPN has defended its independence against everyone. It will not
and it does not permit even the Chinese Communist Party to encroach
either directly or indirectly upon this complete independence. It
determines its policies itself, here in Amsterdam and nowhere else."
The CPN, whose delegates had refused to sign the final communique
at the June 1965 Conference of West European CPs in Brussels, did not send
a delegation to this year's Vienna conference; the Party explained in a
short DE WAARHEID item that it was unable to attend because of the Dutch
municipal electoral campaign and because it had been "too late and too
scantily informed" about the meeting. According to the Party paper, the
CPN objected to the way the meeting was organized: the meeting did not
confine itself to the struggle against monopolies in the capitalist coun-
tries of Europe, and its sessions were not held in public.
The CPN gained slightly in the municipal elections on 1 June. Neither
the Labor Party, a moderate constitutional socialist party which supports
NATO and was a member of the Cals coalition, nor the Pacifist Socialist
Party, a non-Communist, left-socialist, pacifist party, did well in the
election. (See unclassified attachment from the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
"Dutch Face Political Storms.")
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
~~~ (1075 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: MVE078-03061A000400070002-0
Following the elections, the CPN's public image was somewhat
tarnished by three successive nights of rioting and vandalism in
Amsterdam in mid-June. Although the CPN admitted playing a role in
organizing the demonstration of construction workers which preceded
the riots, the Party denied, with only limited success, that it had
a part in inciting the riots themselves. Three days before the riots
began, a pro-ChiCom youth group not officially affiliated with the CPN,
called "Rode Jeugd" (Red Youth), published a RODE JEUGD BULLETIN which
encouraged its readers to break windows in six American buildings in
the Netherlands as a "small part" of what is needed to destroy "capi-
talist possessions." When Marcus Bakker, a CPN spokesman in the Second
Chamber loudly denied complicity in the riots, the Catholic daily DE
VOLKSKRANT ironically suggested on 18 June that he "should go to the
Rode Jeugd offices and ask them to change the name of their paper be-
cause it lends itself to misunderstanding." (The subjects of Peking-
oriented Dutch Marxist-Leninist groups and ChiCom-Dutch relations are
not treated in this Guidance.) Although the activities of the CPN
are not often publicized in such CPSU-directed international publica-
tions as Moscow's NEW TIMES, the 17 August 1966 issue of that journal
published the second of two reports on the Amsterdam.xiots. It noted
that, "as is usually the case, the reactionary press tried to put all
the blame for the 'organized disorder' on the Communists." The NEW
TIMES report, ascribed to a reader in Amsterdam who amplified the
original report by the paper's own correspondent, claimed the riots
were caused by the marriage of Princess Beatrix to a former officer
of Hitler's Wehrmacht, the release and deportation to West Germany of
a "war criminal," high living costs, and "imperialist aggression" in
Vietnam.
The unfavorable publicity on the CPN's role in the riots obviously had
little effect on the Parliament, since it voted in favor of CPN part 5Xl Cl Ob
cipation on these two important and sensitive Permanent Committees.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CI DPP78-03061A000400070002-0
(1075 Cont.)
 25X1C10b
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24 78-03061A000bft70 -d 966
1076. SOVIET CROP RESULTS IN 1966
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Agriculture in the USSR is usually viewed by Westerners
as a critically weak sector and by some Soviets, in their more candid
moments, as a hopeless situation with a catastrophic future. The balance
of informed opinion is that Soviet agriculture has fallen far below reason-
able expectations, considering the abundance of good land and of histori-
cally farm-oriented workers. The exceptionally large 1966 crop may cause
many people to re-examine their views of Soviet agriculture. The closest
observers of the USSR recognize that this year's improvement in agricultural
production is largely attributable to very favorable weather and also to
the implementation of some long-overdue measures to improve farming. The
following discussion is elaborated upon in an unclassified attachment.
In spite of the vagueness of available reports on the Soviets' 1966
crop, it is clear that an all-time high has been reached for total agri-
cultural production and for grain. The preliminary claim by Brezhnev is
that the gross agricultural production in 1966 is 10% larger than in 1965.
Inasmuch as double-counting* of production is tolerated, the gain in net
agricultural production is probably somewhat smaller. Furthermore, adjust-
ments will still have to be made for the Soviet practice of reporting crops
in terms of "bunker weight," or as received at the delivery point. The
final Soviet figures will, if past practices continue, be published at a
rather late date in 1967, and will then have to be converted by Western
analysts to a more meaningful basis by measuring production more accurately.
The Soviets themselves are probably surprised that the 1966 grain crop
turned out to be so good, as evident from their contracts to spend hard
currency for the purchase of almost 4+ million metric tons of wheat from
Canada and France between 1 July 1966 and 30 June 1967. Several factors
play important roles in the 1966 results: good weather, increased use of
mineral fertilizers, and higher farm wages. The weather was not only good,
but its timing was particularly favorable. The European USSR had abundant
rainfall in the spring, and the New Lands had an ideal dry spell for the
harvest season. The application of fertilizer, a relatively simple yet
*e.g., grain fed to animals is counted both as grain production and as
part of the value of beef, pork, poultry, and other food products.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
T (1076 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999MfA~ IA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
frequently bungled task in the USSR, was improved, especially in the West-
ern areas. The payment of higher wages and the new practice of paying a
greater number of collective farm workers fegularly instead of upon comple-
tion of the harvest undoubtedly resulted in greater efforts on collective
lands without reducing substantially the amount of time spent on the private
plots. The most significant of these factors, is the weather.
The active role of the government in the production of this year's
crop should be viewed against the background of stagnation in agriculture
since 1957-58. The leaders recognized that poor crops have had the indirect
effect of limiting resources for industrial development and have also pre-
sented serious obstacles to the formulation of long-term economic plans.
Another consideration, undoubtedly, was the contribution of poor crops to
the long-term decline in the growth of per capita consumption in the USSR.
Furthermore, the Soviets showed acute sensitivity to Free World remarks
about the mysterious transformation of Russia from an exporter of agricul-
tural goods into a country which had to buy food in capitalist markets.
Whether the Soviets can reverse this unfavorable image depends upon their
being able to improve the organization and management of agriculture and to
obtain results from the planned increase in agricultural investment during
forthcoming weather cycles. The Soviets' commitment to buy 6 million metric
tons of wheat from Canada, half in 1967-68 and half in 1968-69,indicates that
they lack confidence in their own ability to produce adequate crops consistently.
The impact of this year's harvest in the USSR is to reduce the needs to
import grain, to replenish sorely depleated reserves, and to ensure that the
Soviets will be able to take care of their export commitments to selected coun-
tries. The improvement has not been enough, however, to permit the Soviets to
lift the rationing of flour which has been in effect since 1963.
There is no doubt that this year's crop will help relieve the USSR's
critical food supply situation. In its wake, however, it will aggravate
other problems. For instance, the USSR is most likely to be committed to an
expansion of investment and industrial production in support of agriculture;
this commitment would restrict the options for the development of other sec-
tors in the taut Soviet economy. The long-overdue policy of paying wage
incentives to farm workers will have a continuing popular impact. With dis-
posable income in the economy as a whole already growing far faster than the
supply of goods, the regime will be hard pressed to show the farm workers
that their rubles can be exchanged for an adequate amount of satisfactory 25X1C10 b
goods.
2
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
JLLC r T (1076 Cont.)
 25X1C10b
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: 78-03061 A000420106bUlEi01966
1077. UNITY AND SCHISM IN ITALIAN
POLITICS ON THE LEFT
25X1C10b
SITUATION: (Unclassified): "October 1966 was a memorable month for
the Italian left. The democratic left found new unity. The Communist
left found new schism." This editorial summation by the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (see page 16, 3 November PRESS COMMENT for the full text), over-
simplifies, of course, the current political scene in Italy -- but, hope-
fully, presages developments which will lead toward a successful (from
the Free World point of view) conclusion at the general elections sched-
uled for 1968. (See the unclassified attachment from the Socialist paper
AVANTI, "Socialist Unity and Communist Immobilism.")
The final weekend of October saw the reunion of the Italian Social-
ist Party (PSI) and the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI), which
have been partners since 1963 in the coalition government led by the
Christian Democrats (CD). (The two Socialist parties had split in 191+7
on the question of collaboration with the Communists.) The new party
(PSI/PSDI/United) represents 19 percent of the Italian electorate and
ranks third in strength behind the CD (38 percent) and the Italian Com-
munist Party (PCI) (26 percent), The meaning of this reunion in terms of
strengthening "the fabric of Italian democracy by providing a strong mag-
net for Italian. workers disillusioned with the Communists" is cited in
a NEW YORK TIMES editorial (see page 22, 2 November PRESS COMMENT), which
calls it "a victory for courage and flexibility in political maneuver"
-- one that can be studied to excellent advantage by political observers
in many other countries with major contests between Socialist and Commu-
nist parties. (See the unclassified attachments: a two-part series
from the CSM,details of the Socialist unification,and the earlier arti-
cle from the SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION, particularly for the
section in the latter on "The Problem of Communism.")
The reunification of the Socialists will probably lead to a major
regrouping of political forces around three major parties: the Christian
Democrats, the Socialists, and the Communists. Although the possibility
exists that the new Socialist party might attract more votes away from
the right than from the far left, the political isolation of the PCI
should become more and more apparent to the Italian workers. A thwarted
feeling among rank-and-file workers who have voted the Communist ticket
in the past, coupled with further electoral defeats such as the PCI suf-
fered in the June 1966 local elections, could become very serious for
the PCI.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
S b**** (1077 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08SNA-RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
Although the PCI is definitely having difficulties, they are not
sufficiently serious to menace the party's continued existence as a major
political force -- or, to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of its death
are greatly exaggerated.
One of the basic reasons for the gradual decline of the PCI's influ-
ence is that its leadership, held together largely by ties formed during
World War II Resistance days, is getting older and lacks the charisma of
the party's longtime chief, the late Palmiro Togliatti. As a result, it
keeps searching about for new issues trying to present a guise of posi-
tive "activism" to maintain the interest of its adherents. The Christian
Democrats and the Socialists, on the other hand, attract and maintain
supporters because of their adherence to traditional political stances.
And the CD is even getting more of a plurality of the new young voters
who are attracted by the well-paid jobs available to the major party's
supporters in the government-controlled businesses.
The PCI's views on the Socialist reunification were given in an
interview to a Paris paper and reported by the Soviet news agency TASS on
27 October thus:
"In an interview with the newspaper LE MONDE, Secretary General
of the Italian Communist Party Luigi Longo stated that the Italian
Communist Party takes a 'clear stand of criticism and denunciation'
toward the unification of the Italian Socialist and Social Democra-
tic parties. This is because, Longo pointed out, in the first place,
it leads not to uniting labor and socialist forces, but to deepen-
ing and widening the differences existing today among the working
and democratic masses of Italy, because it is based on a renuncia-
tion of any contacts and cooperation with the Communist Party and
other Zeftwing forces of the Italian labor and socialist movement;
and, in the second place, because unity resting upon a Social Demo-
cratic ideological and political foundation shows that the Social-
ists are abandoning their best traditions of class and socialist
s trugg Ze. "
More evidence -- which can be understood by audiences in other
countries with actual or potential splits and dissensions among Social-
ists -- of how the Communists fear the unity of the Socialists and its
effect on the labor vote is provided in the attached unclassified clip-
ping from the 14 September issue of NEW TIMES, the Moscow-published
weekly journal of comment on international affairs, which complains that
the new party's "Unity Charter" runs counter to the "need for agreement,
contact, cooperation, and united action of Communists and Socialists on
crucial issues."
The PCI is also in danger, although to a far lesser degree, from
its own far left. Two weeks before the Socialists reunited, a pro-Chicom
"Italian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)" was formed at a conference
in Leghorn of Dissident Communist splinter groups. Uncoordinated
Approved For Release 1999/08/242: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
S_ (1077 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24-CIA-RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
pro-Chicom factions have existed in Italy for the past three years, but
they have not succeeded in winning a significant following -- and at
present the Chicom "cultural revolution" is believed to be disillusion-
ing many possible adherents of the party. (See "Briefly Noted" item,
"Italian Communists Embattled on Right and Left," in BPG 202, 24 October
1966.)
The apparent effect of the formation of this new group is not as
important as the British press would make it appear (see the attached
article from the 22 October ECONOMIST of London, "Togliatti No, Marx
Yes," and the following items in PRESS COMMENT: page 5, 1 Nov -- LONDON
OBSERVER, "Communist Desertions End Hopes of Office"; page 5, 31 Oct --
LONDON TIMES, "Europe's Newest Communist Party"; and page 6, 25 Oct --
LONDON TIMES, "Italian Communists Face Party Split"). The party should
not be thought of as an organization composed of militant youth but
rather of misfits of all ages. The real reason for its formation can be
discerned in its attack on the current PCI policy of seeking political
power through peaceful elections and possible accommodation with the 25X1C10 b
Socialists.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
9*pvLT (1.077 Cont. )
 Approved For Release 1999/08-RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
25X1C10b
References:
No. 993 (28 Feb 66) 11th Congress of Italian Communist Party
No. 972 (20 Dec 65) Italian Socialists Reject Unity With Communists
No. 84+5 (9 Nov 6I) Togliatti-ism: Contradictions Compounded
No. 832 (28 Sept 64) Whither the Italian CP?
No. 717 (2 Dec 63) Italian CP "Declaration of Independence"
No. 663 (20 May 63) The PCI and the Italian Elections
Approved For Release 1999/08/24 : 61A-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
f* (1077.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
By Mario Rossi
CPYRGHT
Lure which could deeply affect their coun-
try's political life. Some others are keeping
a close eye on it; the majority are keeping
their eyes on TV, little caring one way or
another.
Last Sunday the two main socialist parties
of Italy formally united on a middle-of-the-
road-platform which could break for good
the political monopoly held by the Christian
Democratic Party since the end of World
War II. It could also confirm the government
In its present. left-of-center position, ending
the ever-present threat of a renewal of the
coalition between the Christian Democrats
and the Right.
Significant also is the fact that Italy
t
will have one less political party. The
influential parties will be limited to four:
Christian Democratic, Communist, Social-
ist, and Liberal (conservative).
11 Italian politics have been dominated by
this impending event for some time. To un-
derstand its impact we must make a short
diversion into history.
When political life resumed in Italy with
the fall of. fascism, the Socialists emerged
as a compact party under the leadership of
Pietro Nenni. The need to continue the
struggle against those social and economic
factors that had made fascism possible, coin-
bined with a strong:class consciousness, had
led Mi;. Nenni to make a pact of common
action with the Communists.
While there were sufficient internal rea-
sons (as Mr. Nenni saw it) to justify this
pact, it did mean supporting the Soviets --
as the'Communists of course did-in the cold
war against the Western nations. An influen-
tial group of Socialists objected to this, lead-
ing to a split in 1947, just prior to the decisive
,elections that were to be held a few months
`later and which, it was feared, the Commu-
nists and their. Socialist allies had a chance,
to win.
The new breakaway party under Giuseppe
Saragat was Social Democratic along the
lines of the British Labor Party, supported
financially by American labor, and decidedly
anti-CoOmuni~t and pro-Western. It sup-
ported the Christian Democratic majority,
and often shared with them, through thick
and thin, the responsibility of government.
The workers' remained for the most part
faithful to Mr. Nenni and the old Socialist
;Party, which usually managed to get twice
'as?many votes' as Mr. Saragat's.
CPYRGHT
Then came 1956, and the tragic events in
Hungary that deeply rent the far left ev-
erywhere. Mr. Nenni shared the revulsion
against . the bloody suppression of that re-
volt; he had also arrived at the conclusion
,by then that the Communists could not gain
'power and that he and his party would get
:.nowhere with them.
There followed a collapse of the pact of
non action with the Communists. Mr.
Nen is party next moved to parliamentary
sup ort of the center government, and finally
part cipated in the government with Mr.
Nen i as vice premier.
Tl is change in policy led to a new split
and the emergence of a Socialist Party of
Pro tarian Union-a pro-Peking group well
to ti e left of the Italian Communist Party. It
has few followers and little influence.
A3 other event which helped pave the way
to ocialist reunification was the election
of N r. Saragat as president of the republic.
An ndisputed way to leadership of a re-
united party was. thus left open to Pietro
Nen i-with the understanding, however,
hat he should accept the Social Democrats'
basi platform-which he readily did.
F i st of two articles..
C`AISTIAN SCIENCE !MONITOR
4 November i?66
The Italian
ociaiists---2
By Mario Rossi
CPY
Then Giuseppe Saragat was elected to
th presidency of the Italian Republic in
D ember, 1964, many observers thought
th t he was being taken right out of the
rn rket place of Italian party politics. In
It y, the presidency is not an executive but
a figurehead office. And so, it seemed, the
w y was left open for Pietro Nenni to
en erge as the unchallenged leader of a re-
un ted Italian Socialist Party.
r. Nenni has indeed so emerged. But Mr.
Sa agat has still been a major if not always
ob ious influence in shaping the course of
So ialist reunification and in making Italian
so ialism more respectable. To begin with,
ML Saragat - who broke with Mr. Nenni in
th early postwar years and founded the,
So dal Democratic Party has been, by
ge eral;consent, a? good President. He has
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
CHRIS'>TAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 November 1966
The Italian
Socialists I
RGHT
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24.: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
CPYRGHT
even if his socialism is very middle-of-theme
road; and simultaneously he has stood firm
in defense of democratic institutions. Prop.
erly,. he has been a President above party.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Saragat has been
far more effective as a President than as
a party leader. By his wise handling of the
presidency he has done much to enhance
the image of the moderate Socialists among
the voters.
The reunified Socialist Party thus finds
Itself in a position' to become a major
factor in Italian politics. It will appeal to
a large number of people who would'like
a consistent plan of reforms pushed by a
party which is neither Roman Catholic nor
Communist. It also may exploit a rather
important development in Italian social life:
the.lopsening up of what was once a strong
class consciousness on the part of the work-
ers. A new aristocracy has come into be-
ing within the working class in recent years
which has acquisitions of its own to defend
and is no longer interested in class war-
fare.
The i new party also will appeal to those
workers who understand that the time of
the barricades, and revolutions, and vio-
lent seizures' of power is over as far as
Italy is concerned. Italy, will have reforms
by evolution or no reforms at all.
Both' the Christian Democrats and the
Communists have realized the impact that
Socialist reunification is bound to have upon
Italian politics. The Christian Democrats
do not like the prospect in the least. They
see in it a threat to their power and a strong
limitation on their' freedom of action. Fur-
thermore, it cannot be excluded that a num-
ber of voters, who supported the Christian
Democrats as a moderate party without
accepting its ecclesiastical connections will
prefer,an equally moderate lay grouping.
The unified Socialists probably will con-
tinue to cooperate with the Christian Dem-
ocrats in future left-of-center governments.
but their power to insist upon meaningful
reforms will be much greater than hither-
to. Christian Democracy will have to com-
mit itself to a policy of close alliance with
the Socialists, and of acceptance of most
of their program, if, it wants to continue
ruling the country.
The impact in the Communist camp has
also been deep. The party is not expected
to lose many votes to the unified Socialists;
but unless it accepts the new state of affairs
it will become a party of earpers and com-
plainers. In all fairness it must be recog-
nized that without Communist agitation
many of the progressive achievements of
recent years would probably not have been
initiated.
A young Communist told me: "In Sweden
I would support a Labor Party because that
would be sufficient to give the people a fair
deal. But Italy is not Sweden. Here we
need more radical action to achieve the
same results." There are quite a few Com-
munists who feel that way. Most of them
consider Socialist reunification with favor.
The Communist Party hierarchy has taken
positions meant to keep the doors open to-
ward socialism. It hopes that one day events
will lead the Socialists to prefer an alliance
of the left, which would include left-wing
Catholics both within and without the Chris-
tian Democratic Party. This possibility is
probably somewhat distant, but it cannot
be dismissed.
The late Palmiro Togliatti saw the trend
of Italian politics with great clarity and had
spent the last months of his life, working
toward an alliance of the left.
Italian politics will be worth watching
from now on. It could be that Italy's "eco-
nomic miracle" has helped pave the way
for a political evolution which is bound to
have repercussions throughout the Western
world.
Approved For Release 1999/013/24 .:. CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
November 1966
CPYRGHT
NEW TIMES September 1966
"~ " I )
~0.
~11IE finishing touches are b 'ing
put to the mere er of the Italian
Socialist and Social-Democrat par-
ties. A jr i.lt committee has drawl
up and published a pcclaration o
principles, political action and organ
ization, or, to use its more comnlo
appellation, the Unity Charter. Th.
leadership of the two parties hay
agreed on the Constii.ution of thei
joint organization and on procedure
for the duration of the transitio
period. Special congresses are to b
held In October, followed by a con-
stituent conference. But at the in
sistence or the Social Democrats th
merger will be finally formalized af-
ter. the 1DW parliaraentpry electiors
The Socialist leaders have pro
claimed the forthcoming merger
,historic turning point," "a neti
stage" in the Italian socialist move-
ment. They are thus assuming a ver
heavy responsibility.
Capitalists Welcome Merger
Uniting all the workers' parties i
a single or.,anization is a historica
task. Any real stcp towards that god
would, of course, be welcome. No
the absence of, unityy the existenc
of many ?parties speaking for till
working class, considerably hamper
the labour and democratic forces i
the struggle for peace and progress
Evei? since the wdr, there has bee
CPYRGHT
VLA Pli Al) y isUP.U {Y iNOV
a process of division within the Ital-
1 n ],:hour movctne,it. Itt 19,7-4.0,
t] n ]?il;ht wing sec^d. ,I from the
S cialist Party to orirr a brcakaw.ty
o gnnization, the Social-licmocrat
1 rty. In 1011, the Left forces found
t crns^ivcs compelled to break with
tile snrc"'tlist Party and forth an
o';a-riizrit.Von of : their own, the
c cialist i'arty of Prolctotrian Unity.
I aly thcrerore has tour labour
p _ 'tics: Communists, Sociali;?ts, P:7o-
1 tarian Unity Socia]ist.4 and Social
ernocra ls. This was bound to have
a adve:'se impact oil. the dwclop-
t ent of the labour inover& nt and
i Strue.
Now two of the fours parties are
crgin^. One would have expected
t c monopolies and th:~ press that
s eaks for them to conic out in ada-
t ,:nt op;,o sition and to (13 every-
t ing p')ssible to prevent unity.
I owever, we have the very opposite.
ich ic;.cling capitalist papers as
csaaggcro, Corriera Bella Sera and
csto del Carlino have, in effect,
proved of the merger, though not
v ithout certain reservations.
All along the capitaliSit class and
I press have done everything to
event labour unity and to widen
and harden the spilt. 1Pity
they be ;;o crttltusi:.t?: is imw ;a.
prospect of a Suci ii;st and Democratic t rerget? The
will c fount. In ; n rialysis n,' ti.e
Unit Charter, and in the ?i '.::'; 1
activics o% the two paries' 1c:.:a,-1;-
ship 1n the recent per-o:31,
:?~ -y
Aims of the ' acr
Th most distinctive fcuturc of 11i~
Char er has bccn apt1 o:'n u'.atc -i
by t1 o weekly int+t tzi:u: I Iv,s;;;rs.
The 'hat?tcr,' it wr'itCs, Li "Lt tiu .lie-
d'ocu ;cnt ill wirich all me itiuu ui
ultin _tte din,- and structural rc;:uri ;
and ieaiis of their achiet ncr:i. ~s
rcdtiw ed to a }fare rninirnuia." T.:-u,:,
its c inptlcrs could floe uvoi;i rr,c:.t-
tioni hilarxism, but 2t tiw ...ar.
time they have been ccir,.:?at rot t:.
frig h on away elements f;, rc nru c:.t
from 11fai'xisru, clement:; t.ir;it d nut
accel t the crass strug"'Ic .:r;d a, lai conference a nist.ro Debr6; -"j,bto;- aE d3leuner Thorez. Its one mis on 4, ;nitre de r0pr6sentants dos, divers par,,
,entendu ,et examine tous es d'un r u ement ,, des traits de sa persotinatit6
rapports qui, 6taient inscrits ? a qui est pour Ia',, patranderonal bou _ comma 1 esprit. novAteur nt Cau ;defis at. nt estnsfltht e, Duclose presi~
son, brdre "du ,jour, ::et: cos rap, I gaols{e et ,pour see"fnnd6, de "dace polit(t;ue,: lo rile' eminent
qu'il ajoue non seuloment dons Toilessont lee principales' de- ,
ports ont fourni une base solide pouyairs.sourc Y# in ui6tdde`et
g
,
to vie frongaise mais d57ns Ia cisions de la conference Mani-
a'? Ie.,discussion, voire: a Ia co.r1
trdverse. ' Parmi les tres nom- d asenthensid esf pour es re. mouvement ouvricr~' 'mondial: fostatioti non ' n glihaable d'in-
breux, participants francais jprdsentantsde a-classe ouvrire Maurice.Thorez a fait la preuvo ternationalismo~proletarian, eile
historians, hommes politiques ,de et de !a democratie source dinns de la possibilite rl:'une appro. a do!ine une, nouvelle impulsion
la; periods du Front populaire piration, pe,;CRllfiaoCe. et?:d'op .rho nouvelle de la viapolr#rqu0, a Li Lois a aa?rechorcho"scion.
Jeunes. militants ouvriers -,'unol x fi 4misme da Tt'efficScito.propiec.a i' d: tifiquo,.ot,th6oriquc, indispensa?
{'idea pue;.liaunt d'esprit u rherche cr6atrice eta nitia? ble pour Ia fecondit5do la pra.
vm4tetne.ont contribue aux de 3,4 i'n e`st pas Una simpia sou= ti ua,' et %a fa coo
bats,a'dont',; Pierre Cot, houis,venir historique, mars qu'il psi trve.' II a montre qu'il faut non q pbration rcra.
soulement adopter I'heritaya ternelln. 'ontro ' les Partis' com,
conferferee,nce a Jean regu tout tout Zu E. La~toyjdurs, t pCTif, ,qu?'il pre rlc,,unD. iheorique de Marx, d'Eiagels et niunisfos ?t,ouvriers' of lea las?
con
e une vigueur e une extension nou? de L6nine, :-dais le d6veia,iaper,ef, tituts crb6s'par oux, . ,
56rie;,der, messages,. de s6lula? velles dank ]'aspiration a,'union detain, sens;`' te'tepon~
tion Ia?'Iettr'e ,,chaleureuse`de do tb6tes. les forces'domccrati; ns certain ,
contre le; tor un co
Suzanne Lacorre ancien minis sues. gt nationale
s ,
tie de X936, et la salutation parasjfes des misnopolas,?cette
de Ia'LJgce>des Droits -de 1 Hom idee
Ia "? 1 positif rai se to
a animA ies ravaux
dS
,
,:
,:
me antei6 particuhtlromtTnt ap conference 'Elie 1eur a donne : t- ban de to a:onf6rence;
I d'
s
l
Approved For` Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070002-0
p au re
le n a :cartes, pas au la
. ensr et porfea, pratlques,;!, Les e
La tonj6renee 's'ect 'sltude,. a'part#i;ipants ne reyivoient pas pr6tontion d16 uiser ;I6, sujet
?
un .niveau scientifique 6106., seU'@mcnt une.perio.de exaltantequ'olla s'6tait propose. La Ii
Elle. a b66efi6erd'epports. de du passe ils s'assuraient de Ia gno--qu'eile atteinto dolt' plu?
valour ettceptionnelle;:.'comma liaison intime qui exists antis taf servir do"li. o do depart
Ceiui'do -camarade Posp6lov, di?;'tefteperiode of lot luttes d'hier, !Your do nouvelics 6tud'es, pour
rectedr';;Ve .1 lnstitut: du mar?''yellps de la' Liberation, 'comme da nouvellcs rechorches, aussi
xismg,-l pinfime de M6scou,,qui les' futtes,i uiouri hui;' pbir binn'dans lo' don ine de !~ cot,
e-.n~nd?ii d'a . ? _ .. _ t.! ~... -
 .WORLD MARXIST REVIEW: YRGHT
AugustAp ved For Release-19-9-9-/9-81/24.: CIA-RDP78-03061A00040007000Y~-~0
Tire 5igi ufcar$ce of the ropidedr.f?01 U apt rrw cc
GEORGES COGNIOT
N February 6, 1934, fascist organisations in France And he urged.that the pace of progress be accelerated.
attempted to serzc power; The economic crisis anti tiro Ileginning with May 1936 the cost of living rose 40 per cant on
the average. This was due primarily to the repeated devaluation of
h
f
d
en o
t
e
lies to shift the bur
-- desire of the capitalist oligttrci crisis on to the shoulders of the workers;. the tendency of the big the franc, despite Communist protests, and to nonfulfiiment of the
bourgeoisie to resort to violence, to anti-labour and anti-democratic financial programme of the Popular Front. The government did
methods, and last but not least, the advent of Hitler to power in nothing to prevent the outflow of capital or to create new reserves
. . I _ - -
foxing carte incomes The Cumiitilnist slogan "lake the Rich
b
f
y
barred by the policy of united action pursued by the Communist
Party. With tenacity and, political, foresight the Party fought at
!first for a united front with the Socialist Party and, after the con-
clusion of an agreement on united action on July 27, 1934, for the
Popular Front, which won its first big victory with the mass denion-
I stration in Paris on July 14, 1935.
The Seventh Congress of the Communist International hailed
the prospects opened up by the broad policy of unity pursued by
the French Party.
Thirty years ago in April-May 1936, the electoral' bloc of denao-
t cratic parties, chiefly the Communists, the Socialists and the Radicals,
won the general election; gaining! 376 seats in the Chamber of
>
an
n t
e gn
ives
ost t
e
I group increased the number of its seats from 10 to 72. The Socialist1 been useless; those who
Leon Blum became Prime Minister. !dentonstratiou in Paris on February 9, 1934, had not died in vaai.
I,- ---
--I .......it., - the mass . iaseism had 11rrtt
Y. ) tiVt t.Ul 11t:U Vet.
In the absence of a serious progran me of public works unemploy-
ntcnt remained at a high level. In the latter part of 1936 the big
capitalists launched an offensive aga inst collective bargainma; and
for the abolition of the 40-hour wcel . Iviany of the demands of the
working peasant remained unsatisfied. The question of old u;;c
pensions was not settled. In February 1937 the government
announced a `pause" in the reforms. Nevertheless the major wins
won ill the .sunimner of 1936 continued to exert the dominant in-
fluence in the sphere of social relations.
From the political standpoint, on the other hand, no-one could
deny the success of the United fron and the Popular Front. -1 lie
.
Deputies as against 222 seats for their opponents. The Conaiaiunist. people had routed llitlcr's French iuritators. Time sacriliccs.had not
ti t t
ci a
at
i
h
h
n l
l
y
to
s
e e cc ton was ie g g
t
E? i t 'l1? w rker stole red work occupied (lie factories offices demagogy expounded fot? years by lha advocates of struitf; i,.I~ei i1
o s
defeated in France. The political del ages of the reactionaries, who
had been prcpaf?ing for civil war, were foiled.
i cal for 191e real strikes of May and Iune Naked fascist dictatorship togetht r with all the anti parliameiit
' tl
Th 1
ig i mt ton
1
and big shops and, with, the full support of the public, forced tfie ntent" in the Service of "Elcctricitc' .And Colnitc des Forges, and .tfi
hitherto intransigent employers (Who had taken advantage of the the agitation in favour olan author i avian system were swept away
crisis to fleece the workers) to carry out some substantial refoinis by the popular struggle. '[lie ravings of the fascists and outer
The workers won considerable wage increases, recognition of tr life reactionaries evoked revulsion atnoig the public and henvrieneti
union rights, a 40-hour working week, paid holidays and collective, talc fighting spirit, the confidence ant. enthusiasm of the democratic
bargaining. camp.
These measures, set forth in file Popular Front programme, were True, fascism was not complete y extirpated in France. 'I he
now embodied in social legislation adopted by Parliament with all repeated acts of violence by fascist-ty)C cternents during the Popular
I speed. The presence of a strong 'Communist group in Parliament Front period, and such acts ol:policeI - rutality(no clean-up had taken
played an important role in this respect. place in the police force) as ' the sho Ming of anti i ti-fascist deni had
pin -1
ed greater freedom. It was not not been completely eliminated. Nevertheless fascism had been
en
ier and the
o
ha
t
l
j
y
y
pp
easan
er
p
,, only the standard of living that had risen-the very tenor of life dealt a crushing blow in the struggle for the masses (which caplains
changed. For the working class of today the events of the summer wily it resorted to terror and provocation). Political development;
of 1936 will always stand' out as a landmark in their history. They in France offered a striking demonstration above all of the ritolily
regard the Popular Front days as the daysof their power and dignity,; of democracy. The existence of the Popular Front and its achie4c-
of a just policy that fitted in with their aspirations. meets clearly showed that the rot' of democracy had not been
exhausted in our country
.
{{ A number of other legislative' measures improved the position,
S of the civil servants, ex-servicemen, artisans and small strop-keepers` [t had been dcnionsti'atedtliat not only was fascism not inevitable,
culture, Much was done to bring culture, formerly the exclusive; was toe victorious amn-miauon of uutioeraey, its latest lwuuc it cilia
'ri. . L41,., ..1- o?h~,?,.,r~?,li? frr .,r il., n-t
State Grain Board to regulate the grain market. i . I
Apart from the social progress, one of the biggest achicvernents after the strikes had risen to live million, enjoyed great prestl;;c
of the Pnrnilar Front wac the'nrnlrrecc made in the snhcre off among the population. In the eyes of the world the People's Front
crisis. It rendered effective aid tp the peasants by setting up a! rights and introducing workers' representation in the enter prises.
TI e General Confederation of Labour (CGT) whose naenihcrship
I Popular Front was above all an alliance of workers and peasants, the economic,, social and cultural spheres. It preserved and even
tourism, music became I snore accessible to the working man. The
school-leaving age was! taised. Many intellectuals, eager to serve
I the workers' interests, drew closet to the working class.
But, as Maurice Thorez stressed in December 1937 at the Ninth
Congress of the Communist Party, notwithstanding the achieve-
ments even in the social sphere, 'much still remained to be done.
The Positive Social and Political Balance
ILS t7Utl Lil..tl ttI LU V1511110Ul1VI lU l i/VaI I IVI Ia. ;t W-IJ 1111111111111 1,., -..
role in the life of the country, its destiny as the motive force of
social and national progress..
The question of a united working-class party now cattie sharply
to tlicfore. The Communists stressed the importance of solving this
problem on .a class basis. The Socialist Party agreed in principle
Approved For Release
1 A-
 CPYRGHT
and showed a r ca 1 css to' iseuss ways an means o putting t to 935 1 act, and by making con s n t c c t o to
path a powerful force'could have 1, en built that would have been In the circumstances the Communist Party was duty 'bound to
Thc' Negative Aspect of the Chamber of Deputies and demanding that the inplication'
!r,r tr,ic knoll hr explained and commented on in rail schools.
ti - - ,
But the activity of the French working class was not unaffected The policy of the government facilitated the strengthening of the
by what was happening outside th4 national boundaries, its very aggressive blue built around the liome?lJ rliii axis and Increased the
=nelllove mchis W41'43 anuttiotnil 1`01t4l?tl 101' 111e r'CttCtiD11 to Se4K tuonliger tv peace.
runpost; ii I e,cibt uIL-awtatrip Vii ruiner: vy uufel IIIC4i11S---try u? Sabotage by the I nnloyCr5
bayonets of Hitler and Mussolini; supported of course by thf
R
li
i
ng that s a ,a""t.e
e
ev
:for our people the light for freedom merged with action for peace, resorted to by the capitalist oligtirt.aiy.
. . ..
.a a_ ___.
_r
-alit th
policy of the I,,, ,u tar Front ht ic'.
isc r
e
to
f
vcry essence. It was not just an internal matter; by force of circuit-could, dooming skilled worker's to tMC1llpaoytnuat, ncy iitct.ti/y
Hence beginning with June l93 0 France should have taken the'way to bridle the working class is to clause the factories .ntd paralyse
l:?a: :., nn n nnt:rv of c~G:nn arrtintr nnar?n And clip mold rrnltnmiC lift'."
have done so, because the role of the Soviet Union its world athair's The "200 fatililics" crippled the economy and the national dc-
iv.a.-..,ra?,t
"I"I .......... t,
i
ttce `oul.... .. ..n,
)favour of the democratic forces, as:was demonstrated in the report such as the Sociai Security and Action Vt nh
tt,.. alliance in .tefence of democr tcv;unitinn the masses all over liae~ regimes abroad; it lauded the fascist inovemerrt5 which, it belieed,
in the
nions and
th
de
----- ,~ ... ..... ..........
'
e t.ta
u
weme it inestimable cianificiinre for the country insofar asIiinancial and industrial oligarclhy, prom ptecl by their class intelestS
.?,....a,?:t
y
"
h
aa
e losers rr .
upholding the nation's independence. icotintry. I [Cy would be t
to
g
sses
t th
a .... ....... ..p..a
a as
e ma
1 eve no
with ~ 1 he oligarchy iiegarded I titlcrism as an excellent weapon against
and their countr
eir arm
n
ti
l! f
t
f
h
u
di
y
a
ag,
e na
o
t
c
ans o
sto
h
y, all the duties and responsibilities dlisuing therefrom? Would tliey the "social danger", Hitler and N'fir solifli as time custildraiis or
" ..._.1 n.. r......,._: cr..r. s as ilia. champions of
ng
ss
tee to the Nint
mi
ens al
h
rt
- -
.. _..,
_
.a...
t
v. tot .
e repo
----
.... the Communist Party stressed: year more and more concessions welt made to the fascist puwcis
"The policy of fascism is preparation for war, it is war. The and this led Ill ~ieptC1110cr to tile. slitt llulul butten.
policy of democracy is a policy of fidelity to one's commitments,
respect for the League of Nations Charter, recognition of the prin-
ciple of the indivisibility of peace and international solidarity in the
annulling the social gains of 1936. Lxii rlcncc showed
struggle against war. The policy of democracy implies organisation of collective security through the conclusion of mutual aid pacts, has any doubts oil this score today --that it was '*non
which completed the c ollapse of the i' tpular, Frvnt a class, This found expression in the Na vcnlber ordin i relation to Spain fully corresponded to the general judgement on '.i 'foreign policy too similar, Slats, to
that engendered Munich, that lviuniclr. opened the
.'in accordance with the principles of the Franco-Soviet pact', as
the programme of the Popular Front declares." 1939 and eNVIliLlally led to tile defeat of 1940. The li
The Blum government, fbrmed as a result of the victory of the
Popular Front, did not adhere to this policy. Instead it blockaded Course Of Our Country bcfore tile wai. IhStOl'y 1,111.0
Republican Spain, while Hitler and Mussolini were supporting the
Franco rebellion. from the summer of.1936 to the autumn of 1938,
The policy of "non-intervention" Cunning counter as it did to time
letter and spirit of the People's Front programme which set forth Tlie Achilles' I Ices of the Popular Front
anctions
l
i
nd a
i
i
ng s
y
pp
ve secur
ty a
concrete conditions for collect
in the event of aggression, opened: the first serious breach in the The masses fought to prevent the deg'adatioih of policy, especially
alliance of the democratic' forces. This compelled :the Communist ,foreign policy: ]'he numerous demonstrations held under the slogan
deputies on December 4, 1936, to bible a motion of non-confidence "Guns and Planes for Spain!" revealed above all the political tar-
in the government. I sightedtiess of tlhe'working people and their love for their country.
Needless to say, this policy was )accompanied by all, kinds of Why, then, were they unable to safegilard peace and the national
promises and overtures td I the faslrist powers. The result, as we interests'? Why could the Popular Froi It not withstand the pressure
know, was deplorable. The' government assumed it could appease Hof foreign and domestic reaction which was supported by the sub-
them by desisting from strengthening the peace front, rejecting any versivc manoeuvres of some leaders officially described as "Left"?
agreement between the general staff's of the USSR and France, The,niain weakness of the Popular front was that despite all the
which would have been a natural an 1 essential complement to the efforts of the Communists, the ntovcmcrit did not rest on a ramified
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
nd which was
nces aimed at
and no-one
way'to war in
foreign policy
that pursued
 CPYRGHT
system I c ~~rl i l$~al t i lr ~~ NKYLVo i , ar a to a un cr tic P tea influence t,t the
-__- -
??/ ~??,..l tv. PI.U JVIII IVtt.eJ WRII it dL;d111bt the WVrKlitg etaSS,
iltheHVili,' masses. These `"Ct~IlllilllllCS should have become the primary The Popular Front was not an electoral combination of secondary
Ir,lltr.,i .,1' III, ~.,,.... .L,,.,. ,, . ,. L _ n .
I,VI waJ it Cl lcltli}Vlaly W1111IIUH 110111 VI IeliSi:nlcc to
factories, urban conlnlullilies and villages. tns(eatt the Popid uth f
' f A r- c
g
a
e
s anger fsc
Front ism raised its head on I?cbtuaty 6, 1934). it
i awed only an USSOliat toii of ,Ile parties and Orgailisatiotiswa5 something mote: a great ;militant initiative aimed at acccleraling
--
-`-' - ..... 1- ??~+? ,wtinu, nnruworiang core of the nation, against the two lllindt'ed
With it view to prtmluling unity, Carrvintt out the pl'ugrntnl,li' off- 'i; I
m
l
t ids wit, wcic p
undcl ing the cOuntty anti wcie set on outlaying
a the Popular Fri n(, stintululing its ucl11!ity, and building the vitally
it. The Popular Front was a new departure, the product of a broad
Inocessa, vloc?tl inl ":it ., . P ,
> L< i u
us, Uui at ty p 1o posed that a 1) Deli mattt m aI movement uniting the proletarian and petty bourgeois masses who
congress be called of all organisations helonging to the 3idea was ?tdv~lnced in J 1 t 937 Front, ibis hed awakened to the fact that their common interests were injured
( u y wizen serious thlitcultics were by the monopolies-and that they bore a joint responsibility for the
encountered with tie establishment of the Chautcmps govern- future of the nation.
,Our t.eri
Part proposed submitting to I "IJU 1 I It,llt Ilan Ilvtiuug ill culnulvn wit" previous
` y g the congress all the problems blocs", in the first place because it included the General Confcdera-
? j...., ? . ...?., -11 t. It, ItIIInuIIIt;tltdII11li. 1 jcs Iion of Laoour anti other organisations which were not political
congress,as our Partypointed out later could havecIccted a n:ttion?It' iartfe d At
a
h
.-I 5,
n , sewn y--w ich is most -mportant-because the
,conlinittcc empowered to advise the government which would I -V'! 1't I
o
t.,p
tea content of the coalition was quite different. In the Left
ihad to take this advice into account. 'fine idea of such a congress was blocs" and "Left Cartels" of the old type, say, before 1914 or after
ar,ain 'ttiv l 1 N
am
t
h
cu at
le ntt
. E-ong-ess of tic 1..omnuinist Piiity in 1918, which took in the Socialist and Radical parties, the working
IDeceinbe 19`17
Regrettably, however, the Socialist and Radical leaders rejected class was at best an ancillary force, a mete political appendage to
tilt vuu..UUlus i? -'}'-' ............. . ..... . Y....,.. u~ .1936 on the contrary, the working class began to fulfil its historical
anisations on i local and departmental scale and at
tel of or
a
g
c
r
(national committee level prevailed. The road was opened for the role, to act as a force determining and guiding the destinies of the
u
t
'
n
ry
e fif co
degenration of the Popular, Frontrom an allance o the working,
class and the middle strata:. with deep roots in the country, !rant; No longer did the working class confine itself merely to pro-
1 i clairiiing its leading role. It began to exercise that role. In particular
! an expression of a real mass movement against fascism and for all.
,advanced and dynamic democracy, into a simple top-level associa- it worked out if edrupietcly new social policy and elfcetcd it pro-
tion of affiliated organisations susceptible to reactionary pressures totintl change in' Its own mode of -ife. 'T'his is evident front tthe fact
and vulnerable to disruptive.inanoeuvres. ?that the social legislation of 1936 inderlay the reforms carried out
In June 1937, with the rcactionary~ounter-offensive threatening;aftcr liberation iii 1945-46 and to this day determines the tenor of
the very existence of the Popular Front, the Communist fatty 1the workers' life ('despite such setb.icks as for example the abolition
which until then had not taken part in the government, dcclarcd'of the 40-hour week).
its readiness to enter a broad government which would champion' The working class proved that it is loyal to its alliances, and that
the interests of the working people. This was the only way out of the the Middle strati; do not lose by c( -operating with it. The demands
'difficult situation that had arisen. But it could become feasible of the latter wei'e ill considerable measure satisfied. More could
!only if it had sufficient support throughout the nation. And here have been achieved as regards, fl r instance, the demands Of the
too it became patent that the absence of a ramified mass democratic peasants, had the persistent rcpt esettations of the Communist
Popular Front organisation; had made an adverse imprint on the Party on their behalf been heeded.
country's political life. The proposal to appoint Communist In u1)llolding the interests of the middle sections, the Communist
1 11 f1 1' 1'1. i' 1?'I I
P
arty was t Ie, i, anip ono tie u )u al tart o w t c i I It was a so
ministers to a government of national salvation-a proposal that
was never withdrawn-was not accepted. the initiator.
The Popular Front-A New Forin of Alliance The Role of the Communist 'arty in the Popular Front
of the Working Class and (lie Middle Sections The Popular Front did not sp "ing up spontaneously and not
The Popular Front existed for only two or three years. Brit it simply because of the objective need to combat fascism and extend
left a vivid and ineradicable mark in French history. To this day the the united front of the working etas;. The broad masses undoubtedly
parties and the masses frequently refer to it. In the memory of those Went into action and were awakened to political activity by the
who lived in that period, in the history that has recorded it for others, consequences of the economic crisis and the threat of putsches.
]the Popular Front is not a transitory:dnd commonplace episode in The birth date or the Popular Front of struggle for, bread,'liberty,
the coalition of democratic forces with,a democratic government of and peace is known precisely-October 9-24, 1934. And so is its
'a'more or less traditional type. Memories of.it are evoked today by initiator: the French Communist ;'arty. It was then that Maurice
,the new situation, a new spirit representing a break with customary Thorez on behalf of the Party put forward the idea of creating such
!politics; they are linked with a genuine, developing democracy, a it front and deliiicd it as an alliance of the working class and the
]dynamic democracy in a codtinuous process of evolution. middle strata.
June 1936 witnessed the birth not only of a great popular hope, Subsequently, too, the Communist Party played an indispensable
as some historians see it, but also of'a profound conviction that ,,role in the tleveioj)ment of the I=rant. At each stage it was the
mutually advantageous alliance of the working class and broad:Cone monists who provided the theoretical groundwork for a policy
middle strata, primarily the peasantry; is possible. Both the working expressing the aspirations of the masses.
.class and the middle strata suffered from monopoly policy, longed The entire period from 1934 to 1938 offered daily evidence of
for reform, and together formed"the living heart of the nation. All practical steps taken by the Communist Party to build, des clop
this refuted the "theory" current among bourgeois sociologists and and safeguard the Popular Front,,ven at the most difficult times.
?historians that in the conditions of the twentieth century, the small'. But no less important was the Party's theoretical work in this period.
Approved For I elea a 1999/08/24 CIA3 RDP78-03061 A000400070002-0
 CPYRGHT
results of the 1936 clcctons. The r?turras.rcvcaie ire Mn e -nature adnnan stradon. Today democratisation of the political, adn. i-
of the victory wA pVa dfFoillRelt tt4999tO&/2
of the urban middle sections continued to vote for parties hostile to
the Popular Front. I
Should the country have been left split in two? All the forces of
reaction were working to' deepen the division. In particular, the
Church hierarchy made full use of the June strikes of 1936 and
later of the Spanish events to set+he Catholics against the Front.
The Communist Party, which at its Eighth Congress in January
1936 steered a course towards uniting the nation, advanced on
August 6, 1936, the idea of a broader alignment, of expanding the
Popular Front by bringing, in repro: cntatives of other parties on the
basis of a democratic and national programme.
This initiative was epitomised b,' the slogan of a French Front,
reflecting a striving to save France from being divided into two below, and. the combination of parliamentary activity by the
irreconcilable blocs capable of leading to civil war or to the collapse! people's representatives, faithful to their mandate, with high-
of the Popular Front. This slogan embodied a resolve to unite thcliiiitidecl civic activity on the part of the electorate. This is an essential
nation in theface of the growing danger of war and betrayal on the prccouditiou for the new democracy to become it powerful driving
part of the ultra-reactionary elements of the big bourgeoisie. ,force of prot,ress.
The Socialist and Radical leader,,.' did not accept the proposal for 'file Popular ; Front offered confirmation of the decisive role
a French Front. Some chose to regard it as a?nacans of "heightening played by the working class, This cla" cannot be reduced to it
patriotic feeling .. in anticipation of a conflict which they in their subordinate role, relegated to the background, as is desired by the
heart of hearts believed td be inevitable". Actually the issue was one advocates of today's "centrist" combinations designed tt substitute
of averting war, curbing. those who would instigate conflicts and one reactionary policy for another in order to enable the big
engineer aggression, by building an alliance of all the sound forces bourgeoisie to continue Lite Gaullist hone policy without de Gaulle.
of our country. The French Front, which was rejected in 1936 when And.sincc the working class is destined to play the leading role it iq
it could have prevented the subseq.rent development of events and of the utmost importance that its ranks be united! The unity or
forestalled disaster, was formed only much later, in the grim but action of the parties speaking in its name is precious bcyorild iiteasure.
glorious years of struggle against tite Nazi invader. The social Wins of 1936 were the fruit of Comwunr`st-Socialist
In any case the French Conunutiist Party was farsighted. Its role unity. The saint was the case in 1945. Unity, then, is the way to
in the Popular Front was decisive. History has confirmed this. victory.
Lastly, nothing is more urgent than th ; need to bring home to the
The Lessons Rhtnain Timely !people the close affinity of the workin!;class, democratic and
i
The trends which emerged in French society thirty years ago have 1irrluoii.th interests. The programme of the Popular Front, whale)
'become more pronounced since then. The lessons of the epoch- (called for collective security and the application of sanctions agaitas
making experience of the Popular Front, if due account is taken of'agfresaurs, was it just and national programme. The foreign polio
the dictates of our time, have lost' none of their significance. What_pcugrataune of the two hurtdred families was anti-national an
was then all alliance of the workings class and the middle strata araw disastrous for the country. Is not collective security ' in l uroht
takes the form of the unity of all anti-nionopoly.forces against the an obvious necessity today too? 't'ltc interests of time avyrking etas
financial oligarchy and its instrument-one-Haan rule. fare inseparable I'roni the interests of the nation: peace is a blcssin
To achieve this union tf4c aims must be precisely defined, Just asfor all, and to safeguard peace practical ;tees are needed.
in 1936, the programme of the united democratic forces iemaiusj From this standpoint the study of. tl e foreign policy problem
the basic issue. The question of the programme of the unitedyof the Popular front period acquires particular significance today
democratic forces is as basic an ~ssuc today as it was in 1936, a'As never before, the world is now the witness of a confrontation o
question of political clarity and integrity in the relations between two antagonistic policies: the policy of a,,gression and intervention
classes and the democratic strata of the nation, in relations between "tit rnitcstcd in the events in Vietnam, and the policy oh'safeguardin;
the parties which speak in their name. Ipe roe. Today, as thirty years ago, the defenders of peace must see
On January 12, 1936, when the programme of popular unity cautethe support of all those forces which for one or another reason art
into being, the importance and novelty of this development was opposed to aggression and want an improvemctit in internationa
clear to all. For the first time since;tlae establishment of the Republic' relations.
all the Left parties and groupings came to agreement on a precisely' In our time the aggressive policy of the militarists in Wes
defined range of demands. The previous types of purely electoral, Germany is encountering a stronger rebuff than thirty years ago
alliances had had no common program ne. But this time the country but it is dangerous nevertheless. Yet a durable peace should hay
was offered a bold and realistic platf~rm and perspective marked, been established in Europe immediate),' after the Second Worl
by a creative,, pioneering spirit. War, a peace ruling out the resurgence of the German militaris
As for the programme the democratic. forces need today, it can {threat. Bonn insists on re-carving the utap of Europe and clamour.
derive a great deal from the lessons of the Popular Front. Thefor? nuclear weapons. It allows inveterate Nazi killers and w,,,,.
period of the Popular Front was one of economic subversion by the criminals to remain at large, even those who have beat convicts
b L'cd 1 C' ? pan court This is a situation which calls
a s
eta
tc
.
"two "two hundred families" whose sense of civic duty and patriotism y
.is no keener today than it was thirty years ago. These families should:vigilance and niaximuni activity on behalf of peace.
be stripped to the maximum of economic and political power through
nationalisation of monopoly-owned industry, profound democratisa-
scr 1A+RDR7:&tQ 1 ApiaUo()o7OO2Oal institu-
tions should be the concern of all the Left parties.
If the state administration was not cletnocratised during the
Popular Front period, the fact remains that democracy' llourislaed
in everyday life. The social gains of 1936 ratified by Parliament
were above all the result of the activity of the masses. The Popular
Front signified the release of new energy, the conscious participation
of the masses in public affairs. Maurice Thorez never tired of repeat-
ing that working class unity, the Popular Front, should mean
activity, real and cmrsrarrt, carried on jointly and on all sector's.
Nothing could be more rinrela'than this lesson. The new and dynastic
republic which will take the place of one-man rule should rest on
profound democracy in public life, on extensive initiative from
.tion of management in the nationalised sector, vesting real economic)
power in a democratic parliamerij,' and extending the rights of the
working class at both nationalised and non-nationalised enterprises.
Moreover, much was shad at the time of the Popular Front about'
"instilling a republican spirit" ini the state 'institutions. Little was
achieved in this respect. Diplomacy and higher financial bodies, for
example, rema plpnav l?;)ir O4 f ReIiftso 19 O8#24
clean-up in the. police. The, consequences were grave indeed. By
and large the old office-Holders retained possession of the levers of
new conditions require'of today's generation not restoration of th
Popular Front, however great its significance and however high
pitch Lite working-class and democratic movement reached at tha
time. Today's generation should learn from the lessons of ill,
Popular Front in order better to accomplish its own tasks: to rail
all the anti-monopoly forces of the nation around the united workin
class Inko~rgde~r t3o~esta}bllish genuine democracy, a democracy in whic
Ilo~ll bT`rife' }t c7"tWOAMAMNA, d ~ rre3'~idvance t
socialism.