(Sanitized) GUIDELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(17 January to 14+ February 1968)
1. In what may have been the first step in a major new Soviet-
directed ideological campaign, an authoritative lead editorial in the Feb-
ruary edition of the Polish Party's monthly theoretical organ, NOWE DROGI,
asserts (as reported by Radio Moscow 6 February -- full text not yet avail-
able) that "nationalism is the main danger today threatening the unity,
the fighting capability, and the ideological content of the Communist move-
ment. Therefore, struggle against nationalism ... is a necessary condi-
tion for the unity of the WCM and the cohesion of the international forces
of socialism." In previous Communist polemics, the controversy has been
whether the "main danger" was "revisionism" or "dogmatism and sectarian-
ism." If the article in NOWE DROGI remains not an isolated trial balloon
but ushers in a new, major ideological campaign, it remains to be seen
whether this is actually an attempt to "contain" nationalism (today a dy-
namic force in large parts of the world, including a zajority of the Com-
munist countries) -- or primarily a manuever to abandon the "revisionism-
dogmatism" antithesis which proved rather unfortunate for Moscow's ideolo-
gical efforts.
2. With the Budapest consultative meeting only two weeks away
(26 February), Hungarian Party daily NEPSZABADSAG (11 February) frankly
acknowledged that a number of significant parties will not attend. It
disclosed that invitations were extended to 74 of the parties which had
attended the 1960 81-party Moscow meeting, but that six were not delivered:
the Chinese and Albanian parties refused to accept theirs, and "insurmount-
able obstacles" prevented delivery to the Indonesian, Thai, Burmese and
Malaysian parties (all based in Peking). The Cuban, Dutch and Swedish
parties have announced that they will not attend. The article stated that
certain parties which approve the meeting cannot send representatives for
reasons beyond their control," and it added that some other parties which
had not participated in 1960 have asked to be included in the work of pre-
paring the international conference. It dropped the earlier "overwhelming
majority" phrase andclaimed only that "a majority" regard the Budapest
meeting as "suitable" for dealing with preparations for an international
conference. On the basis of information available thus far, one can spec-
ulate that:
a. Attendance might be the poorest yet for any comparable effort
to rally the Communist world, with only 8 of the 14+ ruling parties,
and perhaps no more than half of the others which had participated in
the 1960 Moscow 81-party conference, present. Of the ruling parties,
the Albanian, Chinese, Cuban and Yugoslav have already confirmed their
boycott, and they will probably be joined by the North Koreans and
North Vietnamese. Since the Japanese party has announced it will not
attend, it seems probable that there will be no major party from the
Far East (except for the Soviet-dependent and China-fearing Mongolian
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Party). Moreover, the Norwegian delegates, and. perhaps some others,
will limit their role to observers (according to a 26 January TANYUG
report from Budapest).
b. Even with such limited formal representation, it appears
that the Soviet leaders may have more difficulty in reaching any
agreement than in any of their past efforts. Although there has not
yet been any announcement of the Rumanian Party's intent, close obser-
vers are convinced that it will send a delegation instructed to de-
fend Rumania's independence line and to oppose any Soviet attempts to
impose hegemony on the meeting -- and it would not be surprising if
the Rumanians published a statement to this effect before the meet-
ing opens. It is also likely that such a stance would meet with sym-
pathetic response from a number of the more important participants,
including especially the Italian Communist Party.
3. The very limited press coverage indicates that the 22-23 January
Yugoslav-Italian Communist-sponsored Rome meeting of Communist and left-
wing political parties of the Mediterranean area suffered'Trom the same
ailments as the Budapest meeting -- limited participation and inability
to reach agreement on plans for the future. Apparently l1 parties from 11
countries (including left-socialist parties as well as the Communist part-
ies from France, Italy and Morocco) were represented, seven df them Commu-
nist parties. There were apparently no Communist representatives from
Algeria, Syria, or the UAR, although the Syrian CP has been prominent as
an organizer-member of the 1960 Moscow Communist Conference, the 1965
Moscow "consultative meeting," and the February 1968 Budapest Conference.
The communique issued at the close of the Rome meeting claimed in very
general terms that the participants had agreed on holding a general con-
ference of Mediterranean "anti-imperialists," but did not specify a time
or place.
4. In bilateral relations:
a. The Soviet Party's prestige suffered another set-back in
full view of the Communist world when Politburo member Suslov led a
ten-man CPSU delegation, the most powerful ever to visit Japan, through
8 days of strenuous efforts to persuade the Japanese Communist Party
to go to the Budapest Conference. Suslov did restore party-to-party
contacts, but Secretary General Miyamoto publicly announced, immedi-
ately after the Soviet departure on 7 February, that his party would
not participate in the Budapest Conference or at any subsequent inter-
national conference planned by the Budapest meeting.
b. The Cubans sharply escalated their defiance of the Soviet
leadership when the Cuban Party expelled nine senior members and a
"reVol.utionary tribunal" tried and heavily sentenced them and 26
other members of a so-called anti-party "microfaction" which was ac-
cused of being in contact with Soviet diplomats and intelligence
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agents and opposing the Castro leadership. It is likely that this
event was related to the cancellation "on medical grounds" of a plan-
ned February visit to Cuba by Bulgarian Party-State boss Todor Zhivkov.
c. Rumania, in addition to its opposition to Soviet hegemony at
Budapest, has been unable to come to terms with the USSR, Bulgaria and
Hungary on new friendship treaties. The old 20-year Soviet-Rumanian
treaty expired in February, but is automatically renewed for five years
unless denounced by the signatories or replaced by a new version. The
old treaty was frequently ignored by both the Soviets and Rumanians.
Rumania also took a position in opposition to the Soviet-U.S. drafted
treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.
d. The Bulgarian and Yugoslav Foreign Ministries and press have
renewed old feuding over the status of a Macedonian minority claimed
by both.
e. Yugoslavia resumed diplomatic relations with West Germany,
just a year after Rumania had broken ranks with the other East Euro-
pean states to make this move.
f. New Czechoslovakian Party First Secretary Dubcek flew to
Moscow alone for two days of talks with Soviet leadership; afterwards
a "full accord of views" was claimed.
5. The press has reported further internal unrest or conflict in
Communist countries:
a. In the USSR, relatives of sentenced intellectuals continued
to challenge the regime's violations of "socialist legality" by
threatening to bring suit against "libelous" accusations in KOMSOMOL-
SKAYA PRAVDA. The Soviet Foreign Ministry officially warned foreign
correspondents in Moscow that any contacts with Soviet citizens for
news purposes must be arranged through the Minstry's Press Department.
Further evidence of repression and ferment in the Ukraine, with strong
nationalist overtones, has appeared in the western press.
b. In Warsaw, the police arrested 50 students in breaking up a
demonstration of 200 against the closing of a play by famous 19th
century poet, Mickiewicz, which protested Tsarist rule over a parti-
tioned Poland.
c. And in China, where disorder and violence continue through-
out the country, Peking announced the setting up of two more provin-
cial "revolutionary committees" in February, bringing the total
claimed thus far to 1J4 (in 29 provinces); but reports indicate that
confusion and conflict have grown rapidly in the very provinces which
the Maoists claim to control.
6. Miscellany: Published as an insert in the October issue of RIVO-
LUZIONE PROLETARIA (Milan), organ of the "Federation of Marxist-Leninist
Communists of Italy," is a copy of the Federation's Constitution which
defines as its objective "the construction -- in the unity of all Marxist-
Leninist militants -- of thTeh'Partito Communiissta MalrxiMsta-Leninista' of
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FOR SACKGROUND.USE ONLY March 1968
Excerpts from Minister of Defense A.A. Grechko'.s report on new Military
Service Law which appeared in Pravda, October 13, 1967.
Demands for ensuring the security-of the Soviet state and preparing
the country's entire population for armed defense of the socialist home-
land have increased further, in present-day conditions ... the strengthening
of the country's security is an indispensable condition for successful
implementation of the tasks of communism....
Sincere champions of peace,-Marxist-Leninists have never been paci-
.fists. They have always supported just wars, on the premise that it is
necessary to use all resoluteness and all available means to defend from
imperialist aggression the achievements of the Revolution and the homeland's
freedom and independence....
The soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy are persistently acquiring
combat skill and readiness ... at the same time, it has become increas-
ingly important to prepare the country's entire population to repulse the
aggressors. This presupposes further improvement-in the work of military-
patriotic upbringing.... Itralso presupposes perfecting,the entire matter
of.training young people for military service in the army and navy....
The.draft bn Universal Military Service will introduce a number of
fundamentally new provisions into the system whereby USSR citizens fulfill
their honorable obligations. These provisions include such important
questions as reducing the term of active military service for soldiers and
ai
s
lors, establishing a single conscription age for all citizens; conduct-
ingtwo conscription periods a year instead of one; cutting down on.defer-
ments for citizens of conscription age; introducing elementary military
training for young people, and other measures....
The draft law also provides for military service by women with medi-
cal'or other specialized training. In peacetime they can be registered
for military service, taken for training sessions and accepted as volun-
teers for active military service between, the ages of 19 and 40....
Conscription age. ... The possibility of reducing the conscription age
from 19 to 18 is corroborated by the practice followed in admitting young
men to military academies.... On the basis of this data and taking into
o
t
acc
un
the improvement in the health of conscripted young people, the
draft law provides that conscription age should be 18....
On training young people for service in the USSR Armed Forces.
... Introductory, pre-conscription military, training of young, people in
secondary and equivalent schools beginning with the fifth grade
which
,
was established by the 1939 law, was abolished after the Great Patriotic
War. At the same time the increased demands made on soldiers and the
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reduction in the terms of military service make it necessary to train
young people for service in the armed forces even before conscription.
Therefore the draft law provides for establishing a system of introduc-
tory military training for young people. This training must be conducted
in a compulsory, planned basis for all young men of pre-conscription and
conscription age.... Introductory military training of young students is
to be conducted by regular military instructors at general education
secondary schools beginning with the ninth grade, and also at vocational-.
technical schools.
On military service deferments for continuation of education. ... Draft
law envisages deferments for only daytime students Deferment for grad-
uating from secondary schools will be granted to age 20.... Boys enter-
ing specialized schools after graduation from general education schools
are not eligible for deferment....
0 Q1
ussi eases consc
i i11tar service R VICTOR ZORZA
m
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
13 October 1967
rden
THE term o
.I y
In the Soviet Union is to be The US, the Marshal said, was
more creating hotbeds of war in vary
put Soviet
out parts of the world. The.
cut to bring it into line with Union Some der ded a to the
modern conditions. money into the forces and the "imperialists" did not hesitate
Sailors, who have to give up results of this are now becoming to use any "provocation" in
four years of their lives to the increasingly apparent In the their attempt to contain "the
equipment which is coming Into mighty current of the liberation
Navy, will now he kept in for service. The changes announced movement." Although imperial.
only three years. The same by Marshal Grechko are thus ism had become weaker, its
reduction applies to frontier art of the process of streamlin- aggressive essence has not
hodpsr while national service from ing and modernising the Soviet changed."
soldiers and airmen is cut from armed forces. To compensate for the shorter
three to two years. , term of military service, Soviet
Marshal Grechko, the Defence 'Just wars youths will now, undergo para-
Supreme e x p t a I n c d yesterday that the In case anyone should mis- military training for the last two
the cuts were Soviet made posssisible understand thip announcement, years at school or at work before
the cuts by Marshal Grechko stressed that being called up at 18. This will
the " tremendous changes" in .~ Marxists-Leninists have never lead to the introduction into
for capabilities of the armed been pacifists." They had always school life of a military element litary ree t and s. The striking equipment force supported " Just . wars." The which has often been at odds in
recent years. The rocket troops United States, he said, was recent years with the liberal
of the strategic rocket ton .stepping tip its military prepara? inclinations of the intelligentsia.
and colors Imes had grown tions against the Soviet Union Politicians associated with the
to "lossal "dimensions. The behind the screen of talk about conservative wing of the party
Government, he said, was taking peace and cooperation. This was leadership, and military spokes.
strengthen ttg necessary s steps to the country's defence presumably a reference to blr men, have repeatedly stressed
potential. IdeNamara's ADAM announce- the need for the "military.
These assurances,. combined mint, which had been J inked patriotic " education of the young
with the 15 per cent increase in with an invitation to Russia to people. A, letter in the party
P cooperate in slowing down the by g jzine " Konimunio ,sky signed ned M the military budget, are presum. arms race. s e v e r a 1 other high-ranking
ably Intended to make it it clear ear
that the cuts will not affect the Marshal to the refusal to officers, do not. complains give su that the
fltcithe
combat capabilities of Soviet refer directly ly to the US decision. schools "patriotic" ed oat
forces. These depend nowadays or indeed to any ARitt system, attention to
to a much greater extent on the inchisAfir ricanlicy the since tion.
quality of equipment than on suggests the at the Russians have No complacency
mbe of the men under at last learned their lesson. It They suggest that the schools
arcs. nu is
arms. It i the equipment, too, was the incessant Soviet boasting
that
defence budget. a the bulk of the about the power and accuracy of should inculcate in their charges p Russia, hereet. especially of the Russia's own ARM defences that certain habits which will be
Russia, where the pay of the was one of the factors which led " required by the future
servicemen is extremely low to the US decision. defenders of the fatherland."
compared with Western rates. The Introduction of military
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ovtetJ (17,v('Stta, Oct. 13 (supplementary issues, pp. 7-8. The military-patriotic schools for young pilots, cosmonauts,
Speech by Deputy M. A. Prokofvev (Ostashkov E D tank troops, rocket troops signalmen and sailors that ar b -
of the Union and Council of Nationalities of U.S.S.R. Supreme societies and Organizations.
s
DISCUSSION OF,THE LAW ing of the rising generation and to unite the efforts and re-
sources of such organizations as the Ministries of Education
DISCUSSION OF REPORT ON U.S.S.R. DRAFT LAW ON and Public Health, the Central Council of Trade Unions, the
Kalinin Proviiicej - ... Introductory military training is being ing organized in military schools, academies and subunits of
established In the upper grades of schools. Students will be civil aviation, the merchant marine and inland shipping fleet
taught basic military knowledge and some data on civil de- are an attractive form of inculcating in teen-agers respect for.
f
Th
ease.
is measure is timely and necessary. military service and the profession of the Soviet officer.
The implementation of the law will create a rational system
-r The Y.C.L. organizations consider it their task to streneth-
i
d
ntro
uctory military training for young people. Practical
realization of the law requires much work and energy. With
the planned Implementation of introductory military training,
the post of military instructor will have to be introduced in
36,000 secondary schools. These should be knowledgeable
people, capable of making the boys interested, intelligent ped-
agogues. The necessary material and technical base must be
created in these 36,000 secondary schools. We count on con-
stant assistance in this matter from the U.S.S.R. Ministry of
Defense, its local organizations and the public....
Speech by Deput B. N. Pastukhov (Deinau E
D
Turk-
.
.,
menian Republic). -The-aII-Union marches of Young Com-
munists and young people to places of the Soviet people's
and foremost in training young boys and girls in military-
technical specialties....
Speech by Deputy A. L. Getman (Kaushany E.D., Moldavian
Republic .- ... It is necessary to organize introductory mili-
tary training for all young people of preconscription and con-
scription age, expand and improve substantially the training of
technical specialists in DOSAAF clubs and organize military
training of students in senior grades of general-education schools,
pupils at vocational-technical schools and students at special-
ized secondary educational institutions. A substantial share of
responsibility for fulfilling these tasks falls on DOSAAF. The
,
yWln
prov-
revolutionary, combat and labor glory are widely known. face committees are already adopting measures for expanding
They have become a mass achievement; millions of Soviet the network of the society's educational organizations so that
boys and girls took part in them. In the new conditions they can fully ensure the armed forces'
Allow me, in the name of 25,000,000 Young Communists, to need for trained specialists. The interests of maintaining the
express cordial thanks to the veterans of our party, celebrated combat readiness of the armed forces at a high level require
.fighting men and our most Important military commanders, that upon entering the army, the club graduates piaster more
who led the young pathfinders along the paths of exploits. rapidly and better the complex subject of warfare. This calls
In discussing the draft Law on Universal Military Service, for raising the organizational and methodological level of the
we.considcr it our task to Intensify the work of Young Commu- instruction process in the clubs, expanding and perfecting the
nist League organizations in rearing young people in the revo- material and technical base and improving political upbringing
lutionary, Iahor and rnmIs t traditions of the Party and the work among young people.
people and, jointly with the organizations of DOSAAF [Volun- Since existing clubs possessing their own establishments
teer Society for Cooperation With the Armed Forces], more cannot provide introductory military training for all draftees,
'actively conduct the military training of young people. the law provides for creating a wide network of military train-
Boys have a great propensity for military romanticism and ing centers directly at enterprises, on collective and state
a desire to emulate heroes in all their actions. This is graph- farms and in institutions providing military service training
icaily obvious from the great growth of diverse military, patri-for the young people who do not study in the defense society's
otic and sports associations. Detachments of young friends of clubs.
the Soviet Army and Navy and young friends of the border To train the young generation to defend the homeland, It Is
guards and the militia, which number hundreds of thousands of very important to improve mass defense work among young
children, have become a unique school for bringing the heroic students, especially in the general-education schools. The
traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy to Young Pioneers and establishment of introductory military training in the senior
schoolchildren. Here they become physically steeled and ac- grades will substantially facilitate the solution of this impor-
quainted with combat equipment and technology. In conducting tant task. The DOSAAF organizations have set themselves the
the all-Union military game "Summer Lightning," in which task of actively assisting the public education agencies in this
more than 5,000,000 boys took part, we once again became matter. In our opinion, the time has come to settle the ques-
convinced of the great propensity of boys for military subjects. tion of setting up everywhere military and sports summer
In our opinion, the formation of Youth, a unified defense and camps for young people of preconscription and conscription
sports society for schoolchildren and adolescents, would make age. We have experience in setting up such camps, and they
it possible to improve greatly the physical and character train- have proved themselves to be good....
DOSAAF Central Committee and republic
tcrritor
d
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NEd YORK TINES
4 February 1968
BULGARIAN CLAIM
VEXES YUGOSLAVS
.They Suspect Soviet Effort
for Pressure on Belgrade
By RICHARD EM R
EpocIAi to Tho ti-a' Ye.'Y Tim"
BEi.GRADE. Yugoslavia, Feb.
3-An old issue-rlaims by
Bulgaria to parts of what is
now Yugoslavia--has flared tip;
(bitterly in recent weeks, lead
ing to suspicion that Moscow
Is once more seeking to put,
pressure on Belgrade. I
The immediate reason for
suspicion Is that Bul
garia, which of the European.
nations, Is the most politically
dependent on the Soviet Union,
has been particularly so in for-
eign policy.
"The Bulgarians don't say
'nh' unless the Russians tell
them to,"..one Yugoslav said,
referring to the numerous times
that Soviet displeasure hash
been Indicated by the worsen-
ing of Bulgarian-Yugoslav re-I
Ialinns.
The Yugnslnv Government is
taking seriously the recent pub
licatipn of artirirs in Dulgaria
praisin' th treaty of San Stc-
fano. This treaty. signed after
the Russian-Turkish War of
1877, gave Bulgaria what is
now the Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, and parts of Serbia.
These gains were. annulled.
Bulgarian Envoy Called in
Miss Pavicevic, the acting
Foreign Minister, told the Fed-
eral Assembly today that he
called in the Bulgarian Amhas
sador and informed him that
the re-airing of the San Stefano
claims could harm relations be-
iteeen the two countries.
Claims by Bulgarian scholars
and writers that the Mace-
donians-whose language is
similar to Bulgarian -- were
really Bulgarians have precili-
itated other crises. As recently
as 1966, Todor Zhivkov had to
conic here and talk with Presi-
dent Tito before matters could
be smoothed over.
In some respects. however,
the present dispute presents
more serious aspects. For one
thing, the San Stefano matter
is being aired, not by scholarly
and titcrary~ journals, but by
Rabntnichesko Delo, the pub-
lication of the Bulgarian Com-
munist party.
Internal Difficulties gecn
Sonic diplomatic observers
here suggrst the Bulgarian
articles seek primarily to cits-
tract attention from pressing
internal difficulties.
Most Yugoslav and foreign
[observers, However, suspect
that the new flexin'; of muscle.
by the Soviet Union and Its
close allies is tlrsit:ned to test
Yugoslav independence and to
discourage excessive pro-West.
ern tendencies.
Yugoslavia has done a ntim-
ber of things recently to irk
the Soviet leaders. A decision
not to go In the forthcoming
meeting of Communist parties
In Budapest, and criticisms of
the parley, were offensive to
Moscow.
The recent visit of the Yugo-
slav Premier to Italy and the
resumption of relations with
West Germany were two ma-
jor victories by prn-\Vestrrn
members of the Yugoslav lead-
ership.
Sonic diplomatic observers,
sec a direct relationship he-
twecn the current playing up
of relations with Italy and
West - Germany and the re-
surgence of Dulgarian-Yugoslav
tensions,
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Organization on the Skids
March 1968
Hampered for years by the repercussions of the Sino-Soviet dispute,
the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) split into two
parts on 17 March 1967 in the aftermath of the eighth session of the AAPSO
Council (Nicosia, 13-16 February 1967). On that date the Chinese Commu-
nists issued a statement formally withdrawing from the organization and
denouncing the Cairo-based AAPSO as a Soviet-dominated front. This marked
the denouement of a struggle for control of AAPSO between Chinese and So-
viet forces which had started in 1961. The larger of the two remaining
groups, and for all intents and purposes the successor organization, is
Soviet-dominated. The Chinese-oriented splinter group has but few adher-
ents.
At the first AAPSOtmeeting held in Cairo (26 December 1957-1 January
1958), the organizers sought to create the impression that it was a suc-
cessor to the 1955 Bandung Conference. But it soon became clear that the
non-governmental AAPSO had only the faintest relationship to the Bandung
meeting. Under mixed Soviet, Chinese and Egyptian domination from the
outset, AAPSO fell victim to Communist exploitation and dissension.
At the Nicosia Council meeting in February 1967 the Soviet-oriented
majority had succeeded in transferring the meeting site for the 5th AAPSO
Conference from Peking, as previously agreed, to Algiers. In withdrawing
from AAPSO the Chinese declared the move to Algiers "illegal" and announced
that the Conference would take place in Peking in June 1967 as originally
scheduled. As it turned out, however, neither the Algiers nor the Peking
Conference took place. It was later thought that the meeting might be
held in Cairo on 27 December in conjunction with the AAPSO celebration of
its tenth anniversary, but this did not happen either.
The anniversary celebrations were kept in low key with little public-
ity and, indeed, the event went almost unnoticed. Not only was the occa-
sion not used simultaneously to hold the Fifth AAPSO Conference, but even
more significantly, no announcement was made during the anniversary meet-
ing about the overdue conference. There is reason to believe that a Con-
ference in Algiers in 1968 is still on the planning board but it could
conceivably be held somewhere else in Africa. The Chinese, for their part,
probably will not abandon proselytizing AAPSO members and encouraging them
to attend "the" Fifth Conference to be held in Peking during 1968; so far
there is little evidence that they are making progress toward this end,
even though a few pro-Chicom groups remain in AAPSO.
In the meantime, there are several vacancies in the AAPSO secretariat
(normally held by China, Indonesia, Japan and Ghana) and there have been
protracted disagreements on how to fill them. AAPSO's strength has also
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been sapped by the establishment in Havana in January 1966 of the Afro-
Asian Latin American Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO). Under the leader-
ship of Castro's Cuba this group has pursued a more militant "liberation
policy" which is more akin to Chicom than to Soviet policy. A Second
AALAPSO Conference was reportedly scheduled to be held in Cairo in January
1968, but did not take place; it may, however, be held later in the year.
AAPSO's position is that the larger, tri-continental AALAPSO is an
off-shoot of AAPSO and should be subordinate to it. In practice, however,
AAPSO has been unable to exert control over the "subordinate" group. So-
viet manipulations of AAPSO have obviously been calculated to preserve
the Cairo-based organization as an entity separate from AALAPSO because
it still functions as a Soviet front in the African, Near East and South-
east Asian areas and because the AAPSO national committees of the Soviet
Union and of the Eastern European countries function as instruments for
bilateral contact with African and Asian countries.
With AAPSO's own strength and cohesion waning -- but with its propa-
ganda capability not reduced to the same extent -- Soviet resolve to keep
it above water is further demonstrated by increased liaison between the
Soviet-controlled World Council of Peace (WCP) and AAPSO. A WCP delega-
tion, headed by its Secretary General, Romesh Chandra of India, held talks
with AAPSO's Secretary General, Yusuf as Sibai of the UAR, on the occasion
of the anniversary celebration in Cairo. Their joint communique high-
lighted the importance in the future of increasing and developing solidar-
ity and unity among all revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces. The
WCP had supported the establishment of AAPSO in 1957 but there has been
less cooperation between the two organizations over the years than is
indicated for the period ahead. The trend which has always existed toward
such cooperation had been stymied heretofore by the Chinese presence in
AAPSO who resisted AAPSO collaboration with the Soviet-controlled inter-
national fronts, such as the WCP.
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I4IZASN
Jan/Feb 1967
Vol. 9, No 1
THE PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT :
EVOLUTION AND CONTINUITY
by PAUL F. POWER
The peoples' solidarity movement is a product of the confluence of
Sino-Soviet opportunism and Afroo-Asian ideology on the ground of
anti-imperialism. The focal point of the movement is the Organization
for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity (AAPSO), based in Cairo, which
represents 73 affiliates in as many Afro-Asian nations. Claiming to
,pursue the ideals of the governmental Asian-African Conference at
Bandung in 1955 that did not yield a permanent bureaucracy, AAPSO
began its life under Soviet and Chinese sponsorship in early 1958. Since
then the nominally unofficial organization has contributed to a variety
of opinion-making activities in the developing world. Dedicated to the
proliferation of its understanding of the struggle against imperialism and
its heirs, AAPSO lent cover to efforts which produced the Tri-Continental
Conference in Havana at the beginning of 1966, and a new entity,
the Organization of Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity
(LAAAPSO). Over time AAPSO has experienced ideological -and
structural changes. Persisting despite these changes are the interests of
the two Communist states and the articulations of militant Afro-Asian
ideologists.
Origins AAPSO's formal beginning came from a meeting in Cairo of
representatives of African and Asian "peoples" in late December 1957-
the First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference. Yet AAPSO's
founding, ideology and subsequent programme had roots in prior
decisions and meetings. A main source was the Asian Conference for
the Relaxation of International Tensions, held in April 1955 at New
Delhi immediately before the meeting of Asian and African states at
Bandung. Behind the New Delhi meeting roots led to the All-India
Peace Council, the World Conference for the Relaxation of International
Tensions in November 1954, held in Stockholm, and the World Peace
Council (WPC), established in November 1950 under Soviet tutelage.
An Egyptian representative attended the New Delhi meeting, together
with delegates from Burma, Ceylon, People's China, India, Japan, Jordan.
Lebanon, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Syria and
the USSR. Through the meeting the Soviet Union gained a place as a
legitimate Asian entity in a conference of Asian peoples--a precedent for
Soviet participation in AAPSO, and helpful for later arguments with
China as to the Asian character of the Soviet Union. From the New
Delhi meeting emerged the Asian Solidarity Committee and associated
national committees, all of them dedicated to Asian friendship, anti--
imperialism and peace. Based on its unquestioned Asian character and
benefiting from Chou En-lai's irenic role at the Bandung Conference and
its active part in the New Delhi meeting, People's China employed the
Asian Solidarity Committee to extend its influence among the developing
nations. Its first head was Anup Singh, a Congress member of the Indian
Parliament who had entered the WPC-led peace movement and remained
with it after Jawaharlal Nehru had persuaded other Congress members
to remain apart.
In late 1956 or early 1957 the Asian Solidarity Committee changed its
name to the Asian-African Solidarity Committee and in 1957 began to
publish the Asian-African Review, essentially the predecessor of the
Mr. Power is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University
of Cincinnati. His study was made possible by the Charles Phelps Taft
Memorial Fund of that institution.
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broadening of Communist fronts from non-Communist Asia, where by
this time Russia and People's China had improved their positions, to the
Middle East and Africa where gains from unstable nationalism were
especially promising. In early 1957 Anup Singh, accompanied by
Chinese, Japanese and Russian colleagues from the Asian-African
Solidarity Committee, called on President Nasir of Egypt, the centre of
world attention in the 1956 Middle Eastern crises and since 1955 a
recipient of Eastern bloc military and diplomatic assistance.' This
contact led directly to the First Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference
in Cairo at the end of 1957 and the establishment of the AAPSO. The
reasons for Nasir's willingness to have an Afro-Asian meeting in Egypt
and to locate a permanent headquarters in Cairo include his ideological
and leadership ambitions in Afro-Asia, which had been enhanced by
his participation in the Bandung Conference. Soviet influence was not
absent. A leading figure in the discussions with the Anup Singh mission
was Anwar as-Sadat, an early member of the Free Officers Movement
and from 1960 Speaker of the National Assembly. Later Sadat said that
he had suggested that the visitors extend their interests to Africa.'
Probably they had already decided to do so, as reflected in the name of
the Asian-African Solidarity Committee, and they were searching for a
suitable and available centre in Africa. Revolutionary Egypt was
qualified and interested.
The founders of AAPSO lost no time in preparing its first meeting.
A preparatory group with participants from 22 countries met in Cairo in
October 1957. Important in the preparations was Felix-Roland Moumie,
leader of the exiled faction of the Union des Populations du Cameroun
(UPC) which had found a haven in Egypt to prosecute its unsuccessful
underground campaign against the Ahidjo government, a target of
subsequent AAPSO propaganda. The planning accomplished, the First
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference opened at the University of
Cairo on 26th December 1957, and lasted until 1st January 1958.
Approximately 500 delegates came from about 45 countries. As presiding
officer, As-Sadat welcomed them in the name of the Egyptian people.
Delegates invited from Cambodia, Liberia, Malaya, Morocco, Pakistan
and the Philippines did not appear. No effort was made to secure
representatives from Israel or South Africa, though subsequently the
African National Congress became and remains affiliated with AAPSO.
The bulk of the units sending delegations were previously established
solidarity groups linked with the Asian-African Solidarity Committee or
similar groups newly created for the Cairo meeting. Also present were
delegates of liberation movements in Algeria, Oman and Somaliland.
Represented by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria
had a prominent place on the agenda.
The unofficial nature of the delegates permitted them to treat political,
economic and social issues without serious inhibitions. The Egyptian
delegation had the responsibility for writing a conference report on
imperialism. It left no doubt as to its criticisms of traditional European
imperialism, but also of the collective security efforts of the United States.'
The Soviet delegation, which based its qualifications on the Soviet Asian
and Transcaucasian Republics, was headed by Sh. R. Rashidov,
Deputy Chairman of the Praesidiutn of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
and Chairman of the Praesidiutn of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR.
Reportedly Russia offered to finance a proposed secretariat and head-
quarters building in Cairo, but the Egyptian Government demurred for
fear of overcommitment to the Eastern bloc." Indicative of caution,
Nasir did not address the meeting.
Ideology The aspirations proclaimed by the Cairo meeting in its final
Declaration were repeated in increasingly militant ways at subsequent
AAPSO Conferences at Conakry in Guinea in April 1960, at Moshi in
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Tanganiyka in February 1963, and at Winneba in Ghana in May 1965.
The main objectives are the eradication of Western imperialism; the
full recognition in world politics of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of states, but especially of the developing nations; the elimination of
racial and economic discrimination in international affairs; the banning
of the production, testing and use of nuclear weapons as a preface to
general disarmament; the reduction of world tensions by the increased
use of pacific methods to resolve interstate disputes; and the development
of the common interests and mutual concerns of.the Afro-Asian peoples."
Except for the imperialism and arms questions, all of these points are
found or implied in'the Ten Principles of the Asian-African Conference
at Bandung in 1955. The Cairo Declaration took special notice of and
reaffirmed the Ten Principles. The famous Sixth Principle recognizes the
right of individual or collective self-dcfcnce, provided that collective
defence should not serve the private ends of any great power and that
there should be no pressure on countries to join defence pacts. At Cairo,
however, major addresses and accepted delegation reports implicitly
denied Principle Six and criticized Western defence pacts and those
Afro-Asian states which had joined them. The dualism of affirming
.Principle Six and rejecting Western efforts at collective security reappeared
at the Conakry Conference in 1960. Yet a trend was clear, for the second
AAPSO meeting officially stated that true independence precludes
membership in pacts with colonial powers, and denounced by name the
US-Japanese and Anglo-Cypriot security arrangements." The Declaration
of the Moshi Conference in 1963 dropped the practice of spelling out the
Bandung Principles in favour of a passing word on their behalf. The
Winneba Conference in 1965 produced no mention of the Ten Principles
or the Bandung Conference in its Declaration, its General Political
Resolution or its resolution welcoming the projected second Afro-Asian
conference.
Despite the phasing out of formal references to the Ten Principles of
Bandung, at its start and for a few years thereafter AAPSO identified
itself with the 1955 meeting of Asian and African states. There is no
substantial affinity between the two. AAPSO may claim with some
reason that the "spirit of Bandung" influenced its founding, if by that
expression is meant the rising tide of Afro-Asia in world politics.
Overbalancing this notion are the contributions of the WPC to AAPSO's
conception and birth; its unofficial nature: and the scepticism or disbelief
about AAPSO's independent character in non-Communist African and
Asian circles, especially after signs of AAPSO's Leftward turn in 1961.
A more plausible analogy for AAPSO's ideological position is the
international orientation of the Casablanca bloc of Arab-African states
during its apogee, 1961-3; but even here there is a difficulty. For the
"positive neutralism" stressed in the pronouncements of the Casablanca
bloc states has received next to no formal recognition from AAPSO.
Although the governments of several countries whose people are said to
be represented in AAPSO are firm advocates of some kind of neutralism,
the solidarity movement shows little inclination to recommend non-
alignment as a major strategy to realize its goal.*
*Sensitive about the underplay of neutralism in AAPSO statements on
world problems, in 1959 its Secretariat issued an anonymous, undated
pamphlet, Positive Neutralism, which expounds on the "independent
personality" of Afro-Asian countries subscribing to "positive neutralism"
and denies that they are aligned with the Soviet 'Union. The pamphlet
is atypical of AAPSO publications. AAPSO did officially endorse the
holding of the 1961 and 1964 non-aligned summit meetings, praising
their contributions to easing world tensions and continuing the struggle
for peace.
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Conference's endorsement of the Ten Principles of Bandung amounted
to approval of conditions under which states live i3 peaceful coexistence,
although that term was not adopted by the Bandung meeting and only
later came to he applied to them by Soviet and other participants in
AAI'SC7. With the decline of attention to the Bandung Principles came
a net increase in the demand for preconditions to make living together
in peace feasible. Thus th; 1960 Conference paid heed to peaceful
coexistence as a goal to be achieved only after the liquidation of
colonialism and all forms of imperialist domination. The next year
AAPSO intensified the struggle to realize the termination of these ills
which block ideal objectives and expanded on the nature of the interim
difficulties, particularly nco-colonialism. The United States, `Vest
Germany, Israel. Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa and
France were cited as the main perpetuators of neo-colonialism to which
collective security pacts, Balkanization of former colonial areas and the
Peace Corps were linked. Peaceful coexistence out of dread of nuclear
war received the approval of the 1063 Conference which underscored the
many impediments to its realization, although not without hone of
overcoming them. The 1965 Conference resolved to treat peaceful
coexistence as "meaningless" unless imperialists ceased their intervention
in developing areas.` Related to the growth of this pattern is a mounting
AAPSO call since 1900 for armed intervention or internal revolution
ar,ainst sovereign stags, for example, the Congo (L), Malaysia. Morocco,
Niger. South Vietnam. Thailand and Venezuela, as well as traditional
colonial areas.
The highly qualified adherence of AAPSO to peaceful coexistence adds
up to a position not far removed from thtit of People's China. This view
was expressed in December 1957 at AAPSO's First Conf^_rencc by
Kuo Mo-jo, then head of the Chinese section of the WPC. who said that
the struggle for national independence against imperialism must be
placed before living in peace. This speech foreshadowed the difference
that appeared in autumn 1959 between Moscow and Peking on the
relative importance of national liberation. An explanation for AAPSO's
nco-Chincsc line on peaceful coexistence is that the Soviet Union,
especially between 1960 and 1961, had to compete with Peking in the
developing world, producing a high tolerance for liberation polemics and
a downgrading of the thesis that in a nuclear age Communism should
avoid major risks. Ideologically, Russia has scored against Communist
China on atomic disarmament, obtaining an AAPSO demand at the
Winneba Conference in 1965 for the immediate destruction of nuclear
weapons and for states "to dismantle and abandon all means of producing
nuclear weapons, above all, the use of such weapons by any power"."
But the main power of the Soviet Union in AAPSO is organizational,
leaving AAPSO's unsophisticated ideological !,tatemcnts on the conditions
of peaceful coexistence to be moulded by competition with China and the
exaggerations of Afro-Asian propagandists.
AAPSO offers little evidence of trying to unite ex-colonial peoples
against industrialized societies as did Mir Sayid Sultan Oglu (Sultan
. Galiyev), Stalin's lieutenant from Kazan who offered a theory of
revolution for Eastern peoples before he disappeared in the purges of
the 1930s.1' One bond does exist between AAPSO ideology and Sultan
Galiyev: the thesis that there is no need for class struggle within the
East because it has suffered too much from the West and has experienced
too little industrial stratification. Consequently, the "solidarity"
preached by AAPSO and Galiyev's thought share the justification of
national fronts within former colonial peoples. AAPSO's endorsement of
national fronts is in agreement with African and Arab socialism which
generally rejects class struggle. Yet there is no evidence of Sultan
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Galiycv's main idea-the urging of a counter-struggle by non-Western
peoples against the oppressive advanced societies-an anti-Soviet line
that AAPSO has not adopted and is unlikely to adopt in the light of
Soviet controls in the organization.
Bureaucracy and operations AAPSO's ideological objectives found a
structure to mobilize efforts to realize them when the Cairo Conference
established the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Council and Secretariat,
bringing AAPSO into formal existence. Of different authority and organi-
zation, these organs were formed to carry out the meeting's resolutions, tp
promote the solidarity movement in Afro-Asia, and to act as liaison
between the new centre and its constituents. The Council represents the
national solidarity committees and those liberation movements and
opposition parties recognized by the AAPSO as members. The Council's
powers and organization were vague until the Second AAPSO Conference
in April 1960 adopted the AAPSO Constitution.'-' It specifies that the
Council consists of the heads of delegations to Conferences and constitutes
the steering organ during their sessions. The Council elects the AAPSO
Executive Committee, created in 1960. The Council is responsible for
establishing Conference agendas, appointing special commissions, and
examining financial reports and budgetary proposals. It selects a President
and four Vice-Presidents for each biennial Conference. They lead the
Council, which meets during Conferences and once between them for a
regular session. Although the Conference has legislative authority and
the Executive Committee is the most powerful AAPSO organ, the regular
Council meetings can be influential since they are free to adopt their own
Declarations and Resolutions which elaborate past and affect future
Conference pronouncements.
If the Council gives a forum to all AAPSO members, the Secretariat
performs their bureaucratic work. The Cairo Conference stipulated that
initially the AAPSO headquarters should be in the UAR and that the
Secretary-General should be nominated by the UAR. Although the
AAPSO charter permits other arrangements. these decisions have been
reaffirmed by AAPSO's Executive Committee to which the Secretariat
is collectively responsible. As a result Egypt has an important place in
and some influence over AAPSO. The Board of Secretaries operating
the Secretariat was first limited to one Secretary-General and Secretaries
from 11 specified countries." Including the Secretary-General, the
_ Board's size rose to 14 at the Third Conference at Moshi in 1963 and
to 15 at the Fourth Conference at Winneba in 1965. The present
membership has a distribution of six Asians, six Africans and three
Arabs." Reflecting their political interests and financial contributions,
Russia and Communist China have beta represented in the Secretariat
at all times.
The Secretariat is located in a comfortable but unpretentious two-
storey building in the Manial district of Cairo. Internally the work of
the Secretariat is broken down into sections for finance, publication,
documents and research, technical service, liaison, and women and youth
activities. The last two named inspire or plan meetings of relevant
groups. Afro-Asian Journalists. Afro-Asian Jurists, Afro-Asian Writers
and Afro-Asian Seminars are other groups with ties to AAPSO,
though only the women and youth groups have working sections in the
Secretariat. None of them are embedded in the AAPSO Constitution.
The Secretariat's operations have reflected differences among AAPSO's
members, particularly the Sino-Sovict dispute. A crisis appeared in
the spring of 1960 when People's China tried to discharge the
Secretary-General, Yusuf as-Siba'i, a product of the WPC and Egyptian
nationalism. Peking also tried to move the headquarters out of Cairo,
perhaps to Jakarta. A compromise was found which restricted the
Secretariat's use of AAPSO funds,,ivin Communist China some
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quarters staff under Egyptian direction, Later disputes among the
Secretaries revolved around Chinese versus Soviet influence in the
editorial direction of the AAPSO journal .Afro-Asian Bulletin, causing
it to suspend publication at the end of 1963. The Chinese bloc in the
Secretariat between 1963 and 1965 consisted of the secretaries representing
People's China, Indonesia, Japan and either North or South Vietnam.
Faced with the slowly increasing size of the Secretariat, Peking has not
been able to improve its position which is now about four votes to eleven
out of the total of the 15 secretaries authorized in May 1965.
It is the Executive Committee which has the commanding position in
the AAPSO structure. In addition to deciding every two years on the
national composition of the Board of Secretaries, it is authorized to act
on and interpret Conference decisions and to judge how to apply
Conference resolutions through the work of the Secretariat and AAPSO
affiliates. The Executive Committee decides on the maximum size of
delegations to AAPSO Conferences and their time and place of meeting.
It prepares AAPSO's annual budget, controls the accounts of the
organization and decides on members' dues. The budget is reviewable by
the AAPSO Council and approved by the Conference. Since 1963 after
every Conference the Executive Committee elects from its members a
Control Commission to audit the Secretariat's accounts. Sonic members
contribute substantially more than an expected minimum to compensate
for non-payment and underpayment. The major financial supporters are
the governmental committees or parties in Algeria, Communist China,
Guinea, the USSR and the UAR. A second category of supporters
includes affiliates in Kuwait and Tunisia; and a third. those in Japan,
India, Mongolia, Morocco and the two Vietnams. The least responsive
category includes many affiliates in Sub-Saharan Africa. There is no
charter provision to suspend voting rights or to take other disciplinary
action for non-payment or underpayment of dues, Recognizing the
economic plight of liberation groups alliliated with AAPSO, the AAPSO
Council meeting in 1964 at Algiers discharged them of any financial
obligations.
The Executive Committee is responsible to and a product of the
AAPSO Council which every two years elects the executive body from
its members. The Executive Committee had 27 members until the 1963
Conference increased the size to 30. It meets twice yearly under its own
elected President for each session. ']"Ile Executive Committee maintained
essentially the saute national ntentbcrship from its founding in 1960 until
the 1965 Conference. AAI'SO affiliates claiming to speak for the peoples
of these countries have been continuously represented : Algeria, People's
China, the Congo (L), Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan,
Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Pakistan, Russia. South West Afrfca, Tanzania, Tunisia, the
UAR, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Elected for the first time in 1965 were
Basutoland, Mozambique, Palestine, Portuguese Guinea, South Vietnam
and Zambia. They had become eligible two years earlier for election to
the Executive Committee because of their membership in the AAPSO
Council, i.e., membership in AAPSO. The new members replaced
Ceylon, Cameroon, Iran, Liberia, Somalia, and Uganda, though none. of
these save Cameroon lost its official standing in AAPSO. The changes
reflected AAPSO's increased attention to the remainder of colonial
Africa, and to South Vietnam and Palestine.
Based on the character of the national affiliates involved. Russia's
influence has been greater than Communist China's in the Executive
Committee. From 1960 until 1965 People's China could depend only on
Japan (the Communist Party of Japan), probably on the two Vietnams
and Indonesia and possibly on Pakistan. The 1965 upheaval in Indonesia
is likely to reverse the usually pro-Peking conduct of its affiliate in
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AAPSO. The pro-Peking orientation of the Japanese, North Korean and
Vietnamese affiliates is now uncertain in view of their shifting away
from Peking, revealed in 1966. In agitprop terms which are so crucial
to AAPSO, some militant Left-neutralist members, for example Guinea
and Mali, may find no difficulty in joining the Peking group. Yet there
is little doubt it is a minority.
Soviet influence also outweighs that of China in AAPSO's Solidarity
Fund. A product of the 1960 crisis when Peking sought to shape the
organization more to its liking, the Solidarity Fund was formed to satisfy
People's China and AAPSO militants who were anxious to'give material
help to liberation movements in Africa. In keeping with a Conakry
'Conference resolution adopted the previous April. the Fund got a formal
start in a meeting of the Executive Committee in November 1960.
The Solidarity Fund i's composed of seven members elected every two
years after each Conference by the Executive Committee from its
members. The Solidarity Fund began with Executive Committee
members representing Cameroon, Communist China, Guinea, Indonesia,
Morocco, the Soviet Union and the UAR. The membership has remained
constant, except that Tanganyika replaced Cameroon in 1963. Why
Algeria and one or both of the Vietnams have not become Solidarity
Fund members to add their expertise is an intriguing question. The Fund
elects a chairman, first vice-chairman and second vice-chairman, who
to date have come from Guinea, Morocco and Communist China
respectively.
The Solidarity Fund's mission became clearer in February 1961 at
Conakry when a secretariat was established under Guinean direction to
solicit financial and material aid to meet the "urgent needs" of national
liberators--communications equipment, educational materials, scholar-
ships for "technicians". medical care, foodstuffs, clothing and legal
defence. The appeal went to national solidarity committees and to other
anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist organizations and "all persons who
support and approve the objectives of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Fund."15
Since 1961 financial problems have troubled the Fund, reducing its
importance as a supply centre for insurgency groups. Competing agencies
of AAPSO and the Organization of African Unity have also been present.
In January 1961 the AAPSO Council created the International Committee
for Aid to Algeria and the Congo to secure diplomatic, financial and
medical assistance for the FLN and the Stanleyville rdgime. For African
liberation problems the Solidarity Fund has a governmental competitor
in the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, established
by the African states in May 1963 at the founding of the OAU.
Additionally, some governments involved in AAPSO have their own
conduits, revealed in the Congo crisis of 1963-64 when Algerian, Chinese,
Egyptian and Russian supplies and arms flowed to Eastern Congo
insurgents through the Nile valley and East Africa. To date the most
likely use of the Solidarity Fund as an insurgency supply or training
centre concerns the Portuguese African colonies.''
Prospects Four leading and interrelated issues face the solidarity
movement-the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the emergence of
membership questions the relation of AAPSO to the tri-continental
LAAAPSO, and the outlook of Afro-Asian constittents. The impact of
the Sino-Soviet conflict has ideological and bureaucratic aspects. The
growth of AAPSO's nco-Chinese ideas on coexistence and liberation
questions suggests the likelihood of continuing militancy.' A qualifying
characteristic is that AAPSO resolutions usually mention "armed"
struggle only after some historical evidence of formal insurgency. Thus
a 1965 Conference resolution on the "internal colony" of the Afro-
American population in the United States says that it "must no longer
he isolated from African and Asian struggles for national liberation"
and l? nes AAPS u~ t for the "militant Afro-Americans in their
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either Soviet or Chinese ideology will leave their mirk on the solidarity
movement. When structural questions appear, Russia is apt to retain its
hegemony. illustrated in the entrance of observers from WPC groups and
Eastern European socialist countries into AAPSO Conferences over the
objections of the Chinese faction. The Soviet bloc won its point on WPC
observers at the Moshi Conference in 1963 and on st~cialist states in 1965
at Winneba. The resulting division of labour may provide a stabilizing
factor in the solidarity movement, provided Russia and China are
satisfied with their respective advantages. A different aspect of the
Sino-Soviet dispute is how it is assessed by Afro-Asian governments now
supporting or tolerating AAPSO. Conceivably tht se governments will
grow weary of the Sino-Soviet dispute and try to establish their own
unofficial, Pan-organization, a step threatened by Algeria's Muhammad
Yazid in AAPSO's hierarchy after the Sino-Sovict feuding in the March
1964 AAPSO Council meeting.* Because of their interests in Afro-Asia
apart from the solidarity movement, the. two Communist powers are
unlikely to permit it to be reconstituted without them.
Membership questions have become important for the solidarity
movement. Until the AAPSO Conference of 1965 membership matters
were not cspecialy controversial. Previously the list of the original
solidarity committees in Communist and neutralist countries, plus some
exile groups, had expanded to include similar groups. Acceptance into
AAPSO is through Conferences by majority vote, with the understanding
that the Executive Committee and the AAPSO Council screen all
applicants. At the 1965 Conference it became clear that three kinds of
membership problems had arisen : the question of how to treat competing
segments within a recognized affiliate; the challenge of one or more
national rivals to the existing affiliate; and controversial applications
from countries new to AAPSO." These problems often involve the
instabilities natural to the solidarity or liberation groups in AAPSO's
purview. Membership questions have carried over from AAPSO into
LAAAPSO.
The evolution of the solidarity movement from an organization for
two continents, AAPSO, to the creation in Havana of an organization
for three continents. LAAAPSO, stems from ambitions revealed as early
as the AAPSO Council meeting at Bandung in April 1961. Soviet, Chinese
and Cuban manoeuvring delayed the preparations for a tri-continental
meeting under AAPSO and Cuban-Soviet sponsorship. Held in January
1966 distinct from the sessions of AAPSO organs, the Havana meeting
of some 600 delegates from 82 nations created a new solidarity institution,
located in the Cuban capital. Yet the action did not end AAPSO,
raising relationship issues for the two organizations. Based on a decision
at the 1965 Winneba Conference, AAPSO's 1967 Conference is scheduled
to be held in Peking, an unlikely event in view of China's internal crisis
and its isolation in world politics. Wherever the next Conference is
held in 1967, it may yield answers on how AAPSO relates to LAAAPSO
which is to have its second Conference the following year in Cairo.
Meanwhile, LAAAPSO proceeds on the AAPSO pattern with a
Secretariat, a Cuban Secretary-General (Osmani Cienfuegos), a national
liberation committee and a specialized body to aid insurgents in South
Vietnam. Complicating organizational relations, a Latin American
Solidarity Organization (LASO) came into existe:.ce immediately after
To illustrate the three types of problems, the 1965 Conference gave
competing factions of Cameroon's affiliate, the UPC, six months to mend
differences; affirmed the .11ovimcnto Popular dc Libertatao de Angola
(RIPLA) as the sole representative of Angola, despite the challenge of the
Uniao das Popula4?ocs do Angola (UPA); and took under advisement
applications from groups claiming to represent the Comoro Islands, Chad
and the Ivory Coast. The Conference admitted the Thailand Liberation
Front, centred in Peking.
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the end of the Havana meeting. No less important for the future of the
solidarity movement are the ideological questions raised at Havana.
Essentially they refer to a continuation of the neo-Chinese views on
coexistence and liberation at the expense of conventional Soviet notions
which have been at a disadvantage in AAPSO.
One new factor suggested by the appearance of the solidarity movement
in Latin America is the possibility of independent Cuban influence on its
bureaucracy and ideology without regard to Soviet preferences. Castro's
removal of Che Guevara in 1965 and the decline in Sino-Cuban relations
in 1966 suggest that Russian guidance of Cuba will persist. Another new
matter concerns the relation of the solidarity movement to the West.
Although AAPSO has not declared an ambition to expand into the West
to include members in agreement with its ideology, its attempts to take
advantage of difficulties in American race relations and LAAAPSO's
support of Puerto Rican nationalism are to be noted. Also of interest is
the Havana meeting's appeal to the working class and popular movements
in Europe and North America to tighten bonds with the peoples of the
South in the common struggle for its liberation from imperialism,
thereby aiding the "emancipation of the oppressed classes in capitalist
countries" .12 However weak its logic a solidarity movement that has
organizational lines into the West is not beyond comprehension,
The future of the solidarity movement will also be influenced by the
response of the solidarity movement's constituents to its services.
Liberation groups are apt to find more benefits than drawbacks from
association. Non-Communist governments which sponsor affiliates or
tolerate them may have to weigh the impact of association on their
international power and national integrity. These governments are in a
position to realize many of the goals found in the Ten Principles of
Bandung and in AAPSO's Cairo Declaration of 195S through the slow
but demonstrable progress stemming from acculturation, inter-state
relations and self-development. Fear of Soviet political or economic
retaliation and their own ideological orthodoxy may deter them from
phasing out ties to the solidarity movement. Probably AAPSO or
LAAAPSO will exist as long as international Communism believes that
it can benefit from the weakness of the developing nations or until they
decide that their national interests can be advanced without the help of
the solidarity movement.
The Anup Singh mission to Cairo and the Asian Solidarity Committee
are detailed in Odette Guitard, Bandoeng et Rdveil Des Peeples
Colonises (Paris, 1961), pp. 70-73.
' Keith Wheelock, Nasser's Egypt (New York, 1960), P. 254.
Afro-Asian Peoples' Conferences: Principal Reports (Cairo, 1958),
pp. 23-55.
New York Times. 2.1.58.
The First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (Cairo, n.d.),
pp. 25-27.
IHsnc Congres de Solidarity des Pcuple.s Afro-Asiatiques (Cairo, 1960),
pp. 64-67.
r Afro-Asian Bulletin. May-June 1961, pp. 39-42. Listing of states as in
original.
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Resolutions of the Fourth ,4 f ro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference.
mimeo, n.d., pp. 1-4.
Richard Lowenthal, "China", in Africa and the Conuntntist 117orld,
ed. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Stanford, 19(33), p. 170.
Resolutions of the Fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference,
p. 4. Without contending that Chinese progress in military atomic
affairs contributes to peace, Peking's delegate, Liao Cheng-chip,
clearly rejected the Winneba meeting's position. Sec Peking Review,
21.5.65, p. 16.
For a summary of Sultan Galiycv's ideas, sec Alexandre Pennigsen,
"Sultan Galiyev: The USSR and the Colonial Revolution", in The
Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Z. Laqueur (New York 1958),
pp. 398-414.
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement (Cairo, 1962), pp, 78-84.
Cameroon, People's China, UAR, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
,japan, Sudan, Syria and the USSR. "Organizational Resolutions",
The First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference., pp. 64-65.
Algeria, Angola, Peoples' China, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Japan, Kenya, South Africa, South Vietnam, Tanzania, UAR
and USSR.
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement, pp. 117-114.
Cooperation between AAPSO members and liberation groups for
Portuguese Africa is shown in the early October 1965 meeting of the
Conference of Nationalist Organizations of Portuguese Colonies
(CONGO) in Dar es Salaam, attended by observers from the Soviet
Solidarity Committee, People's China, North Vietnam and Algeria.
Egyptian Gazette 3.10.65.
Among the liberation cases AAFSO cited in 1965 were the "armed
stnig gle living %V;1ged by the peoples of the Karncrnu and Niger against
French imperialist aggression camouflaged behind the re-gitnes of neo-
colonialist dictatorship", and "the armed struggle of the people
of Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras against United
States neo-colonist political and economic domination". Resolutions
of the Fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 18.
john K. Cooley, East (hind Over Africa (New York, 1965), p. 20.
Soviet authorized accounts of the Havana meeting appeared in World
Marxist Rrt'icw, March 1966, pp. 11-13, and April 1966, pp. 1-6. A
Chinese version is found in Pekin? Review, 21.1.66, pp. 19-25.
Western appraisals are Paul 1). l;cthcl. "The Havana Conference"
The Reporter, March 24, 1966, pp. 23-129, and D. Bruce Jackson,
"Whose Men in Havana ? " Problems of Communism, April-May
1966, pp. 1-10.
Following a protest against the 1963 decision lodged with the AAPSO
Secretariat in October 1966 hr AAPSO groups representing Angola,
Gambia, India, \lalagasv and South Africa, the AAPSO Council is to
review the question. The Patriot (New Delhi), 11.10.66.
Resolutions of the First Conference for Afro-Asian-Latin American
Peoples' Solidarity (Cairo, 1966), p. 73.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY March 1968
The Ninth World Youth Festival
The Ninth World Youth Festival (WYF) is now scheduled to take place
in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 28 July through 6 August 1968. The event was
originally planned for Algeria in 1965, but was postponed after the over-
throw of Ben Bella; it was rescheduled for Ghana the following year, but
the coup d'etat against N'Krumah once again forced postponement.
The Youth Festivals are the largest and most expensive of the Soviet
front events. This Festival will be the first since 1962, when the Sov-
iets staged the event in Helsinki, Finland. It will be the first to be
held inside the Soviet Bloc since the WYF held in Moscow in 1957. The
location should reduce, but will probably not eliminate, the dissension
which has given the two Festivals held outside the Bloc (Vienna, 1959;
and Helsinki, 1962) something less than an image of complete "peace and
friendship" -- the theme of the Festivals.
According to the organizers, approximately 20,000 participants are
expected at Sofia. Despite the sponsor's exaggerated claims in the past,
this expected attendance figure does not appear implausible. For the
first time, several West European Social Democratic Parties (those of
West Germany, Italy, Finland and probably other Sandinavian countries)
will apparently permit their youth sections to send delegations.
While the war in Vietnam will be the major propaganda theme of the
Festival, the Middle East is expected to be a significant secondary theme
throughout the affair. Another propaganda subject, and one which may
receive greater attention if more non-Communist West Europeans attend,
is "NATO and European Security."
The Festivals are nominally sponsored by a seemingly representative
International Preparatory Committee (IPC). Although the IPC is composed
of a long list of organizations and individuals purporting to represent a
number of countries, ideologies, races and languages, it is in fact only
a front for two Soviet` financed and controlled international organizations:
the Prague-based International Union of Students (IUS) and the World Fed-
eration of Democratic Youth (WFDY), headquartered in Budapest.
Generally, delegates to the WYF are grouped into "national" delega-
tions which are organized by National Preparatory Committees (NPC's) ac-
credited to and by the IPC. Occasionally this pattern is altered to accept
as "representatives" of a given country students or exiles who live closer
to the site, who are ideologically more reliable, or who represent a more
fruitful target to the Soviets. For the Soviets, the success of the event
is keyed to the degree of control which can be firmly but subtly main-
tained, and the extent to which Soviet positions on a variety of issues
can be impressed upon the parti'ipants. In most countries, the NPC is
the key to the type of representation which will appear at the WYF. In
the past, the Festival organizers have done everything possible to have
the NPC appear representative of a variety of tendencies and groups, and
yet remain firmly under Communist control of influence.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY
The Viet Cong Tet Holiday Offensive
in South Vietnam
March 1968
Although documents captured from the guerrilla forces had long indi-
cated that some major offensive by the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong
(NVA/VC) forces was planned -- presumably for the winter-spring of 1968
-- the exact nature and timing of the attack was not known. A major at-
tack was not expected during the Tet holiday truce (even though numerous
minor violations of the truce were expected of the Communists). Conse-
quently late January found South Vietnam's people in a festive mood for
the celebration' of" the happiest and holiest holiday of the Vietnamese year.
On the night of 29 January Vietnamese soldiers, a great percentage of them
on leave because of the truce and the holiday, made special efforts to
join their families, emptying barracks and leaving guard ranks thin. It
was after the holiday celebrants had retired that night that 50-60,000
North Vietnamese and VC soldiers struck with a fierceness and bloodiness
unusual even in Vietnam. The Communists hit a hundred places across the
land -- 36 out of 44 provincial capitals and some 60 district towns, air-
fields, military bases, South Vietnamese government buildings and other
politically important targets, including the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. The
toll of lives on all sides was heavy; allied forces suffered their heavi-
est casualties of the war, with the South Vietnamese Army sustaining the
greatest losses on the allied side.
Heavy Communist losses
It was the attackers, however, whose losses were staggering. Many
of the NVA/VC attacks were avowedly suicidal, such as the one against the
U.S. Embassy, and the recklessness of these attacks cost the Communists
some of their best men. In most cases the attackers were highly trained
guerrilla forces, including specialists such as demolition experts. The
accuracy of the allied count of enemy dead has been controversial; in the
heat of battle accuracy may be sacrificed to expediency and exaggerated
counts have undoubtedly been turned in by units too eager to please the
authorities. But, there is no question that Communist losses were tre-
mendous and the claim that the loss ratio runs from eleven or twelve to
one in the allies' favor appears reasonable.
Estimates of enemy losses up to midnight 3 February were close to
15,000 NVA/VC billed; General Westmoreland gave the estimate as of mid-
night 5 February as 21,000 enemy dead. When the U.S. Command announced on
10 February that it was discontinuing its daily casualty reports for the
Tet :offensive, the total of estimated enemy dead as of midnight 9 February
had risen to 27,000. The U.S. Command's final count was over 30,000 enemy
dead. Added to this toll were several thousand captured. Reducing these
figures by 10 or even 20% to compensate for possible error would still
leave at least one third of the attackers killed or captured. The toll
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of civilian casualties resulting from the Communist. attack is difficult
to estimate but what has been reported already is shocking and the hospi-
tals in Saigon and in the provinces are overflowing with wounded. Presi-
dent Thieu, at a joint session of the Assembly on 9 February, said that
since the 30th of January 3,000 civilians had been reported killed and
8,000 reported wounded. He added, in making an appeal for special execu-
tive powers to cope with the situation, that 196,000 South Vietnamese
citizens have been made;homeless. This brings the total number of refu-
gees, some of whom have twice been made homeless, to an estimated 345,000.
Communist Failure to Spark a Popular Uprising
Hanoi's avowed intention was to arouse the people, to bring about a
popular uprising in conjunction with the attack. A captured document
released to the press on 10 February and addressed to personnel of the
so-called Liberation Army provided a clear statement of Communist intent:
"The ... National Liberation Front has decided to launch a
full-scale attack to defeat the enemy and return the Government
to the people. All military forces of the Liberation Army and
militant political forces are ordered to collaborate closely
with different patriotic forces and the entire population to
simultaneously dash forward to ... wipe out a good deal of enemy
potential ... disrupt the puppet army, overthrow all levelsc 3f
the stooge government and drastically punish all high echelon
traitors and ... establish the people's revolutionary government
at all levels."
Interrogations of prisoners have shown that the Communist cadres were
thoroughly indoctrinated in this belief. Wild claims were made on the
Communist "Radio Liberation" that "patriotic forces, including men in the
South Vietnamese Army, the armed organizations of the people, and patri-
otic youth are rising up to oppose the U.S. forces and the Saigon Govern-
ment and to seize control of the city."
It has been reported by defectors that they had received orders to
go from door to door in Saigon summoning the people to join the attacking
forces and observers of some of the street battles reported hearing Com-
munist exhortations to the people over megaphones. The Communists also
called for a general strike in South Vietnam and asked for demonstrations
abroad in support of their offensive. According to Hanoi's broadcasts
and newspapers, scores of organizations supporting the Communists sprang
up spontaneously throughout South Vietnam. But the truth is that the
people did not join in the attack, there was no general strike, no demon-
strations, no organizations spontaneously bursting forth. It quickly be-
came clear that the "popular support" claimed by the Communists in Vietnam
is a myth which the Communists leadership is vainly attempting to perpetuate.
In this connection it is important to distinguish between "popular support"
and acquiescence to Communist demands. It is true that the guerrillas
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were able to hide among the people in the cities and towns before strik-
ing out. In some instances this was no doubt due to sympathy for the Viet
Cong; but in most cases it was due to simple fear of the consequences of
refusal. The important point is that when the Communists came into the
open the people did not join them; in fact they fled at the earliest oppor-
tunity. (See attachments land 2 for more details.)
Viet Cong Alienation of the Population
Far from stirring up the popular support Hanoi had led them to believe
was bubbling just under the surface, the Communist attacks brought on a
vastly different response. By choosing to attack during the traditional,
almost sacred, family New Year celebration, the NVA/VC undoubtedly alien-
ated major portions of the population. By firing bullets and bombs at
the heart of heavily populated areas they caused the indiscriminate slaugh-
ter of civilians, rendered thousands of city dwellers homeless and terror-
ized those already in refugee status who had fled to the cities for safety.
Nor should it be forgotten that all this occurred during the Tet truce
which the Communists themselves had proposed first.
The Communist offensive against the lives and sensibilities of the
South Vietnamese people were not confined entirely to the violation of
the Tet truce or the Tet holiday celebration. The NVA/VC forces attacked
hospitals as well as military installations, they used churches, pagodas
and schools as defense posts, and forced captured civilians (most frequent-
ly women) to be human shields. In the areal south of Hue they brutally
executed 300 civilians and buried them in a mass grave; they marched off
to some unknown destination 125-150 Catholic prisoners and have reportedly
started holding "trials" of captured city officials. In the highland town
of Ban Me Thuot, the VC killed six American missionaries in a sweep through
a leprosarium operated by the Christian and Missionary Alliance. After
killing the missionaries, they wired their bodies with booby traps. In
Saigon a score of VC paraded through the streets singing songs, waving
flags and shouting: "This is the Liberation Force come to liberate the
city! Be compatriots! Help us liberate the city!" Two and three-man
teams with the same message went .from door to door, like census takers,
asking for the names and addresses of local police, government officials,
and army personnel. Those they found, they killed on the spot. In Danang
a VC guerrilla rose in a Buddhist Tet service with a pistol in one hand
and a megaphone in the other; interrupt-ng the service, he appealed to the
assembly over the megaphone to "support the uprising." The Buddhists
seized him and his two comrades and turnedthem over to the South Vietna-
mese police. (See attachments 4-6 for additional details.)
Viet Cong Betrayal of its Own Fighting Forces
The losses caused by the Communist Tet offensive were not confined to
the South Vietnamese armed forces and civilians. The Communist leadership
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showed the same callous disregard for the lives of -- and the same readi-
ness to betray -- its own fighting forces as it did the enemy's. There
is no question that Hanoi has perpetrated an incredible betrayal against
its own troops. They were asked to sacrifice for a "popular uprising"
which never developed; they were told that their wounded would be housed,
hidden and healed by collaborators in the urban areas, but the collabora-
tors never appeared; they were told resupply would be forthcoming within
12-24 hours, but in fact provisions had never been made to this end; they
were promised reinforcements, but the reinforcements were not sent. Sui-
cide squads were sent on missions without the slightest hope of survival;
the squad sent into the U.S. Embassy compound, for instance, was abandoned
as soon as it had entered the grounds; 19 VC commandos attacked the com-
pound and six hours later 19 VC commandos lay dead. In at least one pro-
vince, Chau Doc, the Communist units were told by -their leaders that they
were to celebrate the New Year with the townspeople who were waiting to
welcome them with open arms. In fact they were greeted with gunfire.
(The only exception to the almost total lack of genuine cooperation the
VC received from the South Vietnamese people may have occurred in Hue
where the continuing battle still obscures what is going on there as of
this writing.) It remains a stark fact that Hanoi made a cold-blooded
decision to sacrifice thousands of its best soldiers' lives in a risky
bid for a short-lived psychological/political advantage. This, of course,
is traditonal Communist military doctrine. (See attachments 7 and 8.)
Heartening Performance of the South Vietnamese Government and Military,
Although the morale of the Communist forces must be under consider-
able stress, the morale and subsequent response of the ARVN officers and
men, after the nitia-l surprise had worn off, has been praiseworthy. Not
only did they quickly return from their holiday leave and fight well against
the attacking forces, they have also assisted the civil authorities in
attempting to restore order and get food and medical supplies flowing and
utilities operating and public services functioning once more. Civilian
officials have set up centers in the Saigon area to help care for dis-
placed persons and Ministry of Health teams are furnishing these centers
potable water, rice and other food as well as supplying immunizations
against cholera and plague. One third of Saigon's garbage truck fleet of
70 was operating normally by 10 February and more than 500 tons of rice
had been delivered to Saigon sales points by the same date. More than
2500 tons of rice were discharged from ships or brought in from outlying
warehouses between 8-10 February and it appears the flow will continue.
The fresh vegetable supply to the city showed considerable improvement
nine days after the attack and Saigon's water and power supplies are func-
tioning -- below normal, but at adequate levels. Provincial officials
have responded well to the emergency and committees have been organized
to deal with the refugee problem; schools, churches and public buildings
have been converted to refugee use and food is being supplied in increas-
ing quantities. Two thirds of the civil servants were reported back on
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the job in Phu Khuong Province and all 63 hospitals in the 44 provinces
are in operation.
Responsibility for the overall effort of rehabilitation has been
vested in a joint South Vietnamese/American task force. It generally
appears that the people are behind the government's efforts to restore
order and there have been signs of across-the-board participation which
are not usual in a society as divided among partisan interests as Viet-
nam has traditionally been. However, the Communist-made crisis may have
ignited a spark of unity which will be the eventual means of reversing
tradition. Time and the performance of both the government and the people
will tell. (See attachments 9 and 10.)
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 the South Vietnamese as
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LOS ANGELES TIMES (1)
3 Februar?, 1968
Reds Claim Victory
Vita Drive Is Assured
Iiberately giving the im-
pression that the offen-
sive, which began Jan. 30,
is a total commitment of
their manpower and arms
to crushing American and
South Vietnamese resis-
tance.
Political Objectives
But Observers Believe Part of Effort Is The political offensive is
to Soften U.S. Stand on Peace Conditions
BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Timte staff writer
I LONG KONG - The Hanoi claimed t h a t
Communists declared Fri- "millions of patriotic"
day that they now are S o u t h Vietnamese had
y joined the Communist-led
striking for total victory insurgents in the total
in South Vietnam and assault on the power of
claimed victory is assured. the Saigon government,
Among' a spate of state- which is directed at 40 key
towns and cities. According
merits, the official Hanoi I to the broadcasts 'and news-
d a i I y N h a n Dan (the', papers of the Democratic
People) hailed the present R e p u It 11 c of Vietnam,
generalized offensive of scores of organizations
the'Viet Con as a compre- like the National Demo-
cratic Alliance of the old
hensive uprising which capital of Hue have
will bring the Communists sprung up all over the
to nower_ country.
Kong believed the Com-
rnunists are seeking a
political objective as much
as a purely military victo-
ry. They think the Com-
munists are seeking to
soften American public
opinion for a new peace
offensive.
.As the picture was un-
folded by their publicists,
It appeared more and
more that the Communists
might be staking every-
thing on one throw of the
dice. An undertone of
desperation was evident in
a strategy that could leave
them defeated and facing
the task of rebuilding
their strikin; power from
a dispirited and van-
quished cadre.
Despite the heavy com-
mitment of Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese regular
troops to the assault, high-
ly qualified specialists in
Hong Kong believe the
offensive seeks political
the same, the creation of a
government in South Viet-
nam which, whatever its
name or formal composi-
tion would be wholly re-
sponsive to Communist
wishes
also directed squarely at
the South Vietnamese
ppeople. Throughout the
Co in in unist statements
runs the theme that the
masses of South Vietnam
are joining the guerrillas,
oven soldiers and officials
of the present regime de-
serting their posts to "en-
ter the revolutionary
ranks."
If the Communists can
convince the South Viet-
namese people that furth-
er resistance is hopeless,
they will be well along
toward the victory they.
claim. They have in pur
suit of that objective set
u organizations-fictious
o real -- like the Alliance
for National and Peace
Forces in Saigon, w h i c h
they claim "has been wel-
comed by many prominent
personalities."
Seen as Bait
wrongly assessed the
American reaction.
Accept Consequences
The South Vietnamese
have always assumed the
Viet Con, could make an
effort like the present one
if they are willing to
accept the consequent los-
ses. While the offensive
will certainly not enhance
popular support for the
Saigon government, it is
not likely to turn a
shocked populace to the
Communists.
The impact on the Unit-
ed States is likely to be
greater. Nonetheless, psy-
chological warfare special-
ists pointed out that the
Communists may have
miscalculated.
The Communist offen-
sive does not, after all,
vitiate the previous Amer-
ican assessment that the
a n t i - Communist 'forces
were making slow pro-
gress. It has always been
axiomatic among specia-
lists that the Viet Cant;
could hit any place in
South Vietnam at any
time they were prepared
to take the losses.
Although specialists are
surprised by the scope of
the attacks, their surprise
derives from Communist
That alliance, carefully strategy rather than Com-
distinuished f r o in t h e munist capability.
South Vietnam National. Failing Impact
Liberation Front, the poli- "If the Communists fail
tical arm of the Viet Cong, to have the impact they
has issued an "urgent expect on the United
National Salvation lla-. States," one specialist
nifcsto" demanding "the asks, "if they make the
U.S. and its satellites American people angry
withdraw their troops instead of cowing them,
from South Vietnam so as what will t h e y have
to end the war." The
ained b
th
ir l
vi
h
g
y
e
a
s
at least as much as milita- alliance, its composition expenditure of lives and
ry objectives. They think undisclosed, has also un- materiel? They c a n n o t
the target of the Commu- dertaken "to negotiate possibly hold the towns
nists is as much American with the South Vietnam they have taken. If they
and world public opinion National Liberation Front fail to win big now, they
as It is real estate the on measures to restore will have squandered their
guerrillas cannot hold. peace.... " r
ith
ff
"
esources w
out e
ect.
The Communists were The assault was ob- The Communists oh- It appeared that the
viously well coordinated viously hope to use their Communists might have with ir re s pone athe m sin- the enigm atic peace newly created organiza- been impelled to their go-
lanoi has
l been tions as bait to draw all for-broke strategy by tent
surrection. they have so pinning for the past the disaffected and the sions among both the long r sov ctor Ino carry month and a half. These war-weary in South Viet- sions
and the haraViet
ssed
y practi- analysts believe that Han- itam to their side.
Viet-
cal, tactical terms, they of might quite soon offer It would be unwise to population of North Viet-
have
have staked their success nam. Such a mass offen-
a total trevolt of heir s negotiations on terms understate the impact of sive by units that are not
South Vietnamese which would appear a the offensive on the South linked on the ground is
people, little less obdurate than Vietnamese None-
That revolt is vital to the people. a erns, all the basic tenct:s
strategy tl mive4t' ht'?q 0itilA~1880~~10~04e~~erlrilla warfare-p::ir-
ini; while negotiating." however, would remain may have wrongly as- ticularly when it is staved
sessed the psychology of in the face of total enemy
Red Gamble
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2 rebr"unry 1 'Tito Communists variously
? claim to have held between
m 11,H s tai l fw, forty and fifty towns, and they
~,t?y~ have not so far admitted aban-
doning any of them., The Hanoi
? party paper " Nhan Dan "
1 n claimed yesterday that the
1..e isrve events of the past few (lays
By VICTOR ZORZA
Communist radio stations in
Vietnam have announced the
impending formation of an
alternate Government, The
call has gone out for the final,
mighty push towards victory.
A new political organisation
has been set up which is being
represented as a coalition of
all anti-Saigon forces, and
which Is evidently acting as a
non-Communist front for the
MY and the Vietcong.
The tifd"s "Liberation
Radio " has announced that the
" long 'awaited general offen-
sive " had now been launched.
The headquarters of the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces. which
introduced itself as " directing
the general offensive to over-
throw the regime," has announ-
ced : " We are going; to set tip
a Government which will he
entirely ours," It appealed to
all citizens to join its forces in
attacking the US troops and
their South Vietnamese "hench-
men."
The new political organisation
has introduced itself under the
name of "The Alliance of
National and Peace Forces." It
has issued a 'national salvation
declaration," and claims to have
held a meeting to explain its
policy. In Saigon, it claims,
runny intellectuals, industrialists,
and representatives of non.
Communist political parties and
religions have responded to the
alliance's appeal. The alliance
demands an Anverican with-
?drawal from Vietnam, and calls
for " negotiations with the NLh
in order to discuss measures to
restore peace and bring independ-
ence and sovereignty to the
country." I 11 Identical policy
In policy. ' therefore, it is
identical with that of the NLF.
It it has any real existence-
other than in the broadcasts of
claim that political parties and
religious organisations, so far
unidentified, have joined the
alliance.
The headquarters of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces,"
which claims to be directing the
general -offensive, would appear
to he distinct from the Vietcong,
which goes under the name of
the " Liberation Armed Forces."
The new headquarters is des-
cribed by the " Liberation
liadin " as the commanding organ
of the various patriotic South
Vietnamese " armed " forces.
The " Revolutionary Forces "
headquarters therefore appears
to stand in the same relation to
the alli.inre a'; the Vietcong
stands to the \LF.
The " Liberation Radio " claims
that " the revolutionary Adminis-
tration has been set up " in
Saigon and in other areas where
the " Revolutionary A r m e d
.Forces" have taken "complete
control or many important
centres." The revolutionary
Adminstration, which claims to
enjoy the " enthusiastic support "
of the people, has set itself a
number of military and political
tasks which are quite distinct
from previous NLF-Vietcong
policy, and suggest that this is
seen by the Communists as the
final stage of the war.
The Revolutionary Administra-
tion has immediately taken up
the task of
1 Directing the completion of
the armed uprising;
2 Reorganising the militia
units and ;
2 Setting up r volutionary
political parties."
But the armed struggle Is
primary. In Ilue, where the
National Alliance claims to have
seized control? it issued a local
appeal to all patriotic forces, in
much the same terms as a
national declaration, calling for
an imm diate armed uprising.
The political import of the NLF
move may be seen in a state-
ment issued by the NLF repre-
the NLF's "Liberation Radio"- sentation in Hanoi, which says
the alliance seems to have been that in Saigon and Ifue "many
set up in order to represent the organisations opposing the USA
new offensive as the concern not and the Thieu- y clique have
only of the NLF, but of elements been set up to coordinate action
-
which have previously kept clear with the NLF.'*
of it, hence, presumably, the
showed that the enemy could be
beaten not only in the country-
side, but also in towns, "thus
quickly reversing the tide In
key political, economic and
military centres." The offfensive
was not over, it added, but was
gaining momentum.
T' his is closely reminiscent of
the Vietnamese Communist text.
brxtk formula for the final victory
of the revolution. The. Viet?
nanhese Communists have !always
claimed that they have evolved
their own revolutionary road, to
suit the conditions of their own
country, and quite distinct from
those of China and of Russia.
In Russia, the revolution had
begun in the cities and had
spread to the countryside. in
China, it began in the country
and gradually engulfed the cities.
The Vietnamese formula, how-
ever, requires a period of armed
strue l&' in the countryside and
of political preparation in the
cities, with the two finally merg-
ing in a great explosion of
nat:onwvide political and military
struggle in tho cities as well as
in the country.
Struggle
This Is the " General Uprising
which is supposed to crown the
revolutionary struggle-but it is
noeworthy that while the C'hm?,
uiunist reporting of the "events
of the last few d;%?.w (its the
formula of the General Uprising,
the term itself is not being sed.
This may be due to doctrinal
differences in the Communist
leadership which have isuaily
attended major shifts in strategy.
There was one such debate;
centring on the concept of the
;general uprising, and particular ly
on the 4uestion whether political
or military struggle was primary,
in 1964
On the question of an uprising
in the cities, there were clear
differences id the leadership
more than a year ago, when one
faction was pressing for armed
urban struggles, while the other
argued that the city population
was not yet ready for it.
Liberation Radio " broadeast-~
expiaincd at the time that the
eontlitlons for "a direct revoicr
tionary struggle In the cities arc
not yet adequate," because there
were still nothing like the mere,.
sary number, of organised Viet
cong groups. in the urban areas
2
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LONDON TD-
9 February 1968
(3)
A- 0
C I S 11 (S- 0 ri d re a 1. 1 n H
not shoot before she had time to
FItoM DAVID BONAVIA speak, but by the seventh night she
S,ue;oN. FEU, 8 was very depressed and feared she
A British girl described today would never escape.
how she sent last week hiding A Vietnamese who lived across the
p g street slipped in and ollered to guide
under a bed with a Vietnamese her to the American military com-
faamiiy in Hud, as mortars and pound later. He went out again,
rockets fell all around and the and the next thing they heard was
Vietcong sniped at American heli-
copters from the house next door.
Miss Helen Bowen, aged 25,
who is third secretary for infor-
mation at the British Embassy in r
Saigon, was visiting a Vietnam-
ese family in the old northern
imperial capital over the Tet
(lunar new year) festival. In the
small hours of January 31 " there
was it terrific pandemonium of
mortars, rockets, and everything
else ", Miss Bowen said. "I was
fast asleep, then gradually realized
that this was a hit more than Tet
firecrackers."
Miss Bowen, whose parents live
at Sherwood Park Road,
Mitcham, Surrey, said the eldest
girl of the family rushed into her
bedroom and took her next door,
where she ,hid under the bed until
morning. The parents, 12 children,
and three servants had taken
refuge in the same .room. .
" In the morning we crawled out
.and ,,at around in the house with
the ngisc continuing ??, she said. For
the next sir clay:, they ate boiled rice,
with marrows from the garden as the
f"irhiing went on all around. They
listened to the B.B.C. twice a day
and Miss Bowen, who is fluent in
Vietnamese, tran:vlated for the head
of the f am:ily, a civil servant. At
one point ,i North Vietnamese voice
on the radio announced that Huc
had been taken.'
Sometimes shells fell so close that
plaster fell from the ceilings. Every
nix_ht the family returned to sleep
under the beds. " When there was a
lull we used to open the shutters and
peep out. We knew there must be
Vietcong just behind the house
There was rifle fire at helicopters
from the house next door." One
night they heard the Vietcong pass-
ing just behind the wall.
Miss Bowen wanted to leave, but
her host told her:." On no account
must you go out, because if you
are sear by the Vietcong they will
shoot you and all of the. family."
She passed the time in reading Svct.
that he had been shot.
Miss Bowen said the family 'she
stayed. with were " absolutely
fantastic ??, in their concern for her
safety and insisted on giving bet the
beat morsels of food, to her embar-
rassment. She saw no sign of
popular support for the attack.
Last Monday they saw at last
heavily armed United States Marines
coming down the street. They pushed
in the door and started to inspect
the house. They were astonished to
See Miss loweq, but moved on, leave
ing her there. Soon afterwards,'hvo
Marines returned and told her to
leave at once, because they might
have to call for an air strike on
a concentration of 1,000 Vietcong
just behind the house. The Marines
had her and the family taken to a
refugee centre where they spent the
next night.
The refugees were not hostile, and
kept ollcring to let '? the American
girl" share their mats on the floor.
There were bodies in the refugee
centre and fresh mounds whcre
others had been buried.
'the next day the United States
Navy put her on a landing craft to
take her down the river to Da Nang.
Before they left, a mortar shell fell
near the landing craft and showered
fragments on the deck, As they
sailed down the river she could see
the Vietcong flag still floating over
the citadel of Hud. The battle is
continuing.
Pat Healey writes:-
Before Miss Bowen went to Hut
she wrote to her married elder sister,
Janette, to say that she hoped to go
but that the American intelligence
services were predicting a Vietcong
attack. " I may finish up being cap-
tured by the Vietcong", she wrote.
Her mother, Mrs. Caroline Bowen,
said at her Mitcham home yesterday:
" She did not really mean it when
she wrote the letter, but it is signifi-
cant considering how close she came
to being captured."
For five days Mr. and Mrs. Bowen,
waited anxiously for news knowing
their daughter was in i-luc and that
the Foreign Office had no news of
e
on a three-year engagement, is her
second overseas posting since entering
the Diplomatic Service five years ago.
and a Vietnaamese book called The to say.that their daughter had been
Nivht iu?hich l?u.cfs a Lifetime. evacuated to Da Nang. " I asked
She had her British passport and them what was the point of taking
red diplomatic card with her--" the her to Da Nang when it was under
thin ;~ t really clung to"-and fire too ", said Mrs. Bowen. "They
believed she would have been raison- told me she would be flown to
ably treated if North Vietnam Saigon."
troops entered the house and did
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 > 1e bruary 1968
? pp v or/as 20 5/04/ 1 : CIA-RDP78-03061AO00400040004-1
~s Q
_t 0 R Refugee Rolls
WRbhtn;ton Post Fnrrt?n ficrvlc, i
SAIGON. Feb. 4 The in. central relief committee tof Ambassador Robert W.tgoo area.
jury to South Vietnam's p situation the Americans pr 1966, as "a remarkably ex-'
would have ave no indigenous ally j, source1 allocated 1.- ;A.- to the promo-,
doubkii the. Americans
cot in
by t.ic ittelYf 5`~
/Mr. Pike said he believed,
(fairly quick victory because oft
a measure of disagreement
within the North Vietnamese;
\\Communist party leadership.,
'* ++ l llso:e,? t at,
some, younger members dis-
atgrecd with the view of General)
Ginp, Presidnt Ito Chi Minh(
+?,o P- -i-i' r Phani Van I)ong
that. Vietnam can be reunited
by a stubborn, unrelenting war.
Defense Minister Giap may
have tried to speed up the war.'
because of this "grumbling,"'
WASHINGTON POST
2 February 1968
(12)
I Wrote Book During Leave
Mr. Pike, who is 4.3 yeas
old, ,rot=e "The Vietcong: Tlui
Organization and Techniques of
the National Liberation Fronts
of South Vietnam" while at the]
Massachusetts Institute of Tech-I
nolopy's Center for Internation.i
al Studies in 1964 and 1965 oft
a leave from the United States
Information Agency.
A native of Cass Lake, Minn.,
Mr. Pike was news editor of~
the Arm's Far East radio net-
work . in' Tokyo before joining,,
the information agency about
eight years ago. Previously, he
had been a reporter and radio
Red Raids on Cities Are fwft
a eakness, Not Strength
WE A 1111 ALREADY en-
gulfed in another spate of
warnings that. all is hopeless
In Vietnam, because of the
attack on the U.S. Embassy
and the other VC efforts in
Saigon And other cities.
In reality, however, this
flurry or VC activities In
urban centers will almost
certainly prove to have just
the opposite meaning in the
end. Th