BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300060006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 28, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A2Ob
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? r 19"1f Ica"
:_? _ r~r Of If If t- nn tos '
Afro-Asian Scientists Conference, New Delhi, sponsored by World Federa-
tion of Scientific Workers (Soviet) [previously scheduled for February].
? Continental Congress for Defense of Self-Determination of Peoples and
Non-Intervention, Santiago, Chile, sponsored by left-wing labor in
Uruguay and Chile [previously scheduled for September 1965].
26 Geneva Conference: agrees to armistice and partition of Vietnam;
recognizes neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. Conference ends 21 July. 1954
29 India and Chinese People's Republic conclude 8-year pact for "peaceful
coexistence." 1954.
30 9th Inter-American Conference, Bogota, adopts resolution "Preservation
and Defense of Democracy in America," condemning International Communism
and all totalitarian forms as incompatible with American principles.
Name changed to Organization of American States (OAS). 1948.
APR
7
MAY
I May Day -- International Workers' Day, designated by Second International
(Socialist) Congress 1889.
1 Castro proclaims Cuba socialist nation, states no more elections will be
held. 1961. Fifth anniversary,
2 Eighth Congress, International Federation of Journalists, Berlin, 2-7 May,
5 Karl Marx born. (Dies 14 March 1883.) 1818.
5 Socialist international Congress, Stockholm, 5-8 May.
5 Commander Alan B. Shepard, Jr, USN, becomes first US sub-orbital space
?ravelee 1961. Fifth anniversary.
Soviet forces lift land blockade of Berlin.
Third International (Comintern) dissolved.
1949.
1943.
treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties"
signed
by
China-USSR.
1858..
Charter of the Organization of Africa Unity
signed
at
22-25 meeting
in
Addis Ababa 1963.
28 World Buddhist Conference, Colombo, Ceylon. Previously scheduled for
January, sponsored by United World Buddhists Association, 28 May- 4 June:
International Youth Conference for Solidarity with Vietnam, Pyongyang,
North Korea, sponsored by World Federation of Democratic Youth and the
lnternationai Union of Students (Soviet) [previously mentioned for
February].
7 Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Council Meeting,
Zanzibar, Tanzania, May or June. [An important question may arise:
shifting the venue of the 5th AAPSO Conference now set for Peking, 19671.
12
15
16
22
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28 March 1966
Set- Soviet Concern with
backs to "spectaculars."
science
Unconvincingly, the
Soviets announced on 5 March that
the craft that hit Venus on 1
March has been sterilized before
launch and that its mission had
been a soft landing (later cor-
rected to say: to land on the
planet). This announcement was
a feeble response to the concern
and confusion expressed earlier
by US and European scientists.
(See Press Comment 3 and 4 March
66) Sterilization of spacecraft
destined for other planets is a
complex, expensive matter and a
burning issue among US scien-
tists; yet Soviet scientists
at international conferences
cannot be drawn into meaningful
discussions of this subject.
Hence, it is believed that the
Soviets have probably failed to
take the fullest possible pre-
cautions against the contamina-
tion of Venus and consequently
they could have jeopardized
future scientific research in
the environment of Venus. Also,
the announcement contradicted a
Soviet report of 28 Nov 65 that
the craft, Venus-3, and its com-
panion, Venus-21{ would pass the
planet on different sides and
report back.
Some questions piquing the
curiosity of Western scientists
are:
--Why does Soviet publicity
consistently cast doubt
on the validity of Soviet
technological feats which
deserve praise?
Briefly Noted
000,
--Why can't Soviet scientists
share fully in the world's
dialogue concerning the con-
quest of space?
Part of the answer is found in
the pathological secrecy underlying
Soviet society, as seen once more in
connection with the successful Luna
9 (see BPG #994).
The "Socialist" -- but
trickery Really Communist"
of words.
Among the 21 conditions
for admission to the
COMINTERN, Lenin specifically pre-
scribed the use of the name Commu-
nist Party and also required appli-
cants to agree to identify themselves
asa "Section of the Communist Inter-
national." But communist strategists
have long since attempted to appro-
priate the term socialist to gain
the advantage of appearing associated
with liberal and progressive forces
throughout the world.
Bona fide established socialist
parties and the various types of
socialism evolving in the under-
developed countries of the world
differ basically from communism;
but the limited comprehension of
this fact has failed to counter,
generally, the favorable nomenclature
the communists have sought.
In our output, we should never
call communists anything but commu-
nists -- and we should avoid using
proper names of countries which have
appropriated the word socialist (or
people's democracy), or of groups
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S4401"T (Briefly Noted Cont?)
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which have adopted names such as
labor or workingmen's organization
or party for the same propaganda
purposes. Where such misleading
words occur in a title or a quota-
tion, we should either put them in
quotation marks or add the true
identity in parentheses or in a foot-
note. Our goal is to deny communists
the favorable image attached to so-
cialism (or the left): we can start
by resisting any further extension
of its use -- e.g., in new organiza-
tions, in agreements, etc. where they
attempt to insert phrases such as
"the socialist countries"; and we can
give greater currency to their proper
title in a concerted movement to sup-
plant their use of misnomers.
We can also, for example: note
that they downgrade "socialism" in
all their doctrinal works as the last
phase (of undesirable societies) be-
fore the ultimate achievement of commu-
nism; or we can lampoon them for being
so obviously ashamed of their proper
name.
[See BPG #185: Briefly Noted
"Socialism' and 'Capitalism'` An Inter-
national Misunderstanding" which draws
attention to an article on that sub-
ject by Ralph White in the January
1966 issue of Foreign Affairs (reprints
available); and Item #991 "Communism
and the Myth of the Left." Also, BPG
#186 item #997 "Socialist International
Congress..." which shows the differ-
ences between communism and socialism
and carries a note as to the use of
terminology.]
Latin Will the Soviets Disavow
America Their Support of Tri-
insistent Continent Conference?
According to the Uru-
guayan press, the Uruguayan Govern-
ment presented the Soviet Ambassador
in that country a verbal note on 15
March in which it rejected the conten-
tion contained in the Soviet note of
11 February that the Soviet delegates
at the Tri-Continent, Conference in
Havana spoke as private citizens.
The Uruguayan note calls upon govern-
ment of the USSR to condemn all ac-
tions which negate or violate the
foreign policy principles stated by
the USSR, in other words that it dis-
avow its approbation of the policies
laid down at Havana. An unclassified
attachment reprints an English trans-
lation of the verbal note as it ap-
peared in the Uruguayan press. We
suggest maximum replay of the note,
with appropriate comments based on
previous guidances covering the Tri-
ContinentConference, especially the
Briefly Noted item, "Support of Libera-
tion Struggle," in BPG #186.
SPECIAL
:~..,..:.}...,.~,.,.,.,...,
q GHANA,
x$io' n.'t.iei:i:i:.;i: xxit~;ititxx::%
by GHANAIANS
A special PRESS COMMENT (18 March 66)
has been sent to all regular recipi-
ents, containing
editorials and articles--
from Ghana publications
(25 Feb tb'8 Mar)
first-hand attribution--
people involved in and
reacting to the problems
of Nkrumah's Ghana
live accounts--
portraying attitudes and
atmosphere in a country
which rid itself of a
is tyrant.
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(Briefly Noted)
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
Commentary
2-15 March 1966
Principal Developments:
1. The 23rd CPSU Congress remains scheduled for 29 March: numerous
clandestine or off-the-record reports describe or forecast plans or inten-
tions of the Soviet leaders and of other CPs for treating the problems of
the ICM at that gathering -- but the reports are so divergent that it is
difficult to summarize them. Most sources apparently assume that the CPSU
has promised not to engage in anti-Chinese polemics or to attempt to use
the gathering to isolate or excommunicate the Chinese. On the other hand,
a number of sources predict that the Chinese will attend and will attempt
to use the forum for a down-the-line denunciation of Soviet policies and
objectives, thus precipitating the "organizational demarcation" which the
Chinese have been proclaiming in recent months.
2. Overtly, Peking continues to excoriate Moscow on the old charges of
selling out the revolutionaries of the world and, specifically, trying to
"bring the Vietnam question into the orbit of US-USSR collaboration."
Moscow does not reply.
3. Castro replies to Peking's late-February rebuttal of Castro's earlier
charges, delivering a long, free-wheeling speech which brands the Chinese
leaders as "degenerate" and in their "dotage" (by implication, holding on
to their posts after they have become "biologically unable" to run their
country), including by name the "god Mao Tse-tung," and predicts that "the
Chinese people will settle accounts" with them for their present errors,
Castro expresses his opinion that "they have been trying to create a prcb-
lem, to provoke a break." (The 72-year-old Mao Tse-tung has now been out
of public view for 5 months, exceeding his longest recorded previous absence
in 1956-57 when he is believed to have suffered a stroke, This absence,plus
a recent outpouring of idolatrous propaganda, leads observers to speculate
that he may be nearing the end of the road.)
4. A Yugoslav correspondent reports from Moscow that "observers" there em-
phasize that China's aim is to pressure the USSR to open in Europe a second
front of struggle against imperialism and'also to push North Korea into a
similar move against South Korea.
5. Western correspondents in Moscow report continued rumors there -- trace-
able to the Chinese Embassy -- of the move of large Soviet troop units into
Mongolia in accordance with the 1966 Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance
treaty.
6. The Miyamoto-led Japanese CP delegation flies from Peking to Pyongyang.
In Europe, Italian CP SecyGen Longo confers with Polish First Secy Gomulka
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in Warsaw, and a Kadar-Kallai Hungarian party-state delegation visits
Rumania. Emphasis is on the need for unity, but nothing is heard from
either Warsaw or Bucharest about an international CP meeting.
7. The Yugoslav Party CC approves a 17-point resolution embodying such
far-reaching economic and social changes that press observers call it a
new "greap leap forward -- in revisionism."
8, In neighboring Albania, there is fresh evidence, including an open
letter from the Party CC to the population (broadcast 6 March but text
not yet received here), of serious factional differences in the leader-
ship, with opposition to Hoxha,reportedly led by Defense Minister Balluku,
disturbed by lack of economic progress and Albania's international isola-
tion.
9. Pro-Chinese Communist splinters from most of the countries of South
America reportedly held a clandestine conference in Santiago, Chile, at
the beginning of March. Reported as violently anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet
in tone, though final resolution omits Cuba and makes Soviet revisionism
the main enemy (above U.S. imperialism), to be fought to the end and with-
out quarter. NOTE: This is highly sensitive Noforn information, FYI only
until further notice.
10. A further clandestine report on plans for the 1966 conference of the
CPs of the European capitalist countries places it in Vienna 9-11 May.
(This is still unconfirmed information, differing slightly from earlier
reports -- #71.)
Significance:
Although the 23rd CPSU Congress will be under way or past when this
reaches its readers, we (and most of the rest of the world, Communist as
well as non-Communist) are still unable to forecast with any assurance pro-
spective developments relating to problems of the ICM.
Meanwhile, the public charges and counter-charges of this period are
again concerned almost exclusively with state and national rather than
ideological issues.
(Commentary)
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#74
2-15 March 1966
March 2-5: Italian CP SecyGen Longo meets with Gomulka and other top
Polish Party officials in Warsaw, discussing (according to Warsaw PAP)
the main problems of the international situation and the ICM and
stressing the "decisive importance of unity of action" -- with no
mention of any kind of a Communist meeting.
March 6 and.7: Peking People's s Daily excoriates IVioscow on two successive
days. On the 6th, a Commentator article headed."What Are They Up To?
-- Comments on the Moscow Talks Between the Leaders of the British and
Soviet Governments,includes passages such as the following:
It is true that the roles played by the British Labor
Government and the Soviet Leadership are not entirely the same.
The Wilson Government is playing the open, undisguised part.
Whenever U.S. imperialism escalates the war, it cheers and applauds:
whenever U.S. imperialism peddles its 'peace talks' hoax, it hawks
all around the world.
"`The Soviet leaders, however, follow a different course.
They pretend to support the Vietnamese people,by mouthing a few
words in condemnation of U.S. imperialism.... But their real aim
is to try to lead, by hook or crook, the Vietnamese people to the
conference table of 'unconditional discussions' of the Johnson
administration to bring about another 'Munich.'"
A highly defensive article entitled ''About Twists and Turns" on
the 7th acknowledges that even "'Comrade Mao has said: 'Like every
other activity in the world, revolution always follows a tortuous road
and never a straight one,'" and that, although "twists and turns in
themselves are not always bad, of course one prefers not to have them.
Answering its own question: "'What sort of attitude one should take
toward the twists and turns in the path of revolutionary advance?"
PD declares:
"The attitude of M?-Ls and other thoroughgoing revolutionaries
is diametrically opposed to that of the opportunists and revi-
sionists: the former do not slacken their vigilance but anticipate
possible twists and turns...; and when twists and turns do come,
they are never panic-stricken, nor do they sink into passivity and
despair....
"Today, whenever a temporary zig-zag appears in the revolu-
tionary road in a certain country, the modern revisionists, like
the opportunists of former times, will jubilantly try to peddle
their foul proposition for the abolution of revolution.... This
is the typical countenance of a renegade...."
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March 8: Yugoslav Radio correspondent in Moscow, Milika Sundic,
comments on Chinese efforts to stir anti?-U.S, hostilities on other
fronts:
"...China's aim is not war against the U.S., Moscow observers
emphasize. Its aim is pressure on the Soviet Union to o en in
Europe a second front of struggle against imperialism. The
possibility must not be discounted that this is precisely what is
being demanded in N. Korea now, with bigger prospects of success
than in the case of the Soviet Union, which, contrary to N. Korea,
can resist this pressure and recognizes where the opening of a
second front in Europe or in the Far East would lead."
March 10-12: Hungarian Party First Secy Kadar and Premier Kallai pay
'a friendly visit" to Bucharest, holding talks with top Rumanian party-
state officials. Bucharest AGERPRES says "the two parties and govern-
ments hold that it is imperatively necessary to make efforts for the
strengthening of the unity and cohesion" of the socialist countries
and the ICM,,-- but makes no mention of any discussion of an interna-
tional meeting.
March 11: The Miyamoto-led Japanese CP delegatibn which has been
touring in China and X. Vietnam (see also #72 and 73) flies by special
plane" to ongyang, with a send-off by Chou En-lai and "more than
4,000 ... well-wishers, beating drums and gongs and waving flowers and
banners." Also, New Zealand CP GenSecy Wilcox departs for home from
Canton after "a friendly visit" which began with a 2,000-man welcome
in Peking on the 3rd.
The Yugoslav Party CC approves a 17-point resolution calling for
major economic and social changes, including a welcome to foreign
capital investment with the right to take a share of profits out of
the country, a formal proclamation of the "right" of every enterprise
"to decide freely and independently on the mutual development of all
forms of economic cooperation, at home and abroad," and a denunciation
of the usurpation of workers' rights" by Communist bureaucrats.
Foreshadowing a purge, it declares:
"Communists cannot treat political and social functions as
acquired rights. Recognizing the justified criticism of working
people, the leadership must call to responsibility those Com-
munists who have made serious political mistakes and propose
their removal from their functions...."
March 12: Djakarta Radio announces that "President - Great Leader of
the Revolution" Sukarno on the 11th delegated General Suharto to act
on his behalf "to take whatever steps necessary to insure security,
and stability of the Government" ... etc. Suharto on the 12th pro-
claims "Decision of the President - Supreme Commander of the Indonesian
Republic Armed Forces - Mandate Bearer of MPRS Great Leader of the
2 (Chronology Cont)
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Revolution No. 1/3/1965 (sic)" dissolving the Indonesian CP. "including
all of its sister oranizations, `both in the center and in the regions,
and including all organizations which are under its protection," and
banning it as an organization "in all territory of the Indonesian
Republic." The Western press cites ""Western intelligence sources"" to
the effect that the Indonesian military leaders took over Sukarno's
political power because they had come into possession of a secret
document signed by Foreign Minister Subandrio and Chinese Foreign
Minister Chen Yi outlining a plot to wipe out the Indonesian military
leadership, a document which riotizig students reportedly found when
they ransacked the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.
March 13: Speaking more than 4 hours at Havana University on the 9th
anniversary of the assault on Batista's Presidential Palace, Cuban
Premier Castro waxes increasingly vituperative and personal in his
denunciation of the Chinese leaders (among other subjects!):
11... It is painful, and it is shameful at the same time, that in
the midst of the battle that our people are obliged to wage against
imperialism, we also have to divert our energies to replying to
those who until a short time ago we believed to be sincere and
honorable allies of the people who fight against that imperialism,
to those who until a short time ago we believed to be honorable
revolutionaries. It is shameful and painful to see how NCNA can
now hardly be distinguished from UPI and AP.
"It is shameful that even the Government of that country has
not yet made a reply, but in a belligerent tone threatens like a
veritable Jupiter and has limited itself to writing a brief string
of insults and saying that it reserves the right to reply. What
fear! What terror! What a fearsome threat: What an intimidating
threat! (See Chrono #73, Feb. 22, for Chinese "threat" to which
Castro refers.]....
" They are shoddy revolutionaries, theoreticians of a revolu-
tionary + +
war they will never carry out, people who have never fired
or will ever fire a shot.... Those are the chorus leaders used
by the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic to denigrate the
Cuban revolution.... per revolutionaries, revolutionaries in
theory --- I am not going to say that the Chinese people are not
revolutionary.... Those who do not deserve any respect are the
others, the salaried ones, the ones who lie for wa es, who are the
ones who have been used as instruments to accuse Cuba, to launch
against Cuba a campaign in the imperialist style, in the Goebbels
style, in the fascist style.
"If we are going to argue basically, we must tell some basic
truths and we must unmask everything that is of fascist type
hidden under Marxist emblems. Of course this story of revolu-
tionaries, who in spite of having done good things in their lives,
have committed great barbarities later at the end of their lives,
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is not new. During the past we have seen with sorrow the things
that men are capable of doing when they degenerate.
We ... have ... one of the first laws of the revolution,
establishing a prohibition against putting the name of any living
leader on any street, on any city, on any town, on any factory,
on any farm; prohibiting even the statues of living leaders;
prohibiting something more -- official photographs in adminis-
trative offices.
"'t'his honor goes to this revolution, and I invite the leaders
of the Chinese People's Republic to approve a similar law in their
country....
"And going back ... to the hope I expressed that all of us
men of this revolution, when in obedience to biological law we
become unable to run this country, will know enough to leave our
posts to other men able to do it better. It is preferable to
organize a council of elders, where they are listened to, but in
no way allowed to carry out their whims when dots has seized
upon them.
?f... Preserve us from the ridiculous belief that we know it all...
that we are infallible....
... While the (Tri-Continent) conference was taking place, China
published hardly a word about about the conference. Then when
the conference ends, they began to write and to transmit over
NCNA numerous articles talking of the great Chinese victory at the
Tri-Continent Conference, taking for themselves all the merit,
and presenting in a lying and false manner as a victory for them
the results of the Conference....
... Some day the Chinese people will settle accounts in ^onnection
with the errors which their leaders are committing with regard to
us. They have tried to present to the Chinese people our charge
as an act directed against the Chinese people, an anti-Chinese
act. There is nothing more infamous, nothing more slanderous....
"We have simply defended ourselves against a cowardly and
unmentionable aggression.... It is not important that so many
million Chinese can be deceived.... No lie can last for long, and
we know that one day the truth will be known. We know that one
day, regardless of the fact that today that country makes a S2d
of Mao Tse-tung, one day there -rill be men capable of seeing
objectively, and they will know how to distinguish errors from
right actions....
... We have noticed that the Chinese Embassy has requested a
number of permits to take out trunks, luggage, packages, auto-
4 (Chronology Cont)
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mobiles, and we assume that their plan is to provoke a break with
our country.... In my opinion, they have been trying to create
a problem., to provoke a break....
March 15.-16: Western correspondents in Moscow (we have seen dispatches
from NYTimes? Grose on 15th and Stockholm Svenska Dagbladet of 16th)
report persistent rumors of the movement of large units of Soviet
tro9x~s into Mongolia under the 1966 Soviet-Mongolian mutual assistance
treaty: the reports are said to be traceable to the Chinese Embassy
in Moscow. (See also #73, Feb. 25, for earlier AP report of same.)
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WANTED:
THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM
25X1C10b
SITUATION: In going to the assistance of South Vietnam the U.S. has
shouldered a burden of benefit to the whole free world. This effort has
received considerable free world support, but more is required. The tragic
cost to the U.S. in the lives of her fighting men is growing inexorably and
the consumption of military hardware and cost of civilian economic aid for
South Vietnam will rise this year to a tremendous $10,500,000,000.* The
casualties already suffered and the money already spent have not finished
the job in Vietnam -- even though they have begun to turn the tide. Defense
Secretary McNamara has just authorized (2 March) an increase in U.S. forces
to 235,000 men and is already preparing Congress and the public for another
boost by assuring the nation that the U.S. forces in Vietnam can be increased
to 350,000 without calling up the reserves.
World-wide public support and governmental aid for Vietnam is essential
-- and should be an obligation accepted by all. South Vietnam needs help
against its enemies -- the communist aggressors from the North -- who are
also the enemies of the entire free world. In answering South Vietnam's cry
for help, the U.S. has been fulfilling duties to the world, It is now time
for the free world to recognize that the reality in Vietnam -- Communist ag-
gression -- is a vital concern of all free nations.
U.S. official efforts have drawn material and military support from
allies; but Vice President Humphrey's mission to muster country support for
South Vietnam did not elicit as much as could be hoped. Formal efforts will
continue, of course, but a non-attributable, world-wide effort is now needed
to persuade third countries that the battle in Vietnam is theirs also and
that separation by distance and ocean mean very little in the way of protec-
tion in the nuclear age. Since self-interest is the driving force behind
any nation's offer of assistance in a situation like that in Vietnam, this
*as of early March 1966, 2,314 Americans had been killed and 11,472 had
been wounded.
Department of Defense estimates that the monetary cost of the war will
run $10 billion for purely military needs and $500 million for help to
the South Vietnamese civilians in 1966,
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(999 Cont.)
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can be used to U.S, advantage today -- not in reminding our allies what
they owe us for our investment of billions in foreign aid after World
War II, but in pointing out that it is to their own interest to see
communist aggression blocked in the Far East. Only after the war is
finished in Vietnam can Southeast Asia and the Far East be at peace.
See unclassified attachments:
Chart from U.S. News and World Report, 14 March 1966, showing free
world aid to South Vietnam.
Quotations from prominent citizens or high level officials in third
countries expressing support for forces fighting communist aggres-
sion in Vietnam.
Expressions of support on part of private citizens of third coun-
tries 1
25X1 C 10
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n r n n r r (999 Cont.)
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1000 WH. CASTRO FACES NEW DIFFICULTIES
25X1C1015
SITUATION: The trial on 8-9 March 1966 in Havana of seven persons
accused of a plot to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro was widely
interpreted in Cuba as a phony show-trial, designed to provide an excuse
for eliminating several of Castro's opponents. The trial itself gave
every evidence of being staged, with the principal defendent abjectly
declaring his guilt, blaming his failing on a "disorderly life of parties,
cabarets, vices, and all the things involved, including drugs." "If I
must die, I will die shouting 'Long Live the Revolution and Long Live
Fidel! Fatherland or Death!"', proclaimed Major Cubelas, a comrade-in-
arms of Castro in the Escambray mountains in the struggle against Batista.
As the trial neared its end Castro unexpectedly sent a letter to the
prosecutor requesting that the original demand for the death of the chief
defendents be dropped. It is believed that the motivation for this sur-
prise move was in good part the widespread protest movement which arose
among the students at Havana University. Their signs painted on university
walls went so far as to threaten Castro's life if he executed the accused.
There is also evidence that this protest struck a sympathetic chord among
the armed forces, where Major Cubelas and another defendent, Major Guin,
enjoyed a certain prestige as a result of their role in the revolution.
The protests of the students are in turn symptomatic of growing popu-
lar discontent on the island, where Castro's Communist dictatorship is, by
its own admission, in very difficult times. Sugar production is not meet-
ing expectations, per capita food production is off by one third compared
to pre-Castro times, and the rice ration has been reduced to three pounds
per month from the former level of 11 pounds. Other indicators of discon-
tent are the defections of Cubans abroad and the continued exodus of re-
fugees to the United States. The airlift from Varadero to Miami is carry-
ing out from 3,500 to 4,000 refugees per month, and the waiting list still
grows, Some 200,000 Cubans have applied for exit permits and Cuban refugees
in the United States have submitted the names of almost one million persons
they believe would leave if they had the chance.
Castro is also having his troubles on the international scene. The
blatant call to armed revolution which issued from the Tri-Continent Con-
ference in Havana served more to stiffen the opposition to Castro than to
frighten shaky governments. Most of all, Castro must be haunted by the
spectres of fellow dictators Ben Bella, Sukarno, and Nkrumah -- all over-
thrown by their own military forces.
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That these troubles weigh on Castro was clearly in evidence in his
speech at the University of Havana on 13 March. Displaying a defensive,
whining, petulant state of mind which contrasted starkly with the ebulli-
ent, aggressive, optimistic Castro of years past, he lashed out at a
"degenerate," "feeble-minded" Mao Tse-tung, called Chilean President Frei
"a liar," and the CIA: "this plague of rascals who in all the ports of
the world, in all the cities of the capitalist world, await the Cuban
merchant ships and besiege the diplomatic and commercial officials of our
country, Anybody who reads that captain so-and-so abandoned such-and-such
a ship, or this commercial attach' or the other ambassador deserted, and
who judges our people by that, would be making a tremendous mistake, be-
cause he would be judging our people by that weak, vacillating, cowardly,
corrupt, conscienceless, unprincipled, characterless tribe that lets itself
be bought for a few paltry pesos."
25X1C10b
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SOVIET MARITIME POWER GROWS --
for Legitimate and Illicit Uses.
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Because of their potential use for aggressive and defensive
purposes, the Soviet merchant fleet (SMF) and Soviet fisheries are con-
sidered jointly. Together they give the Soviets an increasing presence on
high seas and shore bases throughout the world. (See attached map.) They
provide the Soviets with a force in-being to concentrate on objectives in
particular areas. Besides contributing to the development of Soviet sea
power the SMF and fisheries are economically advantageous.
Soviet Merchant fleet. In 1965 the Soviets' share of total world sea-
borne foreign trade amounted to only 7 to 8 percent; it is expected to rise
to about a tenth by 1970. However, the growth in tonnage and the perfor-
mance of the fleet, now sixth in the world, has been rapid and is expected
to continue.* Whereas the Soviets depended on foreign-owned vessels for the
shipment of well over half of their seaborne cargoes in 1958-64, they were
able to ship half of their cargo in their own ships in 1965 (and they have
never been known to suffer delays in shipping military goods [Secret]). By
1970, they are estimated to be able to ship about two thirds of their
cargoes in their own vessels. To a limited extent, they will also be able
to service shipping needs of other countries during lulls in their own demand.
1958 to 1965 the fleet increased to a total of 8.4 million deadweight tons
-- about 150 percent. In ten years ending 1965, seaborne cargo increased
by about 400 percent to 56 million tons, and the ton-miles increased by
almost 1,000 percent to 176 billion. The five-year plan programs a tonnage
increase of 50 percent, 1966-70, and ton-miles performance by 82 percent.
(Western analysis based on unclassified sources)
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The major economic results of these improvements will be a saving of scarce
convertible currencies and the benefits from exercising closer control over
their shipments.
Fisheries. The growth of the Soviet fishing fleet, now one of the
world's largest, has been even more remarkable than that of the SMF. But
the growth of the fish catch, while substantial, has not been commensurate
with the increase of fishing facilities.* This disparity provides support
for the widely held belief that some of the Soviets' purported fishing
activity is a cover for other activities. And, according to a recent Mos-
cow broadcast, in 1966-1970 "larger and more up-to-date ships are to be built
which will be able to operate efficiently in any ocean of the world." Pre-
sumably, the broadcast refers to ships of a size up to and including the
43,000 displacement ton factory ship now under construction in Leningrad.
Besides its canning and freezing facilities this ship will carry 20 small
trawlers on its deck.
The fishing industry contributes almost 15 percent of the animal protein
consumed in the USSR. Its low time and investment costs have spurred Soviet
planners to program in 1966-70 an increase in the catch by 50 percent or more.
The geographical areas of Soviet fishing activity -- actual and poten-
tial -- are shown on the attached map. Also shown are the land bases for
fishing activities in Africa, South America, Asia, and Caribbean which the
Soviets have either established or have shown an interest in establishing.
Another revelation of the geographic scope of Soviet fishing activities is
indicated by the industry's significant auxiliary, the world's largest and
most active fleet of oceanographic vessels. This fleet consists of at least
18 well-equipped vessels from which Soviet scientists have conducted re-
search in: the Northeast, Northwest, Central, and South Atlantic; the Car-
ibbean; the Mediterranean; the Red Sea; the Indian Ocean; the Arctic; the
Antarctic; and the Pacific. (Details of last sentence S E C R E T.)
Intelligence collection and support for navy: This coverage by the
fishing ships, plus the sealanes which are or could be covered by Soviet
merchant ships, provide the Soviets with a virtually unlimited scope of
operations on the high seas. The Soviets have taken advantage of several
opportunities to use fishing and merchant ships for the collection of
*1948-1955: fishing fleet horsepower increased by 242 percent (to 834,200)
and the number of ships by 244 percent (to 10,872) while the fish catch (in-
cluding whales and other sea animals) increased only by 74 percent (to
2,737,000 tons).
1965: fish catch exceeded original play by 26 percent and was 112 percent
more than 1955, compared to an increase in the fleet's horsepower by 193
percent, (Western analysis based on unclassified sources.)
2
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intelligence and support of their navy. Such uses have been extensive elec-
tronic monitoring and photography of US and Allied naval vessels on maneuver
and US missile and space shots, and refueling of naval vessels on the high
seas. (Secret)
Most of the Soviet intelligence collection has been performed by
trawlers stripped of their fishing gear which has been replaced by electronic
equipment. It is noteworthy that no Soviet fishing trawler so equipped has
ever been registered at a non-bloc port. (Secret)
Potential uses: Of greater concern, however, are the potential useq to
which such vessels could be put. Among the numerous fears which have been
raised, the more plausible are the following: landing of small guerrilla
or sabotage units; logistic support of Soviet submarines and other warships
on the high seas; expanded intelligence collection by electronic means;
guidance of submarine-launched missiles through precise mapping of ocean
topography and by stationing well-equipped vessel between shore and distant
submarines; detection and reporting of other nations' submarines by trawlers
(between 200 and 800 of them fish in the NE Atlantic on a year-round basis).
(Secret)
Soviet penetration objectives and methods: A separate but related
problem arises in the sphere of Soviet aid in the establishment of fisheries
in underdeveloped countries. As shown on the attached map, the Soviets have
completed or are building fisheries in 6 countries and have entered into
discussions with 5 other countries about establishing fisheries with Soviet
aid. Not only does this form of aid provide the Soviets land bases far from
their own shores for possible uses in intelligence collection and naval
support, but it also has been an early step in the penetration of under-
developed countries.
Soviet fisheries activities in 3 African countries -- Ghana, Somalia,
and Senegal -- yield some insight into the Soviet methods and objectives.
In Ghana, a fishery was among the first batch of projects discussed, and
was included in the August 1960 agreement which provided the first USSR
credit given Ghana. This economic agreement preceded the first Soviet
military aid to Ghana by an estimated 1 to 2 years. In Somalia, a fish
cannery was on the original list of projects under the June 1961 economic
aid agreement with the USSR. The first Soviet military aid to Somalia dates
from November 1963, almost 2.1/2 years later. In Senegal, the first and
only economic aid agreement, signed in November 1964, covered the construc-
tion of a tuna-fishing complex.
From the foregoing it can be speculated that the Soviets use fisheries
as a lure in the early stages of their economic-political-military pene-
tration of underdeveloped countries. The recently publicized espionage and
insurgency activities in Ghana and the Soviet focus on Somalia for their
military assistance and instruction in East Africa serve as a warning against
possible Soviet motives in offering assistance in establishing fisheries.
3
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Activities by other bloc countries: In addition to the Soviet efforts
along these lines, account should be taken of some of the activities of other
bloc countries. Poland was active in the preliminary steps to set up a
fishery in Guinea; recently however, the Soviets are reportedly taking over
this activity. East Germany has supplied 10 fishing vessels on credit to
Tunisia under an April 196+ agreement. And the Bulgarians and Ethiopians
have discussed a joint venture to develop the fishing industry of Ethiopia.
25X1ClOb
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1002. MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS
25X1C10b
SITUATION: May 1 (May Day), first proposed by the Second Socialist
International in 1889 as a day for world-wide labor demonstrations, will
be observed as Labor Day in many free and in all the Communist-controlled
countries. Celebrations will range from entertainment, to serious rallies,
marches, parades, demonstrations, and possibly to riots. In the Communist
countries, May Day is a government-organized propaganda spectacle; and in
certain Free World countries Communists are the most active May Day cele-
brants. Originally, May Day celebrations sought to muster international
labor solidarity, primarily in European countries but also in the U.S.,
Cuba and Chile, for an eight-hour work day. This year, May Day will most
likely also give occasion to protests -- be it in the form of resolutions
or of demonstrations at U.S. embassies on the war in Vietnam.
It is somewhat ironical that the big achievements made by labor, es-
pecially in the advanced. countries, have made the masses of non-Communist
workers increasingly apathetic to May Day celebrations, even in the many
countries where May Day is a paid holiday today. With the improved living
standards and the faster-living societies, the accent is more on private
or family relaxation in a great variety of forms rather than on organized
political, socio-economic or similar activities. Where free labor demands
largely have been satisfied domestically, the accent of May Day celebrations
is on labor's role in international affairs, and in such instances labor
Leaders and socialists tend'tbifeel that further justified demands can well
be met without parades. On the other hand, the modified character of May
Day has drawn some non-socialists into the ranks of the celebrants.
Free World labor organizations (ICFTU and its affiliates, as well as
the Socialist International and its member parties [see also BPG 186 Item
#9971 now emphasize on May Day the need for social and economic progress
for the working masses in the developing countries -- i.e., the battle
against hunger and disease, the closing of the gap between "have" and
"have-not" nations, etc, -- which, if not attained, will lead to frustration
and unrest and ultimately to dictatorship. In these situations, they consider
the rights and role of free labor a vital one. In countries where labor
unions are state-controlled (Communist, fascist or military dictatorships),
free labor deplores the exploitation of workers under these systems, i.e.,
less than decent pay, inadequate housing, sub-standard working conditions,
inhuman labor discipline, production "norms," denial of basic workers' rights,
etc.
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Communist governments and Communists in the Free World exploit May
Day for political objectives. During the month of April Communist coun-
tries issue May Day greetings to fellow Communist regimes and to selected
governments outside the Communist sphere as well as a series of May Day
slogans. These proclamations have consistently reflected the propaganda
image which the issuer wishes to project in matters of domestic or foreign
policy and on problems within the International Communist Movement (dis-
armament, peace, agriculture, space, "peaceful coexistence," colonialism,
"national liberation," Vietnam, Dominican Republic, etc.) In Communist
countries, the day is marked by mass rallies or parades, speeches of of-
ficials, marching workers, military reviews and display of military hard-
ware and by disinterest on the part of the general public. Communist May
Day celebrations in the Free World generally reflect the interests, orienta-
tion and objectives of the local party: In affluent countries, emphasis is
on international issues; in the developing countries, or where organized
May Day celebrations are repressed, the focus is more on local issues which
are of interest to the workers. In any event, however, it is primarily in
the underdeveloped countries where Communist exploitation of May Day pre-
sents a threat.
25X1C1Oc
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1003 FE,NE,g. THE PRAGMATIC POLICIES AND
PERSONAL DIPLOMACY OF AYUB KHAN
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Pakistan's Fear of India Continues to Dominate Its Foreign
Policy. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan, which drew to an
inconclusive close with the cease-fire agreement of 22 September 1965,
marked the alteration of the framework of great power relationships with
the subcontinent, but left the basic issues between the two countries still
unsettled. Pakistan sees itself in a struggle for survival against India,
a struggle symbolized by Kashmir.
The immediate aftermath of the conflict was a conviction that
Pakistan's worst fears had been realized, and caused Pakistan to test inter-
national friendships by the measure of support given it against India. Ac-
cording to Pakistan, Communist China alone among the big powers stood by
Pakistan. The result was a bitter Pakistan, unmindful of past support,
deeply skeptical of the Western alliance and sensing abandonment by the
United States in favor of India.
During the seven months since the cease-fire, Ayub Khan has held
private talks with President Johnson in Washington in December 1965; with
Prime Minister Shastri and Premier Kosygin at Tashkent in January 1966;
with Vice-President Humphrey in Pakistan in February 1966. These exertions
in personal diplomacy have resulted in a new and more pragmatic approach
to Pakistan's foreign alignments. Ayub has recently displayed a keener
appreciation of Pakistan's continuing requirements for US (and Western)
aid for economic stability, while at the same time counting on friendship
with Communist China for political tranquility and insurance against future
Indian aggression.
On 1 March 1966, Ayub expressed his current reapprasial of the political
necessities of national survival: "The guiding principle of our foreign
policy is that differences among other countries should not interfere with
our relations with them. Consequently, alongside our ties of sincere friend-
ship with China, we are developing friendly relations with the United States
on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other."
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Pattern of Personal Diplomacy Established By Ayub.
The frank talks held in private between President Johnson and
Ayub helped to improve the atmosphere between Pakistan and the United
States, and gave each leader a better understanding of the policies of
the other. These private talks also set a pattern of personal diplomacy
which Ayu:b continued at Tashkent. The most important were those held
between Ayub and Shastri alone: Pakistani spokesmen emphasized the
value of these direct contacts between the responsible leaders of the
two countries. While Pakistan certainly did not achieve a victory over
India in Tashkent, a basis was established from which fruitful negotia-
tions could proceed. (At least equally important, from the Pakistan
point of view, was the role of the Soviet Union as that of an impartial
friend of India and Pakistan rather than that of a partisan of India.)
But Shastri's sudden death created new uncertainties just when the re-
lations between India and Pakistan showed signs of improvement. The
friendly personal relations which Ayub appears to have established with
Shastri have lost their effect on future Indo-Pakistan relations. Further-
more, Ayub had regarded the pending visit to Washington by Shastri as the
third important part in the round of discussions begun by Ayub's talks in
Washington, Washington's attitude towards India, in Ayub's view, would
have had to confirm the US attitude towards Pakistan as clarified to him
in Washington in December. Although Prime Minister Indira Ghandi has
pledged her government's support to the Tashkent Declaration signed by
Shastri, the momentum of the personal diplomacy established by Ayub with
Shastri is lost, and the extent of mutual understanding possible between
Mrs, Ghandi and Ayub is still an unknown factor.
Resolution of Kashmir Basic to Indo-Pakistan Dispute.
Both Pakistan and India realize -- helped by the insistence of the
US and the Soviet Union -- that some accommodation and eventual reconcilia-
tion between them is essential, but both are seemingly intransigent about
Kashmir. Neither government can afford to move too fast or too far from
positions in which each is so firmly entrenched. Public opinion in both
countries reflect the emotionally charged climate resulting from the con-
fli~:t over Kashmir. Demonstrations against the Tashkent Declaration have
occurred in both India and Pakistan, each side citing the Declaration as
a betrayal of the Kashmir people, and even more, an acknowledgment of
defeat in the bitter three-week war.
President Ayub has termed the Tashkent Declaration a beginning and
not an end. Both countries have completed the withdrawal of their forces
to positions held prior to the armed conflict in September 1965 and met
the 25 February 1966 deadline, as outlined in the Declaration.
The first Ministerial talks called for in the Tashkent agreement
were held in Rawalpindi the end of February, with another scheduled for
late March. No significant progress was made in solving the sources of
dissension, although Pakistan insists that the talks produced one minor
accomplishment. By undertaking extensive discussion on Kashmir, India in
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(1003 Cont.)
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effect, tacitly acknowledged that its claim to the area is a proper
subject for negotiation. This is looked upon as a step forward by
Pakistan, since at the time of the cease fire, victory could be claimed
by neither side.... Pakistan did achieve its tactical purpose of
bringing the long-simmering Kashmir question to international attention,
although falling far short of its ultimate goal of removing Kashmir from
Indian control.
Neither Ayub nor his Foreign Minister Bhutto has given any evidence
of compromise regarding Kashmir in their consideration of foreign policy.
Winding up the debates in the Pakistan National Assembly on 15 March,
Bhutto categorically stated that Pakistan will never accept a non-war
pact with India as long as the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved, and
that the Tashkent Declaration of 10 January 1966 was merely a "declaration
of intent" and not a contractual obligation,
(The unclassified attachment provides a review of the developments
of the Kashmir situation, the changing relationships between Pakistan and
the US; Pakistan and Communist China; Pakistan and the USSR.) 25X1C10 b
3 (L003 Cont.)
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6&"N MM
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Fact Sheets
MMMNF~
March 19
Official statements supporting forces fighting communist aggres-
sion in South Vietnam
Philippines: Former President of the Philippines, Diosdado
Macapagal, who was making an extended tour of Latin America, was
asked while in Argentina in January 1966, his opinion of the U.S.
role in Vietnam. Macapagal's reply was carried in all Buenos
Aires morning papers on 24 January:
"I think (U.S. intervention in Vietnam) has been
very opportune, because it has prevented that part of
Asia from falling under communist domination. The
situation has greatly improved with the increase in
American troops and our hopes have grown that democracy
will continue in the Far East."
Philip ip nes: The newly-elected (November 7.965) President
of the Philippines, Fernand Marcos, in discussing Philippine
contributions to the Vietnam conflict stated that he feels it is
essential for the Philippines to send more than engineers to
Vietnam to augment the small group of civilian Filipino doctors
and technicians already there. The Philippines will spend $350
million to send the engineers. In discussing this expenditure
and related matters on 22 February 1966, Marcos told the Filipino
people:
"If South Vietnam falls we may have to spend $350
million for the defense of the Philippines . . (it is
our intention to make our commitment in Vietnam) more
meaningful . . . the necessity for stopping this
aggression is obvious. If we sat by complacently
awaiting the uncertain arrival of peace, we might wake
up to find that we had nothing left to negotiate about."
Marcos went on to say that if the communists win in
Vietnam, "that victory will signal the reactivation of
Communist insurgency all over Southeast Asia, including
the Philippines . . . assisting Vietnam today consti-
tutes one form of guarantee that communist activity does
not arise in our country again."
West Germany: During 1965 German publishers in West Berlin
initiated a fund raising campaign for the material and moral
support of the South Vietnamese people. At the end of the
December 1965, 133,473 DP?i (about $33,368US) had been collected.
On 1 March 1966 a number of Berlin newspapers thanked contributors
to the fund in identical articles which reported the use of much
of the fund for the purchase of medical supplies:
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"In the light of the meaningful, humanitarian
purpose of this project on behalf of the suffering people
of South Vietnam, pharmaceutical houses . . . responded to
the appeal with such open-heartedness and charity that the
actual market value of the drugs supplied was three times the
sum collected....
"Special gratitude is due the German Red Cross and the
International Committee of the Red Cross for aid in the
packaging and transporting of medical supplies to Vietnam.
""In late January 1966 a delegation of the publishers
association delivered the initial shipment of medical sup-
plies to South Vietnam's Social Minister in Saigon. This
gesture was received by the Vietnamese public with consider-
able gratitude.
"Berlin daily newspapers have learned that (their)
initiative has led to the development of worldwide attention
to the social problems of these people who have lived under
war-time conditions for 25 years. (We) once again thank all
the participants for this successful demonstration of
humanitarian unity."
West Germany: During January and February 1966 West German
Minister of the Interior Luecke has been carrying on discussions with
various German firms regarding contributions German industry could make
to the South Vietnamese war effort. In January 1966 Luecke stated that:
"Federal Republic of Germany is in agreement that there
should be a substantial and well-coordinated German aid
effort for Vietnam . . . to make the German people more
fully aware that their own interests are at stake there."
Luecke is also organizing a publicity campaign to explain the Viet-
namese situation to the German public and to enlist popular. support
through public contributions for a CARE-type of program.
West Germany: In press conference given 2 March 1966 when Walter
Scheel, West German Minister of Economic Cooperation was asked about
West German aid for South Vietnam, he replied:
"The Federal Republic of Germany has comprehension for
the difficult problem the U.S. faces in Southeast Asia and
considers that the U.S. is defending the freedom of the people
of that country and of other people in the world....
"We should be grateful to the U.S. for thus engaging
itself in the defense of freedom."
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Belgium: In a speech delivered in Brussels on 7 March 1966,
Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister and former Secretary General
of NATO posed a series of questions to his audience stressing the far
reaching implications of what was going on in Vietnam:
In 1960, the North Vietnamese CP declared (publicly)
that the objective of North Vietnam was the conquest of South
Vietnam - that is the way the affair began . . . little by
little North Vietnam sent troops into South Vietnam . . . it
was then and only then that the U.S. intervened.
"If the U.S. does not observe one among the commitments
it has made in various parts of the world, how can the rest
of the world believe that it will respect other engagements?
Here, we are directly concerned. (Should) . . . the U.S.,
which has a treaty with South Vietnam . . . fail to honor
it . . .? Is there anyone who would dare to suggest that
the free peoples of Asia are not menaced by Chinese imperial-
ism?
"Much more is at stake in the Vietnam conflict than
simply the independence or the servitude of South Vietnam.
If the Americans were voluntarily to abandon Vietnam, why
should they remain in any Asian country? I am astounded and
stupefied when I receive petitions asking . . . peace in
Vietnam. Of the belligerents, which ones unceasingly offer
peace under reasonable conditions? The Americans and the
South Vietnamese. Who obstinately refuse? North Vietnam
supported by Communist China."
Spain: The Spanish philosopher Salvador de Madariaga made the
front pages in Bern on 5 March 1966 in discussing the obligations of
European nations to assist in what is also Europe's battle in Asia:
"The U.S. is fulfilling duties to the world. The most
one could charge is that they should patiently wait until
the necessity of their battle is gratefully recognized by
some hundred nations and a billion people who seek protection
behind American soldiers . . . it would be better if . . .
European nations - a United States of Europe - stood to-
gether with the United States of America against Chinese
imperialism . . . for their fight is our fight."
Italy: At the end of a week long visit to Argentina in January
1966 the Italian Defense Minister Guilio Andreotti, made a statement
warning against abandonment of Vietnam. The Buenos Aires Herald of
22 January 1966 quoted from Andreotti's speech:
"It is not a question of United States prestige but to
avoid leaving all Asia and the Philippines at the mercy of
Red China. Italy appreciates and shares the desire for
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peace but feels that peace cannot be gained at the cost of
abandoning Vietnam to the hands of the communists." Andreotti
added, "United States withdrawal would also give China an
open road to Australia."
Canada: In late 1965, a Toronto group of brimarily)students
formed an organization called "Canadian Volunteers for Vietnam" to
recruit 900-1200 Canadians for induction in the U.S. armed forces as
a unit. The convictions and aims of the group have been embodied in
a charter from which a few quotes follow:
"The governments of Communist China and her satellites
are determined to extend their system . . . over the entire
world, and are willing to employ military force to this end
. . . only a conviction of the capacity and willingness of
the U.S. and her allies will persuade China and her satellites
of the unfeasibility of extending their system by warlike
means.
if... all free men have an interest in a U.S. victory in
Vietnam. Only through such a military victory can come the
fruits of American financial and technical aid to the
development of this troubled, sorely distressed country."
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US Nevs and World Report, 14 March 1966
What the rest of the free world gives to South Vietnam -
AUSTRALIA-1,400 combat infantrymen with logistic support. Also: 1 million
textbooks, 3,300 tons of roofing,' 6 windmills, 15,750 sets of hand tools, 400
radios, 16,000 blankets, 14,000 cases of milk.
AUSTRIA-Blanketsand BELGIUM --
medicines. No troops. No troops.
CANADA-1 professor, 130 scholar-
ships, a new science building at Hue
University, $850,000 worth of flour
and butter. No troops.
DENMARK-Medical
supplies. No troops.
BRAZIL- Coffee , and
medical supplies. No
troops.
CHINA (NATIONALIST)-S00,000
textbooks, 80-man agricultural team,
2 surgical teams, 26 warehouses,
tools, seeds and fertilizer. Govern-
ment has offered troops, has been
turned down.
ECUADOR-Medical
assistance. No troops.
FRANCE-600 educa-
tors, medical and tech-
nical personnel.. No
troops.
GERMANY (WEST)-23 professors, physi-
clans and technical advisers, 30 ambulances,
20 million dollars in credits, radio batteries.
Promised: 3,000-ton hospital ship, additional
people and credits. No troops.
INDIA-Clothing for
flood relief. No troops.
GREECE-Medical supplies.
No troops.
GUATEMALA-15,000 doses of
typhoid vaccine. No troops.
IRAN-22-man medical team, 1,000 tons of petro-
leum. No troops.
IRELAND-$2,800 in cash. No troops.
ITALY-9-man surgical
team, science scholarships.
No troops.
KOREA (SOUTH)- 20,321
troops now in South Viet-
nam, 20,000 more promised.
Also: mobile surgical hos-
pital, 3 ships.
ISRAEL-Pharmaceutical supplies. No
troops.
JAPAN-5s million dollars in World War 11 repara-
tions, 6-man medical team, 20,000 radios, 25 ambu-
lances. No troops.
LAOS-$4,167 in cash for flood relief. No troops.
LUXEM, BOURG -Plasma and blood-transfusion
equipment. No troops.
MALAYSIA-Counterinsurgency train-
ing for 2,000 South Vietnamese air-
men. No troops.
NETHERLANDS-2 surgical teams, 1
dredge, $2,000 worth of antibiotics.
No troops.
NEW ZEALAND -i so troops in howitzer bat-
tery. Also: surgical team, $200,000 science
building.
PHILIPPINES-2,000 troops to come if Philippine
Congress approves. Already furnished: 70 persons
in medical and psychological-warfare teams.
SWITZERLAND-30 mi-
croscopes. No troops.
PAKISTAN - Clothing and
$10,000 cash for flood relief.
No troops.
SPAIN-Medical team,
medicines, blankets. No
troops.
THAILAND- Cement, TURKEY-Medical sup-
certain classified aid. plies. Cement promised.
No troops. No troops.
UNITED KINGDOM-11 police instructors, a professor
of English, some technical and construction equip-
ment. No troops.
VENEZUELA-Soo tons
of rice. No troops.
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28 March 1966
CASTRO'S MOUNTING TROUBLES
The growth of Castro's troubles seems to be accelerating; at
least that is the deduction to be made from the 8-9 March trial in
Havana of seven persons accused of plotting the assassination of the
Cuban premier. Actually, it developed during the course of the trial
that only three of the defendants were really accused of the assassi-
nation plot; three others had unwittingly become involved in a plan to
buy an escape boat, and another, it turned out, was in the dock on the
much used charge of being a spy for the CIA.
The leader of the group of plotters was Army Major Rolando Cubelas
Secades, a former member of the Revolutionary Directorate, once a
powerful anti-Batista organization. In March 1957 he had taken part
in an abortive attack against Batista's presidential palace and had
subsequently become military leader of the Directorate's guerrilla
forces in the Escambray Mountains during the prolonged struggle against
the Batista dictatorship. He was named Deputy Minister of Interior in
the first revolutionary government. Subsequently, he returned to
medical school, where he was appointed president of the powerful
Federation of University Students as a result of which he gained con-
siderable popularity among the students. He graduated from medical
school in 1962 and was then named director of the Manuel Fajardo
Hospital in Havana, one of Cuba's largest.
Also implicated in the alleged assassination plot were Jose Luis
Gonzalez Gallarreta, who had been secretary of the Cuban Embassy in
Madrid and had apparently been in close contact with anti-Castro exiles,
and Alberto Blanco Romariz, who had been sent abroad by Castro's
secret service as a spy, but who had immediately put himself at the
service of the anti-Castro exiles. Three persons were accused of
attempting to arrange for the purchase of a get-away boat; one of them
was convicted, though the prosecution failed to demonstrate that he
was aware that there was an ulterior purpose behind his friend's
request for help in buying a boat for weekend fishing; the other two
were acquitted.
Thrown into the trial as an accessory, on the accusation that he
was aware of the plot but hadn't reported it to the authorities, was
Major Ramon Guin Diaz. Guin, only 31 years old, had served under
Cubelas as a guerrilla fighter in the Escambray Mountains. Since the
revolution he has served as a high official of the National Institute
of Agrarian Reform.
The trial. The conduct of the trial was obviously carefully
staged by Castro's minions to be a convincing demonstration of the
guilt of the accused. This was an extremely important point for Castro
because the two major defendants were important, well-known figures.
They bore the highest rank in the Cuban army, that of major, they had
(Cont.)
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fought with him it the hills against.B,atista, they had been important
officials in establishing the regime after the revolution, in short,
their revolutionary credentials were as authentic as his -- and yet
they set out to assassinate him for his perversion of the revolutionary
cause. Castro was obviously concerned over the support and sympathy
they might have among the military, which constitute the single most
important source of support for the regime, and among the students,
the breeding ground of political discontent in Cuba.
Because it was too carefully staged, perhaps, the trial succeeded
in horrifying many observers. Major Cubelas, a guerrilla fighter,
leader of an attack against the presidential palace, a leading light
of the revolution, abjectly declared his guilt, blaming his failing
on "a disorderly life, a life of parties, cabarets, vices, and all the
things involved, including drugs." He shouted: "If I must die, I will
die shouting `Long Live the Revolution and Long Live Fidel. Father-
land or Death!" At times the testimony was pure rote:
Question: Cubelas Secades, what, in your view, is the
punishment merited by [your] conduct?
Cubelas: The worstl
Question: What do you mean by the worst?"
Cubelas: The wall.
Question: What do you mean by "the wall?"
Cubelas: Deserved execution by a firing squad.
Question: And what is execution by firing squad?
Cubelas: Execution by firing squad is the punishment
for those who commit errors such as this.
Question: And what is the consequence of the execution?
Cubelas: The consequence of the execution by firing
squad? Well, the decision the court may have taken on . . .
Question (interrupting -- evidently because Cubelas had
missed his cue): But what is the consequence of execution
by firing squad?
Cubelas: The consequence of execution by firing squad
is loss of life.
2 (Cont.)
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Question: Loss of life? Do you want to lose your life,
or not?
Cubelas: I deserve to be executed, that's what I deserve.
Perhaps some day some scholar will prepare a dissertation on the
staged trial as a necessary phase in the evolution of the Communist
state, drawing on the abundant material available in the archives of
Moscow, Prague, Peking, and elsewhere.
In sum, Guin, Gallarretta and Blanco also dutifully admitted their
guilt. The other three acknowledged their tangential involvement in
the purchase of a boat, but firmly denied any knowledge of the assassi-
nation plot. The prosecutor demanded the death penalty for the four
leaders and 30 year prisons sentences for the other three.
The imposition of the sentences demanded by the prosecutor seemed
a foregone conclusion until, in a last-minute letter to the prosecutor,
Fidel Castro requested that '`you not ask the court for the death sen-
tence for any of the accused." As a result, Majors Cubelas and Guin
were sentenced to 25 years imprisonment and Gallaretta and Blanco
each received 20 year terms. Two of those involved in the getaway
boat were absolved and one, Juan Alsina Navarro, was sentenced to
10 years in prison.
Castro's "intervention." The motivation of Castro's interven-
tion puzzled observers until the explanation leaked out through
refugees recently arrived in Miami: the trial had stirred widespread
unrest among both the military and the students. One refugee reported
seeing an old, emaciated horse which had been left grazing in a
neighborhood where many of the government leaders have their residences.
The horse carried a sign which read: "No me empujen. Yo me caigo
solo" (do not push, I will fall by myself). This was an obvious
reference to Fidel Castro who is referred to by the public as "'El
Caballo" (The Horse). Other refugees reported seeing signs on walls
in the University of Havana area which read: "Fidel, Cabeza Paga
Cabeza" (Fidel, one head pays for another head), which can only be
taken as a direct threat of reprisal against the premier's life should
the prisoners be executed. Other refugees reported additonal signs
and also a student demonstration march which had to be broken up by
the police and by firemen using water hoses. According to other
reports, there were widespread arrests in the western end of the
island: some seventy persons arrested, including some military. The
most common interpretation of these extraordinary protests was that
both the students and the military viewed the charges as trumped up
reasons for eliminating Castro opponents.
Student opposition. Actually student unrest existed well before
the trial, which served principally to exacerbate the situation. The
older complaints were against the political indoctrination which has
largely replaced education, frequent purges of teachers and students,
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often under the guise of eliminating homosexuality, and, most of all,
protest against the closing of the universities for one or two months
in the cane cutting season to force students and teachers into the
cane fields to help in the harvest. In the lower schools there has
been discontent over the hiring of totally unqualified teachers.
Because of the large numbers of teachers applying to leave Cuba for
refuge in the United States, the Ministry of Education appealed on
5 February for youths to undertake a five-month teachers' training
course. The only academic qualification stipulated was the completion
of primary education!
Military opposition. There has also been considerable opposition
to the regime by the military, the very forces which constitute the
backbone of Castro's authoritarian regime. In April 1961, Major
Humberto Sori Marin and Rafael Diaz, an engineer, were executed after
being accused of an assassination attempt. And in October 1961 the
Cuban police foiled an attempt to fire several bazooka shells at the
balcony of the Presidential Palace, where Castro was scheduled to
speak. Again, in the summer of 1965 a Cuban Air Force pilot was
executed after failing in an attempt to shoot down a plane carrying
Fidel Castro. On 7 February 1966, Raul Castro, Minister of the
Armed Forces, spoke about the difficulties they were having in
recruiting regular army officers and technicians. He suggested that
party members in the armed forces should work to improve the image
of the army among non-party civilian families. This would seem to be
a rather urgent necessity in view of the trial of Major and Cubelas
and the others.
Indeed the image was even further sullied by the announcement
on 17 March that the Vice Minister of the Armed Forces (i.e. second
only to Raul Castro) Major Efigenio Almeijeiras was dismissed, stripped
of his rank, and would be court-martialed for "activities contrary to
revolutionary morals." Almeijeiras was one of the original cohorts
of Fidel Castro, having participated in the attack on the Moncada
Barracks in Santiago de Cuba in July 1953, having been with Castro in
exile in Mexico, and having been one of the 12 survivors of the small
band that landed on the coast of Oriente Province. Reportedly
several dozen other government officials were arrested at the same
time as Almeijeiras and they will also be tried for "antisocial
activities."
Other symptoms of unrest have appeared with increasing frequency
in recent months. There seems to have been a veritable flood of
merchant marine officers deserting the Cuban ship of state. One
Cuban merchantman sailed from Japan without insurance coverage because
Castro apparently couldn't provide a qualified captain to replace the
one who defected in Tokyo. There has been a steady stream of defections
from the Cuban diplomatic service, including ambassadors and minister@.
And, of course, the airlift of refugees from Cuba to the United States
continues. Although 3,500 to 4,000 persons are flown out each month-,
4 (Cont.)
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the waiting list gets longer and longer. Some 200,000 Cubans have
already applied for exit permits, and Cubans in the United States have
submitted the names of almost one million relatives they believe
would leave Cuba, given a chance. Cuba's population is only 7 million.)
Failures. These symptoms of discontent reflect the all-too-
obvious failure of Communism in Cuba, where the economy is falling to
pieces. Despite Castro's early boasts of freeing the nation from
dependence on sugar, Cuba is now more a one-crop economy than ever.
In 1965 sugar production of 6,050,000 tons barely equalled the 1952-59
average of pre-Castro Cuba; production of rice, root crops, and corn
fell to half of the pre-Castro levels; the cut in rice imports from
China has forced a reduction in the monthly rile ration to 3 pounds per
person (compared to an average 10 pounds per month consumption pre-
Castro). Overall, total agricultural output last year was almost 15
percent lower than the 1957-59 level, and per capita food output,
exclusive of sugar, was about a third lower.
On the international front, too, Castro is in serious trouble.
His blatant call to armed revolution in Latin America issued at the
Tri--Continent Conference did more to arouse a determined opposition than
to frighten other Latin American governments. Most of all, Castro
must be haunted by the spectres of Ben Bella, Sukarno, and Nkrumah --
all fellow dictators overthrown by their own military forces.
That these troubles weigh heavily on Castro was clearly in evi-
dence on the 13th of March when he gave a speech at the University of
Havana commemorating the ninth anniversary of the assault on Batista's
presidential palace. Displaying a defensive, whining, petulant state
of mind which contrasted starkly with the ebullient, aggressive,
optimistic Castro of years past, he lashed out at a "degenerate,
"feeble-minded" Mao Tse Tung, called Chilean President Frei i1a liar,"
and decried the constant defections of his ambassadors, merchant
marine personnel, and commercial officials abroad. He cited the array
of forces assailing Cuba in such detail that the Cuban listener must
surely have sensed a siege of acute paranoia.
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SOVIET FISHING AREAS AND FOREIGN BASED FISHING INSTALLATIONS
0- Installations operating or under construction C3 - Areas currently being fished by the Soviets
O- Installations proposed or under negotiation - Areas exploited to a limited degree by Soviet
Installations Operating or Under Construction: Fisheries Research Vessels
1. Havana, Cuba - port facilities operating, processing plant under construction.
2. -Conakry, Guinea - port facilities operating.
Tema, Ghana - port facilities operating, processing plant planned.
? Ras Banas, UAR (Egypt) - port facilities operating, processing plant under construction.
5. Las Khoreh, Somali Republic - port facilities and processing plant under construction.
6. Al Hudaydah, Yemen - port facilities and processing plant under construction.
Installations Proposed or Under Negotiation.' D. (Undetermined port), Sudan - ne otiations dropped by Sudan.
A. Montevideo, UruguaApop eP*yR a i2600/OBA bxi.616x0-{RE)FM -43 Uft3Q9 QO nt.
S. Dakar, Senegal - planned port facilities and processing plant.
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Terms of the Tashkent Declaration,
10 January 1966
1. A "firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations,"
including a commitment to repatriate prisoners of war; restore normal
diplomatic relations; consider measures aimed at restoring economic,
trade, communications, and cultural relations; and "to discourage"
propaganda directed against the other country.
2. A re-affirmation of the "obligation" of India and Pakistan
under the UN Charter "not to have recourse to force and to settle
their disputes through peaceful means and a statement that, with this
background, "Jammu and Kashmir was discussed," a discussion in which
each side "set forth its respective position."
3. Agreement to complete withdrawal of "all armed personnel of
the two countries ... to positions they held prior to August 5, 1965,"
by the deadline of February 25,1966.
4 Agreement to continue discussion of "questions relating to
problems of refugees and evictions;" and to continue "meeting both at
the highest and other levels, on matters of direct concern to both
countries. Both sides, moreover, recognized the need to set up joint
Indo-P-kistan organizations to decide "what further steps will be taken."
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