(Sanitized) GUIDELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

SE CRE7 TRcocP4
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February 1968
WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVES
1 PROBLEMS-OF REFORM IN CHILE (WH)
2. SOVIET PENETRATION OF NIGERIA (AF, EUR, NE)
3 HANOI AND THE VIET CONG FACE MULTIPLYING
PROBLEMS
COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ABROAD OUSTED DURING 1967
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(13 December 1967 to 16 January 1968)
1. Preparations for the Budapest consultative meeting continue to
hold the center of attention of most of the Communist world. A CPSU
statement carried by TASS on 9 January disclosed that the opening date
will be 26 February and confirmed reports that the Hungarian invitation
was sent only to the 81 parties which participated in the 1960 Moscow
conference, contradicting the 25 November announcement that "all" fra`
ternal parties would be included. This excluded the Yugoslav party --
which stated its intent to boycott the meeting under any circumstances.
The Budapest daily NEPSZABADSAG claimed on 24 December that "some 30"
parties had declared their intent to join the 18 signatories; TASS has
since; then reported acceptances by a number of parties, but it is not
clear.whether these are in addition to those counted by NEPSZABADSAG.
There has been (at this writing) no indication that any of the Far East
parties has yet committed itself.
2. Meanwhile, various developments underscore Soviet difficulties
in managing Communist affairs even among generally Moscow-oriented CP's:
a. The Italians and Yugoslavs are organizing a 22 January
Rome meeting of representatives of some 20-25 Communist and other
left-wing political parties from countries bordering on the Medi-
terranean to plan "a major conference dealing with threats to peace
in the area" on the very eve of the Budapest conference. Yugoslav
Communists, who leaked the story to the western press in Belgrade,
reportedly view the conference as "something of a slap at the Soviet
Union," according to the NEW YORK TIMES of 14 January 1968.
b. Rumania became further estranged from the USSR and the Sov-
iet bloc. The 14-15 December visit of Ceausescu with CPSU leaders
produced a communique described as the coldest ever resulting from
a visit of a Communist leader; at least one foreign correspondhnt
in Moscow described the situation as "the brink of a major crisis."
(Anatole Shub in the WASHINGTON POST). On 3-4 January Ceausescu
paid a "friendship visit" to Tito which was seen as a consultation
on opposition to the Budapest meeting. (However subsequent news
reports indicate the Rumanians will attend that conference.) Mean-
while, a Rumanian delegation signed new protocols,, in Tel'iiv on
19 December greatly increasing trade and providing for joint indus-
trial ventures. And in Bonn it was reported on 12 January that
Rumania imported more industrial machinery and equipment from West
Germany in 1967 than from the USSR for the first time since World
War II. West Germany has become Rumania's principal creditor.
c. The Czechoslovakian Communists finally ousted old-liner
Novotny from his 14-year Party leadership on 5 January in a stormy
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Central Committee plenum which began 19 December (recessed on the
21st for the holidays), despite Brezhnev's hasty visit to Prague
on 8-9 December in an apparent attempt to avert the action. The
compromise victor, 46-year-old Alexander Dubcek, moved in from the
top spot in the Slovakian party organization, thus becoming the
first Slovak to head the national party. There seemed to be nothing
in Dubcek's background foreshadowing resistance to Soviet policies;
indeed, he grew up in the USSR while his dedicated Communist father
worked there. Less than a week after he took command the Party's
official daily, RUDE PRAVO, published an article which set forth in
broad outline a series of radical policy proposals which appear to
be more liberal domestically than those of the Yugoslav "revision-
ists", and more independent internationally than those of Rumania.
(These, however are similar to articles in the same paper last sum-
mer and may well represent only the hopes of the liberals, not the
policy of the new leadership.)
d. Further Soviet problems with Cuba were seen when, only four
days after PRAVDA on 29 December glorified the Soviet "oil bridge
... guaranteeing the supply of oil to the Cuban economy," Castro
announced stringent gasoline rationing and other curbs on oil because
Soviet deliveries had been so inadequate that Cuba had to use its
military reserves.
e. In mid-January the Communist; press revealed ex post facto
that the Soviet "troika" -- Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny -- had
made secret visits to Warsaw, on 13-14+ January, and to East Berlin,
on 15-16 January. This was the highest-level Soviet delegation to
travel abroad since Khrushchev's trips with Bulganin. Speculation
on the reasons for such a move included discussion of further prep-
arations for the Budapest conference, measures to curb West Germany's
growing ties with Eastern Europe, and discussion of the new Czech
leadership ... but there have been no "inside" reports as yet.
3. The most notable Soviet Bloc achievement during this period was
a 19-21 December Warsaw meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers which
drew Rumanian and Yugoslav participation. It produced a weak communique
which did not repeat their earlier charge of Israeli "aggression", bal-
anced a renewed call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab ter-
ritory with the reaffirmation of Israeli's right to exist, and failed
to mention any pledge of military and economic aid to the Arabs.
4. Moscow suffered public exposure of internal unrest during this
period, brought into the open by the daring opposition of a number of
brave Moscovites to the regime's efforts to crack down on dissident intel-
lectuals. Even the daily organ of the British Communist Party, MORNING
STAR, was moved to condemn the secrecy of the trail of Galanskov and his
colleagues in a front-page editorial on 13 January. And in New Delhi,
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where Svetlana Alliluyeva chose freedom last year, there was a repeat
performance on a lower level as 28-year-old Aziz S. Ulug-zade, member
of a Soviet youth delegation and son of a prominent Tadzhik writer,
slipped away from his colleagues and requested asylum in the U.S. Embassy
an 20 December. After complicated negotiations, he was permitted by the
Indian Government to leave on 31 December for refuge in Great Britain.
5. Reports from Communist China indicate the continued spread of
disorder and violence in many areas. Most schools are apparently still
closed, despite the orders to reopen last fall. Meanwhile, a speech by
Peking Revolutionary Committee Chairman Hsieh Fu-chih, reported in Can-
ton Red Guard newspaper WEN NO TUNG HSUN of 11 December, indicates that
the Chinese CP is planning to hold a national congress -- the last was its
8th in 1956 -- between. May and October of this year. It will be totally
rigged, with delegates appointed from the top down. Further Chinese
isolation from the world resulted from the expulsion of the only Czech
correspondent from Peking 15 January, and the closing of the NCNA office
in Brussels on 22 December.
6. Miscellany: A pro-Chinese "Parti Communiste Marxiste-Leniniste
de France" was formally constituted by dissidents formerly associated in
the "Mouvement M-L" at a 30-31 December congress in Aixe-en-Provence.
The weekly L'HUMANITE NOUVELLE will continue as the organ of the party.
....The strengthened Berlin' wall permitted only 120 refugees to escape
across the boundary in 1967, according to the Wast Berlin "August 13"
organization.
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7 January 1968
G YRGHT
'56 Soviet TV Film Omits Khrushchevl
ap.UU to The New York T1mes
year. But the rebellion, which The producers were frank!
was suppressed by the Soviet about the tragedies of those
Army, is described as a result years, however, and particularly
of plotting and active interven- denounced the dictator for the
lion by Western imperiatists, purges In which thousands were
1shot and millions sent to labor
primarily the United States. camps.
MOSCOW, Jan. 6-Nikita S.
Khrushchev, in his momentous
"secret speech" before the 20th
Congress of the Soviet Com-
munist party in 1956, exposed
Stalin as a tyrant whose abuses
of power had caused suffering
to millions and inflicted great
harm on Soviet society.
The speech marked a turning
point In Soviet history, but in
a one-hour television documen-
tary, about that turbulent year,
the producers have succeeded
in recalling the events without
once mentioning Mr. Khrusch-
chev's name or even alluding
to his existence. He was ousted
from power three years ago.
The documentary shown to.
night, briefly records that the
20th party congress demolished
the myth of Stalin and con.
demned his rule of terrorism.
But full credit Is given to the
party and its Central Commit-
tee.
Hungarian Revolt Recalled
The film also deals with the
anti-Communist uprising in
Hungarian rebels are shown
firing on streets at troops and
security police. The narrator
says. that weapons and anti
Communist Hungarian emigres
had been infiltrated into the
country from Austria.
The television documentary
films, each devoted to a year
of Soviet rule, began to bet
shown last fall to mark the
50th anniversary of the Bolshe-
vik Revolution, celebrated
Nov. 7.
The programs were inter-
rupted shortly before the holi.
day and were resumed Dec. 25
with 1953, the year of Stalin's
death.
In contrast to the blackout on
Mr. Khrushchev, the films about
the nineteen-thirties and forties
occasionally showed Stalin,'
usually without comment.
WASHINGTON POST
7 January 1968.
Soviets Put
Nikita out
.Of Picture
Reuters
MOSCOW, Jan. 6 Soviet
historians, who decreed Josef
Stalin a nonperson, may have
decided the same fate for Niki-
ta Khrushchev, the Soviet lead
er who began the historic pro-
cess of destalinization.
Congress of the Communist
Party, at which Khrushchev,
then Party Secretary, de
The official Soviet motion
Picture record of the year
1956, released tonight, in.
eludes the momentous 20th
The films about the years,'
after Stalin's death have care-
fully avoided mention of Mr.
Khrushchev, who became party
~chiief, and Georg,' M. Malenkov,
who took over the premiership.
Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin,
who was named Premier in 1955
forced to step down, appeared
fleetingly in a scene of young
Communist volunteers arriving
in Kazakhstan to plant the the
vast vigin lands to wheat. The
marshal's portrait was being
raised by someone at the edge
of a crowd of welcomers.
. Narration of the years since
Stalin death poses a sensitive
political problem for the films'
producers since most of the
members of the post-Stalin col-
lective leadership have since
been disbraced.
ality" and liquidating his hne-
mies in a reign of terror.
But the motion picture does
not name either Stalin or
Khrushchev, who was ousted
In 1964 and now lives in re-
tirement in Moscow.
The commentator of the
movies-part of a series de.
voted to 50 years of Commu?
nist power-begins to speak
in solemn tones and back-
ground music fades out as the
movie comes to the 20th Con.
gress.
Ile'tells listeners that dele.
gates' to the Congress dis-
cussed "temporary failures
and mistakes."
The film at no time shows
the Presidium of the Congress
wh
-
ere Khrushchev sat-but
only shots of rank-and?filc
delegates.
A brief reference to the
arrival of Yugoslav President!
Tito for his first visit t
M
s
I
o
o
?
pounced the 1 e d' tfor for cow after the s w'
f~j.pvod-, ?g>tr a M. 005/ d Rsi;At- oi4
Ing a train and striding across
the platform with his hand
outstretched.
But as he approaches his
host, Khrushchev, the scene
fades out.
 CPYRGH7
28 December 1967
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Spanish 'party challenges the policies of their countries
now. It Policies that its own
diplomatic and economic seuvi-
.~ ... fine eauld d t t th
o m
rn
e
1st royalists" to prevail. it had
TILE S p a n I a h Communist ! to give them some indication of
h I
d
P
hi
s manage
arty, w
c
from a secret headquarters In
Eastern Europe on funds pro.
vided by the Kremlin, has
bitten hard the hand that feeds
It
The party has rejected
Moscow's prompting that It
The Communist
World
by Victor Zorza
o
a urn
isting regimes away from
pendence on the United States.
The Kremlin's Spanish policy
should work with other political
forces in Spain to establish a
constitutional monarchy. It Soviet support. This is why the
added insult to injury by Izvestia" article was published.
announcing this over ' Radio The quarrel between the
Independent Spain," a sup- Spanish party-in-exile and the
posedly clandestine radio station Kremlin reflects the wider dis-
which Is operated from Czecho- pute in the world Communist
Slovakia with the aid of Soviet movement between the
funds. moderates and the radicals. In
The Soviet Union's preference Latin America the Cubans and
for Spahish royalty was con- their associates, much farther to
veyed by an article in "Izvestiathe Left than the Spanish party,
the official. Government paper, 'represent the radicals who are
Had the article appeared In a :impatient at Russia's flirtation
"less responsible paper," said with the "reactionary" regimes.
the Spanish Communist Party's They suspect that the
reply,. we would have taken no Kremlin is pursuing Russian
notice of it." But the publication national Interests In Latin'
of it In "Izvestia " might cause America rather than those of the
some people to think, said the' world revolution, and that In
broadcast, that the article doing so it is hindering their.
reflected the views of the Spanish own revolution. This Is a com
party, or, worse still, that it was plaint often heard in the Conr-
an attempt to " correct " the munist parties since the early
party's attitude. days of the Comintern, particu-
But the article was neither of larly after Stalin transformed the,
these things, the broadcast Communist International into a
declared. " We formulate our tool of Soviet foreign policy.
town policy" If the party were
Gold estion
to o " follow the line 1* set out in qu
" Izvestia," the broadcast said., There were certainly many
the Spanish Communists would Spanish Communists during the.
fall into error. Spanish Civil War who thought
The broadcast thus says, in that their party was being bled
effect, that the " Izvestia " to death for the greater glory of
.article was not an attempt to . Stalin. Their suspicions were
dictate to the Spanish party-but silenced by the r u t h l e s s
that. If It was, the Spanish party operations of Stalin's s e c r e t
will not have it. This Is only an police whose tentacles extended
attempt to sweeten the pill, for. even over the battleflelds of
the writer of the " Izvestia " Spain.
article cannot have been in recent -years, there have
!unaware of the party's uncom- been several unofficial attempts
promising stand against the by Moscow to reestablish diplo-
monarchy.
First step'
in other words, "Izvestia "
was reflecting the views of the
Kremlin, as it always does In
matters of policy. There is some
disagreement among Spanish
;Communists as to whether they
of the monarchy as a first. step.
matic relations with Spain. One
of the difficulties which stands
In the way of a reconciliation is
' the question of Spanish gold, 500
.tons of which was shipped to
Moscow during the civil war. So
far the Russians have refused to
return IL
The Spanish Communists,
whose political following in the
country is small but not
Insignificant, would naturally
suspect that In Spain, too, Russia
Because the Spanish party 1s, seeking to satisfy its own
Internal affairs. But since the whether the Communists can
interference in the party's #ry ' rotilme's bet'ause It uuhlr
and it would evidently prefer to
:see a liberal "constitutional
monarchy" as a step towards a
regime of the Left. The Spanish
Communists, on the other hand,
fear that a constitutional
monarchy might .prove to be so
strong as to keep their party
out in the cold for a long time-
to come.
In a statement broadcast by
"Radio Independent Spain" at
the beginning of this month, the
s general secretary of the Spanish
!Communist Party, Santiago Car-
rifle, maintained that the Com-
munls+ts had repeatedly said that
they would never take part in
any action to restore the
monarchy. If the monarchy was
restored, they would regard It
as a " continuation of the dicta.
torship," even though it might
try to present itself as a
" liberal " regime.
But the "Izvestia " article,
published a few days later. said
that " monarchy " and " reaction "
need not be synonymous. Den-
mark and Norway were monar-
,chies, but their peoples enjoyed
democratic freedoms
In a remark that might have
been addressed directly to the
Spanish Communist Party,
"Izvestia" said that "one must
not fail to take into account the
possibility of the restoration of
the monarchy, if only for a time."
Don Juan, the Pretender,
"Izvestia" said, was In favour
of a dynamic and liberal
monarchy, and had declared that
he Wanted to occupy the throne
only with the support and
agreement of the people.
Differences
Where, asked " Radio Indepcn.
dent Spain," had " Izvestia "
obtained Don Juan's views I
" We do not know these
opinions," it declared. The
" Izvestia " article had presented
" a variety of debatable proposi-
tions " which " were bound to
cause confusion "-presumably
in the minds of party members,
who might come to look with
favour on a constitutional
' monarchy, in opposition to the
party leadership.
But there was a " profound
difference" between the stand of
" our party," said the broadcast,
and the view expressed by
" Izvestia." That was why the
party had decided to publish
this " Inrlflcsi bii" ut If as
more than a c~artAcation--ft is
this, the -Kremlin could not those of the Spanish Communist a challenge, and a declaration of
formal declare that It favoure Party. Independence. which Is sympto-
~itd ,t1~ i n w situation In the
since thishl VpgkP>~tlerc}t gasq 21Q~ cr 0 *6MLb3061A000U96Ilist movement.
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F:OR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968
PROBLEMS OF REFORM IN CHILE
Eduardo FREI Montalva's election as President of Chile in September
196+ was hailed by democratic forces as a major step forward in the his-
tory of a country long considered one of the most stable and democratic
in Latin America. It was hoped that his dynamic, reform-minded Christian
Democratic administration would prove to be an effective alternative to
Communism by offering a real route to social and economic progress. Frei's
decisive victory in the presidential election was followed six months
later by an impressive Christian Democratic Party (PDC) showing in the
March 1965 congressional elections. The PDC, won a majority in the Chamber
of Deputies as well all the Senate seats it contested. However, the
Senate majority remained in opposition hands, presenting a serious ob-
stacle to the passage of Frei's reform measures. Since December 1966 the
Senate has been controlled by an informal coalition of the Communist-
Socialist front, FRAP (Popular Action Front), and the opportunistic Radi-
cal Party (PR), supported at times by the conservative National Party (PN).
In January 1967 the PN voted with this combination in the Senate to
embarrass the government by withholding permission for Frei to make an
official trip to the United States.
Christian Democratic Party
What is Christian Democracy? Its definition varies from country to
country in Latin America. The movement is a force on the left which
espouses change and reform, often radical in nature. It has parties in
16 of Latin America's 20 countries, but only in four of them -- Chile,
Peru, Venezuela and El Salvador -- is the movement of current political
significance. In only one of these -- Chile -- is the PDC the governing
party. Christian Democracy is based essentially on the Roman Catholic
Church's growing liberalization in social issues. While the majority
of Christian Democrats are Roman Catholics, the ideology of the party
throughout Latin America is one of general Christian practice and
not especially one that is grounded in the precepts and tenets of Roman
Catholicism. Many Latin American Christian Democrats have renounced the
teachings of the Catholic Church. The changes advocated by the PDC are
broad in range and include agrarian and tax reform, and extensive economic
planning and control by the state. Classical capitalism is repudiated.
The Christian Democratic movement is def4nitely on the left, but the
distance from the center varies from country to country. No matter where
the parties stand, however, Chile's President Frei may be regarded as the
symbolic hemispheric leader of the movement.
Recent PDC Trends toward the Far Left
After Frei's victory the PDC was faced with the problem of changing
from an opposition party to a governing party. Frei had drained off many
of the most able, moderate party members for positions in his government,
leaving a leadership vacuum which he himself refused to fill -- he feels
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that the position of the presidency transcends party leadership respon-
sibilities. The left-wing "rebel" faction of the PDC -- taking advantage
of its newly acquired freedom of action -- gained control of the party
on 16 July 1967 by taking over the national council and the presidency
of the party.
Five days before the party elections last July, the PDC rebel fac-
tion asserted its independence of the Frei administration by engineering
a party resolution approving the formation of a Chilean committee of the
Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO). The
declaration damaged Chile's image in both North and South America and
disheartened Christian Democrats elsewhere in Latin America who had
regarded the Chilean party as a prime example of successful radical
reforms through peaceful means. Frei reacted by denouncing LASO and
labeling Chilean delegates to the LASO Conference as "traitors," point-
ing out that while he had no legal means of preventing LASO from forming
a local committee, his government "will repress without hesitation any
subversive intent and will not permit Chile to be the base for any action
whatsoever which interferes in the free self-determination of other
peoples," adding that "Chile has all the means necessary" to control
extremists.
One of the first acts of the new PDC governing group was to appoint
a commission to "stimulate a non-capitalistic way of development." The
commission's "Chonchol Report" advocated large-scale government inter-
vention in the economy and nationalization of industry and conflicted
directly with Frei's more moderate reform program. Shortly thereafter,
the rebels demanded that Frei shake up his cabinet, firing the ministers
of health and labor, whom they considered too far to the conservative
right; Frei refused, saying that the selection of cabinet officers is
the prerogative of the president -- but he did compromise by agreeing
to consult the new party leadership on important questions of internal
and foreign affairs.
A drop in popular support for both Frei and the PDC was indicated
in the 2 April 1967 municipal elections, when Frei, placing his adminis-
tration and program on the line in the hope of turning the municipal
voting into a plebescite for the PDC, received only 35.6 per cent of
the vote -- a distinct decrease from the 42.3 percentage received in
the 1965 congressional elections.
However, Frei regained at least interim control of the PDC on
7 January of this year at a special party convention where after a
hard-fought 15-hour battle during which the President made two personal
apperances to defend his program -- he received a vote of confidence of
278 against 202. Senator Rafael Gumucio, the rebel leader, and his
directorate stepped down to make room for the new chairman, Jaime Castillo
Velasco, former Land and Colonization Minister and staunch supporter of
President Frei. The PDC convention pledged support for Frei's reform
program, including his wage adjustment legislation, but voted against
his one-year ban on strikes. (See Attachment A)
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Communist Party of Chile (P.CCh)
During the course of the recent disputes in Latin America between
adherents of the Cuban brand of militant revolutionary Communism and the
advocates of the more moderate Moscow line of peaceful revolution, the
PCCh has consistently favored the "via pacifica." Secretary General
Luis Corvalan is one of the foremost Latin American proponents of the
theory that the correct strategy for achieving Communist goals in a par-
ticular country can best be determined by the local Communist Party, and
that armed revolution is not the way to success in Chile. To prove this
thesis the PCCh will have to make an all out effort to gain power through
legal means; therefore it can be expected to attempt to broaden its
popular base aslmuch as possible in preparation for the 1970 election.
Corvalan, in an article in the "World Marxist Review" for July 1967 (see
Attachment B), claims that this is being accomplished: "The Communist
effort gradually to win over the masses from the Christian Democrats,
delivering them from bourgeois influence and rallying petit-bourgeois
support for the People's Action Front, is bearing fruit." Since July
1967 PCCh has made several steps toward inspiring a loose left-to-far-
left coalition with the Radical and Socialist parties, even though a
new split within the Socialists themselves (see below) and other factors
may keep these three parties from any meaningful coalition behind a
common presidential candidate in 1970. The PCCh took an active part in
the campaign of Alberto Baltra, the Radical Party's +aandidate for the
senatorial by-election on 17 December 1967, and the Communists and the
Radicals are likely to continue their cooperation. Baltra won the
senate seat by a narrow margin over the PDC candidate Jorge Lavandero,
who received little help from his party.
Socialist Party of Chile (PS)
Dissensions within the PS during the last year tended to strain the
unity of the FRAP, the Communist-Socialist coalition of several years'
standing, in its struggle against the Frei administration. In a PS Party
plenum in June Senator Raul Ampuero, motivated by presidential ambitions
and disagreeing with Socialist Party leader Salvador Allende, withdrew
from the meeting, taking with him another Senator, six deputies, and 15
(of about 30) regional secretaries. Ampuero, who has since been expelled
from the party, threatens to drain off the remainder of his so-called
"popular socialist" following from the PS and establish a party of his
own -- thereby creating a special dilemma for the Communists, who would
then be forced to maintain working relations with two groups opposed to
each other.
At the PS Party congress in November, Senate President Allende, long
a supporter of Castro's extremist views, suddenly found himself on the
other side of the fence. The extremist faction of the PS, which had come
out strongly against supporting Radical Party candidate Baltra for the
special senatorial election on 17 December, vilifying the PR as an
"opportunistic bourgeois grouping," and condemning the electoral process
as a means to power, decided not to participate in the election. Allende,
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booed when he counseled moderation toward the Radicals, threatened to
resign the Senate presidency and did, in fact, later turn over his official
duties to an acting president. Meanwhile, the extremist faction, strength-
ened by the Ampuero withdrawal from party leadership, threatened to form
a new party -- possibly in combination with the Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR) and other ultra extremists -- unless the congress adopted
a harder line toward elections. The congress finally decided on a compro-
mise course -- to abstain from the December senatorial by-election and
participate in future elections on a selective basis only. The decision
will further increase the strains within FRAP, since the PCCh is committed
to the legal road to power.
Student Trends toward the Far Left
In the student field there has also been a significant turn to the
extreme left. In the Concepcion University Student Federation (FEC)
elections the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Socialist
University Brigade (BUS) formed a coalition to defeat the Christian Demo-
cratic slate. The FEC Council will be composed of five members of the
winning coalition, three Christian Democratic Youth members and one Radi-
cal Youth member. The new president, Luciano Cruz of the MI4, was expelled
from the Communist Party youth organization in 196+ for adopting a posi-
tion more radical and extreme than that held by the Communist Party. The
election of Cruz would seem to indicate that University of Concepcion
students openly support violent revolutionary change.
Frei's Reform Program
In spite of opposition from both the extreme left and the far right,
the PDC reform program has made some headway. Just past the mid point of
his "revolution in liberty," Frei has managed to obtain some of the neces-
sary legislation for his program, although in his own party the left wing
seems to have more in common with the Communist-Socialist Popular Action
Front than with the-government.- Frei's land reform program has been.
hailed as the best of its kind in Latin America. The Land Reform law,
which was signed 16 July 1967 by Frei, proposes to parcel out 100,000
small holdings to landless farm workers, squatters who have worked land
they do not own for at` 'least five years, sharecroppers, renters, and
caretakers or owners of land insufficient to support one family. The
lan.d,which will be sold to peasants without down payment and on long-term
credit, will be expropriated from other land holders, who will be paid in
cash and bonds over the next 25 years. Land can be expropriated if it is
larger than 160 acres of irrigated land, if it has been abandoned and lies
fallow, or if it is poorly administered or upproductive. This does not
mean all large farms will be taken over by the government for sale. In
outlining his program Frei has said: "There are 260,000 farms in Chile;
we propose to expropriate only 4,000 of these." All this is to be accomp-
lished in the next five years, according to'Frei's program. In this pro-
gram as well as in most of his other reforms, Frei is caught in a cross-
fire by his political opponents -- the Communist and Socialist parties
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are claiming that the law does not go far enough in that it will not pre-
vent the rich land-holders from hanging on to their properties by hook or
crook, and the rightwing interests contend that turning over good land to
Chile's ignorant campesinos is a criminal waste.
Inflation has long been recognized as a major problem in Chile by the
Frei administration. His latest measure to,combat increasing inflation is
a composed wage adjustment plan which would limit wage increases in both
public and private sectors, establish a wage increase partly payable in
slow-maturing government savings bonds, prohibit strikes for additional
wage increases and impose extensive price controls. A 24-hour general
strike in protest against this wage bill was called on 23 November by the
Single Center of Chilean Workers (CUTCh), which is controlled by the
Communist and Socialist Parties. The strike was also supported by non-
Communist unions not affiliated with CUTCh. The government initiated
proceedings against the leaders of the strike charging them with "organi-
zing, guiding and promoting" massive riots, Wrhich left at least five per-
sons dead and 66 injured. The 35-day strike at the Anaconda Copper Com-
pany's mine was settled on 4 December, with wage increases far above the
government's suggested guidelines. Other copper workers struck last month,
both in sympathy with the Anaconda miners and in cooperation with the
strike of 23 November. When their contracts expire next year they will
undoubtedly demand wage increases at least equal to those attained by the
Anaconda workers, thus ending Government hopes for wage and price restraint
in 1968.
Frei has initiated other reforms -- some quite unpopular with the
voters. In order to lessen Chile's dependence on imported foodstuffs and
conserve foreign exchange, he placed a ban on the sale of beef three
weeks out of every four; and in an effort to regularize the working day,
he shortened the daily three-hour siesta and placed strict regulations on
the hours of movies and bars. In the fields of education and housing the
Frei administration had made significant progress. Other portions of
Frei's reform program, however, have not fared so well -- his revision of
corporation law have been held up by the opposition majority in the senate.
Any attempt to assess the Frei government's popularity, however, must
take into account his successes and failures on issues such as agrarian
reform and inflation. It is still too early to judge the effectiveness
of his agrarian program -- just getting underway -- but he managed to
reduce inflation from 48 per cent a year when the PDC took over in 1965
to 19 per cent in 1966.
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Febrero de 1968
PROBLFMAS DE IA REFORMA EN CHILE
La eleccidn de Eduardo Frei Montalva como Presidente de Chile, en
septiembre de 1964, fu4 considerada por las fuerzas democrdticas como un
paso hacia adelante en la historia de un pals considerado por largo tiempo
como uno de los mds estables y democrdticos de Latinoameriea. Se espe-
raba que su administraci6n Cristiano-Dem6crata, dindmica y reformista,
probarla ser una alternativa efectiva al comunismo, ofreciendo una ruta
verdadera hacia el progreso econ6mico y social. La decisiva victoria de
Frei en las elecciones presidenciales fud seguida, seis meses mds tarde,
en las elecciones para congresistas de 1965, per la presencia del impre-
sionante Partido Dem6crata Cristiano (PDC). El PDC obtuvo la mayorfa
en la Comara de Diputados y en todas las curules del Senado; sin embar-
go, el Senado permaneci6 en manes de la oposici6n, presentando un serio
obstdculo en la aprobaci6n de las medidas de reformas presentadas por
Frei. Desde diciembre de 1966 el Senado ha estado controlado por una
coalici6n informal del frente Socialista-Comunista, FRAP (Frente de
Acci6n Popular), y del oportunista Partido Radical (PR), apoyado en oca-
siones por el conservador Partido National (PN). En enero de 1967 el
PN vot6 con esta combination en el Senado con el fin de sabotear al go-
bierno denegando el permiso a Frei de un viaje oficial a los Estados
Unidos.
Partido Dem6crata Cristiano
Qud es Democracia Cristiana? Su definici6n en America Latina,
varfa segun el pals. El movimiento es una fuerza de izquierda que pro-
mulga cambio y reforma, a menudo en forma radical. Tiene partidos en
16 de los 20 passes de la America Latina, pero solamente en cuatro de
ellos - Chile, Peru, Venezuela y El Salvador - el movimiento tiene una
verdadera importancia polftica. Unicamente en uno de estos passes
- Chile - el PDC es el partido que gobierna. La Democracia Cristiana
estd basada esencialmente en la creciente liberacidn social de la
Iglesia Catdlica Romana. Aunque la mayorfa de los cristiano-dem6cratas
son cat6licos romanos, la ideologla del Partido, a traves de America
Latina, es la practicada por la generalidad.de los cristianos y no estd
especialmente basada en los preceptor y normas del Catolicismo Romano.
Muchos cristiano-dem6cratas latinoamericanos 'fan renunciado a las ense-
fianzas de la Iglesia Catdlica. Los cambios abogados por el PDC son muy
amplios e incluyen las reformas agraria y de impuestos, un extenso plan
econ6mico y el control por el estado. El capitalismo cldsico es repu-
diado. El movimiento Cristiano-Dem6crata es definitivamente de izquier-
da, pero la distancia que to separa del centro varfa segun el pals.
An sin tener en cuenta las tendencias de los partidos, puede conside-
rarse al Presidente Frei de Chile como lfder simb6lico del movimiento
en el hemisferio.
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Recientes Tendencias del PDC hacia is Extreme Izquierda
Despu4s de is victoria de Frei, el PDC se en;rent6 con el proble-
ms de tener que cambiar de partido de oposici6a a partido de gobierno.
Frei ha extrafdo de su partido a muchos de los miembros moderados mds
capacitados pars ocupar posiciones en su gobierno, dejando un vacfo en
la jefatura que 61 mismo rehusa ilenar -- 41 siente que la posici6n pre
sidencial est6 por encima de las responsabilidades de is jefatura del
partido. Ls fracci&n "rebelde" del ale izquierda del PDC -- aprove
chdndose de su libertad de acci6n recientemente adquirida, obtuvo el
control del partido el 16 de Julio de 1967, tomando las riendas del
consejo nacional y ocupando is presidencia del partido.
Cinco dfas antes de las elecciones del partido en Julio pasado,
la fracci6n rebelde del PDC asent6 su independencia de is administraci6n
de Frei con is elaboraci6n de una resoluci6n del partido aprobando is
formaci6n de un comit6 chileno de is 0rganizaci6n Latinoamericana de
Solidaridad (OCAS) - organizaci6n apoyada por Cuba. La deelaraci6n
afect6 is imagen de Chile en Norte y Sur Am4rica y descorazon6 a los
cristiano-demdcratas en toda Am4rica Latina que hab:fan visto en el par-
tido chileno el primer ejemplo del 4xito de las reformas radicales por
medios pacfficos. Frei reaccion6 denunciando a OCAS y tildando de
"traidores" a los delegados chilenos a is Conferenc:La de OCAS, senalan
do que aunque 61 no tenfa medios legales pars imped:tr a OCAS is formaci6n
de un comit6 local, su gobierno "reprimir6 sin vacilar todo intento sub-
versivo y no permitird que Chile sea la base pars cual ,uier acci6n que
interfiers con is libre determinaci6n de otros pueblos', anadiendo,
"Chile tiene todos los medios necesarios" pars controlar a los extre-
mistas.
Uno de los primeros actos del nuevo grupo gobernante del PDC
fug el de nombrar una comisi& pars "estimular una forms no capitalis-
ts de desarrollo". La comisi6n "Iaforme Chonchol", abog6 por una in-
tervenci6n del gobierno en gran escala en is economi.'a y en is naciona-
lizacidn de is industria e interfiri6 directamente con el programs de
reforms mds moderado de Frei. Poco despuds los rebeldes pidieron que
Frei rehiciera su gabinete ministerial, suspendiendo a los ministros
de Salud y de Trabajo, a quienes ellos consideraban de tendencias de-
masiado derechistas. Frei se neg6 diciendo que la selecci6n de los
miembros del gabinete era una prerrogativa del presidente - pero se
comprometi6 accediendo a consultar con is nueva jefatura del partido
importantes aspectos sobre asuntos internos e internacionales.
Las elecciones municipales del 2 de abril de 1967 indicaron una
baja en el apoyo a Frei y al PDC, cuando Frei, al poner su administra-
ci6n y su programs en juego con is esperanza de convertir las elecciones
municipales en un plebiscito pare el PDC, obtuvo solemente el 35,6 por
ciento de la votaci6n - una baja apreciable del 1+2,3 por ciento que
obtuvo en las elecciones pars congresistas en 1965.
Sin embargo, Frei volvi6 a ganar por lo menos el control inte-
rino del PDC el 7 de enero de este aflo en was convenci6n especial del
tsrtido, donde - despu4s de was ardorosa lucha de 15 horas, durante
less cuales el presidente se hizo presente dos veces pars defender su
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programs, recibid un voto de confianza de 278 contra 202. El lfder re-
belde, Senador Rafadl Gumucio y su directiva se retiraron para dejar el
lugar al nuevo director, Jaime Castillo Velasco, Ex-ministro de Tierras
y Colonizacidn y partidario incondicional de Frei. La convenei6n del
PDC invoc6 la ayuda pare el programs de reforms de Frei incluyendo su
legislacidn sobre ajuste de salarios pero vote en contra de su procla-
ma de ilegalizar las huelgas durante un ano (v4ase anexo A).
Partido Comunista Chileno (PCCh)
Durante el curso de las recientes disputas en Amdrica Latina entre
los partidarios del comunismo revolucionario militante de sello cubano
y los partidarios de is lfnea de Moscd, de revolucidn pacffica, el PCCh
ha favorecido continuamente is "v:fa pacffica". El Secretario General
Luis Corvaldn es uno de los principales proponentes latinoamericanos de
la teorfa de que is estrategia corrects pars lograr las metal comunistas
en un determinado pats, debe ser establecida por el partido comunista
en un determinado:,pafs, y clue una revoluci6n armada no es la forma de
obtener dxito en Chile. Para probar data tCsis, el PCCh tendril que ha-
cer un verdadero esfuerzo a fin de ilegar al poder por medios legates;
sin embargo, es de esperar que intente aumentar su base popular tanto
como sea posible a fin de prepararse pars las elecciones de 1970. Cor-
valdn, en un artfculo en la "World Marxist Review" (Revista Mundial
Marxists) de Julio de 1967 (ver anexo B), pretende que se estd logrando,
"el esfuerzo comunista de ganarse gradualmente a las masas de los cris-
tianos demdcratas, liberdndolas de is influencia burguesa y obteniendo
el soporte del peque n burgues pare el Frente de Accidn Popular, estd
dando su fruto". Desde Julio de 1967 el PCCh ha dado varios pasos ha-
cia is inspiraci6n de una coalicidn suelta de izquierda a extreme ipio:
ghierda con los partidos Radical y Socialists, adn cuando una nuevarup-
tura dentro de los mismos socialistas (vdase adelante) y otros factores,
pueden mantener a estos partidos apartados de ens coalicidn significan-
te respaldando a un candidato presidencial comdn en las elecciones de
1970. El PCCh tomb parte active en is campana de Alberto Baltra, el
candidato del Partido Radical para las elecciones de senadores el 17 de
diciembre de 1967 y parece que los comunistas y los radicales conti-
nuardn dando su colaboracien. Baltra gan6 la curul del senado por un
estrecho margen sobre el candidato del PDC, quien recibid poca ayuda
de su partido.
Partido Socialists Chileno (PS)
Las disenciones dentro del PS durante el ano pasado tendieron a
atirantar is unidad del FRAP, is coalici6n comunista-socialista por
varios afios en su lucha contra is administracidn de Frei. En un pleno
del PS celebrado en Junio, el senador Radd1 Ampuero, ilevado por ambi-
ciones presidenciales y en desacuerdo con el lfder del Partido Socia-
lista, Salvador Allende, se retir6 de la asamblea, arrastrando consi-
go a un senador, seis diputados y quince (de aproximadamente 30) secre-
taries regionales. Ampuero, quien desde entonces ha estado expulsado
del partido, amenaza con buscar la escisidn del remanente de los que
41 llama "socialistas populares" que an siguen en el PS, y establecer
en partido propio -- creando por consiguiente un especial dilema a los
comunistas, quienes entonces tendrdn que mantener relaciones de trabaJo
con dos grupos opuestos entre sf.
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En el congreso del PS celebrado en noviembre, el Presidente del
Senado, Allende, por mucho tiempo partidario de los pantos de vista
extremistas de Castro se encontr6 al otro lado de is vaila. La frac-
ci6n extremista del PS que se habfa pronunciado fuertemente en contra
del apoyo al candidate del Partido Radical, Baltra? para las eleccio-
nes especiales de senadores del 17 de diciembre, calificando al PR de
"agrupaci6n burguesa oportunista" y condenando el proceso electoral
como medio del poder, decidi6 no participar en las elecciones. Allende
fug abucheado cuando aconsej6 moderaei6n hacia los radicales, amenaz6
on retirarse de la presidencia del senado y efectivemente lo hizo mas
tarde relegando su posici6n a un preside-ate encargado. Mientras tanto,
la fracci&n extremists reforzada con is renuncia de Ampuero de la jefa-
tura del partido, amenazaba con former un nuevo partido -- posiblemente
con el Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) y otros ultra-extre-
mistas -- a menos que el congreso adoptara una ifnea mds severs en las
elecciones. Finalmente el congreso se decidi6 por un curso de compro-
miso -- abstenorse en las elecciones pare senadores en diciembre y par-
ticipar en las elecciones futuras dnicamente en una base selectiva. La
decisi6a aumentard posteriormente las escisiones dentro del FRAP, ya
que el PCCh estd comprometido a is via legal pars el poder.
Tendencia de los Estudiantes hacia is Extremes Izguierda
En el campo estudiantil tambi4n ha habido un giro fundamental
hacia la extreme izquierda. En las elecciones de is Federaci6n Estu-
diantil de la Universidad de Concepci6n (FBC), el Movimiento de iz-
uierda revolucionaria (MIR) y is Brigada Universitaria Socialists
BUS) formaron una coalici6n pare derrotar a is fracci&n Dem6crata
Cristiana. El consejo de is FEC estard compuesto por cinco miembros
de is coalici6n ganadora, tres miembros-.de is Juventud Dem6crata-
Cristiana y un miembro de is Juventud Radical. El nuevo presidente,
Luciano Cruz, del MIR, fug expulsado de is organizaci6n de is juven-
tud del Partido Comunista en 1964 por adoptar una posici6n mds radical
y extreme que is que segufa el Partido Comunista. Is elecci6n de Cruz
parece indicar que los estudiantes de is Universidad de Concepci6n
apoyan abiertamente el cambio revolucionario violento.
Programs de Reforms de Frei
A pesar de is oposici6n tanto de is extreme derecha como de is
extreme izquierda, el programs de reforms del PDC ha hecho algdn progre-
so. Justamente, habiendo pasado del punto medio de au "revoluci6n en
libertad", Frei ha.conseguido obtener algo de is legs laci6n necesaria
pars su programs, an cuando en su propio partido el ala izquierda pa-
rezca estar ins en comdn con el Frente de Aeci6n Popular Comunista-So-
cialista que con el gobierno. El programs de reforms. agraria de Frei
ha sido ensaisado comp el mejor de su clase en Amdrica Latina. La Ley
de Reforms Agraria que fug firmada por Frei el 16 de Julio de 1967..
propone percelar 100.000 pequefios lotes pare los campesinos sin tierra,
arrendatarios que hayan trabajado por lo menos cinca aflos terrenos
ajenos, cosecheros, mayordomos o propietarios de tierra tusuficiente
pars mantener una familia. La tierra que nerd v*ndida a los campesinos
sin cuota inicial y a un largo plazo, serd expropiada a otros propieta-
rios a quienes se les pagard on dinero y on bones durante los 25 alas
siguientes. La tierra podrd ser a opiada si t s yor
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de 160 acres de tierra irrigada, si ha sido abandonada y permanece des-
montada o si estd pobremente administrada o se encuentra improductiva.
Esto no quiere decir que Codas las fincas grandes vayan a ser apropia-
das por el gobierno pars su vents. Al delinear este programs, Frei ha
dicho: "En Chile hay 260.000 fj.ncas; nos proponemos expropiar solamente
4.000". Todo esto serd llevado a cabo en los pr6ximos cinco anos de
acuerdo con el programs de Frei. En este programs al igual que en Is
mayor parte de sus otras reformas, Frei estd entre dos fuegos, sus opo-
nentes politicos - los.partidos socialista y comunista reclaman que is
ley no vs lo suficientemente lejos al no impedir que los terratenientes
retengan sus propiedades por medios tortuosos o aviesos, y los intereses
de las derechas claman que entregar buenas tierras a los ignorantes
campesinos chilenos es un desperdicio criminal.
La inflacidn ha sido reconocida durante largo tiempo por la ad-
ministracida de Frei como el mayor problems en Chile. Su ltima medida
pars combatir la creciente inflacidn es un plan compuesto de reajuste
de salarios que limite al aumento de los mismos, tanto en los sectores
pdblicos como privados, establecer un aumento en los salarios pagadero
parte en bonos de ahorro del gobierno a 1 argo plazo, prohibir las huel-
gas par demanda de aumento en los salarios e imponer un extenso control
sobre los precios. El 23 de noviembre, la Central Unica de Trabajadores
de Chile (CUTCh) que estd controlada por los partidos socialista y co-
munista, llam6 a una.huelga general de 24 horas en protests contra esta
ley de salarios. La huelga f ud apoyada tambien por uniones no comunis-
tas ni afiliadas a la CUICh. El gobierno inici6 procesos contra los
lfderes de la huelga acusdndoles de "organizar, guiar y promover" moti -
nes masivos que dejaron un saldo por lo menos de cinco muertos y 66 he-
ridos. La huelga de 35 dfas en la mina. de is Compa.nfa de Cobre Anacon-
da fud solucionada el 4 de diciembre con un aumento de salarios muy por
encima de las lfneas promulgadas por el gobierno. Otros mineros de
cobre hicieron huelga el mes pasado pars simpatizar, tanto con los mi-
cros de Anaconda como pars cooperar con is huelga del 23 de noviembre.
Cuando sus contratos expiren el ano entrante, sin duds, demandardn au-
mentos de salarios por lo menos iguales a los obtenidos por los traba-
jadores de Anaconda, acabando asf con las esperanzas del gobierno de
una restriceidn en los precios y salarios en 1968.
Frei ha iniciado otras reformas - algunas bastante impopulares
pars los votantes, a fin de reducir la dependencia de Chile en alimen-
tos importados y conservar el cambio exterior, implantd Una disposicidn
prohibiendo is venta.de carne tres.semanas de cads cuatro; y en un es-
fuerzo pars regularizar Is jornada de trabajo,,acortd-la siesta diaria
de tres horse y establecid regulaciones estrictas en be horarios de
los cines y de los bares. En los campos de educaci6n y vivienda, la
administracidn Frei tuvo progresos de importancia. Otros aparte del
programs de reforma de Frei no han ten.do tanta suerte - su revisidn de
la ley sobre corporaciones ha sido rechazada en el senado.por is oposi-
cidn mayoritaria.
Sin embargo, el cualquier intento pare tasar la popularidad del
gobierno de Frei, deben tomarse en consideracidn sus dxitos y fracasos
en aspectos tales como el de la reforms agraria y is inflaci6n. Es muy
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pronto an Para juzgar la efectividad de su programa agrario -- recien
puesto en marcha -- pero 1ogr6 reducir la inf'laei6n en un 48 por ciento,
cuando el PCD asumi6 el poder y en un 19 por ciento en 1966.
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CPYIRGHT
Frei w I ins ao,nahea
on Chilean reforms
Bye%stafr correspondent of made Mr. Frei's role quite difficult - in
The Christian Science Monitor light of the sharp opposition he faces from
both Left and Right in Chile's political
Mexico City spectrum.
Eduardo Frei Montalva's success in re.
gaining control of leadership of his party
is a personal triumph for the Chilean Chris.
tian Democratic President.
At the same time, victory provides Chile's
reformist President with new impetus to
carry out his moderate program of national
reforms.
As seen by hemisphere observers here, Mr.
i~ rei's success at ousting extremists from
control of party apparatus signals a smooth-
er path in his struggle to win nationwide sup-
port for his reforms.
On the Left, the Communist Socialist amal-
gam known as Frente de Accibn Popular
(FRAF) has called the Frei reforms "too
little and too late," in the words of the
Socialist leader, Sen. Salvador Allende Got.
sens, who lost out in the 1964 presidential
election to Mr. Frei.
Rightist opposition
On the Right, oldtime conservative and
liberal parties are banded together in a
new national party, and represent conserva-
tive business and landholding groups. Also
to the right of the Christian Democrats but
The Frei victory came in a marathon 1S. 6r,1raatiy regarueu as sumewnati muuerare
hour party congress which ended in the clear is the Radical Party.
party mandate for the President's reform In numerous electoral contests, as well
program. The majority of delegates voted as in the arena of political debate, these
278 Ito 202 to support the President. forces have presented stiff opposition to
It was a hard-fought battle, requiring two Mr. Frei.
Frei appearances. But in the final tally, the Thus when control of the Christian Demo-
six-month extremist hold on party leader. cratic Party appartus fell into the hands of
ship was ended and extremist leaders re. extremists last June, Mr. Frei was pre-
signed. sented with a serious new obstacle to his
Jaime Castillo, onetime Frei cabinet mem- reform program. For a time it appeared
ber and perhaps leading Christian Demo- to observers that he was losing control of
cratic theoretician, was promptly elected his own party, Chile's largest.
new president of the party in wake of the There have been numerous hints, however,
resignations. that in the crucial vote Mr. Frei would still
be able to rally the party behind him.
Moderation criticized And he did just that in a speech which
Regarded as a noncontroversial party fig* observers on the scene say was a rousing
call for support.
ure but one loyal to President Frei, Mr. "I have been criticized for attempting to
Castillo is expected to concentrate his at- proceed with prudence. . . and this has
tention on ending party differences. occurred within my own party," President
These differences are significant. Opposi. Frei said in the course of his speech. "The
Lion forces to Mr. Frei, headed by Rafael opposition exploits these sputterings to in-
Agustin Gumucio, say the President has flame the impatient ones."
The President said an international con.
not moved fast enough with his reforms. spiracy of the "economic right" combined
Moreover, they say reforms announced to with "international Marxism" was a serious
date are too moderate. They also have threat to his reform program and he called
called for elimination of the capitalist sys- on all Christian Democrats to rally around
tem in Chile and its replacement with a the party banner to work for moderate
vague doctrine termed "comuntarian-. reforms.
ism."
In a special report titled "A Noncapitalist Controversial plan
Route to Development," extremist elements In the voting during the party convention,
expounded a philosophy which to many ob. held in Pehaflor, a small Chilean village 25
servers differs little from a program ad-
vanced by Marxists and others of Chile's far miles from the capital city of Santiago, the
Left. Christian Democrats voted to back almost
Control of the Christian Democratic Party all parts of the reform program. This in.
apparatus by forces of the extreme Left eluded the controversial and un o ular
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CPYRGHT
forced-savings plan for all Chileans-a plan
designed to curb the nation's rising infla-
tionary pattern.
The party did, however, vote against one
Frei proposalLone that would ban all labor
strikes fore one year. But this was a small
defeat in the multihour session which saw a
procession of votes which supported the
Chilean Christian Democratic leader.
Mr. Frei and his supporters argue that
reform is essential for Chile, but it must
come about through legislative vote and
must not undermine the Chilean Constitu?
tion. Mr. Frei calls his program a "revolu-
tion in liberty."
Key elements of the Frei program in.
elude agrarian reform including land distri-
bution, Chilcanization of the copper industry
(in which the government owns a substan.
tial share of foreign-controlled copper com.
panics), education; reforms including expan.
sion of the system to include all Chileans,
tax reform, and significant housing construc-
tion.
'Temporary setbacks'
The Frei reform program has been widely
viewed as a major test of whether a Latin-
American nation can carry out reform within
the context of existing social and economic
order. The latest Frei victory gives new
hope to those who believe such reform is
possible.
Many observers of the Chilean scene have
not been overly concerned by setbacks to
the Frei program which have occurred from
time to time, saying, as one here this week
said, "In'the end Mr. Frei always manages
to win the battle despite temporary set-
backs."
Only time will tell, however, whether Mr.
Frei has won a lasting victory over dissident
elements within the Christian Democratic
Party.
Mr. Castillo, new head of the party, said
after assuming the post that he is inter-
ested in being the leader of all Christian
Democrats but refrained f om making any
other statements on the party vote.
In line with this, Radomiro Tomic,
Chile's Ambassador to Washington and a
member of party often regarded as Its
leading presidential hopeful. for 1970, urged
the party in a cable that "there will be
neither winners nor losers" in the show-
down.
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 CPYRGHT
WORLD NIA IST P,EfIE a rague Release 7- -
July 1967
National Liberation Movement Today
Alliance of the Anti-Imperialist Forces in Latbi America
1. The fig)tt against imperialist domination and against the
oppression of local oligarchies. tense and arduous, diverse in
form but single in content and ultimate aim, is gaining momentum
in La+;:f Arena.
Latin Americans are on the road to national and social liberation,
, democracy pnd socialism. Their fight for freedom is conditioned by
the need fqt social progress; their ship is sailing before the wind of'especially those forced to resort to armed struggle (in Guatemala,
t history. ) Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia) or to function underground.
i True, they have to contend with imperialism's aim of maintaining The Latin American wars of independence in the past century
its grip onn;the continent and with the aim of the oligarchies to 'were continental wars. When Bolivar, Sucre, San Martin and
two forces is in full swing. The time of grand battles has come:
w~orth Ajnerican imperialism is resorting to undisguised inter-
' 'Wntion. It$ system of military pacts and missions, anti-guerilla
training eer;ltres and units of "green berets", "black berets" and
Rangers is a:form of armed aggression. President Johnson has stated
he will stop qt nothing to prevent any other country from following
Cuba's example. The Imperialists are prepared to sow death and
destruction ijt town and village, flouting international law as they
1 did at Playa 6ir6n and Santa Domingo, and as they are doing every
# day in Vietnam.
The independence of every Latin American country is in jeopardy.
The road to falvation, to a happy future, is that of battle.
sovereignty and right to self-determination. As pointed out by the
Thirteenth Congress of our.Party, "the supreme task, the task of
tasks. Is to frustrate the aggressive designs of the imperialists. The
fight for revolutionary reconstruction and people's rule blends with
the fight against US intervention. for sovereignty, self-determination
and peace".
The historical mission of the proletariat is to abolish capitalism
anti-imperialist action as they fight together for common aims
against the aggressive interventionist policy of the Yankee im-
perialists. The fight against US imperialism and the local oligarchies.
their common enemy. is bringing the Latin-American re tcs chrser
together. So are the imperatnts of solidarity wti.h the r:he ie:Yes
or the world, particularly of Vietnam and Cuba, and with the anti-
Imperialist and anti-feudal movements on our own continent,
striving also for the freedom of the other American peoples: No
national stales and nogcographical frontiers existed on ourcontinent
in those days. The borders of the various colonial possessions were
rather indistinct, and the independence armies fighting for the
liberation of their people counted In their ranks officers and soldiers
from other colonies.
It was not until independence was won and capitalism began to
develop that the national states came into existence. But. as before,
the peoples of Latin America had a common destiny, common
problems and common enemies. Still, they could not and did not
escape the effects of the law or the uneven development of capitalism
and capitalist society. Against the present general setting of back-
wardness, there are appreciable disparities between the countries in
levels of economic, political and social development. This gives the
revolutions a national complexion and conditions their variety in
form and discrepancy in time.
For this reason. the present situation differs from that of the past
century. However, Washington is pursuing its policy of aggression
and Intervention throughout the continent, which, as the Cuban
Communist Party stressed in its statement of May 18, "inter-
nationalises aggressive wars, in which soldiers of different nationali-
ties arc engaged, as in the Korean War and now in South Vietnam
:fie with changes in the international situation. In the 'thirties, where North American, South Korean, Thai, Filipino, New Zealand
) when Hitler Germany was the centre of world reaction. the task was, and Australian troops have been committed, and as in Santo
to rally all forces against fascism in defence of freedom. Now that; Domingo, where soldiers were shipped from Brazil, Costa Rica,
US imperialism is the main reactionary force, the task is to enlist all Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay; furthermore, imperialism is
forces against the imperialist policy of war and aggression, for the, trying through the OAS to build up an international armed force for
liberation o' colonial, nco-colonial and dependent countries, for use against Cuba and the liberation movements on the continent".
peace and peaceful coexistence, fusing these efforts with the fight: This necessitates joint action by the Latin-American peoples and
for the social reconstruction imperative in every country. . imparts an all-continental complexion of outstanding international
One or another specific aspect of the world-wide struggle against importance to their struggle.
imperialism conics to the fore, depending on what the adversary is;1 Working hand in hand with the local oligarchies, imperialism
doing in the particular area at the particular moment. Yet every area' spurns the principle of non-interference and the sovereignty and
of battle is part of the single historical movement. frontiers of the Latin American countries. It espouses the so-called
The October Revolution in Russia, the 50th anniversary of which Idoctrine of ideological frontiers, which revolutionaries have to
we celebrate this year, marked the beginning of the end of capitalist counter with the utmost solidarity. Among other things, this pre-
domination. It ushered in the socialist era, the time of the liberation supposes direct participation in the liberation struggles of fraternal
of the working class and of pcoplcs oppressed by imperialism,; peoples wherever this is warranted by necessity. provided it is done
Today, socialism is being built in Cuba on American soil. Social under their leadership.
conflicts have engulfed our continent, which is an important theatre i In some cases. as in the anti-fascist war in Spain, revolutionaries
In the world-wide battle against imperialism, for democracy, pence s of different nationalities may participate jn large numbers, with
and socialism. Imperialist plunder. coupled with the tyranny of the marked political and historical effect. However. the most important
feudal oligarchies, is imposing poverty and suffering on millions of contribution revolutionaries can make to liberation and working.
Latin American workers. Peasants and Indians, and prejudicing the class victory on a world scale is struggle in their own country and
Interests of students, white-collar workers, intellectuals, tradesmen their moral and material support to revolutionary battles in other
.and industrialists, who no
pk dh~ ~bl~dl~Q1' R?P78-03061AO00400040005-0
numbers, And they will gain in political awareness and extend their " t ont-nunlar Manl alto, Marx and Engels. the founders of
Marxism and of proletarian Internationalism, stressed that "though
. 'd build socialism, while the specific tasks may change in accord.
 not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat Willi the it is no secret that Latin America i revolutionaries nave ditlering
bourgeoisie is at firggpatjl~~pgIteAP~>a~111~1t?431Ai'fFB~I~sO$OSFQOA~A0~4D1~tal+illency made its appearance
country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own after considerable numbers of new fighters from the less politically
bourgeoisie." developed sections of the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie joined
In this national struggle it is the revolutionaries in each country the Latin American revolutionary movement, and after differences
who determine the variou, aspects and concrete.tasks of the revolu- of an international order obstructing the struggle broke out among
tion, They know the sonic situation setter thnii anybody 0100 and the revolutionaries.
are in a far bcuer position to define the alms and the mcaiods of The allusion here is to problems bred by the development of
attaining them. They may err, but are less likely to do so t! an others. modern society, the emergence of new extremely complex social
equipped to assume full responsibility for working out the right
I, course of action after a preliminary review of their own experience,
The Cuban revolution is proof of the fact that reality plays
havoc with preconceived assumptions, serving as a reminder of the
folly, of generalising the singular fcatu~cs of this or that experience.
This, is not to say, however, that the specific features of one revolu-
tion, pay that, of the Cuban, will not recur elsewhere (at least in a
somewhat different form). We believe, therefore, that in some Latin-
4 American countries revolution may be sparked off by a guerilla
movement, as was the case in Cuba.
For this to happen the courage and d4termination of a group of
revolutionaries, though an important, sometimes even decisive
l actor, is, pot enough. Much more essential are favourable general
conditionst To be sure, we hold that they need be neither absolutely
of maturiqq" with a clear prospect of becoming fully ripe.
t tim
f
i
l it i
t
pl
t
d
fi
th
d th
e
C
or
ne
e
xac
e
erta
n
s no
easy
o
e
ace an
e
guerilla orriomc other form of armed action. Lenin warned against
reckless vfures which, as a rule, cause a senseless waste of lives
and c4' in retreat. On the other hand, Leninism has always been
crew cly bold, infused with the desire to advance the revolutionary
causIt would be wrong therefore both to reject out of hand or
bliq'dly accept any specific form of struggle. The main thing is to
empark squarely on. the path of struggle, size up the situation to the
best of one's ability and decide on the most propitious course of
action. The revolutionary must.be ready to take the offensive at any
mo ent, to retreat when necessary, and to perceive situations
favouurable for revolution.
Many trends-men, women and youth of varying political views
2' and social backgrounds-have joined the liberation struggle.
The important thing is to extend the anti-imperialist front and engage
against, the common enemy all sections of the public, including those
who may not be admirers of the Cuban revolution and revolution
in general, but who have taken a stand in behalf of Cuba's right to
build socialism and the right of all Latin American peoples to opt
for the sy tem of their choice.
Any attempt to impose the Communist view on the other anti-
imperialist!,forccs, and similarly any attempt by the latter to impose
their viewskon others, can but hamper unity of action and narrow
the struggle! against the common enemy.
This is wily the accent should be on. the specific tasks that all agree
need to be serried out-that is, on what unites, rather than divides,
Latin Ame
ary movement. We believe that the Organisation for
A
an Solidarity (OLS) and the respective national
country to country and to the growth of the revolutionary forces.
Lenin pointed out that any growth of the working-class movement
and appearance of new fighters and new sections of working people
"is inevitably accompanied by vacillation in theory and tactics".
And he called attention to the fact that "the yardstick of an
imaginary ideal" will get us nowhere and that vacillation should be
regarded as "a practical movement of ordinary people".
In other words, what we are dealing with arc growing pains that
cannot conceivably be removed overnight. But it is also a cogent fact
that imperialism benefits from differences arising between the
revolutionary forccs, and especially from differences in the Com-
munist parties. It is our duty, therefore, to prevent differences from
obstructing united action against the common enemy. DitTerences
arising between Communist parties should not impede mutual
understanding any more than differences between Communists and
other revolutionaries should impe.tr th - common fight against
imperialism.
Experience has shown that open polemics results in senseless
name-calling and in arbitrary judgments. It serves no useful
purpose and only aggravates the difficulties. Sometimes, it is true,
a party has no choice but to express its opinion publicly. We have
nothing against this. Out we are sure that direct contacts, bilateral
and multilateral meetings, :a tactful fraternal dialogue and, most
important of nil, steadfast unity of ncllon, are the best way to further
mutual understanding.
The driving force of the revolution in Latin America comprises
the working class, pcnsants (tire majority of whom in many
the national bourgeoisie. There are contradictions between than,
but common interests in the fight against US imperialism and the
oligarchies predominate. This offers a serviceable basis for tinily and
call: for closer bonds. Our policy of united action by all anti-
imncrialist and anti-oligarchic forces builds nn the belief that an
alliance of workers and peasants, of the proletariat and the non-
proletarian elements, is the hest possible basis for an enduring and
militant united front. To make headway, mutual understanding
lictwccn proletarian and petty-bourgeois revolutionaries is absolutely
essential.
The proletariat, the most powerful social class on our continent,
is still growing. As many as 40 million pcopie (of whom one out of }
every three is a factory or farm labourer), or more than half the
gainfully employed population between the Rio Grande and Cape
Horn, earn a livelihood by selling their labour power. In five
countries, that is, Mexico, Brazil, Aui'entina, Uruguay and Chile,
with nearly two-thirds of the total potmtation of Latin America, the
proletariat is relatively strong, and not in numbers only.
Communist parties exist in all Latin American countries. Like
the fraternal parties elsewhere in the world, irrespective of their
degree of development, they expound ideas that strike terror into
imperialism, of which they arc the most relentless enemies.
They arc the bearers of the finest revolutionary traditions of their
peoples and have acquitted themselves splendidly ire tl " :^'nortant
committees fhould concentrate on extending and co-ordinating
intcrnationat-solidarity and joint action. What is needed most is for
all revolutionaries, all anti-imperialists and all popular movements
on our cgflkrncnt to thrash out a common revolutionary standpoint.
This, hop( cr, is inconceivable before a certain process of develop
ment run .its course. We may accelerate the course, but cannot as;
yet consider it completed. If, therefore, we were to try and impose a,
standard' approach, entirely unnecessary difficulties would arise.
The best way to facilitate unity in defence of the Cuban revolution
and the fight against imperialism and its agents is to promote joint
action and to accentuate what unites us, while rectifying whatever
disunites us.
CPYRGHT
work of disseminating Marxism and socialist ideas, :N.._.--Ilding
the scientific socialist outlook of the foremost workers and intcllcc-
ti als. Cultivation of proletarian intcrnationism among the working
class is one of their accomplishments. In brief, it is they who are
forging_ the class consciousness of the Latin American proletariat
and the ti-i r'a i t 7 s coies
 CPYRGHT
In all the countries of Lttitalbunmarel>F?~bZietiemsgs~t8b6aN 1 (tlll1P8-t33~ rf,~~ t t amen the petty-
subjected to persecution at one time or another. But they have nevergeolsie can be trace fo~ ft es g '',vag the the proletariat,
flinched in face of the terror campaigns. Thousands have seen the to the years of work put in by the Communist Parties, to the entire
inside of prisons and concentration camps, thousands have been modern development of history, influenced chiefly by the steady
manhandled and tortured, and many leaders have paid with their growth of the socialist system.
lives for their convictions. Staunch and experienced fighters emerge Objectively speaking, the revolutionary mood of the petty-
from this ordeal. bourgeoisie is a welcome fact. It is a manifestation of progress and
Some Communist parties, entrenched among the masses, con- should not be regarded as merely a posture or an as act of despera-
stitute an influential and at times even the decisive, political force. Lion, an act which the petty bourgeoisie admittedly often commit.
Others are still small and lack some of the requisites of a vanguard. Under no circumstances should we underrate the revolutionary
w
tial of the ru - and
an
t
, -
--
en
However, international experience na3 snvwn toss small panics can po
t
Latin American bourgeoisie is no longer capable or' heading
at times virtually overnight
ents
ontin
l
tio
la
b
c
.
g
,
nary c
rge revo
u
e
ome
Just before the Second World War, for example, the Italian Com- revolutionary processes (though some sections of it may participate
d
f
one
orce an
munist Party numbered 15,000 members in a country with a in them), the petty bourgeoisie is still a revolutionary
rkin
th
i
h
g
e wo
ere
es w
population approaching 50 million. Yet after Mussolini's downfall that may even play a leading role in countr
towards the end of the Second World War Cho Party grew into a class is weak numerically and lacks the needed political
powerful force of millions of members. Early in 1958, at the time the - weight.
Percz Jimenez dictatorship was overthrown in Venezuela, the The Cuban revolution has demonstrated that the petty bourgeoisie
Communist Party had a mere 300 members; soon, however, its has a potential of revolutionary courage in battling for national
membership numbered tens of thousands, making it in a matter of liberation and socialism.
months the biggest political body in Caracas. There is, then, a distinct bond between the revolutionary trends of
Communists organise the workers in trade unions, fight for the the proletariat, on the one hand, and those of the petty bourgeoisie,
economic and social demands of the people and safeguard working- on the other. There is much that unites them, but also much that
class unity by inspiring a new, anti-imperialist patriotism. divides them. Petty-bourgeois revolutionaries tend at times to under-
The most advanced section of the working class and the best of rate the workers and the Communist parties, to gravitate towards
the Latin American intelligentsia have joined ? the Communist' nationalism, recklessness, terror and, at times, even anti-communism
parties. These-parties have their sources in the proletariat of their and anti-sovietism. Also, they are more susceptible to despair and
respective countries, in the October Revolution, in the victory of subjectivism. But.they are revolutionary all the same, and the
Leninism, of revolutionism over reformism. proletariat must put the accent on unity with them rather than on
hi
l
d
i
f
p
ea
ers
ng
or
This consolidation of the Latin American Communist parties is fighting their mistakes. The two trends are compet
a great gain of the revolutionary working class. Their path has not of the movement; to a certain extent, their rivalry is ideological. But
"
been strewn with roses. They have had to withstand the assault of
their class adversaries and also to combat anarchism, Trotskyism
and other petty-bourgeois trends In their own ranks.
The founding of Communist parties brought about the fusion of
Marxism with the working-class movement. This was an historical
Imperative to that the working Blabs, to us# Mttrles.words, should
not be only a class In Itself but a class for itself, and that Its fight for
emancipation should be a conscious fight.
Pernicious tendencies and sectarian views, isolationism, passivity,
adventurism, conformism and time-serving occur now and then
in the Communist parties regardless of whether they arc functioning
legally or underground. Nona of these can be combated effectively,
unless a continuous fight Is waged for the Party line through
criticism and self-criticism and hard daily work among the masses.
These pernicious tendencies, which we Chilean Communists
know all too well from our own experience, are a hindrance to party
development. But small partics.grow into big ones by virtue of their
vanguard position in the social struggle, for as the proletarian
masses gather experience they range themselves , alongisde the socialist-communist unity within the People's Action Front. The
Communists. This we want to make absolutely clear. However, we Socialist Party, like the Communist, has deep roots in the working
only the politically conscious workers but also a considerable' _s?
considerable influence also among the petty bourgeoisie, with the
section of the pcttybourgcoisie are adopting a revolutionsryIt Socialists holding an edge. The petty-bourgeoisie do not comprise a
attitude and fighting for the liberation of our continent with the aim'; special group in the Communist Party, whose leadership derives
of building socialism. This bccnmo doubly evident after the. cialist chiefly from the working class.
ft+w~hllitm in l'ulat, 1 The mutual understanding of Chile's Communists and Socialists f
$oitic ill' the i+ctt (,iitrgeoI ie Jilin the C'unttttuaist pnitir;i itr (comes up against snags from time to time, but the alliance is
become friends and followers, exerting an influence of their gown for ,sufficiently strong to make'a split highly Improbable. It draws Its
a certain length of time. However, a more considerable part forms strength from the will of the people. As Comrade Galo Gonzales
Its own parties or joins the Left wing of other movements, pointed out at the Tenth Party Congress in 1956, whenever Socialists
This trend often engenders sectarianism. In Chile, for example, and Communists worked together "the working class has gained and
'Communists campaigned for n time for the dictatorship of the whenever we parted ways or quarrelled the enemy benefited". W~:pre
proletariat and for Soviet power. This approach did not help our strong when we stand together, and weaker when we do not.' he
Party to grow. (Upon abandoning this sectarian line, we delncd the pc?plc of Chile will not win, political power unless Socialists and
Chilean revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution, but (.?/aunttmiats tire allies. Neither Communists nor Socialists can claim
realised in 1945 that even this non-sectarian definition had been sole leadership. We need each other. -
rendered unsound by reason of the world-wide changes-advance of o c t r oisie and of the working class
the working class, thecontAPWM E t1"c fteo2Ri AffliKz2'~,fi~~? Rig {~Q{ 95tget taken a definite'
fight,
if anything is done to accentuate this rivalry and precipitate a
for the destruction" of either trend, the solo beneficiary will be
imperialism. That imperialisni and its agents are concentrating
precisely on intensifying the rivalry should be enough to tsar this
out. The national bourgeoisie, too, which seeks to maintain its class
positions, is also eager to see the. proletariat and the petty bour-
geoisie part ways. So today, mutual understanding, co-operation
and united action by the proletariat and the revolutionary petty
bourgeoisie is a matter of the first magnitude,
The Latin American Communist parties arc aware of the need for
understanding with the other Left forces, above all those espousing
socialism. However, this does not apply to anti-Party groups and
splinter parties, who represent no'one and who live off factional
activity and dissent.
The militant co-operation of the working class and the revolu-
tionary petty bourgeoisie need not stop short of founding united
revolutionary Marxist-Leninist parties wherever they have parties
of their own today. In Chile this co-operation has crystallised into
revolutionary ardour of the bourgeoisie.) stand. Most of them support the Radical or Christian Democratic
narlics. }
 Ilowever, since the municipal elections last April the more tartan and revolutionary petty-bourgeois groups is being torgca in
advanced groups in i I jb Rwle say 004 C1 $B F~tt411 01~(30O i3 into the fight for change
ground, have been working for an understanding with the Socialists
and Communists. Their leader, Alberto Baltra, maintains that "the
objective Interests of the proletariat and the middle sections are
similar", that "the world is moving inevitably towards socialism' and
with the ultimate aim of sparking off anti-imperialist and anti-feudal
revolutions.
It is up to the revolutionaries to find the way to mutual under-
that "a soclallsed alternative is perfectly conceivable, paving the way 'clearly, in each country the choice rests with the local revolutionary
to effective planning, replacement of the capitalist system, abolition of . forces, which makes it doubly necessary to disseminate Marxist.
monopolies, decline of imperialist Influence and to accumulation and Leninist ideas and implant proletarian ideology.
mobilisation o,,the considerable resources required to expand national
capital and, hence, the rate of Chile's development';. Baits described * ' ?
people's unity as "a process of Joint action by Radical and other The argument- most frequently used by the enemy is that the
ft forces". Communists' united action policy is simply a tactical manoeuvre
Some deputies and many members of the Christian Democratic to strengthen their hand, to absorb real and possible allies, use them
Party, too, are calling for "concentrated fire on the oligarchy" and to the fullest and then abandon them and to go on to achieve a
for joint action with the People's Action Front. Mosthave expressed Communist one-parry empire.
3 themselves in favour of'socialism. It would be a sheer waste of breath to go into this at length, for it
To be sure, their idea of socialism differs substan6,&.-. -i .n that is malicious slander pure and simple. That the Communists will
of the Socialists and Communists. But the important thing is their gain in strength is certain, despite all the difficulties. The other
desire to reach an understanding with the People's Action Front. progressive forces will also grow in proportion to their contribution
The most important factor in Chile today is the desire for change. to'lhc common struggle, because the march of time favours the
Thanks to Communist and Socialist efforts, the people are beginning exponents of progress, not the reactionaries, In Chile, the co-
to realise that the old economic structure must be radically altered. operation of Socialists and Communists has benefited both parties.
The national bourgeoisie represented by the Christian Democratic They improved their positions in the recent elections, with the
Party is acutely conscious of the advances made by the revolutionary Socialists making a somewhat bigger advance this time.
working class and of the possibility of a major shift in public senti- We Communists have always maintained that the working class
40 ment, which could bring the working class to power. Consequently, has two types of allies--permanent and temporary. This is an objec-
large sections of the national bourgeoisie have declared themselves live fact. History never stands still. Upon attaining one goal, society
in favour of change, offering reformist solutions within the Alliance- begins planning the next. New tasks and contradictions appear,
for-Progress framework. To stem the tide, the oligarchy, too, aligned conditioning changes in the political approach, with new nlign-
itself with the Christian Democrats in the 1964 presidential election, menis, some drifting into the reactionary camp and the majority
thus enabling the latter to win. straining forward. It is not the Communists, therefore, who by
The thirty months of the Christian Democratic government have malice aforethought part ways with groups that had been their
been enough to disenchant the people who had believed in bourgeois allies.
reformism. Most of them turned to the Popular Action Front and imperialist policies of menacing world peace, flouting the rights
now seek revolutionary change. of nations, assailing democratic freedoms and human rights, and
Needless to say, this reaction was not spontaneous. It was brought prejudicing the interests of all socio-economic groups save those of
about by the work of the Communists who have consistently urged the monopoly bourgeoisie, evoke the indignation of all social strata,
joint action by all partisans ofchange, regardless of whether or not including a large part of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie. On the
they are against the government. other hand, the spectacular achievements of the socialist world and
The shift in favour of the Communists and Socialists was reflected its accomplishments, which are in harmony with man's aspirations
in the results of the April municipal elections. The Communist for freedom, learning, culture and welfare, coupled with its aid to
Party polled 354,000 and the Socialist Party 322,000 votes. Some non-socialist countries .;hiring to independent development, is
120,000 electors who previously voted Christian Democrat sided making socialism attractive not only to the proletariat, but also to
with the Communists and Socialists, who polled 30 per cent of the other classes and social strata.
rote. Meanwhile, the Christian Democratic, Party, which formerly The development of the Cuban revolution into a socialist one and
collected 42 per cent, slipped to 36 per cent. The Socialists and the socialist orientation of sonic revolutionary processes in Africa
Communists are on the upgrade, while the Christian Democrats and the Middle Cast could never have occurred other than in the new
have entered a phase of decline. historical conditions brought about by the October Revolution and
The future of the Radical Party, which represents some 16 per then the Soviet victory over flitter Germany, after which socialism
cent of the electorate and consists chiefly of middle class people, will became a world system strong enough to safeguard the new rcvolu-
depend on its eventual understanding with the People's Action tionary states, frustrate imperialist blockades and assist the newly-
Front. free countries in their independent development.
In the circumstances, the People's Action Front is becoming a in this situation, the problem of our temporary alliances with
centre of contact for all the democratic forces in the country. non-proletarianand non-Communist forecscallsfor a newapproach.
The election was a serious setback for the Christiat-Democratic, Our allies now have much greater opportunities for marching ahead,
Party and for President Frei's administration. It was a setback for not of course without vacillation'and difficulties. Whatever happens,
the reformist alternative and the Christian Democratic variety of the it is farthest from our minds to use them at some specific stage, only
pilot experiment offered by the US imperialists to some of the Latin to discard them at another. On the contrary, we could wish for
American countries. The election also showed that the Communist nothing better than to co-operate with them indefinitely.
effort gradually to win over the masses from the Christian Demo- What we Communists want is a progressive alignment of all
crits, delivering them from bourgeois influence and rallying petty- champions of democracy and socialism, recognising the right of
bourgeois support for the People's Action Front, is bearing fruit. every ~Ily to participate in nil stages of the revolutionary process
This Communist policy holds out good prospects for the people's and In nil governments that the people's struggle may bring.irtto
movement in its advance and in combating the enemy on other being.
fronts in the event of Chile being affected by the present epidemic of It should be added here that many Communist parties do not
"gorillism consider the one-party system obligatory for socialist society. The
Doubtless the situation in the country is a singular one. But else-
where In Latin Amcr' t m 1 u c tandin &-!-CPYRGHT
;l
between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. And
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CPYRGHT
matter hinges on specific national conditions and on the existence in
many countries of democratic and popular political forces and of
objective social realities that fondition a multiplicity of progressive
trends and parties. The Communist Party of France, for example,
does not believe that "the one-party system Is essential for the
transition to socialism", and the Italian Communists share its,
opinion.
The Communists in Chile, 'too, favour a multi-party system. We
hold that the Communist and Socialist parties should not only
jointly lead the people in tic fight against imperiat?sm_tiid the
oligarchy but also jointly build the socialist society of
we expect many other groups to participate as well.
The Communist Party of Chile, a working-class party, exercise
leadership in co-operation with the Socialist Party, which, as
have noted before, holds strong positions in the country. Man
problems faced by our movement are settled by agreement between
the Socialists and Communists on the initiative of one of them. We
call this joint leadership, which in Chile represents the concrete form
in which the Communist Party plays its vanguard role.
It may be that ultimately the Communists and Socialists will form
a united party. But so far the question has not arisen, and is not
likely to arise in the foreseeable future, and perhaps may never arise.
As for the other Latin American countries, it appears that the
need for united action by Communist parties and other revolutionary
forces fits in with the need for co-operation at the level of joint
leadership by those revolutionary forces which, in a definite sense,
share the function of vanguard.
A vanguard cannot conceivably be built by arbitrary or synthetic
means around a leader or a few men who, individually, at least in
their own opinion, adopt radical standpoints and prepare for
revolutionary action. The exceptions to this rule only bear this out.
A vanguard is the result of the fusion of Marxism with, the
working-class movement, the moulding of revolutionary thought
(above all among proletarians) and the application of Marxism-
Leninism to the concrete conditions of a country, that is, the result
of purposeful activity and of a natural, rather than spontaneous.
process.
On the other hand, as Lenin said, it is not enough to call oneself
the vanguard or the forward contingent; all other contingents must
be convinced that we really are in the van.
The Latin American Communist parties were founded at different
times. They function in different conditions and in different social
and political situations. Some arc going forward from dissemination
of scientific socialist ideas to consolidating their bonds with the
masses, to organising mass struggle, to the phase of intensive social
and political work which paves the way to the conquest of power,
to the rapid development of the Latin American parties into the
guiding force of the revolutionary movement.
However, the Communists do not consider this the only possible
perspective. In the name of the proletariat and on the basis of
Marxism-Leninism, they arc -prepared to raise' to the highest
possible level co-operation and unity with the other revolutionary
forces,.
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BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968
Soviet Penetration of Nigeria
The birth of Nigeria on 1 October 1960 was acclaimed by many as
the entry onto the world scene of a black African state "destined to
emerge as a major power in Africa." The British wanted Nigeria to be-
come their "showpiece" in. West Africa, but a showpiece of good govern-
ment by Western standards -- a major mistake in the case of Nigeria.
The country is a collection of diverse nations, tribes and cultures.
Its people speak three major languages -- Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo -- and
about 150 minor languages. English is the official language, but
many Nigerians cannot speak it. Religions make the gap even wider.
Most of northern Nigeria is Moslem, and its culture comes from centur-
ies of contact with Arab caravans. The south is Christian and pagan,
with a Bantu culture, somewhat modified by European incursions into
the coastal areas. British rule has been the only unifying factor in
Nigeria's past history, and even then the British administered it as
three units -- the colony of Lagos and the northern and southern pro-
tectorates. Since 1960 this loosely knit structure of incompatible
cultures and racial groups has been held together by a constitution
written as if intended for a people -united by'Anglo=Saxon traditions-
and committed to a multiple-party system of government. Its present
internal problems were inevitable. In January 1966 an Ibo officers'
clique staged a coup, murdering officials and seizing power. Six
months later a non-Ibo officers' clique ousted them with additional
bloodshed. Each tribal faction called on tribal loyalties for support
and this inflamed latent passions. Northerners began to slaughter
Ibos in their territories -- upwards of 30,000 men, women and children
who had been living and working in northern cities as civil servants,
techni6ians and traders were murdered in a barbarous fashion. About
two million survivors fled south where an Ibo Colonel named Odumegwu
Ojukwu led the secessionist movement that in May 1967 created the
independent state of Biafra. (For further background data, see Attach-
ment A.)
SOVIET BLOC MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
Soviet efforts to gain a foothold in Africa by supplying arms and
planes to developing countries inimical to the. West began in Egypt in
1955 and extended rapidly to Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville)
and Ghana. Quick to take advantage of a chaotic situation, the Soviets
have turned toward Nigeria. Until last year Moscow never showed it-
self sympathetic toward the Western-oriented leaders of the Nigerian
Federation of 1960. However, after the fighting broke out in July
1967 between the Federal Military Government (FMG) of Nigeria and the
secessionist state of Biafra, the Soviet Union was quick to respond to
the FMG's appeal for assistance. During the latter part of 1967 the
Soviets managed to sell over $5 million worth of military equipment
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to the FMG, including 10-12 MIG jet fighters and three patrol boats.
There are currently about 50 Soviets in Nigeria training Nigerians to
operate and maintain the equipment. By the end of August a Nigerian
jet fighter was already attacking secessionist forces in the Midwestern
State.
Other Communist countries have also proffered military and techni-
cal assistance. In 1965 Czechoslovakia extended a $14-million line of
credit to Nigeria and, after the secession, furnished to the FMG six jet
trainers -- which can also be used as fighters and bombers. In September
1967 there were 14 Hungarian civil engineers engaged in roadbuilding and
river control in northern Nigeria. Polish pilots now predominate in
harbor operations. But through it all the Soviet Union insists that
the conflict in Nigeria is an internal one and that all that ' the: Soviets
want is peace and stability for Nigeria! In October 1967 Soviet Premier
Kosygin, in a personal message to Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian Chief
of State, stated that he is opposed to any outside interference in
Africa's internal affairs.
While the Soviet Union is giving military support to General Gowon's
Federal Military Government, it is also pursuing its standard tactics of
penetrating Nigeria from within. A number of Soviet-Nigerian friendship
societies have recently been formed in the Western State, the home of
the Yoruba tribe. With the withdrawal of the educated Ibos to Biafra,
the Soviets have found it expedient to cultivate the Yorubas, who are
now supplanting the Ibos in public office. Friiendship societies are also
being formed in the largely Muslim north, where the Soviets undoubtedly
foresee future ties with the rest of Muslim Africa.
Moscow is also trying to enlarge its toehold in the Nigerian labor
movement. Following the dissolution of all political parties in 1966,
the pro-Communist "Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party" formally dis-
banded, but its weekly organ ADVANCE has been taken over by the pro-
Moscow Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) and continues along party
lines. On 5 November 1967 ADVANCEpubllshed a glowing message of greet-
ings to the Soviet Union for its 50th Anniversary and a tribute by the
head of the Nigerian-Soviet Friendship Society to the great friendship
shown by the Soviet Union in Nigeria's time of need.
While openly professing its support for Gowon's government, the Sov-
i.et,Union is giving its covert support to the extreme Left. In an October
1.967 article on Nigeria in the international Communist journal WORLD MARX-
IST REVIEW, the Soviets praised the banned Socialist Worker's and Farmers'
Party and claimed that this party and the NTUC are in the forefront of
the struggle against "feudal and captialist" elements in Nigeria (See
Attachment B.)
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2
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The Soviets have also stepped up their efforts aimed at the infor-
mation media. The Soviet news agency, Novosti, has recently appointed
a representative in Ibadan and a splinter journalists' organization is
receiving Communist support. With the relaxation of FMG import restric-
tions, there has been an increased influx of Communist literature, which
can be bought at newstands and bookstores, and which is also distributed
by the NTUC and affiliated unions. The Soviets have requested permission
to increase their Embassy staff in Lagos and have just opened a new
chancery which is obviously designed for a greatly augmented diplomatic
force.
The Soviet Union had long taken special interest in countries that
supply oil to Western Europe: Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and
others. Now it has taken a stake in Nigeria which, before the war broke
out, was supplying ten per cent of Britain's oil and has rich oil resources
as yet only partially exploited. Soviet interest in Nigerian oil became
apparent in early 1967, following speculation in the American press that
an independent Eastern Nigeria might give the oil companies better terms
than they enjoy under existing contracts with the FMG. Over twenty mil-
lion tons of oil were produced in Nigeria in 1966, and 63 per cent of that
in the Eastern Region. If Biafra remained an independent state, the Sov-
iet Union's chances of cutting into that vast oil reserve would be negli-
gib'.e. Once Moscow had made the decision to support the FMG, it did not
hesitate to play upon Nigerian suspicions of the United States by linking
that country's oil interests with Biafra and claiming that the United
States is supporting the rebel forces with white mercenaries.
In addition to its oil reserves, the Eastern Region has a palm pro-
ducts crop that has been bringing in nearly $100 million a year. Now, of
course, revenue from both oil and palm products is denied to the FMG.
The oil reserves of the Midwesternv-Region are at least as large as those
of the East, although not yet as well developed. The Western Region re-
lies largely on its $100 million yearly cocoa crop, and the landlocked,
North on its $150 million crop of peanuts, which, however, must be moved
through the East or West to the sea. While oil and cocoa are Nigeria's
major exports, its natural resources also include coal, iron, limestone
and natural gas. It produces 45 per cent of the world's columbium ore
-- used in the manufacture of steel alloys. With a foreign trade amount-
ing to $1.5 billion in 1966, it is the biggest and richest state in Black
Africa, and -- with the decline of Western influences -- a natural target
for Soviet subversion.
Although the soviets have made a substait3ai:breakthroUghin-Nigeria,
and their position can be expected to improve at all levels in the future,
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there are still important influences at work against Communist aims.
General Gowon does not wish to break Nigeria's traditional ties with the
West, particularly with Great Britain which has resumed military support
to his government. In addition both Gowon and his foreign affairs minis-
ter, Dr. 0. Arikpo, seem fully aware of the dangers inherent in too ser-
ious a commitment to the Communist camp. As long as the present govern-
ment is in power, Western interests will continue to be represented in
Nigeria and expansion of the Communist subversive base may yet be conk
tained.
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 CPYRGHT
THE NEW ApER a or FkWase - - -
1 January 1968
Nige
ria:
Study in
ypocrisy.
BY George T Orick
IGERIA, the world's tenth most tion among much of the citizenry.
populous country, has torn it- The one serious exception was the
came to a halt as 60 million citizens
evaluated the military government's
intentions.
This quickly removed millions of
pounds from daily circulation, and
for a short time it was possible for
a father to enroll his child in a paro-
chial school without paying a bribe
to the registrar, or for a dying hos-
pital patient to get a bedpan without
bribing the nurse. Soon. however.
Ironsi became a Big Man-Rolls
Royce with motorcycle outriders.
embassy parties, the works-and a
wary populace relaxed. Membership
cards in the revived Bribe Scorncrs'
League were quietly put away, and
business returned to normal-al-
most.
It was already too late: Foreign
investment was declining, food prices
were rising, and tribal hatreds and
regional suspicion were becoming
exaggerated into overt hostility. Oil
drilling and pumping had increased,
helping to preserve for a time the
illusion that the economy remained
viable. The multi-regional charter
of the oil operations. moreover, was
a practical argument for continued
national unity. But the big tribal
cats. tied together by their tails in
the artificial colonial creation called
Nigeria, were fighting free of one
another-each blaming the others
for the growing troubles, and each
convinced it was the rightful dictator
of terms for continued national as-
sociation.
In the six months between that
first Army coup and the second in
July 1966, it was Ironsi's Ibo tribe
of Eastern Nigeria whose influence
was felt. Ironsi permitted his tribes-
men to encroach disproportionately
into the civil service and into the
managerial levels of the big quasi-
public corporations that operated
self apart, aborted its economic and reaction in the predominately Mos-
social development, and begun the lem Northern Region.
extermination and suppression of its The young officers made two ser-
most advanced tribal component. ious mistakes. First, in doing away
The developed countries which had with those responsible for Nigeria's
regarded Nigeria as the very model drift into heedlessness, they killed
of black African promise and sta- the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar
bility now watch the disaster, para- Tafawa Balewa, a gentle man who
lyzed by their own habitual stances, had grown in world stature as his
relationships and antagonisms. The government rotted from within, and
situation is a study in functional his manipulator, Sir Ahmadu Bello,
'hypocrisy, both on the part of the the Sarduana of Sokoto, who in ad-
? developed countries and of the Ni- dition to being premier of the North-
gerians themselves. ern Region was spiritual leader of
Until two years ago, the industrial Nigeria's Moslems. Deep in Rama-
nations rejoiced in the capacity of dan fasting, the Moslems did not
corrupt Nigerian governments, re- react immediately; but when they
gional and Federal, to buy millions did, six months later, their fury was
of pounds' worth of largely unneces- spiritually as well as politically moti-
sary capital goods, and in the capa- vated.
city of Nigerian farmers to expand Secondly, the officers assigned to
their plantings of peanuts, cocoa and kill the Iho premier of the Eastern
oil palm to keep even with declining Region, Michael Okpara, failed to
world market prices. The big share- fulfill their mission, and in two days
cropper country was doing fine: pro- tribalism eclipsed idealism: The of-
ducing more every year, buying more ficers handed over the central gov-
and more goodies at the company crnment to their Army superior, Ibo
store--and going satisfactorily into Brigadier General Aguiyi-Ironsi. By
long-term debt. the time Ironsi himself was mur-
Then the Nigerians embarrassed dcred in July 1966, tribal polariza-
the world by exposing to public view tion in Nigeria had gotten well under
what most of the participants had way.
known from the start: that Nigeria Since the military men were fairly
was not a developing country; it naive about the techniques of cor-
was not, in fact, a country at all. In ruption, while foreign businessmen
January 19.66, when a group of trained them in the proper use of
young Army officers representing Swiss bank accounts the growth rate
many tribes seized control from. the of the Nigerian economy began to
thoroughly corrupt hierarchy of fall. For several weeks after Ironsi
political leaders, there was jubila- came to power, there was a sharp
,
The bv~
~~e
j~hones
~'r~ } ak a~ CkL jj~~ t ~} $ ~~
electric
c r ~ Jrrr-lu i i
l
Irjr
i
d+
,
C
,
,,
e
,
.
Pot
~E?~l~l vrs
n Igen. 611 ey e wor''ks a~Itdports
and work erl in Nigeria for six ears. ~' ~YP'~QI~It"~1 1cve s'
()RICK
new ronlrihu-
shrinkage in the country's cash flow:
 CPYRGHT
That the :Ibos were probably more
qualified than the other big Nigerian{
tribes to operate the government,
bureaucracies was particularly galling
to their rivals. Through almost
unique tribal open mindedness, the
Ibos had moved in half a century,
from primitive paganism to Chisti
anity, to progressive, educated mod-
ernism. This angered the increasing-
ly decadent Yorubas of the Western
Region, and the feudal, static, fatal-
istic Moslem Hausas of the North-
ern Region.
Y JUNE 1966, the country's
fragile framework could no
longer survive the imbalance of one-
tribe supremacy. The Ibos were
moving too fast, too gleefully in
their search for the secrets of dur-
able national power, and the keys to
the safe. Tribal fragmentation was
the order of the day, and one-tribe
supremacy was, after all, only a
warped version of tribal fragmenta-
tion. A scapegoat had to be found
for Nigeria's troubles.
Clearly, the Ibos were the enemy,
for they represented much that was
hateful to both the Yorubas and the
Hausas: They worked together in a
spirit of mutual self-help, instead of
clinging together out of mutual sus-
picion; their upstart peasant vigor
challenged the clever, subtle sophis-
tication of the Yorubas and the dig-
nified tranc, of the Nausas: their
tribal democracy was almost un-
African. Particularly tirestm;c was
the Ibo insistence that political lead-
ers are stewards of public trust,
owing their constituents at least a
shilling's worth of benefit for every
pound of bribe sent to Switzerland.
Most disturbing of all was the Ibo
conviction that there is a future be-
yond the beginning of the next rainy
season, and that a man could some-
how learn to control that future to
his betterment.
power, he set about restoring the
dignity and local-level power of tra-
ditional chiefs and minor kings in
the Western (Yoruba) Region. This
limited gesture was about as far as
he could go in applying democratic
thinking to the Yorubas, but its
tentative success was too much for
the Northerners.
Thus, on July 29, 1966-two
days after a conclave of traditional'
chiefs whose support he was wooing,
at which he had decreed that the
national anthem would be sung at
the opening and closing of all school
sessions and.at all public entertain-
ments-Ironsi was murdered by
Northern soldiers. Killed with him
was Colonel Fajuiyi,,his governor of
the Western Region, and his ally in
courting the chiefs.
Each of the major Nigerian
tribes is a nation in spirit, and
bigger than most African countries
in size: There are about 17 million
Nausas, 15 million Yorubas and 9
million Ibos. During the week fol-
lowing Ironsi's death, it was evident
that no replacement could he selected
from these tribes, giving rise to the
short day of the minority tribe. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a
Christian member of one of Nigeria's
200-odd smaller tribes, emerged as
the nominal leader of the military
government. Gradually Gowon has
become little more than a miouth-
piece for the Hausa leaders, who
still speak of national unity yet say,
and not always so privately, that
unity (meaning Northern domina-
tion) is not possible unless the Ibos
are either killed or contained in their
homeland.
For two months after he became
Supreme Commander of the Military
Government of Nigeria, Gowon tried
to bring sonic semblance of order
to the country. Then in September
1966, the Moslem Hausas got down
to the serious business of extermi-
The Ibo reflex was operative in nating Ibos: In less than 10 days
Ironsi, and the affable, permissive they slaughtered upwards of 50,000
general began to think politically Ibo men women and children who
Northern cities as traders, techni-
cians and civil servants. The Army
units in the North, already purged
of Ibos in July and August, instead
of stopping the slaughter partici-
pated in it.
Whether the killing stopped sud-
denly through Gowon's good offices,
or because it was planned to begin
and end on a signal from the North-
ern leaders, is a subject of debate
to this day in Nigeria. In any event,
the next six months saw nearly 2
million Ibos who had over the years
gone to live in all parts of Nigeria
flee back to their homeland in tile'
Eastern Region.
Disintegration, accelerated by the
mass killings, was irreversible by
early 1967. Foreign investment
shrank to almost nothing, ending the
proliferation of factories that had
passed for development. Trade
dropped to about half its normal
level; Nigeria was no longer viewed
as a prime market for toothpaste,
plastic shoes, used clothing and all
the other manifestations of Western
prescriptions for African progress.
Whites began to leave, and the with-
drawal of their purchasing power
pushed the Nigerian economy down
still further,
The leader of the Thos, Colonel
Odumegwu Ojukwu. disappointed
his old friend (iowon by listening to
his assurances of goodwill and fair
treatment with the special car of a
man whose people have been mar-
tyred for the wrong reasons: Oju-
kwu reflected the growing paranoia
of his tribesmen, and in threatening
secession he found support among
the minor tribes of the Pastern
Region who had begun to identify
their interests with the Ibos'.
int.ii TtiU. RFSi of Nigeria
VU stagnated, the Eastern Re-
gion came alive with secession fever,
and in May constituted itself as the
Republic of Biafra. Whites fled-
except for missionaries, arms sales-
men and diplomats. A month later
, d Gowon began a gentleman's
In his search for theA$*6 dEFW6r RRf asb TodW 4/zit . &Ar~ft$-03061A000400040005-0
war in
 CPYRGHT
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are basically capitalists and hope
lessly bourgeois; but the Russian
presence clouds the situation and
minimizes U.S. effectiveness in any
effort to knock heads together and
bring peace. Nigeria would be a sad
and pointless place for a new East-
West confrontation.
The British have never been able
to leave Moslems alone. The desert
is the opposite of an island and seems
always to fascinate than.. Of all the
Nigerian tribes whose leaders learned
tq speak with a good British accent.
[lie Iiausas, on the southern fringe
of the Sahara, have remained the
most amenable. The Iho leaders
have good British accents, too, but
they think Ibo. Nearly all colonial
rebellions against British rule origi-
naled in Iboland, including (lie final
drive for independence. So the
British have quietly cast their lot
with the Northern-controlled Fed-
? eral government. And a considerable'
lot it is: British-owned oil companies,
trading companies, raw-materials ex-
tractive and purchasing companies,
and British investment still dominate
the Nigerian economy, All of this
means more pious talk of unity for
unity's sake.
Biafra has made some strange
friends in its struggle for embryonic
progressivism. Portugal has become
the principal channel through which
arms and supplies reach Biafra, and
a telecommunications link through
Lisbon keeps Biafra in tenuous touch
with the world. The crisis of Africa's
biggest nation tends to divert atten-
tion from Portugal's unpopular colo-
nial holdings elsewhere in Africa;
and for the moment, Portuguese help
is as acceptable as any to the des-
perate Biafrans. Rhodesian planes
have also been reported in occasional
traffic into and out of Biafra, and
Rhodesia's motive may be similar to
Portugal's.
French prospectors have reported-
ly found a particularly rich oil field
in northwestern Biafra, which may
account for the sale to Biafra of
French helicopters and arms. The
extent of the French presence in
Biafra is not fully known, since the
world press reports the war almost.
exclusively from Lagos. It is known,
though, that the Biafran government
has been promising mineral and raw
material concessions to its new
friends in order to get still more
tools and money for its war. Like a
low-rated boxer selling more per-
centages of himself than exist, Bi-
afra is fair game for fiscal adven-
turers, who stand to gain a great deal
for low stakes if independence can
be brought off.
T IIE ORGANIZATION for African
Unity-whose members fear
fragmentation in a world where eco-
nomic success belongs more and
more to nations acting in concert-
has been easily dissuaded by the
Federal government from making
any serious efforts to effect peace in
Nigeria. That Nigeria's principal
human resource for development-
the Ibo tribe-niay be decimated
while the ono acts out its charade
in perfect righteousness is one of the
unfortunate contradictions of Africa
today.
No African nation has recog-
n;zed Biafra, and no other nation
cart until the black countries make
the first move. Such are the rules of
the world game of diplomatic pa-
tronization.
Biafra possesses all the elements
of a viable political and economic
entity. Its population is certainly
large enough, it has plenty of raw
materials to trade in the world mar-
kets, and in aggressive human core.
The oppo ite argument, for unite. is;
equally convincing. A big Nigcria
could in time, become a nucleus of a
huge federation encompassing its
landlocked neighbors to the north
and perhaps its smaller neighbors
to the west-the first real possibility'
of a United States of Africa. Yet
what is needed is not an immediate
determination of the merits of seces-
sion vs. unity but rather a cessation
of fighting, and most particularly of,
genocidal aggression against the Ibos.
In terms of world politics, the
positions of the various powers:
toward the Nigerian tragedy are
orthodox and perfectly correct-in'
other words, based on their own self-
interest. The hypocrisies involved
in the public descriptions of those
positions are irritating to a number
of observers, though, and must be
galling to the Biafrans, principally
the Ibos, who know they are being
penalized in the name of unity fop
being progressive in a country un-
able to move out of stasis.
The heedless inrush of machinery
salesmen, investors, and merchant
adventurers after Nigerian indepen-
dence in 1960-backed by European
and American government credit,
cash and guarantees-was not, some-
how, seen as foreign intervention.-,
Now that the pickings are slimmer.
persuasive, even strong measures to
stop the current slaughter in Nigeria
are labelled intervention and fore-
stalled by the label. It has, however,
the ring of abandonment, of an ab-
dication of responsibility. The Ni-
gerians, no matter what their tribe.
are the same people today in their
inchoate thrashing as they were yes-
terday when they so happily posed
for their unity portrait and bought
what the developed world said they
should have.
 CPYRGHT
s-sue E
the expectation that minimal force
would bring the rebels to heel. Oju-
kwu not only held off Federal attacks
but shocked the Lagos government
by immediately seizing the Midwest
Region and grabbing nearly $10 mil-
lion in cash from the banks and busi-
ness houses there. An earnest war
was obviously called for, and effec-
tive control of the Federal military
forces was lifted from Gowon by the
Northern Officers.
Now, after nearly half a year of
fighting, Federal troops have found
it impossible to establish military
supremacy over the stubborn Bia-
frans, even though they have retaken
the Midwest and established some
measure of control over approxi-
niately, 25 per cent of Biafra's land
area..Ojukwu, meanwhile, has been
given a mandate by his Consultative
Assembly, representing 14 million
people from all tribes in Biafra, to
continue the fighting. With the lbos
feeling compression, and with the
other tribes in Biafra having com-
mittcd themselves to secession be-
yond the point of no return, the
Federal troops are facing an elusive
and difficult opponent. Formal mili-
tary action has increasingly degen-
erated into unconnected guerrilla
skirmishes.
Enugu, the Biafran capital, has
fallen to Federal forces-largely be-
cause of a sellout by a handful of
Biafran officers who decided the
situation was ripe for a Communist
coup. (They have since been ex-
ecuted by Ojukwu.) But capitals are
portable, especially the Biafran capi-
tal. and olliecs of the civil service
have been scattered in three other
Biafran cities. The present center of
government is Ojukwu's car, the
most portable capital of all.
tion
more realistic broadcasts from Radio
Kaduna, in the Northern capital,
discussing the final solution to the
Ibo problem and dolefully listing
names of lbo leaders marked for
execution. If the truculent Biafrans
show no signs of giving up, it is be-
cause they at least know they are
literally fighting for their lives.
Therein lies the major hypocrisy
of the Nigerian disaster: The public
posture of nearly everyone else re-
flects a pious concern for Nigerian
unity, as if this were still possible.
Diplomats, businessmen and other
foreigners familiar with the situation
know very well that the loos, and
perhaps other tribes in Biafra. face
extermination in large numbers; that
in the event of a Federal victory in
the civil war the Eastern survivors
will be pariahs. Gowon and his
government maintain that Nigerian
unity is the sole issue in the civil war;
they claim such matters as the clash
between Moslem and Christian
ethics and suppression of the uppity
lbos do not exist.
That the civil war has turned puni-
tive is undeniable; that there is una-
nimity on the purpose and extent of
the punishment to be meted out to
the Ibos is debatable. Gowon's per-
sonal attitude seems more petulance
than hatred; his field commanders
seem committed to mass slaughter.
But no matter who prevails, there is
little chance that the Ibos will be
welcomed back as real participants
in a unified Nigeria, should there
ever again be a unified Nigeria. Em-
ployment is a critical issue in the
country, and the Ibos, having been
displaced in their jobs by Yorubas
and members of other tribes, are not
likely to find postwar Nigeria re?-
ccptive to their aggressive penetra-
.
ducer of crude oil. Sixty per cent of
the Nigerian oil reserves so far dis-
covered are in the Eastern Region,
and 60 per cent of that is in iboland.
So talk of unity means, among other
things, talk of who is to control the
oil.
Religious conversions from ani-
mism in West Africa are being won
by the Moslems, seven to three. To
deny that there is religious involve-
ment in the Nigerian impasse is
fatuous nonsense, especially when it
is realized that two directly opposite
-ways of looking at life are in clash
between the North and the East:
Moslem fatalism and Christian self-
determination. A sort of jihad is in
progress, no mistake.
Tribal supremacy is not in doubt
for the moment. The loos could gain
supremacy only through complete
military victory, and that is all but
impossible, considering the array of
Nigerian and world forces against
them. The Yorubas, through a half-
century of internal bickering and dis-
organization, have forfeited their
claim to forceful influence, especially
now that Nigerian military power is
virtually a Northern monopoly. The
Hausas and their intermingled Fulani
remnants are supreme again.
No world power seems willing
to intervene to stop the war, to mini-
mize the gathering genocide. Amer-
ica has abdicated its growing influ-
ence in Nigeria to the British on the
thin, vestigial pretext that it is in the
British sphere of influence, and that
a special relationship between Wash-
ington and London precludes Amer-
ican interference. The American cop-
out has hurt and angered many Ni-
gerians deeply.
Now the USSR-invoked by the
aiiu
iii u~~~ wvumu not, at a cru-
upwards of 10 thousand noncom- ~~a
i
l
i
a
po
nt last spring, permit arms
bat ants have recently been siau h- c
y g aNt:Y, tribal supremacy and
h
purc
ases by Nigeria-has moved
tered by Federal troops in the com- h religion are what the Nigerian i
h
nto t
e vacuum with MIG and
hat areas. They experience little con- turmoil is all about. and unity as an Czech Delfin jets, and hundreds of
fusion, therefore, when they com- abstract concept cannot he serious.-
technicians.? The Russians prob-
pare Federal broadcasts from Lagos ly discussed. Oil is money, and Ni - ably cannot make lasting headway
promising safety to the somewhat gcria is the world's 10th largest pro.-
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 (B)
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WORLD MARXIST REVIEW
Vol. 10, No. 10
October 1967
Nigerian Patriots Want National Unity
N IGERIA, largest country in Africa, is in the throes of war.. and French penetration. The Americans operate through "aid":
The conflict was sparked off on May 30, when Col. Nigeria is one of the nine "selected" countries which this year account
Odumcgwu-Ojukwu, Governor of the Eastern Region, for 86 per cent of all American economic aid. The New York Times
announced the region's secession from the Federation to become the recently published an incomplete list of 36 American companies
independent republic of Bi
f
E
l
a
ra.
ar
y in July, Federal troops were active in Nigeria. Some of them arc drawing up development plans
ordered into Biafra
One mo
i
h
.
re war, w
t
all its attendant destruction
of life and property, was added to the list of wars already raging.
The conflict had been maturing for some time. In fact, its roots
can be traced to the divide-and-rule policy customarily followed by
British imperialism in colonial territories. Its repercussions were
painfully felt after Nigeria became independent in 1960. The ruling
feudal and capitalist elements fomented communal strife, pursued a
reactionary policy that left foreign-monopoly control intact and
aggravated the poverty of the people. These factors, in the aggregate,
arc responsible for the present tragedy.
In February, the New York Times had this to say to potential
Anerican investors: "The Federal Republic of Nigeria possesses
abundant human and natural resources. Moreover, Nigeria main-
tains an open-door policy towards foreign capital ... and has the
largest and fastest growing market in Africa."
With the biggest population of any African country, Nigeria
probably also has Africa's greatest natural wealth potential. It is
the world's biggest exporter of palm products
a major
row
f
,
,
g
er o
o
e struggle. Nigeria now has a workers'
cocoa beans and ground-nuts; its northern areas supply 90 per cent paper, Advance. In the summer of 1964, the country experienced the
of the world's columbite and 9 per cent of its tin, and Nigeria also biggest general strike in African history, involving 800,000 workers
exports quantities of timber, cotton, hides, rubber and soya beans. in practically every branch of the economy.
Its economic and strategic importance was enhanced in recent Discontent grew, and in January 1966 triggered off a coup by a
years with the discovery of rich oil deposits in the South-east. With group of progressive officers led by Chukuwma Nzcogwu. The new
an output of more than 20 million tons last year, Nigeria is Africa's government, however, did not last long, and power passed to army
third, and the world's 17th, biggest oil producer, supplying about chief General Ironsi, who was able to hold out for only six months.
10 per cent of Britain's requirements, American economists estimate In fact, Ironsi only succeeded in complicating the situation; he
that within five to ten years Nigeria will rank with the world's top banned all political parties, including the Socialist Workers' and
ten oil-producing countries. Farmers' Party. General Ironsi was overthrown in July and a new
The growth of the freedom m ...e...
t B
de ce but
Iberia, as the catty telegraph rightly stated on
August 15, 1967, was to be turned into a "'show-window' of
successful devolution from colonial paternalism to the responsible
exercise of self-government". Independence was hedged off with
reservations that safeguarded the interests of the imperialist mono-
polies, which continue to operate just as they did in the colonial
days.
So much so, that practically the entire economy is controlled by
the United Africa Company, a subsidiary of the great Unilever
monopoly. Its operations extend from production of primary
products to the clothing industry and retail trade, and together with
other British firms it has cornered the supply of imported foods and
consumer goods. The country's finances arc controlled by two
British banks, Barclays and the Bank of West Africa.
In oil, 85 per cent of extraction, refining and export are in the
hands of Shell-BP, a combine of British Petroleum and the Anglo-
Dutch Shell firm. Its new refinery at Port Harcourt is owned jointly
by the com
4
pany (
0 per cent), the Federal Government (40 per cent),
and private Nigerian investors (20 per cent). A pipeline has been built
others are prospecting for oil, and still others are actually producing
and exporting oil.
The whole profit structure rests on rich natural resources and
cheap labour, and to maintain that structure the imperialists have
trained a cadre of bureaucrats and politicians.
The foreign-monopoly stranglehold, the policy of the feudal
chiefs, the compradore and venal bureaucracy have sharply aggra-
vated social conflicts. The gap between the privileged minority and
the poverty-striken majority is steadily widening. And in recent
years the feudal and capitalist elements, supported by foreign Big
Business, have maintained an offensive against living standards
through wage freezes and confiscation of communal land tilled by
the peasant farmers. The result has been more poverty and more
unemployment.
The working people have never accepted this and through their
trade unions have been fighting to change the situation. The
Marxist-Leninist Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party, founded
in 1963
is in the forefront
f th
It leaned for support on the feudal sultans and emirs in North
ern
Nigeria, but General Gowon realised that, in this complex situation,
his administration could survive only if it had the backing of the
public, and if it curbed the omnipotence of the foreign monopolies.
The ban on the political parties was not lifted, though many
political detainees were released, among them Obafemi Awolowo,
the West-Nigerian radical leader.
The new government announced it would encourage economic
and cultural co-operation with the socialist countries. For one thing
it envisaged a substantial increase in trade with the USSR, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and co-operation with these
countries on oil refining, iron and steel and other projects.
The Nigerians attach importance to the recent Soviet visit of their
Commissioner for Information and Labour, Mr. Anthony Enahoro,
and to the signing of a cultural agreement. Advance (September 2)
commented that the visit "not only strenthened the relationship
between the USSR and Nigeria but also opened a new era of
friendliness and mutual understanding between our two countries".
On Januar
f .~ - .. _
y
wi
h
- --
arr the oil to
E
h
.+..un.
t
'
-'
t
xperts
e Vii companies. It would still receive half of the profits, plus
estimate that oil could become the basis of intensive industrialisation, concession payments and taxes, but there would be more stringent
but industrialisation is the last thing the foreign monopolies want. financial control. The oil companies, predictably, objected. Shell-BP
Latterly, US business has conic into the picture~J~ 1~j1+2v u# , but American and
been vigorous efforts Apwo` i 3FlWhRQ"e rtit`vVCttt'b, i`Mah t~S2fR' toug6~atttittuude and suc
suspended production.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21
The imperialists retaliated by stepping up subversion in an
attempt to sever off the oil-rich regions. They adroitly exploited
tribal tension, always part of Nigerian life.
Nigeria is inhabited by numerous tribes, the biggest of which are
the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. The Hausa, followers of Islam, are
concentrated in the North, whereas the Yoruba and Ibo are con-
centrated in the predominantly Christian South. Originally the
North formed a separate region, while the South was divided into
three--the Western (including the Federal District of Lagos), the
mid-West and Eastern regions.
Distribution, of the population, according to the latest census
figures published in the Nigerian Sunday Times in August 1964, is as
follows :
Northern Nigeria .. .. .. 20,758,875
Eastern Nigeria .. .. 12,394,462
Western Nigeria .. 10,265,846
Mid.-West Nigeria.. .. .. 2,535,839
Lagos District .. .. .. 665,246
All Nigeria .. .. .. 55,620,268
The Northern Region, as will be seen from the table, predomin-
ated. Nor is that accidental, for prior to colonialisation the North
was an agglomeration of feudal states with which the British com-
pacted to exploit the people and the natural resources through a
system of indirect administration, that is, through the feudal emirs
and sultans. This tended to keep alive the old, backward structure.
In the South, direct rule encouraged the development of capitalist
relations, the rise of industry and towns, a national bourgeoisie and
a working class and, in the final analysis, a powerful national-
liberation movement.
CIA-RDP78-03.06 Ah00Q4Qg040005
an Easterner, abo esh t e eu a system. inc a sultans and emirs,
alarmed at the prospect of lbo rule and loss of their privileges,
engineered a series of massacres in which thousands of Easterners
were killed and their homes sacked. Then, in July, came another
military coup: Ironsi was overthrown and killed, and Major-
General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner, established a military
government. The Eastern Region governor, Colonel Ojukwu,
refused to recognise the new regime, though there was no indication
of what policy it would follow. This precipitated a new series of anti-
lbo attacks, in the course of which, according to press reports, not
less than 30,000 people were killed. Needless to say, this inflamed
tribal passions. About two million Easterners fled from the North.
But was war inevitable? Nigerian progressives say it could have
been avoided. In one of its August issues, Advance printed a letter
by Chukwuma Nzeogwu, organiser of the progressive January 1966
revolution, to Tunji Otegbeye, General Secretary of the banned
Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party: "I do realise that each
component portion of our hapless Federation is in itself a little
federation. This is all the more reason why the solution 'of the
problem of nationalities should have been tackled in the same
manner as the USSR dealt with its own nationalities. We must
continue to preach this idea in preparation for the day when the
people can fully liberate themselves through a popular revolution."
The letter was written in Enugu, the Eastern capital, at the height,,
of the chauvinist hysteria following the proclamation of the indepen-
dence of Biafra.
Supported by the progressive forces, the Federal government
made several attempts to preserve the Federation. In January,
General Gowon had a meeting (in Ghana) with the governors of all
the regions. Their communiques emphasised the need to '"preserve
the political unity of the country". Things
looked more hopeful but
,
,
The first labour organisations and the first political parties in a situation charged with distrust and imperialist intrigue, chau-
working for national independence originated in the southern, vinist passions, and acrimony, continued to mount. Ojukwu refused
western and eastern regions. Nigerians still remember the 1949 to,turn in tax revenue to the Federal government, and the latter
miners' strike in Enugu, capital of the Eastern Region, when many retaliated by cutting off communications with the Eastern Region.
workers were shot down on orders of the colonial authorities. On May 27, the Federal government made a last attempt to keep
The post-independence divide-and-rule policy was designed the country united by revising the administrative map. The old
primarily to divide the Southern Region, where the revolutionary regions were abolished and 12 states formed instead. This broke
movement was maturing, and place it under the control of the Northern domination, for the Northern Region was divided into six
northern feuda.ls. This, in fact, was consolidated in the Nigerian units and the Eastern into three. This, it was hoped, would weaken
Constitution: each region would have its own legislature and the stranglehold of the Northern sultans and emirs. But it also
government, but the North would always have a majority (167 seats worked against Colonel Ojukwu and his separatists and destroyed
out of 312) in the Federal Parliament. the imperialist hopes of creating a puppet oil republic.
Long before independence capitalist industry and trade were The Nigerian press often likens the Biafra breakaway, backed and A
growing in the Southern regions, with their predominant Ibo and largely incited by the imperialists, with the split in the Congo in
Yoruba populations. In the Eastern Region, where good land was 1960. And while the comparison applies only to a point, there is this
scarce and there was practically no industry, unemployed Ibos common feature: in both cases the aim is to slice off areas rich in
migrated to the North. Here, thanks to their spirit of enterprise and natural resources. Just as they wanted to turn Katanga into a copper
tribal mutual support, they were able to start businesses of their republic, they now want to turn the Eastern Region into an oil
own. After independence many Ibos were brought into the govern- republic. And in both cases the method has been much the same-
merit services. exploitation of tribal discord, assiduously cultivated for years by the
Meanwhile, in the North, there had been little retreat from feudal colonialist administration.
customs and religious fanaticism, both formidable obstacles to Nor do the monopolies make any secret of the fact that they are
progress. The peasants were weighed down by the monopoly interested in Nigeria's oil and other wealth, and not in the well-
system of of feudal relationships, religion and foreign monopoly being and future of its people. Writes the London Times: "With the
exploitation. In these circumstances-and not without aid and Suez Canal closure and the threat to Western oil supplies from the
encouragement by the leading element in the Eastern Region-there Middle East, Nigerian oil, mainly concentrated in Biafra, could
developed what might be described as a superiority complex, with achieve a vital new importance".
all its ugly chauvinism in relation to the "backward" North. The The imperialist powers are officially neutral in the conflict;
Northerners, on the other hand, exploited this, and also relative lbo indeed, some have announced support of the Federal government
prosperity, to incite the Hausa tribe against the lbos, who were held (a lesson learned from the Congo, one suspects). But in practice-
responsible for the poverty and misery of the peasants. In other and that much is obvious from the Nigerian press-some of them
words, this was the old British divide-and-rule policy, and it should have been giving support to the separatists. There was, for instance,
be said that Nigeria is not the only country where it has been, and the incident with the US plane carrying arms to Port Harcourt in
is being, employed to sidetrack attention from social, economic and Biafra which crash-landed in Cameroon. Advance charged US
political problems. intelligence with recruiting mercenaries through Israel and supplying
The military coup of Jmuuau 196 ??vert rr~ fcy~~l~q e, he~i rt
Balewa government, and t ~ rrrt ? g6,aA0o00nI000re4~~~5 ~~e position of the
rous
 Approved For Release 2005/04121 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
imperialist powers as hostile. There have been protests from
different circles. The pro-government Morning Post noted recently
that Britain and the US were gravely impairing their prestige and
would henceforth find it hard indeed to win back Nigerian friendship
through "aid".
Nigeria's patriots, notably its working class, are campaigning for
territorial integrity and demanding effective measures to block sup-
port for the separatists. Wahab Goodluck, President of the Nigerian
Trades Union Congress, has declared that the task of the labour
movement is to preserve Nigerian unity.
And a trade union programme to that end calls for nationalisation
of oil companies that refuse to pay taxes to the Federal government,
for measures to stop the espionage activities of US and British
organisations and consulates, organisation of volunteer security
detachments and permission for the Trades Union Congress to rally
the workers against imperialist conspiracies.
In Eastern Nigeria itself, many favour national unity, and have
been drawn into the separatist movement under pressure. The
revolutionary traditions of the working class, which is least of all
subject to chauvinist influence, are very much alive in Enugu, Port.
Harcourt and other parts of Biafra. The Trades Union Congress and
the banned Socialist Workers' and Farmers' Party enjoy wide
influence too. This is how the situation is described by Tunji
Otegbeye: "It is true that the forces of tribal chauvinism have risen
to control the affairs of the Eastern Region of our country; that
secession has been popularised through the radio and the press. But,
all the information reaching us here indicates that the common
people do not bclioe that the ansmcr to our teething probtcros is
Balkanisation of our country."
Progressive opinion and Communists the stiorld over are deeply
disturbed by developments. They hope and beliese that Nigeria's
patriots, its working class and the people generally kill put an end
to the fratricidal swear and presersc Nigeria's unity. Peace and unity
is the first step towards a democratic ,tructure and a just solution
of the social and national problems that continue to beset Africa's
biggest country.
\lantadou Dionne
4
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968
Problems Besetting Hanoi and the Viet Cong
For the Communist leaders of North Vietnam, 1967 was a year charac-
terized by more failures than successes and beset with problems of increas-
ing severity. In the area of population control, which most observers
recognize as vital to ultimate victory and lasting peace, the Communist
forces continued to suffer a steady loss. Captured enemy documents orig-
inally revealed that the Communists lost control over one million people
between mid-1965 and mid-1966. It has since been estimated, on the basis
of population control statistics, that another million persons deserted
the Communist cause in 1967. Some of the "desertions" were the result of
the extension of friendly areas of control, but most were caused by the
flight of people from enemy-controlled areas. Many fled the dangers
caused by military operations against the guerrilla forces. Disenchant-
ment with their treatment by the Viet Cong -- who increasingly expected
food, shelter, intelligence and tax money -- was a major reason for the
population's swing away from the Viet Cong as were the prospects of a more
secure life under the protection of the South Vietnamese Government, and
the appeal of the Government's economic and social development programs.
One of these, the Revolutionary Development (RD) program trains 59-
man teams to go into hamlets all over South Vietnam to teach the people
about farming, the need for education, medical and sanitation techniques,
etc. The RD cadres have been increasingly successful in helping the
people and often in providing resources for the way to a better life. At
the end of 1965 there were 3,000 such team workers, by December 1966 there
were 24,000 and by mid-1967 35,000. By the end of 1968 it is anticipated
that more than 60,000 RD workers will have graduated from the National
Training Center at Vung Tau and will be at work in the field trying to
build a new and better Vietnam. A measure of their success was illus-
trated this spring when 4,500 of South Vietnam's 12,500 hamlets were suffi-
ciently secure to hold the first round of free elections.
The Chieu Hoi ("open arms") defector program encountered unprece-
dented success in the first half of 1967, winning over more Viet Cong
defectors in six months than it had in the whole of 1966. By November
1967 over 25,000 Viet Cong had defected.* Captured enemy documents have
revealed great concern on the part of the enemy leadership over the inroads
of the Chieu Hoi program on their manpower as well as the effect of the
RD program on their population base. The RD cadres are high on the list
of targets for assassination by the Viet Cong and the intelligence given
to the South Vietnamese Government by Hoi Chanh (ralliers to the Govern-
ment) is a cause for continuing concern to enemy leaders. A link between
*Although this figure represents a drop in the number of Viet Cong de-
fectors,experts attribute this to the fact that the-Chieu Hoi program has
been sufficiently successful to appeal to all save the hard core Viet Cong.
They have now been reached and the number of defectors may decline fur-
ther.
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these two government programs has been the willingness of an increasing
number of Hoi Chanh to work in the RD program.
One problem inevitably breeds another, and the Communists' shrinking
area of population control markedly reduced their ability to extract food,
shelter, protection and tax money from the population. The amount of intel-
ligence they were able to gather via the civilian population also dwindled
with a steady reduction in their effectiveness. An increase in the bru-
tality exercised to keep the population under control only served to alie-
nate the people more and eventually this loss of influence was felt in
fewer recruitments for the Viet Cong fighting forces. As far as can be
learned from Viet Cong defectors, the enemy, in the early days, had little
difficulty in recruiting sufficient manpower in South Vietnam to fill the
ranks of existing Viet Cong units and to activate new units as well. By
mid-1966 the Viet Cong was recruiting an estimated 7,000 guerrillas per
month. However, their waning population control and the increased Allied
military pressure have greatly reduced the Viet Cong's ability to recruit,
and between January and May 1967 their recruiting average was only about
3,500 per month. To bolster their dropping numbers, the enemy was forced
to find recruits somewhere and considerable evidence points to the increas-
ing enlistment of women and young boys.
The supply of fighting men from North Vietnam, which averaged about
8,000 during the first six months of 1966, dropped to an estimated 5,000
for the same period in 1967. Allied bombing has made infiltration of
North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam more difficult and certainly more
hazardous, but that is only one portion of the problem. North Vietnam has
great numbers of able-bodied men available, but over half a million must
be used constantly to repair damage caused to North Vietnam's vital trans-
port arteries by Allied bombing in order to keep up the flow of imported
materials on which their entire war machine depends. That fact eliminates
at least 300,000 able-bodied men from military duty. Other major drains
on manpower are the constantly increasing need for troops to man coastal
defenses, heavy artillery batteries, and more than 7,000 anti-aircraft gun
sites, and the growing need for army and security forces to maintain inter-
nal. security. It is suspected that the North Vietnamese Army leaders will
inevitably be driven to drafting younger men and then boys as well as
women to keep their fighting units close to minimum strength.
Closely related to Communist difficulties in maintaining troop
strengths are Communist difficulties in supplying the troops they do have
with rice, clothing, medicines and a variety of other essentials. Hanoi's
agricultural and industrial output has shrunk to such a minute fraction of
its former volume, that it is now dependent upon the Communist bloc for
most of these civil requirements as well as virtually all its military
supplies. Supplies traveling overland can come only through Communist
China, whose internal discord and running argument with the USSR have caused
innumerable stoppages of badly needed supplies for-Hanoi. Allied bombing
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of the area close to the China border compounds transportation diffic,i
ties as does the mountainous terrain of the frontier area. Allied bor:
of the areas close to Haiphong (the major seaport) has caused Haiphong's
virtual isolation from the rest of the country and goods leaving it since
October of 1967 have had to be ferried laboriously across each of the
many waterways. Godowns quickly filled to overflowing and the congestion
has become so serious that valuable goods have been left in the open
streets.
As for supply of foodstuffs, numerous captured documents, prisoners,
and defectors have reported that food is increasingly scarce, that many
of the rice growing areas formerly used by the Viet Cong have beeniover-
run by Government troops and that the population is increasingly loath
to pay higher taxes or to produce food upon demand. And the increased
demands have served to alienate more of the population with the result
that the Viet Cong has a decreased base from which to derive support.
The Communist difficulties are interlocking and feed upon one another
in other ways as well. The population swing against the Viet Cong result-
ed in a considerable reduction in the intelligence furnished the Viet Cong
which resulted in a poorer military showing. A concomitant increase in
intelligence flowing to the Allied troops has, in turn, been of consider-
able military help.
In 1967 the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam
suffered heavier casualties than in any previous year (92,000 KIA by
actual body count in 1967 as compared to 58,000 in 1966), they saw their
supposedly impregnable base areas overrun in large-scale operations (such
as Cedar Falls and Junction City), they lost immense quantities of arms
and foodstuffs, abandoned quantities of top secret military and political
documents and saw the destruction of literally miles of laboriously con-
structed underground tunnels.
1967 also saw a steady decline in the desertion rate from the South
Vietnamese army and a steady increase in'that of the Communist forces.
The Communist forces are also losing greater numbers in combat -- more
than four times as many men as all the allied forces combined; Communist
losses reached an alltime high in January 1968 with 5000 enemy troops
killed in two weeks. In 1965 the South Vietnamese Army was losing three
weapons for each Communist weapon they captured. By late 1967 they were
capturing four Communist weapons for each one they.lost.
There is no question that one of the telling factors in the declin-
ing combat effectiveness of the Communist forces has been the growing mili-
tary maturity of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The ARVN now has para-
military forces. The ARVN has made more contact with the enemy and in-
flicted more losses than ever before and U.S. observers are quick to
point out that the South Vietnamese soldier is shouldering more of the
heavy combat burden with every passing month. (See Hanson Baldwin article,
attached, for details.)
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Tied in with the Communists' declining fortunes is a propaganda prob-
lem, a weakness, that is being interpreted in some quarters as the major
influence on their future military course. Whereas Communist forces
achieved 13 significant military victories in 1965 and four in 1966, there
were none in 1967. The end of 1967 was characterized by heavy concentra-
tions of Communist troops (principally at Dak To in October and Loc Ninh
in November) who sought, with what appeared to be suicidal desperation,
a military victory. "Human wave" attacks followed one upon the other,
with appalling losses against an enemy in an obviously vastly superior
position on land and in the air. The lunacy of these attacks can be inter-
preted, in light of the mounting difficulties facing the Communist forces
in 1968, as a dramatic illustration of North Vietnam's anxiety to secure
an improved position from which to negotiate an end to the war. The
Communist military offensive undertaken in early January may be a prelude
to a diplomatic offensive by Hanoi to start as soon as it is possible to
do so without its appearing to be the result of a military defeat. If this
speculation is correct, the enemy's belated willingness to sue for peace,
or at least to commence negotiations, constitutes the strongest evidence
of increasing Communist military weakness.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968
1943-1945
1946-1949
KOREAN CHRONOLOGY
A series of wartime agreements between U.S.,
Britain, China and the U.S.S.R. led to the
reestablishment of Korea as a free and independent
state. The Soviets occupied a portion of Korea
from the 38th Parallel north, while the U.S.
occupied the South.
A Joint Soviet/American Commission failed to
reach agreement on the formation of a Korean
government. The U.S. referred the matter to the
United Nations General Assembly in September
1947. Elections sponsored by the UN were held
in May 1948. The North Koreans refused to par-
ticipate and established their own government.
The UN subsequently declared the Republic of
Korea to be the legitimate Government of Korea.
The Americans and Soviets withdrew their troops.
1949-1950 The UN established a new commission on Korea to
'work for reunification of the country, in the
light of developments "which might otherwise
involve military conflict in Korea."
December 1949-January 50 Mao Tse-tung conferred with Stalin in Moscow. A
Sino-Russian Treaty of Fri ndship and Mut}zal
Assistance was signed. Allegedly the decision
to attack the South was made at this time.
25 June 1950 A force of 60,000 North Koreans crossed 38th
Parallel* The U.S. requested UN action and UN
forces were commited to Korea.
October 1950 Chinese CpDunists began infiltrating thousands
of troops into North Korea.
November 1950 200,000 Chinese troops smashed across the 38th
parallel in a massive drive which split and
trapped UN forces and brought Chinese forces in
South Korea to a fighting strength of 400,000.
14 December 1950 The UN General Assembly approved a resolution for
the creation of a Cease Fire Committee to negoti-
ate! a compromise solution. Communist China was
invited to the UN to discuss peace terms. No
compromise was reached.
1 February 1951 The UN General Assembly condemned Communist China
as the aggressor in Korea.
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Spring 1951
April 1951
Chinese Communists begin their spring offensive
with a force which totaled 600,000. UN forces
began counter-attacks which. defeated the Chinese
offensive and opened the way for armistice nego-
tiations.
General. MacArthur was relieved of command. Presi-
dent Truman assured the allies that he did not
wish to extend the war.
June 1951 UN forces drove the Communist forces back to the
38th parallel.
23 June 1951
10 July 1951
26 July 1951
1952
Russia's Jacob Malik, during a UN radio program
said, "Discussion should be started for ,a cease-
fire."
UN (including ROK), North Korean and Chinese Com-
munist representatives met in the first truce
session. at Panmunjom.
The negotiators agreed on an agenda after weeks
of exchanges of messages between General Ridgway
and Marshal Kim Il Sung.
The truce talks dragged on; all major issues
were agreed upon except the voluntary repatria-
tion of prisoners. During these negotiations the
UN forces were continually denounced for alleged
violations of the truce. The war continued and
the Chinese, despite their agreement not to do
so, increased their troop strength to a total
of 700,000 plus 1,000 airplanes in comparison
with a total of 450,000 UN forces, which remained
static during this period. U.S. casualties alone
were 30,000 per year, while negotiations continued.
October 1952 Truce talks were suspended indefinitely over the
issue of repatriation of prisoners.
April 1953
27 July 1953
An agreement on the exchange of sick and wounded
prisoners was reached after an adjournment of
six and. a half months.
An armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom
after more than three years of war and two weeks
of negotiations.
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 App ~ l5e?rN~ I ? se(WP5/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
Saigon Controls Two-Third's
Of the Country, Computer Says
SAIGON, Dec. 1 (AP) --,schools available, development
Two-thirds of South Vietnam's
17 million people now live in
secure areas controlled by the
Saigon government, the U.S.
mission said today.
The U.S. Embassy unveiled
its new computerized Hamlet
Evaluation System and said
.the "secure" population has
increased more than a million
since last January.
Ambassador Robert W.
Komer, who heads the Ameri-
can side of the pacification
program, told a news confer-
ence that the computer system
provides a detailed monthly
check on the campaign for the
allegiance of the South Viet-
namese living in the country's
12,800 cities and hamlets.
A checklist on 18 major
Criteria Is filled out on comput-
er cards for each hamlet by
the U.S. district adviser and
put through computers in Sai-
gon and Bangkok, he said.
In addition to hamlet securi.
ty, the cards include informa-
tion on such -matters as
WASHINGTON POST (2)
7 December 1967
projects, health facilities and
even whether the hamlet chief
sleeps in the hamlet at night.
Pointing out that human
evaluators previously weren't
even sure how many hamlets
were In South Vietnam, Komer
said the new system is "not
even near perfect, but it's
more objective, more systemat-
ic and it focuses on the key as-
pects of pacification."
"I think It's getting a pretty
accurate picture," he added.
The system has been in use
since January.
Only 8650-or 63 per cent of
South Vietnam's 12,600 ham-
lets can be evaluated. The rest
are controlled by the Viet.
cong. But Komer said popula.
tion figures are more impor.
tant than the number of ham-
lets considered secure because
the hamlets vary In population
from 50 to 20,000 persons. Sai.
gon and other large cities are
classed as a group of hamlets.
He said government-con-
trolled hamlets tend to be larg-
er and more prosperous since
the government gives higher
priority to more heavily popu-
lated areas.
Secure hamlets now em-
brace 66.6 per cent, of the pop-
ulation. Contested hamlets ac-
count for 16.2 per cent of the
population, while another 17.2
per cent lives under Vietcong
control, according to the com-
puter report.
When the system was put
into operation last January,
Komer said, 62.1 per cent of
the population lived in secure,
hamlets, 18.5.per cent were in.
contested areas and 19.4 per
cent were under Vietcong con?
trol. The population then was
estimated at 16.4 million.
Vietcong control Is highest
in the Mekong Delta, where it
runs 27.6 per cent, according
to the report.
In the embattled Military
Corps I area just south of 'the
Demilitarized Zone, 28.5 per
cent of the people are said to
be under Vietcong control.
A Long Night of Burning
By Peter Arnett water buffalo slaughtered burns. Of the village's popu
the hamlet'
s bamboo lation of 2008
400 were
,
DAKSON South Vietnam,
Dec. 6 (AI'1-The Montag- fence. missing, presumably driveh
hard tribesmen of- Dakson A day later, the bodies of into the jungle by the
learned only recently how to men, women and children en mv.
were laid out in rows under Within hours, the injured
use matches. Flame throw- s were beyond their the one shade tree on the began dragging themselves
imag[- hill. On the lid of a basket into the hospital at the
nation.
But for were the bodies of a tiny nearby provincial capital of
one hour Tuesd ay brother and sister, still Songbe. Some were carried,
just after midnight these clinging to each other. Like "I picked up a little girl the weapons, wielded by
Vietcong, wreaked death th the other bodies at llakson, to move her from a litter to
they were blistered b flame a bed," said Dr. Herbert Ro-
"
a Theyh threw fire at us;'' throwers. Y . senbieeth of Flemington,,
"They throw said the survivors in this By late Wednesday, 63 N.J. "Her flesh came away
"New Life" hamlet 80 miles bodies had been dragged in my hands. She was dead."
,vr from the bunkers where the Nurse Linda Mudge of
ce d st of Saigon. They population hid when the Mansfield, Pa., said she had
trere describing one of the Vietcong first launched its "never seen people so filthy.
most vicious attacks of the attack. More were expected They had been crawling
war against Vietnam's civil. to be dug up. American and around In the mud all night.
`Ian Population. Vietnamese officials at the Their wounds were packed
' 'Sixty scene estimated that as in mud.
.. 1. an- a thatched-roof Lt. Col. Nguyen Duong
i
a
1
5 CIA-MDR780MOOM0104100640
~~
~
rows late ~l dt t'eR c ~ /b
razed by fire. The ashes At least 47 were wounded, scribed the' cause of this
blew across the carcasses of 33 of them with serious carnage as "a calculated
Communist attempt to
frighten the Monlagnard
population away from the,
government-the stakes are
high."
The people of Dakson are
members of the Steng tribe
nomads who move freely
back and forth across the
border of neighboring Cam.
bodia. The women gig bare-
breasted and the men wear
simple loincloths. Many of
them have been used by the
Communists as porters.
i Late in 1066, the Saigon
government won several
thousand Stengs over to its
side. These were settled In
"New Life" hamlets around
Songbe. The hamlets are
fortified enclaves guarded
by Revolutionary Develop-
ment teams.
The Vietcong. have made
it clear this year that they
want the tribesmen back
their control. Emis.
t visited the new vil?
lages, warning the Inhabi.
tants, that their. ? houses
 would be burned _ur~ s t co~fl~ I'tf ?~' gin gt
Nlontagnt l~r4Ka1 nE6tr elea* ~Ot Clsf~ 78-OT BR'.arQ!l~ AmerlOcans d
Vlo Jungles. Bred in their flimsy bamboo Songbe across the valley
Dakson apparently was
singled out as an example,
it repulsed three earlier at-
tacks. The assault this week
was probably ca ried out by
more than a battalion. The
120-man defense force was
beaten to the southern edge,
of the hamlet.
According to survivors,
the Vietcong shouted
through bullhorns: "Evacu-
ate your houses, you must
return with us. ,,Evacuate
your houses."
deep bunkers dug beneath
them.
One survivor, a man
named Duot, said he heard
the enemy shouting to him
to leave. He said he was too
frightened to move.
He saw a shadow In his
doorway. Then a jet of
flame shot out, searing his
back and shoulders, As his
house began to burn, he
crawled out.
All around him, he said,
men were running and
SAIGON POST
8 December 1967 (3)
37 Guerillas and Nurse; Biggest Haul
said, the hamlet seemed to
be ablaze in minutes.
The Vietcong melted back
Into the jungle.
Saigon authorities erro
neously Identified Dakson
during the confused first ac-
counts from the area Tues-
day as Daksong. a bigger
settlement near the Cambo-
dian border 50 miles farther
north, The U.S. Mission at
first reported 300 dead In
the Incident, but this was
later scaled down.
NEW YORK TIMES (u)
22 November 1967
Washington: VVhv' Westmoreland
Tired Plafooii , and BunkerAre Optimis'tic'
By JAMES RESTON Their conclusion is that the
Surrenders WASHINGTON Nov. 21-- United States and its allies are
r_ -.1 W tm l d d steadily wearing down the
e
o
n
SAIGON. I)''. 7 'UPli-Tired, hungry arid
stared, a pl.ihron of 37 guerillas and-their 1S-
year-old girl nurse stumbled out of the jungle and
surrendered in the largest single communist dee-i
feclion of the war, U. S. spokesmen said today.
"They were afraid to die. They stated they
lacked food and were disenchanted with the Viet
('ling cause," the spokesmen announced.
The platoon carried four automatic weapons In
surrendering Tuesday at the village of Loc An,
about 3(jfh blF 6ii9a'~06t1~i00046Ej 49@O5 D to fade away
2 Into the jungle.
puted areas td provide military'
intelligence.
5. Finally, the Vietcong now
control only 2,500,000 people
out of a total of 17.2 million in
South Vietnam-down from
4,000,000 in mid-1965. And ac-'
cording to the latest estimates
here,. Vietcong recruitment in
the South has dropped from,
7,500 to about 3,600 a month,
in the last twelve months.
This is what Westmoreland:
and Bunker mean by "steady.
progress." The -war, they csti
mate, is now further along
toward a conclusion than the
World War was. after Nor-'
mandy and the Korean War
d the official con-
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24 November 1 ,7
a.-.tire. "` Pza pers Raise U.S. Hopes
By Lee Lescaze
%VnNhil. tan Pn,c Forri n finale'
SAIGON, Nov. 23-Cap-
lured enemy documents,
which have become one of
.the major Indices in measur-
ing the progress of the Viet-
nam war, show that areas of
South Vietnam controlled
by the Vietcong are deciint
Ing.
Both Ambassador. Ell-
'Sworth Bunker and Gen.
William C. Westmoreland
quot+cd from the enemy doc-
uments In speeches in
Washington last week, in de-
scribing the hardships and
failures of the Communists.
The men here who work
with the documents, most of
whom are attached to.the in-
-tellihence staff of the U.S.
Military Headquarters, say
that the material they see is
becoming increasingly excit-
`1ng.
Documents have given evi?.
dence of the enemy's inabill.
ty to find recruits, food and
align of the people in never-+ North. Vietnamese and Viet-
'al arras of the country.. cong, there have been
The U.S. Mission in Sal- repeated statements of the
gon yesterday released four difficulties of fighting in the
lengthy documents In which countryside and the fear of
the Vietcong mention theiri American air strikes and ar-
;loss of control over the pop-1 tillery.
ulation? ' Communiques from com-;
A cadre's notebook cap- bat groups to their head-
during
t T
d l
as
anuary
ure
l Operation Cedar Falls de-
Scribes Vietcong control In
1965 and 1966.
"A comparison with the
early part of 1965 shows a
,decrease of 1 million people
in rural areas due to the
,presence, of U.S, troops."
The cadre wrote, "We have
greatly worn down the
enemy, potential, , All the
same, we have failed,to win
many people over to our
side."
"If we fall to solve this
problem urgently, we will
be bound to encounter more
difficulties," the notebook
year is 30( )MO. The decrease dinh and other provinces. 7 or no intelligence value.
of quantity also involved a More than 3 million pages The largest single group
of documents have been cap
decrease in quality:" lured by American and of translators in South Viet-
Other documents criticize nam sifts this material and
wavering determination South Vietnamese troops puts what is important into
this year-1.5 million were
among some Vietcong Vietcong Sol right- -
diets. This captured in all of 1966. English. In addition to being
,
Ism" manifests itself in Passed to Saigon screened for their English
ability, these Vietnamese
"fear of hardships and a A piece of paper uncov- translators have to learn the
fierce, protracted war, es- ered on a military operation vocabulary of the Victcong.i
capism and demoralization," is passed through intelli- Often the enemy uses
according to a Vietcong po- gence channels from com- words, and phrases which'
litical directive Issued last pany to battalion to brigade are not intelligible to other
January and captured in to division and then to the Vietnamese-it Is a lan-
September. Combined Document Exploi-. guage developed from years
"Overestimating t h e tation Center In Saigon. of guerrilla fighting among'
enemy, ,and becoming sub- The lower levels have lirn- people who are not meant to
ject- to his psychological Ited means to translate and know all of the army's;
slonary peace and the slack- they pass them up to Sal-
ening of alertness for enemy gon. The CDEC works quick
propaganda, signs of weari- ly to separate the, docu-
ness and the Inclination to ments into categories.
enjoy some rest," are other Its first responsibility and
weaknesses the directive or- first Interest Is In uncover-;
ders controlled, criticized Ing information that may be
and corrected, of value to soldiers in the
Setbacks Described -field.
In diaries, letters to their Recently, the CDEC got a
families and other personnel description of an enemy
quarters asking for more
men, rice and medicine have
been captured in large. num-
bers recently.
The 171st Vietcong Regi-
ment moved from its tradi-
tional base in War Zone D
about 40 miles north of Sai-
gon in September because it
couldn't get rice to feed its
men, according to a docu-
ment cited by U.S. military
officials.
As it moved west from its
former stronghold, elements
of the U.S. 1st Division
picked up its trail and
inflicted heavy casualties in
a series of battles during
September and October.
says ?at another point.', "Food supply does not
"Four-fifths of the funds de- meet the combat require-
rive from the population'. - ment," a May 13 political di-
rective issued in Phuyen
minefield in a certain area.
In less than 24 hours they
Sent word back to the troops
who had found the docu-
ment. The troops had
planned to walk into the
minefield area the next day.
After receiving the report
from CDEC they sent men
with. minesweepers ahead of
the combat soldiers.
The minefield example Is
only one of many times that
CDEC has helped field
troops avoid a trap or frus-
trate an enemy attack.
Not a Stalemate
Data which provides this
sort of Immediate help to
combat units Is the first
priority with the documents'
center. Most documents fall
into a second category
which Includes the type of
enemy reports, Bunker and
Westmoreland quoted re-,
cently.
From enemy internal or-
ders, after action reports,
memorandum and personal
documents, intelligence men
gather ia picture of a foe
who Is not fighting a stale
mated war, but is hurting
batll;1,
guerrillas dropped to 180,000 Province says and there are The Center has other cate-
and the requiremani
9!&Od FWPFeI> l!28A04 'I` ?i~faR 07810
301 ?400040005-0
ocumen are, of.,marginal
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
.NEW YORK TIMES (6)
17 December 1967
`Arvin' Is a Mixed Bag
By HANSON W. BALDtVIN
SAIGON, South Vietnim -
Units of the -South Vietnamese
Army moved into a few of the
new bunkers and strong points
of the "McNamara Line" south
of the demilitarized zone last
week. At the same time, three
Vietnamese ranger battalions
took over .from the U. S. 199th
Brigade the principal burden of
providing a pacification screen
around Saigon.
These and many other indices
pointed to what some-but by
no means all-U. S. officers feel
is an increasing Vietnamese mili-
tary maturity. Everyone agrees'
that greatly improved Viet-;
namese combat effectiveness-
better leadership, better disci-
pline, less corruption, a lower
desertiol rate and better morale
-acre essential If a military vic-
tory is to be won and confirmed
by the political victory of pacifi-
cation.
The expanded responsibilities
of the Vietnames armed forces
are, In a sense, a test of the
degree of improvement in these
forces since their low point in
1965. That they have improved
is unquestionable; that they
have a long way to go Is also
unquestionable. The armed forces
now number about 750,000 men
and ' women and include many
different types of military and,
paramilitary units.
Conscious of Clamor
American officers in Vietnam
are conscious of the public
clamor In the United states'
about "Arvin"-the Army of the
Republic of Vietnam. But they t
feel that many unfair criticisms:
and sweeping generalizations
have been made, and that since';
U. S. combat units have been
In Vietnam, the American press!
has not reflected adequately the:
heavy combat burden shouldered
by the Vietnamese.
"The truth is," one observer
put it, "that everything you say;
about the Vietnamese forces Is
true."
The armed forces are a mixed '
bag. They are spotty and uneven;
militia; some of the best units
have fought the Vietcong and
the North Vietnamese to a stand-
still. In some units the war stops
at siesta time and the dark of
the night is a time to sleep, not
to patrol. But not In all.
Some uniti repeat the same
mistakes they have made time,
after time in the past. But not'
all.
Some units loot the villages
they are supposed to, defend.
But not all.
Some units are commanded by
officer politicians. But not all.
There are highly encouraging
bnd very discouraging signs.
Perhaps the most encouraging
sign is that there have been few
Vietnamese Army debacles in
1967. Two years ago, V.C. Main
Force units used to give "Arvin"
units a bloody nose and Govern-
ment forces left stores or bun-
dted of bodies on the fields. It
IS true, of course, that more.
%1J. S. troops and increased air.`
rind artillery support for "Arvin"
jhave been major factors in the
`improved performance.
Nevertheless, even in the
Mekong Delta where three
"Arvin" divisions have shoul-
dered the principal burden, the
Vietcong units have lost more
than they have gained. Two local
V.C. battalions have been de-
activated, and even the once.
feared and famous Taydo batal-j
lion, which operated near`
Cantho, has been worn down- to
a fraction Of its former strength.
Leadership is Vital
The effectiveness of South
Vietnamese units is almost a
direct reflection of their leader-
ship. And in Vietnam-an unde-
veloped country with only 13
years of independent life and
more than 20 years of war-
leadership is thin indeed in both
.the North and the South.
Thus, the results vary from
the sublime to the ridiculous
from unit to unit. In the Camau
Peninsula, a battalion of the 21st
Division-regarded as one of the
patrols regularly to five "clicks"
(kilometers) beyond its base
camp. But in the Vungtau coastal
region, the vessels of the Viet-
namese Navy's in-shore patrol
usually lie snugly in harbor at
night, the very time when V.C.
blockade running sampans may
land their arms.
There are many things being
done to change this very mixed
picture. A list of ineffective
"Arvin" officers at many levels
has been prepared: some have
even been relieved and a few
court martialed. An inspector
general of the South Vietnamese
Army is now checking effective-
ness of units and commanders.
Retraining programs and mobile
'training teams are operating
throughout South Vietnam with
regular and regional and popular
forces. Enlisted men have been
promoted from their ranks; new
sources of officers and noncoms
are being tapped, and slowly,
very slowly, the French Man-
darin system which tended to.
restrict commissions . to the
upper classes is being broken.
Many Reforms
New laws have broadened the
draft; a rice ration, pay raises,
a better accouhting system and
stiffer penalties have reduced
the desertion rate by about 37
per cent this year as compared
to last year. Even so, desertions
.still account for about 71 per
cent of the total manpower
losses In the South Vietnamese
armed forces, and the slow
struggle to make all the units
combat effective is only In Its
first' chapter.
Nevertheless the process has
started. "Amin" has rebounded
from the dismal 'days of 1965,
and next year the process of re-
equiping the "Arvin" forces --
which has already started with
the assignment of M-l6 rifles to.
the First Division---will bebroad-.
ened and expedited.
their leadership varies from ex-
cellent to execrable; some of the better "Arvin" divisions engaged
in providing a pacification screen
Popular Force platoons are
ragged, undAppt1Qdeti4dentel elease' 28 Y'fs efA-&I"-0306 IA000400040005-0
 WASHINGT01~ @d ltl Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
12 Janua4
Record Enemy
Toll
?rnm T(rws Dispatches '
SAIGON, Jan. 11-The U.S. Military Command today
confirmed a South Vietnamese report that more Viet-
cong and North Vietnamese were killed last week than
In any other week of the war.
An American spokesman said 2868 enemy troops were
`'killed during the week, which included the 36-hour New
Year truce.
In the same period, guerrillas killed 184 American.
troops, he added.
The highest previous total of Communist deaths In any.
week was in March when 2783 guerrillas died in seven
days of fighting, the U,S. spokesman said.
MISSING oR
KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED
1;'6 12/30 1/6 12/30 1/6 12/30
'U.S.'........... 184 185 1132 437 37 (not given),
S. Vietnamese .. 263 227 657 556 '83 63
Other Allied ... '19 37 36 47 0 0
-Communist ....2868 '1438 (not.given) (not given)
?As reported by the U.S. Command.
WASHINGTON POST
8 January 1968 (8)
tyening is comprehensible, in
fact, if you do not grasp the
amply documented fact that
the efforts the enemy troops
are now being asked to
make are regularly pre-
sented as climactic, with the
assurance that they will be
followed by peace-by-coalt-
tidn."
THE GENERAL dissemi-
nation of this happy assur-
ance in Vietnam is the rea-
son, in turn, for the convic-
tion of the informed group
in Washington that Hanoi is
getting ready to offer nego-
tiations, although only on
Hanoi Seen Aiming for Talks,
,On I'Lled Terms, After Attack
AFTER LONG years of
,waiting, almost everyone in
the narrow circle of in-
formed persons is 'at last
convinced that Ilanoi is on
the verge of a major drive
for a negotiated settlement
in Vietnam. Yet there is lit-
,tie rejoicing, for two quite
different reasons.
The first and simplest rea-
son is the kind of enemy ef-
fort that must be expected
in the very near `future,
which will be aimed to ere-
ate a favorable climate for
the kind of talks that Hanoi
.obviously wants. This can,
perhaps, cost all too many
American and allied lives.
For example, Khesanh,
the most westerly of the Ala-
rines' fortified outposts on
the DAIZ, is now held by
less than two battalions of
:troops. It enjoys overwhelm-
;ing artillery support, but at
this season it Is very hard to
resupply. And no less than
Six regiments of the North
Vietnamese home army-the
equivalent of two divisions
.-have been moving into
place around this outpost
held by less than two batta-
lions,
The
temporarygjy~i
of Khesanh is imaginable.
Gen. Westmoreland may
perhaps order evacuation in
order to throw the very
slow-moving enemy off bal-
ance for a while, anchoring
the western end of the Ma-
rine line on the DA'IZ on the
more easily defensible rock-
pile position. But there is no
sign of any such plan.
Other less important posi-
tions like the airfield at
Banmethout and even Plei-
ku, where the attack on
the U.S. barracks touched
off the Northern bombing,
are also beginning to be
menanced, albeit by less
substantial enemy forces
than those around Khesanh.
There have been a whole se-
ries of sapper and even
ground force attacks on dis-
,tricts and provincial capitals
in South Vietnam in recent
weeks. These will no doubt
continue throughout this
month'at a minimum. .
ALL THIS PAST or fu-
'ture enemy activity can only
be put in perspective by the
captured documents summa-
rized in the last report in
Hanoi's own terms. As to
the motives for such an
offer, they are obvious
enough.
One motive Is the simple
fact that the strain and bur-
den of the war are becoming
near-unbearable for both
Hanoi and the Vietcong pup-
pets. That Is why the ex-
traordinary step is being
taken of promising the
enemy troops an end of the
war at a stated time. As for
the other motive, Hanoi is
obviously planning to use
the lever of the election
year In America to get a-
better deal than would be
possible later on.
No positive negotiating
move will be made, most
probably, until the attacks
now prepared have at length
been mounted. The offer
will then take the initial
form, beyond doubt, of a
public or private intimation
by Hanoi: "You stop bomb-
ing the north uncondition-
ally, and we'll start talking
about coalition government
In the South." This has al?
ready been telegraphed by
the Hanoi Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh.
There are only two draw
backs to this. An uncondi.
tional, unreciprocated bomb.
Jag halt in the North Is a
nice, simple way to give the
enemy just the respite he
needs, so that the U.S. and
allied soldiers at the front,
will have a brand new war
on their hands in six
months' time. And the kind
of coalition ;Hanoi wants to,
talk about is also Intended
to permit the "occupation of
the countryside," followed
by "surrounding the towns,"
leading to "complete vic-
tory."
But there are all too many
people in this country who
have forgotten all our past
experience, In Korea and
elsewhere. President John-
son will need a lot of guts to
stand up to the clamor of
people like' these. What al-
most certainly lies ahead Is
this space. Some documents tacked by the 18th Regi- profoundly, encouraging for
announce that the "winter- ment, so the schedule was the long run, In fact, but It
fin I xig kept. may be rough going in the
cam a 5 : CIAhRIDF;i11(161*'RO O040t0&eun.
formation of a coalition gov-
ernment in which (the.
National Liberation) Front
will fully, participate."
All.indicate that climatic,
especially intensive enemy
efforts will produce peace-
and-coalition during 1968. A
few documents even say
that fighting will end "after
the Tet holidays --
which means in early Febru-
ary. A fairly far-out, but
broadly representative speci-
men, is a propaganda direc-
tive from Binhdinh Province,
where the other side has
long been in very'bad trou-
ble.
"The period 20 December
to 5 January will be re-
garded," said this directive,
"as the climax of the 1967-68
winter-spring campaign."
Being interpreted in the
light of hindsight, this
meant that in Bindinh, the
dreadfully tattered and
eroded 18th North Viet-
namese,regiment was being
asked to make one last bold
effort, in the form of an at-
tack on. one of the most
fully pacified districts. Tuy-
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WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS (9)
12 January 1968
The Viet Cong Offensive
% THE Viet Cong have been attacking at
a hard, fast pace ever since the New
Year's truce ended. A Communist bat-
talion flattened Tan Uyen, a ? district
town 23 miles north of Saigon; another
occupied for three hours Khiem Cuong,
a province capital 21 miles northwest of
Saigon. Commandos hit supposedly, se-
cure Kontum airfield in the highlands.
North Vietnamese troops are showing
new toughness in the central coastal
plains and valleys, notably Que Son.
And now a big buildup is reported near
exposed Khe Sanh, near the Laos bor-
der.
We find this situation ominous and
mystifying.
Allied commanders take some satis-
faction in the high price the communists
are paying: 2868 reportedly killed the
first week of the year. But the fact the
Reds can mount an offensive in every
section of the South - despite the 1.2
m i I l i o n men the "improving" allies
have under arms - gives us no cbm-.
fort.
As the Saigon-area attacks show, the
Viet Cong evidently are using "War
Zone C':' northwest of the capital, de-
spite themassive American "clean-out"
-in "Operation Junction City" over a
year agog ,
And there is some disturbing arithme-
tic in the latest official estimates of
communist strength in the South. De-
s, p I t e 87,534 communists reportedly
killed anc1 ` 27,178 defected last year,
their ranks ' increased from 281,000 to
somewhere between 298,000 and 333,000
comparing Jan. 1, 1967 and Jan. 1, 1968,
To cover losses and achieve that build-
up, the communists had to recruit or
infiltrate between 132,000 and 167,000
new troops! Either the official statistics
are out of whack, or the communists
are not being so badly hurt by Gen.
Westmoreland's "war of attrition" as
we are led to believe.
Even so, why the big communist of-
fensive now? Probably to add to the
fears of the South Vietnamese populace
and further shake the morale of Sai-
gon's armed forces and make headlines
in the USA. There may also be an inter-
nal motive: in recent weeks Viet Cong
indoctrinators have urged their troops
to make a special effort before the Tet
holidays (at month's end) to win the
"decisive victory" they promise will
bring about a coalition government on
favorable terms.
Maybe, then, the current offensive is
:designed as a prelude to a new diplo-
matic move by Hanoi. We'll know short-
ly. If the communist do use the Tet pe-
riod to.make an offer, it will have to be
more detailed and forthcoming than
the bare "willingness" to talk provided
we permanently halt our Northern
bombings.
In the past some leading doves have
shrieked with fury that just when (it
seemed) .the chances for peace talks
brightened, the U.S. would "destroy"
the prospect by upping its bombing
raids or sending in reinforcements. Now
that peace talk is in the air again - and
is accompanied by the current commu-
nist offensive In the South - we haven't;
beard even it chirp of complaint.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY February 1968
Expulsions of Communist Officials
from Free World Countries in 1967
Country Country from Month When
Name Position which Expelled Expelled
ALBANIA: none (none in 1966)
BULGARIA: none (2 in 1966)
COMMUNIST CHINA: 9 (7 in 1966)
a. CHEN Lu-chih First Secretary India June
The Indian Government labelled Chen a spy and ordered him out of the country.
Unofficially, the real reason is regarded to be retaliation for the severe
beating of India diplomats in Peking.
b. HSIEH Ch'eng-hao Third Secretary India June
The Indian Government labelled Hsieh a spy and ordered him'out of the
country. See above note on Chen for the unofficial reason for Hsieh's ouster.
c. HSU Jen Consul General Indonesia April
HSU was expelled as a result of a series of rude exchanges between Chi-
nese Communist diplomats and Indonesian officials.
d. LI Chien Third Secretary Kenya July
LI was expelled for interference in Kenya's internal political affairs,
specifically as a-direct result of the Chinese Communist Embassy's letter to
a Nairobi newspaper attacking Kenya's Minister of Economic Planning and Develop-
ment.
First Secretary Indonesia September
e. LU Tzu-po
LU was declared PNG by the Indonesian Republican Government because he
and another official were held responsible for shooting at Indonesian youths
who were holding a demonstration at the Chinese People's Republic Embassy com-
pound in Djakarta on 5 August 1967.
f. SHIN Hsin-jen Assistant Naval Attache Indonesia January
Shih was told in a diplomatic note to leave Indonesia by 28 January at
the latest. He was accused of demonstrating an unfriendly attitude toward
the Indonesian Government and people.
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g. SU Sheng Consul Indonesia September
Su was declared PNG by the Indonesian Republican Government because he
and another official were held responsible for shooting at Indonesian youths
who were holding a demonstration at the Chinese People's Republic Embassy com-
pound in Djakarta on 5 August 1967.
h. YAO Teng-shan Counsellor Indonesia April
Yao was Charge d'Affaires at the time she was expelled as a result of
a series of rude exchanges between Chinese Communist diplomats and Indonesian
officials.
i. YU Min-sheng Journalist Burma July
Yu, a NCNA correspondent in Rangoon, was ordered on 14 July 1967 to leave
the Union of Burma by air before noon on 17 July 1967.
CUBA: none (4 in 1966)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 6 (5 in 1966)
a. Vaclav BUBENICEK Press Attache Brazil March
Bubenicek was alleged to have written derogatory material about Brb.zil
for Czech newspapers.
b. Oldrich HLAVICKA Assistant Commerical Ghana June
Attache
Hlavicka was expelled by an official Ghanaian Government decision,evi-
dently to curtail Czech influence in Ghana.
c. Karel PATEK Representative of firms Turkey April
MOTOKOV and METALIMEX
Patek was accused of collecting secret documents and information about
Turkish NATO ties and defense plans.
d. Jiri PRAVDA Representative of Czech Ghana June
news agency
Pravda was expelled by an official Ghanaian Government decision, evi-
dently to curtail Czech influence in Ghana.
e. Jiri SMIDT Press and Cultural Greece September
Attache
Smidt was arrested during a meeting with an espionage agent.
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f. Jaroslav SVOBODA Chauffeur France September
Svoboda was sentenced to 10 years in prison in Paris for espionage. He
was released in exchange for a French prisoner imprisoned in Czechoslovakia.
EAST GERMANY: none (3 in 1966)
HUNGARY: 1 (2 in 1966)
a. Istvan LASZLO Third Secretary Switzerland April
Laszlo was charged with repeated attempts to gather information on the
Union of Hungarian Emigres in Switzerland and on that basis ordered on
21 April to leave Switzerland.
NORTH KOREA: none (7 in 1966)
POLAND: 1 (3 in 1966)
a. Leszek BEKSINSKI Representative of Polish Belgium December
travel agency
Beksinski was expelled for conducting "improper activities," he had been
implicated in the Staszczak case. Staszczak was arrested by Luxembourg's
counter-espionage service for espionage and deported to the Netherlands,
where he was assigned to the Commercial Section of the Polish Embassy. Staszczak
left the Netherlands in haste, presumably to avoid being declared PNG.
RUMANIA: 2 (none in 1966)
a. Vasile ILIE Second Secretary Greece September
Ilie was caught in a meeting with an espionage agent whom he had recruited
in Greece, and to whom he had given intelligence requirements at previous
meetings.
b. Florea STOIANA First Secretary Brazil August
Stoiana. was expelled for involvement in intelligence activities.
USSR: 10 (38 in 1966)
a. Vladimir A. GLUKHOV Representative of Netherlands January
Aeroflot
Glukhov was arrested and subsequently expelled for an abortive attempt
to obtain Dutch state secrets; he had been interested in air defense systems
and aircraft construction techniques.
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b. Aleksey N. KAZANTSEV Novosti representative Ghana June
Kazantsev was declared persona non grata for "committing slanderous
propaganda activity against the Government and people of Ghana aril for
engaging in wanton acts of espionage in an attempt to bring the outlawed CCP
and its notorious ex-leader and criminal Kwame Nkrumah back into power."
c. Valentin I. KOROVIKOV Pravda correspondent Ghana June
Korovikov was expelled for the same reasons as Kazantsev. (See above.)
d. Anatoli T. OGORODNIKOV TASS correspondent Belgium April
Ogordnikov was accused of endangering state security. He was reported
in the press as having been involved in directing and paying a "Madame X" to
gain employment in SHAPE, and to photograph secret documents there.
e. Ignor Pavlovich OSHURKOV Commercial repre- Greece March
sentative
Oshurkov was linked to the famous Rinaldi case in Italy, and expelled
for that reason."
f. Yuri Kuzmich PAVLENKO Attache Italy March
Pavlenko was reportedly an Embassy contact man for Giorgio Rinaldi, the
norminal head of a spy ring which operated against NATO installations in
several Mediterranean countries.
g. Boris M. PETRIN Attache Cyprus March
Petrin was expelled for the same reason as Oshurkov. (See above.)
h. Ivan Yaklovlevich PETROV Official of inter- Switzerland February
national organization
Petrov was expelled for asking a senior Swiss civil servant to spy for
the USSR. Petrov had been a high-ranking member of the UN-associated Inter-
national Telecommunications Union (ITU) in Geneva, a post( to which he had
been elected by all: member; nations of the ITU.
i. Nikolay I. Ranov Aeroflot Representative Cyprus March
Ranov was expelled for the same reason as Shurkob. (See above.)
Albert M. ZAKHAROV Second Secretary Greece March
Zakharov was expelled for the same reason as Oshurkov. (See above.)
YUGOSLAVIA: none (1 in 1966)
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January 1967
,Expuisions - 1966
Poem;ion Expelled from
Military Attache
Greece
Bulgarian Military Attache Zahari KRISTANKOV was arrested by Greek
security officials on 3 November 1966 while he was holding a clandestine
meeting with a Greek non-commissioned Army officer whom the Greek
authorities had been surveilling for more than a month. Perceiving the
approach of the security officials, KRISTANKOV attempted to flee in his
automobile and was only stopped by police officers firing at the rear
tires, thus immobilizing the automobile. He was released when he dis-
closed his identity and claimed diplomatic immunity, but was declared
PNG by the Greek government that same day.
2. POPOV, Stefan Commercial Representative Colombia
It was announced in the Bogota press in October 1966 that Stefan
POPOV, commercial representative in the Bulgarian trade mission in
Colombia had been declared personna non grata and given four days to
leave the country. Fie was accused of intervening in the internal af-
fairs of Colombia and of giving unspecified aid to the subversive ele-
ments in that country. However POPOV appealed the order and was still
in Colombia at year's end.
COMMUNIST. CHINA
1. CHANG Chung-hsu, Embassy employee Kenya
(also spelled CHMG Tsung-hsu)
In March 1966, ten diplomats, correspondents, and commercial repre-
sentatives from Communist nations were expelled by Kenya for attempt-
ing to subvert the government of that country. They included persons
from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Communist China.
While specific charges were not levied against individuals, the Minister
of Home Affairs,'Daniedarap Moi stated that more than 16400,000 had been
used by "certain individuals" to subvert the government. CHANG Chung-
hsu was declared PNG on 9 March and his colleague, YAO Ch'un, Third
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, was PNG'd
on 16 March.
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Second Secretary Ghana
2. CHL Kuei-yu
After the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah (24 February.1966) the National
Liberation Council discovered massive evidence of subversive activities
by Communist nations that had been carried on under the former dictator.
These discoveries resulted in the departure from Ghana of nearly 1000
Soviets and about 250 Chinese. Of these, only 20 Soviets and 3 Chinese
were officially declared PNG. The Chinese were CHU Kuei-yu, HU Ting-is
and TIEN Chang-sung, who were served with PNG notices on 14 March 1966
and given 48 hours to leave Ghana because they. were "intelligence
HU Ting-i, First Secretary of the Chinese Communist Embassy in
Accra, Ghana, was declared PNG on 14 March 1966 and given 48 hours to
leave the country. (See CHU Juei-yu above for further details.)
4. LI En-chiu Charge d'Affaires Netherlands
LI En-chin, Charge d'Affaires of the Chinese Communist Embassy at
The Hague, Netherlands, was PNG'd on 19 July 1966 for implication in
the abduction of the Chinese welding expert HSU Tzu-tsai from a hospital
in The Hague. HSU Tzu-tsai had injured himself in attempting to defect
and had been taken to a hospital for treatment, whence-he was abducted
.by members of the Chinese Communist Embassy. He subsequently died.
officers engaged in espionage."
3., IHU Ting-i First Secretary
TIEN Chang-sung, attache of the communist Chinese Embassy in Accra,
Ghana, was declared PNG on 14 March 1966 and'given 48 hours) to leave
l
5. TIEN Chang-sung Attache
s.
the country. (See CHU Kuei-yu, above, for further detai
6. YAO Chun Third Secretary
Kenya
YAO Chun was PNG'd from Nairobi, Kenya on 16 March 1966. His wife,
WANG Ming-o, an English interpreter, was expelled with him. (See
CHANG Chung-hsu, above, for further details.)
WANG Erh-k'ang Second Secretary
Switzerland
the Swiss government on 24 March
d 'D790- b
l
'
y
are
ang was dec
WANG Erh-k
1966 because of his contacts with JUO Yu-shou, Cultural Attache of the
Chinese Nationalist Embassy in Burssels, who was for years an agent of
the Chinese Communists in Bern.
MEWZA, Juan Third Secretary Ghana
On 24 September 1966 the four diplomatic officials of the Cuban
Embassy in Accra, Ghana, were ordered to leave the country for inter-
fering in the internal affairs of Ghana. They actually departed on
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was not officially stated in the formal accusation against them, infor-
mation leaked out that they had been involved in, among other things,
conspiring to return Kwame Nkrumah to power in Ghana. The other persons
involved were: Georgina PEREZ Puig, Gaspar VARONA Hanlen, and Antonio
Lino VARONA Salgado.
2. PEREZ Puig, Georgina Charge d'Affaires Ghana
Georgina PEREZ Puig was ordered to leave Ghana on 24 September
1966, and actually left on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for
further details.)
30 September, at which time the Cuban Embassy was closed. Although it
3. VARONA Hanlen, Gaspar Third Secretary Ghana
Gaspar VARONA Hanlen was PNG'd on 24 September 1966 from Accra,
Ghana, and left on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA, above, for further
details.)
4. VA,RONA Salgado, Antonio Lino Third Secretary
Antonio Lino VARONA Salgado was expelled from Accra, Ghana, on
24 September 1966 and departed on 30 September. (See Juan MEWZA,
above, for further details.)
because he had engaged in espionage activities inimical to the govern-
ment of that country. His expulsion had been preceded, on 10 March,
by that-of Zdenek KUBES of the Czechoslovak. news agency, CETEKA, and
Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy.
2. KOZUBIK, Stanislas Second Secretary Kenya
Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy in Nairobi,
Kenya, was expelled from that country on 10 March 1966. He was accused
of having: engaged in activities inimical to the host government. Also
ousted on'the same date was Zdenek KUBES of the Czech news agency CTK.
On 15 March Jan CARDA, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy was also
expelled.
Kenya
On 15 March 1966 Jan CARDA was given 24 hours to leave Kenya
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1. CARDA, Jan Third Secretary
3. KUBES, Zdenek CETEKA (Czech news agency) correspondent Kenya
Zdenek KUBES was accused by Kenya of having engaged in activities
inimical to that country, specifically of having planted in the local
press aniarticle unfriendly to the government of President Kenyatta:'
He was declared PNG on 10 March 1966. Also ousted on the same date was
Stanislas KOZUBIK, Second Secretary of the Czech Embassy. On 15 March
Jan CARDA, Third Secretary of the Czech Embassy was also expelled.'
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. OPATRNY, Jiri
Attache United States of America
Jiri OPATRNY was declared PNG by the U.S. Government on 13 July
1966 for having attempted to bribe a Department of State employee to
plant a secret wireless transmitting device in the office of the
director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the State Depart-
ment. It was revealed the following day that the State Department
employee had, with the approval of the FBI, pretended to cooperate with
the Czech Embassy for more than five years as a secret agent. OPATRNY
was given 3 days to leave the U.S.A. At the same time it was revealed
that Zdenek PISK.,the Czech diplomat who originally recruited the State
Department employee, had left the U.S.A. in 1963 but had recently
returned as First Secretary of.the Czech United Nations Mission in
New York City. When the U.S. Government informed the United Nations
Secretariat of PISK's past espionage activities, he was returned to
his homeland.
5. PISK, Zdenek First Secretary, Czech Mission to U.S.A.
United Nations
On 13 July 1966 the Department of State revealed that the Czech
embassy in Washington had attempted to subvert a Department employee.
The employee had reported the attempted recruitment to his superiors
and had thereafter for more than five years, pretended to cooperate
with the Czechs. in 1961 he was "recruited" by Zdenek PISK, then
Second Secretary of the Czech embassy, who returned to his homeland
in 1963; after handing over the agent to Jiri OPATRNY, Attacht of the
Embassy. In 1966 PISK returned to the United States with the Czech
mission to the United Naitons in New York. When the details of the
attempted espionage case were made public in July 1966, the UN Secre-
tariat was informed of PISK's role in the,case and he was then returned
to Czechoslovakia. (See also note on Jiri OPATRNY, above.)
EAST GERMANY
1. APPEL, Heiner ADN (East German News Service) Kenya
correspondent
Heiner APPEL was declared PNG.by the government of Kenya in
February1966 because of his "lavish entertainment" of Kenyan leftists
with the ultimate aim of subverting the government.
2. GRAEFE, Karl-Heinz ADN (East German News Service) Ghana
correspondent
Karl-Heinz GRAEFE, a staff member of the ADN, was expelled from
Ghana in November 1966 for subversive and other activities incompatible
with the status of a journalist. According to an official Ghanaian
statement, GRAEFE had sent and received secret messages and a search
of his residence revealed an article which contained "wholly untrue
statements" about Ghana, its aim being to "damage Ghana's reputation."
The Eas't'German Trade Mission was also ordered closed at this time.
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KRUGER, Jurgen (Major) (alias) Ghana
ROGALLA, Jurgen (true) Representative of Ministry
for State Security
Major Jurgen KRUGER arrived in Ghana in November 1964. He estab-
lished a secret training school for Ghanaian spies which was exposed
upon the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in February 1966. KRUGER was
arrested but not tried since the EAst German government held 350
Ghanaian students then studying in that country as hostages in order
to arrange KRUGER's release. On 25 May 1966 the Ghana Government
released KRUGER in exchange for the students. KRUGER had been formally
charged with "illegal entry into Ghana, impersonating a diplomat and
using his privileged position to conduct espionage against countries
with which Ghana had friendly relations." Prior to his release KRUGER
.confessed to the charges against him and further admitted that his true
name was Jurgen ROGAL a.
1. BUDAI, Ferenc Second Secretary of trade mission Italy
2. NOVAK, Janos Third Secretary Kenya
Following the eclipse of the notoriously pro-Communist Oginga
Odinga,' who lost his influential post as 'Vice-President of the KANU
Party,isome 11 diplomats and journalists from Communist countries were
expelled from Kenya. They included Soviets, Czechs, Chinese, an East
German and the Hungarian, NOVAK. They were accused of maintaining
contacts with certain leftist Kenyan politicians for the ultimate pur-
pose,of subverting the Kenyatta government.
Ferenc BUDAI was arrested by Italian police in Milan, Italy, on
3 November 1966 while in the act of receiving secret information from
an Italian citizen employed by the United States 40th Tactical Air
Force in Italy. Since BUDAI did not have diplomatic status, he was not
declared personna non grata, but is being held for trial.
NORTH KOREA
1. CHU-Chan-pyon Trade Mission
Uruguay
CHU Chan-pyon was expelled from Uruguay in the Spring of 1966 when
his visa expired. (See CHU Chang-won, below, for further details.)
2, CHU Chang-won Trade Mission
Uruguay
In February 1966 the Uruguyan Government announced that it would
refuge to renew the visas of the North Korean Trade Mission members
when they expired. The announced reason was that the North Koreans
were attempting to act as diplomats rather than as trade representatives.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA=RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
As a consequence three North Koreans left with their families on
11 February: CHU Chang-won, MUN Chong-sok, and YI Hyong-su. A fourth
member of the trade mission stayed until his visa ran out and then
left: CHU Chan-pyon.
3. KIM Kong Interpreter
In March 1966, in the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah, three
members of the North Korean embassy in Accra, Ghana were given 30 days
to leave the country by the National Liberation Council. They were
NO Su-ok, Ambassador, SIN Sang-ku, Third Secretary, and KIM Kong,
Interpreter.
4. MUN Chong-sok Trade Mission,
Uruguay
MUN Chong-sok was expelled from Uruguay in February 1966, when his
entry visa expired and the Uruguyan Government refused to renew it.
(See CHU Chang-won, above, for further details.)
'5. NO Su-ok Ambassador
NO Su-ok was expelled, on 30 days notice, from Ghana. (See KIM
Kong, above, for further details.)
6. SIN Snag-ku Third Secretary Ghana
SIN Sang-ku was expelled, on 30 days notice from Ghana. (See
KIM Kong, above, for further details.)
7. YI Hyong-su Trade Mission
YI Hyong-su was expelled from Uruguay in February 1966.
Chang-won, above, for further details.)
{
1. DZIEDZIC, Ryszard (Major) Military Attache
Uruguay
(See CHU
U.S.A.
As a result of harrassment of two U.S. military attaches in Poland
in April 1966, for which the Polish Government refused to make amends,
Col. Stefan STAREWSKI, assistant air attache of the Polish embassy in
Washingtoni,:,was expelled on 4 May 1966. In retaliation the Polish
Government then expelled three U.S. military attaches from Warsaw.
This in turn resulted in two other Poles,,hieut. Col. Tadeusz WISNIEWSKI
and Major Ryazard DZIEDZIC, being declared PNG on 20 May 1966 by the
United States.
2. STARZEWSKI, Stefan (Colonel) Assistant Air Attache U.S.A.
. STARZEWSKI was expelled from the U.S.A. in May 1966. (See'DZIEDZIC,
above, for further details).
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6 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2005/04121 :, CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
WISNIEWSKI, Tadeusz (Lt. Col.) Military Attache U.S.A.
WISNIEWSKI was expelled from the U.S.A. in may 1966. (See DZIEDZIC,
above, for further details.) .
SOVIET UNION
1. ABRAMOV, Valdimir Mikhaylovich Trade Mission Ghana
In the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah(February 1966), a
large number of Communist officials was expelled from Ghana. This
included over a thousand Soviets, of whom only 20 were officially
declared PNG. According to the Ghana radio, and a "White Book" on
"Nkrumah',s Subversion in Africa," the Soviets were actively involved in
every possible form of subversion. Not only did they train and super-
vise the internal Ghanaian secret police, including the detachments
charged with protecting Nkrumah, but they also trained and supervised
the Ghanaian espionage and sabotage-services which operated against
the other countries of Africa. These Soviets were declared PNG on
16 March 1966 and left almost immediately.
2. AKHMEROV, Robert Isaakovich First Secretary Ghana
AKHMEROV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
3. GLADKIY, Nikolay Ivanovich Second Secretary Ghana
GLADKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
4. GLUKHOVSKIY, Vasiliy Vasilyevich Trade Mission Ghana
GLUKHOVSKIY was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
5. IVANOV, Nikolay Iosifovich Acting Consul Uruguay
Four Soviets were expelled from Uruguay on 4 October 1966 for
"intervening in labor affairs and inciting strikes." An official
Uruguayan Government memorandum stated that the four men were members
of the Soviet State Security Service and Military Intelligence and
summarized their objectives as: precipitating labor paralysis through
strikes and stoppages; aggravating Uruguay's economic difficulties by
disorganization of work, industrial sabotage and economic subversion;
and strengthening the position of Communist agents in the labor unions.
The four Soviets were: YANGAYKIN, Aleksey A., ZUDIN, Nikilay A., IVANOV,
and Valeriy F. SHVETZ.
6. KAMAYEV, Yevgeniy Borisovich Second Secretary Ghana
KAMAYEV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
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7 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
KATAYEV, Valeriy V. Second Secretary
KATAY'EV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
8. KISAMEDINOV, Maksut Mustarkhovith Second Secretary Ghana
KISAMEDINOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
9. KISELEV, Ivan Pavlovich First Secretary Ghana
KISELEV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
10. KOBYSH, Vitaliy Ivanovich Correspondent of "Izvestiya" Brazil
and Radio Moscow
KOBYSH was expelled from Brazil on 13 April 1966. A government
source stated only that he had falsely reported that Brazilian govern-
ment officials had accepted bribes. However press reports stated that
he had provided financial aid to leftist publications and had encour-
aged them to publish articles defamatory to government officials.
U. KODAKOV, Vladimir Alexsandrovich First Secretary Kenya
In mid-March 1966 Kenya expelled 11 officials from Communist
countries. Although no reasons for this action were officially declared,
it is well known that these officials were closely involved with a
leftist opposition group within the Kenyan government which included
Oginga ODINGA, a pro-Communist vice president of the KANU Party and
also vice-president of the government. KODAKOV was declared PNG on
10 March 1966 and left that same day.
12. KOZLOV, Yuriy Nikolayevich Secretary to Military Attache Ghana
KOZLOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
13. KRIVAPOLAV, Viktor S. Trade Mission
KRIVAPALOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
14. KURITSYN, Yuriy Vasilyevich Novosti Press Agency Kenya
correspondent
KURITSYN was one of five Soviets expelled from Kenya in March 1966.
He was declared PNG on 10 March and left that same day. (See KODAKOV,
above, for further details.)
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8 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
15. LAPUSHENKO, Nikolay Ivanovich Instructor, Ideological Ghana
LAPUSHIENKO was one of 20 Soviets, expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
16. LEMZENKO, Kir Gavrilovich Member of trade mission Italy
Kir Gavrilovich LEMZENKO attempted to recruit an Italian non-
commissioned naval officer to obtain secret information on the Italian
Navy and on the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces in Southern
Europe, based in Naples. The Italian officer reported the recruitment
attempt to Italian security authorities who encouraged him to pretend
to cooperate with the Soviet. As a result the security forces were
able to catch LEMZEVKO red-handed paying the non-commissioned officer
for photographs which he believed to contain secret information.
LEMZENKO was declared PNG on 3 November 1966 and given 48 hours to
leave the country.
17. MALININ, Aleksey Romanovich Assistant Commercial Counselor U.S.A.
MALININ was declared personna non grata on 31 October 1966 by the
U.S. Government on the heels of the arrest of a U.S. Air Force sergeant
for "conspiring to commit espionage" by delivering to the Soviet dip-
lomat "information relating to the national defense of the United States."
The sergeant worked as a communcations equipment repairman.
18. MAMURIN, Leonid Aleksandrovich Soveksportkhleb employee Thailand
MAMURIN was arrested by Thai police on 26 September for espionage.
Security officials stated they had abundant evidence that he was col-
lecting information about Thailand and he was charged with performing
actions detrimental to the state. He was later released to Soviet
custody and left the country very shortly thereafter.
19. MATYUSHIN, Anatoliy Nikolayevich TASS correspondent Ghana
MATYUSHIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana. on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
20. OBOLENTSEV, Fedor R. TASS correspondent Libya
OBOLENTSEV was quietly PNG'd'from Libya on about 7 December 1966.
The story broke in the Italian press ("Il Giornale d'Italia") on
15-16 December. According to the Italian article OBOLENTSEV was a
secret agent, an expert in Arabic, and had attempted to corrupt, with
money and promises of support, the country's most influential officials
and personalities.
21. OBUKHOV, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Attache Thailand
OBUKHOV was declared PNG in Bangkok, Thailand on 28 September for
activities incompatible with his diplomatic status which affected the
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9 Cont . )
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
national security. His expulsion closely followed that of B.A.
MAMURIN, Soveksporthleb employee, who was arrested for espionage on
26 September and expelled from the country.
22. ORLENKO, Vladimir Ivanovich Doorkeeper Ghana
ORLENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
23. OVECHKIN, Vladimir Yevgenyevich TASS engineer Ghana
OVECHKIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on i6 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
24. PETRUK, Boris Georgiyevich . Instructor, Ideological Ghana
Institute, Winneba
PETRUK was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16, March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
25. POPOV, Nikolay Sergeyevich First Secretary Ghana
POPOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
.(See ABRAMOV, above, for further details,)
26. REVIN, Valentin Alekseyevich Third Secretary U.S.A.
On 1 September 1966 the U.S. Department of State declared Valentin
A. REVIN PNG for having attempted to buy secret information on the
United States space program, missiles, and aircraft. He had paid over
$5,000 to an American businessman who was secretly cooperating with the
FBI while pretending to engage in espionage for the Soviets. The
American had been cultivated by Soviet diplomats since 1961.
27. SHELENKOV, Albert A. Consular Officer Ghana
SHELENKOV was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
28. SHPAGIN, Mikhail Mikhaylovich Trade Mission Cologne West Germany
On 20 January 1966 the Federal Interior Ministry of West Germany
denounced a Soviet spy ring operating in that country. It was based
on a West Germany scientist who had been forced to work for the Soviets
in order to secure the release of his wife from Fast Germany. The
scientist reported the situation to his government and the Soviets
were observed in their clandestine contacts by West Germany security
officials. Four of.the.five Soviets denounced for their part in this
spy ring had already left the country when the announcement was made.
The fifth, SHPAGIN, was recalled by the Soviet Government at the
request of the West German government in January 1966.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
29. SHVETS, Vladimir Fedorovich Embassy Administrative Uruguay
Officer
SHVETS was, one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October
1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.)
30. SILIN, Boris A. Attacie's driver Ghana
SILIN was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March 1966.
(See ABRAMOV,?above, for further details.)
31. SMIRNOV, Leonid Vasilyevich Third Secretary Tunisia
SMIRNOV was ordered expelled from Tunisia on 16 March 1966 in
retaliation for a similar measure taken against a Tunisian diplomat
in Moscow.
32. SOLYAKOV, Leonid Dmitriyevich TASS representative Kenya
SOLYAKOV was expelled from Kenya on 15 March 1966
(Se
KODAKOV
.
e
,
above, for further details.)
33. TARASEMO, Sergey Ivanovich Engineer, Office Ghana
of Economic Counselor
'1'ARASENKO was one of 20 Soviets expelled from Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
34. YAKOVLEV, Aleksandr Ivanovich Sovexportfilm Kenya
representative
YAKOVLEV was expelled from Kenya on 15 March 1966. (See KODAKOV,
above, for further details.)
35. YANGAYKIN, Sergey Alekseyevich Cultural Attache Uruguay
YANGAYKIN was one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October
1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.)
36. YUKALOV, Yuriy Alekseyevich First Secretary Kenya
YUKALOV was expelled from Kenya on 10 March 1966. (See KODAKOV,
above, for further details.)
37. ZINKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy V. Sovexport representative Ghana
ZINKOVSKIY was one of 20 Soviets ex
ell
d f
p
e
rom Ghana on 16 March
1966. (See ABRAMOV, above, for further details.)
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11 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040005-0
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12
ZUDIN as one of four Soviets expelled from Uruguay on 4 October
1966. (See IVANOV, above, for further details.)
38. ZUDIN, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Embassy Press Officer U ay
YUGOSLAVIA
1. STRELEC, Ronald Third Secretary -- Cultural Affairs Argentina
Ronald STRELEC was declared PNG by the government of Argentina on
22 July 1966 for proselytizing among Yugoslavian emigres in Argentina
and for illegal distribution of propaganda.
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JAPAN TIMES
29 April 1967
2 Couples Found
Guilty of Spying
PARTS (UPI)-The state
security court Thursday
found a `Vest German couple.
and a Czech couple guilty of
spying on the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization for East l
Germany.
The court sentenced Peter
Kranick, a 30-year-old West
German to 20 years in jail,
for passing out information
collected by his wife from the
former headquarter., of
NATO in Paris.
Kranick's wife, 27-year-old
Renee wbo worked as a secre-
tary at NATO for about two
years received a 14-year jail
sentence.
Hans Bammler, a 4',-year-
old Czech who was. sent by
j East German intelligence to
act as liaison man and who
transmitted the information
supplied to East Germany
was sentenced to 18 years in
jail.
His wife Maria was sen..
tenced to 12 years in jail for
i helping her husband.
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