BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 25, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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Significant Dates
NOV.
7 Bolsheviks seize power in October Revolution (Julian calendar date
is 25 Oct). 1917.
10 World Youth Day (Communist). To celebrate 20th anniversary of found-
ing of the WFDY (1945).
11 International Student Week, concluding with an International Student
day on the 17th (celebrated by communist IUS).
19 Milovan Djilas arrested. 1956.
20, U.S. lifts naval quarantine of Cuba. 1962.
22 Charles de Gaulle born 1890 (75th birthday).
26 Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF -- Communist) founded
1945. 20th anniversary.
29 Yugoslavia proclaimed People's [Communist] Republic. 1945. 20th anni-
versary.
30 USSR vetoes Security Council resolution requesting withdrawal Chinese
Communist "volunteers" from Korea. 1950.
NOV. Proposed meetings of Communist controlled groups -- no firm dates
-- AAPSO (Afro-Asiar Peoples Solidarity Organization)
Executive Committee Meeting, Conakry, Guinea.
-- AAPSO sponsored Afro-Asian Women's Conference, Algiers.
[Previously postponed.]
-- Joint Spark, World Marxist Review Seminar, Accra, Ghana.
[Previously postponed.]
DEC.
8 Republic of China establishes seat of government at Taipei, Taiwan;
leaves mainland in Communist hands. 1949.
8 5th Congress, International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR),
Budapest, 8-12 December (Communist).
10 UN General Assembly adopts, 48-o, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Soviet Bloc abstains. 1948.
14 USSR expelled from League of Nations for unprovoked aggression against
Poland and Finland. 1939.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RD=A000300050003-2 25 October 1965
MEDIA LINES
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ARMY TAKES CONTROL OF THE PRESS AWAY FROM THE PKI.
The coup recently attempted in Indonesia has had significant
repercussions in the press of that country. At the beginning of the
year, the Indonesian Government banned some twenty-one newspapers,
including many of the older, and more respected ones, because they had
supported the nationalist, non-Communist group which was known as the
Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism (BPS). The Communist Party of
Indonesia (PKI), which feared the BPS, had instigated the suppression
of these papers; but, still not satisfied, also demanded the elimin-
ation of forty more papers which it alleged supported counter-revolution
(in other words did not support the PKI). Following the banning of the
twenty-one papers plus several weeklies and other periodicals, the PKI
influenced most of the remaining newspapers. However, its power over
the press did not stop there: all of the remaining papers and magazines
depended heavily on the Government-owned ANTARA News Agency, the sole
news agency in the country. ANTARA, which was so heavily infiltrated by
the Communists as to be under their control, supplied nearly all the
domestic news to all newspapers, and was also their source for most inter-
national news. ANTARA in turn had turned to the Chinese Communist New
China News Agency as its (ANTARA's) source of foreign news.
On 4 June 1965, the Indonesian Ministry of Information published new
regulations which were expected to further tighten the government control
over the press. And since Sukarno and his deputy, Subandrio, were in-
creasingly and openly working hand in hand with the PKI, most observers
saw this step as one which would lead to complete Communist control over
the press. Sukarno himself was quoted at this time as saying that, "of
course we have no press freedom; we are in a revolution." On 26 Septem-
ber, just four days before the PKI attempted its coup d'etat, Minister
of Information, Achmadi, announced plans to implement the 4 June regula-
tions.
The-events of 30 September caused a sudden about face. Although
Sukarno retained his post, the Army was in control. On 6 October the
same Achmadi, still Minister of Information, announced over Radio Djakarta
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* (Cont.)
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that any newspapers, dailies or weeklies, which had supported the rebels
in the 30 September coup, whether by "their methods of carrying news,
their editorials, their corner columns or their photos," were to be hence-
forth banned. One of the first:. papers to be suppressed was Harian Rakjat
(People's Daily), the official PKI organ in Djakarta, which had come out
unequivocally on the side of the rebels in its 2 October edition. Within
a few days, the order banning Communist and pro-Communist papers was
carried out, even in such previously leftist strongholds as Surabaya.
The Indonesian national news agency, ANTARA, which as noted, had become
increasingly dependent upon the New China News Agency (NCNA) was re-
organized and the pro-Communist management replaced by more independent,
nationalist (and incidentally, more professionally competent) men.
Shortly after the pro-Communist and Communist papers were banned,
some of the better newspapers which had been banned early in the year
were allowed to re-open and to resume publishing. One of these is Suara
Islam (Voice of Islam), formerly the leading Moslem paper of Indonesia.
Although as of this writing, there has been no news of any of the jour-
nalists and writers who had been held in prison for political reasons by
Sukarno, there is hope that Indonesia will soon enjoy a freedom of expres-
sion which it has been denied for some ten years.
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
064 29 Sept-12 Oct 1965
Se tember 29-October 2: The CPSU/CC plenum which began 27 Sept. (063)
closes on the 9th :Followed by a USSR Supreme Soviet session the 1st and
2nd -- both apparently devoted primarily to measures to improve economic
performance. In the international section of his major speech on the 29th,
Brezhnev states that in the year since Your Party adopted a line toward
normalization. of Soviet-Chinese relations and the reestablishment of unit
between the CPSU and the CCP on a principled basis,' the CPSU has made
"a number of major moves in this, direction.' 'Unfortunately,... these
effbrtsTly the CPSU have not been supported by the CCP leaders," but "we
must consistently continue to search for ways of settling the disagree-
ment and consolidate friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and
Chinese peoples and between our parties and countries." The plenum re-
solves to convene the 23rd CPSU Congress on 29 March 1966 and names
Brezhnev and Kosygin to de fiver principal reports. Further strengthen-
ing of Bre4hnev7s position is also indicated by several relatively minor
personnel shifts.
September 29; NCNA publicized an editorial from the Karachi paper Jang
accusing; the Sovie Union of being partial to India on the question of
Indian aggression: In the past the Soviet Union has been with the op-
pressed, but now it has betrayed this stand."
September 30: Indonesian CP elements are implicated in a coup attempt in
which 77 e top 'r my generals are murdered: coup is frustrated by
the surviving army leadership; which professes continuing loyalty to
Sukarno while carrying out or permitting anti-PKI measures throughout
this period despite Sukarno's plea for no vengeance. CPSU and other
parties voice thin).y veiled alarm but make no overt moves or commitments
thus far.
September 30-October 7: The extremely bellicose 4-hour press conference
heldnking on the 29th by Chinese Foreign Minister and Vice Premier
Chen Yi in the presence of several hundred journalists visiting for the
net onal holiday (#63, Addendum) draws sharp criticism from Soviet=
aligned CP media (but not from the Soviets themselves, thus far) as well
as from t the non-Communist world. Czech party daily Rude Pravo on the
30th denounces it as "irresponsible.': Belgrade porba on the 1st writes
that "China haq left no doubt of the unpeacefulness of Chinese policy,"`
demonstrated that it "now hardly cares to be represented"in the UN, and
tries, "after having compromised itself in the Pacistan-Indian conflict,
to make the holding of the Second Afro-Asian Conference in Algiers un-
certain." Budapest Nepsszabaddsag on the 7th carries a lengthy report by
its Peking correspondent, with the prefatory editorial comment:
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Led by the consider .~tian of eervinr unity., our Party refrains
from open polemics. UnfortunateZ1. the CCP leaders do not follow
this practice. In order tc let our public see cZearl,j the Length
to which the Chinese leaders have gone in certain questions? the
paper gives details of some of the Chinese Foreign Minister's views.
The interview is not mentioned in Chinese-aligned media (as far as
we are aware), other t'ian a Japanese CP daily Akahata report on the 1st
-~ which omits .!.e challenge to the Soviets to jcin in an invasion of
China. PF:king finally, t t'.blis`ies it prominently in all papers on the 7th,
confirmin Lire bell os treported by Western correspondents. Nocewox'thy
passages include
The Chinese Government is firmly opposed to Soviet participation
in the Afro-Asian Conference.... This is a major issue of principle
on which there can be no compromise or concession.
China is not afraid of an all-round debate with the Soviet
Union. Th,ection of the Soviet Union into the Afro-Asian Con-
ference will meccra thing more t tan the opening o a new ttLe-
font in the struggle against modern revisionism.... In brief, we
should make a success of the conference. Otherwise, it would be
better for the conference to be postvoned until conditions are ripe
than to drag everybody together to make a hodgepodge....
... Will the imperialists allow the socialist countries in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union to live in security? The Khrushchev
revisionists place implicit trust in what U.S. imperialism says,
and they will sooner or later come to grief for it. Kh.iuushchev
said that, instead of liberating Hong Kong and Macao China was
maw other Asians and Africans fiqht imperialism and colonialism
and u c eetnu s out of the fire for China. This is a malicious
pvoadtion. ~K wanted to dictate China's policy. Our reply is:
China's po icy must be decided by China itself and not by the K
revisionists.
The Chinese people are ready to make all necessary sacrifices
in the fiiht against imperialism. It is up to the U.S. president
and the Pentagon to decide whether the U.S. wants a big war with
China toda.... We are ful prepare against U.S. aggression.
If the U.S. imperialists are determined to launch a war of aggres-
sion against us, they are welcome to come sooner, to come as early
as tomorrow.
Let the Indian reactionaries, the British imperialists, and
the Japanese militarists come along with them! Let the modern re-
visionists act in coordination with them rom the nort ! We wtii
still win in the end*
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2 (Chronology Cont.)
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The great Soviet people and the CPS(. will not allow their
leaders to take such a criminal decisions....
For 16 years we have been waiting for the U.S. _ im~pex mists
to come in and attaac us. My hair has turned gray ? waiting.
Perhaps wz_L not nave the luck to sae the U.S. imperialist in-
vasion of China, but my children may see it, and they will resolutely
carry on the fight. Let no correspondent think I am bellicoset....
... The modern revisionist way of seeking peace and comfort at the
expense of principles is a blind alley....
October 1; The 16th anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Peo-
1eublic is celebrated as usual -- but Peking's listing of dis-
tinguished guests does not include delegations from an of the Communist-
ruled countries, other tW n "a delegation of the A banian Ministry of
nterior.` The only non-ruling CPs listed as represented are from Japan,
Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, and the pro-Chinese splinters of Belgium
and Australia. Chinese speeches and articles include anti-Soviet barbs,
e.g., in People's Daily on the lst:
The Khrrushchev revisionists have betrayed Ml-L and proletarian
internationalism. Their collusion with U.S. imperialism and their
selling out of the revolutionary interests of the people of the
world have greatly encouraged the U.S. imperialist policy of ag-
grpesion and war. They act as the agent of U.S. imperialism with-
in the international workers' movement....
Pravda and Izvesti a articles on the anniversary reflect Brezhnev's
plenum Beech, aff rm?ng the CPSU's intent to continue to "work toward
unity in practical matters," "despite all ideological differences."
The speech by Albanian boss Hoxha at the Chinese Embassy reception
in Tirana, as broadcast by Tirana Radio contains the most scurrilous de-
nunciationa yet of the Khrushchevite renegades Brezhnev and Kosygin,"
including a call for stronger unity of Communists "fighting resolutely,
openly, anti ferociously against the Soviet revisionists, Titoists, etc."
October 2: Pravda strikes at the Chinese with an I. Ivanov article, "Li
Chun .en's Re rn," denouncing the-77g--rand press conference on 26 Septembers'
in Peking for the 75-year-old former comrade-in-arms of Chiang Kai-shek
who had just defected to ComChina from his inactive exile in the U.S.:
... Thie latter-day luminary of "revolutionary" thought specifically
advised: smash the CPSU. It is noteworthy that Li Chung-jen is a
real a ecio is eombattin Communists. In 2927, as Chiang kri-
s e "s underling., he exterminated many thousands of Chinese Com-?
muniste. In Z936, he supervised the suppression of Communists and
democrats in 1!wangsi Province; in Z941, he was commander-in-chief
of the eo,calZed anti-Communist armies that launched perfidious
attacks on troops directed by the CCP.... (etc.)
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3
(Chronology Cont.)
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Now Li issues in the CPR recommendations on the problems of
the revolutionary movement. But these recommendations Zook rather
strange. After saying that he has become disenchanted with imperi-
alism, the weaker suddenly turned 180 degrees, intimating that as
a matter of ?fact there are no problems between China and the U.S.
save that of Taiwan which can not be settled through
a deal with the Chiang Kai-s ekites.
So, Li Is political progrc.,m can 'be compressed to two points:
to destroy Communism an jt rea rcre agreement with imperialism.... The
vn y thing to wonder at is that the newspaper People's Daily, the
central organ of the CCP3 allowed its pages to be used a man
for whom the garbage heap of history is the only fitting place.
October. 3: Belgrade Politika article by A. Nenadovic thoughtfully treats
t:,.taestion: "Asia in World Relations -- All Together or Everything
for China?" He concludes :
At present. it is quite c?i ricult to find a reasonable ex--
piana?4ion for Czinese polici; . The conviction is gro.'ing that the
Chinese strive at all costs to obstruct reconciliations -- in the
?567 place between the Soviet Union an ?merica -- and for this
reason relentlessly; instigate and utilise all conflicts as then;
also ,U777 case of the war between Indiia and akistan. Their
were party, auceeoefuZ. The74 do not Lose anything by this. The
waz, is being :vaned outside of China and peace cannot be reac' ed
without it.
But will China gain something by it? ... One can rather say
that Asia and the world along with it, is faced with a hegemony
which) n_ t e last analysis may prove most cal rnf'ul for China itself.
Asia and the whole progressive world demand the redistribution
of the world's resources, but certainly not at the cost of a re-
distribution of territories in favor of Chinese or other national-
istic views on the relations among peoples and states. Asia is
not struggling against Western imperialism only to be su decte to
Chinese or anybody use's great-power ambitions.
October 3-5: The Kadar-led Hungarian party-state delegation to Mongolia
s p pS Of n Moscow en route home: Tass says Kadar discussed international
problems with Bre hnev "in the course of a conversation held in an atmos-
phere of fraternal friendship, cordiality, and complete mutual under-
standing. n
October 4: In the keynote speech at "a scientific conference devoted
to the Cth anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress" in Moscow,
Suslov repeatedly stresses the need for unity in the TCM -- but he also
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affirms the CPSU's dedication to "the decisions of the 20th and 22nd
Congresses" an. again calls for a "world forum of Communists to be held
after thorough all-rouUid preparations.
October! and continuing: A ;"Fe's Zealand C? delegation headed by SecyGen
tj cox is welcomed by _%lbanian boss Hoxha and other leaders of the AWP
fob a visit which is continuing at the end of our period.
October 6; Pravda editorial expands on Brezhnev's plenum speech regard-
ing So et ;ore ,n olio , the essence of which "consists in strengthen-
ing the world socialist comity in every way, supporting the liberation
struggle of the people, and in safeguarding peace on earth," a policy
set by V.I. Lenin! It again refers to "important steps" taken during
the last year "for improvement of relations with the CPR; -- which "so
far has not shown any interest in this matter."
NCNA reports that an Executive Committee meeting of the International
Organiza it on of Journalists -- IOJ -- in Santiago, Chile, 23-25 September
'twas the scene of ashar struggle with regard to the line of the IOJ":
In his report, IOJ SecyGen Meisner energetically preached the
pgZicies of sorcalZed 'peaceful coexistence" and "disarmament' of
Khruahchevian revisionism.... The delegates fa'om Mali;, Indonesia,
and Ceylon expressed objection to the report.... Neither the
Soviet delegates,, nor the president and secygen of the IOJ could
reply to the accusations.
(Di.. Ping-chuan, head of the Chinese delegation) called on pro-
gressive journalists all over the wo to give wide publicity to
the just propositions of the Vietnamese people, expose the U.S.
irrrperic4ist schemes of peace talks, strip the revisionists of all
their disguise and e: oae their deception, and give res a support
to the" strugg e of the Vietnamese peountil final victory. He
denounced t hp service rendered by the K revisionists to U.S. im-
eria ism bith rega to the issues of Vietnam and the Dominican
Repo Zc and the collusion between L.S. imperialism and the K re-
visionists to protect the Indian reactionaries in their aggression
against Pakistan. He severely criticized the IOJ Secretariat for
stubbornly following the instructions of the K revisionists on major
international questions....
... The Indonesian delegate denounced the role laved b, y the Soviet
Union in the U.17. ,Security Council.... (on Vietnam- d an Kas ir) .
the Chinese delegation voted against the meeting's general re-
solution.... Indonesia and Ceylon voted against while the delegates
from Rumania, Peru and Argentina abet..ined.
October 7: NCNA reports that "an acute struggle between two lines was
un ode at a 16-19 September Prague conference of several international
trade unions affiliated with WFTU. "The modern revisionists, by means
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5 (Chronology Cont.)'
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of the so-called majority, .,arimed through the conference a general re-
solution and an appeal for united action ?-- documents that contain a
series of errors of principle,'-, over the objections of the delegations
of Chin:,, Alban=.a, Indorses & , X rea, Ceylon and some other countries.
TASS announces that Cuban Deputy Premier and Armed Forces Minister
Raul astro arrived in the USSR for a visit "at the invitation. of Marshal
MalinQvsky, Minister of -Defense. "
October 8: NCNA reports that the Eighth General Assembly of the World
FeFe ern o: Scientific Workers in Budapest 2~+-26 September "witnessed
an acute :e struggle between the delegation of China and many other coun-
traes on the one hand the Soviet delegation and its followers on the
other hand....'' A draft resolution "submitted by the Soviet, British,
and other delegates at the disarmament subcommittee meeting" "failed to
win approval owing to the vigorous opposition of the Chinese, Korean,
and delegates." The Soviet delegation "did not say a word in answer to
their repudiation" but "set the voting machine in action and had the draft
resolution passed by the Assembly." Chinese Chou Pei-yuan issued a short
Statement denouncing such undemocratic conduct as."a page of shame and
dis race in the history of the WFSW." NC14A adds that the Soviet delega-
tion an Chairman Powell "three times took the lead in walking out of
the conference room" during "refutations" by the Chinese delegate. "'In
addit,oq, they directed others to create distrubances by booing, whistling,
and turr4 g out the lights."
October 0 and cgntI,riuing: The "Sixth World Congress of Trade Unions"
sponsQre y W mOets in Warsaw, with preliminary Polish estimates of
600 representatives from 98 Tcountries attending. Various reports confirm
that "violent clashes" have already occurred in the noisy sessions. (See
further po~~tang an next issue.)
October 10: NCPNA publicizes an article from the Karachi newspaper Dawn
on .nd an efforts to promote "joint U.S.-Soviet machinery to pursue a
policy of support for India and opposition to China."
The th Congress of the Chilean CP opens in Santiago, with a strong
Soviet de e ation headed by CPSU Presidium member Kirilenko in attendance.
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25 October 1965
LATEST SOVIET POLICY MOVES
CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM AND
SIXTH SESSION OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET
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SITUATION: Moscow press and radio have reported at length on the
three-day Central Committee Plenum (27-29 Sept 65) of the CPSU and the
two-day Sixth session (1-2 Oct 65) of the USSR Supreme Soviet (substi-
tute for parliament).
Top billing as speakers at the conferences was shared by Premier
Aleksei Kosygin and Party First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, thus dampen-
ing speculation that one or the other of them was about to suffer some
.loss of position in the leadership struggle rumored to be fought behind
the scenes.
Premier Kosygin led off on the first of the Party Plenum's two agenda
items with a brutally candid description of problems in the domestic indus-
trial sector. He admitted that labor resources in the "social" economy are
being insufficiently utilized, and stressed the need for foreign [read:
"capitalist"] technology. Then he presented a comprehensive scheme for
economic reorganization and reform, stressing widely expanded enterprise
rights (in which profit is to play a key role); complete abolition of Khru-
shchev's "regional economic councils" or "sovnarkhozes" and the Supreme
Economic Council; a return to the industrial branch ministerial system of
management of the economy; and a strengthening of "Gosplan" (the State Plan-
ning Committee). The CPSU Central Committee unanimously approved a resolu-
tion which incorporated Kosygin's proposals on (a) improving the management
of industry, (b) perfecting planning, and (c) strengthening economic incen-
tives for industrial production.
Brezhnev reported on the Plenum's second agenda item, the convocation
of the 23rd CPSU Congress for March 1966. A resolution incorporating his
recommendations was also carried unanimously.
The Sixth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet began on 1 October with
a lengthy speech by First Deputy Premier Kirill T. Mazurov. The speech
was essentially a rehash of Kosygin's report to the Plenum, and was notable
mainly in that it was made by Mazurov instead of by Kosygin, as head of gov-
ernment. The session rubberstamped into law the Soviet government re-
organization proposed by the Party Plenum, including the creation of 28
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industrial ministries. Brezhnev's appointment as a member of the Council
of Ministers' Presidium reinforces his leading position ("first among
equals") by providing him with status in the government structure. Dmitry
Polyansky was promoted to First Deputy Premier, so that he and Kirill
Mazurov, holding the same rank, are now "above" Shelepin, an "unnumbered"
Deputy Premier. [However, Shelepin, member of the CPSU Presidium and
Secretariat, continues to hold far greater r e a 1 power.,] Finally,
the Supreme Soviet approved the Plenum's proposal to convene the 23rd
Regular CPSU Congress on 29 March 1966. It is believed that this post-
ponement of the Congress beyond its October 1965 "due date" is to give
more opportunity to prepare the five-year plan that is to start in 1966,
taking into account the far-reaching reforms in the industry sector which
the party has just adopted, as well as the reorganization of the agri-
cultural sector adopted last March.
News from Moscow on the two conferences has various implications,
including the following:
From a power-political point of view, Kosygin's economic reform
may reduce the supremacy of the party apparat over the government
hierarchy at the working level. One of the aims of Khrushchev in
setting up of sovnarkhozes in 295?, no doubt, was to break the grip
on the economy of Moscow's ministerial bureaucracy (Kaganovich and
the Zike). This he succeeded in doing in that the sovnarkhozes be-
came an instrument for party influence on the economy - through the
local party organs. Wtth the return to the ministerial structure,
the possibilities for economic interference by local party organs
have been considerably diminished [but this also reduces party re-
sponsibility for economic failures at the grass roots].
The speeches by Soviet leaders and Moscow commentaries thereon
were misleading as to the scope of and reasons for their economic-
industrial failures, were over-sanguine with promises of economic
triumphs to come, and were notably defensive in tone vis-a-vis the
West. Although sprinkled with ideological denials and disclaimers,
the announcements could not conceal the fact that the Kremlin leader-
ship is being forced to put a very un-Marxist economic pragmatism
ahead of ideological considerations. This was reflected in the aZ-
Zeged decisions to (a) infuse every aspect of the economy with men
technically qualified (rather than party hacks) for the jobs they
are to perform, (ti)the call for increased decentralization of in-
itiative and decision in production matters, (c) the emphasis on
need for material incentives, (d) the insistence on acknowledgement
of responsibility, (e) the emphasis on scientific and modern methods,
(f) the elimination of parallel production, (g) the repeated admoni-
tions that the government's administrative or bureaucratic apparatus
must not be increased, but must be whittled down, and (h) the sub-
stitution of "sold output" for "gross production" as the measure of
enterprise efficiency.
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Although avoiding such Khrushchevian promises as "We will bury
youor "We will overtake you (America) in per capita industrial
production by 1970," the Soviet leaders stiZZ proclaimed the in-
evitability of Communist triumph in all fields. Brezhnev summed
up Soviet foreign policy aims as "strengthening world socialist
community in every possible way, supporting liberation struggle of
peoples, and preserving peace on earth."
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25 October 1965
956 AF,FE,NE,WH. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NO FATHERLAND:
Ernesto "Che" Guevara.
25X1C10b
"Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat
with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle........"
"The Communists are distinguished from the other working class parties
by this only:
1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the dif-
ferent countries, they point out and bring to the front the
common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of
all nationality.
2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of
the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through,
they always and everywhere represent the interests of the
movement as a whole."
"The workingmen have no country. Since the proletariat must first of
all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of
the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself
national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word."
"National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more
and more vanishing.... The supremacy of the proletariat will cause
them to uxnish still faster. United action, of the leading civilized
countries, at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipa-
tion of the proletariat."
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 Approved For Release 1999/0 lDP78-03061A000300050003-2
"The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They
have a world to win. Proletarians of all countries unite!"
'The Communist Manifesto
Karl Marx, February 1848.
Even today, the Communist Manifesto is regarded as one of the most
significant political documents ever written. Millions of copies in more
than a thousand editions in almost a hundred different languages have been
published. Translations into various dialects of the new nations of Africa
are in progress. The Manifesto remains the 'bible' of international com-
munism and the basis of the world communist movement in spite of the po-
litical, social and economic developments of the last century and the ideo-
logical differences between parties, particularly those of the USSR and
Communist China.
"The success of the working-class cause in any country is unthink-
able without the internationalist solidarity of all Marxist-Leninist
parties.... Whenever a party wants to clear up questions relating
to the activities of another fraternal party, its leadership ap-
proaches the leadership of the party concerned.... Mutual assistance
and support in relations between all the fraternal Marxist-Leninist
parties embody the revolutionary principles of proletarian interna-
tionalism applied in practice."
Declaration of Representatives of the
Eighty-One Communist Parties, Meeting in
Moscow, November December 1960.
Argentine-born, physician-revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara, once
considered the key adviser to Fidel Castro, has been mysteriously absent
from the public scene since shortly after his return to Cuba on 14 March
1965 from a three-months tour of eight African countries and a trip to
Communist China.
Almost seven months of speculation as to his activities and where-
abouts - including allegations of his death or imprisonment in Cuba; his
having been killed in the fighting during the recent coup in the Dominican
Republic; reports that he is continuing his guerrilla warfare training for
"national liberation movements" in several Latin American countries - were
dramatically climaxed by Castro in early October.
Amid widespread rumors that former Minister of Industry Guevara had
lost favor with Castro because of their irreconcilable differences over
economic and foreign policies, Castro announced on 28 September he would
soon explain Che's absence. On 1 October, it became evident that Che had
been dropped from the Cuban Communist hierarchy: Castro announced the
creation of a 100-man Communist Party Central Committee - from which Che
Guevara and four of his proteges were excluded.
2
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$~ (956 Cont. )
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In a rambling address on 2 October, Castro read a letter allegedly
written by Che Guevara on 1 April 1965 in which Guevara resigned from
his political, military and government positions, gave up his honorary
Cuban citizenship and stated he had left Cuba for "new fields of battle."
The letter was read in the presence of his wife who was dressed in
black and seemed on the verge of tears. There was no mention made of his
current location nor of his activities during his prolonged and silent
disappearance, nor any explanation why the letter of April was not re-
vealed until October.
Among other things, Guevara is quoted as having said in his letter,
"I feel that I have fulfilled that part of my duty which tied me to the
Cuban revolution... and I take leave of you and my comrades, and of your
people which are also mine.... Other lands of the world demand the need
of my modest efforts."
Speculation continues to grow concerning Che Guevara. There is no
firm evidence at this time to indicate whether or not he is still alive.
Most observers familiar with Communist affairs doubt that the letter is
genuine. If Che is alive, he may still be in Cuba or may be operating
as a revolutionary elsewhere in Latin America, in Africa, possibly even
in North Vietnam. (See unclassified attachment for biography of Guevara) 25X1C1O b
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 ~1C10b
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CI 61A000300050003 October 1965
957. CPR-PKI INDONESIAN OBJECTIVES
Background on the "30 September Movement"
25X1C10b
SITUATION: In the early hours of the first of October, 1965, a
coup was launched in Indonesia by the "30 September Movement" led by
Lt. Colonel Untung of the Palace Guard. The rebels immediately killed
six of the Army's top generals, but failed in their attempt to assassinate
Defense Minister Nasution, succeeding only in wounding him. They controlled
Djakarta for 24 hours, announced that President Sukarno was safe from Army
plotters and under their protection, read a list of the purported 45 mem-
bers of the new Revolutionary Council (many of whom immediately denied know-
ledge of or membership in such a body), and came perilously close to complete
success. Only the quick counter action of the loyal nationalist Army, and
the refusal of the people to rally to the "cause" of the leftists, prevented
a takeover of Indonesia by the Communists.
It has been fairly well established that Sukarno's role in the "revolt"
was only incidental. For the rebels he constituted a potential symbol, a
symbol which they failed to exploit in the initial proclamation. Typically
unwilling to align himself firmly with one side as opposed to another,
Sukarno vacillated. While hesitating, the army regained control of the
situation, and power polarized. Responsibility for the instigation of the
coup must be laid to the joint connivery of Deputy Premier Subandrio, Air
Force Vice Marshal Dani and Aidit.
It is Communist practice to move first into a power vacuum -- and to
claim the rightness of their cause by charging that a reactionary coup is
being plotted, or that reactionary, bourgeois forces must be removed from
the government. The PKI did believe that Sukarno's health was rapidly de-
teriorating, and its leaders had for months stepped up their maneuvers to
place the party in legal government positions to fill the power vacuum
which would occur with Sukarno's official exit. While they held the most
powerful and influential position in political and civilian affairs in the
country, they were well aware and concerned with the lack of paramilitary
strength, compared with the Army's powerful organization.
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$~~Mm (957 Cont.)
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Sukarno's Guided Democracy and National Front. President Sukarno,
"Mr. Indonesia," is probably one of the most successful (yet reckless)
charismatic leaders of all time. A revolutionary who fought for Indonesian
independence from the beginning, he pictured himself as the Father of all
Indonesians -- later expanding his own image as leader of the emerging na-
tions of the world. His Constitution of 1945 (reinstituted in 1958) placed
all power in the Presidency; his "Guided Democracy" called for organiza-
tions in which Nationalist, Religion and Communist (NASAKOM) groups provided
manipulable political forces for the government, and in which other repre-
sentation in government and throughout the social life of the country was
based on functional groupings. To this end he gradually absorbed all groups
(political, religious, cultural) into single national groups -- one for each
type, e.g., youth, students, veterans, women, labor. By 1960 he completed
the task of placing them all under the control of one National Front.
The Army, early recognizing that the Communists had achieved a high
degree of influence within many of the groups, sought to expand its own
sphere of influence within the National Front, and to create institutions
more directly susceptible to military manipulation. The PKI, while support-
ing Sukarno's concept of the National Front, never submerged their own ef-
forts to build the strength of their individual front activities. Sukarno,
constantly alert to maintain a balance between the Army and the PKI, sought
to contain the Armys military power while correspondingly increasing the
influence of the PKI in the government and society.
The PKI, which had finally organized itself solidly behind D.N. Aidit's
national, popular front strategy prpo-unded in 1951, cooperated with, sup-
ported, and adjusted to Sukarno's whims and demands. After all, mass organ-
izations constituted a primary weapon in their doctrine and practice:
SukarnoA-s accent on functional group representation suited their strategy
of popular fronts and parliamentary, ostensibly non-violent, takeover. The
PKI's major front organizations, which provide a good proportion of its
claimed 3 million membership are: Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) and SOBSI
(labor). It has substantial organized strength in all other fields also --
e.g., peasants, veterans, journalists, peace, women (GERWANI).
PKI Revolts: 1926 and 1948. The PKI, founded in 1920, has twice before
fallen prey to left opportunism, been catapulted into undisciplined, ill-
prepared and poorly supported coup attempts, and failed. On both occasions
the Party went underground and its leaders fled.
The first coup attempt, an uprising which failed to gain momentum,
was against the Dutch in 1926. Musso, one of the leaders, returned in 1935
to set up an "illegal PKI"; another, Tan Malaka, organized an underground
from Bangkok and returned under Japanese auspices in 1944; and the third,
Alimin, remained in the USSR until after WW II.
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The second coup, the more widely known Madiun Revolt of September
1948, was made against Sukarno's government. The army recaptured Madiun
itself on September 30th -- the current leftist coup attempt took the
name of the "30th September Movement." Of the leaders of the ill-fated
1926 revolt, Tan Malaka had been arrested in 1946 for conspiring against
Sukarno; Alimin, after 20 years in Moscow, had taken control of the PKI
in 1946; but Musso had been returned from Moscow in August 1948 to take
charge of preparations to take over the government. In spite of Party
policy to take power through the parliamentary techniques used in Czech-
oslovakia, PKI leaders fought over the breadth of the popular front to
be used and other still advocated violent overthrow. Undisciplined Com-
munist revolutionaries engaged in civil disturbances, demonstrations and
sabotage and finally catapulted the PKI into the Madiun Revolt. Sukarno's
government put down the revolt, the Party was again smashed and its leaders
went underground or fled (Musso was killed).
Dipa Nusantara Aidit (not active in the Revolt), who had reportedly
sought refuge in Communist China and the Communist zone of Vietnam fol-
lowing the unsuccessful Madiun Revolt, returned to Indonesia in 1950 to
assume formal control of the Party from Alimin in 1953. However, Aidit
had set the Party's new direction in mid-1951, adopting the Soviet's na-
tional united front strategy. This strategy was followed meticulously
(including infiltration of veterans and armed services groups) and with
solid progress, until the latest PKI coup attempt of 1965.
Positions after the coup. The Army would like to crush the PKI but,
in the full knowledge that Sukarno still holds substantial influence over
the people, presumably can not risk a clash or open break with him. The
people have demanded that the communists be punished and the party dis-
solved -- e.g., in mammoth demonstrations, destruction of communist party
and group headquarters, and petitions by all major political and religious
groups to the President. The Army pursued a strong anti-Communist cam-
paign against the President's wishes -- making raids, arrests and seizing
arms. Further, it reminded Sukarno through its paper Berita Yukdha of a
statement he had made earlier in the year: "I willooppose Communism if
it disrupts the Republic of Indonesia. But I do not oppose Communism it-
self." On the other hand, the Army continues to support Sukarno's Guided
Democracy and his anti-colonialism, -imperialism. It has made clear its
position as a nationalist group, independent from foreign influence.
Sukarno would like to return to the status quo ante-coup. He has
refused to condemn the PKI or the 30th September Movement; instead, he
calls for unity of Indonesia and asks that no vengeance be taken by one
group against another. But, he has not succeeded in forcing the Army to
abandon its anti-PKI activities and, on the other hand, he has bowed to
their demand by appointing its single candidate General Suharto as head
of the Army.
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It appears that Sukarno may offer a compromise which might well
place the communists back approximately where they were; and it is ap-
parent that his Prime Minister Subandrio, with the assistance of deputy
secretaries of the PKI Lukman and Njoto, is advising and supporting him
in this maneuver. Reports indicate that he might formally abolish the
PKI; organize a new nationalist communist organization whose members
would be dedicated Indonesians -- "not like Aidit and his associates
who served foreign interests"; place PKI second deputy secretary Njoto
at its head; and sponsor the new party himself. If the Army accepts this
"new form" or "new shape" communist party, it may be faced with the same
balance in official government influence as pertained before the coup.
The one thing which may really have changed would be the people's temper
with regard to communist activities and their willingness to oppose them.
Indonesia, the USSR and the CPR. On the level of government-to-
government relations, Sukarno has received his greatest communist country
support from the Soviet Union. He has been given more than one billion
dollars, some economic aid, but mostly military assistance -- a sum which
he is apparently neither able nor willing to repay, despite strong Soviet
efforts over the past several years to force him to do so. Without such
massive Soviet aid, Sukarno could not have taken his aggressive position
on West Irian, nor could he have pursued his present aggressive confronta-
tion -- complete with landing guerrillas and taking armed action -- against
Malaysia. It is ironic that, for the last two years or so, Sukarno has not
only arrogantly turned to the People's Republic of China (which has supplied
only minumum aid of any sort) but has taken its side against the USSR --
especially in the question of Soviet admission to Afro-Asian meetings and
organizations. The two facets of the CPR's blueprint for world domination
(spelled out in Lin Piao's statement) for which Indonesia may be serving
as the model puppet are: the thesis of rural encirclement of urban areas
(within a given country as well as between underdeveloped and mature coun-
tries); and the thesis of aggression and armed revolution.
The record of overt Indonesian collaboration with the CPR shows the
increasing use which the CPR has made of Indonesia to further its own con-
quest of the world, for example:
-- Sukarno has repeatedly assisted the CPR in excluding Soviet dele-
gates from Afro-Asian meetings in Indonesia and in establishing
international organizations in competition with Soviet fronts,
e.g., for labor, journalists, peace;
-- Sukarno's plans for a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO),
whether his idea or one initiated by the Chicoms, have been en-
couraged by the CPR to compete with the United Nations;
4
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-- The CPR's hand is seen behind Indonesia's withdrawal from the
United Nations;
-- The CPR encourages Sukarno's aggressive confrontation with
Malaysia;
-- The CPR applauds, if it did not instigate, Sukarno's stand
against India in its present dispute with Pakistan;
-- The CPR has used Indonesia as a middleman in offering aid to
African countries in its efforts to penetrate that continent;
-- The CPR is engaged in talks with Sukarno's government to supply
and detonate a nuclear device on Indonesian territory, and has
encouraged Indonesia to reverse its support of the ban on nuclear
testing.
-- And Sukarno has led the fight to exclude the Soviet Union from
the II Afro-Asian Bandung Conference -- which the CPR says it
will not attend if Soviet delegates are admitted.
The PKI, CPSU and-the CCP. On a party-to-party basis, the PKI sup-
ported the CPSU and oriented its policies accordingly, until the open
split between the CPSU and the CCP. First Party Secretary Aidit success-
fully led his Party to greater and greater strength within Indonesia on
the basis of the popular front tactic -- and received substantial support
from CPSU-controlled international fronts in the process. Even within
the past six months, Aidit has vigorously pressed for greater representa-
tion in government circles -- and with some success. Nonetheless, and in
spite of general Indonesian antipathy to Chinese, PKI officials did sympa-
thize with individual CCP proposals here and there throughout the years,
and some Party leaders have leaned toward the Chinese for many years.
With the open break between the CPSU and the CCP, the PKI's leader-
ship gradually gave support to the Chinese and then came out solidly for
Mao's hard line -- still following the CPSU doctrine in practice within
Indonesia. Additionally, the leftist Baperki Party, with its major
strength perhaps in rural areas, is largely Chinese-Indonesian in member-
ship. In all Afro-Asian gatherings, the PKI has supported the CCP --
excluding CPSU delegates where possible, creating new organizations to
compete with Soviet front groups. Evidence of close collaboration with
the Chicoms is seen, for example, in the following: shipments of arms
have been secretly delivered by sea along the coast'-of Java (the Commu-
nists main stronghold, where even the Army has been substantially in-
filtrated); close to 3,000 communist youths were given military training
in September at an air force base; arms were issued to youth groups at
the outset of the revolt. And the PKI's official paper, Harian Rakjat,
urged support of the 30th September movement on Saturday, October second.
5
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 ~1C10b
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October 1965
958 WE,WH. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC:
A MAJORITY IN SEARCH OF LEADERSHIP
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The intervention of American troops in the Dominican
Republic in April 1965 has been a cause for interminable debate over
the justification for intervention, over the real cause of intervention
-- to save American lives or to prevent a Communist take over -- and
over the true nature of the Dominican Revolution itself. While these
are fundamental matters and of proper concern for study and debate, the
smoke of the argument over the past seems to be beclouding the realities
of the present. And the present reality is that the political leader-
ship of what, at least in the past, was the majority party of the nation,
the PRD, is seemingly lost in bitter and sterile recriminations, failing
to offer practical, positive, constructive solutions to the myriad prob-
lems facing the country, and doing nothing to support the task of the
Provisional Government. In the process, this leadership is only slowly
coming to realize that the Communist are extremely active and are rapidly
attracting to their cause large numbers of persons theretofore counted
among the democrats.
It is essential to stop this erosion of the democratic majority.
The leaders of the PRD must be induced to realize that under the present
circumstances in the Dominican Republic collaboration, cooperation, or
even a laissez-faire attitude toward the Communists'can only result in
further Communist expansion at the expense of the PRD itself. Addition-
ally, the PRD must be made to realize their stake in the success of the
Provisional Government, which is the only acceptable alternative to a
military junta on the one hand, or a Communist regime on the other.
Attached will be found an account of the Dominican rebellion which
broke out in April 1965, of the expansion of the Communist elements since
that time, and of the dangers facing the democratic majority as a conse-
quence. [A translation in Spanish is included for use by appropriate
Stations.]
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25X1C10b
USSR and Free World
Economic Growths Compared
Since 1960 the USSR has made no progress toward its fundamental
economic goa of catching up with the US in total and per capita out-
put. Thy e of growth in the USSR -- which in the decade of the
1950's was double that in the US -- has been slowing down in the 1960's,
whereas US growth has been picking up in an era of unprecedented pros-
perity and orderly expansion. Thus in the period 1961-65 the average
annual rate of growth in the two economies has been the same, (4.3 per-
cent annually), but because the US economy is twice as large, the abso-
lute gap in output (gross national product or "GNP"has widened by
approximately $60 billion in favor of the US.
Soviet growth, which in the 1950's averaged an impressive 6 1/2
percent a year, has slowed down to a yearly average of about 4 1/2 per-
cent. This lower rate of growth is still respectable by the standards
of modern industrial nations but is below both what the Soviet leader-
ship has come to expect and what is necessary to support the Soviet
leadership's worldwide ambitions. The slowdown is attributable espe
cially to three fundamental causes: (1) the expansion of Soviet mili-
tary programs that have taken high-quality men, machinery, and materials
needed for modernizing the economy; (2) the failure of Soviet agriculture
to provide a rapidly expanding and reliable source of food and industrial
raw materials; and (3) the Soviets' inability to run an economy of ra-
pidly increasing complexity by their traditional authoritarian methods.
Furthermore, Soviet economic institutions are inherently sluggish in
absorbing modern technology and turning out the complex products of
present-day economic life. On the other side of the equation, the rise
in US growth in the 1960's is the result of a combination of favorable
factors, including vigorous and sustained spending by business firms
on new capital plant, the success of government fiscal measures, and
steady advances in consumer income and spending. And the actions of
the Soviet leadership at the recent CP Plenum and Supreme Soviet ses-
sions indicated that the lessons in the US example were not lost on
them. Having exhausted most of the possibilities for low-cost exploi-
tation of Western technological superiority, the Soviets are manifestly
trying to copy US economic and management techniques. But they are not
relinquishing Moscow's centralized control of the economy to any serious
extent, Just as in their past borrowing attempts, they are seeking to
reap the benefits that go with Free World methods without really giving
rein to that which makes those methods work, i.e., private initiative
and competitive free enterprise.
(Cont.)
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Comparing a market econom1 valued in dollars to a planned economy
valued in rubles is at Lest a speculative undertaking. One example of
why this is so is reflected in remarks attributed to some prominent
Soviet economists who have been rather outspoken in their complaints
that official Soviet statistics are unreliable. One of these economists
went so far as to state that Soviet economists have to use figures worked
out by American commentators for their own work on the Soviet economy.
In any case, most current comparisons are biased in favor of the USSR in
that the poor quality of Soviet production and the failure of the system
to respond to the demands of industry and consumers have not been fully
taken into account. But a caution in the opposite direction is important:
in spite of the slowdown in growth, the Soviet economy is still growing
rapidly, and its very considerable energies are still being concentrated
on uses that seriously challenge US national security interests.
Available figures on year-to-year rates of growth fluctuate widely
within both the Soviet and US economies, but fcr quite different reasons.
In the USSR, agriculture accounts for a large part of the GNP, and changes
in weather conditions result in great fluctations in agricultural produc-
tion and hence in GNP. In the US, in contrast, fluctuations in annual
growth are tied to changes in non-agricultural business inventories, in
business needs for additional plant capacity, in consumer spending on
durable goods, and in government fiscal policy.
For the year 1965 a forecast of economic performance can be made
with much greater assurance in the case of the US than the USSR, where
final agricultural results are still uncertain. In the US the pattern
of business conditions for the past six months foreshadows business con-
ditions for the next six months, especially in the current period of
sustained and balanced prosperity. The forecast for 1965 of the Presi-
dent's Council of Economic Advisors, for a 4 percent increase in GNP in
real terms, can therefore he accepted as reliable. In the USSR the over-
all rate of growth in 1965 will be much less than the 7 percent achieved
in 1964 because the 12 percent increase in agricultural production in
1964 makes that year very hard to improve on. In 1965, crops will show
a drop from 1964 -- a drop that may be only partly offset by gains in
livestock which is benefiting from the large feed crops of 1964. Drought
in the new lands" has damaged the wheat crop, and on the basis of cur-
rent evidence, Soviet agricultural production as a whole is estimated
to be in for a drop of four percent for 1965. Soviet industrial produc-
tion in 1965 will grow at a rate of roughly six percent -- up from five
percent in 1964 because of the improved supply of agricultural raw ma-
terials carried over from 1964. Pecause of the current agricultural dif-
ficul-iea, Soviet GNP probably will increase only about three percent in
1965,
2 (Cont.)
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The long-run slowdown in Soviet growth is the result of persistent
underlying economic forces and is not likely to be reversed over the
next five years. In 1966--70, Soviet growth possibly will be greater
than in the US in terms of percentage -- but this is not assured. Sup-
pose that over the next five years the USSR is able to halt the declin-
ing trend in the rate of growth which has developed in recent years and
maintains for example a rate of 4 1/2 percent, while the US economy con-
tinues to grow as it is at a rate of 4 percent. Then the Soviet GNP in
1970 would still be about 50 percent of US GNP, and the absolute gap
between US and Soviet GNP would have widened by $60 billion more.
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Fact Sheets 25X1 C10b
25 October 1965
INDONESIA: 30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT
Highlights from worldwide
press and radio reports
Introduction. About midnight on a Thursday, Lt. Colonel Untung, a
battlion commander in the regiment of the palace guard, started the ``30
September Movement' revolt against the Government of Indonesia. For
some twenty hours on Friday October first, leftist military and civilian
rebels controlled Djakarta and in a brutal slaughter attempted to wipe
out the leadership of its major opponent, the loyal, nationalist Army.
Wounded Defense Minister Nasution and Strategic Armed forces commander
General Suharto escaped the fate of their five assassinated colleagues,
rallied their forces, and, with the support of the police and navy,
gained control of Indonesia's capital by the end of the day. Although
the rebels continued to fight and extended their armed revolt to Sumatra
and Central Java where leftist strongholds and redoubts had been organized,
the Army never lost control and restored order to the country in the ensu-
ing days. Leaders of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) fled or went
underground; many of their military collaborators were still unaccounted
for two weeks later; but some of the associated military leaders, includ-
ing Untung and Latif, were apprehended and hundreds of PKI members (some
1500 in Djakarta alone) were placed under arrest. With the single excep-
tion of the PKI and its affiliates, all political parties and organized
groups in the nation, and the people as a whole, united in condemning
the coup attempt and in demanding that the perpetraters of the revolt
be punished and the PKI abolished.
Untung, a little known officer who is reported to have taken part
in the PKI's Madiun Revolt of 1946, said he was acting on orders. These
orders now appear to have been a product of collaboration between PKT
Secretary Aidit, First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, and Air Force
Vice Marshall Omar Dani.
The PKT was known to have been seriously concerned with reports
given them by Sukarno's Chinese Communist doctors (more precisely, acu-
puncturists) who had abandoned their efforts to treat Sukarno. Their
concern with Sukarno's failing health centered on their determination to
fill the power vacuum when he became incapacitated. The PKI had long
plotted against the Army in preparation for assuming control of the gov-
ernment when the President would be forced to step aside. Only weeks be-
fore the coup attempt, their supporter in the government,Subandrio, had
(Cont.)
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2
said that drastic action should be taken against the capitalist bureau-
crats of the army. Some 3,000 members of the PKI youth and women group
affiliates were trained during September at the Halim Air Force Base.
The bodies of the five n.urder,-d Army Generals and the junior officer,
were found in a w_:ll at the Halim base, an area near which the head-
quarters of Pemuda Rakjat (PKI youth) and Gerwani (PKI women) were also
located.
The evidence shows that Untung had persuaded Sukarno that a Council
of Generals (which did not exist) was plotting a coup against him for
Armed Services Day, 5 October. Furthermore, it appears clear that
Sukarno, taking precautionary measures by going to Halim Air base at
the beginning of the coup, was actually in "protective custody by
leaders of the coup who intended to maintain control over the President
after eliminating their only major organized opposition in the country.
President Sukarno conferred the title "Heroes of the Revolution"
on the five generals who were tortured, mutilated and murdered by the
30 September Movement. This group had attempted to label them imperial-
ist subversives, counterrevolutionaries (i.e., to Indonesia's own revolu-
tion) and coup plotters.
The involvement of the Chinese People's Republic in the leftist
coup attempt is indicated by many factors, for example: the CPR Embassy,
alone of all foreign representations in the country, was allowed special
handling of its cargo (building materials to house CONEPO) -- many of the
weapons used by the rebels had CPR markings. Military weapons were smug-
gled also to the PKI by sea tQ central Java; PKI collaboration with of-
ficial CPR representatives was extensive; CPR personnel treating Sukarno,
informed the PKI leaders that he was failing rapidly and would soon be
physically and mentally incapacitated. (Some believe that this precipi-
tated the timing of the coup). The CPR's long delayed reaction to the
coup attempt finally appeared in People's Daily and NCNA press reports
on 19 October. In this round up of the Indonesian situation, the Chinese
Commun'~ fists expressed extreme hostility to the Indonesian Army (and referred
to the slain Generals as "executed"), supported the actions and statements
of the 30 September Movement in spite of the fact that the coup was de-
termined to be counter-revolutionary, and that Sukarno had given the lie
to their story of the purported General's Council coup by making the
Generals "Heroes of the Revolution"). The CPR objected to the Soviet's
official Izvestiya calling the coup a "rebellion" and its leaders "rebels."
They further defended Harian Ra.kjat's support of the 30 September Move-
ment by condemning Izvestiya for charging this official PKI paper with
supporting a movement which lacked popular support.
The Indonesian governments reaction to the position taken by the
People's Republic of China on the coup and its outcome has been stated
in Sura Islam, a Djakarta daily, on 2++ October which was also reported
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upon by the New China News Agency to Peking. Entitled "Unfriendly At-
titude of China," the article makes the following points:
We are forced to voice our disappointment over the attitude of the
CPR Government which is one of unfriendliness and of showing under kind
of pretext its partiality for the rebels. The CFR endeavors, in fact
has started to interfere in Indonesia's internal affairs. The CPR Embassy
failed to fly its flag at half mast, CPR radio broadcasts have abused the
Armed Forces and the people of Indonesia. If the CPR continues in its
attitude of siding with the counterrevolutionary group in Indonesia, and
of launching dirty abuse and slander and provocative actions, we will
naturally be forced to review our friendly and diplomatic relations with
the CPR. If we oppose British Nekolim for manipulating its puppets in
Malaysia, we must also oppose another which resorts to the same evil
tactics by creating puppets and manipulating them for its own evil pur-
poses."
On 22 October, another Indonesian paper Nusa Putera said that Radio
Peking is apparently standing behind the 30 September Gestairii. Mov ,rnent
and "using filthy terms has shamelessly disgraced the armed forces and
interfered in our domestic affairs." Foreign Minister Subandrio has been
asked to make official protests to Peking over the broadcasts. "Radio
Peking has a number of listeners in Indonesia.... We cannot idly sit back
and let our people be driven by the venomous voice of Peking." As the
Kortan says "A hostile attitude must be replied to in kinds"
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) -- Pre-coup.
1. Aidit receives medal as hero of the revolution -- 16 September
1965. At a ceremony at 9erdeka Palace, President Sukarno conferred the
medal, of "Mahaputera" -- Great Son -- on Aidit for his excellent service
and loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.. Sukarno said that Aidit is an
exemplary patriotic hero of the Indonesian people particularly. in "po-
litical leadership" and in implementing the policy of Nasakom -- national-
ist, religious, and communist cooperation. The President said that every
revolution has its national heroes and that some of them lose their lives
in the revolution while others survive. Aidit is one of the living heroes.
EAidit was a member of the PKI at the time it rebeled against Sukarno's
government in the Madiun Revolt of 1948. At that time Aidit sought refuge
in Communist Chinese territory before returning to Indonesia.]
2. Aidit demands more PKI representation -- 22 September 1965. In
a speech to students of an Agricultural Department school entitled
"Masakomization of the government," Aidit charged that "there need be
no doubt that the present cabinet is not a Nasakom cabinet.... The in-
clusion of myself and several other communists in the cabinet shows that
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3 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2
the present cabinet has only started to 'smell' of Nasakom.'" "The alter-
native of Nasakom is fighting between the political forces that exist in
the country...." [Note: President Sukarno has complete control over the
composition of his cabinet. The PKI has constantly pressed him to in-
crease its representation.]
In similar fashion, Aidit, seeking to place PKZ members in positions
of control in the military, demanded that the armed services also be
Idasakomized.
3. Aidit asks arms for peasants. In recent months, Aidit has in-
creased his pressure on the President to arm the peasants and workers
(i.e., those belonging to Communist auxiliaries) as a "fifth force" to
resist the so-called British imperialist forces of Malaysia. [The CPR
had also proposed to Sukarno that he arm the peasants as "volunteers to
crush Malaysia."I
4. Aidit's strategy for world revolution. The PKI-leftist coup
was in direct line with the CCP's blueprint for world revolution as de-
scribed in Lin Piao's statement in particular. Early statements by Aidit
coincide so closely as to show that there had been close collaboration
between the PKI and the CCP for some time. For example, Aidit's speech
at the PK1's Central Committee meeting in December 1963 said:
"On a world scale, Asia, Africa and Latin America are the village
of the world , while Europe and North America are the town of the
wor-d.'' If the world revolution is to be victorious, there is no
other way than for the world proletariat to give prominence to the
revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America, that is to say, the
revolutions in the village of the world. In order to win the world
revolution, the world proletariat must 'go to these three continents."
This statement was quoted exactly by Peng Chen at a speech at the Aliarcham
Academy of Social Sciences in Indonesia in May 1965. In the now famous
statement of 3 September 1965, Lin Piao in effect requoted Aidit as follows:
"Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be
called 'the cities of the world,' then Asia, Africa and Latin
America constitute the 'rural areas of the world.'"'
The CCP advocates rural encirclement of the urban world by armed force to
achieve their world revolution.
5. 'KI announces its base for the revolution. This spring, Harian
Raakjaat published an article which said that "the revolutionary situation
is ripening." [Reminiscent of Chou En-lai's "Africa is ripe for revolu-
tion."] The paper laid down the line of attack, namely through peasants
and by seizing government posts. [Use of peasants follows Peking's line
of rural encirclement of the urban areas.] And Aidit labeled Jogjakarta
(250 miles away from the capital) as "the base of our revolution."
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6. Murba Party banned: charged with plans to depose President
Sukarno. "On September 22,'1965, Sukarno's government banned the na-
t onalist communist Murba party. This was an important victory for the
PKI which had been exerting pressure on Sukarno, particularly since the
beginning of the year, to eliminate the party. The Murba party, formed
in 1948, was the last publicly organized anti-PKI political party in
Indonesia. The PKI demanded dissolution of the influential Murba Party
for more than one year on grounds that some Murba members alle edly had
laps to depose President Sukarno. Note: the PKI charged that the Coun-
cil Of General's was planning to depose Sukarno.]
7. PKI open challenge to Sukarno. On September 28, 1965, two nights
before the coup attempt, Sukarno was principal speaker at a mass rally of
the CGMI, a Communist-dominated student organization holding a congress
in Djakarta. Speaking before the President, Aidit, "in a highly emotional
outburst, urged the students to persist in their demands for the banning
of the HMI, a leading Moslem student organization. The President, dis-
turbed, left the platform for an anteroom where he stayed for a time be-
fore returning to make his address. Then he told the CGMI it should be-
have and not deviate from the path of the Indonesian revolution he was
uig din&." (Washington Star 17 October 1965, datelined Jakarta)
On September 19, 1965, Sukarno addressed a conf,rence of national
technicians in the same sports hall. Communists boycotted the rally.
"The President again appeared uneasy and touched on no controversial sub-
jects," (iba.d)
8. The PKI was informed by Chinese Communists acupuncturists that
Sukarno was grave y #ll and was deteriorating mentally and physically;
be would soon not be able to carry on his duties, and had not long to
live. The PKI held emergency meetings to speed their plans for taking
action against the Army in order to fill the vacuum left by Sukarno.
According to some reports, it was the information on Sukarno's health
which led to the decision for the coup. The timing was also right to
attempt to sustain the charge that the Army was moving forces into
Djakarta -- Armed Forces Day was October 5.
9. Communists trained at Halim Air Base. The first group of some
120 Communist arty special, cadres was given a seven day training course
by mid..September. A second class of some 1500 was trained by the Indo-
nesian Air force at Halim a week or so later. Included in these thousands
were members of the PKI's youth group (Pemuda Rakjat) and women's organi-
zation (Gerwani).
10. Ranking PKI members remain in Indonesia. None of the important
Communist Party leaders was absent from the country at the time of the
coup attempt 30 September -- an unusual situation considering their reg-
ular and frequent travel to China, the USSR and elsewhere. [On the other
hand, more leading non-communist government figures were absent from the
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country than usual: many of them to the CPR in large agricultural and
scientific delegation, the naming of which were under Subandrio's con-
trol.) The absence of the top three PKI leaders -- Aidit, Lukman and
Njoto -- in the 10 man delegation to celebrate Communist China's Na-
tional Day celebration of October 1 was particularly noticeable. The
delegation, led by a central committee member, arrived in Peking on 28
Se tp ember
11. 3030 September Movement. The coup may have received its name
from the date on which Army quelled the last PKI revolt in September
1948. This was the date on which the Army reoccupied Madiun. October 1
may also have been significant to the PKI -- this is the Chinese Nation-
alist day which the Communists celebrate, and the day on which the coup
leaders announced their takeover of Indonesia.
12, The night before the coup, PKI leaders were given orders (at
base) for their specially trained forces; they were informed
Halim air
that they would be issued uniforms and weapons, and that they might be
away from home for some time.
13. The PKI knew the exact location of each of the leading officers
of the Army t e night t e coup took place.
The PKI -- Coup.
14. The morning of the coup, Untung's command issued weapons to
Communist cadres -- including members of the youth and women's groups.
15. Communist youth in uniform were among those who invaded the
homes of the six Generals in the early hours of October 1st, and who
tortured, Filled and mutiliated the bodies of five and a Lieutenant,
and wounded the sixth. The officers assassinated were: Lieutenant
General Achmad Rani, Major General's Suprapto, S. Parman, and Harjono;
and Brigadier General's Pandlaitan and Sutedjo. Also assassinated was
Lieutenant Panduan. Defense Minister Abdul Haris Nasution was wounded
but escaped; and Major General Suharto escaped without injury. Nasution's
five year old daughter was wantonly killed.
16, Untung's 45-member Revolutionary Council, announced mid-day of
October 1st, did not include Sukarno's name. It did include members of
many political parties and other groups -- almost all of whom immediately
denied knowledge of or support of the Council. But the Communist-named
members -- at least a dozen were known Communists or crypto communists
(Aidit and Lineman in the former and Subandrio, Omar Dani and Martadinata
in the latter) -- did not deny membership or reject the authority of the
Council.
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.7. PKI papers support the 30 September Movement. Harian Rakjat,
the main PKT daily, condoned the coup in an editorial on Saturday
October 2, in a paper that cane out just a few hours after the suc-
cessful counter-coup, rd said: "The people will certainly be on the
side of the 30 September Mover:ient. We call on the people to remain
vigilant and ready to meet any eventuality."
The Warta Bhakti and Gelera Indonesia, two other PKI dailies in
Djakarta, also supported the Movement.
The East Java Pemuda Rakjat (Communist youth organization) said:
".... We, in the name cf 750,000 members of the Pemuda Rakjat in East
Java completely support and stand behind the 30 September Movement in
forming regional Indonesian Revolutionary councils." [Untung's announce-
mentiproclaiming the Revolutionary Council to be the sole authority of
the land, outlined its organizational structure down to the village level.
18. By October 3, virtually all political parties and organized
groups except the PKI and its puppet party, Partindo, had voiced support
of General Suharto and the government forces.
19. D.N. Aidit fled to Java and disappeared -- immediately after
Suharto ra ied Army forces against the rebels. Various reports said he
had been seen in Java, Sumatra and other islands and one said he had es-
caped to the CPR. But none of the reports was verified two weeks after
the coup failed and Aidit's whereabouts remained unknown.
20. Army forces searching Communist quarters found a letter among
other Communist literature, in a Youth leader's home it was from Dipa
Nusantara Aidit and said that the nationalist air forces were joining
the PKI in the coup effort.
21, Lukman anddNN'oto fled Djakarta some time during the fateful
day of October ~.st, but returned, purportedly from Java, with Subandrio
to seek the protection of Sukarno. They took part in Sukarno's Cabinet
meetings, first at Bogor and then in Djakarta. They remained quiet as
Sukarno worked to impose a "unity without vengeance" behind his Nasakom
and anti-Necolim policies, and to achieve a political settlement which
would preserve his balance of power between the army and the communists.
22. Non-refugee Communist leaders appear to have agreed with
Subandric to ac ifice Aidit, dissolve the PKI as pro-Peking and to dis-
avow foreign orientation; and to propose a new communist party which would
be nationalist and dedicated to Nasakom. It has been reported, as in
Mimbar Revolusi of October 10, that: "... the group wanted to form a new
party to absorb communists who wish to dedicate their lives to the inter-
ests of the country, pot like Aidit and his associates who served foreign
interests. The group will soon contact President Sukarno to ask for his
blessing for the formation of a new party. It is expected that "the for-
mation of a communist party will be proclaimed soon after the Indonesian
head of state has proclaimed Aidit's Communist Party banned."
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Chinese People's Republic (CPR): Pre-coin
1. Only the CPR had the privilege of handling its cargo (building
materials for CONEFO headquarters) without inspection of Indonesian of-
ficials. Under this guise they brought in arms and munitions for the
PKI.
2. Officials of CPR instalations supplied extensive support for
the PKI: for example, they gave massive financial support for the PKI's
45th anniversary celebration. For this as well as other FKI activities
they "persuaded" Chinese businessmen to contribute. [The CPR has always
considered all Overseas Chinese to be CPR citizens and has forced them,
under threat of harm to friends and relatives in the CPR, to contribute
to Communist party activities.)
3. The CPR smuggled arms and munitions to the PKI by sea to Java
(a major communist stronghold): some of these were found in caches, com-
plete with Chinese markings, and others were recovered from rebel com-
munist youth guerrillas.
4. The parallel between CCP doctrine and strategy for world take-
over and PKI action has been noted above. In addition, Aidit said that
"guerrilla warfare is one of the correct forms of struggle to achieve
independence if there is a friendly neighboring country." The collusion
of Communist China as that friendly neighboring country cannot be doubted.
The PKI, after the open break between Moscow and Peking, took the side of
and supported the Chinese in their every move.
5. The CPR had assured Sukarno over a long period of time that
its acupuncturists could cure him (of organic ailments that Western
doctors diagnosed as needing surgery). The CPR informed Sukarno, finally,
that they could not cure him; at the same time they informed the PKI as
to the serious nature of his condition ana the fact that he would soon
be incapacitated physically and mentally.
6. Among other activities undertaken by Indonesia for the CPR,
the government was acting as frontman for Chinese aid to African coun-
tries.
CPR: Coup.
7. No word was heard from the CPR until an official message dated
3 October was sent to President Sukarno (4 Oct. over Djakarta radio) which
read in part: "May the Great Indonesian people, under the leadership of
Your Excellency and President, develop still further the spirit of oppos-
ing imperialism and old and new colonialism, and of opposing 'Malaysia.'"
(The CPR has influenced Sukarno's anti-Nekolim policy in some of his
most adventurist moves -- e.g., against Malaysia, withdrawal from the
United Nations, efforts to establish CONEFO, attempts to dominate the Afro-
Asian organizations with the Chinese.]
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8. The first word to the Chinese people was an NCNA broadcast on
4 October, which said only: "President Sukarno left Djakarta owing to
a sudden domestic incident which occurred in Indonesia. According to
the 3 October broadcasts from the Djakarta stations, President Sukarno
declared in a recorded broadcast that he was in good health." [This
understatement and the paucity of news in Communist China occurred when
sizeable delegations of Indonesians were there on economic and scientific
missions and to celebrate the Chinese National Day, October 1.]
9. Flags were ordered flown at half mast for a week, to start on
5 October, in honor of the slain Army heroes. In all of the. Diplomatic
community, only the CPR Embassy in Djakarta and its Consulate in Medan
(along with the Cuban Embassy in Djakarta) continued to fly flags at full
mast for some days. EPKI buildings flew no flag at all.]
10. The CPR Embassy, again alone of all the embassies, locked its
doors tight after the coup and no officials came or went.
11. The CPR published its first official statement on the Indonesian
leftist revolt on 22 October -- three full weeks after it had started and
failed. Peking's People's Daily in a lengthy report, also broadcast by
the New China News Agency, thus continued its support of the 30 September
Movement, saying among other things that:
Untung's movement was a "patriotic and revolutionary action";
The Council of generals was engagedin a subversive movement;
Sukarno calls the coup an "internal army affair";
The Army began "wholesale arrests in Djakarta .... worked up a great
agitation over the execution ... of Yani ... and some other army
generals"; the Army banned all progressive forces "in this atmosphere of terror
4i;
Nasution called the 30 September Movement "traitorous" and lauded
the Generals as "heroes";
hooligans were responsible for anti-communist demonstrations and
slogans;
"Chairman Aidit condemns the 'Council of Generals' and calls on the
whole party to heighten vigilance... and smash the 'Five Evils"'
(a report on purported Aidit letter of 6 October to Djalan Rakjat);
Suharto is going against Sukarno's orders to "restore law and order"
by continuing to suppress progressive forces; and
tries tq explain why CPR flags were not lowered.
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12. Indonesian government reaction to the CPR's hostile
position and interference in its internal affairs appeared in papers on
22 and 24 October (see Introduction above). Among other things, the
papers said that Indonesia's relations with the CPR might have to be re-
considered.
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10
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Subandrio (First Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister).
1. Subandrio was out of the city touring Sumatra during the course
of the coup. He was named to the Revolutionary Council. He did not re-
turn until October 6th, and then in the company of Lukman and Njoto,
second and third in command of the PKI respectively.
2. Subandrio had long supported the PKI in its demands for greater
influence in the Government and all functional activities throughout the
country.
3. It is likely that Subandrio knew of, if he did not authorize,
the trips of sizeable delegations of non-Communists to Peking which took
them from the country at the time of the coup.
4. Subandrio had said that drastic action should be taken against
the high command of the Army if it did not change its capitalist bureau-
cratic ways.
5. There is a strong similarity between several of Subandrio's
speeches and those by PKI head D.N. Aidit. For example, Subandrio de-
veloped themes which were new for him, namely:
That the heroes of the "physical revolution" (i.e., those who fought
against the Dutch) are not necessarily heroes today: now it is neces-
sary to crush capitalist bureaucrats, and corruptors (same as PKI
attack on Army leaders and especially Yani). [Subandrio played no
significant role in the fight against the Dutch.]
He stressed this and related themes: 1) on 14 September to the "Gen-
eratiQn of 194514 organization, reminding them that many former heroes had
turned revisionist or traitor; 2) on 13 September in a speech to SOBSI,
communist dominated labor union, outlining government policy to crush
capitalist bureaucrats; 3) on 23 September, repeating the above at a
sports award presentation when he also said that Indonesia has known but
two complete patriots: Sukarno and the farmers and peasants -- other
heroes had weakened and failed; and 4) 28 September at the opening ses-
sion of the Immigration Directorate, where he said that leaders should
no longer live on past contributions but should implement present aims
of the national revolution and that there should be a ''drastic change"`
in policy to "do away firmly with all elements which cannot follow the
course of the revolution.'"
Air Force
1. Elements of the Air Force trained some 3,000 special Communist
cadres at its Halim Air base during September 1965.
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(Cont.)
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2. The bodies of the five assassinated. Generals and the Lieutenant
were found in the Crocodile Hole area -- part of Halim Air Force base
on the outskirts of Djakcarta.
3. Vice Marshal Car Dani fled with Aidit and Untung from the city
to Java when the Army counter attacked. But Dani went to Bogor to seek
Sukarno's protection a day later.
4. Vice Air Marshal Omar Dani's order of the day, issued on Friday
1 October 1965 at half past nine (i.e., while the rebels were in control)
read:
"On 30 September 1965 night a movement was launched by 'Gerakan
Tigapul,uh September' to safeguard the revolution and great leader of the
revolution.... In this connection, the body of the army has been cleansed
of elements who are manipulated by foreign subversive elements who are en-
dangering the Indonesian Revolution.
".,.. Herewith I order all members of the Indonesian Republican Air
Force to remain vigilant against any provocation and undermining acts
and moreover increase their preparedness against any eventualities from
inside as well as from outside."
:
5. After the Army regained the city, Vice Air Marshal Omar Dan-4
issued a statement for the Air Force on 2 October 1965, as follows: "The
Air Force ... is not involved in the 30 September movement. The Air
Force ... agrees with any cleansing movement in the body of any tool of
the Revolution in conformity with the line of the Great Leader of the
Revolution. The Air Force of the Republic ... does not interfere in the
internal issues of other services. The Air Force ... has no knowledge
of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council and the compcsition of its per-
sonnel."
6. Air Force Order broadcast over Djakarta domestic Radio, 4 Oct
?5, read:
'-Thanks be to Almighty God for the confidence of the President,
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia and
Great Leader of the Indonesian Revolution Bung Karno and the Indonesian
people in the air force of the Republic of Indonesia so that Nekolim
(imperialism) has failed in its. attempt to set us off against each other,
I herewith order: a) to remain calm and vigilant against any provocation;
b) to preserve the existing good relations with other branches of the
armed forces and the people in general and c) to enhance the vigilance
of all combat units to cope with any possible Nekolim attack.
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"If it is proven that elements within the air force are involved
in the 30 Sept incident and the creating of the so-called Revolutionary
Council, such elements obviously have betrayed the Indonesian revolu-
tion and stained the good name of the air force.
Djakarta, 4 Oct. Signed Minister and Air
Force Commander Omar Dani."
7. Vice Marshal Omar Dani, according to a broadcast by Djakarta
radio on 20 October, was sent on an assignment with a "construction air-
craft industrial plant carried out with the cooperation of the Netherlands."
In other words, be was removed from his command.
30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT: Statements by Lieutenant Colonel Untung
[Note: The 30 September Movement failed, after some twenty hours during
which it controlled the capital city Djakarta, in its attempt to seize
the Government of Indonesia. Its spokesman, Lt. Col. Untung was captured,
more than a week after he fled the city, by two Army personnel with the
help of the local community near Tegal in central Java. One of his
closest collaborators in the fighting, Col. Latif, had been captured a
few days earlier near Djakarta. Of those leaders implicated in the plot
with him, Vice Marshal Omar Dani fled the city but returned a day later
of his own volition; PKI First Secretary D.N. Aidit fled and had not
been found some three weeks later; PKI deputies Lukman and Njoto fled
but returned with Foreign Minister Subandrio to Sukarno's side in Bogor
on 6 October. The murdered Army Generals, whom Untung had charged with
being disloyal to the Indonesian Revolution and with plotting a coup
against President Sukarno, were given full funeral honors and President
Sukarno bestowed upon them the title of Heroes of the Revolution. Weeks
after the failure of the coup, officials of the People's Republic of
China restated and supported the claims of the 30 September Movement, in
spite of the evidence that it was a rebellion and that the President
had discredited it and its leaders.]
Messa,es broadcast in the name of Lt. Col. Untung over tthheDjjakarta
radio on l October 1965: The first rca casts started with the state-
ment that they were "now safeguarding the Indonesian President and Re-
public."
First messace: "The Dewan Djenderal [Council of Generals] ... had
planned conduct a power exhibition on armed forces day, 5 October this
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(Cont.)
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year, by sending to Djakarta troops from east, central, and west Java....
It was to prevent such a counterrevolutionary coup that Lieutenant Colonel
Untung took the initiative to launch the 30 September operation, which
has proven to be a success." It is possible that the Generals, who were
thought only to be kidnapped, were murdered by this time.]
"Lieutenant Colonel Untung personally thinks that as a member of the
Tjakrabirawa regiment [the palace guard] he must launch the operation, be-
cause it is his duty to protect the President and the Indonesian Republic."
"As commandant of the 30 September operation, Lieutenant Colonel Untung
called on the entire Indonesian people to always increase vigilance and
fully support the 30 September operation in order to safeguard the Indo-
nesian Republic from the wicked schemes of the Council of Generals and
its agents....
"Lieutenant Colonel Untung called on all army officers and men in the
country to be fully determined to completely eradicate the influence of
the Council of G'', aral: and its agents in the army. Generals and of~
ficers ... twist he kicked out of the army and subsequently punished ac-
cordingly. The army is not for the generals. It is the property of all
army personnel who are loyal to the ideals of the revolution of 17 August
1945.
''... Lieutenant Colonel Untung thanked all armed units outside the army
for their assistance in the mopping up operation of the army...."
Decree No. 1 of the Indonesian Revolution Council:
"A number of generals were arrested....
"The 30 September movement is a movement entirely confined within
the body of the army to put an end to indiscriminate actions of generals
who were members of the Council of Generals and other officers who were
henchmen and sympathizers of the members of the Council of Generals.
This movement was assisted by armed troops not belonging to the army.
i.e., communist paratroops.
Decree No. 2 of the Indonesian Revolution Council:
.... the 30 September movement will set up an Indonesian Revolution
Council..,. [The names of 45-members were released that same day.]
"For the time being, pending general elections for the People's Con-
sultative Council (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) in line with the con-
stitution of 1945, the Indonesian Revolution Council will constitute the
'source of all authority' in the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian
Revolution Council is a tool of the entire Indonesian people to realize
Pantjasila and all five charms of the revolution." [Sukarno was not named
on this 45-member council.]
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Decree No. 3 of the Indonesian Revolution Council:
"With the falling of the authority of the state into the hands of the
Indonesian Revolution Council the Dwikora Cabinet automatically assumes
a decommissioned status. [i.e., Sukarno's Cabinet. Until the forma-
tion of a new council of ministers by the Indonesian Revolution Council
former ministers are dutybound to carry out routine tasks and preserve
order in their respective departments. They are prohibited from appoint-
ing new employees and from taking actions which may have broad consequences.
All former ministers are obliged to give account to the Indonesian Revolu-
tion Council,. New ministers will be appointed by the Indonesian Revolution
Council."
Decree No. 4 of the Indonesian Revolution Council: This provided
for s&t jng up similar councils throughout Indonesia i.e., at the regional,
provincial, district, sub-district and village levels) as "tools of the
i Indonesian Revolution Council."
Sukarno and Major General Suharto.
On October 1, when the rebels controlled the radio in Djakarta, a
pre-recorded statement by President Sukarno was played. His voice was
recognized, but it was weak and dis-spirited. In a second pre-recorded
speech played over the radio on 2 October, after the Army had retaken
the city, Sukarno said:
"Breathers, I repeat my order ... which was announced on 1 October
1965.... I am sound and well and continuously carrying out the leader-
ship of the government of the Republic of Indonesia....
11....I instruct the entire population to continuously increase
vigilance and preparedness in the framework of the implementation of
Dwikera [the cabinet which Untung had "decommissioned"].
"At present the leadership of the army is vested with me, and to
discharge the daily tasks of the army, I have appointed previsionally
Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudro, third assistant to the army commander.
"To restore security and order in connection with the 30 September
incident, I have appointed Major General Suharto,...." [General Suharto,
after consultation with wounded Defense Minister Nasution, had taken
charge of the Army's counter-coup. He was later named by President Sukarno
to head the Army.]
In another 2 October statement, Sukarno said:
"The charge against AURI (Indonesian Air Force) of involvement in the so-
called 30 September incident is not true. [Later evidence shows that only
some elements of the Air Force, were involved in the coup.]
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15 (Cant.)
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"My visit to the Halim airbase on the morning of 1 October was at
my own will as I was of the opinion that the best place for me is a
place near an airplane which can transport me at any moment to another
place if something which is not expected takes place.
"We must remain vigilant and should prevent the playing off between the
air force and the army so that the Nekolim and other side will benefit
from it...."
Sukarno held a Cabinet meeting at Bogor on 6 October 1965. After
it was over, his Deputy, Subandrio reported to the press as follows:
"The President gave a preliminary explanation concerning the 30
September incident and:
"Denounced the brutal killing of the army officers who have now
been appointed by His Excellency the President and the entire peo-
ple of Indonesia as heroes of the revolution;
"Expressed his profound grief over the loss of these heroes of the
revolution;
"Did not justify the creation of the Revolution Council;
"Urged the need for a calm and orderly atmosphere to take the neces-
sary actions against those elements from all groups who took part
in the $0 September incident and to seek a political settlement.
"... At the session His Excellency the President also announced that
the commander of the air force of the Republic of Indonesia, Omar
Dani, had reported to him on the arrest of a number of instructors
of men and women volunteers at Halim Perdana Kusuma, who are believed
to have been involved in the 30 September incident...."
On October 1, the Information Center of the Department of the Army
broadcast the following message:
"There has been cooperation and full action by the army, navy, and
police force to crush a counterrevolutionary movement that called itself
gerakan tigapuluh September (30 September Movement)."
"It is clear that persons of the gerakan tigapuluh September are
counterrevolutionaries who have taken over the authority of the Republic
of Indonesia from His Excellency the President ... Bung Karno, kidnaping
a number of officers of the army."
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16 (Cont.)
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"The community should remain calm and remain vigilant and prepared."
At a later broadcast the same afternoon of October 1, the Army said:
"The 30 September Movement in Djakarta "kidnaped a number of high
officers, namely: Lieutenant General Achmad Yani; Major General Suprapto;
Major General S. Parman; Major General Harjono; Brigadier General Pandjaitan;
and Brigadier General Sutodjo."
"His Excellency President, Supreme Commander of the Indonesian Republican
Armed Forces and Great Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno and his honorable
coordinator minister for defense and security, General A. H. Nasution, were
brought to safety and are in sound and healthy condition."
"The leadership of the army is for the time being in the hands of
Major General Suharto, commander of Kotrad. [Army strategic command.]"
Early evening of the same day, General Suharto reported:
"Brother listeners ... the self-styled "Gerakan Tigapuluh September"
has formed what they referred to as "Dewan Revolusi Indonesia" (Indonesian
Revolution Council). They have taken over the state authority, which is
usually called a coup, from the hands of His Excellency the President,
Supreme Commander of the Republic of Indonesia and Great Leader of the
Revolution Bung Karno, and ... decommissioned (the cabinet) besides kid-
naping a number of high-ranking army officers.
17 We are convinced ... our Indonesian republican state ... will
remain under the leadership of His Excellency the President ... who we
love . "
In a statement on 4October, General Suharto speaks of the
Generals:
"Today, 4 October 1965, we witnessed together with our own eyes the
recovery of the bodies of our generals--6 generals and one junior officer
from an old well. As you already know, our generals and our union of-
ficer have fallen victims to the uncivilized actions of the adventurers
of the so-called 30 September movement. If we survey the place, it is
in Lubang Buaja. Lubang Buaja is within the area of the Halim Airbase.
Here you will also see that the area near the well has been used as a
training center for (volunteers) under the auspices of the air force.
They have trained members of Pemuda Rakjat (People's Youth) and Gerwani
(Indonesian Women's Movement) [both Communist].
"In a word, it is possible that they are undergoing training in the
framework of the defense of the airbase. But the fact is that a member
of Gerwani who has been trained here and captured in Tjirebonhails from
central Java, far away from this area...."
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17
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Fact Sheet 25X1 C10k
25 October 19 5
The Dominican Republic
A Majority in Search of Leadership
Thirty one years of Trujillo--style absolutism is a heritage not
easily overcome, although it looked for awhile as though the Dominican
Republic might be able to turn almost directly into a true democracy.
Trujillo's assassination on May 30, 1961 was followed by six months of
maneuvering on the part of his son, Lt. Gen. Rafael Trujillo, Jr. to
retain power in the family's hands. However, he was forced out of the
country in November of that year and was succeeded in power by Joaquin
Baleguer, who had already been established as puppet President by Trujillo
in August of 1960. Balaguer, in turn, was soon forced out by a combin-
ation of diplomatic pressure by the Organization of American States (OAS)
and serious street riots. A Council of State ruled for 11 months there-
after, until December 20, 1962, when free elections were held resulting
in the election of Juan Bosch as President by a 2 to 1 majority.
Juan Bosch, then 53 years old, had spent most of his life in exile,
principally in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He had established a reputation as
a poet and author; he was a close friend of the most noted leaders of the
democratic left in Latin America, including Jose Figueres of Costa Rica,
Presidept Romulo Betapcourt of Venezuela, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre
of Peru and Governor Luis Muifoz Marin of Puerto Rico. The end of the
Trujillo era in the Dominican Republic, the fact of free elections within
less than two years after his assassination, the choice of an articulate
liberal, dedicated to social reform and modernization, all combined to
galvanize opinion in the hemisphere in his favor. President Kennedy
sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson at the head of a prestigious dele-
gation to Bosch's inauguration.
The Dominican Republic was to become, in the aspirations of many
inside and outside that land, a showcase of progress and reform, a
startling example of the benefits which can accrue to a country rid of
its tyrant -, all, of course, in sharp contrast to the Republic's next
door neighbor, Cuba, a, Communist showcase already going awry. There-
fore the installation of Bosch as President was greeted with enormous
optimism. His ouster seven months later was greeted with some surprise,
some dismay, but mostly stoicism.
The explanations for this turn of events vary widely, as might be
expected. His opponents, consisting essentially of businessmen and mili-
tary leaders, charged him with inept administration, procrastination,
unrealistic thinking; they pointed to an increase in unemployment and a
general decline in the enconomy. But the issue that led them to act was
a conviction that Bosch was either naively or wittingly permitting the
Communists to infiltrate his government and his party. Bosch and his
supporters, of course, deny these charges. Regarding the crucial issue
(Cont.)
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of Communism, Bosch defiantly maintains that he was dealing with the
problem in his own way: that of demonstrating the effectiveness and
virtue of a democratic state in action, a demonstration which, he is
convinced, will prevail in the end more surely than repressive measures
which only force people to join the Communists. The essential qualifica-
tion for this Approach, however, is s sufficiently long period of internal
peace to permit substantial achievements, and a Communist opposition suf-
ficiently weak and inactive to allay the danger of imminent and violent
overthrow. The presence of Castro's Cuba, next door, weighs heavily in
this consideration.
Whichever side may have been right in the circumstance, the essen-
tial point is that Bosch failed to convince those who controlled the
decisive power, i.e., the military leaders. And so they overthrew him
and installed a civilian junta, which soon came to be dominated by
J. Donald Reid Cabral.
The United States, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Bolivia all quickly
suspended diplomatic relations. But Reid soon revealed himself to be no
Trujillo. In fact he turned out to be a competent administrator who made
considerable progress in stabilizing the country's economy and in improv-
ing the quality of its government. He even began to tackle the reform
of the armed forces, a grossly oversized corrupted legacy of Trujillo.
But Reid's position was essentially extremely weak. He had no real
political base, and his illegitimate rise to power gave him little pop-
ular support. And so, predictably, when an uprising burst out against
Reid on April 24, 1965, he found the armed forces unwilling to obey his
commands. In the hope of avoiding bloodshed, he resigned the next day.
The full details of the revolt of Saturday, April 24+, and the fol-
lowing days are obscured by the confusion of the times and by partisan
pleading. However the principal facts are less obscure than some claim.
The revolt was touched off by a group of pro-Bosch army officers
collaborating with leaders of Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolutionary
Party, (PRA). The officers seized control of the "27th of February" mili-
tary camp, outside Santo Domingo. Shortly thereafter Pena Gomez, who had
been a member of the Bosch government and was a regular radio commenta-
tor, began broadcasting over Radio Santo Domingo that a pro-Bosch coup
had occurred, that Reid had been overthrown and that the people should
gather in the streets to hail the revolution. Reid, who was at that point
still in power, managed to impose a curfew that evening and clear the
streets. Ile appeared on television to announce that all was calm and to
summon the rebellious officers to surrender by the next morning or face
attack by the army. The rebels did not surrender and Reid then found
that the army would not carry out his orders to attack. He had no choice
then but to resign and go into hiding. Upon his abdication civilians and
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(Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2
military alike swarmed into the streets to release years of pent-up
emotions. The pro-Bosch leaders met and decided to proclaim Rafael
Molina Urena, a veteran PRD leader, Provisional President, pending the
return of Bosch from exile. The anti-Bosch military leaders, including
most of the senior officers, many of whom had been instrumental in oust-
ing Bosch, warned that they would fight if Molina Urena was sworn in.
At that point trucks from the "27th of February" camp began rolling
into Santo Domingo leaded with pistols, rifles, machine guns and grenades
seized from the arsenal at the camp. These weapons were distributed to
the crowds of civilians, who also armed themselves with Molotov cocktails.
This distribution of weapons proved to be a decisive turning point
in the political course of the rebellion, because by this time the Com-
munist groups, having planned for, and lain in wait for, disorder to break
out, were quickly organized and they managed to see to it that their
adherents received the bulk of the arms.
The Communists were actually divided into three separate parties:
The orthhodox, Moscow-line party was the Dominican Popular Socialist Party
(PSPD), with an estimated membership of 800-1000. (Interestingly enough,
this party changed its name, in August 1965, to the Dominican Communist
Party (PCD), partly because it was safe to do so in the security of the
rebel zone of Santo Domingo, but principally because it wanted to pre-
empt the title "Communist," before some other party adopted it.) A
smaller, pro-Chinese party also existed, known as the Dominican Popular
Movement (MPD);; its membership was estimated at around 500. The third
party, containing an admixture of Communists and non-Communists, but
essentially dominated by pro-Castroites, was the "114th of June" (A-PCJ)
group with 3000 to 5000 members. The leaders of each of these groups
were hard-core professional Communists, most of whom had traveled to the
Communist countries, including notably Cuba, and many of whom had received
intensive training courses in guerrilla warfare in Havana, Moscow, or
Peking.
Faced now with an armed mob, as well as with rebellious officers,
and confronted with the naming of Molina Urena as Provisional President,
the Air Force began strafing attacks against the city. The fighting grew
increasingly intense during Sunday and Monday, the 25th and 26th of April.
Gangs of rebel soldiers together with armed civilians roamed the streets
of the capital, hunting down policemen, looting warehouses and commit-
ting arson. At least five political party headquarters were set afire,
according to the New York Herald Tribune.
By the afternoon of Tuesday, April 27, however, the rebel forces
were tired and demoralized as a result of the continuous attacks by
Loyalist Dominican Air Force planes and the advance of Loyalist ground
forces from the Fast and West. Earlier in the day PRD Secretary-General
Antonio Martinez Francisco had gone to the loyalist headquarters at the
3 (Cont.)
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San Isidro base in the eastern outskirts of the capital, and had broad-
cast a speech over San Isidro radio appealing to the rebels to lay down
their arms in order to avoid further bloodshed, saying: "I ask that
everyone lay down their weapons, because this is no longer a fight between
political parties." By late evening the original rebel leaders, as is
amply clear from their actions, considered the rebellion to have been
defeated. Individually and in small groups they sought asylum in the
embassies in the capital. Among them were Provisional President Molina,
Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, PRD propaganda secretary, Jose Brea Pena, PRD
financial secretary, Jorge Yeara Nasser, and high ranking PRD leaders
Maximo Lovaton Pittaluga, and Leopoldo Espaillat. Many of the military
leaders of the rebellion, led by Col. Hernando Ramirez, the principal
planner and primary military leader of the revolt, also took refuge.
The defection of the major rebel civil and military leaders left the
rebellion in the hands of a desperate group of extreme leftist leaders
(who apparently felt there was no escape for themselves) and a handful of
determined and equally desperate military officers, among the latter Col.
Francisco Caamano Deno. Caamano, the naval Capt. Montes Arache, and a
handful of other officers were not convinced that the situation was lost
and after some further consideration returned to Ciudad Nueva, the strong-
hold of the rebels, to help organize a last ditch resistance. Caamano
then had under his nominal command a number of extreme leftist leaders
and their cadres plus a roughly equal number of non-Communist troops and
irregulars.
On April 28 the loyalist military began moving in on the rebel
redoubt in Ciudad Nueva. The rebels, led and inspired largely by the
desperate extreme leftist leaders, had spent the previous night erecting
barricades, deploying machine guns, artillery, bazookas, mortars and
riflemen, establishing fortifications and observations posts on rooftops
and making other preparations for the next day's fighting. By dawn they
were much beeter entrenched and prepared than the loaalist military
expected. The loyalists moved in, met stubborn resistance, and the fight-
#g see-sawed back and forth during the day. By late afternoon it became
apparent that the loyalists would not be able quickly to quash the rebels,
indeed they were forced back in several sectors. It was clear that the
country was now faced with a protracted, bloody and destructive civil
war. The extreme left, with its superior training and organization for
revglutionaxy action, had established a whip hand on one side, while
the militarists were in control of the other. The political moderates
had abandoned the field. It is hardly necessary to dwell at length on
the future prospects of such a state of affairs.
The military situation was stabilized by the arrival of U.S. Marines
on 28 April and thereafter, who quickly cordoned off the rebel zone. This
prevented the revolution from spreading outside the capital. It also pro-
vided opportunity for the moderate civilian and military leaders of the
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rebellion to return to Ciudad Nueva under conditions in which they could
recapture a measure of their leadership. The leaders of the extreme left
were quick to realize that if they attempted to exercise the potential
control which their position afforded they would give further substance
to the charges of Communist control already being made on all sides.
This, they feared, would quickly alienate international as well as much
of their domestic support and provide a pretext for OAS forces to either
move in themselves or support a general advance by the loyalist military.
They therefore had no course but to make some room at the top for the
returning moderates. Thus the complexion of the new "Constitutionalist
Government" established in early May under the presidency of Col.Caamano
was at least superficially free of Communist participation. The "'commandos'"
organized by the APCJ, MPD and PCD remained intact and under independent
command, however.
-45v' During the,succeeding months the Communists in the rebel zone profit-
ably spent their time in training their members in guerrilla warfare tac-
tics, in caching arms both in the rebel zone and in the countryside, and
in spreading their propaganda throughout the land. Having control of
the main offices of Santo Domingo's newspapers, the Communists were able
to prevent the publication of opposition papers as well as to inaugurate
their own daily, Patric, the first avowedly Communist journal in Dominican
history.
The PRD also gave some half-hearted training to a few of its members
during this time. The negotiations which led to the establishment of the
Provisional Government received little support from the rebel zone. The
PRD adopted the position that the Provisional Government was entirely the
creation of the OAS "occupation" forces, which merited neither support
nor opposition. To its credit, however, the PRD did support the decision
of Col. Caamano to sign the Act of Reconciliation and the Institutional
Act, which led to the establishment of the Provisional Government under
Hector Federico GARCIA-GODOY Caceres.
Unfortunately, however, this was about the only matter in which the
PRD was able to provide any positive leadership for the non-Communist left,
which it claims to represent. Indeed, the PRD's lack of leadership cost
it dearly in dealing with the aggressive Communists, the prime example
being its loss of control over the nominally PRD dominated labor confeder-
ation, Foupsa-Cesitrado. This confederation was already heavily infil-
trated by members of the various Communist parties. But to ensure full
control in order completely to unite the Dominican labor movement, the
Communists convened a "special" meeting of about twenty self-appointed
delegates or the confederation late in August 1965. Even though only a
few of the delegates could claim to represent labor unions, the meeting
elected a "Provisional Executive Committee" which parallels the Foupsa-
Cesitrado National Executive Committee and by implication replaces it.
According to a news report of the meeting, the Provisional Executive
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Committee is charged with calling a general "congress" to elect a new
National Executive Committee "in accord with the by-laws and with the
task of uniting the Dominican Labor Movement." In other words, the
Communists convened a rump meeting which then appointed a committee to
convene a congress which would thereafter control the labor confederation.
And the PRD was left out in the cold.
The Communists used exactly the same method in an attempt to take
over the university. They simply declared that the established rector
was not in step with the Revolution, named a new rector and directing
committee of faculty and student members and baldly declared that they
constituted the new direction of the university. The old rector has
objected to this procedure and is doing his best to retain his position,
with only half-hearted support from the Provisional Government. Here
again is a circumstance which cries for leadership from the non-Communist
left. While the university faculty is not beholden to the PRD, the party
nevertheless has an obligation to assure that the country's principal
university does not fall into the hands of left-wing extremists who most
assuredly will destroy it as a place of learning and will turn it into an
arm of subversion and upheaval.
Once the Provisional Government was installed in the Dominican
Republic, on the first of September 1965, talk revived of an imminent
return of the PRD's leader, Juan Bosch, from Puerto Rico where he had
enjoyed asylum since his ouster two years before. At first undecided,
Bosch finally resolved to return on the 25th of September, the anniver-
sary of his overthrow. Bosch's decision to return was greeted with
scorn by some who blamed him for sitting out the revolt in security in
Puerto Rico instead of entering the fray and providing the leadership so
greatly needed by his followers. Others, such as the Santo Domingo mag-
azine La Nacion were elated: "'The arrival of the leader of the nation's
great majority, Juan Bosch, will certainly be an important event at a
time when the Dominicans pursue peace. Bosch is a map. without hatreds
or grudges .... The announcement of the arrival of the former consti-
tutional President has evoked an unquestionable feeling of confidence
and security among the people of the Dominican Republic. Everyone is
referring to it; everyone expects this man to pronounce words of encour-
agement and guidance, at a time when uncertainty lingers in obscure
areas and sipister corners despite all the efforts for peace."
Imagine, then, the consternation of the elated when Bosch arrived to
speak before a cheering throng wildly waving red banners emblazoned with
the image ... not of Bosch ... but of Lenin! And the 60,000 supporters
promised by Bosch's lieutenants were more nearly 6,000. Later, a PRD
activist bemoaned the fact that when he had arrived at the square early
that morning with a pile of pro-Bosch posters to put up, he discovered
that the Communists had been there during the night and had covered
every possible space with their own posters. How typical of the aggres-
sive initiative shown by the Communists throughout the rebellion ...
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and how characteristic it was that the PRD activist did not simply paste
his posters over those of the Communists!
But the most disappointing aspect of the occasion was Bosch's
speech. Far from pronouncing the "words of encouragement and guidance"
which La Nacion had heralded, Bosch uttered a long, ubridled harangue
against the United States, demanding one billion dollars in "reparations,"
and exhorted the mob to continue their resistance, with strikes and what-
ever other forms of protest were available, until the Inter-American
Peace Force (IAPF) was driven from the land.
The sterility of Bosch's position was evident even to his close
followers, once the passion of the moment had faded away. Essentially
the Dominican Republic had two alternatives at that point: either sup-
port the Provisional Government, established with the agreement of Bosch's
party, in its effort to re-establish normal political and economic life
on the island and to prepare for free elections, or else to continue and
increase the anarchy prevailing in the land in the pope that the OAS
peace force would leave in sheer frustration. Bosch's opting for the
latter course was not only unconscionable, it was self-defeating. For
the great majority of the people, which the PRD could truly claim to
represent when Bosch was elected in December, 1962, clearly did not sup-
port this choice. A few thousand cheering activists in Santo Domingo's
rebel zone hardly represented a majority of a nation of over 3 million
people.
The Communists, meanwhile, were actively promoting a United Front,
joining together the three Communist groups, the leftist controlled
labor elements, and the left-wingers of the PED itself. This in turn
provoked great concern in the more moderate wing of the PRD, and its
leaders such as Martinez Francisco and Pena Gomez have privately expressed
concern over the situation. There were even reports in mid-October that
Juan Bosch was beginning to realize that the Communists were far more
numerous than he had imagined and that they had gained far more influ-
ence in his party than he dared admit. But, as far as one could see,
Bosch was still so preoccupied with venting his spleen against those
who, in his view, blocked his return to power, that there appeared little
indication that he intended to work in a constructive fashion to heal the
deep wounds in the Domican body politic or to moderate the bitter and
violent tone of his public pronouncements.
These partisan positions of the non-Communists did little to help
the Provisional Government, which was in truth the only salvation of the
country. It was established as an apolitical government of strictly
limited duration, for the sole purpose of re-integrating the opposing
forces, of getting the country's economy moving again, and of preparing
for and holding free elections. Surely it was more important to help
achieve these objectives than to demand the withdrawal of the IAPF, a
move nobody seriously believed would happen until peace was established.
Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050003-2