BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300060005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 14, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1A2eb
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA- - 61A00030006000~49March 1966
Media Lines
SOVIETS EXPAND NEWS SERVICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TASS News Agency
for the first time has recently stationed a correspondent in the new
state of Singapore. There are unconfirmed reports that NCNA (New China
News Agency) plans to do the same. NOVOSTI (APN), the other Soviet news
agency, which also functions as a feature service, began offering serv-
ices in Hong Kong about three months ago. NOVOSTI distributes in Hong
Kong through ASAFLA News Agency (presumably for Asia-Africa-Latin
America), the director of which is a Chinese of Indonesian nationality
named"S.K. Ong (aka Wang Hsi-chun [telecodes 3769, 6932, 68741; aka Wong
Sik-kuan, aka Ong Siek-khan), DOB circa 1913.
NEW EDITION OF THE "LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA." The new chairman
of the Soviet State Committee for Publishing announced in December that
a new edition of the Large Soviet Encyclopedia will be published, pos-
sibly during 1966, and that it would be shorter than previous editions.
Speculation is rife that the editors have been advised to abridge cover-
age of the Soviet era -- both historical and biographical -- in order to
avoid future embarrassments if the "official line" changes on a person
(e.g., Beria, Stalin, Khrushchev) or event (e.g., Battle of Stalingrad).
SOVIET PUBLISHERS-COMPLAIN OF CENSORSHIP AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES.
Literary Gazette, leading Soviet intellectual review, in its issue of
last November 13 carried an article, which included a strong complaint
about delays caused by "checking or consultative organs" (i.e., censor-
ship authorities), saying that these bodies were often able to delay
publication of important works almost indefinitely, and recommending
that Soviet laws be passed defining precisely the maximum periods during
which manuscrpits and books can be held by the authorities. The same
review a week later also complained of the faults in the system of al-
locating paper for books, saying that some important works had been de-
layed because of paper shortages caused by printing innumerable brochures
of various types which were of no great importance.
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Significant Dates
10 Easter Marches, Western Europe, circa 10 April, peace organizations tra-
ditionally demostrate [May be focused this year on Vietnam].
15 African Freedom Day.
16 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)) tablished to admin-
ister 17-nation European Recovery Plan [Marshall Plan]. 1948.
17 Nikita Khrushchev born. 1894.
17 Dissolution of Communist Information Bureau [Cominform], last formal
international political link of Communist Parties, announced 1956. Tenth
anniversary.
18 Bandung Conference. 29 A-A countries call for self-determination and UN
membership for all peoples. 18-27 Ap 1955.
22 Lenin born. 1870. (Dies 21 Jan 1924).
22 Chinese "Long Live Leninism" statements indict Soviet theory, challenge
Khrushchev's leadership. 1960.
24 World Youth Day Against Colonialism and For Peaceful Coexistence. Cele-
brated by Communist fronts, WFDY and IUS.
26 Geneva Conference: agrees to armistice and partition of Vietnam;
recognizes neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. Conference ends 21 July. 1954.
29 India and Chinese People's Republic conclude 8-year pact for "peaceful
coexistence." 1954.
30 9th Inter-American Conference, Bogota, adopts resolution "Preservation
and Defense of Democracy in America," condemning International Communism
and all totalitarian forms as incompatible with American principles.
Name changed to Organization of American States (OAS). 1948.
MAY
I May Day -- International Workers' Day, designated by Second International
(Socialist) Congress 1889.
I Castro proclaims Cuba socialist nation, states no more elections will be
held. 1961. Fifth anniversary.
2 Eighth Congress, International Federation of Journalists, Berlin, 2-7 May.
5 Karl Marx born. (Dies 14 March 1883.) 1818.
5 Commander Alan B. Shepard, Jr. USN, becomes first US sub-orbital space
traveler. 1961. Fifth anniversary.
12 Soviet forces lift land blockade of Berlin. 1949.
15 Third International (Comintern) dissolved. 1943.
16 Treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties" signed by China-USSR. 1858.
22 Charter of the Organization of Africa Unity signed at 22-25 meeting in
Addis Ababa. 1963.
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l4 March 1966
Briefly Noted 0000"
Power Castro Ignores British
ve the Guianan Rice Offer.
People
In a series of exchanges
since January Premier
Fidel Castro has publicly charged
the People's Republic of China
with reneging on a trade agreement
)and thereby forcing him to cut the
Cuban people's",ri.ce ration in half.
[See BPG #986.] While it.appeared
likely that the mutual public re-
criminations would cause diplo-
matic relations to be broken,
Cuba's Ambassador has returned
to Peking.
Castro also denounced certain
countries to the free world for
boycotting trade with Cuba while
continuing to trade with the CPR
-- because it was a more important
customer.
But Georgetown's Sunday
Chronicle (27 February) reported
that the, British Guiana government
(no friend of communist Cuba), was
concerned with the plight of the
Cuban people and had offered to
sell rice:to Castro. However,
Castro had not told the Cuban peo-
ple of this-offer, nor had he re-
sponded with a purchase offer.
The same report points out that
when defeated Marxist and former
prime minister Cheddi Jagan visited
Cuba, he supported Castro's call
for armed struggles in Latin Amer-
ica and made no attempt to inform
the people that Brit isl-944iana
would sell them rice.
The article asks: "What kind
of politics is Communism when it
will stand by and see the.people
go hungry and ignore the benefits
for all in buying our rice?"
[See Briefly Noted below on
Castro's latest, official statement
to the UN on his right to export
revolution to Latin America.]
Defies Castro Letter to U Thant
Latin
America As a result of the state-
ments made at the Tri-
Continent Conference in
Havana, January 1966, and the estab-
lishment at that Conference of a
Committee to Aid the National Lib-
eration Movements, 18 member nations
of the Organization of American States
(excepting only Mexico) addressed a
letter (10 Feb 66) to.the Security
Council of the United Nations pro-
testing against this blatant inter-
ference in their internal affairs.
This provoked an almost incredi-
ble letter from Fidel Castro to U
Thant, Secretary General of the UN, in
which he denounced all the signers of
the OAS protest-as "miserable lackeys"
of Yankee imperialism. He averred
that "the peoples of the Latin Ameri-
can countries that those governments
claim to represent are mercilessly
plundered by U.S. monopolies. The peo-
ples under those governments have a
right - which they will exercise sooner
or later - to sweep out those govern-
ments, which are traitors, and serve
foreign interests in their own coun-
tries, and they will sweep them out
with the most violent revolutionary
action, because imperialist exploitation
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and oppression is exercised increas-
ingly by means of force, violence
and arms, and no other possible
choice is left. To proclaim the
right of those peoples ... is not
an act of intervention, but'-rather
the struggle against. intervention.
It is not just to confuse the spirit'
of independence with interventionism."
Not surprisingly, the letter
provoked a storm of protest through-
out Latin America, since it served
to confirm the apprehensions which
the Havana Conference had already
aroused. The text of Castro's let-
ter is attached for further documen-
tation of the actual intentions of
Communism for Latin America and of
"National Liberation" movements
generally.
Soviets
Can';t Caricaturist Censored
Stand for Cartoon.
Criticism
Helsingin Sanomat, the
largest and most respected of Fin-
land's newspapers, carried a cartoon
by the very talented and very it-,.
reverent caricaturist "Kari" in its
edition of 26 January 1966. The car-
toon poked fun at the 10th anniversary
celebration of the return of the
Porkkala area to Finnish possession
(it had been leased to the Soviets
for 50 years at the end of World War
II at their demand), questioning
whether there was any real reason to
celebrate the Soviet gesture.
Obviously spurred by a complaint
from the Soviet. Embassy in Helsinki,
the Finnish Foreign Minister, Dr. Ahti
Karjalainen, wrote a strong letter to
the executive editor of the newspaper
in which he stated, "As foreign minis-
ter, I regard it as- my duty sharply
to condemn the manner in which the
lLelsingin Sanomat has behaved in
this mater. He asserted that the
cartoon conflicted with the best in-
terests of the nation, and accused
its author of willfully harming
Finland's friendly. relations with
the Soviet Union.
As may be seen by the copy of
the cartoon which is included as
an attachment, it was quite innocuous
by free world standards. That the
Soviets should complain about it is
a measure not only of their obsessive
desire to stifle criticism of any
sort, but also of their plain boor-
ishness ... points which might well
be made by replay of the cartoon and
its brief history4 [We do not cast
aspersions on the Finnish govern--
ment].
Soviet
Diplo- Support of Liberation
matic Struggle
Dilemma
Soviet association with
the aggressive calls for revolution
in Latin America, Africa and Asia
issued in January at the Havana
Tri-continent Conference have
brought widespread reaction in
Latin America. On the heels of the
2 February OAS resolution condemn-
ing "the open participation ... of
official or officially-sponsored
delegations of member states of the
UN [in violation of the principles
of the UN Charter and UN Resolution
2131 (XX), 21 December 1965]...,"
Uruguay was reported to be consid-
ering a break with Moscow. Uruguay
queried the Soviets through diplo-
matic channels whether Soviet chief
delegate Rashidov's interventionist
statements at Havana were made in
the name of the Soviet government.
The Soviet reply to the Uruguayan
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V*QL6E T
note, and elsewhere in Latin
America where officially confronted,
evidences cautious attempts to dis-
sociate the Soviet government from
the militant resolutions and speeches
of the Conference, particularly from
Rashidov's statement. The Soviet
reply pointed out that the delega-
tion to Havana represented "Soviet
social organizations" rather than
the Soviet government; and reportedly
also that Soviet officials explained
that Rashidov "merely stated a per-
sonal political position." In ef-
fect, while told that delegates
represented Soviet "social organi-
zations," their positions correspond
with Soviet policy, which "officially"
respects sovereignty of all nations;
however, if peoples are "oppressed"
by colonialism, neocolonialism or
imperialism -- terms that offer
great latitude for interpretation
--, the Soviet Union, as spearhead
of world revolution, does intervene.
In other words, there is no disparity
between Rashidov's statements in
Havana and Soviet foreign policy as
outlined in the recent past by gov-
ernment officials, a fact that
Soviet diplomatic and public dis-
claimers have attempted to circumvent
with clever phraseology and ploys,
always mindful of not alienating
Afro-Asians and Latin Americans or
exposing themselves to harsh comment
from Peking.
Some of the Soviet delegates to
the Tri--continent Conference do be-
long to Soviet social, cultural or
international front organizations,
entities which are said to reflect
the views of the Soviet people.
Other Soviets present in Havana
have in the past engaged in high
level official and non-official
activities which are so comple-
mentary and coincident in time that
it is difficult to imagine that they
do not at least overlap. Sharif
Rashidov's career is most illustra-
tive of this point. (See unclassi-
fied attachments.) Our emphasis
remains on demonstrating Soviet com-
plicity in promoting subversion and
their attempts to pacify and mislead
friendly governments which are Soviet
targets of subversion.
Double The 23rd CPSU Congress
Standards
in Soviet The 23rd CPSU Congress
Media is still scheduled to
convene 29 March, shortly
after this Guidance will be received,
and there is little evidence of what
to expect beyond that discussed in
our two preliminary BPG items on the
subject, Nos. 976 and 985. A brief
plenum session on 19 Feb "approved"
the draft 5-year plan for presenta-
tion to the Congress. As anticipated,
it is scaled down considerably from
the grandiose 20-year project in-
cluded in the 3rd Party Program by
the 22nd Congress.
Washington Post staff writer
Rosenfeld on February 26th drew at-
tention to a "stunning discrepancy"
between the TASS International Ser-
vice English-language summary of
the draft plan and the Russian text
broadcast by Radio Moscow domestic
service: the summary included --
and the Russian text omitted -- a
pledge "to introduce everywhere (by
1910) a monthly guaranteed remunera-
tion for work of collective farmers,
corresponding to the level of wages
for state-farm workers." R. points
out that this is not only a radical
economic proposal but also a politi-
cal hot potato and speculates that
the last-minute switch indicates
(Briefly Noted Cont.)
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conflict in the Kremlin. (See R.
article in Press Comment, 1 March
1966.)
The Russian text also omits
the summary's statement that the
1970 target for average non-farm
wages is 114 rubles/month (compared
with 95 in 1965 and 90 in 1964).
Propagandists can play up
Rosenfeld's suggestion of conflict
in the Kremlin -- or they might
play these cases as samples of
double standards in Soviet media:
i.e., these attractive features are
advertised to the outside world for
maximum international propaganda
advantage, but the Soviet leadership
is so doubtful whether they can be
realized that it does not disclose
such promises to the Soviet people
who might be more likely to remember
and count on them.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
Commentary 16 Feb-I Mar 1966
Principal Developments:
1. The Ambassadors of several non-Communist countries in Peking are re-
porting to their governments around 1 March that the Chinese have notified
the Soviet and East European Communist governments that no further over-
flights of supplies to Hanoi will be permitted, that war material can be
shipped by rail through China to Vietnam, but all other supplies will have
to be sent by sea. The Moscow correspondent of Belgrade Borba reports
Soviet opinion that Peking wants to avoid a political settlement in Viet-
nam "at any price," to prolong the warfare and spread it to "the other coun-
tries of Indochina and make it the cause of a worldwide conflict."
2. The Poles expel the Albanian Ambassador on charges of distributing anti-
state propaganda in Poland ("not for the first time") and enabling a (pro-
Chinese dissident) Polish citizen to escape by providing him with an Albanian
diplomatic passport. The Albanians totally deny the charges, call the Polish
action a retaliation for Albanian refusal to attend the Gomulka-proposed Com=
itunist meeting in Warsaw "under pressure of the Soviet revisionist oovern-
ment" (see #72), and expel the Polish Ambassador (who had just been appointed
on 28 January, in an apparent move to normalize relations after Poland had
been represented in Tirana by only a Charge d'Affaires since Soviet-Albanian
break in 1961).
3. Peking's major polemic of the period is a bitterly defensive People's
Daily rebuttal to Castro's 6 February charges of Chinese pressure and sub-
version tactics against Cuba. NCNA precedes the PD rebuttal by publicizing
a sharp attack on the Castro speech ("which must have warmed the hearts of
Kosygin and Johnson -- present-day patrons of Castro!") by pro-Chinese dis-
sident Ceylonese Communist Sanmugathasan. NCNA also publicizes polemics
from the pro-Chinese dissident Australian Communist organ Vanguard, includ-
ing the charge that the Soviet leaders are joining with the U.S. imperialists
in attacks on China "to prepare for war against China."
4. As the USSR and Mongolia ratify the new treaty of alliance negotiated
during the January Brezhnev visit (#70), the Western press tells of reports
reaching Moscow of the dispatch of 2 or 3 Soviet Army divisions into Mongolia
because of Chinese troop concentration across the border, Feb 25 . Another
Western correspondent, citing reports from Bucharest, tells of Chinese re-
fusal to extradite defectors from the USSR -- Bessarabians deported to Soviet
Central Asia when the USSR annexed their homeland from Rumania in 19+5 -- on
the ground that Russia had failed to extradite Chinese refugees to Soviet
territory as required by the agreement they signed in 1951. The Chinese re-
portedly permitted the Bessarabians to contact the Rumanian Embassy in Peking
for assistance.
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(Commentary Cont.)
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5. The organs of 12 CPs in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere condemn
or deplore the harsh Soviet sentence on writers Sinyavsky and Daniel.. (See
BPG Item #996)
6. The North Vietnamese circumspectly avoid any mention of Sino-,Soviet dis-
sensions during a visit of the Miyamoto-led delegation of the Chinese-aligned
Japanese CP.
7. A Reuters report (Chrono, Feb. 21) that Chou En-lai will visit Rumania in
March is given some off-the-record confirmation by several East European
diplomats, who(iadd that the visit will also include Albania.
8. The 10th anniversary of the 20th CPSU Congress is largely ignored by
Soviet media and most ruling parties. Pravda acknowledges it only "in passing"
in a Feb. 26 editorial pegged to the 23rd Congress: in addition to the
Polish and Yugoslav tributes described in #72, we have seen only a less en-
thusiastic endorsement in the provincial Czechoslovak Communist organ Brati-
slava Pravda.
Significance:
The extent of the transformation of international Communism's internecine
warfare from ideological argumentation to national power conflicts is dramati-
cally demonstated by the line-up of principal developments described above.
The only event of truly great ideological significance -- the 10th anniver-
sary of the 20th CPSU Congress, which (in addition to the more spectacular
launching of de-Stalinization) drastically revised the official Soviet inter-
pretation of the Marxist-Leninist scriptures and set in motion the trends and
chain reactions which have led to today's disarray in the ICM -- is almost
ignored by most of the Communist parties and states, -- which seem to be
largely preoccupied with the evidence that the Soviet and Chinese protagonists
are moving inexorably toward an open break.
Further divergent reports on Soviet plans for trying to convene an inter=
national Communist meeting in connection with the 23rd CPSU Congress leave
the prospects still completely obscure, -- with evidence that most Communists
are almost as much in the dark as the non-Communist world. 25XIC10b
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#73
16 February-1 March 1966
Febrary. 14 (delayed): NCNA Peking describes an article in "the latest
issue" of "the Argentine journal No Transar, organ of the Communist
vanguard group of Argentina," on the theme that "the Soviet revisionists
have betrayed the national liberation movement of the Asian, Africa.,
and Latin American peoples in order to materialize their criminal designs
of cooperation with the U.S."
February 16-23: The organs of 12 CPs in Western Europe and the Western
Hemisphere condemn or deplore the harsh Soviet sentence on writers
Sinyavsky and Daniel.
February 17: Yugoslav Foreign Secretariat official spokesman Blago-
jevic condemns the "harsh, unfounded, and unprovoked attack on Yugoslavia
and its foreign policy" by Cuban Party organ Granma (see #72, Feb. 13),
asking: "Who and what is this intended to serve?~' -
February 17 and continuing: The top-level Japanese CP delegation which
has been visiting ComChina (see #72, Feb. 10 & continuing) flies from
Canton to Hanoi on the 17th "for a friendship visit to the DRV."
Vietnamese editorials and statements and the joint communique avoid
mention of the dissensions ~n the ICM, but delegation head, SecyGen
Miyamoto, at a "grand meeting" on the 19th, pledges to "fight against
the main danger, modern revisionism, to be vigilant against dogmatism,
sectarianism, and, at the same time, to work for the real unity of the
ICM."
The delegation leaves Hanoi on the 27th and arrives Peking on 28th:
at a banquet that evening Miyamoto exults that "the militant friendship
between the JCP and the CCP had withstood all tests in the struggle
against imperialism, reactionaries of all countries, and modern revi-
sionism." (See also Feb. 24 for Sankei report.)
February 19: A brief plenum of the CPSU/CC approves the draft directives
for the 23rd CPSU Congress on the 19 6-70 5-year plan. Observers point
out that, although the plan seems to indicate a modest improvement
in living standards, it falls far short of the grandiose forecasts of
the_3zd Party Program approved by the 22nd Congress. Nothing is released
about. an discussion, pf p gb4em=, in the ICM.
A corn entary in Belgrade Borba by. its Moscow correspondent says:
"It is considered in Moscow that China neither wants nor is able
to extend eff.cient.assistance to the DRV to enable its protection
fot5. bznl qrs. However, Peking is keenly interested in a long-
laasstin war in Vietnam and in avoiding a political solution at any
price..,, Peking is likewise interested in spreading the Vietnam
war to other countries of Indochina and' making it the cause of a
worldwide cpnfl.ict."
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Chronology Cont.
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February 21: TASS announces that:
"Discussions of the draft directives of the 23rd CPSU Congress
on the 5-year plan... have started in party organizations, at
meetings of working people and in the press. Beginning today a
special section is being introduced in Pravda in which articles,
letters, notes, and other material contai inninn g proposals and comments
for the draft directives will be published...."
NCNA reports from Colombo on a 10 February press release by
"N. Sanmugathasan, member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the
Ceylon CP/CC," which was published in Kemkaruwa on 18 Feb. under
the title: "Castro Joins Anti-Chinese Chorus." S. is quoted as
saying:
"Cuba has for some time been drifting rapidly down the path
of revisionism -- propelled down this path by Soviet aid
amounting to 1 million rubles per day.... Castro, of course,
had to pay the price for this peaceful coexistence. He had
to attack the common enemy of both U.S. imperialism and Soviet
revisionism....
Now Castro has resorted to vituperatives -- without any facts.
How this speech must have warmed the hearts of Kosygin and
Johnson -- present-day patrons of Castro! ...
The extent of degree to which Cuba has departed from the revo-
lutionary path can be gauged not only from the exit from the
Cuban political scene of one of its foremost leaders, E. Che
Guevara, but also of other foreign political refugees who had
found asylum in Cuba and who now find political climate the
inconvenient...."
Reuters reports from Vienna: "Well-informed Hungarian sources said
in Budapest today that Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China would
visit Rumania early in March.... The sources attached little special
significance to the visit, suggesting that it was merely a 'demonstra-
tion of Rumania's indepedence from the Soviet Union.'"
February 21-22: NCNA on the 21st claims that "the study of Mao Tse-tung's
writings in China today is taking on an unprecedented mass character
and developing in depth." On the 22nd it reveals that "a lively exchange
of experience on the study of Mao Tse-tung's writings took place at a
9-day conference attended by 1,500 people that ended here last weekend....
(It) is one of many now being convened in the urban and rural areas of
the country as the study of Mao Tse-tung's writings develops in depth."
Non-Communist observers see the Chinese leadership seriously concerned
about the danger of revisionism developing within China.
February 22: Peking People's le's Daily publishes the full text of "Cuban
Premier Fidel Castro's 6 Feb. anti-Chinese statement," together with an
editor's note which includes passages such as the following:
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"In the midst of the concerted attacks on China by the imperi-
alists headed by the U.S., the reactionaries of all countries, and
the Khrushchev revisionists, the Cuban Premier, Fidel Castro, has
added his voice to the anti-China chorus....
Premier Castro lets loose a torrent of vicious abuse organist
the CPR.... He accuses China of 'dishonesty,' 'cynicism,' 'bad
faith,' 'perfidy,' (etc.).... A big country should not bully a
small one, or vice versa; both should abide by principle and reason.
Premier Castro is utterly unreasonable when he incites anti-Chinese
feelings on the pretext of China's rice exports to Cuba and its
distribution of printed matter in Cuba.... Premier Castro has
arbitrarily laid at China's door the blame for the 'grave diffi-
culties' Cuba had encountered in the economic field. This way
of shifting the blame onto others is far from clever....
...Premier Castro has gone very far down the road of opposition to
China. People will wait and see how much further he is prepared
to go....
We have not so far given a systematic reply to Premier Castro's
anti-Chinese statements. We reserve our right to do so.
Premier Castro's statement of 6 February is useful material.
We are publishing it here in full and are broadcasting it to the
world in various languages. We hope that the Chinese people and
the people of Latin America and other parts of the world will read
it, ponder over the problems it raises, and fraw their own conclu-
sions."
Simultaneously with the release of the above by NCNA on the 21st,
Izvestiya stresses Soviet complete unity and friendship with Cuba,
emphasizing its agreement to boost its trade with Cuba by 20%.
February 22 and 24: NCNA Peking publicizes an article entitled "Anti-
China Campaign in Full Swing" from a February issue of Vanguard, organ
of the pro-Chinese dissident CP of Australia (M-L). It includes the
charge that "the Soviet revisionists are just as violent as the U.S.
imperialists in their anti-China campaign. They conduct their anti-China
campaign dressed u_p in Communist laanguage. It is a dirtier campaign for
that, but it is the same campaign.' Another NCNA Peking release on the
24th describes an article from the "February .Vol 3 No. 4 issue" of Van-
guard (not clear whether this is the same as above) which includes the
assertion:
"Why, too, do the Soviet leaders join with the U.S. imperialists
in attacks upon China? Whatever the motive (and we say it is the
same), it has the same result -- to prepare for war against China."
February 23: Ulan Bator MONTSAME announces the publication Mongolia of
an illustrated book, Friendship Solid As Steel, on the Brezhnev-led Soviet
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party-government delegation visit to Mongolia.
February 23 and 25: Warsaw news agency PAP releases the following com-
munique:
"Slanderous and anti-state publications and materials have
been circulated throughout Poland in recent weeks. It has been
established that these materials, which have not appeared for the
first time, were printed in Albania this time, too.
It has been established in the last few days that the Albanian
Embassy went so far as to provide Kazimierz Mijal, a Polish citizen,
with an Albanian diplomatic passport, issued in the name of an
Albanian citizen who had stayed in Poland from 8 to 15 February
this year. Using this passport, Kazimierz Mijal left Poland ille-
gally.
As this activity of the Albanian Embassy constitutes a viola-
tion of the principles of international law and good practice, as
well as a violation of the law and order in force in the Polish
People's Republic, the Polish Govt has recognized the further stay
in Poland of the Ambassador of the Albanian People's Republic, Koco
Prifiti, as undesirable."
On the 25th, Tirana releases the text of an Albanian Foreign Ministry
note to the Polish Government which rejects the Polish charges as "ground-
less and purposely created by the Polish Govt"; ties them to the 11
February Albanian open letter to the Polish Party rejecting its initiative
toward calling a meeting of Warsaw Pact and Asian socialist countries
(#72) "under pressure of the Soviet revisionist government"; and demands
that the Polish Ambassador to Albania, Stanislaw Rogulski, be removed
as persona non grata.
February 24: Tokyo newspaper Sankei reports "information confirmed by
public security officials" to the effect that the Miyamoto-led JCP dele-
gation touring China and Vietnam is scheduled to visit the USSR to attend
the 23rd CPSU Congress. It interprets the JCP decision as meaning that
"the JCP has reached an important turning point in deciding that the party
should adopt its own "independent" policy -- independent of either the
USSR or China.
February 25: Albanian Zeri I Popullit attacks Soviet UN Delegate
Fedorenko's letter to U Thant proposing an April session of the UN Com-
mittee on the Definition of Aggression as deceitful, another link in
"the long chain of demagogical and perfidious acts by the revisionist
Soviet leaders."
A London Observer article by Lajos Lederer, citing news from
Bucharest, describes Chinese refusal to extradite a number of defectors
from the Soviet Union on the ground that Russia failed to extradite
Chinese defectors who fled to Soviet Siberia and Kazakhstan. The escapees
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300060005-9
from the Soviet Union are reportedly Bessarabians who were exiled there
when the USSR annexed that territory from Rumania in 1945, and the Chinese
allowed them to contact the Rumanian Embassy in Peking to ask for help
to return to Rwnania. The USSR and China signed an extradition agreement
in 1951.
Reporting on the ratification of the new Soviet-Mongolian treaty
of alliance, AP Moscow says that unconfirmed reports have reached Moscow
that two or three Soviet Array divisions have entered Monga1i because of
Chinese military concentrations across the border.
February 26: The only Soviet acknowledgement of the 16th anniversary of
the 20th CPSU Congress, as far as we are aware, comes in an "in passing
endorsement in the text of a Pravda editorial pegged to the 23rd CPSU
Congress. (Zagreb Vjesnik's Moscow correspondent Bilic on the 28th
pointedly comments that the anniversary would have been ignored in the
USSR but for this Pravda reference.) Yugoslav and Polish tributes on the
anniversary were a.escribed in #72 (Feb 9, 15~: we have seen only one
more ackilowledgetrient -- a signed article by Ondrej Klokoc in the organ
of the Slbvakian branch of the Czechoslovak Party, Bratislava Pravda,
on Feb. i1.. He generally endorses it, but regrets that measures against
the "cult of J.V. Stalin's personality" concentrated attention on itself
and 'made many people in our country understand the 20th Congress more
or less one-sidedly." Warning of pressure developed by imperialist
propaganda for speedier de-Stalinization in the socialist countries, he
writes: "In our country ... the enemy plays this tune with special
emphasis, since he knows of our weakness -- our trend to 'humanize' M-L...
and to revive 'our traditional Czechoslovak democratism' of the Masaryk-
Benes brand...."
5 (Chronology.)
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27: CI - 1A000300060d 5- ' ch 1966
995 WH,d. ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE OF BRAZILIAN RECOVERY
SITUATION: The second anniversary of the Brazilian Revolution
(to be celebrated on 31 March) will soon be at hand and this provides
a convenient peg for stimulating propaganda favorable to the achieve-
ments of the government of President Humberto Castello Branco. Such
propaganda is particularly necessary since the government itself is
seemingly disinterested in obtaining a "good press" and apparently
satisfied to let accomplishments speak for themselves. A further argu-
ment for stimulating favorable treatment is that press coverage tends
to focus on sensational developments in Brazil, particularly any indi-
cations that the revolution is going astray; this tends to eclipse less
remarkable, though fundamentally more important information such as the
improvement in the foreign trade balance. Finally, current Brazilian
developments require, above all, historical perspective. It is es-
sential to recall the legacy of the Kubitschek, Quadros, and especially
the Goulart regimes and the chaotic economic, political and social con-
ditions which sparked the Revolution, in order to comprehend the motives
and actions of the present government.
The most notable positive achievements of the Castello Branco gov-
ernment lie in the field of economic stabilization. On the domestic
front, inflation has been cut from a projected annual rate of over 140%
in early 1964 to 45% in 1965, with hopes of a further reduction in 1966.
The austerity program has resulted in a substantial reduction of the
budget deficit once financed by large inflationary new currency issu-
ances. Major administrative reforms are being undertaken, including
in the autonomous government agencies such as the Federal railroads,
merchant marine, etc., subsidies to which formerly absorbed more than
one-half of the budget deficit. Efforts are successfully being made
to hold down large wage and price increases, improve tax collections
and limit credit,
The stabilization program has been accompanied by an extensive eco-
nomic reform and development plan, including reforms of the tax, capital
market, and banking systems, Agrarian reform is intended to increase
agricultural output and assist in the redistribution of land not in pro-
ductive use. Improvements in education, health, housing and working
conditions are also programmed. Major emphasis is being placed on more
rapid economic growth and after two years of stagnation, the rate of
growth in 1965 reached 5%.
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The government has taken various positive steps to encourage a
resumption of private foreign investment which virtually halted under
Goulart. Recent announcements by Ford, Volkswagen, Union Carbide,
Hanna Mining, Gulf('o.il,Phillips, and other major foreign companies
indicate that international confidence in Brazil's ability to put its
economic affairs in order under sound management is increasing..
The revolutionary government has instituted a series of political
reforms which seem to have received less criticism on the home front
than abroad. The old political party system of 13 or more groupings
has been abolished and an effort is being made to concentrate their
adherents into two or three major parties which would be more broadly
based and less representative of narrow factional interests. Elections
of the President and of state governors in 1966 will now be indirect,
that is by the national and state legislatures rather than direct, as
in the past. Direct elections for the Federal Congress and the Etate
legislatures are scheduled for November 15. The government has acquired
the power to recess the Congress for periods up to six months in the
event of serious internal strife (this is a temporary measure which ex-
pires at the termination of the present government), In the first months
of the revolution 300 persons were deprived of their political rights for
a period of 10 years; these were persons accused of corruption, Communism,
or supporting the anti-democratic initiatives of the Goulart regime.
Elections are scheduled for the Fall of this year and President
Castello Branco will step down in March 1967. During the remaining year
of his regime many other problems remain to be solved; these include im-
plementation of the agrarian reform bill, building and staffing an ex-
tensive school system, raising the literacy level, extending the road
system into the hinterlands,raising the level of real wages, and counter-
ing a resurgent nationalism. As may be seen, these problems essentially
revolve around the establishment of economic stability and then renewed
economic growth; without them there can be no political solution.
A further point of concern is the nature of the government which
will be elected next Fall and installed the following March. The degree
to which this new government continues the general policies of the pres-
ent regime, and the degree to which it eschews military dictatorship,
are questions of considerable concern. The current front-running candi-
date-is War Minister Artur de Costa e Silva, a professional soldier,
whose principal present base of power is the military. Informed observ-
ers are not entirely sanguine that he would readily adapt himself to the
role of civilian leader of a civilian government.
2
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 25X1C1Ob
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996. SINYAVSKY-DANIEL CASE
SITUATION: Voluminous reporting of the Sinyavsky-Daniel (S-D) case*
recorded first the reaction of non-bloc intellectuals, then a broad
spectrum of world opinion, and finally the leaders or media of at least
12 non-bloc CP's. Non-bloc concern focused on the issue of freedom and
justice; prominent intellectuals tried to get Soviet leaders to release
S and D who, since mid-September 1965, had been held incommunicado,
probably without counsel, and with no charges preferred against them.
Most of the CP's spoke out after the trial: their main concern was that
the S-D case would affect adversely their own positions. The attach-
ment and referenced articles in Press Comment 1 Mar 66 provide abundant
details on the case: we will deal here largely with facts and specu-
lation about aspects of the case which are given little coverage else-
where, viz., internal Soviet politics, problems with youth, legal aspects,
and coincidental developments in other bloc countries.
The Soviet leaders were clearly aware of the crescendo of foreign
concern over the S-D case; yet they permitted a patently rigged trial,
resulting in near-maximum sentences on l4 Feb. Domestic considerations,
therefore, appear to have been paramount. Inasmuch as earlier intensi-
fications of the struggle between the intellectuals and the regime
usually coincided with increasing difficulties for the regime, it is
assumed that the S-D case is a current symptom of such difficulties.
'S and D were charged with producing anti-Soviet propaganda. Their
works were published in the West under the respective noms-de plume of
Tertz and Arzhak.
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(996 Cont.)
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In the realm of politics, severe struggles are suggested by a
survey of intellectual questions in the Soviet press between March and
September 1965. Most revealing was the sharp exchange in August and
September between :a) Komsomol chief Sergey Pavlov [a Shelepin prote'g4
who was linked to the S-D case by a prominent Soviet author (LOU)] and
b) former chief Pravda editor Aleksey Rumyantsev, over the issue of
permissible approaches to sociological and ideological problems. Pavlov
won, and continued to propound the hard line on culture and a tolerant
attitude towards Stalin. Rumyantsev, who had vigorously defended the
liberal authors, was removed from his post some time between 9 and 21
September. (The generally accepted date of the arrest of S and D is
13 September.) It is suggested, on this basis, that if any top Soviet
leader was the victor in the S-D case, it was Shelepin.
A subsequent political victory for Shelepin is suggested by the
sentences. Just before the trial P.N. Demichev, a candidate for the
presidium with responsibility for ideological questions, assured West-
erners in Moscow that the sentences of S and D would be light. (Tarsis
stated in London that, according to Moscow rumor of early February, S
would get 3 years and D would get 2 years). The harshness of the actual
sentences (7 and 5 years) indicates that an earlier decision has been re-
versed. A harsh sentence would be in keeping with the castigation of
authors by Pavlov.
In cultural matters, the enduring problems of the ideologically
"correct" up-bringing of youth appear to have become increasingly signi-
ficant in recent years. This is evidenced by the deep involvement in
the S-D case of Pavlov, whose Komsomol embraces the 14- to 26-year age
group. Pavlov's chief complaint about the influence of the undesired
kind of literature is that it estranges youth from a communist world
outlook and from a clear, precise idea of communist ideology, and that
it interferes with the ability of Soviet youth to objectively analyze
real life and hold correct ideological positions. But Pavlov makes only
feeble efforts to find a way to realize his ideological aims. (See at-
tached translation of article, which details other regime problems with
youth.) Furthermore, the outcome of the S-D case is hardly conducive
to the production of the "right" kind of literature for Soviet youth.
Nor can the recently published praise of the terror-tainted Zhdanov (see
attachment) be expected to inspire Soviet authors to fulfill Pavlov's
prescription. The Soviets may succeed in restricting unbridled creative
writing. But they have given no evidence that they are preparing an ef-
fective program of ideological guidance for youth.
The persistence of other vexing problems -- economic, foreign af-
fairs -- has probably tried the patience of the Soviet leaders. They
may well have been tempted to take a Stalinist short-cut in dealing with
S and D. Whatever their motivation, the leaders appeared to pay no heed
to the substantial post-Stalin efforts of Soviet jurists who had attempted
to reform the seriously deficient Soviet legal system.
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The legal aspects of the S-D case have drawn sharp criticism
throughout the world. These aspects include: the long pre-trial
incarceration incommunicado; the prejudicial attacks on S and D in
the Government press before the trial; the limited access to the
trial (no foreigners; 70 invited spectators, some of whom laughed
heartily at the defendants' responses); the vagueness of the charges;
the reported surprise call on S to submit his plea a day or 2 before
scheduled; the failure of the Soviet court to furnish proof of guilt
to the public; the harshness of the sentences, from which no appeal
is permitted.
For a comparison of reports of the trial with the Criminal Code
of the RSFSR, the article. by Harvard's Professor Berman is by far the
most useful and thorough. (see Press Comment 1 March 66) Berman stresses
the Code's critical requirement that there be "convincing proof of a di-
rect intent -- a special purpose -- knowingly to defame the Soviet system
and to weaken Soviet authority." The British CP chief, John'Gollan,
criticizing the trial, concluded: "Justice should not only be done but
should be seen to be done. Unfortunately, this cannot be said in the
case of this trial." (see Press Comment l March 66 )
General foreign reaction has been more voluminous and harsher than
expected. The vast majority of leftist intellectuals have protested
individually or collectively: in some countries, the communists were
virtually the only ones not participating in the protest.
The pressures of anti-Soviet feeling generated by the S-D case
were evidently more than the CP's of many countries could stand. There-
fore a totally unexpected round of protests was issued by the leaders or
appear.e d- in the CP media of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, UK, France,
Italy, Austria, Uruguay, US, Iceland, Chile. A theme running through most
of the CP protests was that the Soviets' actions were indirectly injurious
to the CP in the non-communist country. Little sympathy was spent, how-
ever, on the plight of the 2 defendants.
During the time that the S-D case was developing, signs of cultural
suppression appeared in 5 other bloc countries, too: Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. A relationship between these
events can only be speculated on. Some of the highlights of the events
in the bloc were:
-- a suppression of journals formerly used by young, creative
writers in Czechoslovakia;
-- the arrest of a poet and attacks on creative artists in East
Germany;
-- attacks on abstract art by the party in Rumania;
-- questioning of the relationship of Marxism and the individual
(within Polish party circles) and a legal case involving the smug-
gling of manuscripts out of Poland;
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-- a clear warning to Hungarian writers to stay within the pre-
scribed bounds.
In more than one of the countries, there was clear-cut evidence
of a reversal of policy, of a step backwards to more restrictions on
the expressions of creative intellectuals. Further details are given
in the attachments.
(996 Cont.)
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 ~4 March 1966
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997. THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS:
Stockholm, 5-8 May 1966
SITUATION: The Socialist International (S.I.), headquartered in
London, will hold its bi-annual Congress in Stockholm, Sweden, from 5
to 8 May, 1966. The Congress is the highest forum of the International,
in which -- as of 1959, the latest available world-wide statistics -- 39
socialist parties are either members or observers. (The now near-inactive
Asian Socialist Conference, headquartered in Rangoon, Burma, has in the
past cooperated closely with the S.I. and the Latin American Bureau of
the S.I., headquartered in Uruguay is an affiliated organization.) As of
1959, these parties represented a total electorate of 66 million voters,
owned 175 daily newspapers in 12 languages and published 154 periodicals.
The S.I. represents the forces of organized Democratic Socialism
throughout the world. The Socialist Parties are non-Communist and indeed
have reason, based on their history, to oppose and fear Communist inter-
ference and infiltration. They represent a substantial segment of labor
and leftist thought outside the Communist world. Their influence in most
countries in Europe, the Near East, and in some non-Communist Asian and
Latin American countries is considerable. Their achievements are parti-
cularly notable in Western Europe, while in Japan, Burma, India and Ceylon
they have also carried marked weight. The S.I., and the parties of which
it is composed, reflect the genuine meaning of Socialism: the gradual
socialization of the principal means-of production, by consent and com-
pensation (rather than by compulsion) and by constitutional (parliamentary)
action through constructive evolutionary processes (rather than by violent
revolution and confiscation); this as opposed to the Soviet and Peking mis-
construction of the term which identifies Socialism as the dictatorship
of the proletariat through revolution against and destruction of the exist-
ing social, political and economic order to be replaced by Communist leader-
ship. For detailed background on the S.I., see unclassified attachment.
As reported in the Socialist international Information (S.I.I.) of
18 Dec. 1965, the 9 December Bureau meeting of the S.I. in Vienna made
final arrangements for the Congress and for the preceding special confer-
ence. S.I.I. reported that "the theme of the special conference will be
'Democratic Socialist thought and action in the new countries.' This
special conference will be of private character, but the same theme will
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--U (997 Cont
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be discussed at the Congress, which will also discuss the international
situation, the integration of Europe, and disarmament. Provisions will
also be made for the discussion of the problem of future liaison in the
Asia-Oceania area, to respond to the desire of the parties in the area
and aiming at a final discussion of the problem at a meeting point in
Asia at the end of 1966."
The S.I.I. also reported that the Disarmament Commission of the
S.I. Will prepare a draft of resolutions for consideration by the vari-
ous parties as a policy document at the Stockholm Congress. -- No ad-
ditional information on the agenda of the Congress is available at this
writing.
While information on the Congress agenda is sparse, there is reason
to assume that the Stockholm Congress may become marked by attacks on
U.S. foreign policy -- despite the fact that the majority of the parties
affiliated with the S.I. have always been staunchly anti-Communist and
generally friendly, or at least objective,toward the U.S. These are
likely to include first and foremost, U.S. policy on Vietnam, but pre-
sumably also U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, U.S. opposition
to the admission of Communist China to the U.N., the civil rights issue
in the U.S., the alleged "persecution" of the anti-Vietnam "movement" in
the U.S., the maintenance of military bases abroad (in Japan in particular),
and others. Concern over escalation of the war in Vietnam could produce a
critical attitude by the current Congress toward U.S. policy with left-wing
parties, such as the Japanese SP, being among the leaders condemning U.S.
policy. Even moderate European Social Democratic parties, like the Scandi-
navian, motivated partly by fear of escalation of the Vietnamese conflict
into a general war, and feeling pacifist and Communist pressures at home
could become increasingly critical. Cooperation of the French SP with the
Communists against DeGaulle in the recent Presidential election, and simi-
lar "pro-Popular Front" trends elsewhere, may further dilute the traditional
anti-Communist position of the S.I. 25X1CJjap
2
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998. SCIENCE AND SCIENTISTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA
SITUATION: Communist China exploded an atomic device in October 1964
(and another in May 1965), shocking much of the world. Reactions ranged
from coldly scientific commentary on the primitive nature of the device to
laymen's private and editorial expressions of apprehension, strong concern
and even fear. Scientific advances had been going forward behind China's
walls for a number of years, but much of the world was unaware of how far
science in China had progressed until the drama of the bomb. [The emotional
reaction to the explosion in technically advanced countries was not unlike
the reaction iii.'the United States to the Soviet Union's first orbiting of
an earth satellite, Sputnik I, in October 1957.] On the basis of available
evidence Western experts have concluded that most of Communist China's
scientific and technical resources are presently allocated to the further
development of more advanced and conventional weapons programs -- as distinct
from pure research and from industrial and other peaceful uses.
Communist China has traveled a rocky road trying to reach scientific
independence. The main burden of her scientific development effort has
been borne by older scientists and engineers trained in America and Europe
prior to 1949, and possibly by those trained in the Soviet Union largely
before 1960. China's first steps in mid-20th century science were taken
with the assistance of the Soviet Union. In the decade between 1950 and
1960 over 7,000 Chinese took their scientific undergraduate and graduate
work in the USSR, and over half of that number completed their academic
training there. Those scientists could be playing a major role in China's
scientific program -- unless they are hampered by regime suspicions that
they might be pro-Soviet, or by bureaucratic controls over the science
program.
In-country training since the communist takeover has been of low cali-
ber. The dominance of the Communist Party in China's scientific life has
been a major factor in slowing down her scientific developments, and in
alienating the older foreign-trained Chinese scientists as well as the
Chinese-trained younger scientists. For example, the Party's Great Leap
Forward (1.958-1960) set science back drastically by spawning radical train-
ing schemes and introducing the study-work program which stressed labor
more than education. 1961 saw education reasserting itself by increasing
study and laboratory time and decreasing time spent by students in jobs and
at political meetings.
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However, in late 1964 the "social rectification" program once more
took precedence and students and graduates in all fields were sent to
the countryside to perform manual labor (as were high party officials).
The increasing stress on this program has been matched by increasing
resistance by many young Chinese, particularly those in scientific
fields, who resent the enforced periods away from their chosen work and
their exile from urban areas which supply the textbooks, classes, labora-
tories and the inspiration of a scientific-academic environment. The
young resent the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) restrictions on higher
scientific education and its imposition of party-chosen priority tasks
on them. This has created a vicious circle which inhibits the rapid
growth of scientific research and development and creates a resentful,
educated elite who may not always continue to be sufficiently placated
by the prerogatives science and higher scientific education are awarded
in China.
The rift in Sino-Soviet relations in 1960 was a far more serious
matter for China than for her Soviet mentors. Unaided, China did not
possess the technical capability to develop weapons for modern warfare.
With the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, China has been forced to con-
centrate on the technically-developed non-communist world. She has been
hampered on two counts -- her own technical inadequacies (so that she
has little or nothing to offer another nation in scientific exchanges),
and her chronic suspicion of things foreign -- which has blocked the
establishment of the relatively open relations which have characterized
scientific exchanges in the free world. China's effort to establish an
international scientific organization independent of the Soviet's World
Federation of Scientific Workers has apparently not been very productive.
However, necessity has pushed China toward the non-communist, techni-
cally advanced world and she has begun to acquire scientific materials
and apparatus from outside the Bloc, to send science students to European
countries for advanced study, to adapt Western scientific methods, to at-
tend scientific conferences and even to invite Western scientists to China
for consultation and lecture tours. China has also used scientific and
technological help as an instrument of foreign policy to gain access and
influence in the less developed countries. The extent of the help ex-
tended by China in these "scientific exchanges" -- especially compared 25X1C10b
to that available from advanced free world countries -- is minimal.
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C.S. MONITOR
Feb. 1966.
)e at Sovie$s
' Sp?cici to The Christian Science Monitor
usso?Finnish War, the Soviet Union de
andcd a!'50-year lease' on, the Porkkala`
rea, :12 Miles west of Helsinki.. The So='
lets trans tormed it into a nav l ' b I ;
a
'
r
t
bl
st's
cart
s
e
a
U+u
.
on. Helsingln Sanomat?printed.his letter.
After Finland's defeat in the Second:
CPYIGHT Stockholm
g ., ,. main reason was that the Soviets;
Sanomat.poked`fun at the 10th anniversary.{ Y.110' onger had any use.for it.
observance of the return of the Porkkala'r owever, the existence of a Soviet mill
', ns 1 e. Soviet s, ed as a sign of friendly relations .be '
;Union:.' x, en the 'Russia and , 'inlhnd, many Finns{
A few days ago a' cartoon th Helsin in the
ase, n
Foreign n s ter 1 ar a ainen' , the. Soviets decided to return Porkkala
has accused his nation's largest and most +inland.
-respected 'newspaper of willfully harming r.. lthou h Perkkala was ; supposedly , re-i
,Finland's fridnAl relatio -%-4-U th ' ` g
Urho Kekkonen and attended . by. M R.'.; e non?Cbmmunist press knows that it
, ?Kusmin, Soviet Assistant Secretary of Com ;'.n u t refrain from outright criticisms of the}
Then and, editors are very aware of the limi-"
T;
anniversary was marked by an official'..'t- ti ns on what should; e expressed in ring')
reception given by Finland's President ' I p
vie
,.. ... ,,
(;gesture. ,, k ;, though 'there is no official censorship in:,
- .r, ; au 41a-w111 agalnsr wnat many. called
} wish?to write, questioned whether ;there was ',a a 'occupation.
any real reason to celebrate the So
t}
.,area to Furnish,possession. ?;t r base , in Finland ' in 'the heart of th
e
i "Karl," whose' political cartoons ?. fro. i ., .
_ , .. .
.
f
t
merce, A. E. Kovalev, Soviet Ambassador o v et Union. Such views must be carefully4
corps.. ? uave ueen used, as a means of ex'
fp e ing theme ? ; ,
An foreign minic4nr i i-.&. A
t .~.:,
i
has b
h
o--- ?.?~?.
e
aved u1 w p- r Its . Views are moderately, consel'Va.
this matter," Dr. Karjalainen said in a I e
?
,'the newspaper;, merican and auspiCio~ls of Soviet
V41 4,
f
'
i t1
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Frensa Latina radio
Havana
10 February 1966
Castro Letter to Blasts
Latin American Charges
[The Cuban revolutionary government sent a letter
to UN Secretary General U Thant answering the docu-
ment containin.* the charg^s sent to the
Concil by re;,resentati-re'a of Latin American rc e 21-
ments -- excl- dJ.n.-Mexico. The text of Prime
Minister Fidel Castro follows.]
"Your excellency, Mr. U Thant, secretary general of the United Nations:
I am addressing you in order to give a proper answer to the letter sent
to the Security Council chairman by representatives of Latin American
governments, with the exception of Mexico, which, following the orienta-
tions of the,U.S. interventionist and imperialist government, 'denounced'
before that organization the resolutions of the first conference of soli-
darity of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which took
place in Havana from 3 to 12 January 1966. I also request that this
answer be circulated among all the members of that organization.
"It is incredible that these governments are so cynical as to accuse Cuba
and the conference of solidarity of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America of intervention, because tne governments on behalf of which the
letter is signed. are pre,,: =sel;T the most servile instruments of Yankee im-
perialism in Latin America, the majority of which unhesitatingly supported
the criminal intervention of the Yankee troops in Santo Domingo, and only
a few of which lodged a weak and hypocritical protest.
"With the cowardly and shameless complicity of these same governments, the
Yankee military occupation and oppression of that country and that brother
Latin American people are maintained, a country in which almost daily the
invading troops fire on the people and murder defenseless men and women.
Some of these governments, such as Brazil, Honduras, and Costa Rica are
participating directly in that military occupation. The limit of cynicism
is reached when Mr. Garcia-Godoy, a puppet without dignity or patriotism,
signs that declaration in the name of a country which is occupied and op-
pressed by Yankee troops and other foreign mercenary soldiers.
"In fact, all these governments are instruments of the interference,
domination, and exploitation of their own countries by U.S. imperialism,
which directs their armed forces, banking institutions and trade, in a
word, the economy of each of them. It sets their foreign policy and
shamelessly reserves for itself the right to occupy them militarily, as
was done in Santo Domingo, when it deems it necessary to its exploiting
interests.
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In collusion with governments that represent those same interests, the
United States has conducted its openly interventionist policy in this
hemisphere.
"Thus, in 1954, using mercenary forces coming from bases established in
neighboring countries, it overthrew the legitimate constitutional govern-
ment of Guatemala, to plunge that country back into the depths of exploi-
tation. In 1961 it organized, financed, and directed.---with the partici-
pation of the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua--the mercenary
invasion at Giron Beach. In 1964 it perpetrated the massacre of the
Panamanian people because they were vindicating their sovereignty over
the Canal territory. And in 1965, defying the protest and indignation
of the world, it invaded and occupied Dominican territory.
"The Latin American peoples' feeling of militant solidarity has grown,
developed, and become more deeply entrenched in struggles against Yankee
imperialist intervention, against Yankee occupation and colonization of
Puerto Rico, against Yankee seizure of a portion of Panamanian territory
in 1903; against the second Yankee intervention in Cuba in 1906 against
Yankee intervention in Mexico in 1914 and 1917, against Yankee interven-
tion in Haiti in 1915, against Yankee intervention in the Dominican
Republic in 1916, against Yankee intervention in Nicaragua in 1910, 1912,
and 1926; and against the aforementioned Yankee aggression in Guatemala
and Cuba.
"And today, that feeling of solidarity acquired extraordinary force and
vigor because of the military occupation of Santo Domingo and the threat
of intervention in any Latin American nation. That threat was expressed
concretely in the recent resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives,
which said brazenly that the U.S. Government should intervene, when it
deems it advisable, in any territory of this continent.
"The Yankee imperialists have pursued their interventionist policy in
Africa, Asia, and the rest of the world, in addition to Latin America.
Yankee intervention in the Congo under the U.N. banner is an example.
Currently, Yankee intervention against the people of South Vietnam and
the air raids on the Democratic Republic of Worth Vietnam furnish an ex-
ample of how the circles of the Pentagon and the North American monopolies
carry on their interventionist policy beyond the seas and endanger world
peace.
"The so-called governments of Latin American countries which, alleging a
danger to peace from the resolutions adopted at the solidarity conference
of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, have signed that letter
addressed to the president of the U.N. Security Council and have turned
a deaf ear and a blind eye to the monstrous reality imposed by imperialism
in the world of today.
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"The peoples of the Latin American countries that those governments claim
to represent are mercilessly plundered by U.S. monopolies. The peoples
under those governments have a right--which they will exercise sooner
or later--to sweep out those governments, which are traitors, and serve
foreign interests in their own countries, and they will sweep them out
with the most violent revolutionary action, because imperialist exploi-
tation and, oppression is exercised increasingly by means of force, vio-
lence, and arms, and no other possible choice is left.
"To proclaim the right of those peoples which are oppressed and exploited
by imperialism, with the complicity of the feudal oligarchies and the most
reactionary classes of each of those countries-,-the privileged and abso-
lutely minority interests which represent such governments--is not an act
of intervention, but rather the struggle against intervention.
"It is not just to confuse the spirit of independence with interventionism.
"The revolutionary representatives of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, who met in Havana, certainly agreed to redouble the strug?
gle against intervention and to help people who are fighting for their
liberation and independence. And not only that, they also stressed that
it is the duty of progressive states and governments to support peoples
who are fighting against interventionist and aggressive imperialism.
`The aid extended to peoples who are fighting for independence has well
known historic and political precedents.
"No one would think of saying that the French revolutionaries, who in the
18th Century helped the North American people gain their independence from
British colonial domination, could be accused of being interventionists.
The peoples of France, the United States, and the entire world recognized
the true virtue of the valiant men who fought in America. to win the in-
dependence of the 13 colonies.
"The militant and revolutionary solidarity of the Latin American people
was manifested very actively in the liberating epic of Bolivar, San Martin,
and Sucre. Peoples of Latin America recall that solidarity with gratitude.
No one would think of labeling the Latin American liberation movement dur-
ing the last century as an act of intervention.
"In 1826, Simon Bolivar called the peoples of America to the Panama Con-
gress to discuss the best means to complete the liberation of the continent
from Spanish colonial domination.
"According to the opinion of Yankee imperialism and the miserable lackeys
who signed the aforementioned letter, the Panama Congress could be con-
sidered an infringement of the sovereignty of nations, having an openly
interventionist nature.
"Let imperialist aggression, oppression, and intervention cease; let the
United States leave Dominican territory; let its troops withdraw from
southeast Asia and Vietnam; let no more bombing strikes be carried out
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against the DRV; let the territory which was usurped in the Canal Zone
be returned to the Panamanian people. Stop exploiting the poor people
of America and other parts of the world; let the United States give back
the territory used for military bases on foreign soil, including the
Guantanamo base; let it abandon its conspiracy in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. In short, let the system of imperialist domination end. That
is what is demanded by the peoples and the men who legitimately represent
the interests of the peoples.
"The Revolutionary Government of Cuba fully supports the resolutions
adopted by the first solidarity conference of the peoples of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.
"We are not unaware, Mr. Secretary General, that the cynical statements
made by the men who claim to be representatives of 18 peoples of Latin
America conceal the intention of justifying future intervention by U.S.
troops in other Latin American nations, and particularly a means for at-
tacking Cuba when the revolutionary tide swells on this oppressed, ex-
ploited continent and the insignificant U.S. minority -- the monopolistic
circles that govern the United States, who are responsible for the tension
existing in the world and responsible for aggression and interference di-
rected against the peoples -- see the empire of their interests crumble
at their very feet.
"But Cuba, Mr. Secretary General, is not defended by an unarmed although
heroic people, like the Dominican Republic. The day this imperialism and
its accomplices dare show their claws in our country, then the time will
really have come in the bosom of that U.N. organization to sigh for peace,
because the resistance they will meet will be capable of shaking the world.
"With highest esteem, i remain attentively yours, Fidel Castro Ruz, prime
minister of the revolutionary government."
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Fcexpts arom the press
and radio of the USSR
USSR Positions on Ii.litainit "National. Liberat on
with particular reference to the
Tricontinent Conference in Havana
January 1966
A. Soviet foreign policy places ni:;.litart alliance between the
socialist countries and the international working class above the
principle of national sovereignty: government officials label
Tricontineiut Conference an instrument for strengtheL= nS this
relationship.
1 excerpts from Pravda,.Fugust 8, 1965 ed i toria:4, "The
Noble Aims of Soviet Foreign Policy":
" ... LUSSR foreign polic ff is aimed ... at support for the peoples
s trugg;ling for liberat-.o A, at the ea-around development of
solidarity and cooperation with the...states of Asia, Africa
and Latin America. .. .
" ....The Soviet Union unfailingly proceeds from the premise
that the right of each people to free and independent development
is sacred, that the desire to put an end to the oppression of
imperialism is prc:round.iy natural and fully just`.f:,ved. To
imperialist attem +Fs to take away this sacred right..., the
peoples answer with cve :'y means of struggle available to them,
including wars of national liberation...
"...the Soviet Union has supported and will continue to
support the national liberation struggle in all its forms,
both peaceful and non-peaceful. The peoples righting for their
independence regard the Soviet Union with full justification as
their reliable friend, ... since it-gives them real help, not
in words but in deeds....
"....The active assistance of the socialist countries to
the peoples fighting for their emancipation...facilitates the
conditions of their struggle.... At the same t.J.ie, the national
liberation struggle, ... contributes to the strengthening of
all anti-imperialist forces and helps the peoples who are
building socialism and coinimutisin...."
2. Excerpts from 4bscow broadcasts to home audiences,
January 2, 1966. Aessage to the Tricontinental Conference
from CPSU Central Committee First Secretary Leonid Sr.%ezhnev
and USSR Council of Ministers Chairman A. N. Kosygin.
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"...The Soviet people greet your conference with a firm
conviction that it will serve toward a still greater cohesion
of the masses which oppose imperialism in the three continents
and toward strengthening their militant friendship with the
peoples of the socialist countries and with the international
working class movement....
"...We are firmly convinced that the freedom-loving
peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America together with the
progressive forces of the entire world will firmly rebuff
the aggressors, will defend freedom and security of the
peoples, and will not allow neocolonialism to become established
in the liberated countries. The Soviet people resolutely
condemn arbitrariness and interference of the imperialists in
the internal affairs of other countries and, remaining true to
their international duty, are rendering and will continue to
render all possible support to the peoples who are struggling
for freedom and national independence."
3. Excerpts from Pravda, January 16, 1966, speech by
CPSU First Secretary Brezhnev at the Soviet-Mongolian rally
in Ulan Bator)January 15, 1966.
"The aim of Soviet foreign policy and other socialist
countries has been, is, and will continue to be concern for
the strengthening of the world socialist system, support for
the peoples in their struggle for freedom....
...The communist party and the peoples of the Soviet--Unidc
see their international. duty -in-supporting the liberation
struggle of other peoples. This struggle presently assumes
various forms, depending on specific conditions and tasks. Some
people have to defend their freedom with weapons in hand,
whereas it is important for other people today to struggle for
economic independence and social progress.
"...More than once in the last decade peoples struggling for
their freedom and independence have turned to Moscow, to the
..party of Lenin for help and support. ...`fie can say with a pure
conscience: in no case did Moscow refuse such sip port.
"...The active assistance of the socialist countries to
the peoples fighting for their emancipation ... facilitates the
conditions of their struggle.... At the same time, the national
liberation struggle of the peoples, as an integral part of the
world revolutionary struggle, ... contributes to the strengthening
of all anti-imperialist forces and helps the peoples who are
building socialism and communism.
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"...The unity of the socialist countries with the peoples
of Asia, Africa and Latin America is becoming stronger ...This
was... demonstrated by the Havana Tricontinental conference.
Its decisions will undoubtedly facilitate new successes in
the liberation struggle and in the cohesion of all anti-
imperialist forces.
"...The Soviet state, since the time it was headed by Lenin,
has consistently defended the principles of peaceful
coexistence... .Today, the struggle for the triumph of the
principles of peaceful coexistence in our time means... struggling
for the creation of conditions most favorable to the triumph
of our great cause."
B. Tricontinent Conference objectives, as outlined by the Soviet
Dress, re-.nforce Soviet policy.
1. Excerpts from Pravda, November 14, 1965, Viktor
Mayevsky, commentator.
"The conference in Havana has great tasks before it. ..?
many questions on the draft agenda... include the struggle for
complete national liberation on three continents and against the
imperialist policy of isolating the peoples; the strengthening
of all forms of struggle, including the armed struggle of the
peoples of the three continents against imperialism,
colonialism and neocolonialism...; support for the just
struggle of the Cuban people and the peoples of the other
countries of Latin America; ...and ways and means for assisting
liberation movements... "
2. Excerpts from TASS, January 16, 1966, reporting from
Havana on resolutions passed at the Tricontinent Conference.
a. On the General Declaration.
"...the conference 'calls for expressions of militant,
active, dynamic solidarity of the peoples of Asia, Africa and
Latin America, for intensifying the anti-imperialist nature of
the national liberation movement... for rallying all progressive
humanity behind this struggle."
b. On the Political Resolution.
"The resolution...Lsays7 at present objective conditions
for developing revolutionary anti-imperialist struggle for
complete liberation exist on three continents. The conference...
proclaimed that all progressive countries and all revolutionary
movements will give substantial and unconditional assistance to
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any people fighting for national liberation or suffering from
imperialist aggression.`
c. On the Resolution on Economic Problems.
"The resolution calls upon all the participants ... to
redouble their efforts in rendering economic, financial, and
other assistance, i nni nrii na aasi stand wi fh arms, to countries
engaged in armed. struggle for liberation."
d. On the Peaceful Coexistence Resolution.
"...a special resolution... notes that peaceful coexistence
applies only to relations between states with different social
and political systems. It cannot apply to relations between
social classes, between the exploited and the exploiters within sep-
arate countries or between the oppressed peoples and their
oppressors.
"The resolution stresses that peaceful coexistence implies
strict observance of the principles of self-determination of
the people, of the sovereignty of all states, big and small.
Violations of the principles of peaceful coexistence gives
progressive and democratic countries the right to beat back the
aggression and to render all-round assistance to the victims
of aggression."
C. Positions taken by the key Soviet delegates to the Tricontinent
Confe_er?e are consistent with the official Soviet line.
1. Excerpts from Pravda, January 8, 1966, reporting on
the address of the head of the Soviet delegation, Sharif
Rashidov*, January 6, 1966.
..He...declared that the Soviet people support popular
wars and the armed struggle of oppressed peoples for freedom
and independence...
"'Devotion to the ideals of freedom and independence and
consistency in the struggle against any kind of oppression,
enslavement and injustice lie at the basis of the Soviet
people's world view and constitute the foundation of our
state's policy,'...
"Following Lenin's behests)-the Soviet Union consistently
struggles for universal peace and the security of peoples. We
See E below for biographic note.
4
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maintain that relations between sovereign states with different
social systems must be constructed on the basis of peaceful
coexistence. At the same time, it is clear that there is not
and cannot be any peaceful coexistence between oppressed
peoples and their oppressors, the colonialists and imperialists,
or between the imperialist aggressors and their victims.'"
2. Except from TASS January 12, 1966, interview with
Sharif Rashidov, Havana, January 12, 1966.
"For us, the Soviet people,...common interests in the
struggle against imperialism, against the forces of reaction
and oppression, are above everything else. Loyal to the duty
of proletarian internationalism, our people have helped and
will go on helping the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America
to achieve national independence, to defend them from the en-
croachments of imperialists..."
3. Excerpts from Izvestia, January 19, 1966, "Militant
Spirit of Havana": Havana correspondent V. Sliantyev's
interview with F. Tabeyev, deputy head of the Soviet delegation.
"The Soviet delegation declared from the rostrum of the
conference the full solidarity of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.
with all fighters for freedom and independence. We gave the
participants...firm and resolute assurance that the country
of Lenin will fulfill unfailingly its internationalist duty of
rendering all-round aid and support to the peoples in their
just struggle against imperialism,
"The Havana conference was a major success for all revolu-
tionary forces that are in deeds, not just in words, waging an
intense and very difficult struggle...The spirit of militant
revolutionary solidarity triumphed and gained strength in
Havana...."
D. Soviet Union does not deny that the allegedly non-official
Soviet delegates to the Tricontinent Conference acted in con-
sonance with official policy.
1. Excerpts from Izvestia, January 28, 1966, reporting by
L. Kamynin on the Organization of American States (OAS) meeting
of January 24, 1966
"...The Havana conference was the chosen object of abuse
and slander...
"The crowning point of these infamous fabrications was the
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accusation against the Soviet Union as having allegedly 'violated
the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states.'
An attempt was made to use the speech of Sh. R. Rashidev, head of
the Soviet delegation to the Havana conference, as a pretext for
this absurd accusation. But after all, everything stated by the
Soviet representative at the forum of the solidarity of the
peoples of three continents was already well known. We are
speaking of the Soviet Union's consistent support for the
national-liberation struggle of oppressed peoples..."
2. Excerpts from La Manana, Montevideo, Uruguay, February
17, 1966. Text of Soviet note to the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry.
"...charges are being circulated that representatives of
Soviet social organizations which took part in the work of the
conference called for 'subversive activity, and intervention in
the internal problems of Latin American countries,'
"...grossly falsifying the real facts, these circles are
publicizing that representatives of the Soviet Government
rather than representatives of Soviet social organizations
took part in the 'Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of
Three Continents'.
"Since the Soviet Union consistently in international
relations follows a peaceful policy aimed at strengthening the
independence and sovereignty of all nations, without interfering
in their internal affairs, the Soviet Union has extended and
will extend necessary help to those peoples who are victims
of imperialistic aggression. ...The Soviet Government gives
full support to the peoples of colonial countries who are
attempting to obtain national freedom and independence. The
Soviet people have feelings of profound friendship and solidarity
toward all peoples fighting for national freedom. It was in
this sense, specifically that the delegation of Soviet social
organizations spoke at the 'Solidarity Conference of the Peoples
of Three Continents'. At the same time the Soviet delegation
declared itself in favor of nations with different social
systems basing their relations on the principle of peaceful
coexistence, one of the fundamental principles of Soviet
foreign policy."
E. Biographical note on Sharif Rashidov: long service as political,
cultural and economic emissary of the Soviet Union to the
developing world.
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SHARIF RASHIDOV
Candidate member of the Presidium of the Central
Committee of the CPSU
First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party
Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet
In his rise from the ranks of the Uzbek Party to the
officialdom of Soviet politics, Rashidov has demonstrated both
an aptitude for administration and pronounced talent as a
writer and propagaudist. These attributes combined with his
credentials as a leader in a Soviet Asian republic have
uniquely qualified him to serve as an instrument of Soviet,
Afro-Asian policy. He is today one of the leading Soviet
personalitieo in the field of Afro-Asian affairs.
He has been widely used to foster Soviet influence in the
Afro-Asian world. His pursuit of this objective has required
extensive travel to Communist and non-Communist countries and
led him to take a leadership role in Afro-Asian organizations.
The highlights of his activity, which follow, have occurred
against a background of the larger developments in Soviet,
Afro-Asian relations..
In 1955 he accompanied Bulganin and Khrushchev on their
tour of India and Burma. In 1956 he went to Karachi for the
proclamation of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, and later was
Mikoyan's traveling companion on visits to India, Burma, North
Vietnam, China and Outer Mongolia. The following year he
accompanied Voroshilov to Indonesia. In December, 1957, he was
the chief Soviet delegate to the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
Conference in Cairo, and has become a prominent member of the
Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. In October, 1958, he
was Chairman of the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Writers'
Conference in Tashkent, and in January, 1959, he was appointed
Chairman of the committee set up by the Secretariat of the
Board of the USSR Writers' Union for liaison with the Permanent
Bureau of the Afro-Asian Writers. The following September he
headed the CPSU delegation to the Fifth Party Congress in
Guinea. In May, 1962, he led a delegation of Soviet specialists to
Cuba to assist in irrigation and land drainage schemes and in
June that year again visited Indonesia. He participated in a
Soviet economic mission to Algeria in August, 1963. A Kenyan
delegation met with him in Uzbek in April, 1964. The celebration
of the Algerian revolution was the occasion for a return trip to
that country in October and November of 1961. Most recently prior
to the Havana Conference, he attended the 45th anniversary of the
Communist Party of Indonesia in May, 1965.
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Fact Sheets
March 1966
Encouraging Evidence of Brazilian Recovery
The forthcoming Second Anniversary of the revolution which resulted
in the ouster of President Joao Goulart and the establishment of Humberto
Castello Branco as President serves as a convenient point for stock-
taking: for assessing the accomplishments of Castello Branco's govern-
ment to date and for estimating the course it is likely to take until the
end of its writ in March 1967.
In fact, the Revolution was hardly a revolution in the classic
sense. There was no bloodshed, no rioting in the streets, no battle
lines. In short, a few military leaders called upon Goulart to resign;
they were joined by a substantial number of political leaders, including
many state governors, and by a rapidly growing number of other top military
leaders. Goulart fled from Rio to Brasilia, where he hoped to find
political support; finding little, he promptly left for exile in Uruguay.
The entire affair lasted but 55 hours. On the other hand, the Revolution
was very real in the substantive sense. There is no doubt that Castello
Branco and the government which he formed were determined to work very
fundamental changes in the economic, political, and social structure of
the nation. Indeed, they had little choice; the chaotic state of the
country's economy and the growing social unrest demanded urgent and major
reforms, and it was the purpose of the Revolution to institute them.
It is perhaps worth recalling some of the basic facts which were
well-publicized at the time, but which tend to drop from memory over the
years. The central and overwhelming fact was the disintegration of the
Brazilian economy. In the late 1950's, when Brazil's huge coffee exports
were bringing a good price of the world market, the government of former
President Juscelino Kubitschek pushed an ambitious nation-wide program to
develop Brazil, especially its vast and virtually untouched interior.
During this time U.S. and other foreign investors poured capital into
Brazil to create an avalanche of new industries. In this period of
dizzy economic growth Brazil seemed firmly set for the long-awaited
economic "take-off"; in one year the economy grew more than seven and one
half percent. However the expansion was financed in good part by infla-
tion and in the 1960's the results of overspending by the government, of
deficits rolled up by state-owned enterprises, and of too much borrowing
against the future, plus a fall in world coffee prices, began to turn
Brazil's dream of quick development into a nightmare of inflation. This
was compounded by a turn toward leftist nationalism after Joao Goulart
assumed the Presidency in August 1961.
Goulart established a severe profit remittance law, a definitely
hostile Brazilian officialdom harassed foreign, especially U.S., investors,
Brazilian reforms which had been promised as conditions for further U.S.
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(Cont.)
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Government loans simply were not effected, and government payrolls were
even further padded by political appointees. The inevitable result was
runaway inflation; it went up 50 percent in 1962, 84 percent in 1963,
and during the first quarter of 1964, immediately preceding the Revolu-
tion, it reached a projected annual rate of about 144 percent. Foreign
investment, which had averaged US$85 million in the Kubitschek years from
1955 to 1960, fell to US$4.5 million in 1963 and US$3.6 million in 1964.
The economic unrest was accompanied by radical political moves by
Joao Goulart which stirred the anxieties of major elements of Brazilian
society. Goulart attempted to build a political following based on
organized labor, the peasants, students and the enlisted men and non-
commissioned officers of the military forces (the latter served equally
to offset opposition to Goulart among the military leadership). Parti-
cularly in his dealings with organized labor, Goulart appeared to favor
and assist the Communists. As a result of his activities there developed
a widespread belief among Brazilians of diverse political persuasion
that the Goulart government had clearly demonstrated its intent to alter
radically the legal and power structure by means of agitation, strikes,
military insubordination, and at least tactical collaboration with trained
subversives of various Communist groups... all for the purpose of perpet-
uating himself in power.
The background to the Revolution, then, was an economy literally
on the brink of bankruptcy, a government which many thought was deliberately
perverting the democratic system which brought it to power, an impotent
party system which had almost paralyzed the Congress' ability.to protect
the people's interests, corruption in government beyond bounds, and a
growing social disorder threatening to lead to civil war, to the ultimate
benefit only of the Communists.
The overthrow of Goulart was received with widespread popular sup-
port in the major cities, in contrast with the apathy, disorganization
and indifference displayed by those groups which the Goulart regime con-
sidered its bulwarks: students, trade-union rank and file, enlisted men,
peasants. This ready acceptance not only avoided violent strife; it
permitted the Castello Branco government to concentrate on economic and
social reforms without being obliged greatly to alter the norms of polit-
ical democracy in Brazil. The field of activity which received most
attention, and which has shown the most impressive results was the national
economy. On the domestic front, inflation was held to 87% for 1964, and
was cut to about 45% in 1965. At the end of 1965 it was running at a
rate of about 2% per month,or 24% per annum, which gives high hopes
that it may be further reduced to 20% during 1966. Cutting down infla-
tion was absolutely essential, but it has worked considerable hardship on
various sectors of the economy. The effort has meant holding down civil
service and military wages, eliminating subsidies and raising public
service rates, higher taxes, and strict controls on wages and prices,
among other measures. Admittedly the change has been difficult, but the
elimination of many of the distortions which had developed in the national
economy -- for example one third of the government budget deficit used to
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be due solely to subsidies to the antiquated railway system -- and this
realignment and rationalization will be of immense benefit in the long
run.
Other reforms in the domestic economic front include: a thorough-
going reform of the personal income tax collection (which will hit, inci-
dentally, the rich -- who have more successfully evaded taxes in the
past -- much harder than the poor),complete with an extensive electronic
computer system which will keep track of who pays what he should and who
doesn't; a completely reorganized banking system with Brazil's first
central bank; greatly increased development grants by the federal govern-
ment to the regional and state authorities for spurring local economic
development; and a reform of the stock market, converting it from a
somnolent instrument of an economic oligarchy to an active, policed, and
disciplined source of investment capital. The result in 1965 has been
an estimated overall gain of 5% in the gross national product -- a
respectable figure for any country and a really impressive one considering
that it had been 1% in 1963, less than the population growth rate of 3%.
The recovery of Brazil's external economic position has been even
more impressive, having been transformed in two years from a shambles
to a broadly based and internationally credit-worthy structure. The
Castello Branco regime inherited a treasury totally depleted of its
foreign exchange reserves and gold stocks and, furthermore, in arrears
on its payments on foreign debts. This situation has now been reversed
to the point that Brazil can boast of a foreign exchange reserve of over
US$300 million -- due principally to a significant increase in exports
and to substantial loans from the United States, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and
other agencies. It is worth noting that these same sources had previously
been closed to Brazil because of its gross economic mismanagement. The
government has changed the profit remittance law, greatly easing the
situation for potential foreign investors, and it has negotiated an in-
vestment insurance agreement with the United States as further encourage-
ment to the influx of foreign capital. However, these measures are just
beginning to take effect, as evidenced by announcements by both Ford and
Volkswagen of substantial expansions of their plants in Brazil, by a
US$96 million investment by Union Carbide and Phillips Petroleum in
major plastic and fertilizer projects, and by a joint Brazil-U.S. iron
ore venture involving the Hanna Mining Company of Cleveland,Ghio, which
will include a $150 million port designed to double Brazil's iron ore
exports in five years. If these should be the forerunners of a return
to former foreign investment rates, then Brazil may well finally "take
Further economic development, however, is intimately related to
continued political stability. Immediately after the Revolution, the
Castello Branco government purged the government and the Congress of some
300 persons accused of corruption, CommunisrA, This housecleaning,
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essential to the political renewal to which the Revolution wasdedicated,
was carried out under the provisions of an "Institutional Act," put into
force immediately after the Revolution, which defined in broad terms the
revolutionary aims of the government and gave it the necessary power
carry them out. That the housecleaning was not entirely impartial wasundoubtedly inevitable. However it did manage to serve its basic purpose
without being permitted to go to extremes. The government continued to
work through the already elected Congress where, despite the purge,
partisans of the old regime -- mainly members of the Partido Social
Democratico (PSD) and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) -- formed
the most substantial bloc.
A further reform was undertaken in the student field, which had
been heavily infiltrated by Communists long before the revolution. Com-
munists held control of most of the local, state, and national student
organizations. The leaders of the Revolution determined to render student
organizations as apolitical as possible in order to strengthen the
university's role as a place of learning and to raise academic standards.
To this end a new student organization was established to replace the
National Student Union (UNE) which was strongly influenced by the Com-
munists. Federal financial support was withdrawn from the UNE and given,
instead, to the new student organization. This aroused criticism among
the students, who apparently felt that a purge of the UNE directorate
would have sufficed. A Communist-led effort to boycott elections of
officers for the new, apolitical student organization in the Fall of
1965 failed, however, and it now has the support of the great majority
of the students.
The political stability of the nation was seriously imperiled,
however, by the election on 4 October 1965 of governors of eleven of the
twenty two states. The overall election results were not unfavorable to
the government. However, in the two most important states where elections
were being held -- Minas Gerais and Guanabara (the former Federal
district of Rio de Janeiro) -- candidates of opposition parties were
elected. This provoked howls of protest from "hard line" elements of the
army who perceived a real danger of the return to positions of influence
of precisely those persons against whom the Revolution had been directed.
The situation was greatly aggravated by the sudden return from exile of
ex-President Kubitschek. For a few days wild rumors circulated of coups
d'6tat led by the "hard line" military officers against the Castello
Branco government, which staunchly declared that the duly elected offi-
cials would be permitted to take office. Under pressure from the "hard
liners7P the President demanded from the Congress broad new powers for
federal intervention in the States to prevent or suppress serious internal
disorder. Congress delayed action, however, and the government was
obliged to promulgate a second "Institutional Act" which dissolved all
political parties, gave the President power to declare a state of siege
and to rule by decree for periods of up to six months, and which estab-
lished the principle of indirect election of the President.
(Cont . )
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It was undoubtedly regrettable that recourse was had to extra-
ordinary procedures rather than persuasion, and comment from abroad has
been critical even from those with strong sympathies for the basic aims
of the regime. It cannot be maintained, however, that Brazil has fully
recovered, economically or politically; what is needed is a period of
political peace'?in which to complete the still only half-achieved program
of stabilization. Moreover, President Castello Branco is the antithesis
of a personal dictator. He has been a moderating influence on his
military colleagues and can be expected to use his new powers with
restraint. In the second Institutional Act he expressly forbids succeeding
himself as president. Personal freedom has not been adversely affected
and freedom of the press remains intact, witness the vigorous criticisms
of the government published every day. Interestingly, the second Insti-
tutional Act was publicly endorsed by a wide variety of Brazilian groups:
the internal press, for the most part; commercial and industrial organi-
zations; women's groups; and trade unions (including the nationwide
Industrial Workers' Confederation). Conversely, most of the opposition
was silent and the general public either mildly in favor or apathetic.
The abolition of the existing 13 or so political parties has been
followed by the creation of two officially approved political groupings,
one pro-government (the National Renovation Alliance - ARENA) and the
other the opposition group (the Brazilian Democratic Movement - MDB).
On 5 February 1966 the Brazilian Government issued its "Third
Institutional Act," establishing dates and circumstances of congressional,
gubernatorial and presidential elections this year. On 3 September
elections will be held for the governors of 11 of the 22 states, with the
voting to be by the state legislatures rather than by popular vote. On
3 October the next President will be chosen by the present Congress;
again this will be an indirect election. Finally, direct congressional
elections are set for 15 November 1966. The opposition party has already
strongly criticized the indirect election feature of the new Act, and
this will undoubtedly be an issue in the forthcoming elections.
Despite its impressive advances in economic and political reform,
there are still serious outstanding problems facing Brazil; one of the
biggest is agrarian reform. Although the revolutionary government
early issued a "Land Statute" outlining its intentions, little has been
done since then except to begin a thorough study of the true nature and
extent of the problem. The government has made clear it has no intention
of expropriating private lands forming part of going agricultural concerns.
However a central feature of the law would make available to landless
farmers potentially tillable or otherwise useful land, government-owned
or private, now lying idle. Other efforts are being directed to improving
their use of the land and tools presently available to them. Perhaps the
most important answer to the problem of land-hungry peasants is the building
of highways and access roads into the enormous isolated but potentially
arable areas of the country.
New hope for agrarian reform was aroused by the recent appointment
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of Ney Braga as Minister for Agriculture. A young leader of the former
Christian Democratic party, and dynamic former governor of Parana state,
Braga is well qualified to bring new life to the program.
Education remains perhaps the most fundamental problem for Brazil.
With a literacy rate of only 55%, with tremendous shortages of schools
and teachers, the nation's further development will hinge in large part
on a greatly expanded educational effort.
The dampening of the inflationary spiral has resulted in a slight
downturn in real wages. Hopefully this trend will be reversed as the
economic upswing progresses; if not the Branco government will face
mounting opposition from the workers.
A final problem to be mentioned is that of resurgent nationalism.
The lowering of the barriers to foreign investment has already brought
cries of protest from several quarters. The right wing of the military
forces is a traditional source of nationalism in Brazil and this sentiment
is coupled with criticism of the government's allegedly gentle treatment
of corruption and with assertions that the government's disinflationary
campaign is fostering unwarranted criticism of the military. Although
these elements of the military do not represent a sizeable political
force, their criticisms freqently supplement demagogic campaigns of
other nationalist and opportunistic groups and constitute a source of
constant harassment for the government.
As can be seen, all these problems revolve around the task of
economic rehabilitation; without first stability and then renewed economic
growth, there can be no political solution. If stability and then growth
can be achieved there is little reason to fear for democracy, which has
long been strongly rooted in Brazil. The patience and understanding
which the people have shown have been remarkable. The undeniable suc-
cesses thus far achieved can well be attributed as much to good following
as to good leadership.
The democratic aspirations of President Castello Branco can best
be understood from a statement he made to the Rio Conference of the
Organization of American States in November 1965:
"Democracy should not be a mere show of appearances, in
which liberty is confused with indiscipline, and social
injustice is perpetuated, masked by the easy promises of
demagogues. Democracy should consist of the democratization
of opportunities for access to land, housing and education;
the promotion of development through austerity, savings and
continued effort, and vigilance against the enemies of the
open society, who avail themselves of the franchise granted
by democracy to destroy it.
9'We in Brazil have been devoting ourselves to the task
of the renovation of democracy, and the profound reform of
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institutions. Less than two years ago we were aware of the
spectre of the class struggle, the black shadow of anarchy,
and the sounds of economic and social chaos.
To a formal democracy, we shall join a democracy meant
for the continued improvement of the people's welfare. It
is with this objective in mind that we have undertaken a
whole series of reforms covering political and social insti-
tutions, finances and economy.
"Therefore, we have no need for any lessons in demo-
cracy. We managed to save it from near destruction in the
hands of the totalitarians, without anybody's help....'
are a country living in peace, which finds political solutions
without the need of bloodshed and are capable of political,
racial and religious tolerance and respect for the human
being, seldom found in this troubled world."
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Ivljreh 1966
Intellectuals and the Party in East European Communist Countries:
Czechoslovakia
Attacks against intellectuals across the board were made by the
Czech CP in November and December 1965. In an address before the
Union of Czechoslovak Stage and Film Artists, Politburo member Hendrych
discussed the "rather serious ideological and artistic problems" con-
cerning them. After praising the positive results of past work in help-
ing to forge a socialist society, Hendrych discusses i. a. films and
plays which "went beyond the borderline of criticism, from exaggeration
to deformation, and from socialist positions to the other side."
In the sphere of literature, the revisionist monthly Tvar and the
frequently critical monthly Knizni Kultura, have been discontinued. The
failure of the regime to provide satisfactory reasons for ending the
magazines' publication gives rise to the strong suspicion that it was
a measure to limit the dissemination of the works of the young writers
who are increasingly critical of the regime.
East Germany
Signs of a possible cultural detente between the two halves of
Germany during most of 1965 changed into a ringing revival of the cold
war climate in November-December. The suppression of the works of the
young poet, Wolf Biermann, was one of the early manifestations of this
re-emphasis of Stalinist ways. Attacks on Biermann and other writers
and film-makers were used as a vehicle for lashing out against "ideo-
logical co-existence," skepticism (vs. wholehearted acceptance of the
resr~i.rne) , tail- rev ; i.o.rr.i_;rb tendencies. In Neues Deutschland (ND), Polit-
buro member Erich Honecker expressed particular sensitivity to the
"enemy's" arguments which lead cultural workers to "uncertainty about
the correctness of our socialist road." The dismissal on 12 January
of Min. Of Culture Bentzien was another indication of the Ulbricht re-
gime's resumption of a hard line on cultural matters.
Some writers, notably Christa Wolf, spoke out at the party plenum
in defense of the artists who had been attacked. Several writers de-
fended themselves in ND. But the party's response to these defenses in-
dicates that more pressures on writers and artists are to be expected.
The most comprehensive article on the East German situation (and
indeed, the situation in any of the bloc countries) is in the Literary
Supplement of the London Times of 13 January 1966. (See Press Comment
20 January 1966.)
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(Cont.)
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Poland
A significant and stirring development has been the recent publi-
cation of Adam Schaff's book, "Marxism and the Human Individual." Schaff,
the director of Warsaw's Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, examines
inter alia the alientation of the individual in the socialist society.
Thus, what the Soviet authors are accused of insinuating in their novels,
Schaff virtually comes out flatly with in his sociological study. Schaff
has been attacked for his views by high CP officials. How successful
his defense will be is yet to be determined.
A companion development has been the arrest of 7 writers during
1965. They were tried and sentenced for slandering the Polish state in
their manuscripts which were smuggled out of the country and published in
Western Europe.
Rumania
"Retrospective" painting and plastic arts came under the fire of CP
officials at the turn of the year. Exhibited works were criticized as
being confused and artistically poor, adoptions of unassimilated alien
influences, purposeless efforts, and immature. The significance of this
development is that it reverses an atmosphere of relative tolerance in
the cultural field which the party had promoted. It probably means that
an effort will now be made to return to socialist realism in art. As in
the USSR, however, there is some journalistic support for a continuance
of the new, more liberal policies.
Hungary
The General Meeting of the Hungarian Writers' Association, which
was held at the end of November 1965, was distinguished by its dullness,
apparently reflecting careful planning. Socialist realism was alluded
to, but apparently not used as a term in discussing the desired orienta-
tion of literature. Reference was made to despair and indifference as
common reactions to present difficulties. And caution was raised against
"... liberalism, an uncritical spirit, (and) blind acceptance" which is
the apparent result of contacts with non--socialist countries. As a re-
sult, more care is apparently to be used in the selection of books from
non-socialist countries for publication in Hungarian. Dobozy, the Sec-
retary General of the Writers' Association, said significantly: "Our
literature possesses a wide variety of ideological colors.... We draw
the line only at political opposition or at writings which offend against
accepted canons of taste."
A note of contrast should be added. The Yugoslav authorities faced
a similar problem with the young author, M.Bulatovic, who was in Western
Europe at the turn of the year. ]3ulatovic severely criticized the Yugo-
slav society both in interviews and in books to be published abroad. The
Yugoslav response was to dismiss Bulatovic with a few words of condemnation
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March 1966
Background of relations between the CPSU party and intellectuals in the
Soviet Union.
The role of Andrey Zhdanov in Party-intellectual relationshps was
of great importance between 1946 and the death of Stalin. With some
fluctuations in intensity, Zhdanov throttled free expression and at-
tempted to harness writers to the service of the state. He assaulted
"cosmopolitanism," an action equivalent to anti-Semitism. Although he
died in 1948, his influence was such that the entire period from 1946
to 1953 was known as the "zhdanovshchina," a synonym for cultural terror.
Thus, the mention in Izvestiya of 25 Feb 66 of Zhdanov on his 70th birth-
day as "a true son of the people" could well be interpreted as a threat
by the regime to increase its restrictive measures unless the intellec-
tuals get back into line.
Upon Stalin's death a short-lived surge in freer intellectual ex-
pression was observed. It was curtailed in mid-1953, resumed in 1954,
accelerated in early 1956, halted in late 1956, reversed in mid-1957,
expanded in 1959, halted in late 1962, cautiously resumed in mid-1963
after which it increased somewhat until October 1964 when Khrushchev was
ousted.
During the first 4 months of the regime of Brezhnev and Kosygin the
intellectuals substantially stepped up their outpouring of anti-Stalinist
expression.
The first sign of a reaction against the intellectuals was detected
in early March, 1965, in a published report of the RSFSR Writers' Con-
gress. There, to gasps of dismay from the liberals, Soviet literature
and films were criticized by the conservatives who quoted the Chinese
Communists. From then on, an increasingly bitter exchange between the
more liberal and the conservative organs was witnessed. It was capped
and epitomized by two articles, one by Sergei Pavlov, the head of the
Komsomol, and the other by the 60-year-old Aleksey Rumyantsev, the chief
editor of Pravda. Pavlov, writing in Pravda of 29 Aug, lashed out at
movies, literature, and the theater for the unhealthy criticism which
was engendering "nihilism" in youth, and he pointed out the need for
caution in dealing with the cult of the personality (i.e., attacks on
Stalin). Rumyantsev in Pravda of 9 September, apparently in rebuttal
to Pavlov and others, stated his belief that nihilism is engendered by
hushing up and glossing over difficulties, not by the passionate effort
to expose wrongs in order to set them right; to underscore the meaning
of his wordsi he went down the list of the liberals under attack and de-
fended them.
Within the next 10 to 12 days, Sinyavsky and Daniel were picked up
by the KGB, and Rumyantsev was removed from his job. (Rumyantsev now
has an insignificant job with the Academy of Sciences.) Pavlov, on the
other hand, is still the chief of the Komsomol and he has spoken out
further in the vein of the hard line. The hard line, especially in
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Izvestiya, became dominant and more strident in Soviet media. In
January in Pravda, for the first time in years, "cosmopolitanism" was
referred to as something to be fought. And, seemingly to bring the
circle to a close, the above-noted reference to Zhdanov was made in
Izvestiya.
Some feeble opposition to the above-noted trend has been ob-
served...Nouyy Mir, the liberal writers' organ, has defied the implied
ban on publication of unacceptable material. Individual writers, such
as Paustovskiy, have protested against the Sinyavsky and Daniel case.
And Pravda held back for some time before joining the ranks of the hard
liners attacking the two. Pravda also commemorated the 20th Party Con-
gress, implicitly supporting de-Stalinization; but it also praised
Zhdanov.
2 (Background)
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Komsomol'skaya Pravda
Moscow, 29 December 1965
SPEECH BY S.P. PAVLOV TO THE
EIGHTH PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE KOMSOMOL
-USSR-
[Following are excerpts from a translation
of a speech by the First Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Komsomol, Comrade
S.P. Pavlov in the Russian-language news-
paper Komsomol'sk aya Pravda (Komsomol Pravda),
Moscow, 29 December 1965, page 3.]
"Comrades! The education of the younger generation is now the
center of attention of the Communist Party, the Leninist Komsomol and
all ideological institutes in the country."
"Strictly speaking, education in the traditions is one of the means
for solving the chief task: the education of man -- the fighter, citizen
and patriot. It was specifically this guide that was used by the bureau
of the Central Committee of the Komsomol in presenting the given question
for discussion at the plenum. In addition other circumstances were taken
into account that also confirmed the rightfulness and even the necessity
of posing such a question today."
"It is typical that. recently two tendencies of bourgeois propaganda
have become absolutely clearly observable: the first is to set the
Komsomol against the youth and the second is to set the party against
the Komsomol and the younger generation against the older.
"At the same time our enemies strive to utilize the deficiencies in
our educational work and to rely on the negative phenomena existing among
our young people.
"What are the causes for similar phenomena? -- ;Say;s the speaker --
apparently one of the causes is that at some stage we relaxed the educa-
tional work among the youth. Some of our Komsomol organizations in
reality began to speak more of percentages and tone, of the head of
cattle and of ferrous concrete and showed little concern for man and the
sentiment that is typical of a given section of our youth and of relations
between young people."
(Cont.)
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"Comrades! Patriotism and humanitarian education of our young people
are inseparable. It seems that the enthusiasm of a certain group of
our young people for modern bourgeois art has its reasons. One of
these reasons is the deficiency in propaganda of our age old culture,
the culture of the peoples of the USSR, and national popular tradi-
tions in art, the knowledge of which instills a natural feeling of
national pride and Soviet patriotism."
"It would be a great error to believe that the fact in itself of
living in the Soviet country under conditions of socialist reality pre-
supposes the presence of a communist world outlook in a young person.
There is no doubt that loyalty to the ideas of communism lives in the
hearts of the overwhelming majority of young Soviet boys and girls. But
far from all of them clearly and precisely understand what communist ide-
ology is, what it means to be a conscientious and consistent communist
and how to bring up in oneself the qualities of a fighter for our re-
volutionary ideals. It would also be erroneous to believe that the
growth of political consciousness and ideological convictions in a
young person is always directly proportional to the growth of his gen-
eral educational and cultural level. Today our task is not simply to
train a highly qualified and educated young worker, graingrower and
specialist but, first of all, to instill in each of them the qualities
of a communist-Leninist.
"The most important events in the political life of the country --
the 20th, 21st and 22nd party congresses and the decisions of the recent
plenums of the CC CPSU, directed toward the reestablishment of the Lenin-
ist norms of party life, the expansion of socialist democracy and the
surmounting of subjectivism in the approach to economic and political
problems -- created favorable conditions for the comprehensive develop-
ment and formulation of human personality.
"It is natural that these events promote the growth of the creative
activities of the young peoples and arouse in them aspirations for inde-
pendent thinking, the comparison and analysis of facts and the desire to
perceive more profoundly the concept of what is taking place.
"Under these conditions the responsibility of all ideological in-
stitutes for the education of the younger generation is increasing as
never before. This is why I would like to dwell in a somewhat more
detailed manner on the role that belongs to literature and art that
are, as a result of their emotional possibilities, the most effective
means of influencing the minds and hearts of the young people.
"Today, at the plenum we cannot but express a number of fundamental
remarks on certain tendencies, holding a position in our literature and
art and preventing, from our point of view, Soviet youth from examining
objectively the many features of our reality and from adopting correct
ideological positions.
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"With the blessings of the editors of Novyy Mir (New World) and
from the pages of many journals a flood of so called "camp" literature
has literally gushed forth. We cannot but be disturbed that the place
of true heroes, people capable of active actions and struggles and feats
is being occupied by politically amorphous personalities, locked in a
shell of individual experiences and flaunting their public and civic
passiveness.
"The journal Yunost' (Youth) particularly zealously produces such
heroes, if one may call them that. It recently published a novel by
Anatoliy Gladilin Istoriya odnoy kompanii (The Story of One Crowd).
"Vodka, money, 'chuvikhi,' second hands clothes -- this exhausts
the spiritual interests of the heroes of the novel. Here, for instance,
is a letter which is sent by one of Gladilin's heroes to his friend:
'TtOld Shoe! I often see the Baron. He's got it made! The pay is
good. Zvonok left the institute. Alla is buying up second hand clothes
from the profiteers, etc.
"'Kol'ka greetings!
"'We are already in Voronezh. We spent the night in the forest,
talked about you, drank vodka and smoked 'Trezor.' At night there is
such jazz -- if you could only hear it. We were in Penza, but there
is nothing there, and the town is spiteful-, but Tambov though we liked;
in particular, we liked the 'Tambov girls; we probably will never again
see such girls though it is true that if you look at it then it is no
worse in Voronezh. Yes, in Tambov there is a lot of second hand clothes:
ten kinds of stretch socks; there were T-shirts for sale; we found
'Elastik' stretch stockings for Lyubasha. (Yes, here they have such
sweaters; today we saw one for 32 rubles in large knit with wild catonic
coloring) (And what wines they have here!)
"'We have 25 rubles. We are looking for a way out of the situation.
Well, so long. Write how you relaxed on Saturday. Pass on greetings to
all.
"'We are now going to see her ... you know yourself who, and then
will move on to the 'Rossiya' bar.
"As you can see it is difficult to establish the difference between
these two letters. The difference is that the second letter was written
not by the literary hero but by a real person, a constant subscriber to
the journal Yunost'.
"This letter was forwarded to the Central Committee of the Komsomol
by Boris Grigor'yevich Vodichkin from Kuybyshev. He has a seventeen year
old son for whom he subscribes to the journal Yunost'. He recently by
3 (Komsomol Cont.)
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chance stumbled on his son's correspondence with his friends. At first
he could not understand the origin of this foppish attack. He began
himself to read the journal regularly, after which he sent an indignant
letter to the Central Committee of the Komsomol, erroneously assuming
that Yunost' is a Komsomol journal.
"Recently, the attacks against socialist realism and ambiguous
expressions on truth in art and the fact that only an artist can evaluate
a work of art, etc. have appeared more frequently. In general the 'ideas'
are not new. What causes alarm is the fact that these 'ideas,' fixed up
and touched up, are more and more actively forced, cultivated and justi-
fied by some people.
"Recently, the journal Yunost' published a retort by the young
satirist Rozovskiy, 'Whom Do You Initate in Your Silly Endeavor?' that
again categorically and loudly maintains that only talent can judge talent
and that only an artist can evaluate works of art. This is an incorrect,
harmful position foreign to us. In essence Rozovskiy places literature
and the arts above the people and threatens principally important Leninist
tenants on the national character of literature.
"Since when have the vulgarization of our reality, indiscriminate
running down of the achievements of our system, sick skepticism and cheap
grumbling as a result of present difficulties been considered as civic
courage? If this is courage, then what is political immaturity? We did
not set it as our task to make an exhaustive analysis of the situation in
literature and art; we wanted to focus your attention on a number of tend-
encies that interfere with the cause of the communist education of the
youths. Our position proceeds from the requirements of Lenin and our
party toward socialist literature and art, and this position of ours also
proceeds from long standing traditions of the work by the Komsomol with
the creative youth of the country. This is the constant support of
writers, composers, artists and workers in the film and theater, main-
taining firm party positions and using in their work the method of social-
ist realism. If we take into consideration the fact that the Komsomol has
at its disposal seventeen journals with a single edition of five million
copies, 108 central and local newspapers published in 24 languages with
a single edition of 10 million, television, radio and cinema and that the
"Molodaya gvardiya" publishing house of the Central Committee of the
Komsomol annually publishes 37 million books, then it becomes obvious
what a powerful ideological weapon we have at our disposal.
"How we will use this weapon is another matter. We propagandize
the talented and ideologically convinced poet inexcusably little and at
the same time endlessly crowd around two or three names that have set
our teeth on edge.
"Today we must present a serious rebuke to the Komsomol press and
the young editors in radio and television for the unjustified timidity
in evaluating individual works of literature and art and in the formula-
tion around them of public opinion. Sometimes as a result of their
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inexperience, a lack of esthetic taste and the inability to orient
themselves correctly in the tremendous flood of literature the young
people follow false fashions, forgetting the wise Russian saying that
all that glitters is not gold.
"Guided by clear cut party attitudes in the area of literature
and art, the Central Committee of the Komsomol together with the
unions of composers, writers, cinematographers, artists and journal-
ists conducted and continues to conduct certain work with the young
creative intelligentsia.
"This includes regular seminars and meetings between the Komsomol
aktive and young poets and artists, the organization of creative re-
ports, business trips and art exhibits, and finally the establishment
of the Leninist Komsomol Prize for the best work in literature and art
for Soviet youth.
"All of this is undoubtedly good. However, the results of our
efforts will be ten or a hundred times better if the Central Committees
of the Komsomols in the union republics, kraykoms and obkoms will de-
vote maximum attention to the creativity and the living conditions of
young poets, prose writers, cinematographers, actors, etc.
"The recently held seminar of young writers in Chita showed that
works about the Komsomol are completely absent in the works of the
young writers. Of all of the works discussed not one was devoted to
the given subject. Apparently this is not by chance. Komsomol obkoms
and kraykoms often are completely ignorant of the young writers: how
they live, what they are working on and what their creative plans are.
"We have begun to forget the good Komsomol traditions when the
manuscripts of the young poets and writers were reviewed at open
Komsomol meetings and when the young poets and writers read their works
at the Komsomol obkom and kraykom offices in order to receive friendly
comments and comradely advice. What is more, many Komsomol leaders are
not even familiar with their native writers and their books, as the
saying goes, 'They have not even sniffed these books.'
"Comrades! Never before has one generation reaped so many fruits
of the lengthy revolutionary struggle as ours has. The most precious
stock and 'dowry' of the Soviet youth is the economic might of our Home-
land, the revolutionary experience of the previous generations and the
life of the best representatives that have become the guiding star for
millions of young boys and girls.
"We are proud of our genealogical and ideological proximity to those
who laid the foundation of socialism and who in the hour of trial bore
the unprecedented brunt of the military toil, suffered great sacrifices
and shared the glory of Victory. Children being in the closest contact
with their 'fathers' draw experience from them, gathered through decades,
and arm themselves with their world outlook. The children worthily carry
on the traditions of our fathers.
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DECLARATION ON COLONIALISM
Joint Statement adopted by the Fourth Congress of the
Socialist International and the Asian Socialist Conference
(London, 12-16 July, 1955)
"2. The right of peoples to self-determination, provided
that it does not infringe the same right for other peoples,
and that it does not prejudice their freedom or the peace
of the world, is a basic principle of the democratic
system of society. The Charter of the United Nations
recognizes this right.
"3. Self-determination, hitherto regarded by imperialist
nations as a privilege, must be exercised as a right by
colonial and dependent peoples and satellite countries."
"5. The colonial rulers and imperialist Powers still
cling to their 'sacred mission', whether in its old or
new interpretations, only to justify their self-interest and
for safe-guarding their domination as long as possible."
"7. The struggle against colonial rule is in essence the
human protest against poverty, misery, degradation and
indignity, which any form of imperialism necessarily
entails for the peoples under it.
"8. But national freedom is only a means to human freedom.
The struggle against colonialism should aim at the emanci-
pation from any form of exploitation of man by man and at
social and economic equality of the suffering masses and
the establishment of a democratic Socialist society."
"10. All genuine democrats full.y share with these fighters
their passionate desire for human rights and freedom, and
therefore associate themselves with the struggle against
colonial and any other form of oppression and for a world
order free from slavery, hunger, political terror and war."
SOCIALIST POLICY FOR THE
UNDERDEVELOPED TERRITORIES
A Declaration of Principles
Adopted by the Second Congress of the Socialist International
(Milan., 17-21 October, 1951)
1. The Socialist International aims at the liberation of
all men from economic, spiritual and political bondage and
the creation of a world society based on the principles of
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freedom and equality and of voluntary cooperation between
free peoples.
"The Socialist International seeks the freedom of all
nations. It rejects every form of racial discrimination
and every system which divides the world into superior and
inferior nations.
"2. To this end it seeks to establish in every country
equal citizenship and democratic institutions through
which to maintain and expand the political freedom and
economic wellbeing of all the people.
"It seeks to create between countries relationships
which express the fundamental unity of all mankind and
which recognize the just aspirations of all people to a
full and free life. It recognizes the value of different
cultures and seeks to promote human dignity in all lands.
"3. The Socialist International therefore rejects without
reservation any form of capitalist imperialism which binds
peoples in the chains of political domination and economic
exploitation and which thrives on the odious myth of racial
superiority.
"It rejects, too, the tyranny which Communist imperialism
seeks to impose upon the peoples of the world. The oppression
and exploitation of any people, whatever ideological justifi-
cation may be sought for it, is diametrically opposed to the
principles of democratic Socialism.
04. The Socialist International recognizes the upsurge of
national consciousness as a stage in the emancipation of
nations. Communist propaganda attempts to divide the world
by exploiting nationalist fervor for its own ends. Socialists
condemn chauvinistic nationalism because it denies international
solidarity. They regard the development of democratic Socialism
as essential to the satisfaction of genuine national aspirations
within the framework of an international community."
"6. Socialists, in their struggle to achieve full self-
government for the dependent territories, as well as the
governments concerned, must give due consideration to the
growing interrelations of the nations of the world, in order
to reach peaceful cooperation between free peoples."
I.
The Task of Socialists in the Underdeveloped Territories
"2. For economic development to go forward people must not
only desire progress; their social, economic, legal and political
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institutions must be favorable to it. Fundamental changes
will be necessary. Economic relationships which rob the
individual of the fruits of his labor have to be broken.
Bonds of caste have to be abolished. Legal and political
systems which concentrate power in the hands of a small
class, intent on maintaining its own wealth and privileges,
have to be removed.
"Under reactionary, selfish or corrupt leaders, the
masses remain apathetic and dispirited or their misery
becomes fertile ground for any ideology which holds out to
them promise, however false, of means towards a better life.
Given vigorous and honest leadership, the masses can be
inspired with an enthusiasm for human progress. Socialists
in the underdeveloped territories aim at providing that
creative leadership."
Socialists in the underdeveloped territories strive to
establish governments convinced of the need for agrarian
reforms. Land redistribution is of vital importance in
many countries where living standards and productive capacities
are low and where a large section of the labor force is
employed in agriculture. Thus Socialists expect the govern-
ments of the underdeveloped countries to introduce legislation
to abolish agrarian feudalism to set up a system of owner-
farmers wherever suitable and to assure to the tenant farmers
security of tenure and a fair share of the increased yield of
their labor. This would induce them to invest in new
ventures, to adopt improved techniques, to put forth
intensive efforts to increase production, and so to raise
their standard of living. Finally, waste lands will have to
be brought into cultivation.
"5. Socialists seek action which will provide the cultivators
with facilities for borrowing the funds necessary to enable
them to carry on operations with adequate equipment and
without a heavy debt burden. They promote the introduction
of the agricultural unit which will maximize output and
the establishment of suitable co-operative organizations.
"6. Socialists work for development programs which will
bring to domestic industry in peasant economies better
appliances and improved techniques both of production and
of organization, and which will build up, where appropriate,
industries under planned direction. They support action
which will assist the necessary flow of capital to their
countries, provided there is full protection against imperialism
in any form."
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THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL
ON
THE UNITED NATIONS
Statement adopted by the Fourth Congress of the Socialist
International (London, 12-16 July, 1955)
"The Socialist International has consistently affirmed
its support for the United Nations Charter and Organization.
The United Nations Organization provides, in spite of short-.
comings, an essential machinery for the furtherance of
peace and international cooperation. One of its prime
functions is to provide a meeting ground where opposing
powers can come together to seek a peaceful solution of
conflicts. For these purposes the United Nations must
be of world-wide character and not an exclusive association
of like-minded nations. The Socialist International accordingly
urges the admission to the United Nations of all states which
are willing to respect the United Nations Charter."
THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL
ON
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
Resolution adopted by the fourth Congress of the Socialist
International (London, 12-16 July, 1955)
Disarmament
"Rearmament is the result of suspicion and political
tension. Consequently the efforts to ease tension must
go hand in hand with the work of the disarmament commission.
"Socialists aim at a universal system of disarmament
under effective international supervision and control not
limited either to certain weapons or certain areas."
European Unity
"The Socialist movement aims to achieve international
cooperation on the widest scale, from which no country should
be excluded. Within this framework, it strives for the
realization, as part of the community of free nations, of
a strong Europe united in freedom, so that its peoples may
enjoy greater security and well-being and the individual
rights and liberties to which all men are entitled."
"The Socialist movement reaffirms its support for
such developments which are designed to promote freedom,
security, welfare and social justice for all the people of
Europe -- and not only in the democratic countries, for
Socialists cannot disregard the lot of democrats, many of
them fellow Socialists, under Fascist and Communist regimes.
The Socialist International declares its solidarity with its
11
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comrades and will continue to strive to secure for the
peoples of all countries the fundamental human rights to
which they are entitled and their freedom and independence."
Asia and Africa
"Throughout Asia and Africa the status quo is being
rejected. The young nations of these continents are seeking
a new social system. Communism pays only lip-service to
the freedom and independence of these peoples; accepting
Communism means the surrender of their independence.
Democratic Socialism is the only alternative which offers
the solution of their urgent economic and social problems
with freedom."
"The first priority is that the free countries should
be able to maintain their independence and that those which
are still dependent should achieve freedom under democratic
self-government.
"National independence does not in itself solve the
economic and social problems which burden these areas. A
vigorous program for economic and social development is
everywhere an urgent necessity. Socialists call for
practical cooperation through the United Nations, its
specialized agencies, and other means which are acceptable
to the countries concerned, in order to bring as rapid a
development as possible in technical knowledge and capital
resources. The Socialist movement urges that this task
should be given greater priority in all countries.
"In the Middle East the new State of Israel represents
a new ferment and a progressive democratic approach to the
problems of this important region. The negotiation of a
peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States would
open the way to fruitful cooperation to the benefit of all.
"In the Far East it is evident that any settlement must
be reached with the Peking Government as the effective
government of China. This will involve the admission of
the Peking representatives to the United Nations. The
Peking Government must for its part show willingness to
respect the principles of the United Nations Charter in
its international relations."
"In Vietnam the guarantor nations of the Geneva
agreements have the duty of contributing to the establishment
of a democratic regime in the country. They have as well,
and above all, the duty to demand a strict observance of
the agreements by the Governments of the North and South."
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"In the Union of South Africa the intransigent policy
of the present Government, violating the Declaration of Human
Rights by depriving the overwhelming majority of its people
of the common rights of citizenship, is dealing a heavy
blow to all efforts towards a peaceful and democratic
settlement of the racial conflicts in the area. Socialists
should press for any steps by their Governments and their
organizations which can assist in calling a halt to this
dangerous course."
"For Socialists 'peaceful co-existence' is only a means
to an end. The Socialist aim is, as it always has been,
more than mere co-existence; it is peace and international
cooperation to realize the true brotherhood of man.
"This goal is not an idea in the minds of a few. It
is a growing need of the common people everywhere. Capitalism,
under which the evils of exploitation and subjection have
flourished, is opposed to the principles of social justice
and equality between men. Totalitarianism, whether Fascist
or Communist, is the old tyranny writ large by using the new
techniques. Democratic Socialism alone has taken a positive
stand to the new social forces at work in the world. It
is the Socialist movement which provides an answer to the
needs and hopes of the common people throughout the world."
Excerpts from:
RESOLUTION ON GENERAL PROBLEMS
Adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Socialist International
(Hamburg, July, 1959)
II. Nuclear Disarmament
"2. Congress further recognizes, as it did in Vienna, 'the
supreme importance of also securing agreement to abandon the
production of all fissionable material for military purposes
and therefore of nuclear weapons, parallel with agreement to
control conventional forces'. The achievement of all-round
multilateral disarmament with effective inspection and
control remains our paramount aim...
"3.---Progress made on tests has not yet been. matched by any
similar advance in the wider field of disarmament. Indeed,
we recognize that even with good will by all concerned the
negotiation of a disarmament agreement will take a long
time. And we are already faced with the prospect that more
and more countries may, in the absence of agreement on
disarmament, proceed to manufacture their own nuclear weapons.
The spread of nuclear weapons to more and more countries is a
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terrifying prospect for the future peace of the world, because:
a) it would lead to a further poisoning of the atmosphere
through increasing radioactivity;
b) it might lead to a breakdown of a test agreement among
those powers that already have nuclear weapons;
c) it would make the achievement of multilateral nuclear
disarmament more difficult.
In view of these facts, this Congress reiterates its view
that while progress toward world-wide disarmament, nuclear
and conventional, is an urgent necessity, immediate action is
required to prevent a deterioration in the international
situation by the spread of nuclear weapons..."
IV. Developing Countries
"l. Congress welcomes the progress made by Socialists of Asia,
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America in the service of
their ideals of liberty and peace. It voices its solidarity
with them in their action to assure for the peoples of these
continents the respect of their fundamental rights and of
democratic liberties."
SOCIALISM AND COI 1U1ISM
Statement adopted by the Bureau of the Socialist International
(London, April, 1956)
"Socialism and Communism have nothing in common. The
Communists have merely perverted the very idea of Socialism.
Where they are in power they have distorted every freedom,
every right of the workers, every political gain and every
human value which Socialists have won in a struggle lasting
several generations.
"We believe in democracy, they do not. We believe in the
Rights of Man, they mock them. This is not changed by the
refutation of Stalinism.
"The repudiation of Stalin by those who -- whether in
fear of their lies or in genuine complicity -- previously
helped in Stalin?s crimes and praised his sins, has not
fundamentally altered the character of the Communist regime.
Even with collective leadership it yet remains a dictatorship;
and what they now call 'Leninism? is nothing but an earlier
edition of the misconceptions and misdeeds of Stalinism.
"We note the professed desire of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union for some fora of cooperation with Socialist
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parties.
"But where Socialist parties in the Russian-dominated
part of the world have cooperated with them, they were
crushed out of existence, compulsorily merged or otherwise
eliminated by the ruthless methods of a dictatorship which
ironically calls itself People's Democracy.
"Nor can we forget that Socialists are denied all
political rights in the countries of the Soviet bloc and
that many are still in prison whose only crime was to
believe that there are more roads to Socialism than one.
"Therefore, the Council of the Socialist International
has already stated that the recent changes of Communist
tactics provide no grounds for departing from the position
taken up by democratic Socialism, which firmly rejects any
united front or any other form of political cooperation with
the parties of dictatorship.
"While the Socialist International thus rejects all
forms of cooperation with Communist parties, it favors forms
of cooperation between governments which will facilitate
the peaceful settlement of disputed issues. The Soviet
Union together with the Western Powers has a heavy responsi-
bility for the settlement of such major questions as dis-
armament and the reunification of Germany -- solutions for
which the whole world is waiting.
"The Soviet Union could, however, immediately contribute
to the relaxation of the international situation by stopping
the arms sales to the Arab States which have aggravated the
danger of war in the Middle East; halting the virulent
propaganda campaigns directed against democratic countries;
and permitting the free dissemination of news and opinion.
"We reaffirm that without freedom there can be no
Socialism. Socialism can be achieved only through democracy.
Democracy can be fully realized only through Socialism. It
is indeed democratic Socialism which offers to the workers
of the world the surest way to their emancipation and offers
to the peoples of the world a road towards the achievement
of a better society."
*Braunthal, Julius. Yearbook of the Socialist Labour Movement.
London: Lincolns-Prager International Yearbook Publishing
Co., Ltd. vol. I, II (1956-57, 1960-61).
Mackenzie, Norman. Socialism A Short History.
London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949.
3_5
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CPYRGHT
Red Chinals,alm -to become
an industrial giant with
great leap forward. In science
and technology has stumbled
rend probably will- not be rea-1
Used for another .20 or 30
ears.
r.y This is the conclusion of a
massive and, detailed' report
on "Scientific and Engineer.
ling Manpower- In Communist'.
China, 1949.1963, made publid!.,111
;by the 'National Science Foun?
.dation; The report was writte
by Dr. Chu?yuan Cheng, -ford
I `merly of Seton Hall Univensl4
? ty, and now associated with9
the University of Michigan. It
also ' makes these observa?1
tions:
? There Is it faint glimme
of. hope that : the mainland
Chinese might someday;: re+
turn-?.to'?'cooperation: with='the
Vest. 4
? Along with . the pr0duC.
tloit of atomic weapons :4Red
China is conducting a' *pra
ra-d4 r,to.::cieveltlp.'. Ockeltl
China has rapidly 'deve'l ']I
p-ed its chemical and petro?.
um industries; whereas it
ould not even make aspirin !
1949, It now produces anti-
lotics, hormones and plastics.
? Without Soviet assist.
nee, lost In 1960 at the'begin-
Ing of the Sine-Soviet split,
r without new ties elsewhere,
ommunist China's scientific
evelopment will be retarded
and Its ambition to climb the'
rld's scientific apex will be
elayed"
Red Chinese science suf.,,
rs from political Intrusions;-
e persistent suspicion of,
'old" .Western-trained Chinese)
ientist.; !~ ear' Ideological-
basis on the quantity rath?i
r than the quality.of trained,
anpower; : and the failure to
back 10,000 ' "capable+i
d.Ue?aged; Western-tthii ed"
! hinese, scientists . ,~qd en.
ineeri;,,#rnm ;abxbad..~,,,,
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In Cheng's views China's .. of Paris' heads China atomic
present; economic difficulties
have forced significant modifl- effort; Ch'len Hsueh ? slitP,
cations in her once-ambi'tious' who Is responsible forte rock
science plans. Famine, partic?i development, was trained
ularly, has diverted s+esources:. the Massachusetts and Cal
and attention to egriculttrral: fornia institutes . of Tech`
sciences. nology.
"Communist China hasp Though; viewed :With 'some,
great distances to travel be- suspicion, these ? Western-
fore It can reach tiie peak of trained 'scientists are . ?paic~?
modern, srlenee and technolo- well and pampered by thq'
gy," Cheng says, setting .'the ' ;state, which is -living- In, A' king
distance at 20 to 30 years, i of uneasy truce with ihes0j
The ifreeent tendency . to "inteileotuals." '
reaffirni the value of'studyyliig Nonetheless; according to;
Westeriri lacience and! technblo? Cheng, there Is a critical and,
gy suggIrsts to Cheng that iu? grow-ing gap between these.
b
tur c
t-peratdon . r~igh?t be senior" scientists and China's
possible, I,.
too
th
b
k
...y..,
, twat
e
ac
bone' of: China's present. grog,
Tess-:are ;;'riddle-aged, .,West,
etn-trained ' .scientists, ,, Ch'ien
san-ch'lang, who received his
doetorat?e; frowttm,?s1J?alvp ity-
"The success or failure
-bridging Chia' gap,' conclu
Cheng, "will determine whetf, -
er 'China, becomes a, eclentil.
tly"advanced .power ;in? the
sext;,de~ada, o~t'~tWO,.M.r.ias?' ,~ ,~
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AbZFiN A ALYb`T
HE Chinese leaders' intense efforts to ensure that future
generations are worthy "heirs and successors" to they
revolution seem to be running into the obstacle of dis-
illusionment among China's young people.
In the country's present state the attainment of "worthy
heirs" in the minimum possible time-admitted to be several
generations-means self-sacrifice, austerity, unquestioning
obedience to party and State commands, and sublimating
self to the collective good.
true
The People's Daily editorial of June i, 1965, recom-
mended:
,i>,}.), . "Only by learning to voice their own opinions and '
,i~, .;make their own decisions to handle affairs by themselves,
j,,i,,,,to become accustomed to a collective life of democratic
Holt, centralism, to independence in thinking and carrying. out
,nit activities in their own organisations, can the children
.yip,,,, from an early age acquire the ability to work for the
country and the collective, the courage to persist in truth,
to be daring in struggle and to shoulder heavy tasks.
Trained and tempered in this way, young people will be
prepared to deal with world affairs, dedicate themselves
to the cause of Communism and take over from the older
generations of revolutionaries on all fronts".
Privation But in the absence of war-time conditions
resented it becomes more and more difficult to per-
suade people to accept --tie-- prospect of
unrelieved hardship and privation. After 15 years of Corp-
munist rule some sections of the population, particularly you>g
people, are showing signs of disillusionment at the failure of
the regime to achieve any significant improvement in living
conditions.
One of the promises the Communists made in 1949 and
have not yet been able to keep was higher education for all.
The cut-back in industrial progress in ig6o was followed by a
reduction in the number of students receiving higher technical
education. This, in turn, meant disappointment, with no
alternative but to work in the countryside, particularly in the
remote border regions.
One way in which the authorities have tried to deal with
the situation has been to expand the youth organisations. On
May 3, 1965, a China Young Communist League (CYCL)
communique revealed that youth leagues were being established
which would enrol young people between the ages of 7-15-
Young Pioneers .(cadet branch of CYCL) would continue to
exist as an elite nucleus of the youth leagues. Similarly,. in
October, 1965, it was announced that the CYCL. (cadet
organisation for the Communist Party) would also increase
January 1966
CHINA'S DISCONTENTED YOUTH
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 Approve
October g:
"Expansion of CYCL membership is neither a
question of merely increasing the number of organisa-
tions, nor a matter of the CYCL alone, but, more
important still, a question concerning the further con-
solidation of the party's leadership over the youths and
the unceasing reinforcement of the forces for carrying
out Socialist revolution and construction".
Peking's The spate of publicity given to stories of the
poisons' struggles of young people of "bourgeois"
and worse origins to repudiate their families
and to live acceptable revolutionary lives has emphasised that
"contaminating" influences are everywhere. These include not
only "hangovers" from the past-such as capitalism, bureau-
cratism and feudalistic and other undesirable ideological
concepts-but also those which are still emerging, such as the
new capitalism, revisionism, complacency and lethargy.
The Press is full of exhortations to young people not
to'take an interest in fashions, to stop thinking of "extravagant"
meals but to be thankful that, however monotonous the diet,
the State always manages to put something in the rice bowl,
to forget their own wishes and ambitions and instead to work
for the attainment of Communism. But even those young
people who have accepted sacrifices for the good of the State,
have found hostility in the remote areas to which they have
gone, have been weakened by physical hardships and have
begun to write to the newspapers questioning the validity of
current policies. The Peking Daily Worker on September 25
rebuked those "who do not believe .there.. are any future
prospects for any young intellectuals who cherish.any ambi-
tions at all".
But life is little better for those students who have been f
fortunate enough to be accepted for higher education; The
."part-work, part-study campaign", together with increased
physical education and study of Mao's works reached such .a
pitch by : the beginning of September that a People's Daily
editorial was forced to urge that a proper balance should be
maintained. between work and rest.and that extra-curricular
activities should be reduced. It added: "What useful 'thing
can a student do if his health is ruined? A student with poor health willbe a very big loss to the country".
Enforced Overseas Chinese students who responded
courses ; to appeals from the Chinese Government to
return to. China for higher education have
also become disillusioned. Many were forced to accept courses
despite their lack of interest or aptitude. The standard of living
was much lower than that to which they had been accustomed,
and their studies were far too heavily, filled with ideological
indoctrination. Moreover, the "part-work, part-study",, drive
interfered with their academic work still further. Some did not
t with go to the promised higher educational institutions but were
2
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300060005-9
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sent to work on farms. A recent edition of the Overseas Chinese
Affairs journal admitted : "Many young people are not happy
with agricultural production. Some want to work in factories
and some on the farm for one year and then sit for the university
matriculation examination".
Those overseas Chinese who have expressed. a wish to
abandon their studies and leave China have been :reminded
that they, were sent to school on a government order and
Refused ' Even those who have applied for leave to
visas visit their families outside China during
their vacations are being refused visas,
-mainly because the regime has found that once they leave they
never return.
+-T
Li Yung-chuan, who had been studying in Canton,
told the Sing Tao Daily News of Hongkong on June 16, x963,'
that of the 3,000 overseas Chinese students in Canton in 1962
only x,ooo remained by the spring of 1963. "I am not going
back to the mainland ...," he added. "In three years all
I learned was Marxist-Leninist theories." The Hongkong
Press also reported that another overseas Chinese student had
said that "not one in a hundred" of his fellow students had
been able to obtain visas to leave China during 1963. By last!
year, according to Sing Tao Daily News, of August 8, fewer still
were successful. Instead they were told by the authorities that
the summer vacation was a time for more political education
and military training and that the "development of their':,
thinking" would be harmed by contact with "capitalist society
and exposure to bourgeois living".
3
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 CPYRGHT
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28 Feb 1966
U.S. - Trame
china
Advise
ntellectuals
I
By Stanley S. Karnow
?' Lon Post Foreign Service
Red China fired with enthusiasm. They Bated Chinese predominate In Red:;
sang stirring songs, discussed world China's academic circles. The Chinese.
events in a new lexicon of slogans they Academy of Sciences, for example, con-
were learning and speculated ambi- tains 150 members trained in the United ,
tiously on their futures. States, more than the combined total
"We were filled with hope," recently of those with European, Soviet, Japa-
reminisced one of those youths, now nese or Chinese higher educations:
a Hong Kong engineer. "The corrupt The large majority of prominent
'Kuomintang regime had. collapsed and faculty members at Chinese universities
a new China offered us the chance to have American backgrounds. Of the 32;
build our country. Besides, there were, winners of prizes awarded in 1957 by.
signs that war was coming. We had to the Academy of Sciences, 17 held Amer-
serve the motherland. scan degrees.
"Call it naive idealism perhaps, but China's most eminent nuclear physi '
for the first time in our lives we felt Gist' Chien San-chiang, studied in
patriotic, proud to be Chinese."
France with the late Frederic Joliot
Windfall for Peking ' Curie. However, three of his key depu-
T HOUGH MANY regretted It after- ties owe at least part of-their forma-
ward, that motive stimulated thou tion to American universities.
ONG KONG-It was late 1950, and pharmaceuticals, electronics and plas
JL.L Chinese Communist "volunteers"' ties.
had crossed the Yalu River Into Korea Without them, Peking might still be
weeks before. Aboard the liner Presi-
dent CleVeland as it cruised the Pacific
were -more than 100 young Chinese
physicists, psychologists, economists
(and other "higher intellectuals," as
they would later be labeled.
Bearing degrees from a dozen Ameri-
', can universities, they were returning to University reveals that American-edu-;
sands of Chinese experts educated in i Wang Kan-chiang, an expert on cos-
years away from a nuclear weapon in-
stead of possessing an atomic stockpile
and approaching the construction of a
hydrogen.bomb as well as a delivery,,
system, that could crucially alter the
nature of its challenge to the West.
Indeed, a study published this month
by Prof. C. Y. Cheng of Seton Hall,
mic rays, did research at the University
of California (Berkeley) in 1948, later
moving to the Joint Sino-Soviet Nuclear
Center at Dubna, where he reportedly
worked with Pontecorvo. Chao Chung
yao, who took his Ph.D. at the Califor-
nia Institute of Technology In 1930, is
well known for his observations oft
gamma rays. The youngest of the
Atomic Energy Institute's deputy die
rectors is 50-year-old Chang Chai-hua,
who received his doctorate at Washing
ton University in St. Louis;in,1952.
The Chinese nuclear project includes
an array o1' other American-educated`.
talent. Hu Ning, now a physics profes-
sor at Peking University, and Chang'
Wen-yu, bead of the Atomic Institute's,
cosmic ray laboratory, both worked at
Princeton's Institute for Advanced;
Study. Teng Chia-hslen, 41, took his'
Ph.D. at Purdue in 1950 before return
ing to China to become a leading nu-
clear researcher.
A random sampling of different de-
partments in the Chinese Academy of
Sciences discloses a wide assortment of
American-educated scholars: agrono- ,
mists from Cornell and botanists from
Minnesota, metallurgists from the Colo- rado School of Technology, Columbia-
trained philosophers and bacteriologists :
~rt experience at the Rockefeller In?
ati ute.
',A ERICAN - EDUCATED Chinese schol
. have suffered severely for their
,~`A erican backgrounds. Their worst
pe iod came in 1957 after Mao Tse.
to g's "hundred flowers" experiment in\
?fr, a speech in'spired a cascade of criti-,,
ci against the Communist Party.
1St nned by the criticism, party leaders;
Ire cted vigorously, and American-4
Itr fined Intellectuals were an obvious
IIta get.
Cal Tech physicist was made to,
Pco fens that his wartime research had;
ltr nsformed him into "an instrument'
of American imperialism." A Harvard-
fed cated biologist had to admit that';
co ecting botanical specimens in his,
youth for the U.S. Agriculture Depart-'
m nt had served "In the exploitation of
,co vial and semicolonial countries."
T dean of National Peking Universi~)
ty' law school, a Harvard Ph.D., ac
kn wiedged his contacts with "devils
lap monsters" such as Harvard Prof.j
Jon K. Fairbank, who had been "en-'
ga ed in espionage in China."
n almost nerveless case of courage!
wa that of Peking University's presi-R
de t, Ma Yin-chu, an economist trained:
at tale and Columbia, whose "crime":
,wa his advocacy of birth control. Or-.
de ed to recant, he refused, insisting,
"I hall not yield to those who resort
,to orce rather than to reason."
or many less prominent Chinese"
wi American educations, life In China
co d be intolerable. In the words of
:dh ng, Wu-Chao,: a - California-trained
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the United States to offer their talents
to the Peking government. An esti-
mated 2000 American-trained scientists
and engineers, Including 450 with doc-
toral degrees, stayed in China following
the Communist takeover, while, hun-
dreds went home from abroad.
Without their skills, Communist
China might not have managed to in-
dustrialize even as modestly as it has.
These American-educated specialists
contributed significantly toward de-
veloping fields that barely existed in
pre-Communist days,, such as chemicals,
 CPYRGHT
February 1966
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?conomist who recently reached Hong
Kong from the mainland: "It was like"
being struck by a fate we could not
1 have foreseen."
The son of a 'Kuomintang official, 9
;:Ching went to the United States to
study in 1947. Three years later, When
the Communists took power, he re-
turned to Peking.
"For the first few years it was fine,",,
he recollected. "I worked as a research-
} er in a government, office and my wife
naught school. As returnees, we re-.1
i ceived higher salaries than other of- ;
i fietals. We trusted our friends and they
`;trusted us."
In the early 1950s, however, the Com-
munists began to check family, eco-
nomic and political backgrounds. Or.
dered to write his autobiography, .
Ching revealed his father's past politi- 4
cal affiliationt, his American education
and his relatives living in the United
"States.. '
"You could not lie," Ching said.'
"They questioned your friends about
you, and if the information didn't Co. inside, everyone 'would be in trouble."
Blossoms Wilted
S A RESULT of his background,
' A Ching was removed from his gov-
ernment job and assigned to teaching
in a college. He was told that he was
"not thoroughly reliable."
Still the pressures accelerated. There
r were more,and more meetings, denun-
criticisms . and self-criticisms
ciations,
until suddenly In 1957, the "hundred
flowers" bloomed a n d everything
changed. As Ching remembered it, "in-
stead of criticizing us, officials begged
us to criticize the party."
After some hesitation, Ching obliged.
At a meeting at his college, he argued
L for more rational legal procedures to'
~. apprehend "counter-revolutionaries.'1'
He urged better treatment for intellec=
Fir tuals and pointed out that party memt,
bers were not always trustworthy.
The hundred flowers wilted In six'
weeks, withering Ching. Arraigned be,,
fore a crowd at what the Communists
* call a "struggle meeting," he was,
pelted with invective. His three years
in America were a natural focus for,
attack.
"Since Ching was educated. In th e .
'United States," an official announces(,,
"he must be our enemy." From then on,..'
Ching theoretically wore a Yu P1 Mao
Tze, the "bap of a rightist."
Meetings of confession and criticism,
continued for seven months. Ching's
eplsop1
n
Matter of Fact Jos
Prudence Plus Paranoia
HONG KONG--The view Nor is this an isolated epi-
of China from this vital.van-
tage point.becomes stranger, j
more downright bizarre'
`with every
.return to
Hong Kong.
Consider, for
example, the
recent fate
of Peking
`University.
Not very
long ago, on
T s e - Lung's Alsop
'.rather rare public appear-
ances, he talked briefly with
a foreign diplomat. The. for-
eigner, for want of anything
better to say, remarked that
he had just visited China's
leading university, and had
been much impressed.
Whereupon Mao replied
shortly that it was a dread-
ful place, about which some-
thing would soon have to be
done.
Something was lone. in.
deed. All members of the
university's three upper
classes were shipped off to
Sinkiang - the Chinese
equivalent of Siberia to
improve their minds by a
period of hard labor. This
was exactly like' the U.S.
Government sending the
sophomore, junior and sen-
ior classes of Harvard or
the University of California
to forced labor in Alaska.
so eo paranoia on
cational front. The Philoso.
phy Department of China
People's University, the Chi-1
nese Language Department
of Peking Normal Univer-
sity, and the professors of
both the History and Philos-
ophy Departments of Peking
University have all been per-
manently exiled to the coun-.
tryside.
THIS IS ONE reason why
the number of "black men"
is now estimated at any-
where from 200,000 to 500,-
000 in the city of Canton
alone-"black men" being ,
people without proper iden-
and work papers, mostly
tity
students who have fled from
forced labor. In short,, the f
persecution of the young,
and more particularly the
students, is now a very mark-
ed feature of Mao Tse-tung's
China. It bespeaks the lead-
ership's intense distrust of
the next generation.
Because of this openly
manifested distrust, the ex-
pert China watchers here
are More and more persuad-
ed 'that a rather radical
change of regime is likely, ,
not very long after the all-
ing, 73-year-old Mao passes
from the scene. But mean- r
while China' must continue,
'
'
In the grip of aged leaders, some of whom have seem
ingly been driven close to
madness by their countless
frusta ations.
in rtheastern China near the Soviet:
bor r. There he endured three years,
fell . trees, building roads and dig-,
gin ditches. When he was released,,
he id, he could hardly walk.
B red from Peking after that, Ching
was ent to a school in Shantung,
Pro nee, nominally as a faculty mein;
ber ut actually to tend the school
F many other American-educated
Chi se Inside China,
life is less intolerable. Those,
wit key Foreign Ministry jobs, for
exa ple, enjoy a certain sense of
Finally, In April, 1958, he was arrested sec ty. Top scientists and taehMeiana.
know that the Communist regime needs
them. Several are dedicated and di
E: ? ciplined enough to accept the continual
din of slogans and the constant rounds
of political meetings that interfere with,
serious research.
By now, It ' seems, most of the evil
American-influenced intellectuals have
been weeded out. And in the wake
the bitter dispute between Peking and,
Moscow, a different kind of devil is
being singled out for exorcism-the
Soviet-trained' Chinese scientist. His
treatment may even be worse than that
of his Amerlcan-educated counterpart.