BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 96
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1966
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Copyright materi~
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Signiicant Dates
[,-ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]
DEC
19
V i etrn i rah u k 1 ae k on French installations at Haiphong begins 7-2 year war. 1946.
l W 1 I EI H ANNIVERSARY.
20'
Gri:.ory Rasputin murdered; Czarist court and army circles begin plotting
removal of Nicholas II, foreshadowing February Revolution. 1916. FIFTIETH
ANNIVERSARY.
20*
Extraordinary Commission to Combat Counter-Revolution (CHEKA) established in
USSR, forerunner of GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MGB, and KGB. 1917.
21*
Joseph V. Stalin born. 1879.
26*
Mao Tse-tung born. 1893.
Late
JAN
December or early January Congress of International Union of Students (IUS,
Communist front). WArsaw or Mongolia. [NOTE: Possibly to hinder covert
action measures by opponents, IUS has adopted policy of not announcing dates
of meetings more than one month ahead.]
2*
Fidel Castro assumes power following Batista's flight. 1959.
8*
Charles de Gaulle i'nauquratedfirst president of French Fifth Republic. 1959.
15
Conference of Solidarity with Workers of Aden, sponsored by ICATU/WFTU,
15-18 January. Approximately 20 countries participating.
21*
V.I. Lenin dies. 1924.
23-30*
In Stalin's purge trials, Karl Radek, Grigory Sokoinikov, two other Old
Bolsheviks imprisoned; 13 others condemned to death. 1937. THIRTIETH
ANNIVERSARY.
26*
Republic of India proclaimed. 1950.
28*
Birthday of Jose Marti, leader of Cuban independence struggle.
1853.
30*
Adolf Hitler-becomes Chancellor of Germany. 1933.
31*
German Army at Stalingrad surrenders, World War II. 1943.
FEB.
February: 3rd Afro-Asian Writers' Conference at Beirut. (The 3rd Afro-Asian Wri-
ters' Conference was scheduled for Peking. The Beirut conference will be a
meeting of Soviet-line followers of the split Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau.)
I* UN General Assembly adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist aggression
in Korea. 1951.
7-12*
World War 11: Yalta Conference (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin). 1945.
13*
Katanga Government announces "massacre" of Patrice Lumumba on 12 February.
1961.
13-25*
Czechoslovakia, last East European nation governed
by traditional
parliamen-
tary methods,falls to Communist coup. 25 February, Klement Gottwald becomes
Prime Minister. 1948.
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7 November 1966
Date and Russell Mock Trial
Site Still Preparations Con-
In Question tinue.
I3rle fly Noted 000e,
Pages 8-15 in PRESS
COMMENT, 24 October,
carry an article from the 24 October
issue of THE NEW LEADER by the philoso-
pher Sidney Hook, who helped organize
the Dewey Commission which examined
the Stalin purge trials in the 1930's.
Hook says Russell's appeal is distin-
guished by "the simplism of its thought
and the virulence of its language,,match
ing the crudest Communist propaganda
leaflets."
Also included in the same issue
of PRESS COMMENT are two articles
from the 15 October LE MONDE, Paris,
headlined "Two judgments on the U. S.
action in Vietnam." One, by former
member of the League of Nations Secre-
tariat Florian de la Horbe, expresses
"Thanks to the American Soldier" in
its headline; the other, by Bertrand
Russell, outlines further preparations
for the "tribunal," whose panel of
participants now allegedly includes
the French Trotskyite mathematician
Laurent Schwartz in addition to the
other names identified in the unclas-
sified attachment to BPG item #1053.
(Russell's new list of panelists does
not include Francois Mauriac, who had
been cited in a Radio Moscow broadcast
and at a 7 June press conference in
London by Ralph Schoenman.)
The basic guidance given in BPG
item #1053 still stands, and has been
amplified in Joint State-USIA Info-
guide No. 67-6 sent as Airgram to all
diplomatic missions on 15 September:
"Under no circumstances do we want
to give this scheme publicity, or to
dignify it with official U.S. cogni-
zance or reaction.... When or if
Russell's 'tribunal' materializes,
we want others to apply to it the
local equivalent of the label 'Rus-
sell's Folly.'"
In addition to the above PRESS
COMMENT items, the following mate-
rial is presented for background use:
1. On 22 October the Bertrand
Russell Peace Foundation issued a
communique which said the "tribunal"
would meet privately in London 13-16
November to draw up plans and that
the open sessions would be held in
Paris next March. Several sources
have called it unlikely that the
French Government will allow it to
be held in Paris. Alternate sites
in Stockholm or Helsinki have been
mentioned, but difficulties appear
also involved there.
2. Communist propaganda support
for the "tribunal" has not increased
- with two notable exceptions. An
article in the 25 September BRATISLAVA
PRAVDA reports that Czech writer Lad-
islav Mnacko, who is in North Vietnam
gathering material for a book, has of-
fered to testify at the "tribunal" and
that Russell has asked him to appear
in Paris toward the end of January or
the beginning of February. The Buda-
pest press on 15 October carries a
HUNGARIAN NEWS AGENCY report of Rus-
sell's LE MONDE article which, in an
apparent effort to excuse Viet Cong
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and North Vietnamese terrorism,
says it is "inconceivable" that the
"tribunal" should equate acts of
force committed by the presumed ag-
gressor in the course of his aggres-
sion w?th those committed by the
"victims" in their "resistance"
against that aggression.
3. Volume One of a "Black Book"
entitled "The Biggest War Criminals
in bur Era," originally issued in
July in Hanoi and Moscow by the Com-
mittee to Denounce the War Crimes of
the . Henchmen of the U.S, Imperi-
alists and Their Henchmen in South
Vietnam, has been republished. by the
North Vietnamese Consulate General
in India as well as by other Commu-
nist sources such as the WFDY and
the WPC. A "Publisher's Note" says
it is "also being sent to the Inter-
national Tribunal being set up by
famous British Philosopher Earl
Bertrand Russell for trying Johnson,
McNamara, Rusk, etc., as war crimi-
nals and it will form one of the
prosecution documents."
4. A MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY
(Egypt) dispatch on 14 October re-
ported that three lawyers from Italy,
France, and Germany had agreed to
bring charges at the "tribunal"
against the Shah of Iran as a "war
criminal" helping the United States
in Vietnam.
5. Radio Addis Ababa on 23 Sep-
terpber quoted a spokesman of the
Ethiopian Ministry of Information
for the statement that Emperor Haile
Selassie had never consented to have
his name used as one of the sponsors
for the "tribunal."
Attached is an unclassified news-
letter from Freedom House, a private
organization in New York, containing
a reply to Russell's appeal by Prof.
Massimo Salvadori, which can be used
as background.
Great Leap Pro-Peking Swiss CP
Backwards! Embarks On Its Own
"Cultural Revolution"
Attached is an unclas-
sified translation of
an article from the SWISS PRESS REVIEW
AND NEWS REPORT which satirizes the
abject breast-beating in the journal
of the "Marxist-Leninist"' Communist
Party of Switzerland. It can be used
by selected assets to show how effec-
tively the Chicoms have been able to
tighten the reins on one of their West
European adherents which had been giv-
ing recent signs of adopting the
Rumanian path midway between Peking
and Moscow. (See Propagandists Guide #3)
For audiences in Europe the charge
by the Swiss CP that certain "fraternal
parties" receive their directives from
Moscow and "encouragement from the
capitalists, from the Vatican, and
from other bandits' lairs" can be cited
as a good example of the ridiculous
lengths to which the Communists are go-
ing to accuse others when obviously
guilty themselves of following foreign
directives. The earlier Swiss CP criti-
cism of "luxurious Chinese embassies in
Europe" can also be used against targets
where local Communists live-in substand-
ard conditions.
Semantics The Red Guards -- Or
of Soviet Are they?
Propaganda
An item in the Chrono-
logy of World Communist
Affairs in this BPG calls attention to
'the difficulty the Soviets have had
with -he title of Mao's youth organiza-
tion, the "Red Guards." In Russia, as
generally in Europe, the "guards" have
traditionally been elite military units,
often responsible for guarding the lives
of potentates, major public buildings,
etc. (Eog the Grenadier Guards, the
Garde Republicaine,? the one-time Prussian
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Garderegimenter and so on.) The
Tsars had their Guards, and the Bol-
sheviks adopted the term "guard" it
this honorific sense, calling their,
detachments of armed workers the '"Red
Guard." During World War II, the
title of "Guard" was revived in the'
Red Army for units which had parties
cularly distinguished themselves in'
battle. Thus "Guards" or "Red Guards"
are supposed to be terms of praise to
Soviet citizens, who have been indoc-
trinated on the glorious deeds associ.
ated with these names. The present
Chinese Red Guards, however, are por-
trayed in Soviet media as groups of
unruly delinquents. To avoid apply-
ing the term of honor to these rowdies,
the Soviets tried using the name
"Okranniki," a word which means guards
in'the sense of watchmen, and which re-
calls the agents of the Czarist secret
police who went by that name. But this
label is not too apt either. As the
Chronology notes, Soviet propagandists
have finally adopted a Russianized pro-
nunciation of the Chinese name "hung
we,i,ping": to transliterate from the
Soviet spelling, "Khunveibini."
We need not share the Soviet con-
cern about protecting the glory of the
name "Red Guard"; indeed, we can ridi-
cule it. But to audiences for whom'
the title of "guard" retains elite
connotations, our output should avoid
using such terms as "Guardsmen" for
the Chinese teenage "rebels."
Ruasian Writer Ilya Ehrenberg
Advises Sot Criticizes Soviet
Jol4rnalists Press
In a wide-ranging
interview published
in the October issue of SOVETSKAYA
PECHAT (Soviet Press), Ilya Ehrenburg,
well-known Soviet journalist and au-v'
thor, sharply criticized the Soviet
press. Ehrenburg revealed that he
spends an average of half an hour
daily reading the Parisian daily,
LE MONDE, and commented that he
seldom spends as much time reading
any Soviet newspaper. He cautioned
against copying the Western press,
but was of the opinion that it might
be useful to learn a few lessons from
it. He complained that Soviet news-
papers do not cover many of the more
interesting aspects of Soviet life,
and blamed this on a lack of interest
on the part of many Soviet journal-
ists, and on the fact that too few de-
mands are made on them to write con-
cise, accurate, and above all, ---
interesting articles. He also
criticized the training of Soviet
journalists offered at Moscow Uni-
versity as not sufficiently ,stressing
creative writing, and not giving the
students enough practice in the every-
day, practical side of journalism.
Ehrenburg noted that too often Soviet
correspondents report: inaccurately
from foreign countries, overemphasiz-
ing the gloomier aspects of life in
the non-Communist countries, but not
conveying a meaningful picture of
political trends, the "class struggle,"
and important cultural developments.
Ehrenburg, who studied journalism in
France, was Paris correspondent for
IZVESTIYA in the 1930's and covered
the Spanish Civil War for that paper,
did not mention the deeper causes of
his current observations, i.e., the
(press) controls imposed by Communist
regimes and the intimidations, dis-
torted views, and "playing-it-safe"
mentality which they have produced,
nor did he refercto his own contri-
butions in past years to the state
of affairs with which he now takes
issue.
3
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Money Taken Seized Communist
From Smugglers Funds Given to
Victims of Terrorism
On 10 April 1965
the Venezuelan Minister of Interior
Gonzalo? Barrios announced the cap-
ture of three Communist couriers
who had been caught at the Caracas
airport with a total of $330,000
which they were carrying from Italy
to the'Communist guerrillas in
Venezula. The ringleader of the
group was Dr. Alessandro Beltramini,
a prominent Italian Communist.
(The Beltramini Affair was discussed
in BPG #165 item 901 of 10 May
1965.)
own youth from stepping out of line.
The "unorthodox" role (to say the
least) of the Red Guards in China
against the official party and Youth
League undoubtedly also spurred
these measures. The measures taken
are in the form of a decree dated
16 September 1966 and published in
the organ of the Supreme Soviet of
the RSFSR, by which 3 new crimes
have been added to the RSFSR Crimi-
nal Code. The crimes are:
a) Spreading deliberately false
fabrications harmful to the Soviet
state and social order, made punish-
able by up to three years imprison-
ment;
In disclosing this affair Gon-
zalo Barrios stated that the captured
funds would be used to aid the fami-
lies of persons have been victims
of Communist terrorism in Venezuela.
On 9 September 1966 EL NACI:ONAL of
Caracas carried an article announc-
ing that the money taken from Bel-
tramini and his cohorts has been
distributed to some 218 persons in
the form of housing, pensions, and
grants. A copy of the article is
included as an unclassified attach-
ment. It provides a convient peg
for recalling the Beltramini affair
and for equating Communism with
terrorism, pointing out the poetic
justice of Communist funds being
used to help rather than destroy
people.
Drawing the Soviets Out to Nip
line on Adop- Dissent in the Bud
tion of
Western Ways The Soviets apparently
have studied student
and youth dissent in
other countries and have decided to
take firm measures to keep their
b) Defacing the national emblem
or flag, punishable by up to two
years imprisonment;
c) The organization or parti-
cipation in group actions which
violate the public order, punish-
able by up to three years imprison-
ment.
Each one of the actions. de-
scribed in the decree typifies acts
which have been committed by youths
in free world countries. Soviet
propaganda has given abundant cover-
age of such acts in the U.S., as
being typical of American attitudes
towards the Vietnam War, The Soviets
have of course made no effort to
balance the picture by pointing out
that the large majority of American
youth support the current U.S. poli-
cies in Vietnam. Nor do the Soviets
assess these acts of dissent as
refle-ting the great strength of a
free society. We do not draw atten-
tion to such already highly-publicized
acts in the U.S. Our main concern
is to treat this new decree by rais-
ing rhetorical questions about the
incidence of such crimes in the USSR....
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For example: Does the publication
of this decree mean that the Soviets
are having difficulty with large
numbers of youth committing the
new crimes? or, Does this mean that
the Soviets expect a rash of such
crimes to be committed?
We may view the new decrees in
the context of steps taken at the
end of July, 1966 to curb "hooli-
ganism," or flagrant violations of
the peace. The coincidental strength-
ening of the police force adds teeth
to the decrees toughening the penal
code concerning hooliganism. Hooli-
ganism, it is worth pointing out,
is usually an individual act. The
three new political crimes of the
16 September decree represent a
group action and therefore reflect
a much more serious concern. (See
BPG item #1074 for treatment of
the 16 September decree in a dif-
ferent context.)
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Media Lines
CULTURAL PURGE REDUCES CHICOM FOREIGN PROPAGANDA PUBLICATIONS. In
recent weeks late deliveries and non-deliveries have shown that there is
a dhi;sruption in the publishing of Chicom foreign language propaganda
publications. The disruption probably stems fromz:a "purging" of the
editors.;and staffs of these publications in the "cultural revolution"
currently sweeping Communist China; the cultural revolution had previ-
ously caused a drastic curtailment in Chicom domestic newspapers and
periodicals. (Media Lines, BPG 197 of 15 August, BPG 200 of 26 Septem-
ber 1966) The monthly, China Reconstructs, one of the best khown Chinese
Communist propaganda magazines to circulate abroad, has not been seen
since the July number. Evergreen, a bi-monthly political magazine for
youth and students, known for its "revolutionary" content, has apparently
not been published since June. China Pictorial, another monthly prestige
magazine, did not mention the activities of the Red Guards in its August
issue, the latest to appear abroad; the editing of this number must
have coincided with the upsurge in Red Guard activity. The omission
may well have been due to the editors' doubts as to how to present the
topic, since the Red Guards have met with hostility even inside China.
Women of China, quarterly prestige journal, has:not appeared since
April, presumably having no replacement for.its publisher and editor,
Tung Pien, who is known to have been fired and who has been accused of
"revisionism." (Unclassified)
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r a i
e-to
op9andist s Gu d
.... WORLD COMMUNIST
................................:.::
AFFAIRS ................................ .
#7 27 September-24 October 1966
ICM AND "SOCIALIST CAMP" AFFAIRS
1. The excessive words and actions of the Chinese "cultural revolution" (CR)
(see below) draw increasingly sharp, voluminous critical reporting and denun-
ciations from Soviet and other Communist world leaders and media, including
even the heretofore reticent Poles -- though the hard-core fence-straddlers
(notably the N. Vietnamese, N. Koreans, and Rumanians) maintain their silence
on the revolution. Although the Chinese try to counter with pages of articles
alleging "worldwide endorsement," they can cite only relatively unknown or
anonymous figures: even the rabidly loyal Albanians are now avoiding the
subject. Soviet and other Communist media emphasize: (a) the anti-Soviet
bias; (b) the use of Chinese non-Communist elements against Party organiza-
tions and leaders; (c) irrationality, confusion and conflict among the Red
Guards; and (d) opposition by the Chinese Communists and by the people as a
whole. Chinese bellicosity toward the USSR/CPSU leads Czech Party daily
RUDE PRAVO to declare that anti-Sovietism has become "the dominant" CPR foreign
policy (Oct. 18).
2. The extent of Chinese isolation is starkly demonstrated when, for the
first time in the regime's history, no important foreign dignitary attends the
annual October 1 National Day anniversary of its founding. Lin Piao drives
the wedge further by blustering anti-CPSU remarks in his key speech, impel-
ling the diplomats of the Warsaw Pact countries (except for Albania and Rumania)
and Mongolia to walk out demonstratively. The Japanese CP, once so militantly
aligned with the Chinese but professing "independence" since early summer,(Nos.
2-5), is now moved to criticize Chinese theories as well as actions (in con-
nection with a new Chinese-line faction split from the JCP) (Sept 22). And
the formerly Chinese-sympathizing Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian
Unity (PSIUP, an extreme leftwing splinter from the PSI), now criticizes the
CCP's attacks on the USSR and declares itself "seeing eye to eye" with the
CPSU. (Sept. 28)
3. The CPSU makes another major effort to forge some sort of an anti-CCP
bloc, or at least to achieve a joint declaration of condemnation -- but
apparently in vain. Following a series of bilateral Brezhnev meetings with
the chiefs of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Polish, and Yugoslav parties in the
preceding weeks, the Soviet party and state invite (all?) the ruling parties
to send top-level party-state delegations to Moscow. Delegations come from
all East European countries except Albania. and from Cuba and Mongolia -- but
(reportedly in the face of adamant Rumanian resistance) the only evident
result is a TASS statement which says that they "exchanged opinions on a wide
range of questions of international policy." (Oct. 17-22).
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INTERNATIONAL FRON-IF ORGANIZATIONS
4. The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) holds its 6th Congress
in East Berlin (Oct. 1o-15), after the .111--China Journalist Association refuses
to participate -- because IOJ has degenerated into a "despicable tool, con-
trolled and manipulated by the Soviets (6). With no dissenting voices present,
the Congress smoothly follows the Soviet line -- as the Albanians charge in a
slashing press attack (12). (See also 3PG Item #1071)
COMMUNIST CHINA
5. What's really happening in China becomes ever more difficult to determine
amid a flow of reports (mostly sketchy and often of doubtful reliability)
depicting a highly fluid and confused situation. The grotesque adulation of
Mao continues, and Lin Piao publicly ap~ea:rs more than ever his heir apparent-
yet when a million and a half Red Guards are assembled. in Peking, on October
18, their largest rally to date, Mao and Lain merely drive speedily past, wav-
ing, but not speaking a word. Could this be evidence that Lin had planned the
show to intimidate strong behind-the-scenes opposition, but that the power
struggle was at such a critical stage that he wouldn't risk a speech, as some
analysts speculate? The Red Guards' owh daily is reported as admitting (on
Oct. ~0) lack of unity among the Guards and a "crucial., struggle between op-
posing lines in the cultural revolution,"
6. Various reports during this period describe Red Guard posters as attacking
more Party figures, now including the downgraded President Liu Shao-chi and
his wife, Foreign Minister Chen Yi. (sub$equently reported withdrawn), and the
First Secy of the Sinkiang Party Committee: the "revolution" seems to enter
a new phase as the Guards attack and detronstrate against the new Peking City
Committee which was installed by the fist purge! Opposition actions are
also reported, including poster attackson Mao and Lin, posters lauding Liu
(removed by the Guards and police), anti-Communist leaflets, explosions, riots,
and a major, continuing, industrial strike in Peking.
7. The Chinese strike hard and. continuously at the Soviet party and state,
both as part of and apart from the CR activities. They hammer away on the
old theme of Soviet-American collusion in articles pegged to President John-
son's Oct. 7 speech and the prospect of',"peace talks," U.S. lifting of export
restrictions of "non-strategic commodities," and Gromyko's talk: with Johnson,
trumpeting shrilly that "even if both ale added together, they are no more than
a couple of paper tigers!" After Moscow orders departure of the Chinese stu-
dents in the USSR in response to Chinesee suspension and expulsion of all
foreign students in China, Peking officially protests "the unjustifiable
decision unilaterally _suspending" their': study, and organizes new demonstra-
tions at the Soviet Embassy. The Foreign Ministry note calls the Soviet
action "another grave incident worsening Sino-Soviet relations" and publicly
"warns" the Soviet leadership,referring,to it (in a Mao quote) as "the enemy."
In what must be a new precedent for diplomatic usage, it screams: "Let all
monsters and demons tremble before our great proletarian cultural revolution
and before the great Chinese people armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought!" (22)
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8. Russian-sourced press reports tell of Chinese demonstrations along the
Soviet border and distribution of leaflets on the Soviet side calling for the
return of the disputed territories; also of the strengthening of Soviet bor-
der forces and of armed clashes. (Oct. 2 & 5)
9. The Chinese also keep up their running battle with the Indonesian Govern-
ment, with official protest notes on Sept. 30 and Oct. 18, and a number of
NCNA releases.
10. Soviet leaders and media sharply increase the volume and tone of their
coverage of Chinese developments, adding their own reporting and criticism
as well as replaying all possible criticism by other parties. They naturally
emphasize the line that the CR has nothing in common with M-L, but is anti-
Chinese-Communist as well as anti-Soviet. They accuse the Chinese of trying
to turn the Soviet people against the Soviet Party and government, while Sov-
iet media are implicitly doing the same in reverse!
11. By way of preparation for the fruitless Moscow summit meeting, the Soviets
not only held the Brezhnev consultations mentioned in para. 3, but also (a)
went out of their way to deny hegemonic intentions when extolling Brezhnev's
talks (Sept 27); (b) floated a "trial balloon" by featuring in PRAVDA a Suda-
nese CP call for the convocation of a world Communist conference; and (c)
had Kosygin openly demand a "resolute rebuff" to the Chinese in the presence
of visiting Gomulka (Oct 13).
12. While entertaining the new Indonesian regime's Foreign Minister Malik,
the USSR encounters some Chinese-publicized criticism from the former Moscow
correspondent of the Indonesian CP's daily HARIAN RAKJAT, now in Peking (5),
and also from five presumably pro-Chinese I. students recently expelled from
Lumumba U. (l1). Moscow again accuses Kenyan papers and Vice President Murumbi
of vilifying the USSR (11).
13. In Europe, Moscow concludes a nuclear research cooperation and TV pro-
gramlexchange agreement with Paris (1) and again pushes "European security" (8).
14. Internally, the 2nd anniversary of K's ouster passes unnoticed, but a new
history textbook leaves him no longer an "unperson" (1). Despite claims of a
record grain harvest, there is no loosening of curbs on flour distribution
imposed 3 years ago (23).
15. POLAND: In a reversal of its previous reluctance to criticize the Chi-
nese, the Polish Party lashes out in TRYBUNA LUDU on Sept 29 with one of the
most effective (and quotable) across-the-board denunciations by any major
party. Meanwhile, although the 10th anniversary of the Polish-Soviet crisis
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#7
27 September-24 October 1966
WORLD COM IST AFFAIRS
CHRONOLOGY
September 3 and continuing: Soviet media engage in semantic acrobatics
to avoid use of the term "Red Guards" (which has a very prestigious
ring in the Communist lexicon) when referring to the rampaging Chinese
youth vigilantes. After initially using a straight translation of
"RT' (and, in Russian, hesitantly trying out a blatant distortion ---
"Krasnyye okhranniki" -- in which the word ''okhranniki" still has the
old connotation of agents of the Tsarist secret political police), they
finally settle in mid-September on an ingenious solution: beginning
with a prominent PRAVDA article on the 16th, they use a direct trans-
literation from the Chinese rather than a translation -- "Khunveibini"
in Cyrillic, or "Hung Weipings" in the Latin alphaheti No other Com-
munist media follow their lead, however.
September 22 (delayed): Two articles in Japanese CP daily AKAHATA
denounce a new faction of pro-Chinese Communists who had arrogated
leadership of the important Yamaguchi Prefecture Committee and control
its newspaper CHOSHU SHINBUN. The JCP/CC on September 5 approved the
expulsion of "five important anti-Party elements, Fukuda, Koreseko,
Sumioka, Obayashi, and Turuya," -- following which the purgees issued
a statement on the 6th declaring the formation of a new "Yamaguchi Pre-
fecture Committee of the JCP (left faction)" and "by forwarding CHOSHU
6 NBUU to Party and democratic organizations throughout the nation,
attempted to expand their anti-Party activities on a nationwide scale."
The unsigned A editorial. denounces the "traitorous Fukuda-Harada
faction" clearly though implicitly as a subversive instrument of the
Chinese CP and reveals serious JCP concern about its possible success:
"The F-H faction ... are modern dogmatists because they re-
gard the views of a foreign Party as the sole dogmas and attempt
to apply them mechanically to Japan. They practice left-wing
opportunism in which struggle is replaced by empty revolutionary
phrases, sectarianism, and demands for dissolving the Party....
...They have been appealing to the readers of the AKAHATA Sunday
edition to stop subscribing to (A, which is) a bogus CP newspaper
and instead read the CHOSHU SHINBUN ... saying 'you may subscribe
to A as a counter-teacher, but you should not pay for it' ...
causing confusion in deliveries and bill collection. They also
robbed more than 100,000 yen from the branch office...."
The second A article signed by Fuha Tetsuzo replies at length to
charges of "degradation of the JCP leadership toward revisionism" made
by the dissidents. First he rebuts their "theory of the American-
Japanese--Soviet 'Holy Alliance? -- borrowed from the arguments of a
certain foreign power," and their denunciation of the JCP for "orga-
nizing an 'anti-China campaign.'"' Denying that the dissidents stand
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for true independence in the ICM, Tetsuzo cites CHOSHU SHINBUN's publi-
cation on August 21+ of a speech at the "Welcoming Rally for the Cultural
Delegation of Chinese Youth" by one'of the dissident clique, Sumioka,
who "praised the thought of the Party leader of a certain foreign power
as 'the highest peak of M-L in modern times' and admired him as the
'guiding star of the world's people (which naturally includes the
Japanese people)."' (See previous reporting of the JCP's movement
away from alignment with the CCP and denunciation of the earlier pro-
Chinese dissident Shida faction, Nos. 2-5.)
September 24 and continuing, throughout period: Chinese media are over
flowing with materials on various aspects of the "cultural revolution"
(CR), the activities of the "Red Guards" (RG) and acclaim and love for
Mao and the revolution by foreigners (mostly little-known or unnamed)
as well as Chinese. On the 27th, for example, NCNA cites praise from
pro-Chinese Ceylonese Communists Sanmugathasan and De Silva, Burmese
writer Daw Amah, "Denkichi Takeshita, the chairman of Aichi chapter of
the Japan-China Friendship Association" and others; on the 28th, "an
American friend" in a Hong Kong bookshop; on the 29th "General Wajih
al-Madani, commander-in-chief of the Palestine Liberation Army," "a
young Ghanian,'"Wbdullah Natepe, secretary of Zanzibar's Afro-Shirazi
Party youth department," etc. In a round-up of "expressions of bound-
less ardent love and respect" by the working people of Poland, Bul-
garia, Hungary and the GDR" on the 30th, NCNA quotes only "a Polish
composer," "a journalist in Western Poland," ? a retired worker" in
Bulgaria, "a cultural worker" in Hungary, "a college student of the
GDR," etc. On October 1, NCNA again claims that, "despite the increas-
ingly vicious attacks and slanders by the Soviet revisionist leading
group against the CCP and Chairman Mao, the Soviet people show ever
deeper love and respect for the great Chairman Mao and for the great
thought of Mao Tse-tung": here again they quote only "a teacher from
Moscow," "a young student from Georgia," etc.
September 27 and continuing throughout period: Soviet and other Bloc
media increasingly report in a critical vein on the Chinese CR, depict-
ing not only the adulation of Mao and the violence of Red Guard actions
but also their anti-Soviet bias, their threat to CCP organs and leaders,
and opposition by Chinese Communists and the people. On the 27th, for
example, IZVESTIYA carries a Peking dispatch describing attacks on Hua
Lo-keng, Chairman of the Chinese Mathematical Society:
"...This scientist, whose works are known to all mathematicians
in the world, is being called a reactionary bourgeois authority.
The mathematician is accused of having opposed the ideas of Chair-
man Mao and of having at one time called the great leap forward
hurried and divorced from real life.... They charge him with hav-
ing praised the achievements of the Soviet Union in the conquest
of space."
On the same day, TASS reports from Peking that "the 'cultural
revolution' in China has touched almost all of the Chinese press.
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Many newspapers and magazines have been closed, others renamed, and
editorial offices of a number of publications reorganized." And another
TASS Peking bulletin that day describes PEOPLE'S DAILY newest glori-
fication of Mao and miscellaneous leaflets circulated by the Hung
Weipings (TASS's English version). Yugoslav TANYUG reporting on the
27th is slightly more "alarmist" (as is often the case): it sees in a
Peking poster confirmation that "the formation of so-called interna-
tional Red Guard detachments with headquarters in Peking has begun"
and finds in the latest Anna Louise Strong newsletter confirmation of
"the information that military drilling of the Red Guard has already
begun and that in a few days ... some detachments of the Red Guard
will be armed."
September 27: In an article extolling CPSU chief Brezhnev's September
visits with the CP leaders in Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia as
strengthening relations, IZVESTIYA denies Soviet hegemonic ambitions
and implicitly attributes same to the Chinese.
September 27-October 1: East German boss Ulbricht visits Tito in Bel-
grade and Brioni: the communique on the 1st declares "concurrence of
viewpoints on the most important international problems" but only an
"exchange of views" on problems of the ICM.
September 28: Hungarian Party daily NEPSZABADSAG interviews SecyGen
Vecchietti of the (extreme leftwing, "anti-revisionist") Italian
Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP): according to Budapest
MTI in English, he says that the PSIUP "sees eye to eye" with the CPSU
and the Hungarian CP on "the more important problems" of the interna-
tional situation and the ICM and "voiced concern over the CCP leaders'
attacks against the Soviet Union, declaring that they were disrupting
the unity of the international working class movement and thereby
obstructing all parties, including his party."
Cuban boss Castro again manifests concern over the problem of
material versus moral incentives as a focal point of contention in his
regime, implying that Cuba's "old" Communists oppose his emphasis on
moral stimuli and prefer to use "the sign of the peso" to spur produc-
tion.
September 29: A long NCNA review of "the present situation of the
struggle of M-Ls and revolutionary people throughout the world against
imperialism, reaction, and modern revisionism" finds it "excellent."
NCNA again denounces the CPSU leaders for "betraying M-L and capitula-
ting to U.S. imperialism," and for forming "a new holy alliance against
Communism, against the people, against revolution, and against China."
However, "the modern revisionist clique is today torn by contradictions
and disunity" and is "nothing more than a feeble paper tiger." Another
NCNA story on Chinese material successes states that "a new situation,
an all-round leap forward, is now in the making on the industrial front."
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A long "Victory Depends on Unity" editorial in Polish Party daily
TRYBUNA LUDU sternly condemns the CPR for "categorically rejecting" all
Soviet unity proposals, "using a whole arsenal of unsavory slanders and
accusations" of ""betrayal'; "conspiracy," etc.:
"The anti-unity scissionist political line of the CCP, the
staging of hostile demonstrations in front of the Soviet Embassy
and diplomatic missions of other socialist countries, the pro-
clamation by the 11th plenum of the CCP/CC of the so-called 'pro-
letarian cultural revolution' and a call to 'open fire'on 'those
who are in power' who march along the road of 'revisionism' and
'capitalism which is 'contrary to the ideas of Mao Tse-tung,'
the assaults on party and state activists and the programs carried
out by the so-called Red Guards on party committees suspected of
'revisionism,' various brawling excesses of unfledged school
youth compromising the idea of socialism -- all that provokes deep
concern and revulsion within the ranks of all Communist and workers
parties which see in the conduct of the leading organs of the CCP
a betrayal of the principles of proletarian internationalism and
of the ideology of the Communist movement."
The editorial quotes at length from Chen Yi's September 7 remarks
to Japanese MPs (#6) to turn the "collaboration" accusation implicitly
against the Chinese, using a quote attributed to APP: "Chen Yi obviously
confirms the opinion of numerous observers that China sharpens its
conflict with the Soviet Union in order to prepare ground for direct
talks with the U.S. Government."
Bulgarian Party daily RABOTNICHESKO DELO editorial on the same
day charges that Chinese opposition to Soviet unity efforts "borders
on treachery to the Just struggle of the Vietnamese people."
Radio Moscow reports that Brezhnev and CPUSA GenSecy Gus Hall on
the 28th held long talks which "showed full coincidence of views of
both parties on all the principal questions of the present time."
October 1: At Peking's celebration of the CPR's 17th anniversary there
are,for the first time, no important foreign dignitaries present (the
top-ranking guest listed was the president of the Somali National
Assembly), no party-to-party greetings from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Hungary or Poland, and only pro forma congratulations from other Com-
munist states. Lin Piao shares the center of the stage with Mao Tse-
t both "in buoyant spirits and smiling broadly, waving greetings"
to "the biggest parade since the founding of new China." Chinese
pronouncements are largely concerned with the internal problems of the
cultural revolution," but keynoter Lin includes the following blasts
at the CPSU:
"'. Imperialism headed by the United States and modern revisionism
with the leadership of the CPSU at its center are colluding and
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actively plotting peace talk swindles.... The Chinese people will
continue to ... carry the struggle against U.S. imperialism and
its lackeys and the struggle against modern revisionism with the
leadership of the CPSU as its center through to the end!"
Diplomatic representatives of the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
the GDR, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland walk out in protest.
French Minister of Scientific Research and Atom and Space ques-
tions Peyrefitte in Moscow agrees to cooperation on a 70-billion elec-
tron-volt accelerator under construction near Moscow.
Hanoi broadcasts an editorial from the September HOC TAP [North
Vietnamese journal of doctrine] which admits inadequacies in the Party's
"theory-formulating task" and says that a new "theory-formulating"
committee and program have been established.
UPI reports from Moscow on the publication of a new history text-
book which gives Khrushchev credit for his role in the historic 20th,
21st and 22nd Party Congresses and as instigator of the post Stalin
reforms. Together with a recent one-volume history of WWII, it is
"seen here by qualified observers as an attempt to be less emotional
and more objective about fallen or discredited leaders."
October 2: Soviet Defense Ministry's daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star)
reports that Soviet missile specialists at sites in North Vietnam had
come under attack during U.S. bombing raids.
October 2 and 23,: AP Moscow cites "Russian sources" for an Oct. 2
report that Chinese Communists have staged demonstrations along the
Sino-Soviet border and distributed leaflets on the Soviet side calling
for return of the disputed territories to China. "The sources said
there had been no armed clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops,
although they mentioned Soviet gunboats on the Amur River being fired
upon." A London OBSERVER article on the same day "by our Foreign Staff"
states that "clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops have been taking
place this summer along the southernmost part of the 6,100-mile border
between the two." It cites "travellers' reports from Russia and
Afghanistan" saying that the clashes have been described locally as
'quite serious." "Soviet soldiers wounded in the fighting have been
seen getting an enthusiastic welcome on the streets of Dushambe, capi-
tal of the Soviet Tadzhik Republic."
On the 23rd, a Hong Kong report of the London SUNDAY TIMES cites
"reports given to neutral Asian envoys by Soviet diplomats in Peking"
about Chinese Red Guards demonstrations along the border and the firing
on Soviet gunboats. "They have also confirmed that Soviet forces along
the Chinese border have been increased recently with troops quietly
withdrawn from East Germany."~
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October 3: PRAVDA reports a declaration by the Sudanese CP which
denounces" the Chinese leaders' splitting activities," and concludes
that "favorable conditions are being created for the convocation of a
conference of Communist and workers parties."
TASS announces the signing of a new military-economic assistance
pact with North Vietnam.
Luis Turcios, leader of the Guatemalan guerrilla Rebel Armed Forces
dies in an automobile accident outside the capital: the organization
issues a bulletin stating that his command would be taken over by his
right-hand man, Cesar Montes.
October 4: The Yugoslav Party CC approves a drastic reorganization of
the leading bodies of Party. Principal change is the shift of supreme
policy-making power from the Executive Committee to a newly-created
25-man Presidium headed by Tito and including the top leaders of the
central organization and of each of the six "republics," apparently
leaving the reduced-status Exec. Com. with only administrative powers.
Observers do not concur on estimates of practical results. On the same
day, a group of 30 Yugoslav representatives attending an agricultural
exhibit in Munich defect en masse.
NCNA reports a new Chinese Embassy protest note of September 30
to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry against "the Indonesian rightwing
forces' planned organization of hooligans to conduct wild anti-China
provocations in front of the Chinese Embassy" on the previous day.
AFP Hong Kong cites travelers for reports that posters glorifying the
downgraded Liu Shao-chi had appeared on the walls of Canton -- briefly:
they were removed by Red Guards and city officials, who launched inves-
tigations.
NCNA Geneva reports that "the delegation of the Chinese Red Cross
Society walked out of the 86th session of the Executive Committee of
the League of Red Cross Societies which opened in Geneva on 4 October"
in protest against the invitation to the "representative of the Red
Cross Society of the South Vietnam puppet regime, who represents no-
body." Before walking out, Chinese Chief "Wang Min exposed the collu-
sion of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism in mounting a 'peace
talks' fraud."
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA publishes its correspondent's report of the
Chinese 17th anniversary celebration in Peking. Highlights:
"More anti-Soviet slanders sounded from the grandstand ...
than even the most pronounced enemies of Communism, the American
imperialists, permit themselves to voice,...
"A 'foreign guest' -- the leader of a pitiful little group of
Australian splitters, Hill -- ... dared to accuse the Soviet Union
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in a provocative speech of intending to perpetrate an 'attack
from without' on China...."
The Government of Uruguay expels 4 Soviet diplomats identified as
i? members of the Soviet military intelligence branch" and charged with
"seeking to aggravate the economic and financial crisis which has
plagued Uruguay for almost two years," including a 2I+-hour strike by
200,000 workers on September 15.
October 4-7: A Sofia meeting of the CEMA [Eastern European Economic
Organization] Executive council apparently goes no further than to
"recommend further efforts to extend mutual trade between CEMA countries
in 1966.1970," according to TASS.
October 5: PRAVDA publishes a summary of an article from the pro-
Soviet Belgian CP paper DRAPEAU ROUGE condemning the Chinese "sorrow-
ful and tragic distortion of the great revolutionary movement" and
expressing "hope that the Chinese people and Communists will manage to
find ways of rectifying the situation." It also reports Israeli CP
denunciation-of the Chinese splittists. TASS on the same day publi-
cizes a Canadian CP protest against the Chinese "rude actions."
NCNA on the same day publicizes attacks on the CPSU revisionists
by New Zealand CP SecyGen Wilcox and "the Karachi monthly MANSHUR."
A SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA review of the Chinese press on the "cultural
revolution" includes the following highlights:
"Reading the Chinese press carefully, one cannot but arrive
at the conclusion that a definite political task has been given
to the Khunveibini ["Red Guards"] -- to strike a blow against the
experienced cadres of revolutionaries, party workers, and progres-
sive intellectuals; against all those who remain loyal to the
ideas of proletarian internationalism and fraternal solidarity
with the working people of socialist countries....
"The Khunveibini directly aim at displacing old cadres. How
can this be explained? Only that the old cadres learned from
the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution and do
not accept the anti-Soviet slander of the Khunveibini. Is it not
because these people have drawn their ideas of M-L from prime
sources and not only from Mao Tse-tung's quotations...?"
NCNA Peking publicizes a long statement by Anwar Dharma, former
correspondent of the Indonesian CP organ HARIAN RAKJAT in Moscow,
denouncing his own expulsion by the Soviets as further proof of "the
intimate cooperation between the Soviet modern revisionists and the
fascist military regime of Indonesia,"' arranged to prepare the way for
the visit of Adam Malik to Moscow.
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Reuters Hong Kong cites "travelers from Communist China" for re-
ports of explosions in Canton during the anniversary celebrations, with
distribution of anti-Communist leaf jets and a new anti-Mao pamphlet
entitled "The Vanguard."
Reuters reports from Bogota that the Colombian Govt expelled
Bulgarian commercial representative Stefan Popov. "The Foreign Ministry
refused to give reasons ..., but sources said they included interference
in domestic political affairs and alleged connection with pro-Communist
guerrillas operating in southeast Colombia."
October 5-12: A North Korean Workers (Communist) Party conference
reaffirms the "declaration of independence" announced by NODONG SINMUN
on August 12 (#5). The keynote speech by Chairman Kim Il-song expands
on the earlier "declaration," providing many new quotable passages
aimed against both "left opportunism" and "modern revisionism" and
against the practices of both the CCP and the CPSU, without mentioning
either by name. He also declares that "every socialist country should
dispatch volunteers to Vietnam."
October 6: The All-China Journalists' Association issues a statement
on its refusal to participate in the 6th Congress of the International
Organization of Journalists (IOJ) in Berlin, October 10-15, asserting
that the IOJ is "controlled and manipulated by the Soviet revisionist
leading clique" and "has degenerated into a despicable tool for pro-
moting" the latter's line.
TANYUG Peking reports on a list published by the Chinese Red
Guards of the names of 84 CCP officials -- including eight members or
alternate members of the CC, headed by Peng Chen and Lu Ting--yi --
whose activities have already been unmasked and against whom the fight
should be further conducted.
Cairo AL-AHRAM reports that Egypt will send nuclear experts on
"working and training missions" to the Soviet Union.
The Russian Federated Republic, largest unit of the USSR, intro-
duces new penalties against demonstrations, strikes, subversive wri-
tings, and "slanders against the Soviet state."
PRAVDA summarizes an editorial denouncing the CCP in "MAROON,
central organ of People's Party of Iran."
October TANYUG Peking reports publication of a new list of 130
lesser officials who are criticized by the Red Guard. It also reports
posters appealing to all revolutionary members of the Communist Youth
League to prevent the organization from being dissolved under Red Guard
attack.
Moscow announces a decision to "suspend the training of CPR stu-
dents at Soviet educational establishments and research institutions"
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effective in October, because "this September the Chinese side uni-
laterally violated the principle of reciprocity" with Soviet students
in the CPR and "ordered then to return home before October 10."
October 8: NCNA interprets President Johnson's speech of the 7th as
advocating "greater 'reconciliation"' between the U.S. and the USSR
"so as to enable the U.S. to further concentrate its strength for the
war of aggression in Vietnam." Johnson's endorsement of German reuni-
fication "means that he wants the Soviet revisionist leading clique to
hand the GDR over to the West German militarist clique."
PRAVDA editorially endorses recent moves toward strengthening
European security, including the "Bucharest declaration of socialist
states," the De Gaulle visit to the USSR, the proposal by "the parlia-
mentariens of 8 European countries" for a conference of European par-
liaments, and the 16th Pugwash conference in Sopot (Poland).
TASS publicizes a condemnation of the Chinese in Czech Party
theoretical organ NOVA MYSL, including the charge that "such rude pro-
vocations (as those staged against the USSR in Peking) have never taken
place in any civilized country l" TASS also reports from San Jose on
an article denouncing the Chinese by Arnoldo Ferreta, CC member of the
People's Vanguard Party of Costa Rica.
October 8 & 15: LOS ANGELES TIMES correspondent Morris in Damascus
on the 8th cites "Western diplomatic sources here" reporting that
"Soviet experts, believed to be military officers, have been spotted
recently in Syria's sealed-off border areas close to the tense frontier
with Israel." He also says that Sian CP leader Bakdash was quoted
by a Hungarian newspaper as urging all Communists to support the pre-
sent government in Damascus. NYTIMES on the 15th reports that "the
Soviet Union's strong support for Syria in her dispute with Israel in
the UN Security Council and reports that Russian arms and instructors
have been provided for two Syrian guerrilla groups have revived fears
among diplomats over the peace of the Middle East."
October 9: PRAVDA, TASS, and Radio Moscow reports on China emphasize
the anti-CCP bias of the rampaging Khunveibini ("Red Guards"), includ-
ing posters and demonstrations against the new leaders of the Peking
City Committee, which had been purged only a few months ago and riots
throughout the country, where "workers are coming out more and more
often in defense of the local CP organizations attacked by Khunveibini
from Peking." PRAVDA also notes that "the anti-Soviet campaign is
being stepped up."
Tokyo ASAHI reports on a Peking round table discussion between
three members of a Japanese wrestling group and representatives of the
Red Guard- at High School No. 85, including:
"Question: Is it not necessary to study about foreign countries
besides studying the Mao thought?
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"Answer: We can understand the world objectively if we study the
Mao Tse-tung ideology alone. Mao Tse-tung thought is a very
great ideology, and we think that the study of this alone is suf-
ficient."
October 10: A Gomulka-led Polish party-state delegation arrives in
Moscow. Moscow upsets Vienna by postponing on 12 hours notice Presi-
dent Podgorny's scheduled visit to Austria on grounds of illness.
(On the 15th, TABS announces that it~is rescheduled for Nov. 14-21.)
PRAVDA reports condemnation of the Chinese CR by Se.cyGen Acosta
Salas of the Peruvian CP,and Radio Moscow reports a similar denuncia-
tion in "the Iraqi CP paper TARIQ ASH=SHAAB."
NYTIMES correspondent in Cairo reports, according to "informed
sources," that "the Govt has quietly started a campaign against Com-
munists and Com, sympathizers who have attained influential positions
in the country's only legaTT political movement, the Arab Socialist
Union. The sources said that a number of intellectuals, perhaps 27
to 50, had been arrested since last week...."
October 10-15: East Berlin ADN claims attendance by "more than 200
delegates representing 42 countries" at the 6th Congress of the Inter-
national Organization of Journalists (IOJ). Reporting indicates that
all speeches uneventfully followed the Soviet line --- as the Albanian
BASHKIMI charges in a slashing attack on the 12th! (See Oct. 6 for
Chinese boycott.)
October 11: Moscow's KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (Red Star) article by Leontyev
hits at "some Kenyan newspapers" for "publishing all kinds of fabrica-
tions with a view to vilifying the Soviet Union and making the peoples
of Kenya and other African states mistrust the peaceful and friendly
policy of the USSR," and "expresses regret over the fact that Vice
President J. Murumbi also took part in this campaign...."
October 11-14: The Italian CP CC holds a plenum in Rome, while the
non-Communist press comments on the party's difficulties, with defec-
tions from the right to the center-left coalition and from the left
to pro-Chinese splinter groups. According to TANYUG, SecyGen Longo's
opening speech accuses the Chinese leaders of having inaugurated the
"cultural revolution" to offset "disappointing" domestic achivements
and the failure of their opposition to the policy of "peaceful coexis-
tence" in the international field. Reuters reports that "more than
100 delegates" met in Leghorn (Livorne) on the 11th to found a new pro-
Chinese CP: an East Berlin Radio commentary by Mario Porto on the 17th
belittles the move as one which is not taken seriously by the PCI. He
states: "There are five small pro-Chinese groups organized in Italy.
No one known in the workers movement belongs to them. There is such
competition among these small groups, primarily over the money sent
by the Albanian Embassy or the Chinese Legation in Bern...."
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October 12: Radio Moscow broadcasts a Moscow speech by Hungarian
Politburo member Sandor Gaspar which includes "our firm conviction that
one cannot abuse for long the patience of the wise and patient Chinese
people with their great past...,. Under the name of socialism, one
cannot go on doing something different for any length of time...."
Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU and the Budapest MTI agency both comment
from Peking on the "new phase" of the CR in which bodies and organiza-
tions created by the CR are already coming under attack.
October 12, 16, 19: Press reporting reflects continuing unrest in
Poland. Reviewing the events of the millennium celebrations on the
12th, Cardinal Wyszynski angrily refers to the regime's refusal to
admit Pope Paul, its attack on the Polish bishops' conciliatory letter
to the German episcopate, etc., and bitterly castigates those men with
"hard, stony hearts" who forbid the building of new churches badly
needed (NYTIAES). The Cardinal and bishops receive "one of their
greatest ovations ever" from 150,000 jammed into the center of Wroclaw
on the 16th (AP). And Polish as well as foreign observers are "struck
by the narrowness'" of the regime's handling of the 10th anniversary of
the Soviet-Polish confrontation. TRYBUNA LUDU avoids the "conflict"
aspects, blandly speaks of the return to leadership of Gomulka "and
other outstanding activists" without mentioning that they returned
from 8 years of disgrace, imprisonment and torture, etc. (NYTIMES)
October 13: Speaking together with Polish chief Gomulka in Sverdlovsk,
Soviet Premier Kos in openly deplores Chinese policy and "demands
that a resolute rebuff be given to those who are attempting to split
the unity of the WCM, who will not cease subversive activities...."
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries the diary of Dashdavaa, a 23-year-
old Mongolian student in his last year at Shanghai Textile College who
was persecuted and beaten by the Khunveibini before being forced to
leave China. TASS reports denunciations of the CR by the CPs of Chile
and Colombia.
NCNA reports the U.S. Commerce Dept's decision to lift export
restrictions on "nonstrategic" commodities to the USSR "against the
background of recent intense U.S.-Soviet collusion and bargaining over
the Vietnam question and U.S. efforts to promote 'peaceful evolution'
in the Soviet Union and the East European countries."
October 14: Bucharest releases a communique on the October 5-13 visit
of a top-level Finnish CP delegation: they agree in their emphasis on
independence and equality, -- and in their insistence that "differing
opinions between CPs must not affect normal comradely relations between
them."
TASS reports that Rector Rumyantsev of Moscow Peoples Friendship
(Patrice Lumumba) University brands as "a gross invention... a state-
ment made by a group of Indonesian students to the effect that they
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had allegedly been suba ected in Moscow to Ipsychological pressure.""
Their statement, in the form of a letter to the Indonesian Govt, was
published "at the beginning of the month in the Indonesian paper BERITA
YUDHA." Rumyantsev says they were failing students and "someone wants
to make use of this for a definite purpose, to make political capital."
Radio Peking broadcasts an all-out endorsement by Eiichi Bane,
leader of a Japanese Socialist Party delegation, including:
As for the Vietnamese people's anti-U.S. struggle, the
Soviet Union has, in fact, given no aid of any sort, and China
has single-handedly taken the responsibility of aiding Vietnam....
It is my opinion that even if the Soviet Union attacks China from
the back, even if Japanese imperialism launches an attack on
China, or even if all other imperialists attack China together,
China has sufficient strength to smash their attacks."
October 15: Moscow central Trade Union daily TRUD denounces the CR
across the board under the heading: "Nothing in Common with Revolu-
tion." It includes descriptions of condemnations by Communists every-
where, with specific reference to France, Spain (exile), Costa Rica,
Australia, GDR, Italy, and Lebanon. KO:%SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA again writes
about the apparent Chinese effort to wipe out the Communist Youth
League and resistance against it.
Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU reports "very sharp attacks" by Red Guard
posters and loudspeakers against Liu Shao-chi and his wife for sup-
porting efforts to control the PG.
TASS reports a CANADIAN TRIBUNE article by Canadian CP SecyGen
Kashtan denouncing the CR.
NCNA again reports charges that the Indonesian Govt is using
"Chiang Kai-shek agents'? to persecute Overseas Chinese.
NYTIMES correspondent Mooney in Paris cites the visit of Bul-
garian Premier Zhivkov to Paris this week to demonstrate the dilemma
of the French CP in handling De Gaulle's moves toward closer relations
with Communist regimes abroad while ignoring the FCP at home.
October 15-16: Western correspondents cite a passage in the latest
HOC TAP editorial in which Hanoi "moved closer to a public acknowledge-
ment that the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam is their
creature": it lists as "examples of clever application of Communist
principles" the formation and activities of the NLFSV, following the
founding of the Indochinese Democratic Front in the late nineteen
thirties and formation of the Vietminh in 1941.
October 16: Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY Observer article comments on Presi-
dent Johnson's Oct. 7 speech:
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U.S. imperialism is a paper tiger, and so is K. revisionism.
Even if both are added together, they are still no more than a
couple of paper tigers!"
NCNA reports denunciation of Soviet-U.S. collusion by the Singapore
Socialist Front organ BARISAN and "noted Burmese writer Daw Ah Mah in
LUDU.
Prague RUDE PRAVO reports attacks on Mao and Lin Piao among the
Red Guards activities.
October 17: The second anniversary of Khrushchev's ouster is noted in
the Communist world only (as far as we know) by an Albanian ZERI I
POPULLIT article: "The Failure of Khrushchev's Successors on the K.
Path."
Poland and North Vietnam sign an agreement on economic aid for
1967, hailed by NHAN DAN on the 20th as "a new step" in "militant
solidarity."
Prague Radio commentator Slahounek says about the Red Guards:
"If anyone wanted to drag socialism in the mud in front of
the entire world public opinion, he could hardly have outdone the
schoolboys with red bands on their arms who have unleashed some-
thing that can only be compared to mass hysteria in the darkest
Middle Ages...."
October 17-19: Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY devotes a whole page on the 17th
to "worldwide coverage of acclamations" of the CR by "well-known citi-
zens" of Japan, Iraq, Colombia, Mexico, Australia, Sudan Algeria,
France, Mongolia, and Britain; and most of a page on the 19th to tri-
butes to Mao by "12 friends from 9 Asian, African and Latin American
countries."
October 17-22: Top art state and military chiefs of all the EE Com-
minist countries (except Albania), Cuba, and Mongolia meet in Moscow
in what is seen by Western observers as another Soviet effort to forge
some sort of an anti-Chinese bloc, or at least to achieve a joint
declaration of condemnation. PRAVDA on the opening day seems to sound
the keynote with what TASS describes as a "theoretical article" which
says that
"the leaders of the CCP have rolled downhill on the road of
departure from the Leninist principles of internationalism, slipped
into nationalistic.positibns which confuse class consciousness
and prevent the working people from seeing the common purposes of
all revolutionary fighters,... have counterposed themselves to the
entire socialist community, and ... reject the joint actions of all
progressive forces against the aggression by American imperialism
in Vietnam."
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As reports leak out to the Western press that Rumania is adamantly
opposed to any joint action or statement, PRAVDA returns on the 20th
to an editorial expressing "bitter regret and condemnation" at Chinese
actions. But the "statement" which TASS finally issues shortly after
midnight on the 22nd merely confirms that the visitors were shown
several rocket launchings and adds only that "while in the Soviet Union"
they "had meetings and talks," during which "they exchanged opinions on
a wide range of questions of international policy of interest to the
sides concerned ... in an atmosphere of fraternal cordiality and
friendship."
October 18: The strange, non-speaking appearance of Mao and Lin Piao
at a rally of a million and a half Red Guards in Peking -- they drive
past at 40 miles per hour -- draws press speculation: the NYTIMES
reports analysts as seeing the rally aimed at intimidating opponents
of the CR but the absence of speeches- as indicating the seriousness of
the struggle for power.
Prague RUDE PRAVO article by Zdenek Horeni declares that "Anti-
Sovietism has undoubtedly become the dominant foreign policy product of
the CPR...."
Moscow releases its annual "slogans" for the forthcoming "October
Revolution" anniversary: last year's "long live the cohesion of the
great peoples of the Soviet Union and China" is replaced by "to friend-
ship and cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese peoples" -- the
same wording as used for Albania, and differing from the "long live the
eternal, unbreakable friendship and cooperation" applied to all other
"socialist" countries, including Yugoslavia.
TASS announces that Kosygin will visit Turkey December 19-24.
Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry sends a note to the Indonesian
Embassy "lodging a strong protest against the grave incident of the
illegal detention of Chinese nationals by the Medan military authori-
ties" on 10 October.
October 19: TAP~YUG Peking reports Red Guard demands in Sinkiang that
Wang En-mao, Sinkiang First Secy, be burned alive and the Committee
bombed for suppressing the CR in Sinkiang and cooperating with "rightist
elements." It also describes new demonstrations and charges against
the Peking City Committee.
East German Party daily NEUES DEUTSCHLAND comments that the main
topic of talks and leaflets in Peking is the strike of 3,500 workers
at Textile Enterprise No. 1 which started in mid-September and is still
continuing. "The leaflets also report on actions against Mao troops."
October 19-20: Successive issues of HUNG WEI PING PAO (Red Guard
Daily), "a paper intended largely for the Red Guards," as reported by
TANYUG Peking, (a) declare that the U.S. will inevitably attack China,
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(b) admit that there is no unity among the Red Guards but "crucial strug-
$le between the two opposing lines in the CR."
October 20: AFP Peking adds Foreign Minister Chen Yi to the list of
those attacked by the Red Guard posters. (Delhi Radio next day cites
Japanese correspondents for the same information.)
October 22: A Chinese Foreign Ministry note to the Soviet Embassy pro-
tests the "unjustifiable decision unilaterally suspending the studies
of all Chinese students in the Soviet Union and ordering them to leave"
as "another grave incident worsening Sino-Soviet relations...."
"We want to warn the Soviet leadership: your evil action will
certainly be opposed by the revolutionary students and the people
as a whole of the Soviet Union and the whole world.... As Chair-
man Mao taught as, 'to be attacked by the enemy, is not a bad thing,
but a good thing....
"Let all monsters and demons tremble before our great prole-
tarian cultural revolution and before the great Chinese people
armed with Mao Tse--tung's thought!"
October 23: NYTIMES reports from The Hague on the continuing Dutch cor-
don around the Chinese diplomatic house which shelters the eight Chinese
technicians whom the police want to question about the July 17 death of
the ninth delegate after he had been wounded in an apparent defection
jump and then abducted by the Chinese from a Dutch hospital (#!+).
LOS ANGELES TIMES reports from Moscow that, despite Soviet claims
of the largest grain harvest in history, t'there has been no loosening
of curbs imposed three years ago on the distribution of flour": -- this
year's Revolution holiday ration is no larger than last year's and none
can be purchased outside the ration.
October 23-24: Thousands of Red Guards mass outside the Soviet Embassy
in demonstrations keyed to the Soviet expulsion of Chinese students.
October 24: The Japanese CP opens its 10th Congress in Tokyo with a
3-hour CC report by SecyGen Miyamoto, who proposes that the JCP should
help form a unified anti-imperialist front against American aggression
in Vietnam while maintaining an independent line not inclined to the
CPSU or the CCP. He claims that the JCP now numbers 300,000 members
and that millions read AKAHATA. No foreign guests are mentioned: the
Govt denied visas to those from ruling CPs. The CCP's message of greet-
ings includes the gratuitous "Down with modern revisionism with the
leadership of the CPSU as its center!"
NYTIMES reports from Santiago, Chile, on the decision of Rector
Gonzales of 4,500..-student Concepcion University to suspend activities'
for the year as a result of a 742-day Communist-led strike for demands
which included the removal of 15 Peace Corps teachers from the faculty.
UN correspondents report that, according to EE sources there, Hun-
garian Foreign Minister Janos Peter secretly visited Hanoi last month
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 7 November 1966
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1070. THE DEVELOPMENT OF
COMMUNIST CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Communist China seems today a country gone berserk, its
ordinary citizens caught up in a bewildering whirlpool of Red Guard terror
and intimidation supported by the old men in Peking. Since August
the Red Guard has acted as Mao's primary tool in the spreading of the
cultural revolution, from the first attacks on the intellectuals, ancient
traditions, religion, and the West to attacks on all things foreign and
finally to the calculated weeding out of Chinese Communist Party officials
whose revolutionary fervor did not measure up to Mao's fanatic devotion.
The first Red Guards were handpicked in July by Central Committee re-
presentatives from schools throughout the country where the purging of
teachers had already taken place. As July moved into August and recruit-
ing became less selective and more intensive, the Guard established branches
in production brigades, schools, commercial departments, factories, etc.,
until by September their numbers were estimated at between eight and twelve
million.
The most commonly held theory is that they were invented and at first
controlled by the Central Committee of the CCP, with Mao Tse-tung and his
heir-apparent Marshal Lin Piao pulling the strings. The Red Guard not
only proved a less than perfect instrument for refurbishing Chinese Commu-
nism, it turned into a Frankenstein carrying out its assigned tasks with
such unholy fervor that even Chairman Mao may have been taken aback. Sig-
nificantly, the public rallies at the Gate of Heavenly Peace on 31 August
and 15 September sought to incite the Guards to attack "those in the Party
who are taking the capitalist road," but maintained that these were only
a minority in the party. By early September word had filtered out of China
regarding the assignment of leading officers of the Peoples' Liberation Army
(PLA) to instruct, supervise and discipline the Guards. Other reports that
the PLA had been used to quell Red Guard disturbances seeped through to
watchers in Hong Kong; in one case at least the PLA had been called in by
local officials unable to cope with the Guards. These efforts at restoring
order and discipline - a belated attempt on the part of an aging dictator
to consolidate his hold on 750 million Chinese and ensure his immortality
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in the person of a chosen successor- were too long delayed. By the
beginning of September too many emotionally charged stories had reached
the outside world of Red Guard excesses - their desecration of Buddhist
temples, their eviction of eight frail nuns from China, their book burn-
ing and destruction of priceless art works from China's past, their beat-
ing of elderly citizens and frenzie. attacks on foreigners and so on - a
disgusting and terrifying list which the press is circulating to the far
corners of the globe.
What is actually behind the cultural revolution - Mao's obsession
with revisionist tendencies in Chin, or whatever - is less important
today for our propaganda purposes than the electrifying effect the re-
volution is having on the outside world, and the growth of resistance
to its excesses inside China. Rumots of fierce clashes between the
Guards and anti-Guard elements, protest groups, anti-wall poster cam-
paigns, suicides of prominent educators, scientists, and artists, have
gradually added to our picture of resistance within China. One of the
surest indicators of the changes being crammed down Chinese throats is
the reduced living scales among Chitese diplomats and officials abroad.
They have been ordered to master their weakness for bourgeois delights
such as Mercedes automobiles and British gin and are now shoring up
their resolve with pictures of Mao supplanting art treasures and replac-
ing fashionable clothes and haircuts with the ubiquitous baggy trouser,
simple dress and bowl haircut of yesteryear. Western diplomats and
others have heard a certain amount 6f-grumbling from the less tight-
lipped Chinese because of their reduced salaries and newly-limited re-
presentational funds.. It has been speculated that morale problems can
be and are developing.
At the outset of the cultural revolution, it was to be expected
that Chinas Asian neighbors would take notice of what was going on
so close to their back yards and that anti-communist countries would
immediately begin commenting on Chiiia's newest convulsion. However,
as the purge widened to include traditional institutions, Moslem and
Buddhist countries or groups representing them began their protests
as did Western Europe and Latin America. Finally as the purge reached
Chinese Communist Party officials aid government officials and expanded
to demote or remove CCP committees in local factories, educational in-
stitutions, etc., the communist world began to react. From. communist
party organs in Eastern and Western; Europe, from Latin America, from
the Near and Far East came rumbling, protests, criticism and even ridi-
cule of the CCP and the Red Guard. Leading the communist hue and cry was
the powerful central organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(see unclassified attachment for rojindups of worldwide criticism from
communist and non-communist countries). There have even been signs that
the most sycophantic of Peking's er$twhile followers, the Albanians, are
having second thoughts as may be the North Vietnamese (see Zorza article
attached).
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 -9-t a RTT
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Further evidence of China's growing isolation was the lackluster
turnout of foreign guests at China's National Day Celebrations on
1 October and the walkout of diplomats from seven communist countries
when speechmaker Lin Piao tactlessly dragged out the dog-eared accusa-
tion that the USSR is conspiring with the US on Vietnam (see attach-
ment). Bulgarian leader Zhivkov and Czech leader Novotny both con-
demned China on 9 September in speeches in Sofia; a well-known
Yugoslavian writer and former diplomat pointed out that "China's
political influence in international affairs has sunk to the lowest
possible point." Major articles in Western European,communst papers
(see Press Comment for past month) rail at the CCP for setting back
the advance of communism and completely excising Marx and Lenin from
the revolutionary scene.
Two aspects of the cultural revolution are particularly disturb-
ing to communists outside China. One of these is the spectacle of
Communist party leaders being attacked by elements which stand, in
effect, outside the party. Probably few East European and other
apparatchiki would welcome a return to the purges of the Stalin era,
but at least those purges were conducted within the framework of the
party; adroit party officials could follow the changing party lines
and attack whatever elements were newly tagged as "anti-party" and
"deviationist." The party as such remained supreme. In today's China,
on the other hand, the Red Guards, despite their official origin, seem
to represent a force standing in fact outside the party; insofar as
they are controlled from above, this control seems to come through
the PLA and not through party cadres, and indeed the Guards have aimed
many of their attacks at local and regional party headquarters. Both
the mobilization of the army against the party and the mobilization of
youth against old party officials are anathema to the other CPs.
The other aspect of the cultural revolution which disturbs com-
munists is that there is no longer much pretext of following the doc-
trines of Marx and Lenin. Instead, this peculiar revolution concentrates
on lauding the "thought of Chairman Mao." Mao's thoughts are claimed to
work wonders in solving everyday problems, such as those of harvesting
or the garment industry. Chicom indoctrination seems to aim at making
"Mao say" replace the old stereotype of "Confucius say..." To communists
outside the Middle Kingdom, this movement seems to resemble fascism more
than communism.. Like Mussolini, Mao (in Chicom propaganda) is "always
right." Non-Chinese communists are concluding that, as Mussolini once
said of fascism, the cultural revolution is "not an article for export." 25X1C10 b
3
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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1071. FRONT ACTIVITIES: I.O.J. CONGRESS
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The Communist-front International Organization of Jour-
nalists IOJ held its 6th Congress in East Berlin, 10-15 October 1966,
attended by more than 200"de.legates"from 42 countries. The IOJ is less
important organizationally than the mass membership fronts in the fields
of youth (WFDY), students (IUS), labor (WFTU), and women (WIDF). How-
ever, its more limited number of journalist adherents exert considerable
influence on public opinion.
Available reports indicate that the Congress was carried off in a
rather harmonious atmosphere, probably much more harmonious than any
international front gathering in recent years. Ideological charges
were directed at the West (principally the U.S. and West Germany),
rather than at representatives of one or another brand of Communism.
The reasons for the harmony at the Congress were that it was boycotted
by the Chicoms and Albanians and that a Peking-based Indonesian delega-
tion was refused admission.
Chicom Charges. In advance of the Congress, on 6 October, the All-
China Journalists' Association declared its refusal to participate. The
statement harshly condemned the IOJ as a Soviet-controlled, Soviet-
manipulated instrument "tailing behind U.S. imperialism and its accom-
plices"; as violently opposed to the revolutionary struggle in Asia,
Africa and Latin America; as helping to peddle U.S. imperialism's
"peace talks" fraud; as preaching "united action" with U.S. imperialism
against China; as pleading for cooperation with the (non-Communist) In-
ternational Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and begging for advisory
status in UNESCO (labelling both organizations U.S. imperialist tools);
and as attacking and undermining the anti-imperialist, revolutionary
Afro-Asian as well as the All-China Journalists' Association. But cap-
ping these more worn-out charges, the statement also said that before
the Congress, the IOJ had sent out its agents to undermine the unity
among progressive journalists in Asia, Africa and Latin America and to
instigate anti-Chinese moves. It also stated that, as regards the pre-
parations for and the Congress.itself, the IOJ Secretariat had barred
the All-China Journalists' Association from access to relevant informa-
tion and had failed to make available copies of the principal documents
to be submitted to the Congress. Hence, the statement said, progressive
journalists must draw a sharp line between themselves and the "capitula-
tionist" and "splittist" Soviet clique in the IOJ and desist from "united
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s (1071 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08-RDP78-103061A000400070001 -1r,
action" with the IOJ. The Albanian', press simila
tempting to cooperate with reactionary j!ournalis'
visionist League of Yugoslav Journalists, and cl
in particular its secretariat, were, completely s
and dictates of the Union of Soviet': Journalists.
Soviet Line Prevails at Congress. As charg
the Congress did adopt the official'Soviet line
affairs. The IOJ President, Jean-M,urice Herman
all the IOJ demands from its members with differ
be in agreement with our general principles, tha
profession, and practice it with full ro ' sponsibi
dom, national independence for natipns,and peat
and in his own way serving the common objective.'
the Sino-Soviet controversy the Seclretarfy Genera
that "despite divisionist attempts"'th.e'IOJ had
but had grown. He urged journalists to 'work for
repeated Soviet propaganda charges, especially a
Germany.
Vietnam Treatment Is "Phe Test;." In a welc
the Premier of East Germany, Willi tope, said:
war of aggression in Vietnam has become 'the test
nalist." A general resolution on the "ethical p
called upon journalists to use their media and o
false arguments and faked information of the U.S
nam problem" -- in other words, notitodeviate f
gates witnessed a dramatic demonstration} of Viet
was informed that the Chairman of the Executive
of Patriotic and Democratic Journalists of South
of silence was observed for the "victi.m.of a poi
Appeal to Journalists in Emer4in ; Countries
called on journalists of newly-freed countries t
the fight to preserve national independence agai
ism and neocolonialism. Naming U.S. imperialism
aggression and war, he asked journalist to aler
the combination of all anti-imperialist elements
action for a united front against ikriper~ alism.
to unmask all U.S. propaganda and that Of other
ouflage aggressive designs and acti;ons., He set
tensifying journalistic support for liberation m
South Africa, South-West Africa, 'Southern Rhodes
r4 4- 1, A -- I ref TT c +- --r i'wr.m gnii+;Tn TCnwaa _
Ly accused the IOJ of at-
of the IFJ and the re-
imed that its leadership,
bordinated to the orders
:i by the Chicoms in advance,
n international political
told the delegates that
nt ideologies is that "they
they love and respect their
ity in the service of free-
-- each in his own language
In an oblique reference to
Jiri Meissner, stressed
of only proved itself viable
a lessening of tensions, but
out "revanchism" in West
ming address to the delegates,
"The attitude toward the U.S.
by which to judge every Jour-
:inciples of journalism"
portunities to "smash the
imperialists about the Viet-
om the Communist line. (Dele-
am propaganda: The Congress
ommittee of the Association
Vietnam had died and a moment
on gas attack by the U.S.")
Secretary General Meissner
mobilize their peoples for
st the inroads of colonial-
as the principal force of
the public and stimulate
for joint international
he task for journalists is
ress organs seeking to cam-
he task for the IOJ of in-
vements in Angola, Mozambique,
a and the Congo, and for the
IOJ Reported to be Exandin Meissner reported that the IOJ had grown
into the largest international organization of journalists, now representing
about' 130,000 members throughout the wdrld.* Hq claimed one third (about
*He had given similar organizational data in an nterview carried by the East
German news agency ADN on 20 Septen#ber. Of tour e, a very high proportion of
the membership is made up cf journalists from CAmunist countries; according
to a TASS item, the recent Congress of Soviet Journalists represented 43,000
journalists.
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!Q,000-) of all journalists in Latin America have been rallied in the IOJ,
and announced:;that thirteen African ,journalistic' or:gani.zations.o.r trade
unions belong to it. During the Congress twenty-two"new groups",of
journalists were admitted (from Chile, Venezuela, Panama, Colombia,
Uruguay, Guyana, Argentina, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guinea,
Gambia, Cameroon, Uganda, South-West Africa, the South African Repub-
lic, Mozambique, the UAR, Syria, India and Korea). The Congress made
further overtures to journalists from developing countries by express-
ing support for "progressive" journalists in Africa and Asia. Efforts
were also made to retain Cuban support by resolving to hold the next
congress in Havana in 1970, and by urging Latin American journalists
to join national liberation movements in line with Cuban policy. (R;epre-
sentat1ve's of the Latin American solidarity organization and of the
Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization [and the
Pan African Journalists' Federation] were present.) In addition,
overtures were made for cooperation with the non-Communist IFJ. (Hermann:
"We know that apart from the journalists who oppose all cooperation,
there are in its ranks colleagues who fully share our views.")
IOJ Plans and Activities. Secretary General Meissner announced
that the IOJ Executive Committee has a 3-year plan for promotion of
press, radio and TV in developing countries. The USSR, the GDR, Czech-
oslovakia and Hungary are in the forefront of IOJ efforts to give active
support to national organizations in the training and education of jour-
nalists. The IOJ plans to form research groups with journalistic insti-
tutions to discuss technical progress in press, radio and TV.
"European Security." As host country, East Germany received specific
affirmations of support. Meissner suggested attention be devoted to the
question of West German access to atomic weapons and he called West Ger-
many's "presumption to be sole representative of the German people" an
aggressive concept which threatens European security. Safeguards for
European security were described by the Secretary General as one of the
most urgent contemporary needs. A Polish delegate discussed a proposal
of the "socialist" states to convene a European Security Conference and
he called on journalists from capitalist as well as "socialist" ? countries
to meet their great responsibility in regard to such a conference. (The
World Council of Peace, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and
the International Union of Students also have plans for a European Secu-
rity Conference.)
Spoils for the Host. The East German press cast Walter Ulbricht
as the star of a reception given for the delegates. Ulbricht welcomed
the IOJ delegates with praise for their profession and quoted, "all
intellectual struggles of modern times have been waged in millions of
newspaper columns." In passing remarks Ulbricht strongly supported the
Vietnamese struggle, but most of his speech was devoted to Germany.
25X1C10b
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 25X1C10b
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1072 FE. JAPAN'S ROLE IN ASIA
AND THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS
25X1C10b
SITUATION: On 6 December 1966, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) is
scheduled to hold its biannual conference, the outcome of which can have
a strong bearing on the continued life of Prime Minister Sato's moderate
free-world oriented government. (General elections in Japan will be held
in 1967). With 145 seats in the Diet's (parliament) powerful lower house
the JSP has functioned as the core of the opposition to Sato's ruling
Liberal Democratic Party's 283 member majority but the effectiveness of
the JSP has from the beginning been severely corroded by factionalism.
At the JSP's January 1966 national conventiop an unusually severe
confrontation between the ruling extreme left wing factions under Sasaki
Kozo and the moderate factions under a number of leaders.united the mod-
erates in an uneasy truce which has survived despite intense personal and
ideological frictions. Should the truce be continued in the hope of achiev-
ing collective power, the moderates could unhorse the hard-line Marxist
Sasaki despite his advantage of being an "in"' working against him also
is the problem of divisions among his backers although he was elected party
chairman at the convention despite this problem.
At the moment the best hope for the moderate element appears to be a
group of younger, bright JSP Diet members who have wearied of the role of
perpetual opposition party. These men, having acquired a taste for power
through the labor unions which support the JSP and which provided their
original springboard for election to the Diet, now want to: help rule the
country. They are believed ready to take up the cudgels within the JSP
for a form of peaceful coexistence (as opposed to the hard-liners' pro-
Peking position); for the development of a Japanese defense force and some
defense relationship with the U.S. (as opposed to the hard-liners' position
of "unarmed neutrality" and total antagonism to Japan-U.S. defense arrang-
ments); and for maneuvering independently of the Japan Communist Party (JCP)
(as opposed to the hard-liners' enthusiasm for joint action with the JCP).
The moderates in the JSP are still Marxist-oriented, but their desire
to wield significant power as a functioning part of the Japanese Govern-
ment has forced the realization that they must accommodate to the new look
in Japan to which Sato's government contributes - prosperity, trade expan-
sion, participation in international affairs, and a growing awareness of
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purely Asian wants. Japan will probably continue on this course as
long as her booming prosperity cont.nues', but Sat,Y's government could
undoubtedly enlarge the scope of itt internationaL participation if
the JSP moderates can get taemselveb into a positLon to support the
government rather than oppose it.
The moderates' chances depend .n great part!rn the nature of their
support from Sohyo, Japan's molt porerful trade d)nfederation*, which
furnishes most of the JSP finds, supplies most of its street demonstra-
tors and half of its membership, and in.1963 decried the election of
about one third of the JSP's 11l5 Diet representa ives, Sohyo was born
in 1950 when the country was still buffering the'anavoidably hungry, sour
aftermath of defeat and surrender. 'Despite the ast benevolent occupa-
tion in man's history, Japan proved ready soil fd the growth of commu-
nist elements and less than a year after; its organization Sohyo was un-
compromisingly Marxist-orie ted and'heaVily communist-penetrated. Sohyo's
stormy history has reflected Japan'e economic proress, and has see-sawed.
back and forth between the extremism of its Marxist-inspired beginnings
and the moderation brought about by Japan's phencnenal_ economic growth.
In the early'60's Sohyo's leadership began to doubt the wisdom of support-
ing the JCP; it cut off close relat.ons and join political action with
the JCP and moved towards t::~e JSP. ;Except for a brief flurry among the
extremist elements of Sohyo in 1961+-65 (brought :i by an economic reces-
sion, rising prices and the Vietnam; war) Sohyo's Leadership appears to
have concluded that the unions are better off cor:;entrating on economic
rather than political issues. This!trend was refrLected in Sohyo's action
program for 1966 which is heavily weighted towar4a the economic side and
urges cooperation with moderate unions during we struggles." Inter-
nationally, Sohyo has adopted "positive neutralit,r" as its program and
increasing numbers of its affiliateb areejoiningpthe ICFTU** rather than
the WFTU***; some affiliates have also joined apolitical western-oriented.
international trade secretariats subh as the Intd_-national Metal Workers
Federation, the Japanese branch of which; numbers?00,000 members.
Other significant political fo~ces,in Japan re the Soka Gakkai
and Domei, Japan's second largest labor'confederation. Domei was formed
when Japan's post war miseries were(a hazy memory and Japan""s burgeoning
and healthy economy influenced its development tc~:,rards domestic moderation
and international expansion. Domeilhas affiliatd.i with international trade
secretariats and free trade unions all aver the arld widening the horizons
of Japan's labor movement and encouraging activekrelations with labor or-
ganizations abroad. Although Domei'is half Sohyo's size, it is growing
much faster despite its fig:nt againtt further uni$ fication of the Japanese
labor movement. This fight is partly based on Dc~nei's fear of being over-
whelmed by Sohyo. Although Domei generally avoiq:3 political action in
*General Council of Trade Unions in Japan; x+,200)00 members.
**International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (the free world inter-
national labor organization)
***World Federation of Trade Unions(internationdl_ communist front labor
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favor of economic initiatives, it does support the Democratic Socialist
Party which broke away from the JSP in 1960. Domei has gone so far as
to furnish medical supplies and clothing to South Vietnam not because
it supports the west's position in. Vietnam but because it is more criti-
cal of communist subversion in Vietnam than of U.S. military activities.
It appears that if Japan's economy remains healthy, Domei will continue
to be a friend of the free world.
Soka.Gakkai, the much-publicized militant lay Buddhist organization
of Japan has risen from obscurity to national political prominence in
Japan over the past decade. Its religious intolerance, its authoritarian
structure, and its assertion that the world's problems-can be solved if
everyone embraces its branch of Buddhism (the orthodox Nichiren dogma),
are expected to limit its eventual appeal, and its growth rate has slowed
up since 19.59. Soka Gakkai has a young and vigorous leadership which has
recognized"that political and economic factors are paramount with the
majority of the populations of technically advanced nations like Japan;
in 196+ this leadership established a full-fledged political party, the
Komeito (Clean Government Party), which has addressed itself to those
political and economic factors. Komeito won 13.7% of the votes (over
five million) for the House of Councillors (the Upper House of the Japan-
ese Diet) in the July 1965 elections, and for the first time will field
candidates in forthcoming elections for the House of Representatives (the
important Lower House). All political observers, including the rival
parties, concede that Komeito will enter the Lower House; if it displaces
the middle-of-the-road Democratic Socialist Party for third place there,
as it has already done in the Upper House, Komeito will command the swing
vote in the Diet. Despite its exaggerated claims to membership and the
decline in its growth rate, the Soka Gakkai is a major political factor
with which both conservatives and leftists must reckon since it can bar-
gain for concessions by offering its support to one side or the other. 25X1C10 b
It is generally characterized by political observers as an enigmatic,
troublesome object in the Japanese body politic.
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1073 WH. THE LATIN AMERICAN
FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION -- LAFTA
25X1ClOb
SITUATION: Why Economic Integration? The need for economic inte-
gration was first formally proclaimed by the United Nations Commission
for Latin America in 1949, although it had been the dream of a few far-
sighted Latin Americans since the days of Simon Bolivar. However, the
absolute necessity of it became increasingly evident after the middle
of the 1950's, when per capita income began to fall as a consequence of
the explosive population growth rate which surpassed the economic growth
rate. Also during the late 1950's, Latin America's export revenue began
to drop alarmingly as a result of falling commodity prices. Another com-
pelling reason was the creation of vast trading areas elsewhere in the
world --+ the,Communist bloc, the European Economic Community (EEC), the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) -- which forced small, independent markets
outside these agglomerations to unite into new economic blocs or face con-
tinuously weakening trading positions. The success of the EEC undoubtedly
also had a profound influence on Latin statesmen. Although there are
obvious, wide differences between Europe and Latin America, the concrete
example of an integrating regional market showed that uniting independent
economies was a practical possibility. The final and conclusive reason
for embarking on economic integration was that there was really no alterna-
tive: continuing the status quo ante could only have led to growing
poverty, famine, and revolution.
The fundamental reason for the continent's having arrived at this
state was a series of tariff barriers erected around the separate coun-
tries of Latin America which frequently reached 300%. These barriers had
grown for several reasons. The countries of South America have tradition-
ally had only limited relations among themselves due partly to the geogra-
phy of the continent -- divided by the Andes mountains and the vast un-
developed Amazon basis -- and due also to the heritage of the ancient
Spanish colonial empire which (because of Madrid's suspicions against her
ambitious Governors and Viceroys) had been based on direct dealings be-
tween the separate colonies and Spain, with little inter-relation between
the colonies. Added to this, foreign currency shortages had tended to
foster the local manufacture of goods which couldn't be brought abroad.
Tariff barriers also s=erved to foster development of "prestige" industries:
"every self-respecting country should have a steel industry." Another con-
tributing factor was the oligarchical.nature of most Latin American indus-
try; which had no desire to face foreign competition and which had the
political power to limit or prevent competition by imposing tariffs.
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The result was high cost production; andithe unnecessary burden
increased as foreign manufacture ?s were able too reduce their prices as
a result of larger and larger scale production. The relatively small
size of the national markets of the Latin American countries simply
does not permit separate production on an economical scale in today's
wor 1Ld .
The CACM and LAFTA
The states of Central Ameriba realized the necessity of economic
union as early as 1958, when a Mlultilateral T4eaty on Free Trade and
Central American Economic Integration was signed; this subsequently
developed into the Central American Common Market (CACM), which was
discussed in EPG Item #1319, of 9 May. 1966.
In 1960, seven countries of:South Americo agreed to work toward
the creation of a free trade area as a means df speeding their economic
development. Their efforts resulted in the Treaty of Montevideo which
created a new organization, the Latin Americar# Free Trade Association
(LAFTA). Its goal is the creation of a broads multinational market
which would encourage investment; in new industry, provide jobs for
their rapidly expanding :populations,and introduce the benefits of
industrial specialization and mass productions The treaty was ratified
in 1961 by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, l araguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Colombia and Ecuador. In 1966 Vbnezuela also decided to join, and
Bolivia is considering joining. ` The treaty envisaged the' gi-adual elimi-
nation of internal tariffs (that: is, tariffs between the member nations)
over a:12 year period. J
Since its inception LAFTA has made significant gains. Through a
series of annual bargaining sessions, tariffs~on more than 9,000 prod-
ucts,have been reduced or eliminated. Intra-LAFTA trade has increased
about 120 percent, although such trade represdots only about 1.2 percent
(up from 7 percent in 1961) of the total intea}national trade of the
area.
The process of tariff reduction has provgd to be difficult. So
disparate are the tariff structures of the member nations that across-
the-board reductions have been impossible, this necessitating tedious
multi-lateral negotiations on individual item. And the negotiations
have steadily grown more difficult as the readily-eliminated tariffs
have been taken care of and the discussions mdYve onto tougher items.
Progress in 1965, after only minimal concessions in 1963 and 1961+, was
heartening. The most recent negotiating sess4on convened in Montevideo
on 21+ October 1966. It is expected to last until 2 December and will
be followed by a meeting of the 'foreign ministers of the LAFTA nations,
who are supposed to ratify a new.. economic into?ration schedule and work
out a general agreement on transportation, tho pooling of human resources,
and the use of arbitration in trade disputes.1
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Beyond LAFTA
Although LAFTA has made significant gains, Latin American leaders
have indicated a growing realization that Latin America needs more than
just a free trade area, and the goal which is now being discussed is a
Latin American Common Market, the chief additional features of which
might be automatic tariff reductions, common external tariffs and co-
ordinated domestic economic policies. Also being studied are various
multi-national development projects within the area, designed to con-
tribute to true economic integration. The projects would include such
undertakings as development of the major river basins for flood control,
irrigation, and power, the building of major road links to open up
isolated areas and to provide transportation between the various coun-
tries, and the improvement of communications systems. The LA Common
Market envisages the eventual union of LAFTA and the CACM.
These plans were the outgrowth of an appeal by President Eduardo
Frei of Chile to four of Latin America's most distinguished economists
in January 1965 for ideas to hasten economic development in the continent.
The result was a report sent by the four economists to the presidents of
all Latin American countries in April 1965 entitled "Proposals for the
Creation of a Latin American Common Market." The report was subsequently
endorsed by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress
(CIAP) in a report prepared by that group in August 1965 for the presidents
of the AFP countries. Economic integration was given a further boost at
a meeting of some 400 business leaders from Latin America and the United
States in Mexico City in June 1966. The meeting, sponsored by the Inter-
American Council for Commer3e and Production, adopted a resolution pledg-
ing the businessmen to work closely with their governments in furthering
and hastening the work of LAFTA. In August 1966, high-level representa-
tives of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela met in Bogota,
Colombia to discuss possible steps for greater economic cooperation.
Among the cardinal points of "The Declaration of Bogota," as the conclus-
ions of the meeting were titled, was an outline of steps to be taken to
reinforce the structure of LAFTA and to move it toward eventual union
with the CACM to form a Common Market for all Latin America. Equal stress
was given to economic integration by President Johnson in a speech com-
memorating the fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress on 17 August
1966. Mentioning the forthcoming meeting of the presidents of the American
republics, President Johnson stated that the first item on the agenda will
be economic integration of Latin America. 25X1 C1 Ob
An unclassified attachment to this guidance describes the development
of LAFTA in more detail.
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 7 November 1966
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25X1C10b
SITUATION: Far from being immune from youth problems, Soviet leaders
are Faced with a wide range of attitudes and problems which have lingered
and grown as, insufficient attention was paid to remedying them. Soviet
propaganda is striking hard at the Red Guards, evidently hoping to convince
their own youth that conditions in the USSR are favorable. Soviet youth,
in their present disaffected mood, are unlikely to be convinced by mere
rhetoric. Nor do there appear to be other easy methods open to the Soviets
to cope with their youth problems. Probably to be on the safe side, the
Soviets have recently tightened up their legal and police machinery in
order to stem the more radical manifestations of disaffection amongst their
youth.
The Red Guard Movement in Communist China is in all major respects
radically different from youth organizations in the USSR and the East Euro-
pean satellites. The 8 to 12-million strong Red Guards were brought into
being independent of all prior existing organizations; amongst the youth
of the Soviet Bloc there has been no new officially sponsored organization
or movement. The CPC-sponsored Young Communist League with 40 million
members has played no observable role in Mao's "cultural revolution;" the
USSR's Komsomol,* also an adjunct of the CP, continues to act as spokesman
and guiding spirit not only for its 23 million members but for all Soviet
youth. The Red Guards' activities, as described-in BPG item #1070, are
militantly opposed to vestiges of the past and appear to be taking sides
in the ChiComs' current political struggle. On the other hand, the of-
ficial Soviet youth activities aim to stimulate reverence for the older
generation and unqualified support for the CPSU.
Probably the leading medium in the Soviets' assault on the Chicom
Red Guards is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA (KOMSOMOL TRUTH), the official newspaper
of the Komsomol. The pages of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA have been crammed with
*sometimes referred to as the Young Communist League (YCL) or the Commu-
nist Youth League.
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articles falling into 3 categories: a series or4 Red Guard activities
or tactics such as "big character" posters and the "black .-List" of
enemies of Mao; quotations from the Chicom Press, usually without com-
ment; and observations by :COMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reporters of typical
events. One obvious aim of the articles is to ridicule the Red Guards
and the "cultural revolution." Implicit in KOM)MOLSKAYA PRAVDA's treat-
ment of the Red Guards is an exhortation to SovTh t youth to realize that
they live well and have a 'bright future: in the USSR, not only relative
to the situation in Communist China but also wht:i compared with the
Stalin era. 11
This opinion-shaping effort dovetails neat]4r with KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA's year-old campaign to stress the patriotic education of Soviet
youth. Pavlov, chief of the Komsomol, has sparl:~d this effort, aimed
largely at getting the youth to appreciate the dLder generation for its
contributions to economic development and theirLaartime achievements. i
(One method is to get Komsomol units to. build or{restore monuments to
war heroes). In addition, the Red'Army and the~jolice have joined forces
with the Komsomol in an effort to steer: Soviet y9Duth away from foreign
and liberal influences.
No matter how hard or skillfully KOMSOMOLSI4'1YA PRAVDA uses the Red
Guard developments, however, Soviet youth is most, unlikely to respond
favorably to the regime;'s suggestions. For in tae USSR, as in, several
Satellite countries, there is long-&.ccumulating e0.ridence that the negative
attitudes of today's youth pose an`.enorinous barr.er between them and the
wielders of power and control. Among the prevalllant attitudes are distrust,
boredom, indifference, and self-indulgence. Thel causes of these attitudes
include: the contradictions between the lofty-sl)unding communist principles
preached in school and by the Komsomol and the J-~pths to which. communist
reality has actually sunk; unresolved conflicts [:)etween generations (see
attached gist of magazine story); the stifling chntrols imposed on youth,
especially through the Komsomol which is dominat[2d by a small group of
CP-appointed officials; the continuing shortages of quality consumer
goods; the restriction in openingsfo:r advanceme~it in political, economic,
scientific and military spheres indicated by theN rising average age of top
Soviet officials; the effects of the double graCating class from inter-
mediate schools in 1966 (viz., the sharp reductij)n of the percentage of
graduates going on to higher educational irstitu:ions and the high per-
centage of graduates who are unemployed or underemployed: see BPG item
#1018, "Employment Problems in the USSR"); the *decisiveness pervading
Soviet society because of the present leaders' slowness in resolving ques-
tions of political and economic policy; the regijie's attempts to insulate
Soviet youth from Western contacts.and influence(;; and the throttling of
free expression, as most starkly evidenced by the Sinyavsky-Daniel case.
Indeed, the oppressive intellectual environment 1uid the inept efforts of
the Soviet leadership to control Soviet youth ha4~ led some groups in the
USSR to express their disenchantment. The SMOG 1,initials for "Youngest
Society of Geniuses" and for the mmtto of the sok:iety: Boldness, Thought,
Image, Profundity) has been mentioned widely in t:he Western press, and its
2 '
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rejection of Soviet society has been discussed openly by Valery Tarsis.
In addition, University of Leningrad students have published a secret
journal, "Kolokol" (The Bell), which is a clear indication that some
Soviet youths prefer to pattern their philosophy after that of Alexander
Herzen, the emigre radical who smuggled the original radical "Kolokol"
into Russia in the mid-1800's.
The severity of the USSR's youth problems is clear from the speeches
of Komsomol boss Pavlov (see attached) and the contents of KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA. Although they make feeble efforts to blame bourgeois propaganda
and foreign influences for the unsatisfactory state of Soviet youth, the
Komsomol leaders paint such a broad array of grinding problems that it
is evident that the disaffection has roots in the Soviet environment.
The Soviets' prospects for solving their youth problems appear to
be slight. The Komsomol cannot be counted on because it is not re-
spected, due to overdoses of control and a failure to stimulate its mem-
bers. (As far back as 1958 Khrushchev addressed himself to the frequent
complaint that young people were bored in the Komsomol.) The main meas-
ures undertaken recently by the Soviets are in the field of detecting
and treating crime and hooliganism,* as decreed in July 1966. A sub-
sequent decree of 16 September has added three new crimes: spreading
deliberately false fabrications harmful to the state and social order;
defacing the national emblem or flag; and the organization or participa-
tion in group actions which violate the public order. (See accompanying
BN). Thus, Soviet legal measures not only tend to bear out the existence
of severe youth problems on a wide scale, but also reveal that the Sov -l C10 b
regime's response is increasingly negative.
*In Soviet parlance hooliganism is a catch-all term extensively used to
cover a multitude of violations against the Soviet-defined social order:
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25X1C10b
Reference
Fisher, Ralph T. Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth[ A Study of the Congresses
of the Komsomol, 1918-51+, Columba University ress, New York, 1959.
I
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w j (1074.)
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CPYRGHT
cJe 1966
Ei ~cic c~r7c:, ~r,! Vilrc'li s 9 ce Set~ei,,i,) re
7
h 'I 1 1 r7ia(i hl53r'TZ
E
La cornisi6n, que presidia. el Dr.. Gustavo H. Machado
resolvio favorcblernente 218 cases con Bs. 1.476.000
El i\1inistro dci Interior, Gonzalo Barrlns, ell', Jos nicmhros de la cotnislon: Pablo IYerrera Cam-
pins, Gustavo 11. Machado, Maria Eugenia de Ailvarcz y Coronet Jesus 14Laria Leon, qulen
rcliresent6 at General Carlos Soto Tamayo. (Foto Bottaro)..
Ll Ministro del interior, doctor
Gonzalo Barrios, almorz6 ayer con
los miembros de la comision que
hlzo use del dinero incautado a
Beltramifsi en favor de families
damnificadas por el terrorisino Po.
lilico.
F'ue caste un agasajo y un reco-
nocimiento a la actividad desarrn-
l ada por la comision, que actuh
con caracter adhonorem y estuvo
integrada por las siguientes perso-
nas: Dr. Gustavo Ii. Machado,
quien la presidi6; General Carlos
Solo ] atn: yo, Dori,,. Maria Euge-
nia%lvaroz, Dr. Pablo Herrera
Campins y Dr, ls'nrique Padilla
Ron.
i?;n el almurrzo estuvieron pre-
srnt t, mbien el coronel Jesus
aria L m, en represenl.aci6n del
General C