WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES

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CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9
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RIPPUB
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S
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79
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December 19, 2016
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August 14, 2000
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6
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Publication Date: 
January 1, 1968
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REPORT
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Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 (PLACE FORM 490 HERE) OFFICIAL RECORD COPY The attached document (s) must be safeguarded. It is the Agency's Official Historical Record and must be preserved in accordance with the Federal Records Act of 1950. For additional information, call the Chief, CIA Archives and Records Center, extension 2468. E T ELYRDO~f$Tc6Bs1 E4olOoolib1f CIA ARCHIVES AND RECORDS CENTER Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 NEW YORK TIME roved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 12 December RUSSIAN nlii~~~ tonight that a Russian was shot! Pilot Was a Captain planes. When the first planes down late last week by royalist These documents were re- ',were seen, partly assembled, at r ~j ~} ~t 11 r V ~j tribes a few miles north of the Sana airport on Nov. 20, D~ 1I N ttL h1r~~1J Sana, the Yemeni capital. He ported to show that the pilot! there was no evidence that So- was reported when was a Soviet Force captain. viet pilots were also on hand. Ported to have died His name was not given. There was no immediate indi- 'his plane crashed. From this and other reports, Intelligence reports indicate cation of the size of the Soviet rofficials here have concluded ~U.S. Gets Reports Soviet that he had* been on a bombin contingent. But American offi- and strafing mission anains his as ahat some airmen are serving cials put the total number of Pilots Aid Republicans Ro alist sitions when combat pilots for !,shipment ; :,Soviet military advisers and MI y t d h yht fi - - - - own. o er. was s L --o~r?,????? ???? ?? .c.uc.. , iau --- WAbtl,~lVlt.,tVl`~r UeC. 1l..--lne~ ,have been inspected by Royal- no known qualified pilots for i;United States has received reli- fists and European mercenaries ' these jets. able reports that Soviet pilots fighting with them, some of : Diplomatic reports from Ye- ?have been flying combat mis- whom read Russian. According men last month indicated that sions for the republican Gov- to reports from Yemen, the the Soviet Union had promised ernment of Yemen in recent pilot carried Sovietidentifica- to send the Yemen Government fighting there. 'don papers, maps and other 24 MIG-19's and about 40 tech- t` ..American officials reported documentation in Russian. nicians to help assemble the 'Egyptian planes to hold the royalists at bay in the coun- t.iy.'S five - year - old civil war. Uut' this support was removed when the United Arab Republic agreed in late September to .:pull its forces out of Yemen. NEW YORK TIMES lii December 196 Soviet Airlift Said to Aid Yemeni ~4e, ubli cans ,rourth the number of flights Eurfopean mercenaries have tian contingent is reported to By HEDRICK SMITH in the Soviet military airlift seen Russian maps, documents be imminent. 6Declel to The New York Times to Egypt after the Arab-Israeli and other markings identifying The United States and Brit- WASHINGTON, Dec. 14 -war. But for Yemen and the him as a Soviet Air Force cap- tin, which regard Yemen of The Soviet Union has uietl modest scale of Its five-year-old tain. Western diplomats believe little strategic value, are puz- q y that ossibl a dozen Soviet zled by Moscow's eagerness to carried o out supplyy the emergency embattled led"maa,ssive effort effort and a not consider it In. a combat pilots are flying for the replace Cairo as the political lift t significant Soviet commitment republican regime. patron of the Yemeni Republic, ement republican regime with "For , especially while it is so weak to the survival of the Yemeni all intentc and purposes politically and militarily. military aid; Western diplo-Republic. you could say there is a Rus- American officials speculate matic sources reported today. The Soviet decision to pro- scan MIG squadron operating that the Russians, if successful These sources regarded the vide the Yemeni regime with in Yemen," said one well-in- e re- Soviet support, which has in-military aid first came to light formed analyst. "The markings publican regime, Intend d th to use Soviet the use of Soviet Air in late November when some on the planes are Yemeni. But Yemen regim me, as a base for mounting Force pilots for combat raids, partly assembled MIG-19's were the planes are Russian-built subversion in East Africa and as a major factor in tipping the seen at the airfield near Sana, and supplied, the ground crews other parts of the Arabian Pen- balance, at least ternporarily,!the Yemeni capital. But not un- are Russians, and most of the insula. Somalia and Ethiopia lie in favor of th bl:... ..~-...-r ... - . ' th i1oth s b R ians 11 __ t e repu e p em e uss xtent of o li t the roya s s ho seek to over- throw it. Diplomatic sources said there were 75 to 100 flights of So- viet AN-12 transports and Ilyushin-28 bombers, apparently serving as transport planes, into Yemen In the last three weeks. They have been carrying MIG fighters, crews, techni- cians, bombs and other muni- tions, and ground equipment, diplomatic sources reported. At least 24 MIG-19 fighter-bomb-, ers have been included in the shipments, according to these reports. Diplomatic sources describeItions a few miles outside Sana. the airlift as approximately one-1 neyUt is 1A U111 l e,llct, ",tltintc Sea from ,Yemen. that the air attacks have in- flicted ~_._...._ ~Y severe casualties on royalist forces and have slowed the momentum of their drive to capture Sana. For five years the republic was propped up by the presence of Egyptian troops, -which num= bered 70,000 at their peak in. late 1965. But President Gamel Abdel Nasser has withdrawn all but a few hundred Egyptian soldiers under an agreement with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who `has armed and financed the royalists. The departure of the final Egyp- Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 1 P o G-19 fighter-bombers hur- ;technicians in Yemen at about plane, a Soviet-built MIG riedly sent to Yemen in Novem_ 5O men. Soviet support to the Yemeni Republic become known. . Western analysts now esti- mate that Soviet transports, reaching Yemen after flights over Egypt, have. ferried about 10,000 tons of equipment to Yemen. Because royalist forces have been closing in on Sana, most of the flights have been to the airfield at Hodeida, the Soviet-built port on the Red Sea. At least one Russian pilot been shot down during a straf- ing raid against royalist posi- Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 THE EVENING STAR 6 December 1967 ,-s , Soviet Presence in. Mideast Growing Wa i sAftermath ~n i-eueirauon By ANDREW BOROWIEC P situation from the Russians Foreign Correspondent of The Star , Israeli intelligence sources in Republican Yemen. g themselves. Those rare Soviet, But there are persistent re- B E I R UT -0 a the western, discern four stages in Russia's diplomats willing to engage in a ports of new arrivals of Soviet bank of the Suez Canal, Soviet penetration of the Arab World: discussion with a Western re- officers in the Republican capi- military experts man Egyptian 1. Passive military and econ- porter speak of the need for ltal of San's, while the Jenad army missiles pointed toward Is-1lomic aid which began with the { peace and withdrawal of "Is- airbase, some 12 miles east of raell positions. arms agreement with Egypt in 1 rael the aggressor" from the Taiz, is now reportedly staffed Between 40 and 50 Soviet war-:' 1955. occupied territories. by Russians. ships criss-cross the Mediterra 2. The encouragement of Arab Obviously, .they do not talk of There are also reports Soviet neon, until recently almost a pri- neutralism to undermine the tra- any Arab concessions. agents have uistributcd money vate preserve of the U.S. 6th ditional links of Arab states with it would seem logical that and some 10,000 rifles to Yemeni Fleet. the West. Russia wants peace in the Mid- tribesmen around San'a to win en- de Creation of stron 3 bli R h p g . can cause. epu em to the die East. Yet it is difficult to t And in the craggy 8ashid Mountains of Yemen, Soviet dente on Russia in the military reconcile this with the massive While the Mediterranean is no distribute silver coins field and through economic pro- arms shi ments to the "revolu- longer a private American lake t p s agen and rifles to Royalist tribesmen jects such as Egypt's Aswan tionary" Arab countries and the and Soviet arms have become High Dam d S l th bi f th h ousan e . or . presence of severa g- e. o- standard equipment in t to buy their allegiance Re ublican. regime. . Strengthening of ideological viet advisers in Arab armies. p gesf Arab armies, much of the left win i th various Six months after the So? links w g One explanation for the influx Middle East is still largely out- viet-hacked Arab armies were political parties in the Arab of military experts is that Rus- side Soviet influence. the Soviet world. sia wants sole control of the Such oil- roducing countries Israel d b f t d p , y ea e e resence in the Arab world con- Militarily, Egypt, Syria and more sophisticated weapons, as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are . p tinues to make a steady pro- Iraq in the Middle East proper, such as the Luna ballistic mis- strongly pro-Western-either by th Afric N i i or a n a, siles installed in the Suez Zone. inclination or by nature of theiti gross. Even pro-Western King and Alger like It Iran Sh th , aa of ? ..__t e w Moscow and , a pro-American bastion on Since the June defeat, Russia -?", the; violations of the cease-fire. all Arab countries have to pay a fringes of the Middle East, has ! s believed to have restored en- The Russians, obviously, are least lip service to Nasser's sia tirel 5 ria s military pateatfal announced he plans to buy arms' Y Y not interested in seeing their gars, of revenge against Israel. from Russia. and replenished 80 percent of material smashed again. An Arab statesman can hardly R Algeria and t s arsenal E k i i t t i h i . gyp It is o ma nteres r ssue n the is e compo mise on t Defender's Role Iraq did not suffer much in the sure that the Arab armies re- regardlress of his interest and A year, the Russian bear was hostilities. semble somewhat their more so- allegiances. These measures were not nee- t E uropean coun- still cautiously eyeing the sands phisticated Eas essarii taken because Russia and oilfields of the D4iddle East. Y terparts. Russia is deeply involved believes in the inevitability of a Hence the Soviet Union in ef- Toda y in Middle Eastern politics and, }new conflict in the Middle East feet imposed on Egypt's presi- or feels that another clash would to a great extent, can influence ~ dent Gamal Abdel Nasser a any future conflict between Is- foster its aims. But to the seeth- par-reaching reform of the cad- reel and the Arabs. ,ing and frustrated Arab coup- res now supervised by between The fiercely independent Arabs tries sending arms was the only four and six Soviet generals. the hour of neeussia s To boost Egyptian morale and have accepted a partnership s y of demonstr with Soviet Russia for lack of a possibly deter more daring Is better, more powerful ally. On Bitterness Felt raei attacks, Soviet warships the international. scene, Russia visit the klgyptian ports of Alex has emerged as the defender of That also does not mean that andria and Port Said almost the Arabs while the United the Arabs are satisfied with the continuously... States is becoming more and degree of Soviet backing. There more Identified with Israel. was a great deal of bitterness in Boosting Nasser Saviet aims in the complicat the Arab world when Russia failed to rush to the Arab side at In the diplomatic field, the ed, risky, frustrating and den- the time of defeat. Kremlin has ?appointed Serge gerous Middle Eastern political Angry Soviet speeches at the Vinogradov, one of its top dip-; game can be summed up as fol- United Nations, the breaking of Iro. There saon doubt tha~Viilao lows: diplomatic relations with Israel Russia does not need Middle and the subsequent airlift of gradov has some influence on Eastern oil but wants to make it arms have somewhat alleviated{ Nasser. But whether or not he difficult for the West to get it. can keep Nasser permanently Apparently it does not want a this feeling. Nevertheless more sophisticat- "on the leash" is still a ques- major war ob e . ever the Its to maain- n- ed Arab leaders are convinced tion. problem. Yet it roasts that there is a limit to Soviet The Egyptian disengagement n to ly In the so-called progres- its inff mluence, friendshi while the believe in Yemen after a futile four-year not o Ar b ries b t in the e that the United States would not war apparently prompted more whoile Arab area as pa aun crt t of of its n t hesitate to help Israel all the Soviet interest in that part of wh a its global way if it were really menaced. the Arab world. It is not clear power politics. ,It is. difficult to obtain an yet to wht extent the Russians Approved For Release 2005/04/2 want to replace the Egyptian l 1 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs (17 November to 12 December 1967) 1. Exactly three weeks after the anniversary of the Soviet Revolu- tion, the CPStJ and 17 other Communist Parties announced agreement to hold a "consultative meeting in February 1968 for a collective exchange of opinion concerning the convocation of an international meeting of Communist and workers' parties" and they called upon all fraternal parties to support the initiative and to take part in it. The communi- que named 18 parties which attended the consultative meeting in Moscow in March 1965 and which held bilateral consultations on the new move. Of course, there was no mention of the fact that 26 parties had been invited in 1965 (they were originally the members of the "drafting committee" for the 1960 81-party conference) and that seven (Rumania, Albania, and the Far East) parties had boycotted that meeting. Nor was mention made of Cuba, which participated in the 1965 meeting. 1~ The communique stated the objectives of the international meeting as strengthening the unity of the Communist movement" and "rallying all socialist, democratic forces ... against imperialism, for national and social liberation ... and for world peace." A front-page Pravda editorial on the 28th disavowed any attempt at interference in the internal affairs of, or the excommunication of, any other party. Re- action by other Communist media followed the pre-announcement pattern with endorsement by a considerable number of those claimed by the Soviets as supporting the move, no mention by Rumania, objection by Yugoslavia, and denunciation by China and Albania. 2. The Rumanians continue to play the role of maverick in inter- national and internal affairs. Further strains in Rumanian-Soviet rela- tions became evident as the Rumanian Party refused to yield to intense Soviet pressure to associate itself with the call for an international Communist conference. Shortly after, it was leaked to correspondents in Bucharest that Soviet-Rumanian talks on renewing their 1948 twenty- year bilateral friendship and mutual assistance treaty (which expires in February) had broken down over Moscow's refusal to agree to changes in the wording of the old treaty, especially in its references to the menace of West Germany and its requirement for mutual consultations on important foreign policy questions. After a series of apparently unsuccessful lower-level bilateral talks between the two, a strong Rumanian delegation headed by Ceausescu departed for Moscow on 12 December, apparently to attempt to salvage some sort of agreement on the many points at issue. Within Rumania, meanwhile, the party held its first National Conference since 1945. During that conference Secretary General Ceausescu implicitly rebuked the Soviet Union for breaking a number of economic agreements in efforts to influence Rumanian policies. During the conference he also "yielded" to a "unanimous re- quest" that he take over the top government position, President of the State Council, along with his party post. This was part of a broad Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 program of measures aimed to fuse power between the Party and Govern- ment, r1confirmed" immediately afterward by a meeting of the Grand Na- tional Assembly. Observers saw two objectives behind the move: central- ization of political power to counterbalance recent decentralization of control of the economy; and increased stature for Ceausescu in his inter- national role. 3. Serious internal dissension is evident in recent developments in Czechoslovakia and the USSR, while the conflict in China continues to spread, despite Peking's "moderation" line. Against a background of steady deterioration of the Czech economy and stirred by the courageous stand of a large group of intellectuals against regime policies-at the Prague Writers Congress in June and the student riots in October, gen- eral dissatisfaction with the Party-State leadership has reportedly be- come widespread within the power structure as well as among the public. Observers had predicted top-level personnel changes at a Central Commit- tee plenum scheduled to convene on 13 December, and speculation was heightened when Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev made an unexpected visit, obviously hastily arranged, to Prague on 8-9 December. A last-minute postponement of the plenum for a week seemed to confirm the forecasts of serious troubles. Meanwhile, dissident intellectuals in Moscow told reporters that secret trials were scheduled to begin 11 December against Ginzburg, Galanskov and several other young writers who had been held incommun- icado since January, presumably for emulating and defending the cele- brated martyrs Sinyavsky and Daniel. They described petitions on be- half of these writers which had been signed by large numbers of Soviet intellectuals of various professions during the past year. Also, the publication in Paris of a collection of Ukrainian manuscripts smuggled out of that largest of the non-Russian republics of the USSR revealed widespread intellectual dissidence in the Ukraine which is further in- tensified by a strong nationalistic resentment against Moscow's rule. (Latest reports indicate that the Moscow trials did not start on 11 December, but no further details are known.) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 HINDUSTAN TI 41 Decflvf 16, , 'm- -a t M''e"' d d le' d. Indian s ec- on From Krlshan Bhatla Hindustan Times Correspondent Washington, Dec. 3-Shouting ?Spy" Is a game that two can . When questioned about al- flay eged revelations made by. Mr John Smith, a former U.S. Em. `bassy employee who has defect- ed to the Soviet Union. U.S. au- thorities suggest that Mr Smith's 'statement recklessly hurling espionage charges against the U.S. Is indeed a hurriedly con. trived device on the part of the Soviet Government to draw the attention away from the disclo. sures made some weeks ago by ;a Soviet agent. Mr Y. N. Loxti nov. Mr Loginov. described as a %WkINDUSTAN TIMES '1 December 1967 K.G.B. agent, was, arrested . In South Africa and, ccording to reports appearing in several European and American news- papers, he has furnished a fairly detailed account of Soviet opera. tions in India, especially the So- viet effort to interfere with the last general elections. Mr Loginov has described how a high-ranking K.G.S. officer, whose real name was Mr Lyudin, was sent last year as a political counsellor in the Soviet Embassy' In Delhi where. under the assumed, name of Mr Yuri Modin, he organized Soviet Union's "election campaign" in Ir la Mr Loginov has reonrt???ily mentioned many Soviet and In- That Moscow meddled in the Indian elections was confirmed by the Indian Government's own in- quiries. Authorities here tend to measure every Indian attitude towards the U.S. against the In. dian attitude in similar circum. stances towards the Soviet Union. Consequently they are upset that the alleged disclosures by a for- mer American Embassy clerk should receive so much attention in India, while attacks on the Indian Government and leaders by "Radio Peace and. Progress" of Moscow and other Soviet ac. tivities such as attemnts to In. flu-nee the Thai-in elect'on have gent. virt-ally unnot'ced. IB to work for Russian New Delhi, Nov. news Publicity contract with the Soviet iet news and feature agency Novosti, the Press Information Bureau of the West dtenat to suppress Justified ? Government of India will circa. Its lister ors not to shed too not own direct responsibility for g i late Russian publicity material mane -s over the dismissal of the broadcasts. It told the Gov. protest of workers and people and photographs to Indian news- the OF civernment and with ap. ernment of India that Radio through strikes and demonstra.. papers, a Job hitherto done by ~rropriat references to Maoist Peace and Progress was control for democratic WFTU demands lite,sppec the Information Department of jargon n id revolution could notled by private organizations" dam r ithe Russian Embassy here. a ach :,vcd through the "parlia- l'ke . ovosi, Russian Union of toration democratic i res. The PIB undertaking, which mentarr road." Journalists, Union of Soviet So- and release of all those arrest- ' might be considered unusual at cleties of Friendship and Cul ed.,. Radl- Peace and Progress had trral Relation with Foreign: The message has been circa. The any time, is particularly intrigu- hithe +?> listed Swatontra leaders Countries, All_Union Society of now because Novosti is Rat'is! -ialachari and N. G. Knowledge, Soviet Peace Com- lated to newspapers here by the among the half a dozen Soviet Ranr:, Jan Sangh leader Balraj mitres. Soviet Women's Commit. secretary of the All-India Trade ,agencies responsible for props- Madh ?< and Congress leaders tee and Committee of Soviet Union C:oagress. Qanda tirades against the Gov- j Tike .tr S K. Patel and Mr Youth Organizations. d i . i l ?c nacho r spec a overseas ?_?d rea~it~iffieliedr9w$0(i3'/( l ? : f0flAi4ttD M eon - allst line" of the West. maintain con 1 o e s a Yo Even the Red Chinese atomic arsenal is thing for the future to show. Chinese already being used as an element in a propaganda have considerable influence In Tanzania, a i campaign with strong racial overtones. Red country that leans far more toward socialism ,China's atom bomb, for instance, is termed than toward Western democracy. "the 'colored atomic bomb," implying that it The railroad project is certainly high on is a weapon on the side of colored races of the President Kaunda's priority list. Copper-pro. vt suin Zambia has found itself pressed more o g a;:ld programs in Africa, the Red' program.'?is galls hefmust haveoanlithin resiall to dolwth Y g pureiy destructive, aimed at smashing U164"* Ietlnk order. Rhodesia. But Zambia's best current outlet to s Th s shi -1'r- e `a -J to -Jr backing' Red Chinese causes as they support The' Red deals declared its unilateral independence of t ti h i nen e con sts on t n national . Afri .~Chinfse have latched onto the most vio)ept of Great Britain nearly two years ago would f have.beenthe old way, across Rhodesia. This with the saltl-white movements in Africa,or- tue, South Africa and Rhodesia the prii4ary might have earned vital foreign exchange for targets. Funds collected in the Western VMrld Zambia. tp s sist "African freedom movements' In But, under African nationalist pressure, tthesc countries often help African you s President Kaunda has elected to be the lead. . ittudy in Red China. ing anti-Rhodesian nationalist in his part of the world. This role calls for him to be more ? ceased Portugal concerned about what is happening in Rhode- In Rhodesia and South Africa, numerous sia than about any economic harm his own people, especially those on the government country might be experiencing. So Zambia ;,route for funnelling Chinese-trained guerrillas, tation routes, at what promises to be a high 'into southern Africa. Portugal became so in- price. The proposed rail link is one of the ceased at this activity not long ago that it alternatives. So expensive in this route that temporarily suspended shipments of Zambian the World Bank figures it to be uneconomic. copper over its railroad in Angola as a warn- The rail link could be expensive indeed for tog to the Zambian government. Zambia in political terms, too, It the line be- "Thus, Red China's offer to build the pro- comes a route for bringing Red Guards jected new railroad may be part of a broader Into the country. subversion plan. Whether or not African na- And the Rhodesian rebellion- whether it succeeds or fails, nomic answer to Rhodesia's; plan, that no political develop- export its 70 , as a non unist men it is a proposed la's mile white-ruledinsate.n Ifn it does' uptt iwas t, thatlythe eiZambian world se econd la -Com t produc- perbe from om Zaanzan por perbelt to the Tanzanian ian port not work, it will increase economy was unlikely to be t;on. It was also important to aes Britain, Zambia's biggest cos-I and capital of Dar es Salaam. Black Africa's already sour way system, afford a second that if rail- It is comparable to Aswan feelings about Rhodesia. ways needed to the north would and and. million price tag makes it the Zambia's future leaders east a road off better. third large ~,t, (fores ic~ ppro bout the sfrikllF~R[iR/tt-rP &AUW1?etdrlC"DP78-03061A000400040006-9 LUSAKA, Zambia, Nov. 14, Ghana's Volta River dam-and ey a R olilically --The Tanzam Railway ap? political sensitivity. The West ening when the World Bank hodesia's railways p pears likely to become as im. so far has declined to back it turned thumbs down on the unthinkable, portant a benchmark in AM. and Communist China has idea in 1964 on the grounds An alternative thus became Rhode Zam ca's political and economic de- stepped In with an that s tranexist o through was the a life-and-death rmat er Af lean veloprnent as the Aswan Dam offer. It IQ Zambia's main eco-only economically sensible standards so 1000 t nsta year East and West Are Involved country achieved independ- Alternative Necessary ence in 1964, when they real- One of the Bank's basic 'continue they would not want to premises disappeared in 1965 -In Efforts to 'i.nance Line continue dependent on a when Rhodesia took indepcnd- (white-ruled Rhodesia for ex- once with no intention of I,iv- By Anthony Astrachan porting their copper and im- ing black Africans a signifi- washinston Post roreian service porting everything. cant political role, and thus Th h d a first rude awak- made Zambian dependence on Becomes an African issue WASHINGTON POST .1.6 November 1967 .r P oropose 'd'-Tanzam Railway tourer, and the Unite LeA. base of one of the iiP'r i mining companies. Britain and America pitched in with an emergency airlift and a road improvement and truck program to keep copper 'to ~3 d ; 1- t'la r .! tianac a rr amrs an ana a an m aa e,; ter of political and diplomatic by three firms headed by Max- maneuvers that surround the fists. well It Stamp puts , the cost e of o con- - railway and obscure the eco- of struction and rolling stock at nomie debate on it. $353 million, plus $33 million The American Embassy in coming out and oil coming to enlarge the harbor at Dar Into Zambia, whose Rhodesian!~es Salaam to handle an esti- supplies were cut off when'. sanctions stopped the flow oft oil to Rhodesia's refinery from; Beira in Mozambique. But they did not become converts to the idea of the Tanzam Railway. Tanzania became as enthu? ?,siastic as Zambia, however, not only because it. wanted to help a sister African state but even more because the railway offered the first hope of open- Ing up the agricultural poten- tial of the Kilomhero valley and the mineral resources of'. the Mbeya area, both In south- west Tanzania and both sty- mied by lack of transport. I The two countries did not become so obsessed with the Idea of the railroad that they ignored other means of trans- port, Improvements to the Great North road are under way, some with American help, but economists and transport experts In Lusaka and Dar es Salaam do not be- lieve the road can handle Zambia's export and import needs by itself. Pipeline Being Built A 1060-mile, eight-inch pipe- line Is under construction to carry oil from Dar to the Zam- bian copperbelt town of Bwana Mkuhwa (a Swahili phrase that means Big Boss and is under attack in East Af- rica as a colonialist inherit- ance). It is being built by Ital- ian contractors and will carry oil from the Dar refinery run by Italy's LFC, but the $42.5 million it costs is basically an Investment of the two African nations. They believe the Tanzam railway Is still a necessity, particularly since road and pipeline projects will not by themselves eliminate Zambia's dependence on Rhodesian rail- ways, still carrying about a third of Its copper exports and three-quarters of all Its im- ports, and the equally unreli- hble rail routes through the Congo and Angola, Malawi and Mozambique. The two countries now have a Western produced survey that says the railway makes economic sense, and Peking's mated 2.5 million tons more of cargo if the railway is complet- ed by the early 1970s. That puts the total cost at $386 mil- lion. The Stamp report assumes that the railway will make a profit if It carries two million tons or more, a profit estimat- ed at $51.8 million In 1981 as- suming that the Tanzam oper- ational costs will be below those on the older Rhodesian railway system. Question of Method The Stamp team assumed the railway would be built by modern methods, while the Chinese are believed to be planning a labor -intensive method, which would add three years to construction and affect profit estimates. If the Chinese build the railway the some way they built the Friendship Textile Mill In Tanzania, it will also operate by labor intensive methods in an antiquated style (the textile mill uses 1938 equipment, ac- cording to a Zambian source) which may also reduce the profits. ' But the Stamp report specifi- y says the Tanzam link "would be profitable even if there were no political objec tion to using Rhodesia rail ways, because the Zambian! economy has developed so much faster than the World Bank anticipated. The Rhode- sian system would have to make a large capital invest- ment to cope with the Increase in Zambian traffic, which af- fects the comparison. Complete comparisons of rail versus road systems have not been made. But copperbelt experts point out that most of the rail traffic will travel the full 1000 miles. American and European arguments for the superiority of roads assume that traffic will be picked up and let off at many points along the route, not true In this case. Report Quarded The Stamp report , though Its basic estimates and conclu- sions have been published un- officially, is carefully guarded offer to build It. Approv $PWt31-I4 W M '}2 waa9 'of their dance team that came for the cele. bration of Zambia's Independ-' lonce anniversary last month and the zeal of some Chinese have raised some Zambian l eyebrows. Government offi t th ea ci s ut ons wi a all. seen the Stamp report,! 1hou a? ette of ?? President Kenneth th h A i oug mer can diplomats, htve been seen with copies' of It. United States officials seem to recognize little '??-.- -` ` But the correct Chinese be railway, though underneath havior and profitable produc they are defensive about the.} Lion at the Dar es Salaam tex- fact that the U.S. Congress is the mill are what the Zam. highly unlikely to appropriate anything like the sum 'bians hope will be the model needed for Chinese to build It. Sunnorters of the J or In' railway wish the U.S. would get an International consor- tium started like the one that arranged finance for the Niger River dam In northern Nigeria. l (They say the Tanzam link Is, Just the kind of regional pro-1 3 ject that U.S. aid to Africa is, ,supposed to favor. Zambia has released no de- tails of the Chinese offer,' though an agreement has been' signed. One source who has seen the agreement says it goes much further than the $4-million two-year survey of the route reported as the only commitment by some Wash- ington sources. He says it com- mits the Chinese to an Inter- est-free loan to build the whole link. Other sources have estimated the Chinese commitment at $280-million, but it is likely that this is an order of magnitude rather than a precise figure An important and un- answered question' is how (many Chinese will pour' into Zambia to conduct the survey, and build the railway. Don't Seem Committed The Zambians do not seem to be committed to accepting the Chinese offer. They say they have asked for Western indications of interest. West- ern embassies deny this. Zam- bia did ask Canada, West Ger- many, France and Japan, as well as China, for help in 1065. Zambian Vice President Simon Kapwepwe said in an interview that he had asked Secretary of State Dean Rusk for help on the railway when he visited Washington as For- eign Minister last year. But in Western diplomat practice, asking Rusk for help in con- versation Is not the same as exchanging formal papers with technical specifications. The Chinese have behaved fairly well In Zambia, where Kaunda, widely believed to be intended to halt the. wearing of Mao buttons distributed by. in the Tanzam Railway, if it, occurs. China watchers believe Pc.. king can 'a afford the for eign exchange cost of the rail- way, though it is larger than all Red Chinese assistance to Black Africa an far But they . wonder If the Great Proleta- rian Cultural Revolution will allow China to spend such re- source of money and manpow er so far from home. . thi@tAbR@pl78-OU6gg3000040006-9 like those In Kenya. But the I 25X1C1OB L Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 FORAj*FSGjjatff . Re .2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A0004000400066-anuary 1968 Evidence of Hanoi's Control and Direction of the Viet Cong and the !IFLSVN In January 1967 elements of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division overran a. strategically vital Viet Cong field headquarters in South Vietnam. This headquarters turned out to be the link between Hanoi and Communist military forces fighting in South Vietnam -- in effect, the command post through which Hanoi's Communist party, the Lao Dong, issued orders to its fighting units south of Vietnam's demilitarized zone. It was learned later from interrogations of captured NJA regu- lars, who were Lao Dong members, that the parent unit for this head- quarters had been set up in 1961 by the Lao Dong in Hanoi. The par- ent unit-, called the Lao Dong Party Military Committee, is a classic example of Party control of the state via the interlocking directorate, for the Military Committee is at the same time a Lao Dong organ and a section within the North Vietnamese military establishment directly under Defense Minister Giap. The command post in South Vietnam overrun by the 101st Airborne was called the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and proved to contain a rich lode of Communist documents. These included de- tailed instructions from the Lao Dong to its branch in South Vietnam called the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). One of the most sig- nificant documents found in this haul, written by the Lao Dong's First Secretary, Le Duan, emphasized the importance and necessity of Lao Dong control at every level of Viet Cong operations. The tone of Duan's letter was one of unquestioned command -- that of a su- perior to a subordinate element. Lao Dong control of Communist elements in South Vietnam has been clearly apparent since 1961 when a Lao Dong Central Committee reso- lution was discovered among documents captured by South Vietnamese Government forces. The document read in part, " it must be clearly understood that ... although the overt name is different (PRP) from what it is in North Vietnam, nevertheless, secretly ... the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party under the leadership of the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Ho (Chi Minh) Other documentary evidence has since substantiated and clarified the role of the PRP as-a mere cadet branch of the Lao Dong. In early 1962 the Lao Dong, finding the PREP leadership and spirit in the South lacking in verve, circulated a statement among National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) cadres which com- plained that despite the Lao Dong's "six years of efforts in the South the revolutionary movement continues to lack organization and leadership .... It is required that the revolution in the South be placed under a unified system. Only by this means can the revolution be accelerated ... the PRP (has been) ... established to assure that the revolution in the South will have proper leadership." Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 This claim of Party leadership of the Northern forces was readily acknowledged by the NFLSVN in a captured document dated 1962: "The Party is the highest organization. It is responsible for the leader- ship of all other organizations, the liberation association, the mu- tual aid associations, as well as the leadership of all the people who will overthrow the old regime for the sake of the new. The Party is the paramount organization." Between the evidence offered. by captured Lao Dong, Viet Cong and NFLSVN documents and the statements made by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners and defectors, the pattern of control emerges clearly: Through the standard Communist mechanism of interlocking membership of ranking Com- munist leaders in parallel Party and state posts, the Lao Dong controls the North Vietnamese Government. The Lao Dong Party in the North also controls the PRP in the South ("the party segment in South Vietnam is a segment of the Lao Dong Party ... headed by Chairman Ho"). The PRP in turn controls and directs the National Liberation Front and its military arm the Viet Cong ("The Party is the highest organization . it is responsible for the leadership of all other organizations,..."). Communist control of this command structure is freely-acknowledged by the Lao Dong to such subordinate elements as Viet Cong fighting units and PRP members. Typical is the statement of a Viet Cong lieu- tenant and PRP member who defected to the South Vietnamese Government in May 1966: "The PRP in the South and the Lao Dong Party of the North are one and the same. It's the Communist party. The only difference ,..-I was, told ,-was that a Party member in the North had to observe more rules than his counterpart in the South." Another document picked up by soldiers of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division when they captured COSVN headquarters in January was the record made of a speech delivered by North Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Vinh concerning North Vietnamese-Viet Cong policy. Vinh's speech, which has been widely circulated in the press, was replete with ref- erences to Lao Dong Central Committee resolutions which must be ex- ecuted, with "our" and "we" references, statements about Northern reinforcements for the forces fighting in the South, and possibly most damning of all, in the context of negotiations, an anticipated "opportunity offered by the negotiations to step up further our military attacks ... (until) ... the Americans would withdraw their troops and we will continue the struggle to achieve total success." General Vinh is head of both the North Vietnamese Government and Lao Dong Party organs concerned with reunification of North and South Vietnam -- again the interlocking arrangement which ensures Party control of the state. In April 1967 another rich haul of captured documents added to earlier knowledge gained from NVA and Viet Cong defectors regarding specific provinces in South Vietnam where the North Vietnamese Army Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 2 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 has direct responsibility for military activities. These include Kon- tum, Pleiku and Darlac provinces in Western Central Vietnam as well as a large sector in Southeast Laos. According to captured documents,Quang Doc province, bordering Cambodia, has also been organized under North Vietnam's direct supervision as a base for safeguarding communications between the NFLSVN and Hanoi and possibly as a new location for COSVN (mentioned in above as Hanoi's command post for issuing orders to its fighting units in the South). In addition, the five northernmost pro- vinces of South Vietnam are believed to be under direct North Vietnam- ese military control. North Vietnamese military control of Communist forces fighting in South Vietnam is carried out by ranking members of the NVA command structure. There are at least eight NVA generals and a number of senior NVA colonels now permanently assigned to command posts in the South. The frequent combination of these military positions with a cor- responding political (Party) role has been regularly reported by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners and defectors. For example, Major General Tran Do, Political Officer in COSVN, is a Lao Dong Central Committee member. Along with Lieutenant. General Tran Van Tra, also a Central Committee member, Do is responsible for implementing Lao Dong/PRP control of the Viet Cong. Both of these men were deputies to General Nguyen Chi Thanh prior to his death in July 1967. Thanh, the senior political officer in the South, was a four-star general in the NVA, second in military rank only to North Vietnam's Defense Minister Giap and commander of all Viet Cong forces in the South. He was buried with highest military honors, his funeral being attended by ranking members of Hanoi's heirarchy, including President Ho Chi Minh. According to claims made by NVA and Viet Cong prisoners, Thanh's re- placement as commander of Viet Cong troops is Major General Hoang Van Thai, well-known as one of the founders of North Vietnam's military and political machinery and a close comrade of Ho Chi Minh and General Giap. Prisoners have also reported hearing rumors that Thanh's replacement may be General Van Tien Dung. Dung is Chief of Staff of the NVA, a ranking member of the Lao Dong and is also an old comrade in arms of President Ho and Defense Minister Giap. Major General Hoang Van Thi, one of Giap's deputies and a Deputy Chief of Staff for the NVA, is the Commanding Officer (and Political Officer) for Military Region V in South Vietnam. Two other NVA general officers assigned to Military Region V in South Vietnam are Major Gen- eral Nguyen Don, a Lao Dong Central Committee member, and Major General Le Chuong, who is Chief of Propaganda and Training for the NVA. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 3 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 It is not necessary to employ speculation, guess work and rumor in trying to piece together the command structure for the forces fight- ing against the South Vietnamese Government in this war. D?cumentary evidence, biographic data, photographs, prisoner and defector interro- gations, even general knowledge of Communist, methods, all lead inev- itably to the conclusion that the NFLSVN and the Viet Cong are dominated by the PRP, that the PRP is merely a cadet branch, a subordinate ele- ment of the Lao Dong and that the Lao Dong controls the North Vietnamese Army and the Government of North Vietnam. The case has been concisely stated by a'senior Viet Cong officer, Colonel Le Xuan Chuyen,who re- cently defected to the South Vietnamese Government: "the Viet Cong is nothing but an extension of the (North Vietnam) People's Army." Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 4 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 January 1968 (1) North Vietnamese Intervention in South Vietnam Information and comment on North Vietnamese troop disposition in South Vietnam from official U.S. and South Vietnamese sources, North Vietnamese news releases, etc: The number of North Vietnamese military personnel confirmed in the South in 1959-60 were 1,800; in 1964, )+,400. The first complete units began arriving in 1965. (US State Dept., February 1965). Since May 1966 North Vietnamese regulars have infiltrated both through Laos and through the DMZ, a fact which the North Vietnamese Government has not recently taken pains to deny. On 12 December 1966, NFLSVN President, Nguyen Huu Tho, in a message to North Vietnamese leaders, acknowledged that the "North Vietnamese people are doing their best to fulfill their task as the major rear area, the cradle of the revolution for the whole country." (VNA, 16 December 1966). In a tape recording captured early in 1967 and made public by the South Vietnamese Government, a North Vietnamese Army officer told a Lao Dong Party (Central Committee meeting that despite the decrease in Viet Cong guerrilla personnel, total main force strength had nevertheless increased sharply owing to the arrival of more men from North Vietnam. Well-known Viet Cong military units, such as the 271st Main Force Regiment, are now 50% manned by NVA regulars as the demand from the Viet Cong for additional support grows. North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in an interview with a reporter from JEUNE AFRIQUE, said of the U.S. demand for reciprocal de- escalation: "We are in our own country and we shall fight as long as the aggressors remain on our soil." (JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 April 1967). It was estimated in April 1967 that nearly half the Communist forces in the South were North Vietnamese (US State Dept., 15 May 1967). On 28 May 1967, the Liberation Armed Forces Command, reporting 1966-67 winter-spring fighting, spoke of "emulating North Vietnam ... our great rear area ... and co-ordinating our activities with it ...." (VNA, 30 May 1967). Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 A r ved For Ri~ we 2005/04/21 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 oven~ber lHla~oi's Dilemma: Cut Losses In South or use Home Army me no great': r AMONG the informed Be stressed that this was AT THE ti ' ,leaders and analysts, as. al- no more than a possibility, stress was, laid upon this ready reported'in this space, Ile stressed, too, that there NLF proposal of coalition, there are two almost dia- were no new indicators--of. More recently. however, the: metrically' opposed views increased troop movements, top Soviet leaders have; 'about the next stage in for instance-to turn the taken to referring to it fairly' `Vietnam. Both have the possibility into a semi?.p'rob pointedly, in one context on dame basic- assumption: that 'ability. , another. The Soviets' East, the North Vietnamese can. He merely remarked that prn . European allies have no longer carry the huge this was something he had gone even further, finding ,manpower burdkn of the to be ready for; and he all sorts of ways to pass th# ',Southern war on the old added that he was complete. word to American diplomats system, 'ly ready. Indeed, he pre. that the NLF platform wal The difference is about dieted that the Hanoi lead- f -a most important documents hl h the United States ` iv s would lose rather thharl.. ; tow the way this dilemma will kbe resolved In Hanoi. If you gain by the, additional hu had given too little weight. lire heavily over-spending man investment in South "It has beef' like the over- your iticome,you can either 'Vietnam that he was talk; ture of the symphony twd 'reduce your rate of expends ing about. ;years ago," one of the wiser 'tore, or else you can draw Any hunch of General Kremllnologists has said, W tm eland's must be' !'The symphony" in question r tat YOU may MA ave. .The more hopeful view is n6 one else has anything ap- orchestrated, loudly revel'- letEastern Eu' x b S i b ,further upon whatever caps- es o ll h profoundly respected, for.. was the wonderfully well- , a e that the Hanoi leaders will' proacaing compara 'choose the first alternative, 'perlence. it must be added[ reducing their over-ambi- however, that whichever way ttious troop structure in the they resolve their dilemma ,south, and thereby cutting the Hanoi leaders rather tau monthly loitssesh new m they plainly share General Wc troops. The cc w replace view oreland's expectation that t is that the Hanoi leaders there may be bad trouble will, in effect, draw upon ahead for them. their remaining capital, by The fact of the matter is 'rising their home army in that in an extremely deft north Vietnam to provide and secretive way, Hanoi -reinforcements and replace- long ago began planting ccr- '3nents In South Vietnam. tai, obscure seeds. And The first thing to say these seeds, if the war in Y'bout this second view is the South goes badly for ,that there's no evidence to Hanoi, can then be watered Support It. Indeed, It runs `^d brought to bloom as a 'counter to the more impor-, ,drive to open the kind of " " negotiations that may be (cant recent evidence, such as the, Increasingly peculiar supremely dangerous, yet behavior of Prince Norodom will appeal to many unin? 6ihanouk ' concerning the formed people in this coun- grrobiein of the Cambodian t'ano'tuarles. Last summer, + in brief, Hanoi's southern puppets of "THE SECOND thing to the National Liberation "y, however, is that those Front rather inconspicuously ;Who have tentatively taken Issued a kind of political this view are men of great platform. The great novelty experience and sound In- In the platform was a call atinct, not ab I y Including for "free general elections" Gen. William C. Westmore- which would lead, in turn, to land. While In Washington, a "national union democratic; Westmoreland privately government," including NLI!', stated that he thought it ,quite possible that the Hanoi 1Ieaclers would soon send [three to five more regi- ov ng erat ropean drive in the autumn (2) of 1965, to secure a, long bombing pause which, so the Soviets intimated, would then lead to fruitful talks. In the present instance; the wisest Kremlinologist,', feel that no "symphony" it- self will begin without a deg clsive signal from Hanoi--: which was lacking in 1965. Captured documents, ex- plaining what Hanoi really means by coalition govern, ment in South Vietnam. meanwhile indicate that the signal may conceivably be given later on, if worst comes to worst. Coalition, it is stated, will be nothing but a tactic, which will be necessitated, if and when that time comes, by the Vietcong's inability to win "complete victory", without further ado. Under the cloak of coalition, it l3"i further stated, the country-' side Is to be "occupied"; t after that, the towns are to' be "surrounded"; and when that moment arrives, "com.' plete victory" will then be Within easy'grasp. "Complete representatives but not ex' victory," of course, means elusively recruited from the the Communist subjugation Communists' adherents, of the South. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 1 ebe0r (21 :CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 vnawftv riml,F21 P scant Pose Oi YC Chief Seen Filled I SAIGON, Sept. 10 (UPI)- :The general who was ch;ef of staff of the army when Viet- minh forces defeated the French 13 years ag has been named commander of Viet- cong tromps In South Vietnam, Intelligence reports from pri ooers Indicated today. Informed military sources In Snlgon identified the North Vietnamese commander as lit l*Loc4NJ Pro"' jib I JAiaj, Gen. Roans; Van Thai, a JIOANG VAN' THAI f versed In guerrilla warfare i rs North Vie sc Dcfensejpredecessor to the Victcong,.~~- Chief Vo Nguyen Giap, the ar=land later joined Clap and 1Io`I~< chitect of the Vietminh victory Chi Minh In establishing the! ,1~14 F ' over t h( rench. Clap s theo North FIetnamcse army. 11 ! ties on warfare have become a i nisi Insurgency. " Thai, one of the founders ofi, %" North Vietnam's military and k. i political mnchincry, has appar. ?p } cntiy been a pp o I n t c difl commander of Vietcong forces j : Iin Southvictnarn to replace+' i Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh. osition is kn The wn a th p o s e, l ;.Y head of the Central Office for'' ' Sout Vietnam. This controls) South Vietnamese Comtnunistl~ c political and military act-vI-; %, nann, accortan, to r(nc:lol' anoi died on Jt:iy of a , jy. Iheart attack. as the new commander camel ns no surprise to the V.S. Co,n? f mand. fie is rate4 as a "bril?,' liant strategist" who Is very,` popular with his Tten and not not content to Issue commands from a desk. [Joe Was reported Ito have been In South Viet- nam prior to hit sppointment~ During 1Verld War 11, Thai Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release'2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 1ASAHI EVENING NEWS, Tokyo 21 November 1961 C", a o is JCamp in y George McArthur and Horst 'Faas 'ON THE CAMBODIAN `BOR , Chidden beneath .lush jungle about Your miles inside neutral Cam- zbodia. f '~l he signs were unmistakable, :,despite Cambodian denials, that "many hundreds of. men and tons Of supplies had crossed this jungle site tend gone on to the war in South Vietnam. It offered hard ?evidence from the Cambodian side of the frontier that such camps exist. -? The camp had sheltered several hundred men, probably from, a major headquarters command' group. The occupants had left barely days before. Some had been in the area the previous night,? .::But Premier Son Sarin -said an investigation will. be made' by Cambodian officials. "It is impossible that the camp was used for any long period of time," the Premier ? said. "it was not a sanctuary." , . He acknowledged that there had been some crossings of the frontier by Communist forces, but he'said the Cambodian Government has always demanded withdrawal as soon as the intrusions were dis- covered. -Reporters visited the frontie( at tithe invitation of the Prince., Diplomats in Phnom Penh felt that despite his stated sympathies with the Viet Cong he did not' believe the Communists were seriously using Cambodian ter- ritory as a stage area. as Chown by fresh footprints fol invitation to the frontier. He lowing a hca4y rain the day be- l offered military escorts and order- fore. One soldier had left behind . jed provincial officials to coope- a khaki mosquito net, still rigged ! !rate with Western newsmen. They, From the camp and stretching toward the unmarked frontier with Vietnam was a heavily traveled military road, running through ,Virtually uninhabited jungle. Mon- soon rains had turned stretches of it into a bog. Engineers had laid down a carpet of neatly 'trimmed logs. The corduroy surface was capable' of supporting heavy trucks, and countless tracks indi- cated many had passed that way. The road crossed the border barely nine miles from the South Vietnamese district `town of Loc Ninb. scene of a bitter battle this month when the Viet Cong kept up an assault by two regiments, perhaps 5,000 men, for a full week. American commanders said that ,battlefield was selected by the Viet Cong because of its nearness to the sanctuary of the order-a did. When we drove to the district capital of Mimot, about 15 miles from the Vietnamese frontier, and pointed out prccisley where we' wanted to go, no difficulties were raised. On a map, we pinpoint- ed a jungled area of the border within a hundred miles of Saigon. The district administrator, Oung Hong Cheng for, an affable 39. year-old career civil servant, laughed and said we would find nothing. Then he hospitably laid out a three-hour Lunch: Our preselected site, on the basis of information from qualifi- ed sources, was a thin track branching off National Route 7 and barely marked even on detail- ed maps. From the paved high- way which parallels the border north of War Zone C,-the track was barely noticeable-the en-- ditch. It was late afternoon and the small military escort was em- barrassed. A young lieutenant said perhaps the road was used' by timber thieves. Another sug- gested it was built by the forestry department. - ON THE CAMBODIAN BOR-] DER, Nov. 21-We asked to come back the next day, with a bigger military escort to go deeper into the jungle. The Army major 'in charge of our escort agreed but the friendliness shown earlier in the day was gone. Prince Sisa wath, a cousin of Prince Norodom -who was along, remarked some- what bitterly: "I suppose you will' Write about the Sihanouk trail." Next morning, when we started back into the jungle with a larger escort, the Prince was absent but there was a full escort including an Army truck with a 20 mm. cannon which stayed on the paved road to protect us, it was explain-. ed, from possible attack by in- truding American planes. Back in the jungle, with troops deployed on all sides, a little path off the .corduroy road led within half a mile to the Viet Cong camp site. There was no mistaking the neat military order,' the shelter, the little bamboo desks arad tables. Drainaged ditches were dug around each shelter. Everything was camouflaged. Some shelters 'also contained the little bamboo pens used by the Viet Cong to. house pigs or chickens. A khaki mosquito net dangled in one pal- metto-roofed shelter. Although the Communist forces always police their camps thoroughly, there were incrimi mnating bits and pieces. In what was evidently a dispensary, a lit- tle pasteboard container for Japa-'- nese-made hypodermic needles was found. Other medical labels -from Cambodia and South Vietnam-turned up. There was also a little plastic North Viet- 'tramese medical supply bag. A {soap container made in Saigon ` sanctuary denied by Cambodia's ' `trance thickly shrouded by trees. neutralist ruler Prince Norodoml On each side were ordinary Sihanouk although he has recently signs warning against smoking, qualified his position by saying forest fires. or the unauthorized his 34,000-man army could not cutting of timer. Walking down possibly seal the 500-mile border. the twisting trail, there r was .Cambodian military officers on nothing out of the ordinary save the frontier indicated little effort the unusual number of tire and had been made. They claimed, cart trucks on a small dirt toad however, that there were no per. that ostensibly led nowhere. manent Viet Cong camps and no Then, a few hundred yards into, serious incursions. the heavy woods, the corduroy Prince Sihanouk has been In- road burst into view-a road focmedqp,pt vt deF~arryFdlt a 2~@O8tO41~F*qs ~hA;F:[~Rs7&d 3061 camp. lis reaction has not been ly deserted area. To one side -3 disclosed. was a small' camouflaged clearing Beneath sonic leaves was burl-' ed a page from an old notebook -written in Vietnamese and the evident record of the camp's sup- , ?Pst~cdated Oct. ~r*h-itcros as as sugar, vegetables, cloth, tea, pigs, ' X4) (4, cont'd) Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 traveled.' The tracks ineludtdt those of big double-wheeled trucks as well as countless bicycles and oxcarts-both favored means of transportation by the Viet Cong. The location of the camp in- ilicates that the Viet Cong is rc- gularly using Cambodian Route 7 which runs east from the capital of Phnom Penh and roughly parallels the South Vietnamese border for about 40 miles above War Zone C where much of the fighting in Vietnam has taken place in the past year. Checkpoints along Route 7 ate virtually nonexistent. Any Ordinary civilian truck coming down from the North would pass unnoticed, Parking areas along the, cordu- roy jungle road we located could easily handle 20 trucks without danger of discovery. Loads were evidently taken off the trucks here LOS A'VET,ES TIMS 26 April 1967 and placed on oxcarts or bicgclei, for onward transport There were 20 or more log platforms which could serve to keep rice or other stores off the"? damp earth. All platforms were constructed in precisely the same manner, 12 inches from the ground and with five log cross- members. One such Viet Cong camp, of course, does not prove the Amer- ican contention that the Viet Gong systematically violates the Cambo- dian frontier and use Cambodian territory as a sanctuary. The American say, however, that such camps are numerous along the northern " half of the 500-mile Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier. It takes a week or more on foot to get to areas where such camps might be located. The Cambodian Army has almost no troops there. in his arrest for involve- - ment with "anti-Khmer Cambodia ears in' Crisis reCam", pp Cambodia has never de- nied that the Viet C ong 'were receiving food and Over Viet medicine from Cambodian , Cong? Suppl Line sources. Sihanouk has in recent months declared DY ROBERT S. ELEGANT -publicly that he would HONG KONG-A gigantic pipe. limn $tmt wtner like reinforcement of the line through Cambodia supplying supplied through the overseas mixed Polish, Indian' and the Viet Cong with arms Chinese and Vietn ammu i , n - amese merchants Canadian teams of the I: tion, food and medicines--operated who control that trade. International C o n t r o l with the cooperation of senior ram. Within the past few cla .. s Prin y c rr~~?o ~v uc u4uw- - --.vun, home mlrusrer uon it is to investigate in g up into a major polith:al crisis 1h of the kingdom, has arrested five allegations that Cambo. the Cambodian kingdom Cambodian officials and cl th d th . ose e an neutrality is being ' Overt events of the past few d country even more tightly than violated . ays, combined with painstaking analyses usual to foreign correspondents.' He has admitted that he made b Since We t f th y s one o ern intelligence speei- e men arrested let himself cannot be perfect- alists, offer it picture of intrigue and Chao Seng, a leftist who ,.._. ly sure that the Viet Cong smuggling of vast quantities of virtually controlled the supply operation may well do not take shelter on coritraband which would do credit to Cambodian economy until be at the heart of Slhan- Cambodi an territory nor a high-flown suspense thriller, late last year, specialists ouk's difficulties, since it i l receive su lies th b l pp h r u arge part of the M g the specialists make a most feel that Sihanouk is striv- nvoves a Cambodia He has Cambodi h i i , , owev- conv an power struc. ng to solve a major inter- ncing case of their reconstruc- . tion of the manner in wht..h et,_ wi_. Hai crisis in an atmru . lure. Chao Song, who re- er, always said that the Cong dissidents to South -Vietnam phere of as much seclusion turned only a mouth or so hurt, of atnanouicvilie was and Cambodian chat 30 motor torpedo boats, and 200 landing craft. It is diic\1t ,. C....__ cc~~. to give an ate a for auxi as they run into thousands, and many mercantile vessels are used for ancillary purposes and constitute Para mili't.ary support. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Merchant Fleet of the USSR Year Number of Ships 1946 507 1950 515 1956 716 1960 873 1965 1,345 Deadweight tons 2,699,000 2,583,000 3,439,000 4,939,000 9,561,000 World total Deadweight tons 97,884,000 107,215,000 136,880,000 171,890,000 217,229,000 1970 13,900,000,(Soviet 260,600,000 estimate) Source: The Soviet Merchant Marine, U.S. Department of Commerce/Maritime Administration, 1967 Fish Catch of the USSR (In metric tons; includes whales and sea animals) Year 1938 1948 1955 1960 1965 1966 1970 (plan) Tonnage 1,542,000 1,575,000 2,737,000 3,541,000 5,774,000 6,093,000 8,500,000 to 9,000,000 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Soviet Fish Catch in Selected Areas (In thousands of centners; 1 centner = .1 metric ton)' 1960 % of total 1965, %,.of total 1966 Catch Catch I North East Atlantic 11,340 32.3% 10,410 18.2% 11,477 II North West Atlantid 2,850 8.1% 8,531 14.9% 7,112' IV West Central Atlantic 567 1.0% 374 III East Central Atlantic 695 1.2% 793 V South East'Atlantic 470 1.3% 3,671 6.4% 3,612 VI South West Atlantic 733 VII VIII North West Indian Ocean South West Indian Ocean 347 o.6% IX XI South East Indian Ocean North Pacific Ocean 8,555 24.4% 18,260 31.9% 16,352 ~rr- XIX ian Sea Cas 3,669 10.5% 4,480 7.7% 3,758 XX p Azov and Black Seas 1,526 4.3% 2,265 3.9% 3,077 Sources: Economic Handbooks of the USSR Food and Agriculture Organizatiop ~eo~__ ~2D' _Fp Approved For Release 2005/04/$1E:CdA-kDP78-03061A000400046dA4 THE COMMUNIST CONCLAVE AT BUDAPEST The "Consultative Conference" of Communist parties to be held in Budapest in February 1968 offers remarkable opportunities for dis- ruptive attacks against the Communist movement. The major divisive issues are discussed in the enclosed background paper and news articles. Media and organizational assets -- political, labor, youth, etc. -- can seize on the Budapest meeting to attack the Communists on a wide variety of issues. These issues will vary radically according to the local Communist position, the nature of the asset employed, and the inventiveness of case officers and agents. The following suggested lines of attack may stimulate further ideas for treatment. 1. Discrediting the Communist movement as a whole. The Budapest meeting proves once again the basic allegiance of Communist groups to an international movement and ultimately to the Soviet Union. Thus talk of independence, autonomy, and true commitment to popular fronts and other forms of united action is false and dishonest. The meeting threatens to create a new Comintern. Gross Soviet efforts to force Rumania and other Communists striving for autonomy into line prove once again the monolithic nature and Soviet domination of the movement. Efforts of the Italians and others to claim their autonomy are eyewash designed to deceive potential collaborators. The division of the move- ment into three camps, the Soviet, Chinese and Cuban centers, shows that Communism is ultimately only a means of attaining and keeping power and uses ideology solely to assist in reaching this objective. It further shows the disintegration of the movement, a point emphasized by the object of the Budapest conference: to try to rebuild Communist unity in the face of the "imperialist offensive." 2. Exploiting the issue of Communist China. The absence of the Chinese Communists and their allies from Budapest proves they have excommunicated themselves from the movement, or that the Budapest meet- ing is not representative of the Communist movement -- depending on how one views it. A move against the Chinese Communists at the meeting is a move against independence and autonomy of Communist parties; it makes permanent a breach which might otherwise heal; it places North Vietnam in an impossible position, since that country requires the support of the entire Communist world; it rejects the right of such parties as the North Korean to maintain contact with Moscow and China. On the other hand China's vituperative attacks against the USSR, despite the Soviet restraint, its refusal to participate in the normal activi- ties of the international movement, its sectarianism, its hindrance of joint Communist aid to the war effort in Vietnam, its splitting activi- ties in local parties around the world, its absurd praise of Mao's thoughts -- all these things show that it is the Chinese who have effec- tively withdrawn from the international Communist movement. These points can be played against local pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese factions to heighten their mutual antipathies. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 SECRET Approved For Release 200544/Q'R:E(MA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 3. Representativeness of the Budapest meeting. Not only will the participants at Budapest represent only a part of the Communist move- ment, but that movement itself is not truly representative of the entire revolutionary movement in the world. Many militant revolutionary groups in Africa and Latin America do not consider themselves Communist. Thus the Communists are presumptuous in speaking for all revolutionaries. 4. Black operations. Mutual antagonisms, jealousies, and special interests make the occasion of the Budapest meeting an ideal occasion for disruptive black operations. Local Communist and leftist factions will attack each other on various grounds such as subservience to Moscow, allegiance to Peking, Lack of representativeness, and so on. These attacks can be started or stimulated by carefully planned black operations. Approved For Release 2005/04/2) : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY January .1968 The Communist Conclave at Budapest Since the beginning, a major problem of the Soviet Union has been to preserve and extend its authority over the international Communist movement. Lenin and Stalin accomplished this through formal international organizations, notably the Comintern. However, under Khrushchev a new system developed: international gatherings of Communist parties. He convened international conferences in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 and was in the process of organizing a third when he was ousted in 1964. All of these meetings were called in -response to signs of the crumbling of Communist unity and the erosion of Soviet domination. That they proved generally ineffective in bolstering the Soviet position or the unity of the communist movement has not deterred the present Soviet leadership from calling a new "Consultative Conference" to be held in Budapest in February 1968. The conference of ruling Communist parties was called in 1957 following the political upheavals in Poland and Hungary of 1956. It was held in Moscow in conjunction with the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet revolution and resulted in a call for unity in the bloc, with Moscow "at its head." The 1960 Conference was attended by representa- tives of 81 Communist and Workers' parties and resulted in the issuance of a lengthy General Statement that was intended to serve is a doctrinal guide for the entire Communist movement. However this statement, which recognized the Soviet party as the "vanguard" of the movement, but not its "head," was only a compromise between the Soviet and Chinese ideological positions and did little more than paper over the profound cracks then developing in world Communist unity. Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated rapidly after the 1960 Con- ference and Soviet efforts to force the Chinese Communists back into line by the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet aid served only to increase dissent in the movement. It soon became apparent to the Soviets that a new meeting was needed to re-define the international Communist line and to tackle the problem of Communist China. Under Khrushchev's leadership the Soviet Union invited the 26 parties which had organized the 1960 Conference and had drafted its General Statement to a Consul- tative Meeting in Moscow in 1964 to prepare for a new world Communist Conference. The ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964 forced a postpone- ment of this meeting, which was eventually held in March 1965 with only 19 of the 26 invitees present; missing were China, Albania, North Vietnam, North Korea, Rumania, Japan and Indonesia. At the March 1965 meeting it soon became apparent that the divi- sions in the Communist movement were so serious that a world conference would cause more problems than it would solve. It was therefore agreed that while a world meeting should eventually be convened, it should be preceded by further consultations among the Communist parties. Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Since then Sino-Soviet relations have, if anything, worsened and other problems have arisen to challenge Soviet leadership of the move- ment, notably the growing independence of both Cuba and Rumania. Thus a deblaration by Bulgarian party General Secretary Todor Zhivkov in November 1966 that "conditions are ripening" for the convening of a new world Communist conference was not entirely unexpected. During the following year other Soviet-dominated parties took up the call and by the time of the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Revo- lution in November 1967 the Soviets were able to claim that "some 70 parties" supported the convening of a conference. Apparently final agreement was reached during the Anniversary cele- brations and on 24+ November 1967 it was announced that a Consultative Meeting would be held in February 1968 in Budapest, hosted by the Hungar- ian Party. The organizers will be 18 of the 19 parties which met in Moscow in March 1965; the absentee will be Cuba. The 18 are: Australia, Argentina, Bulgaria, Brazil, Britain, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Mongolia, Poland, Syria, USA, USSR, and West Germany. According to the original announcement, invita- tions have been sent to all other Communist parties (the latest Soviet count lists 88). The purpose of the Budapest conference, according to the official communique, is to permit "a collective exchange of opinion concerning the convocation of an international meeting of Communist and workers parties." That international meeting, in turn, will have as its objec- tive the "strengthening o:' the unity of the Communist; movement and also the rallying of all socialist, democratic forces in the struggle against imperialism, for national and social liberation of the peoples, and for world peace." This statement is deliberately vague on whether or not a subsequent international meeting will actually be held. Later comment by Soviet, Polish, and'French Communist makes it clear, however, that those groups, at least, expect to convert the "consultative" meeting into a "preparatory" one. The Polish paper Trybuna Ludu, for example, stated on 26 November that the "consultative" meeting will draw up preliminary draft documents and an agenda for a future world conference. The French party noted in L'Humanite on 29 November that the Budapest meeting will require documents to be worked out collectively by all interested parties. However, the vagueness of the statement regarding a future meeting was necessary to avoid presenting certain recalcitrant parties with a fait accompli; these parties have no desire to commit themselves to a later international conference without more precise agreement on its composition, purpose, and likely stand on certain cru- cial issues. Indeed, the convocation of the Budapest meeting is only the first of the problems which must be resolved before an international conference is held. One major question is: who is to be invited to such a meeting? The Yugoslav and Italian parties, especially, have pointed out that a Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 closed meeting of Communist parties would~-is,olate the Communists from, other leftists, increasing the difficulties of forming popular fronts and other forms of "joint action," and would greatly increase the apprehensiveness of others who would see in this a resurrection of the Comintern. Moreover, a closed Communist meeting would exclude other groups which in many cases are more representative of the leftist and revolutionary forces in their countries than miniscule or non-existent Communist parties. The Soviets are believed to support the concept of strictly Communist meeting since, if the main aim of the conference is to promote the identity and unity of the world Communist movement, there is little point in diluting it with non-party members. The question becomes even more complicated when one considers that in some countries there are several Communist parties, in others there are both Communist and revolutionary parties, often bitterly opposed to each other, and in yet others the important revolutionary organizations may even be anti- Communist. Another major problem faces the conference organizers: that of Communist China. The Soviets have had to recognize that there is too much opposition to any move to cast the Chinese out of the Communist movement to make such an effort worthwhile. In an effort to attract as large an attendance as possible to the Budapest meeting the Soviets declared in a statement in Pravda on 28 November that "the purpose of the conference cannot be interference in the affairs of any fraternal Party whatever or, still less, excommunication of anybody from the Communist movement." This disavowal was repeated in a Pravda article on 5 December by Vitaly Korionov who wrote: "The ostracizing of anybody from the Communist movement cannot be the purpose of the conference. The opponents of Communism should have learned long ago that ostracism runs counter to the very nature of the Communist movement." (Korionov seemed to have conveniently forgotten about Yugoslavia's ostracism by the Soviets in 1948.) Actually it is hardly necessary to?cas'b--out the Chinese since they have effectively excommunicated themselves. More- over, past opposition has diminished; the Italian Party, which for years had opposed the convening of a world conference because it believed such an act would aggravate the division between Moscow and Peking, now says its doubts have been invalidated by Chinese behavior and that a confer- ence now is timely. While the Italians may believe that a world conference might not make matters worse, they evidently expect the conference shot to take action against the Chinese Communists. Whether this will turn out to be the case remains to be seen; the anti-Chinese statements in many of the recent calls by Communist leaders for a world conference may indi- cate that China will figure on the agenda no matter what. A further consideration is that the war in Vietnam will surely loom large as a conference topic. But it is difficult to envisage a discussion of this subject avoiding for long the question of Chinese hindrance of joint Communist aid to North Vietnam. Approved For Release 2005/04/2 31 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 The final major problem to be resolved before convening a world co ference of Communist and workers? parties involves the fundamental ie of Moscow's hegemony over the Communist movement versus party autonomy. Few Soviet Communists have lost their deep emotional convic- tion that Moscow is and must be the leader of the world Communist movement, even though some of them have perhaps recognized the ration- ality of claims to equality by other Communist parties, Knowing this, leaders of other Communist parties are attempting to circumscribe the nature of a possible world conference. Waldeck Rochet of the French Communist Party, for example, asserts that "it would be wrong to adopt a general and universal document like the 1.960 Declaration." The Italian Party, progenitor of "polycentrism," insists that the prerequi- site to a world conference is the acceptance of a new attitude through- out the world movement, the acceptance of differences without accusa- tions of treason: "Strict autonomy for each party is what is needed without professing to impose obligatory lines and courses, and without implying hostile attitudes to parties which do not agree to some common decisions," Luigi Longo wrote in the party weekly, R.inascita, on 20 October 1967. Rumania has been one of the chief proponents of national autonomy within the Communist movement. Its position was clearly stated by Nicolae Ceausescu in an article published in Pravda on 17 October in which he stated the Rumanian insistence on sovereignty, national inde?- pend'ence and a Communist party's obligations to its own working class and its own people. He called for "relations of a new type" among Com- munist countries to create "favorable conditions for the affirmation of their national essence and individuality, for closeness and coopera- tion between governments, between free and sovereign nations." This degree of autonomy is not without strong opposition in the Communist movement. Rumania's position was denounced by Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar in Pravda on 17 September: "It is impossible to approve the position sometimes taken which expresses itself inra neutral attitude to disputed questions or even in direct refusal of international contacts and comradely exchanges of opinion. It is also impossible to consider internationalist" any party which -- "even for the best of intentions -?- declares its own particular interpretation of the international situation." And Czechoslovak Party Secretary Vladimir Koucky wrote in the August issue of the World Marxist Review that "there can be no internationalism that is neutral and not binding on parties, no departure from the "application of generally obligatory norms for the individua-_ detachments of the Communist movement." If such strictures were not sufficient to alarm those Communists seeking greater independence from Moscow's grip, Ceausescu's speech tol the Rumanian National Party Conference on 6 December should give pause for reflection. Ceausescu rebuked the Soviet Union for putting economic pressure on Rumania and unilaterally violating economic agreements Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 4 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 between the two countries. "Differences of opinion" over international and party affairs should not be an excuse for "influencing economic relatibns," he said, declaring Rumania "will not tolerate such viola- tions. It was clear that one of the "differences of opinion'was over the Budapest conference and its possible sequel in the form of an international conclave. If the Soviets were prepared to apply this degree of pressure to a ruling Communist party, what might be the pressures on lesser Communist groups? Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Tlil? ECONOMIST fECEM]3rR 2, 1967 Moscow prepares to stop the rot are already signs of divisions over Cuban t After months of hesitation and endless. ideas inside some pro-Moscow Latin ]confabulations with other party leaders, ,American parties. Havana, however odd l the Russians have at last made up theirl? its interpretation of marxism-Leninism.! !'Hinds to take an important step towards' secins set on becoming a third centre of + holding a world communist conference. world conini rn';m,j,, t?:t , rr!rnt f'rm, it' According to an official statement put out will be very ;,,c t;ubaits' in Moscow on November 23rd, the Soviet_ consent to have anything to do with any I and 17 other communist parties have Moscow-oriented meeting. decided to convene a meeting in Budapest' ' The Russians have other worries apart for a "collective exchange of opinions"! from the Cubans. Tern is no sign that 1 1 about' a world communist conference. It: the important and influential parties of: should be quite an impressive turn-out.--IJugoslavia, Rumania, North Vietnam and I'he number of communist parties which, North Korea have overcome their dis have openly committed themselves to an: taste for a conference, And to secure the international conference has risen from amount of support they can now claim,' around 40 to more than 65 ; presumably, the Russians have had to make consider gat any rate all these will accept the !able concessions about the kind of meeting ,invitation to go to Budapest. On the other hand, in spite of their impressive majority support, the Russians municating the Chinese, partly because have to face the fact that the communist they have in effect excommunicated movement is now. virtually split into three -!themselves, but partly also because there land that the conference they want to' was too much opposition to this project hold is more likely to draw attention to among the pro-Moscow parties. There these divisions than to paper them over. is no question either of getting the The quarrel with Peking must have .participants to sign any grand new become an accepted fact of life in f statement of ideological principles. The Moscow. With Chinese spokesmen pro- Russians have had to abandon this claiming Peking as the new ce,,i. ? of because of the lively fears of individual and urging the,Russian people to get' rid of their present rulers, it is clear that for the time being-which does not necessarily 'mean for always-the breach between, Moscow and Peking will remain unhealed. But there is also the rapidly widening; gal) between Moscow and Havana. Dr Castro has ? no use at all for. Russia's' cautious attitude towards revolutionary; violence. It can be small consolation to, the Russians to know that Havana's relations with Peking are also distinctly d cool. Indeed, Dr Castro's theories about revolutionary tactics-in so far as they have been distinctly fornmlated-arc: ! coniuntist, whether he is pro-Moscow or pro-Peking, for they spring from the belief that the party should play second fiddle to the guerrilla forces when it: is a question of organising a revolution. They could, however, catch on in parts t of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Therci they would be willing to settle for. There is no question now of formally excom- parties that it would amount to an at-j tempt to sabotage their autonomy. There will also be difficulties about] exactly who is to be invited to the meet- ing. The Italian communists, whose views carry weight, feel as strongly as do the: Jugoslavs that the communist movement should not divorce itself from other pro- gressive but non-communist movements and that representatives of these groups should be invited to attend any world communist meeting. The Russians are believed to oppose this-not surprisingly, since if their main aim in pushing for a conference is to reassert the identity of the communist movement, they will not want .it to be diluted by delegates who may be very worthy men but lack party cards. All the same, the Russians may in the end have to give way on this. Why then, one wonders, are the Russians so doggedly determined to have a meeting at all ? One reason is that Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040006-9 WASHINGTON MUST 17 Dvccrnber 1967 Rumanian, :soviet Ties a Crisis $y Anatole Shub i Ws,hlneton Pnat rorelan service MOSCOW, Dec. t6-The So- viet Union today stood at the brink of a major crisis with in- dependent Communist Ruma- nla which might prove as fate- ful as. Aloscow's break with ]Yugoslavia 20 years ago. The -next moves on both sides remained unclear after ;Kremlin summit talks Thurs- day and Friday, led by Rus- 61a's Lconld Brezhnev and Ru- ~rrania's Nicolas Ceaucescur failed to clear the air of Ru? rnantan charges that the So- Iviet Union -was applying eco- nomic pressures because o# k9e political differences be- 'twecn the two countries. Unofficial Soviet sources re.- ported tonight that Brczhnev and other Soviet leaders lvould go to Bucharest next :1tnonth in a last-ditch attempt 1.o heal the breach. However, Rumanian sources said they had heard nothing of a visit so soon. It would be more logical, they said, for the Russians to come after the Budapest Inter- rational Communist "consults- tlve meeting" scheduled for late February, The Budapest meeting re- !exchange of views on past -resulted In Rumanian pgftici- mains one of the main sUh= trade pacts, but pledges to im-l patios In joint lt'arsa ? ]?a jects of disagreement between prove future t ade? i maneuvers and other rr? fs- the Soviet Unlonft ?'stronfilY pi'o Although Rumania has been ; ores to reduce tensions: 4p- moting a world Cornmunlst shifting its trade westward; during the past five years, the, tween Moscow and Bueharelt.1 conference, and Rumania, p' lie took part in the Thursday ,Which suspects the Soviet pur? Soviet Union remains its lead-I and Friday Kremlin talks pose to be the production of a ing trade partner. Russia has! with Ceaucescu, althoijg he, joint policy declaration unac. not only supplied massive: was conspicuously a art O n t .ceptable to China, with which quantities of coal and iron ore; from even the social e.vcj#th Rumania remains on good but has also pledged hea+y during the visit by f astF terms. machinery Or au+eh key Pro)*, many's Walter Uibrlc Arkr: Other major areas of dis- sets 'as the Galati xtecl gem-t,in the week, I Some cord Include the German prob- bine and the Iron Gotes hgdro observers 5r d' lcm, the Middle East, arms electric Station and dam on that the Soviet stand tysl 1r1 control and the Soviet-Ruma? the Danube. not be fully clarified untie. nian friendship treaty due to A massive Soviet cconomicl next plenum of the Pari Ci~n? squeeze, as, applied by Josef 1 y > expire next month. tral Committee. Accordtni;'_`-to However, all thes,~ policy Stalin to Yugoslavia in 1048 ors some rumors, a plenum -pay differences are said to pale byi by Nikita'K h r u s h c h e v to be held in the coming ++re k, comparison with the contro-! China in 1000, could hurt Ru? but some reports, appareAtly' ,versy over alleged Soviet tail, mania seriously despite Its moro substantial,, say its krill 'ore to deliver ra+t materials steadily Increasing commerce take place in January, v,th and industrial goods ,aromised with West Germany, France, Communist unity, the. `I lz'tta?i to Rumania under long-term Italy and other Western states. pest meeting and the Ryrwa? Trade agreements. However, the present Soviet nian problem high ~1C th Neither Russian, BBumanianl leaders are . generally con agenda. for Western sources have sidered unlikely to behave In The difficulties of t?reEir::. been able. to confirm or deny so impetuous a manner. Sevl Lion are Increased by toe, ec- whether Soviet deliveries have) oral of them, notably Presi? ollection that w he n tit'lin been tardy or lnstifi dent, oil dent Nlkolat Podgorny, are expelled Yugoslavia fr rp 1ha to specify which if any goodst known to favor a live-and-let- Communist bloc on J4 1 2a were being hold hack Ilive policy with the Rumanian 1048, It became know 0 ly; !? Nevertheless. observers Dept, as well as the Yugoslav "Na. then that the crisis bet en stressed the inciiisin^ in Fri-i tionai Communists." Belgrade and Moscow had ',day night's o t" rwi+e bland` Podgorny was reported to. been under way for near] Soviet'tum h'^.r c ,im:,nr~ue have paid a secret visit tol)'ear., `pf the ilhra~c that the, two Rumania last summer-whlch sides had "exchanged opin- Sons" on the fulfillment of earlier trade agreements. Ob- servers said that had the So- vlets denied any conscious pressures, agreed to Investi- I gate non-deliveries, or pro- vided reasonable technical ex- planations, the communique would not have registered an they apparently feel obliged to demon- strate, somehow or other, that the com- munist movement is still a force that counts on the international scene, and .this feeling may be reinforced, perhaps, misguidedly, by the defiance of- Peking and Havana. A second reason is probably' ?the problem of their own standing in the communist movement. Brought up as the direct heirs of the Bolshevik revolution, ,Russia's leaders cannot, it seems, quite shake off the feeling that all-or at any. rate, most-communist parties ought to look up to Moscow in some kind of ,special way. They cannot resist hankering after some kind of communist consensus that would be initiated in Moscow and more or less meekly accepted by the rest. But what kind of a consensus ' Not about the ' correct path of internal deve~Qj~ ! t nt f a cmnis state be~a iW RL't ?CrBe 3 Q4.~21 experimentation going on (in eastern Europe) and anyway the Russians can hardly claim to be giving a lead here. They may, however, argue that a con- ference confined to specific issues that can all he presented as part of an " anti. l imperialist " crusade might well secure virtually unanimous agreement. After all, every good communist is against " US imperialism." Other issues, like' Germany and the Middle East, 111i [it be more difficult to manage because dbnmtunists in ;power are increasingly sensitive to the ]national interests and prejudices of the `countries they govern. In fact, enlightened self-interest rather than loyalty to Moscow will be the pre- dominant feeling at any world communist meeting. Everyone will be on their guard against any attempt by the Russians to circumscribe their freedom of action. It used to be the Chinese whose position was under scrutiny at international conr- munist gatherings. In ' future, however much criticism may be hurled at the ( llr0i R78d08i;t6(VAOO40f1040D06 be the Russians who are on trial,