(Sanitized) GUIDELINES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1 C
April 1968
World-Wide Perspectives
1. SOVIET PENETRATION OF SUDAN (AF, NE, EUR)
2. SOUTH VIETNAM: "OPERATION RECOVERY"
3. COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES -- FOCUS ON
VIETNAM
4. ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE USSR AND EASTERN
EUROPE (EUR, a, b)
5. SOURCES OF IRRITATION BETWEEN ARABS AND
SOVIETS (AF, NE, EUR, g)
25X1 C
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Principal Developments in World Communist Affairs
(15 February-21 March)
1. Consultative Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Budapest
a. The world Communist movement has undergone a signifi-
cant shrinkage. At. the last international Communist conclave
in Moscow in December 1960, 81 Parties were represented. At
the recent Budapest Conference, 26 February-5 March, 64 Parties
actually participated, and 3 others sent observers. The absen-
tees were almost as significant as those attending, and included
6 of the 14 Communist parties in power throughout the world: those
of China, Albania, Cuba, Yugoslavia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.
Rumania's withdrawal on the fourth day left only 63 participants, and
brought to 7 the number of absentee ruling Parties.
b. Although the Conference revealed Moscow's waning control
over the world Communist movement as a whole, the Soviets neverthe-
less completely dominated the proceedings, and rammed through an
agreement to hold another international Communist summit meeting in
November-December 1968 in Moscow. A Preparatory Committee with
headquarters in Budapest will be responsible for all arrangements
for this Moscow conference.
c. The first three days of the meeting set the tone: first
the USSR's Mikhail Suslov, then Poland's Zenon Kliszko, and then
Erich Honecker of East Germany, hard-liners all, laid down a rigid
line of obedience to the Communist movement in the grand old style,
that is,fully subservient to Moscow. The soft words and kind prom-
ises that were made to woo recalcitrant parties to come to Budapest
were ignored. The Soviets were set on having at the center of the
Communist movement a clearly and tightly controlled core of parties
under Moscow's domination, even at the price of further alienating
parties which demand greater autonomy and equality between parties
in the world movement.
d. The most dramatic event of the Budapest Conference was the
departure of the Rumanians on the 4th day, following a bitter attack
on them by the Syrian delegate, who was assumed to be speaking by
proxy for the Soviets. The Rumanians had decided only at the last
minute to participate in the Conference at all, and had agreed to
attend only on condition that there be no criticism of fraternal par-
ties at the meeting. They said they had come to the meeting in the
hope of having a free exchange of views with the leaders of other
Communist Parties, but had found this quite impossible. Instead
they discovered that the main purpose of the Conference was simply
to ratify what the Soviets had already determined to do anyway --
hold another international Communist conference later this year.
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e. The Soviets, Poles and East Germans spoke constantly of
the necessity for a "common"general line among the Communist par-
ties of the world, and the need for a "basic document" spelling
out Communist strategy. This is rightly understood to be a device
by which the Soviets are attempting to regain as much control of
the movement as possible.
f. Although the Soviet tactics at Budapest succeeded, there
is good reason to doubt whether such parties as the Czech and espe-
cially the Italian, which also had attempted to avoid inter-party
criticism and tried to conciliate the Rumanians, will remain as
subservient to Moscow in the future.
2. Warsaw Pact Summit Meeting, Sofia
Immediately following the conclusion of the Budapest Consultative
Conference, the members of the Warsaw Pact convened in Sofia on 6 and
7 March. The Rumanians attended, but conspicuously refused to sign
a document supporting the Soviet-U.S. draft agreement on non-prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons, which the other six Warsaw Pact members found
acceptable and signed.
3.. Czechoslovakia
a. The rapid trend towards liberalization in the Czech Party
and Government further accelerated during the period, climaxing in
the forced resignation of Antonin Novotny, Stalinist President of
Czechoslovakia, on 21 March. He had already lost his power base as
First Secretary of the Party in January -- despite personal inter-
vention on his behalf by Leonid Brezhnev. Three of his top sup-
porters, the Minister of Interior, the Prosecutor General and the
Party's secretary for ideological matters had already been removed
within the preceeding three weeks. Another, Major General Jan
Sejna, defected to the United States in February, and still another,
a Deputy Minister of Defense, committed suicide on l4 March en route
to an inquiry into the circumstances of Sejna's defection.
b. The entire political atmosphere in the country has changed
drastically within the past three months, as evidenced everywhere.
The group in the Ministry of Interior responsible for press censor-
ship has requested that it be dissolved. The first president of the
country, Thomas Masaryk, who has been almost an un-person for years,
is again an officially recognized national figure. The new regime
may also consider moving towards a more flexible foreign policy to-
ward the West, including West Germany -- but the die-hard opposition
of East Germany and Poland, (apparently backed by the Moscow leader-
ship), expressed at the rapidly convoked conference with the Czech
leaders in Dresden, indicates serious roadblocks, impeding swift
progress in this direction.
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c. Student militance is also growing rapidly in Czechoslovakia.
New student associations, independent of the Communist Party student
organizations are springing up in the universities in Prague, Brat-
islava and in schools elsewhere. The new student organizations are
supporting Dubcek, but this support is conditional on the performance
of the regime, especially the types of programs it institutes and
the way it treats educational and cultural matters. Intellectuals
and journalists are wary, for conditions are reminiscent of those
in Poland in 1956, when intellectuals and students believed in and
supported Gomulks, only to watch him gradually resume the hard-line
policies and totalitarian controls of his predecessors.
4. Poland
Resentment by students, professors and other intellectuals towards
a repressive cultural policy boiled over into fierce demonstrations,
riots and finally pitched battles in at least eight Polish cities. The
trouble began when the government forced the closing in January of a
production of a well-known 19th century play which concerned a period
of Russian occupation of Poland. The audiences applauded too enthu-
siastically unfavorable references to the Russians in the play and so
the government cracked down hard on the students, arresting many of them.
But this only led to further trouble, including student boycotts of
classes in leading universities. Then the government resorted to bla-
tant anti-Semitism, blaming the student unrest on "Zionist agents."
The absurdity of this is apparent when one considers that there are now
only 20,000 to 30,000 Jews remaining in Poland of a pre-World War II
Jewish population of more than 3,000,000.
5. Rumania
Although Rumania received more attention in the world press for
having staged a walkout at the Budapest Consultative Conference, little
notice was taken abroad of a significant internal shakeup of the ap-
paratus of the Communist Party and the Rumanian Government in which
as many as 10,000_persons have lost their jobs during the past two
months as a result of administrative measures begun in January. The
regime explained the firings and reorganizations with the need to
achieve greater efficiency, but it is suspected that the real purpose
was to give Ceausescu and his group complete control by removing old-
time Party bosses who could have obstructed the programs of the pres-
ent government. In contrast to liberalizing reforms in Czechoslo-
vakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe which have seen the Communist
party relinquish some control, the Rumanian reforms actually have
strengthened the party's grip. Ceausescu exercises a greater degree
of personal power than any other East European leader (with the pos-
sible exception of Walter Ulbricht in East Germany). The Rumanian
public has practically no access to news media not'controlled by the
government, and foreign journalists and diplomats are barred from any
but the most formal relationships with Rumanians in official positions,
however minor.
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WASHINGTON POST
13 March 1968
P it 0 "M
0,11 sift
ds 'I r Lo Av'el'
By Victor Zorn
btarchetter buardlan
LONDON, March 12-Pol-
and's. Communist leaders
are trying to turn aside the
wrath of the people by ac-
eusing Jews of having insti?
gated the rioting of tt t'ast',
few days.
Warsaw newspapers print'
the names of alleged .Jewish
instigators among the sUt-
dents and leading Communist
`Party officials are making
tpeechca, reported .n the;:
papers, In which they try to.
lay the blames on Jew, ~v th-
out putting it in so many
worts.
Thtw government is vvi-
dcnlly relying on the P..lish
tradition of anti-Semitism to
discredit the political oppo-
sition which has, m-turcd
among the young peopin of
Poland - including Polish
Jews-.,in recent years. This
Is a political trick that has
often been used in Eastern
Europe and Russia in the
past, and has paid dividends
in the form of pogroms led
by government agents.
Few Je~vs Left
There are not many Jews
left In Inland. Accnrdir.v to
some Jewish sources, they
number only about 2;r.tltlu,
An article In Slow : t'ow.
szeclme, a pseudo 'Catiu lie
newspaper supported by the
Party And used by it to
undcVint ne the Ch -~, eh,
blames Zionists" for the
drmo'istratinns. and gives
the names of alleged 'Zionist
Mina nIl~ ~~ 0-Ti3 J el-VU
i
students and their fathers.
The organizers of the demon-
strations are said to have
met In the Jewish Babel
Club ..n Warsaw to plan tn: lr
activities. It also claims that
the instigators of thg disturb-
ances were being led by their
"political blindness" to serve
the "anti-Polish" polio-v of
West Germany.
Since West Germany and
neo-Nazism are virttfally
synonymous in Polish offi-
cial propaganda, the Jews
are in effect being accused
of lack of patriotism and of
collaboration with the neo?
Nazis.
The chief Polish Party
.paper, Trybuna Ludu, has,,
selected the names of the
supposed instigators of the"
riots in such a way as to
;make it clear to the readers'
that they were Jews. It also'
Identified one of the young'
men as an "activist" of the
Babel Club and the son of a'
well-known editor--and few:
of Its readers will need to
be told that his father is the
editor of Poland's only Yid-
dish paper.
Jewish Background ,l
There is certainly a verys
real Jewish background to,
the Affair. It is true that the
offspring of prominent
officials and former,
officials have played An
outstanding role in'
.the student and intellectual.
ferment in Poland, and that
many of these officials were
Jews. A considerable pro-
pnri.lon of these Jewish
Party leaders, who were
among the most ferxlous.
Stalinists in the early years
of the regime, have mellowed
greatly since then, and
'some of them have tried to
instill in their children some
of the idealism that first
brought them into the Com-,
munist Party.
The Jews have conse-
quently found themselves,
largely on the liberal side
of the Party, and the Party.
conservatives have there-
fore been able to use Anti?
Semitic Arguments with
which to heat the liberals.
The high point of this-
struggle was reached during
:and Immediately after the
war in the Middle East last
spring, when Jews in the,
Party expressed their dts-.
approval of official govern-
ment support for the,
Arabs, and were described
In a public speech by Com-`
munist Party First Secre.
'tarn Wladysiaw Gomulka'
as Fifth Columnists. A num-
her of Jews resigned from'
,leading party positions.
Others, such as the editor
of Trybuna Ludu, were dis-
missed.
A vicious whispering cam-
paign was started-under the
direction of conservative ele-
ments In the Party, but with
the encouragement of such
+"centralists" as Gomuika?
himself - to tar the :,ews
and the liberals with the,
same brush as "un-patriotic
elements."
Students Back Liberals
The liberals fought bark
by denouncing the officially
sponsored anti-Semitism and
anti-liberalism. At Warsaw
University. a battle of leaf-
th and-
'lets develtioed, w
Semitic and anti-
conserva-tive broadsheets alternating
on University notice boards-.
It. is noteworthy that both
the official youth organiza
tions at the University, tha+
Communist Party's "Social-
ist Youth Union" And, thin
"Union of Rural YnIlth,'%
passed formal resolutions of.'
protest against the .anti-?
"Semitic campaign and asso-
elated themselves unmis.
;takcably with the liberal
opposition. 11
The Party First Secretary'
of the Warsaw rcglon has
given the government's vet',
anon of the affair, hut In a,
way clearly calculated tn!
`arouse the masses against';
the Jews.
In his speech, published
Tuesday in Trylwnn Ludu,
he said that the trouble-
innkers active In recent days
'lave, "to divert attention
from themselves, exploited
the fact that some of the
well-known organizers of the
incidents were Polish cttl-
zens of 'Jewish origin."
Shorn of the camouflage,
.this means-and will be
,read by the public as mean
Ina--that "the well-known
organizers of the incident.4
were Polish citixcns of Jew.
ish origin."
But if the Jewish "trick
did not succeed, as the See-.
rotary says, then the riots'
were presumably not organ
'zed by the Jew, -or so n'
logical analysis of his speech
would a u g g e a t. But the
Party's fear of a rising hai
perhaps momentarily da.
prived it of logic.
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20 March 1968 demonstration against thej 'ts such, he is the most power-I Commenting on Catholic Ii-
Apart from those who nt'ant f Dziady," a 19th century clas- ski's description of the Polish
~'" o l nd to et to help Israel, Gomulka said, sic of the Polish theater. The there are two other categories gorernnaent as "a scandalous
Its Jews riots, the worst Poland has;of Jews in Poland. dictatorship of blockheads,"
seen in more than a decade, One consists of Jews who Gomulka said:
later spread to Krakow, Lodz, consider themselves neither "Only the 'blockheads' saw
Go to Israel Poznan and other majorcities. nor Jews. "We don'ts that friendship with the
. blame them," the Party leader The students have demand- Union is the only way.'
From NeR?.i Dispatches continued. "Nobody can im-~Gomulka said 1208 persons
rd that the local press tell pose national feelings.'" I3htt
WARSAW, 'March 13-Coln- had been arrested in the re-
their side of the story as we,iI1 he advised these people to,
munisr Party leader Wlady- scent demonstrations, includ-
'l-, ;_ tie., .:.., as the government's. that!,, _, fields of work where
ling 367 study*nts.
which has swept the country, that those expelled be read-
today Invited Polish Jews who mitted to the University.
want t:r go to Israel to do so. Gomulka asserted that the
but he apparently sought students had been "led down
to blunt a propaganda cam- the crooked path by forces
pail n. which has blamed the hostile to Socialism" in Po-
disorders on Zionists, Intel- land and ? neighboring Com-
lectua.s and former Stalinists. munist count.rie , an apparent
reference to the changes cur-
"It would be wrong to see rently taking place in Czecho-
in Zionism a danger to socia- slovakia.
1km in Poland," he said in a "These forces sowed the
tyro-hour televised speech. seeds of anarchy among stu-
Moreover, he said, the na. dents and trespassed against
tion's leadership would "take the law," he said.
into account" the resolutions Toward the end of his
passel by the students who speech, he mentioned that
essary." These areas would in-
clude the armed forces, the
government and the press.
The second category, Go-
mulka explained, is made up
of Jews who regard Poland as
their homeland and place its
interests above all others. In
a warm tribute to these Jews,
Gomulka said many of them
had held important positions
and that their services were
appreciated.
Before World War IT, the
Jewish community in Poland
was an estimated 3.5 million
persons. Jewish sources esti-
took part i.n the protests. there were a number of Po-Iabout430
000Jews in the coun-
"
Tners are right and wrong ]is]' Jews who wanted to help;
points," he continued. Israel in the war in the 11id-'illy'
[From London, Victor Zorza die East last June. Poland " I Concerning the u I t I m a t e
icause. of the riots, the closing
of the Manchester Guardian the Soviet Union and theiro# "Dziady," Gomulka gave
reported that Gomulka had to allies backed the Arabs. 1
this explanation:
put up with repeated interrup-
tions from students scattered
through the hall where he
spoke, Zorza listened to the
speech broadcast live on the
railio,J
The disorders of which Go-
mulka spoke began at Warsaw
University March 8. Students
protested the expulsion of two
colleagues who took part in a
NEW YORK TIMES
18 March 1968
Poland Intensifies
From L a n don, Victor
Zorza of the Manchester
Guardian fired the follotuing.
Gomulka had to fight waves
of ironic .cheering as he read
his sp.'ecli. Four times he was
obliged to ask his audience to
be quiet. -
This was the first time in
my experience that. the leader
of a Communist country l-
hid to put up with this ki.
of behavior from what had
originally been announced as
a mectiny of "activists"---al.-
though it is quite. clear that
the "activists" were different
f.om what the organizers of
the proccedin"s intended.
The "opposition" appeared
well organized. There was no
hint of trouble until the meet-
Ing got well under way, by
which time the students had
suuuer OF raver will juave our
country," Gomulka said. "Thr_ become a springboard for anti-distributed themselves among
frontiers of Poland are open IRussian attacks." the many thousands of people
to everybody. For those who) The play, written by Adam~in the hall and could not,
think Israel is their country,1 'lickiewicr., Is highly criticalitherefore, be reached by the
we are ready to issue them iol. Czarist rule In the 'days police without greatly disturb-
emigre passports." when much of Poland was oc?jint; the occasion.
Except for a trickle of un-rcupied by Russia. Every Pol-I The first w~s indication tqcathat
official emigres, Poland has'ish schoolchild reads it. something
me
roduction when the a u d 1 e n e e beg
i Gomulka said the
p
not permitted its citizens to
te closed earlier this year couldishouting "Ste tat"-"long li
move to Israel since the l
a
1950s. i not be tolerated because of the I-an ancient and amiable Poh-
Gomulka Is the First Secre-1 enthusiastic response which f ish way of indicating regard
tart' of the Polish Unitedgrected such lines as: "All1for a celebrity In the most in-
Workers Party, as the Com-i Moscow sends us is spies, jack-' appropriate places in the
munist Party is known here.assca and fools." ISPeech.
Drive on Zionists No dicturh:tncec were re-I placo the-day, after Edward
ported today. But a source said: Glerek, the local party chief,
Blamed for Unrest! he saw the police use dogs and vowed that he would "brealk
a water gun to disperse arush- the -bones", of any trouble-
___ hour crowd of several thousand makers.
By JONATHAN RANDAT, students adults in Katowice Other reports reaching War-'
saw confirmed rumors that
sprrrel to Tree New York Trmrt Several hundred helmeted security forces had entered the,
WARSAW. March 'I7---ti4ass! Policemen blocked oft the, grounds of the 3af icltontan
rallies coiling for the' "punish) square and its main access, University in Cracow last
meat of the streets and started, beatings 'Wednesday in violation of tra?
organizers of ihe 'peorie with sticks, the witness l extraterritnriailty ac?
Zionist campaign" are being said. 1}crnon:,tratr,rs and by- corded Polish institutions of
held at every level in the coun- slanders sought refuge in near higher learning.
tryside. Trybunu Ludu, the 'by office btllldin;?.=, and a dc? Witnesses said the police had
Communist newspaper, said to- partnhcnt store, he : ddcda also used truncheons Friday to
day.
"We demand that the guilty Party Citief s Warning . break up a meeting in student
be expo dormitories in Cracow.
a
an
t
lied Stalinists. Mxrnv of tiro al.
lc,^,cd ringleaders citrri by the
party and the press arm Jews,
Trybunu Ludu ucvotcd more
than a half page to a porfito of
Stefan Sta,zowski, a Jea: and
on important party offiv:;at iii
the Stalinist era. He hr- becn%
accuseed of. w eking' to ? t'.' ilhe+
unrest to return to power. . - 3
r y~,, o;
v
morts
state posts be pu GP Cgg0#tge~4fho CIAZA8i0$1MM400040003-2
sons not worthy of the Polish Silesian industrial city t;'ncC televtsron continued to c.uarge
people's trust," read resolutions' student unrest began nine days that the eer')n-trati.',ns had
quoted by the nctvspaper. face at Warsaw University. toak been organized by Zionists, 11,
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SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, China
11 March 1968
Fears of _ s boa ~ .iii G~iiton
over Spring Export Fair
There is an air of uneasiness in Can ion, and the authorities fear that the coming
Spring Export Commodities Fair may be sabotaged by anti-Maoist elements, an arrival
from 1Ctaangtung said yesterday.
The arrival, a Local business-
man dealing in herbs, said:
"The authorities are taking
every. precaution to prevent
trouble."
The People's Liberation Army
had intensified their searches,
and had been told to "get
tough" with any rebel elements.
"Sudeten searches would often
be made on suspected rebel
hide-outs in the city," said the
arrival, who stayed a week in
Canton.
Other arrivals form China
said stevedores at various ports
had recently voiced dissatisfac-
tion over a cut in their wages
from JMP120 to J:t11170 a
month.
One arrival, who refused to be
identified, had recently toured
China extensively. He said that
at the port of Dairen, two vessels
had waited more than two
months to work cargo, and it
third vessel was held up for a
month.
Ile said that in recent weeks.
children swarmed to Whampoa.
the port for Canton, to beg for
cigarettes from the visiting crew
members of vessels.
The arrival said that there had
been a shortage of cigarettes in
many parts of China, because
many of the ci,aretie factories
had closed down (luring the cul-
tural revolution.
One of tic reasons for the
closure was lack of transport to
deliver tobacco to the factories.
The arrival also said that the
Chinese Government had recent-
ly imposed rationing for civilians
in some of the ports in China.
They were only allowed one
metre of cloth and a pair of
shoes a year, 24 l:.ilo;;rainmes of
rice a month for adults and 1:;
kilogrammes per month for
children. Each person was also
allowed only half a kilogramme
of peanut oil a month.
Acording to the arrival, each
person was permiticd to spend a I
maximum-ii of JM1124 on food.
Stormed
The pro-Maoist "Autumn
lf,trs.est Uprising Red Guards
General tteaclyuartcrs" in Can-
ton was stornu'd and burned
clown in a bid try %.,khotage tile
maicurialiation of the recently
established revvolutionary conT-
ruittees there.
This was reported in a special
bulletin on the inetdent put out
by the Political Department of
the Canton Physical Culture
Institute.
The bulletin said that a "hand-
ful of fa:c?ist f angsters" of the ,
IIed Flag group of the I'rovincial
Revolutionary ftebel Joint Com-
mittee with other supporters of
the disgraced former First Secre-
tar} of the Central South
Bureau, Mr Tao Chu, lcd more
than 20,000 people in the attack.
It said that the attack lasted
nine hours and that the building
burned for seven hour , while the
"hood-winked masses" went on a
looting spree.
Apparently some people were
killed durinf the attack for the
bulletin said it was hoped that
the misguided people would ex-
pose tite "ringleaders who are
guilty of arson, murder and
looting."
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY April 1968
Soviet Penetration of Sudan
The Soviet pattern of obtaining footholds in Africa by supplying
armaments to developing countries unfriendly to the West began in Egypt
in 1955 and spread rapidly thereafter to Algeria, Guinea, Mali, Congo
(Brazzaville) and Ghana. Recently, taking advantage of the anti-Western
sentiment generated by the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967, the So-
viets have stepped up their subversive activities in Sudan. The military
aid agreements between Sudan and Soviet Bloc countries signed in late
January of this year were the culmination of a series of attempts by the
Communists over the last four years to gain a base in African territory
with easy access to the heart of Africa -- i.e., Congo (Kinshasa).
EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TIES
Well aware that the training of Sudanese students in Communist coun-
tries provides the most effective long-range returns for themselves, the
Soviet Bloc has been offering scholarships and other inducements to the
Sudanese for several years. With the exception of a group of Sudanese
students who returned from Bulgaria in a huff in 196+ because of an ex-
cess of Communist indoctrination in their study courses, the training of
Sudanese in Bloc countries has generally been well received, although not
-- until recently -- held in as much esteem as that at Western universi-
ties. Many returnees from the Communist countries have worked with the
Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and nearly all provide a growing base upon
which the SCP, the largest Communist party in Africa, can rely in the
future.
In November 1967 an agreement was concluded between Leningrad Uni-
versity and Khartoum University which provides for the exchange of scien-
tists and teachers and of publications. Khartoum University graduates
are now able to enroll as post-graduate students at Leningrad University.
In January 1968 a protocol was signed in Khartoum providing that diplomas
granted to Sudanese graduates of Soviet institutes and universities are
considered equivalent to Sudanese bachelors' and masters' diplomas. Also
in November 1967, a program for cultural and scientific cooperation dur-
ing 1968 was signed in Khartoum by the East German Deputy Foreign Minister
and the Sudanese Minister of Education and Culture. The agreement be-
tween Sudan and East Germany provides for cooperation in the fields of
higher education, culture and health. Reciprocal scholarships are offered,
as well as exchanges of scientists and technicians and exchange visits of
students, junior scientists and art groups.
An established Soviet device for gaining a propaganda base in an
emerging nation, the so-called "friendship society" -- used so effectively
by the Soviets in Nigeria -- is being used in Sudan. Through the
auspices of the Sudanese-Soviet Friendship Society, a Russian language
course was established at the Soviet Cultural Center in Khartoum, which
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in January graduated 17 Sudanese from a two-year course. At the gradua-
tion ceremony the Sudanese Minister of Education stressed the need for
"further extension of cultural, economic, and state relations between
Sudan and the Soviet Union." The Soviet friendship society with its of-
fers of training, scholarships and cultural exchange, has this extension
of relations as its ostensible mission.
Another favorite Soviet technique for gaining entree into a develop-
ing country -- the "humanitarian approach" -- was attempted as early as
1965 when the Soviets initiated a protocol calling for the construction
of four hospitals and a drug-manufacturing concern in Sudan. This pro-
gram fell through mainly because of Sudanese budgetary problems.
In the economic field, Sudan and Bulgaria signed an aid agreement on
7 March 1967 under which Sudan obtained a loan of $16.8 million -- half
to be used for the purchase of complete factories, including a tomato-
processing plant and a flour mill, the other half for machinery and equip-
ment for both state and private enterprises.
A clear objective of the Soviets in Sudan has been to obtain air-
craft landing and refueling rights there, in order to complete their "air
bridge" for passage of personnel and supplies to Congo (Kinshasa) and
other centers of guerrilla activity. The Soviets have had air terminal
rights in Khartoum since 1962 and Aeroflot has a weekly flight to Sudan.
The Soviets have been negotiating with Sudan for onward-passage privil-
eges without success. As a consequence, their transport planes are forced
to bypass Khartoum and fly the longer route from Cairo to Dar es Salaam
via Sanaa and Mogadiscio.
The Soviets have also long wanted a strategic air base in the Sudan,
which is a relatively short flight from Yemen, where Soviet air support
to the Republican forces has been a decisive factor in the failure of the
Royalist forces to capture any major cities. On 18 December 1967 the
Sudanese Government decided, under pressure from an Egyptian military
delegation to Khartoum, to give the United Arab Republic (UAR) extrater-
ritorial facilities at the Wadi Sa'idna airfield, about 15 kilometers north
of Khartoum. This decision resulted in a confrontation between Prime
Minister Muhammad Ahmad Mahjub and his senior military officers, who had
not been consulted about the Egyptian proposal and were strongly opposed
to it. Mahjub was forced to back down and the Egyptians departed without
having effected an agreement. It appears that the Egyptians may have
only been acting for the Soviets, who were using them as proxies to gain
the airfield for their own military ends. Less than 18 hours after the
rejection of the Egyptian request, the Soviet Ambassador in Khartoum no-
tified the foreign office that the USSR was ready to receive a Sudanese
delegation in Moscow to discuss an arms agreement. The Soviets, who had
been stalling for more than three months on a Sudanese request for military
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aid, were evidently influenced in their decision to move ahead by the Su-
danese rejection of the Egyptian request.
The Soviets have an equal interest in obtaining a naval base in the
Red Sea. In early January 1968 a Soviet mission composed of specialists
in harbor installations visited Khartoum to discuss a project for en-
larging the Port Sudan harbor, with the apparent intention of developing
facilities for Soviet maritime commerce with Africa following the closing
of the Suez Canal. The proposal was rejected by the Sudanese cabinet,
but it can be expected that the Soviets will not relinquish this objec-
tive.
On-24 January, Sudan signed a military aid agreement with the USSR
-- Sudan's first such agreement with the Soviets -- which culminated
negotiations begun in July 1967. The Soviets and the Czechs began dis-
cussing arms aid with the Sudanese shortly after the Arab-Israeli war but
reached no conclusive agreement for six months, probably as a result of
uncertainty on both sides. The Sudanese Army elements were reluctant to
permit Soviet technicians to come to the Sudan. Moscow, on the other
hand, was watching the unstable political situation in Khartoum to see
which way the tide would turn -- in favor of the radical, anti-Western
elements of the newly-formed Democratic Union Party (DUP), formed by the
December merger of the pro-Egyptian People's Democratic Party (PDP) and
President Ismail al-Azhari's National Unionist Party (NUP), or toward the
opposition group led by the pro-Western wing of the Umma Party under
former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. With the growing strength of Sadiq's
opponents -- which included the conservative wing of his own Umma Party
-- the Soviets evidently decided that the time was ripe for an arms deal.
Sudanese Minister of Defense Adam Musa Madibu announced on 13 February,
after a month-long trip to Europe, that he had concluded agreements in
Moscow, Belgrade, and Sofia under which Sudan would receive military aid
valued at $86 million, including aircraft, weapons, and training (both
in the USSR and Sudan). The Yugoslavs would provide naval equipment, and
the Bulgarians would provide technical assistance. A few days later,
Madibu stated that the arms agreement was to take effect two months from
the date of signing (24 January) and that Soviet experts would soon arrive
in Sudan to study and remove the difficulties involved in the change-over
from Western to Communist armament. He added that the aid agreements
would include sending a number of Sudanese officers to Soviet military
academies for training in the use of modern aircraft and armored weapons.
He said that the agreement with Yugoslavia concerns the development of
the Sudanese navy so that Sudan can defend its independence and its ter-
ritorial waters. He concluded with the claim that Sudan's purchase of
arms from the Eastern bloc does not mean that Sudan has decided to side
with one of the international camps -- it will still maintain its unaligned
policy. But "it is now clear to us that only the socialist countries are
ready to assist us in this field."
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In general, the Sudanese military elements seem pleased with the
arms deal, although many of them remain opposed to the anticipated influx
of Soviet technicians and trainers onto Sudanese soil and fear the threat
of Soviet political pressures that could be applied in the future through
the withholding of spare parts and ammunition. The administration's
prestige has been increased among the younger officer corps, whose morale
has been raised by the possibility of acquiring modern weapons and by the
proposed training in modern warfare techniques. On the other hand, the
Soviets, in their efforts to increase their influence in the military,
may run into difficulties with the moderate elements in the Sudanese Army,
who will be reluctant to relinquish their ties with the West, including
the considerable amount of time they have invested in training with
western weapons.
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 NEW YORK TIMES Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
1#t' March 1968
L- VIILlUdl LVIL
By LAWRENCE rrLLOWS
1D.cl i to Tn. YM TIA Tlmal
KHARTOUM, the Sudan, Feb.
14---The Sudan is deep in poll-
tical confusion, with two pre-
miers, parlIament and no easy
way in sight to get out of the
situation.
Since Feb. 7, when Premier
Mohammed Ahmed Mahgouh
dissolved the Constituent As-
sembly, troops have hcen dug
In around Government build-
lns;s and vital installations in
Khartoum.
Even the army Is uncertain
about Its loyalties, The Chief
of Staff has denied reports that
a group of young officers Is
flotting Its own course nut of
he crisis. The Commander In
,hla,.f has asked the High Court
*400 decide whether the army can
continue to accept orders from
Mr. Mnhgouh's government if
the court accepts the nppnsi-
tion's contention that he dis-
solved the assembly Illegally.
The Sudan has humbled Into
the. crisis over a familiar course
-a bitter quarrel within the
powerful Mahdi family' to
which the Ansnr sect of Mos-
lems looks for religious and
political leadership,
independent for 12 Years
The crisis came at the worst
possible time--just when the
assembly seemed about to
reach it compromise on it con-
situtlnn, which has eluded
tltl9 vasteoiintry, tha biggest In
Africa, in the 12 years since
it seized independence from the
British.
The, Sudan, with only 13 mil-
lion people in an area of nearly
a million square miles, Is a clas-
sic example of a country created
by a colonial power in a tract
of Africa where no nation ex-
isted. It stretches from the sun-
baked Nubian and lihyan Des-
erts south to the steamy
swamps and dense forests of
the upper Nile. Its people are of
different origins, different
races, different religions, differ-
ent languages, different ways
of life-some of them so primi-
tive that they wear nothing and
live by hunting rats and croco-
diles.
The Sudan Is beset by separa-
tist movements, but none more
carious than a rebellion that
has sputtered among Christians
and pagans in the Nilotic, Ne-
groid south and kept it Isolated
from the Arabic. Moslem north.
This rebellion threatens the in-
just possibly have been put
gradually to rest by the federal
constitution the assembly had
prepared.
but now in the old capital of
Omdurman, across the conflu-
ence of the Blue and White
Niles, policemen and troops
stand by with tear gas and
other riot weapons.
About 5,000 Ansars have
come into the city from the
,Western provinces of Darfur.
and Kordofan and they mill
about, their long white gnwnsi
and loosely wrapped turbans
flapping in the hot wind blow-
ing in from the desert.
A Fanatically Religious Group
These are fanatically reli-
glous Moslems, fanatically loyal
to Sayed Sadik el-Mahdi, the
great-grandson of the Mahdi's
who led the forces that killed
Gen. Charles Gordon in Khar-
toum in 1.885, four years before
British rule was set up. The
Sudan became Independent in
1956.
The day after the assembly
was dissolved, Mr. Sadik's
allies tried to get in the cham-
her and found the doors bolted.
They held their meeting on the
lawn outside. Under the ban-
yan trees, they elected Mr.
Sadik Premier.
Last Friday night several
hundred Ansars, after a rather
sober explanation of the situa-
tion by Mr. Sadik, swirled
through the streets of the
capital shouting ? "Down with
Mahgouh!" But the police tact.
fully steered them away from
the center of the city until the
force of the demonstration was
spent.
The threat was not merely
that Ansars loyal to Mr. Sadik
might go on a rampage, but
also that they might clash with
Ansars loyal to Mr. Sadik's
uncle, Imam el-Hadi el-Mahdi,
religious leader of another sect,
who has whittled away at his
neahew's following and has,',
forced him to show his hand
against the Government ear?
lier than he would perhaps
have liked.
Last May, when Mt. Sadlk
was Premier, it was his uncle
who persuaded the more con?
servative forces in their Unmia
party to join with the Na-
tional Unionists in order to
overthrow Mr. Sadik and re-
turn Mr. Alahrnub to the Pre?
mirrship.
Elects Rival Premier
Mr. Sadik won support In
the Assembly from members
who, for various reasons, were
just as loathe as he to face
the almost certain disaster of
elections. He introduced n mo-
tion of no confidence in the
Government of Premier Mnh-
gnuh. Air. Sadik was certain
of toppling Air. Mahgnub and
winning the Premiership and
could have prolonged the life
of the assembly beyond Feb. 29,
the date of Its scheduled dis-
solution. It might have given
him time to reconstruct his
position in the Ansar sect.
A vote on the no confidence
motion was due en Thursday,
but on Wednesday 9O members
of the Assembly resigned in a
last-ditch effort to block Air.
Sadik, With that, Mr. Mali nub
dissolved the body and ordered
that elections he held by April
26.
:,-tea 11'
QJ. A. ta.
EoyPT1 ~,
AF RWA
.. ur;ct-
ITHECOMO
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AL-ITTIHAD, Beirut
31 January 1968
Soviet Practices in Sudan
. The pattern of Soviet infiltration of the Sudan is beginning to evolve. Soviet use
of the UAR as a front to disguise Soviet bctigns is rapidly being unmasked. It is becoming
obvious that the Soviets and not the UAR engineered the merger of UAR-financed and directed
Peoples Democratic Party with the National Unionist Party to form a new stronger radici61
party -- Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Although the merger appeared as another step in
the UAR's dream of a unified Nile Valley under UAR control, it is becoming apparent thft
the merger is a step in the realization of Moscow's dream to gain a firm foothold in thW
"Bridge of Africa".
Shortly after the merger was announced, the Sudanese press disclosed an agreement made
between President Nasser and President Mahjub of Sudan to give the UAR the exclusive use of
the military airfield at Wadi Sa'idna, about 15 kilometers north of Khartoum. This ar-,.
rangement, to place UAR jets in a position to hold Khartoum as hostage, had not been re-
vealed to the Sudanese military. commanders, who only learned of the agreement after the
arrival of a UAR military mission to implement the terms of the agreement. A popular out-
cry, led by patriotic Sudanese, thwarted UAR's efforts to obtain a strategic air base in
Sudan. With this failure, the Soviet's plan to use the UAR as its stooge, the Soviets were
forced to expose their true intentions.
By rejecting the UAR effort to move into Wadi Sa'idna, the Sudanese people unknowingly
were rejecting a Soviet bid to sneak in, just as they did 'by outlawing the Soviet-lackey
Sudanese Communist Party and had earlier knowingly rejected the Soviet attempt to take
over Sudan.
Although the move into Wadi-Sa'idna was rejected, the Soviets feel that this is only
a temporary setback which will soon be reversed. They..are definitely on the move in the
Sudan, which is a high priority target for them. They have found a vehicle to attain their
objectives -- the new DUP.
Acting through the UAR, the Soviets were able to organize and finance this new party
and with their money and loyal agents, to use DUP as a vehicle for making Sudan a Soviets
base for subversion in neighboring states.
For seven months the Soviets had been dangling a possibility of their supplying weap-
ons to the Sudan without taking positive steps to implement the arms deal. Obviously, the
Soviets were not willing to make arms deliveries to a country whose government might turn
against them but once the new DUP, a Soviet creation, was formed and gave some promise of
maintaining power, the Soviets pushed for completion of the arms deal, with delivery prom-
ised in the near future. The arms deal thus assists the Soviets in two ways, by giving
them a substantial position in future Sudanese military activities while, at the same time,
adding to the lustre and,prestige of the DUP. Thus the Soviets will eventually gain access
to Wadi Sa'idna military airfield. In the secure confines of this airfield, far from com-
mercial air traffic the Soviets will be able to infiltrate thousands of military advisors
and technicians, as well as political subversion agents, thus.gaining a controlling posi
tion in the future of the Sudan and a base of the subversion of neighboring states.
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FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY April 1968
South Vietnam's Government and People
Work at "Operation Recovery'
On 3 February 1968 the Government of South Vietnam went into action
to restore order and security to the land and to help the victims of the
Communist Tet truce onslaught which continued for three days thereafter.
The Government began to mobilize by establishing a Central Assistance
Committee (also known as the Central Committee, the National Recovery
Committee, and the Recovery Coordination Group) to coordinate the work
of all civil and military agencies involved in restoring South Vietnam
to normalcy. By 13 February, 125 refugee centers had been put into
operation in Saigon. Enough rice and pork had been brought in to provide
suffering families with supplies sufficient for five days and trucks
loaded with rice were placed throughout the city to serve as mobile gro-
cery stores. By the end of the first week these makeshift stores were
selling over 300,000 poinds of rice daily, -- enough to forestall hoarding
and black marketing of food. A blood donation program was started by the
Ministry of Health and, after overall requirements were tabulated, re-
quests were cabled to the capitals of the free world for supplemental con-
tributions. Also by 13 February, the main post and telegraph offices were
reopened, railroad workshops were back in operation, and coastal shipping
to Danang, Nhatrang and Can Tho had been restored.
The Central Assistance Committee was allotted $5,000,000 to begin to
repair the scars left by enemy attacks. Architects were put to work map-
ping plans to rebuild the most heavily damaged cities, and aerial photo-
graphs have already been taken of each city to speed their work. In the
Saigon area, plans include construction of a minimum of 10,000 housing
units in the next eight months for 150,000 persons whose homes were des-
troyed. The new housing areas are being built with future as well as pre-
sent critical needs in mind; durable building materials such as cement
and steel are being sought by the Minister of Public Works and each area
housing an anticipated 3-5,000 persons is to have schools and shops. For
the immediate future, each refugee family has been promised 20 sheets of
galvanized roofing, five bags of cement, and lumber, plus $50 cash to re-
build and refurnish their homes. The first distribution of these construc-
tion materials and allowances was made on 4 March to 1500 families.
While fighting still continued on the outskirts of Saigon, some 2,500
Revolutionary Development (RD.; often called "Pacification") workers were
brought in from the National Training Center at Vung Tau to help collect
garbage and assist at 73 emergency centers that had been hastily set up.
They also manned the mobile grocery stores, gave first aid, helped process
refugees and exposed suspect Viet Cong still hiding among the population.
South Vietnamese people who came into contact with the RD workers were
frequently impressed with the honesty and motivation of the group; as a
result, in many instances people buying rice at RD distribution centers
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identified Viet Cong suspects to the RD workers and then assisted in
arresting those suspects.
President Thieu, Premier Loc and Vice President Ky have all been
actively involved in the recovery program, have made TV appearances and
radio talks, have regularly attended meetings of various official groups
concerned with "Operation Recovery" and have made an unprecedented effort
to keep the South Vietnamese people informed of government actions and
plans for the future. The government has also moved to increase its armed
forces by 65,000 men by 1 July and there are plans afoot to add an addi-
tional 65,000 troops during the last half of 1968. A nationwide Civil
Defense movement has begun and all male civil servants, university pro-
fessors and students 18 years or older must undergo military training.
Present draft procedures are being reviewed in light of these new commit-
merits.
President Thieu has taken strong steps to stamp out corruption; he
has removed two mediocre generals commanding the II and IV Corps Areas;
General Thang, the new IV Corps commander is a man of unquestioned ability
and. integrity; Thieu has also dismissed eight province chiefs (army offi-
cers are being trained to replace them); other dismissals are expected.
In a recent broadcast to the nation, Premier Loc reminded listeners that
during its first three months in office the government had brought to
trial 32 military personnel and eight civilians on corruption charges.
Three of these were sentenced to death and eight received prison terms.
(See attachments l-4 for additional details.)
The South Vietnamese People Respond to Crisis
There appears to be a growing awareness among the political elite
of South Vietnam that they have a vital part to play in supporting their
government and building their nation. The shock and horror of the Tet
offensive solidified this awareness, and out of that shock seemed to grow
some recognition that they must forget their chronic quarreling, bury
their differences and unite in positive action in order to survive today
and eventually to have the privilege of expressing their differences in
the permissive atmoshpere of a free society at peace?
The "Peoples' Congress to Save the Nation" is an example of this new
cohesiveness. It was convened on 18 February when over 200 South Vietna-
mese political figures met to form a "nationalist anti-Communist front"
and resolved "to stand together to defeat a common enemy." The opening
speaker, Senator Tran Van Don, called for unity and decisive action, de-
claring: "no one can save us if we do not know how to save ourselves."
The participants in that and subsequent meetings provided a remarkably
diversified cross section of South Vietnam's political scene.
In Danang, Father Nguyen Quang Xuyen, Chancellor of the Danang Diocese
of the Catholic church, organized a committee which included all signifi-
cant Danang religious denominations. It was proposed that the committee
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visit various civil and military hospitals, then refugee centers (including
the Buddhist welfare center) and, finally, prison camps. The group has
already cooperated in fund-raising efforts and the original collection
drive for hospital relief netted generous contributions from the Catholics,
the Protestants, the Cao Dai, and smaller sects. The Buddhists have ten-
tatively accepted Father Xuyen's overtures to participate in this com-
mittee's activities. The group, which appears to have generated a remark-
able desire for cooperation among Danang's diverse denominations, is known
as the "Joint Religious Assistance Committee of Danang".
Another Catholic-inspired organization, which embraces non-Catholics
as well, is a neighborhood self-defense organization in Saigon comprised
of refugees from North Vietnam. Actually, these refugees live in 23 dif-
ferent communities in the Saigon area, each numbering 5,000 to 8,000 people
and each under the guidance of a Roman Catholic priest. The purpose of
each of these groups is not religious; their common interest is the pro-
tection of lives and property and the prevention of infiltration by the
Viet Cong into their neighborhoods. The groups are organized into major
functional sections varying in size and number in different areas and are
responsible for such tasks as reporting the appearance of strangers in
the neighborhood, keeping the people informed of general and crisis period
news, giving first aid to the needy, maintaining order, fighting fires,
and maintaining security within each neighborhood. Each neighborhood is
enclosed by barbed wire and entry may be gained only at specific entry
points; strangers are not permitted inside without an escort.
These groups were first formed spontaneously at the onset of the Tet
attacks. As the disorder has diminished, they have been able to strengthen
their organization by collecting funds to purchase fire fighting equipment,
barbed wire, etc. and appear to have been very successful in preventing
Viet Cong activity in their communities. The South Vietnamese Government
has recently issued these groups some light weapons and the leaders are
hopeful that more arms will be forthcoming from the Government as the self-
defense groups prove their worth. Unfortunately, the groups' South Vietna-
mese neighbors have refused all overtures to join the self-defense units
-- an example of the suspicion of neighbors, of members of different polit-
ical parties and of religious denominations that has been eliminated in.
some quarters as a consequence of the Tet offensive. (See attachments
5 and 6.)
Many South Vietnamese civilians responded to the shock of the Tet
attacks in their accustomed scattered groupings with no apparent aware-
ness of the value of presenting a united front to the Viet Cong. They
have, however, made a considerable contribution to "Operation Recovery"
on a more traditionally individualistic basis. Various Buddhist organi-
zations were quick to set up refugee centers and welfare organizations and
to cooperate with the South Vietnamese Government in some of its relief
activities. However, the full weight of the Buddhist hierarchy does not
appear to be behind what has been accomplished to date. Labor unions have
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involved themselves in relief and rehabilitation work with the Confedera-
tion of Vietnamese Workers (CVT) in the forefront. It took an immediate
anti-Viet Cong stand when the attacks came (despite :harsh disagreements
with the South Vietnamese Government in January) and printed 10,000 copies
of the CVT weekly tabloid repeating its anti-Viet Cong stand and calling
for local unions throughout the country to join in a campaign to aid the
suffering and the homeless. The CVT offered its headquarters and person-
nel for rice distribution, sent its President to attend the "Peoples' Con-
gress to Save the Nation" and has cooperated with the Government in the
identification of suspect Viet Cong agents following Tet. The CVT's com-
ing forward to ask for arms to help defend Saigon, in fact, prompted the
Government to take the first steps toward creation of a home guard, a task
complicated by the problem of preventing the weapons from falling into
Viet Cong hands.
A good percentage of Saigon's youth has been active in refugee and
relief work, cleaning up trash and rubble, acting as guides and errand
runners, even issuing several four-page tabloid-size "newspapers" featur-
ing stories of brave deeds performed by South Vietnamese citizens under
the stress of the Tet onslaught. The Government is supposed to direct and
monitor work done by Saigon's youth, but it is believed that much of what
they have done has been spontaneous and voluntary. SVN's youth has also
been volunteering for service in the nations armed forces at a rate of
five times greater than before Tet.(See attachment.)
Saigon University faculty members have denounced the Viet Cong in a
formal declaration as have 93 Vietnamese intellectuals (in a rare show df
unity) and the President of the Buddhist Institute, the Venerable Thich
Thien Tuong.
Vietnamese Lower House Deputies participated in refugee work in three
provinces near Saigon, helping private volunteer relief organizations
until the local committees tied to the National Recovery Committee were
activated in provinces. The Red Cross and local hospital staffs tackled
the problems of feeding and sheltering the refugees and of providing ade-
quate medical and sanitary facilities. They were assisted by village
council members and Buddhist and Catholic laymen in a laudable exhibition
of unity. These groups have continued to work together and with the Gov-
ernment -- well enough to force admission from foreign observers that the
Government dserves considerable praise for its skill in mobilizing these
disparate elements, possibly a sign of Tet-enforced maturity on all sides.
(See attachment 7.)
Third Country Assistance for South Vietnam
In connection with the Tet offensive, the Government of South Vietnam
issued an urgent appeal to the free world for emergency assistance to the
refugees flooding South Vietnam anew. Many of the 37 nations which are al-
ready furnishing material support to SVN quickly came forward with offers
of additional assistance. Twenty-three nations and organizations have
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already responded to South Vietnam's plea. The Government of Thailand sent
39 boxes of cholera vaccine and four of typhoid vaccine, and has decided
to send building supplies including 8,000 tons of cement and 500 tons of
corrugated iron. The Thai Red Cross, in its turn, sent 200,000 doses of
cholera vaccine and 100 bags of rice.
Great Britain announced on 9 February a grant of +250,000 emergency
aid in addition to her earlier contribution of L114,000. The British
grant was intended to meet urgent medical and sanitation needs of the
refugees and other victims of the Tet attacks and to finance whatever
personnel, equipment and supplies a British survey officer decides neces-
sary for proposed mobile clinics in South Vietnam.
New Zealand's Prime Minister Holyoake announced on 28 February that
his government would contribute food and other emergency supplies for the
relief of refugees, specifically mentioning canned meat, fish and milk pro-
ducts. There is also a possibility -- how being explored -- that New
Zealand will expand its surgical teams already serving in South Vietnam
to include Public Health personnel. A private charitable organization
in New Zealand, CORSO (Council of Relief Services Overseas), announced a
contribution of NZ$10,000 (US$11,318) for relief work among refugees in
the Saigon area. This contribution will be used, according to CORSO's
national secretary, to purchase the necessary supplies in South Vietnam
for distribution through Catholic relief services.
In late February, the Bonn Government chartered a ship to leave Germany
between 8 and 11 March for Danang carrying a cargo of food, pharmaceuti-
cals and corrugated sheet iron donated by the government. West Germany
is also pursuing the possibility of purchasing milk powder, blankets, and
hygienic articles worth about DM200,000 in Hong Kong for shipment either
to Saigon or Danang. Germany has already sent an advance air shipment of
six tons of pharmaceuticals (mainly vaccines, disinfectants and blood
plasma). The Zambon Pharmaceutical Company of Milan, Italy, sent an air
shipment of six cases of antibiotics worth two million lira. At the re-
quest of the Italian Foreign Minister, Alitalia carried the medicines
without charge to Bangkok for transhipment to Vietnam.
The Canadian Government quickly approved an emergency aid package
to Vietnam of C$50,000 for four surgeons and four orthopedists for short
term assignments under Red Cross auspices, C$50,000 more to th.e Candadian
Red Cross for drugs and medicine, and an additional C$50,000 for housing
material for emergency shelter for refugees.
The list of contributors is an impressive one (see attachments 8 and
11) and it is anticipated that more will follow. It seems logical to
assume that if the South Vietnamese Government and people continue to work
together to help themselves, much of the free world will continue to want
to help those who are trying so hard to help themselves. The recent an-
nouncement that a group of newsmen from Saigon's hard-bitten press corps
have organized a "Correspondents Refugee Relief Drive" to help victims of
the Tet offensive cannot help but substantiate this assumption.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
CHOSUM ILBO, Seoul
1 March 1968
Headline: South Vietnamese political circles active amid turmoil;
Anti-Communist posture strengthened; Self-defense corps
and national salvation front formed; people who were aloof
in the past crave for stronger government leadership.
Saigon -- After the crisis of January 30, the South Vietnamese government is
taking strong measures for the relief of refugees, undertaking the formation
of a strong anti-Communist front, and the establishment of a civil defense
system. Under martial law proclaimed in Saigon which is harassed by artil-
lery fire every night and armored cars guarding the Independence Palace,
political circles in South Vietnam are in a state of convulsion. The Tet
offensive mounted by the Viet Cong revived in the minds of the South Viet-
namese people fading memories of their past experiences and motivated them
to discuss anticipated events of the future. Even Vietnamese people who
have been regarding the war in their country as if it was anothers affair
now emphasize that the people should do away with the hackneyed thinking,
"war in local areas and politics in Saigon."
An American official expressed his fear that the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment might plunge into a political vacuum but he added: "As the people
are apprehensive of such a change and ardently desire strong government
leadership, the government should show them that it can do something for
them." At any rate, the government seems to have come to take an initiative
by disclosing the heinous nature of the Communists to the people and imbuing
them with strong anti-Communist sentiments. Such initiative on the part of
the government prompted the organization of the civil self-defense units in
which the South Vietnamese males at the age of i1 and above are required to
undergo military training at Vung Tau to become defenders of regional security
and workers for the national reconstruction. The government also gave infor-
mal permission for the organization of the National Salvation Front (national
salvation council) on 19 February. It has been announced that the purpose
of the national salvation front was to openly challenge the Communists. The
front has drawn world attention by making unprecedently strong accusations
against the Communists. Even more significant is its allegation that it is
neither pro-Ky nor pro-Thieu. On hand at the front's inauguration ceremony
were Senator and retired Army General Tran Van Don as a newly elected chair-
man of the standing committee of the front, former head of state Phan Khac
Suu, former-premier Tran Van Huong, leader of the VNQDD (Great Vietnam Party)
Ha Thuc Ky, and Buddhist extremist leader Thien Min. Chairman Don said that
he would obtain government approval for the front within two or three weeks.
Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
 App~oved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
SAIGON POST (2)
19'February 1968
Reconstr~ctio~ Tait.
v
In Saigon Underwa
.i
l
S AIGON, Feb. 1S- (VP) - Director.' General' for. Recdriatruction' Le" Aron
Lam Friday told. VP that the - reconstruction- plan for. An Quang,. Su Van Hans;
Nguyen Thien Thuat, Phan Thanh Gian, Nguyen Van Thoai and Ly Thai To areas
s underway and 12,000 housing units will be built in the first lphase.
These were areas where "wbich will include8,000?bou- for each hoUise.
government troops defeated sing units. An ad boo com- . Mater al' to - be used will
he Vietcong during the bat-.. milte,e will be formed to de. bons at of:' :
1104 which caused several big , side who will get the houses. . ...concrete - cement for
(,Lres and destroyed hundreds He addei that the fire, v'c. ,.colur os gad thest~ofyl midi.,
-Mu- A6mainf
ane-story'bousing units with
, Von g Eaah yhoustogm unit will rotber parts such as covering
bard material gad, ,;~n all
consist of lhawal s, painting, flooring
orderly fashiod. One communal room eni' Inside decoration will
Mr. Lam said thattileardo- i be left to the discretion of
hers have started td'olea the which can be used as draw , , ,
tttbblo in the An ua'ria.' Su in rodm' and 'bedrooiu 3.G tu urn owners. p
Q Mr.?Lam said that the tan:
Nan Hsnh,, Nguye ' T ` meters.-, ? 1 is ex `cted to take around'
,Thuat` Phan Than iiiflat ^'y One kitchen which can
be used as dtnin renal and `jam 00 na of cement, 15,000
Nguyen Van ` Thoai' o n'ti~id? :?L:9 tons of steels rods and 200,000
Thai To areas and one cog- ,ibodraom. 3.5 x. ? .2, melem square meters of flbro4
tractor has already won the One rest room.,, . cement pmete
bid to rebuild., .three. bloclts -.. lt~ogii1y S$.Fgdar n'to is
Yore, It is necessary to - _ra-
ibe reconstruction scheme main parts . of 06 errs
'build the houses in rows of i U M L I building are Included. The
`not enough large roads for the l that tbey will be preserve
k as the are. -.ground canals, public water
fire true s toreater. There- Froltowing are'deialt`s'abottt i'-and power supply. Only the
he burnt houses were built WUULU WILL ULF auv..VJ ?".....
f light-'materlal a n d in, Asked about what will be earthen bricks for the wails.
inch a d- i a o r d e r l done with the houses wbich. " Roughly' the' cost Is VN$
Ipud hazardous way the pi still stand in the burnt areas., 265 for"+tach' house ex-
jyrhen a fire began there were I the Director General said` . chiding expenses for the
d building of lanes, under-
WASHINGTON POST .(3)
12 March 1968
8 Province Chiefs llep1aed' c by
{ SAIGON, March 11-In a
move to reduce corruption
and inefficiency, President
,Nguyen Van Thieu today ap-.
;pointed new chiefs for eight of
South Vietnam's 44 provinces,
according to well-informed
sources.
Among the officials rep
'placed was Lt. Col. Phan Van
Khoa, chief of Thuathien
Province and mayor of Hue,
which was Overrun by Commu-
nist troops Jan. 31 and held by
.e;enemy for three weeks,~;~,
By Nguyen Ngoc Rao
Special to The Washington Poet
Thieu signed a presidential
decree this aftrnoon dismiss-
ing Khoa and five other prov
Ince chiefs And naming re-'
placements for them and for
ne who had been killed in a'
helicopter crash and another
who was wounded during the
Communists' lunar new 'year
offensive.
It was the first time the
chief executive has personally
named. the men who head
i9outh Vletn&tn'r# tiro trees
Previously, they have been se-
lected by the commanders of i
the country's four military
,: ores areas, and their primary
lallegiance was to the generals
who appointed them.
U.S. officials welcomed the
move. However, they warned
that it is too early to tell how
much effect the changes will
have in the Saigon govern-
ment's performance, even in
the. affected provinces. The
government has yet to regain
what it lost in the countryside
du> 1ng the Tet offensive, one
Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
 Approved For Release 2005/04/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400040003-2
(1)
CHOSUN ILBO, Seoul.
1 March 1968
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