BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 7, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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IgnIfIcant Dates
14 USSR expelled from League of Nations for unprovoked aggression
against Poland and Finland. Twenty-fifth anniversary. 1939
15 Preparatory Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow [??]
17 Simon Bolivar dies, 1830
21 Joseph V. Stalin born, 1879
26 Mao Tse-tung born, 1893
JAN.
2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959 (Sixth anniversary)
6 Pres. Roosevelt enunciates Four Freedoms: Freedom of speech and
expression, of worship; from want and from fear., 1941
'8 Charles de Gaulle inaugurated first President of the Fifth
Republic, 1959 (Sixth anniversary)
10 UN General Assembly opens first session, London, 1946
11 UNGA establishes 12-nation disarmament commission to consider
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments
and armed forces, 1952
13 USSR "Doctors' Plot" arrests announced, 1953
15 Karl Liebknecht & Rosa Luxembur, founders of German CP, killed
in Spartacus uprising, 1919
16 Leon Trotsky exiled to Alma-Ata, 1928
21 Lenin dies (Born 22 April 1870), 1924
21 Chicom govt orders Tibet representatives to Peking to negotiate
"peaceful solution Tibet's status," 1950
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Reprint
Dolores Ibarruri's October Message
Note: The following is the text of an article by the
veteran Spanish Communist leader, Dolores Ibarruri,
who became known as "La Passionaria" during the Span-
ish Civil War. The full text of the article, which
commemorates the anniversary of the October Revolu-
tion, was broadcast on November 6, 196+, by the Span-
ish Communist clandestine radio station located in
Rumania. The article was also published in Moscow
by Izvestiya on November 8, but the indented portion,
referring to Nikita Khrushchev and the reaction to
CPYRGHT his fall from power, was omitted by that publication.
Each anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution of 1917 is
like a new and moving, page of the passing of time and history, like
something alive and permanent, adding constructive experiences to the
political and ideological reserve of new generations. Although these
experiences are different owing to their origins and to the moment when
they acquired form and essence, they are all united by the common bond
of progress toward the future. These pages contain political events
marking milestones, class struggles parallel to the heroic fight of the
colonial people for national and social liberation, remarkable achieve-
ments and technical and scientific discoveries, structural changes and
revolutions, and new forms of popular and national democracies. The con-
stant brilliance of the October Socialist Revolution of 1917 illumines the
essence of all this weaving and unweaving of these forms and ways of life.
And it is impossible to understand many present changes and politi-
cal events if one forgets the great turning point for the world produced
by the impact of the revolutionary October, the reflection of thatiim-
pact in the foundations of the economic and political structure of the
world capitalist regime; the political event of the socialist revolu-
tion of October 1917 has permanence and instructive effects. Communism
is not a ghost; it is a live and acting force with influence, in one
way or other, on the evolution of the political and social institutions
of all countries, reflected. in the desperate efforts by the ruling
classes and groups in the main capitalist countries to coordinate and
unite their potentialities in a hopeless attempt to stop the progress
of socialism.
The capitalist countries were not able to avoid the establishment
of socialism in Russia, nor its strengthening, development, and trans-
formation into the fundamental political force of our epoch. They
could not stop that after World War II, and thanks to the existence
and decisive support of the Soviet Union, new countries separated them-
selves from the capitalist system to form the socialist camp, which to-
day covers over one-third of the world's territory and population. Nor
will they be able to stop the historical development of the people from
( n
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CPYRGHT
crystalizing in new socialist formations that will not necessarily
have to be a forced and artificial repetition of the existing ones,
although they may take from them all that is useful and fit it into
the concrete conditions of every country. By birthright, neither
inherited nor bought, as in the biblical legend, but conquered in
October 1917 in a most difficult fight; because it won the first of
hard-fought combats to break the imperialist front and to establish
socialism, and because of its resistance to blockade and aggression in
self-sacrificing effort for close to half a century in order to develop
and insure the position of socialism, the Soviet Union appears naturally
and logically as the historical and political axis of the socialist
system.
At the same time, and because of its decisive part and its re-
volutionary activity, without which the victory of socialism would not
have been possible, the CPSU enjoys remarkable prestige among the inter-
national working class, among the people struggling for their national
and social liberation, among the most advanced progressive forces of
the entire world.
On this anniversary of the socialist revolution of October 1917,
two facts of different character have drawn world attention upon
the Soviet country: the flight of the spaceship with a three-man
crew and the changes in the leadership of the government and the
CPSU.
I will only mention the cosmonauts to wish them all sorts of
happiness, from deep in my heart, as well as to the scientists,
technicians, and workers who in one way or other took part in the
worderful feat.
Even in a brief and concise way, I wish to present my humble
opinion regarding the changes in the leadership of the Soviet
Union, to rebut in a certain measure the perfidious campaign by
the bourgeois press and propaganda media trying to confuse public
opinion. The removal of Nikita Khrushchev from the leadership of
the CPSU and government has provoked various movements of opinic.vbich
the opposition is trying to use against the communist parties.
The reactions of surprise, concern or fear that such removal may
involve changes in the Soviet policy were natural. It must not be
forgotten that for close to ten years Nikita Khrushchev personified
abroad the policy of peace, coexistence, friendship, and coopera-
tion between socialist countries, general and total disarmament,
and peaceful settlement of problems between states of different
social regimes--a policy which was that of the CPSU. The state-
ment issued by the CPSU Central Committee, that the policy initiated
by the 20th and 22nd congress will not only remain unchanged, but
will be reinforced and maintained, is a, guarantee not only for the
communists fighting in the vanguard for the triumph of this policy,
but for all the peace-loving peoples who do not wish to live again
through the horrors of war nor to know them again. And this is
the important point.
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CPYRGH
On this 47th anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution, with
the same affection as always toward the Soviet people and with respect
for the CPSU and its central Committee, we recall with emotion and re-
volutionary pride the date of October 1917, which opened the path to
a new life, the path of socialism for the peoples; and on this con-
tinuity of our affections, of our respect and our loyalty, the firm
promise to fight, to maintain united with the international communist
movement, lives and throbs; without forgetting that the key to our
victory lies in the practice of the proletarian internationalism through
unity of will, ideas, and actions within a diversity of situations --
the victory of the forces of peace against the forces of war, the victory
of democracy and socialism in the entire world.
3
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Aleksandr Nikolaevich SHELEPIN Background Use my
Chairman of the Committee for December 196
Party-State Control
Secretary and Member of the
Presidium, CPSU Central Committee
Deputy Chairman o the Council of
Ministers
A.N. Shelepin, one of the youngest of the top officials
of the CPSU, is an outstanding example of the ambitious party official
who makes a career out of his administrative and organizational talents.
In mid-November 196+, he became a full member of the CPSU Presidium.
His most important administrative post had been that of chief of the
KGB (Committee for State Security) from 1958 to 1961; he was succeeded
in this post by Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny, who appears to be his
protege, and it is probable that Shelepin still has a role in making
major decisions involving the KGB, the Soviet secret police organization.
Shelepin was born in 1918 at Voronezh, the on of a rail-
wayman. From 1936 to 1939 he studied history at the Moscow Institute
of History, Philosophy, and Literature; his later career suggests that
he stay have spent more time in Komsomol (Communist Youth) activities
than on his studies. He served during the Russo-Finnish War in 1939-
1940, and then (in 1940) got into full-time Komsomol work in Moscow as
an instructor and later as head of the Agitprop Department of the Moscow
City Komsomol. In 1943 he became Secretary for Cadres in the All-Union
Komsomol and a member of the All-Union Committee for Physical Training
and Sport, an organ of the government. Between 1947 and 1952 he was also
Vice President of the International Union of Students (IUS), and he led
the Soviet delegation to the World Festival of Youth and Students in
Prague in 1947. From 1952 to 1958, he served as First Secretary or Chief
of the All-Union Komsomol. In this capacity, he had over-all responsi-
bility (in 1954-1957) for send:Lng hundreds of thousands of Soviet youth
to the Virgin Lands as "volunteers." During this period he was also
Vice President of the Communist international youth front, the World
Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), and he took part in youth festi-
vals, meetings and congresses in various Bloc cities as well as in London
and Helsinki.
In April 1958, at the age of 40, Shelepin put youth work
behind him and served a short term as Chief of the Central Committee
Party Organs Section. Then, in December of that year, he became Chair-
man of the KGB, replacing General I. A. Serov, who was transferred to
the command of Soviet military intelligence, the GRU. Shelepin teas the
first chief of the secret police not to have spent years in "conspira-
torial work." It may be that he was intended to strengthen party con-
trol of the police, to improve the public image of the police, or to
sweep out some of the bureaucratic cobwebs which had accumulated since
the days of Felix Dzherzhinsky. While in this position, he personally
conferred the Order of the Red Banner on Bogdan Stashinsky for Stashinsky's
murder of Lev Rebet and Stefan Bandera.
In November 1961, Shelepin left the KGB, having become a
member of the Central Committee Secretariat a month before. Then at the
November 1962 CPSU plenum, Khrushchev established a Party-State Control
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Committee,, with Shelepin as Chairman. The Committee's activities have
not received much publicity, but the Committee is able to take disci-
plinary action or launch legal proceedings against persons who cause
"damage to the cause of building Communism." This usually means cor-
ruption or negligence in party or state work, especially in the economy,
but could mean any activity the party leaders consider undesirable.
Stalin used his control of a predecessor organization, the Workers' and
Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin), as one of his main instruments for
gaining control of the party and state bureaucracy by weeding out poten-
tial opponents.
Only three men besides Shelepin are both members of the
Secretariat and full members of the Presidium: Brezhnev, Podgorny, and
Suslov. Further, of those who are both Secretaries and Presidium members,
only Shelepin also holds high state office, being a Deputy Cha'.zmtan of
the Council of Ministers. With his background in the Control Committee
and the KCB, Shelepin is evidently one of the most powerful men in the
Kremlin.
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Fact Sheets Background Use Only
November 196+
Invasion and Subjugation. Fourteen years ago, in October 1950, the
armies of Communist China invaded Tibet. On 23 May 1951, after six months
of resistance during which international bodies failed to respond to calls
for help, the Government of Tibet was forced to sign a 17-point Agreement
with the People's Republic of China (CPR). This Agreement, among other
things, provided that: Tibet's political system would not be altered; the
Tibetan people had the right to exercise regional autonomy; and that, any
reforms would be carried out solely on the initiative of the Tibetan Gov-
ernment.
The 1951 Agreement was violated by the CPR from the beginning. By
early 1952, the Tibetan leaders and people started their doomed struggle
against complete Chinese engulfment. The CPR imposed political changes,
giving Chinese officials control of regional administrations over tra-
ditional local Tibetan government bodies. An illegal program of "social
reform" was started, intended to erode and communize the Tibetan society
preparatory to absorbing it as an indistinguishable part of the social-
ized Chinese state.
When Tibetan resistance continued to hamper Chinese efforts to charge
the society "peacefully," demands for conformity increased and threats
against officials became more ominous. After eight years, during which
increasingly restrictive and alien measures had failed to subdue the peo-
ple or radically change their society, Chinese Communist armies again
invaded the country. In March 1959, just ahead of Chinese Communist
troops, the Dalai Larva fled to exile in India. He was followed by some
20,000 of his countrymen who found haven as refugees in India and Nepal.
The economic burden placed upon these countries has been extremely heavy,
and international assistance has not alleviated the suffering of nor as-
sured the future of the refugees (who now total some 75,000).
Chinese Communist Territorial Claims and Aspirations. In 1_9399, Mao
Tse-tung claimed that scores of national minorities, including the Mon-
gols, the Uighurs, the Koreans and many others, were fundamentally Chi-
nese and rightfully belonged to China. Since taking power in Mainland
China, Communist territorial claims have been increasing and ever more
demanding. For example, zaps published by the CPR Government represent
considerable parts of Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and India, including portions
of Kashmir, as part of Chinese territory. The open dispute between the
CPR and the USSR has exposed the fact that several territories are claimed
by both, adding to the estrangement of these "fraternal, anti-nationalist
colleagues."
(Cont .
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Since the subjugation of Tibet in 1959, the CPR has persuaded Burma,
Outer Mongolia, Nepal and Pakistan to sign border agreements. In light
of some relatively favorable aspects in these agreements, these govern-
ments apparently suppressed suspicions which might have remained from
the treatment of Tibet subsequent to its 1951 Agreement with the CPR.
CPR officials have attempted to persuade the Government of India to ne-
gotiate border agreements. But in this case, Indian officials refused
to negotiate territory they considered rightfully their own: the Chi-
nese Communists responded with a military invasion of Indian Territory
in October 1962. The threat of further territorial incursions continues
as CPR troops remain poised along a vast expanse of border joining the
two countries.
Genocide and the United Nations. The 14th UNGA passed a Resolution
on 21 October 1959 k45 or, 9 against -- Soviet bloc -- and 26 abstentions)
in which it appealed for respect to the fundamental human rights of the
Tibetan people [text attached . At the 15th UNGA in 19 0, when it bec~&e
clear that the question could not be debated before adjournment, the 06'
sponsors (Malaya and Thailand) of the Tibetan item on the Agenda pointed
out to the Assembly that the Chinese Communist regime had ignored the
appeal made by the previous Assembly.
The problem of Tibet was inscribed on the 16th UNGA (1961) Agenda,
again by Malaya and Thailand --
"7. Question of Tibet (Item proposed by Malaya and Thailand)
The situation in Tibet today has not improved and remains a
source of grave concern,' said the two states. Therefore, they
were proposing inclusion of the item in the agenda again, 'hop-
ing that the renewed consideration of the question will pave
the way for the restoration of the religious and civil liber-
ties of the Tibetan people.' "
The Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet of the International Commission
of Jurists (ICJ) devoted a full year to investigating the Tibetan situ-
ation. Their report, made available to the UN and published in 1960
(Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic, Geneva) drew three major con-
clusions, namely:
1) acts of genocide had been committed in Tibet in an attempt
to destroy the Buddhist Tibetans as a religious group;
2) most of the guarantees under the UN Declaration of Human
Rights had been violated, including and especially the right to life
itself; and
3) under international law, Tibet had legitimately regained
its status as an independent state before 1951, having been recog-
nized de facto as such by other states in the international commun-
ity. Tibet had surrendered her de facto independence under the
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17-point Agreement with Communist China; however, the Chicoms vio-
lated their guarantees to the Tibetan government to an extent which
entitled the Tibetans to repudiate that agreement, -- which the
Dalai Lama did on 11 March 1959.
As to the methods of genocide used by the Chinese Communists in
Tibet, the ICJ report included the following: systematic eradication
of Buddhist belief; removal of large numbers of Tibetan children --
particula:r1y those being trained for Buddhist leadership -- to China;
murder of religious leaders whose practice encouraged others; and pro-
hi:bition of adherence to or practice of Buddhism. Subsequent reporting
by Tibetan refugees confirmed that these practices were still being used
in late 1960 and 1961. With the full facts of this human tragedy before
them, the Assembly passed a Resolution on the last day of its session
(20 December 1961) which applied the principle of self determination to
the Tibetan situation. Fifty-six members voted for this i{esc:Lution ---
eleven more than had supported the weaker Resolution in 1959. Only the
Communist Bloc and Cuba opposed it [text attached].
No action was taken by the UNGA at either its 17th or 18th sessions.
However, El Salvador, The Philippines and Nicaragua have inscribed the
Tibetan problem as Item 53 on the Agenda in the 19th UNGA (December 1,
196+). It is probable that several additional countries will rise to
sponsor this debate over the Chinese Communist's treatment of the people
of Tibet.
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Resolution on Tibet
1li-th UNGA
21 October 1959
The General Assembly,
Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights and
freedoms set out in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on
10 December 1948,
Considerir that the fundamental human rights and freedoms to which
the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled include the right to
civil and religous liberty for all without distinction,
Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage of
the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have traditionally
enjoyed,
Gravely concerned at reports including the official statements of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human
rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly denied them,
Deploring the effect of these events in increasing international
tension and in embittering the relations between peoples at a time when
earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible leaders to re-
duce tension and improve international relations,
1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is essential for the evolution of a peaceful world or-
der based on the rule of law;
2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the
Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.
Resolution 1353 (om)
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Resolution on Tibet
16th UNGA
20 December 1961
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 1353 (XIV) of 21 October 1959 on the ques-
tion of Tibet,
Gravely concerned at the continuation of events in Tibet, including
the violation of the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and
the suppression of the distinctive cultural and religious life which they
have traditionally enjoyed,
Noting with deep anxiety the severe hardships which these events
have inflicted on the Tibetan people, as evidenced by the large scale
exodus of Tibetan refugees to the neighboring countries,
Considering that these events violate fundamental human rights set
out in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, including the principle of self-determination of peoples
and nations, and have the deplorable effect of increasing international
tension and embittering relations between peoples,
1. Reaffirms its convictions that respect for the principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights is essential for the evolution of the rule of
law;
2. Solemnly renews its call for the cessation of practices
which deprive the Tibetan people of their fundamental human rights
and freedoms, including their right to self determination;
3. Expresses the hope that Member States will make all possible
efforts, as appropriate, towards achieving the purposes of the pres-
ent resolution.
Resolution 1723 (XVI)
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The follo.?ring are excerpts from translated articles
by Dr. Afana Ossende, an exile from Cameroon and a Com-
munist China sympathizer, who was at one time Cameroon's
representative on the AAPSO secretariat. The articles,
apparently taken from a book, appeared in the French-
language Brazzaville weekly, Dipanda, which generally
reflects a Communist Chinese line. Extracts are taken
from numbers 47, 26 September 1964; 48, 3 October 1964
and 49, 17 October 1964.
Dear readers, we are happy to present to you a book on our
revolution by Brother Afana Ossende. He is a doctor of laws and eco-
nomics. Brother Ossende is a great fighter in the African cause and
also in the anti-imperialist struggle. Brother Ossende is from Cameroun
and is also one of the most influential members of the UPC (Union of
Peoples of Cameroun).
The African peoples and all peoples deprived of their liberty, jus-
tice, and peace have expressed a profound sympathy for this revolution.
We might mention a few examples here: the Council of Solidarity of the
Afro-Asian Peoples, which met in Algiers from 22-26 March 1964 parti-
cularly welcomed the revolution in Congo-Brazzaville. The same happened
during the economic conference of the Asian peoples held at Pyongyang
(Democratic People's Republic of Korea) in June 1964. The 2nd Congress
of the UPSA (Panafrican Labor Union Conference), held from 10-14 June
1964 at Bamako, elected the member from Congo-Brazzaville to its central
bureau. In mid-April of that year, a delegation from the permanent
bureau of Afro-Asian writers went to Brazzaville to pay proper tribute
earned by the Congolese people and by their new leaders.
I would like to dedicate this modest work to these leaders and to
this sister nation: all I want to do here is to help publicize their
heroic struggle against the common enemies of all peoples of the world:
imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.
Before concluding this introduction, I must say a very simple but
a very cordial thank you to the political leaders, to the leaders of
the labor unions, of the youth movements, of the women's movements, to
the chiefs and responsible officials of the administrative services, to
the editors of the revolutionary newspaper Dipanda, in short, to all of
my Congolese friends, whose help was infinitely valuable in the prepara-
tion of this essay on the revolution in Congo-Brazzaville.
Out of all of the French colonies of Black Africa, only Guinea,
under the leadership of Sekou Toure, forcefully rejected the French-
African community and approved the idea of immediate independence. But
in the other countries, powerful forces were conducting campaigns along
the same lines. In Congo-Brazzaville, the Union of the Congolese Youth,
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stro zgl;;r orGi_- ized for more than 1 year fought heroically against trib-
alism and for immediate independence. The struggle of these young people,
who had the sympathy of the Congolese workers and the complete support of
the FEANF (Federation of Students of Black Africa in France) and other
forces throughout the world.
We see the first serious crises breaking out in May 1960 in Congo-
Brazzaville. We saw that the UJC (Union of Congolese Youth) had for
years been fighting for national independence. The authorities labelled
this just struggle a Communist-inspired affair. Under this pretext of
trying to block Communism, Youlou, the moment the Constitution was ap-
proved, forbade the youth organizations from engaging in political acti-
vities. But these youth organizations nevertheless succeeded in gradually
becoming stronger.
The CGAT (General African Confederation of Labor) also developed
definitely along anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist lines.
Starting in 1959, this organization raised the issue of unity among
all of the labor unions of the Congo. Under its initiative, a strike
was called on 3 May 1960 by the water distribution and electric power
companies. This strike lasted 2 weeks and was very successful. In an
effort to break this strike, the Youlou government on 10 May announced
a so-called "Communist plot." The director of the secret police, the
Frenchman Pointu, prepared a long report according to which the struggle
for national independence constituted a subversive and Communist acti-
vity; anyone who was involved in this struggle was disturbing the public
peace. Such individuals would be arrested in the future. That is the
report and that is what the government did. On that same day, the
leaders of the CGAT and the UJC were arrested and jailed without a hear-
ing for many long months. Popular pressure did not succeed in getting
them freed until 14 November 1960. But fortunately prison was a great
school of revolution for these labor union and youth leaders; they were
able to figure out what they would have to do for their salvation and
that of the Congo; they realized that its regime and its straw men were
no longer any good but that their own people would have to run the Congo
and that their organizations and their unity would have to be strengthened.
The August 1963 revolution actually was born during the imprisonment of
the leaders of the CGAT and the UJC.
But let me continue to point out the main phases in this process.
The struggle of the Congolese patriots began to bear fruit on 15 August
1960; they were successful in proclaiming the independence of the country.
Of course, they were still under Youlou, an agent of imperialism; this
independence was therefore only nominal, even on the political level.
Nevertheless, it did constitute an important step because it offered the
patriots more favorable conditions for the development of their revolu-
tionary struggle; this led to the development of African personnel for
the higher civil service positions, the creation of an embryo national
army, the increase of relations with foreign countries, and above all, an
end to the vast deception of the popular masses as a result of the poli-
cies of the regime.
2 (Cont.)
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The Coy olene patriots manaGec. to e:.?ploi.t these favorable condi-
tions admirably. Despite numerous attempts at creating divid.lons in
their ranks, despite police harassment, despite corruption and repres-
sion, the nationalist organizations developed progressively, particularly
in the case of the labor unions and the youth movement. In 1961, the
labor unions laid the foundation for the unification of the Congolese
worker movement. Little by little, by dint of hard work, the national-
ist movement became stronger, adding new branches in the form of women's
associations, cultural and sports associations, etc. Thus we see that
barely 3 years after independence, this movement constituted a very large
and very powerful current. The vanguard organizations carried great
weight among the masses of the people. This new balance of power emerged
quite clearly in 1963. The CGAT held a very impressive Congress at
Brazzaville between 9 and 12 May 1963. During this meeting, it felt
strong enough to come out openly in support of revolutionary labor union-
ism and against the so-called apolitical labor unionism which was under
the control of the regime. The Congress in particular decided that its
headquarters should adopt a position on every international event. In
the course of the activities of the Congress, the workers learned of two
particularly important news events.
1. President Sekou Toure would visit the Republic of Congo-Brazza-
ville immediately after the conference of chiefs of state and African
governments which was to be held in Addis Ababa from 22-25 May 1963.
2. A telegram from F. Youlou demanded the formation of committees
for the creation of a single party.
We must emphasize all of these facts because the labor union Con-
gress session from 9-12 May 1963 greatly contributed to the maturation
of conditions for the revolution of August 1963. This was true for a
number of reasons.
First of all, the official decision in favor of revolutionary labor
unionism did not simply result in the assertion of internal cohesion
and in the political maturity, hence the strength of the workers rally-
ing around the CGAT; this operation also enabled the labor union head-
quarters to commit the working class to the increasingly more decisive
battles for the conquest of its own identity and personality and dignity,
and for a constantly growing material and cultural well being. This
decision, in particular, made it possible to adopt immediate positions
on such important current problems as the Summit Conference at Addis-
Ababa or the announced visit of President Sekou Toure and Youlou'a call
for the formation of committees for the creation of a single party.
The workers came up with some quite realistic decisions on the
prospects of the conference of. Addis-Ababa; they felt that a reunion of
the progressive forces was necessary, otherwise the conference would
constitute an obstacle, a kind of holy alliance intended to stop the
revolution as in the case of the pretended Communist plot in 1960.
3 (Cont.)
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With these reser,?atiou^, they .hailed the Addis-Ababa conference
as a first step toward African unity which, as we shall see, constitu-
ted one of the essential objectives of the August 1963 revolution.
In the immediate future, however, the thing which contributed most
to isolating the Youlou regime and bastenirg the outbreak of the insurrec-
tion was the visit by President Sekou Toure and, of course, Youlou's
attempt to consolidate his neo-colonialist dictatorship by imposing
upon the Congolese people a single party which of course would sell out
to the imperialists.
We remember that, in October 1962, Abbe Youlou had made a visit of
State to the Republic of Guinea. On that occasion he invited President
Sekou Toure to visit the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville. When the visit
of President Sekou Toure was announced, the workers decided to make the
best of it. For the first time, since 1960, the labor unions of the
CGAT decided to participate in public manifestations organized on that
occasion. They were actually invited to participate by the Youlou govern-
ment.
The most remarkable fact is that Youlou, the puppet and corrupt
dictator, was publicly criticized with impunity, although the criticism
did trigger the applause of the crowd. This was one factor which helped
the masses realize once again the justness of the slogans of the patriots
and to become aware of their strength. The leadership, group was bound
to see this as a serious development and as a consequence tried to get
closer to the people. Unfortunately, nothing came of this.
In the presence of the Guinean leader, the Abbe President made a
speech whose central theme was this: the Republic would have to change
its style and would have to adopt some new methods. Youlou went so far
as to say this:
"People of the Congo, the President of the Republic of Guinea, our
brother, has come to give us a course in civics, nationalism, and patri-
otism."
"We would like Sekou to tell us not only what he likes about us
but also what he does not like about us. Do we all unanimously accept
those things that are not in our favor? When Mr. Sekou Toure mentioned
some of the things that are in our favor, all of us applauded. But he
also said that the people of Guinea; ao one can, accepted the idea that
a man who earned 400,000 francs should take a cut to 100,000 francs --
and the people of Guinea accepted that. Do you accept this idea, people
of the Congo?" "Yes, Yes!," replied the crowd unanimously and Youlou
continued as follows.
"Every country had individuals who are called leaders. We have
them in our midst, in the Congo,and you will permit me to get these
leaders together in order to discuss the entire situation." "Yes!,"
shouted the crowd.
4 (Cont.)
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Youlou actually did get his team together. But their discussions
brought out the exact opposite of what the people had been demanding
and of what he had been promising the people in the presence of the
leaders from Guinea: the aggravation of repression and misery, instead
of an era of liberty, austerity, and social progress for all. From
8 June onward, that is to say, barely 21. hours after the departure of
the Guinean guests, the government arrested Mr. Julien Boukambou,
Secretary General of the CGAT (today Vice President of the National
Assembly and permanent Secretary of the Political Bureau of the National
Movement of the Revolution).
The charges against him: he informed his friend Sekou Toure on
the shortcomings of the regime! Along with him, there were others
who were put in sail; they included Balossa Hanse, today Secretary
General of the Union of Congolese Youth, Mbonala Jean-Baptiste, Mili-
tant of the CGAT, and Moukongo Germaine, one of the ex-wives of the
Abbe President.
In the night from 8 to 9 June, the CGAT, the African Confederation
of Believing Workers, the Congolese Confederation of Free Labor Unions,
the Postal Federation, and the Federation of Civil Servants decided to
organize the masses in support of the liberation of J. Boukambou and
his companions.
In view of the vast size of the solidarity movement in their sup-
port and in order to avoid disturbances, the police ordered his release
on the next day, that is, on the evening of 10 June. On 11 June J.
Boukambou and the other labor union leaders organized a great meeting
for explanations and protests in which all of the labor union organiza-
tions and even the farmers participated.
At the end of that meeting, all labor unions adopted an extremely
important decision concerning the creation of a fusion committee. Dur-
ing this meeting, also, Mr. Diallo Idrissa, at that time Secretary
General of the Postal Federation and today Secretary General of the Con-
federation of Labor Unions of the Congo, launched a historical slogan:
"If a labor union leader is arrested," he told the workers, "you
Just go to the office of the police commissioner; if he is not there,
go to the gendarmerie; if he is not there either, go to the prison and
rush the prison. If the prisons cannot hold you, they will burst and
this will be liberation."
Thus we see that the Congolese working class managed to strengthen
its unity and cement its alliance with the farmers during this struggle
and prepared itself for an assault on the regime.
Youlou, for his part, only tried to consolidate his neo-colonialist,
anti-national, and anti-popular dictatorship, In the middle of 1963,
his efforts were aimed essentially at the formation of a single party.
Why? Did the Congo at that time have a truly anti-imperialist party,
a party capable of overthrowing the neo-colonialist regime? Absolutely
not.
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There was no basic difference bet~:~eeu the party of Mr. Youlou
and the others. This came out into the light of day, for example,
in the behavior of Mr. Jacques Opangault, leader of the MSA, who left
his ministerial post to join the opposition although this about-face
did not bring about any change whatever in the basic policy of the
Abbe President. Nevertheless, there was a possibility that one of the
President's rivals might exploit the situation for his own benefit and
throw out the leadership team and take its place. This was an even
greater danger than the danger coming from the popular masses themselves;
this was the main thing the clique of Youlou was afraid of. This ex-
plains his desperate efforts to domesticate the other political organiza-
tions within the framework of a single party which would be under his
control. To this end he called a rou d-table conference in mid-June.
The labor unions demanded that their joint committee be represented
within the single party and appointed their representatives for the round-
table discussion. Youlou refused to accept these delegates and said
that he would admit them only as individuals. The representatives left,
slamming the doors behind them. On the evening of the same day, 5 July
1963, the labor unions adopted a decision to extend their activities
beyond Brazzaville and to conduct a campaign on the national scale from
5 104,22 July. This constituted a new phase in the strengthening of
worker unity and the alliance of the workers with the farmers.
Scared by the sudden rise in popular forces, Youlou, around the
end of the month, called the various labor union leaders together with
a view to a reconciliation. But on what basis? On the basis of a
simple patch-up job on his corrupt and unpopular regime; he offered
them two ministerial posts. The labor union leaders agreed to partici-
pate in the government on the condition that Youlou dismissed his entire
team of administers. Youlou promised to proceed to this surgical opera-
tion and called a new round-table conference for 7 August.
On 3 August, the labor unions organized a meeting at the labor ex-
change. Youlou sent the police to arrest one of their leaders Aime
Matsika (today Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Mines, etc.).
The workers victoriously opposed this arbitrary arrest. They
decided to hold another meeting on 7 August. Youlou, in response, pro-
hibited all meetings, including labor union meetings. The labor unions
replied tit for tat: they ordered a general strike for 13 August from
0600 until 1200. They also anticipated that this strike might turn
into a general uprising. They therefore gave their militants a number
of slogans, particularly the following: No racist manifestations! No
attacks on the lives and property of foreigners!
Now the police went after these leaders and they had to scatter.
They did not meet again until the evening of 12 August in order to make
the final preparations for the strike; we were now on the eve of the
three glorious days.
The meeting of the labor union leaders appointed a delegation of
five men who would be responsible for finding out, after 0300, whether
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the labor w.:cha4lG e was occup:.ed by the so-called public safety forces.
The delegation included the following: Ganga Thauley, Bengui
Adolphe, Samba Dominique, Miakassissa, and Gandou Francois.
These men went to the labor exchange at the appointed hour. But
the gendarmerie surrounded them at 0305 and arrested them. Only Samba
Dominique and Miakassissa were able to escape.
On the morning of 13 August, Brazzaville was at a fever pitch: the
government was making feverish preparations for the celebration of the
3rd anniversary of independence, whereas the vast popular masses were
increasingly caught up in the excitement of revolution.
At 0715, the workers, responding to the general strike call, began
to gather in the square in front of the railroad station, today called
Liberty Square. Around 0800, a crowd of about 8,000 persons had gathered
to listen to speeches by a number of labor union leaders. Then Samba
Dominique and Miakassissa, the two men who had escaped from the group
sent to the labor exchange at 0300, arrived on the scene. They announced
the arrest of the other members of the delegation. A few moments later,
detachments of gendarmerie and police caused clashes with the crowd.
"This strike is illegal,"said the officer in charge. The crowd responded
to him as one man: "Release Ganga Thauley, Gandou Francois, and Bengui
Adolphe!"
Similar movements developed in the principal cities of the country,
especially at Pointe-Noire and Dolisie. But let us take a closer look
at events in the capitol.
The droved had gathered mainly around the principal public buildings
and especially in front of the prefecture. The prefect told the crowd
to go away and then ordered tear gas grenades to be fired on the crowd.
The ranks of the demonstrating strikers were swelled rapidly. Around
0930 a crowd of about 15,000 people marched on the prison, following the
historic order of Diallo Idrissa, which we mentioned earlier.
The first bloody clash with the armed forces of the neo-colonialist
reaction occured in front of the prison; the armed forces were re-
enforced there at 09+5 by gendarmerie units. Lt. Colonel Vallenet, a
Frenchman, gave the order to fire. The Congolese soldiers refused.
But the gendarmerie did fire: two persons fell to the ground; a third
was hurt by a prison guard; at the General Hospital, a woman, hit by a
stray bullet, died. Later on, there were about 52 wounded.
Because of this bloody intervention by the armed forces of reaction,
the demonstrators, although unarmed, rushed the prison and liberated
the three labor union leaders and about 400 other prisoners.
Through this act, the Congolese workers brilliantly revived one of
their old revolutionary traditions: during the 30's the political and
labor union leader Andre Matswa had succeeded in organizing a vast
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movement for a struggle against racial discrimination and against the
regime of colonial slavery. Along with some other patriots, he was
arrested and sentenced to a 3-year prison term in April 1930. As
soon as the verdict was announced, thousands of black workers went
on strike and besieged the court, asking for the release of their com-
rades.
After the seizure of the Bastille of Youlou, the insurgents went
to the radio station, which was still French property, even after three
years of independence. They forced the gates of the building and seri-
ously manhandled the station manager.
During this time, another column went to the post office and took
it over without any trouble.
All of these successes galvanized the crowd of demonstrators and
unleashed avalanches of supporters for the insurrection, including
members of the armed forces and other supporters of the regime.
Panic now spread to the group in power; the leaders felt aboblutely
uncapable of stopping this sea of human fury which rushed toward the
center of the city from the outskirts in several successive wavep.
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Communist Use of Labor and Youth Groups
In Congo BrazzavilleYand Sudan
Coup in Sudan. Riots and demonstrations sparked on October 21 by
police bungling in handling Khartoum University student meetings (re-
garding disgruntled African tribesmen in the southern portion of Arab-
dominated Sudan) brought down President Ibrahim Abboud's military govern-
ment on October 26.
Two elements were decisively important in the Communist-influenced
rebellion. The army refused to fire on the riotors and the Communists,
who had long prepared for just such an opportunity, quickly seized on
the angry student demonstrations and expanded them to include all dis-
satisfied national groups. Skillfully assessing the potential of civil
disobedience and Abboud's uncertain command of the army, the Communists
issued a demand for a united front to be made up of workers and profes-
sional organizations to replace the military regime. The other political
parties took up the demand. Strikes were called. Sudanese students in
European Communist countries obediently demonstrated their solid support
for "democratic" rule in Sudan. After five days, General Abboud dis-
solved the military junta which had ruled since the bloodless coup of
1958 and dismissed his cabinet.
The national front proposed its candidates for a civilian Cabinet.
Negotiations with Abboud began against a background of the Communist-
inspired general strike and further student demonstrations. Non-
Communists soon became alarmed at the increasing evidence of Communist
strength but were unsuccessful in reducing their Cabinet representation.
Abboud and the army finally accepted a 15-man civilian cabinet which in-
cludes four Communists, all of whom have traveled in to bloc countries
and have Communist front group connections. The national front, in which
the Communists are the most important faction, and the civilian cabinet
began an immediate purge of the army and police, then requested -- and
obtained -- Abboud's resignation. This interim government is to rule
until popular elections which are now scheduled for March 1965 -- al-
though the Communist may try to postpone them to gain time for building
up a mass following.
Coup in Brazzaville. The background of these events is reminiscent
of the Communist-directed riots which led to the downfall of Fulbert
Youlou in Congo (Brazzaville) in August 1963. Disciplined Communist
cadres from youth and labor groups planned and carried out the successful
riots. The provisional government which succeeded to power held elections
in December which installed a coalition government under Alphonse Massasnba-
Debat, a moderate leftist. Included in the government are several Com-
munists, among them Aime Matsika (see p.6 of panda attachment), a
labor leader and WFTU official who was prominent in the overthrow of
Youlou. Since that time the Congo (B) has moved closer to both the USSR
and Communist China which it recognized in early 196+ and which it now
permits to train Congo (Leopoldville) rebels in guerrilla warfare and
sabotage for the current civil war against Tshombe.
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In both countries the Comi uu .s ts had labored long with the key
youth and trade union groups which then provided the individuals
trained to step into the vacuums of leadership created by each coup.
Sudanese Labor. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP), alone among
Sudanese political parties, worked zealously among labor unions, organ-
izing and directing individuals and groups toward federation and train-
ing them for political action. By 1957 the Communists whose own politi-
cal fortunes were at a low ebb, controlled approximately one third of
the trade unions. In 1958 El Shafie Ahmed El Shaikh of the SCP organized
(by the Communist cell system) the important Sudan Workers Trade Union
Federation (SWTUF) of which he became Secretary-General. Significantly,
the Communists also succeeded in dominating the largest, richest union,
the Sudan Railway Workers Union,where non-Communist cooperation had
failed. The SRWU's ability to disrupt traffic and communications to
Red Sea ports made it a prize for the Communists.
The Sudanese army took over the government in 1958 and General
Abboud dissolved the trade unions. Fourteen SWTUF leaders, including
El Shafie, were arrested for their Communist activities. Although it
had been supported by the WFTU since 1948 the SWTUF had never affiliated
with that Communist international labor organization -- in line with
Communist strategy for non-aligned countries.
During the period 1960-63,the outlawed SCP worked persistently,
though for a long time unsuccessfully, to form a waited front with other
political parties. Unable to make headway, the SCP turned back to the
trade unions which it soon dominated. In 1963, as Abboud's government
moved to liberalize labor policies, the SCP used its labor groups to
press demands for legalizing the trade union federation. Fellow travel-
lers were even appointed to the government's committee to study trade
union matters. El Shafie was released from prison in 1963 after serving
five years and promptly went to Eastern Europe to meet with officials
of the WFTU of which he is a vice president. Returning to Sudan he
soon stepped up the tempo of Sudanese labor activities.
In the summer of 1964 the government cancelled a national labor
conference -- called to discuss legalizing a Federation of Sudan Workers
Unions -- since the Communists were likely to dominate the conference
and the Federation. The cancellation built up pressures among the
frvrated labor groups which the Communists cannily exploited two months
later against the government. After the coup, the FSWU chose its Sec-
retary General, El Shafie,to be labor's representative in the cabinet
of the new interim government of November 1964. Sudan now has the dis-
tinction of having a bTFTU vice-president as its Minister of State.
Sudanese Youth and Students. In 1946, ten years before Sudan
gained her independence from Great Britain, Communists organized a
Sudanese group in Cairo called the Sudan Movement for Liberation but it
was not until six years later that the movement began to show any real
strength. Communist student tactics were the same as those used else-
where in Africa: nationalism and student dissatisfactions were translated
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into ant` .qccte n act:.)-as; Communist countries vere held up as proper
models for development and champions of anti-imperialism. At the
University of Khartoum, Communists are influential in the Student
Union which rioted in October (see opening paragraphs).
Large numbers of Sudanese youth obtained Communist scholarships
without the knowledge of the Education Ministry whose approval was
legally required. The SCP nominated and approved each selectee and
expected to be able to use him on his return to Sudan. in 1963 the
Ministry of Education itself received direct offers of scholarships
from the following which were additional to scholarships administered
by the SCP): Bulgaria 18; USSR 33; Poland 7; Czechoslovakia 8.
Students reaching the Communist states are urged to join African
or Sudanese student groups run on the Communist cell system. They
are used for demonstrations and for other propaganda purposes and are
indoctrinated into political activity. On their return to Sudan they
are half-educated, perhaps unemployable and over-impressed with their
own importance so they soon join the dissatisfied who form the bulk of
Sudanese Communist Party followers. Thus is Communist strength built
up in the absence of a legal Communist party. Many Sudanese students
in bloc countries have reportedly finished their "education" and are
hurriedly being sent back to Sudan following establishment of the new
national front government.
Congo (Brazzaville) Labor. Dipanda, the Communist-line weekly
newspaper in Brazzaville, printed a series of articles from a book by
Afana Ossende (extracts are attached) which describe Communist use of
labor groups in the agitation and demonstrations which led to overthrow
of Fulbert Youlou's government in 1963. (Ossende of course refers to
the plotters as "patriots,"not"communists.") Soviet and Chinese support
to the trade union movement in this political role is no secret. On
October 2, 1964 Moscow Radio broadcast a talk praising the role of the
trade unions in overthrowing Youlou in Congo (Brazzaville) and Maga in
Dahomey. Chinese and Soviet assistance to the Communist-dominated
trade unions in Congo includes buildings, equipment, automobiles, salary
payments and labor scholarships. Radical pressures from these groups
are pushing the government toward an increasingly pro-Communist posture.
The leader of the large and influential Catholic trade union federation
was arrested in late November, thus weakening one of the principal forces
still opposing the leftward trend of government.
Congolese Youth. The members of the national youth federation
Union de la Jeunesse Congolaise (UJC) are very close to labor organizers
of the WFTU affiliate, Confederation Generale Africaine du Travail and
are themselves affiliated with the Communist-led World Federation
of Democratic Youth. Although the Communists exploited youth of both
Congo and Sudan, the techniques differ. In the Congo a few well trained
and indoctrinated individuals in a few key positions wielded influence
far beyond their numbers; the infiltration and control of youth organi-
zations on the Sudan pattern was not necessary in Congo.
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A typical example of the Corumun st use of individuals is the
management of Dipanda (see Congo-Brazzaville Labor, above). In
October 1963 two students (Jean-Baptiste Lounda and Claude Ernest
Ndall) returned from three years study in the Soviet Union and com-
menced publication of Dipanda which has become one of the most out-
spokenly Communist-line papers in West Africa, generally leaning to-
ward Chinese Communist positions.
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Fact Sheet Background Use Only
December 196+
Excerpts from Speech Enver Hoxha in Tirana 28 Nov 64
Broadcast by ATA International Service
N. Khrushchev's dismissal is a great victory, but this does not
mean the end of Khrushchevite revisionism or of modern revisionism in
general. Apart from the big part which N. Khrushchev played in the ca-
pacity of leader of the revisionists, the course, policy, and social and
economic roots of revisionism have not been liquidated along with him.
Khrushchevite revisionism itself, which has brought so much evil to the
communist movement, to the Soviet Union, to the socialist camp, and to
the people's liberation struggle, has not been liquidated. That is why
the Albanian Workers Party, as all true revolutionaries everywhere, should
not and will not have any illusions on this point.
N. Khrushchev's downfall marks the beginning of a new state in the
struggle between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism which will lead to the
total defeat of modern revisionism and to the inevitable triumph of Marx-
ism-Leninism. In this stage communists and the people here must more
than ever have a clear idea of their future attitude and of the line of
their future struggle which have been drawn up correctly by our party,
which bases itself on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and on the inter-
ests of strengthening the whole communist and workers international
movement.
Our party has struggled and will continue to struggle in a consist-
ent manner against modern revisionism, Khrushchevite or T'itoist, until
its total defeat as a (reactionary?) line, as an anti-Marxist course, as
an ideology and a policy which have found their concrete expression in
the revisionist decisions of the 20th, 21st, and 22d CPSU congresses.
This position of our party is completely correct and complete with
principles, for one could not even contemplate the destruction of revi-
sionism and the victory of Marxism without rejecting and repudiating the
ideological and political basis and platform of revisionism.
The present leaders of the Soviet party-government have stated more
than once that they are faithfully following the line of the 20th, 21st,
and 22d CPSU Congresses, as well as its program approved at the 22d con-
gress. They have also stated that N. Khrushchev's expulsion will in no
way touch the essence of the line hitherto followed by the CPSU. It is
clear that the future continuation also of this anti-Marxist course,
making allowance for tactical nuances which could be used and will doubt-
less be used in its application and by which they count on deceiving the
revolutionaries and the peoples, will not fail to rouse the determined
opposition and the open struggle on principle of true Marxists-Leninists.
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Our party considers that the true liquidation of the revisionist
platform, and consequently of Khrushchevite revisionism itself, must be
and will be achieved with the help of the high principled struggle of
Marxists-Leninists, in order to repair gradually all the evils which the
revisionists have so far caused international communism by their treach-
erous line.
In the first place, the settlement of the question of Stalin, of the
rehabilitation of Stalin as a great Marxist-Leninist, regardless of some
insignificant errors which he may have committed, is a great question of
principle of great international importance. Our party and all Marxists-
Leninists regard the question of Stalin not as a sentimental affair but
for what it really is, as a question of line, as a question of principle.
Mikoyan, Kosygin, Brezhnev, Suslov, and others have taken an active
part in the slanderous attacks against our party and our country. This
is why the fact that the Soviet Government is no longer headed by N.
Khrushchev does not in the least touch the heart of the problem. The
responsibility for all the anti-Albanian activities falls on the USSR
leadership, and it is up to this leadership to correct it courageously.
Only in this way can conditions of equality necessary to bilateral talks
and to the reestablishment of the unity of the socialist camp be created.
[underlining added]
The turning point can be prepared and reached by revolutionary strug-
gle, by openly condemning and denouncing the treason of N. Khrushchev and
his group, for one cannot correct the errors while keeping Khrushchev,
while keeping the question of Khrushchev within the limits of the party,
as all the modern revisionists try to do. This is an effort aimed at de-
fending treason, for to bring out into the daylight the treason of N.
Khrushchev would harm and expose the whole revisionist course on all the
primary questions of which we have been speaking.
Like all revolutionary Marxists-Leninists, the Albanian Workers Party
will courageously struggle to win new victories over revisionism. Our
struggle and the open and principled polemics will continue unceasingly
until Khrushchevite positions are annihilated all along the line.
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the Argentine ;art a?z~entary Elections
The Argentine Congress is currently composed of 192 deputies and
46 senators. Senators are elected for nine years, one third being
renewed every three years; deputies are elected for four years and
one half renewed every two years. The elections scheduled for 14 March
1965 affect only one half of the Chamber of Deputies and a number of
provincial legislatures. Under normal circumstances, this event would
attract little attention abroad. However, political tensions have been
building up to such an extent in recent months that the elections may
become the occasion for a serious governmental crisis.
The most conspicuous, but perhaps least important, factor creat-
ing these tensions is the threatened return of Juan Domingo Peron.
From his exile in Madrid, the former dictator has sought to control the
Peronist movement, often playing one faction against the other. His
supporters have been carrying out a noisy campaign calling for him to
return to Argentina and personally aseume leadership of the movement.
Peron's presence in Argentina, or even in a neighboring country, could
be the detonating element in a potentially explosive situation. The
government has stated officially that Peron is free, like any ordinary
Argentine citizen, to return to his native land. However, it has been
made clear to him that he may be prosecuted on charges of treason and
corruption of a minor. Also, he would face the very real threat of as-
sassination at the hands of some of his former victims. Anti-Peron
sentiment in Uruguay is so great that he would not be welcome or even
safe there. Although he is an honorary general in the Paraguayan Army
and a personal friend of President Stroessner, the latter's government
would not want to contribute to unrest in Argentina by furnishing Peron
with a base for political operations. In light of the above considera-
tions, it is fairly safe to predict that Peron will not return to
Argentina in the immediate future. His threatened return is rather a
bugbear which his supporters use to harass and annoy the government,
the army, and the anti-Peron parties.
In the congressional elections of March 1962, Peronists were al-
lowed to vote for the first time since Peron was overthrown in September
1955. Upsetting most predictions, they received nearly a third of the
popular vote and emerged as the strongest single party. As a result,
the elections were annulled by President Frondizi and he, in turn,
ousted soon after by a military coup.
For the general (presidential) elections held 7 July 1963, it was
again illegal for Peronists to run candidates. This brought about a
division within the movement, prompting one faction to enter the elec-
tions under the guise of "Peronism without Peron." As a consequence,
eleven provincial parties of the "Justicialist Bloc," also known as "Neo-
eronists," succeeded in electing 17 national deputies. The official
faction, comprising the majority of the Peronists, followed the instruc-
tions of their absent leader and cast blank ballots.
(Cont.)
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One of the valuable and highly negotiable legacies which Peron
left to his adherents Was control of key unions and positions in
Argentina's principal labor organization, the Confederacion General
del Trabajo (CGT - General Confederation of Labor), which includes
about 85% of organized labor. In January 1963, the CGT was formally
reconstituted with half of the six positions on the executive committee
allotted to the Peronist bloc of 62 unions and half to the independent
bloc, which includes neo-Peronists. The so-called "62 Bloc" forms the
hard core of Peronist strength and the instrument of its plan de lucha
(battle plan), or long-range strategy. First launched in early 19b4,
the battle plan includes sit-down strikes, demands for price controls,
and constant pressure for the return of Peron. Their demands for re-
peal of laws outlawing Communist and Peronist activity and for "full
political amnesty" have borne fruit: a law was passed repealing most
of these restrictions on 16 November 1961..
Originally, the Peronist movement consisted of three branches:
political, labor, and women's groups, with Peron as head of the supreme
command: Recently the party structure has been completely reorganized:
the official wing of the movement is known now as the "Justicialist
Party," but not identified with the Justicialist Bloc mentioned above.
In the party elections of July 1961+, Augusto Vandor, leader of the
Metallurgical Workers Union and acknowledged chief of the "62 Bloc" was
elected head of the party over the strenuous opposition of Andres Framini,
of the Textile Workers Union and, until then, the most powerful of Peron's
supporters in Argentina. Framini was elected governor of Buenos Aires
Province in the annulled elections of 1962.
Although the followers of Peron form the largest single bloc of
potential voters, they still account for barely a third of the electorate.
The other two major parties are splinter groups that broke off in 1957
from the old Radical Civic Union (Union Civica Radical - UCR): the
Intransigent Radical Civic Union (Union Civica Radical Intransigente -
UCRI) and the People's Radical Civic Union (Union Civica Radical del
Pueblo - UCRP). In 1958, Arturo Frondizi., founder and leader of the
UCRI, won the presidency with 11.5% of the pcpular vote. Current presi-
dent of the party is Oscar Alende. In the elections of 1963, its rival
party, the UCRP, polled only about one fourth of the popular vote, but
enough to put their candidate, Arturo Illia, in the Casa Rosada for a
full six-year term as President. These two parties split originally
over personal differences between their leaders rather than ideological
ones, although the UCRP seems to be the more moderate and the UCRI more
inclined to welcome Peronist, extreme leftist, and even Communist sup-
port.
Counting the above and the Neo-Peronist groups, there are 23
parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies and 12 in the Senate.
The most important of these are: Union of the Argentine People (Union
del Pueblo Argentino - UDELPA), built around the personality of former
provisional president Pedro Aramburu; the Progressive Democrat Party
(Partido Democrata Progresista - PDP); National Federation of Center
Parties (Federacion National de Partidos del Centro - FNCP), a coalition
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of both conservative and leftist elements; the Argentine Socialist.
Party (Partido Socialista Argentine - PSA); the Christian Democrats
(Partido Democrata Cistiano -- PDC); and the Democratic Socialists
(Partido Socialicta Democratico -- PSD).
It is this excessive fragmentation of the Argentine electorate
that has enabled the Peronists, as a well-organized and unified party,
to play such an important role, and actually hold the balance of power
at times. If the anti-Peronist parties could get together, they could
easily form a working majority. The present electoral law, it seems,
will only encourage further fragmentation. Under the old Saenz Pena
law, which was in force for the 1962 elections, each electoral district
-- the 22 provinces and the Federal Capital -- was treated as a single
constituency. Voters cast their ballots for a list of candidates from
a given party, and two thirds of the available mandates were given to
the winning party list and one third to the next highest. Only the
first and second parties in a district gained any representation at all.
Under the Saenz Pena law, the leading party list almost never reached
fifty per cent of the total vote. This meant that two thirds of the
seats some times went to a party list polling no more than one quarter
or one third of the total votes cast. In the 1962 elections, this led
to over representation for the Peronist parties in the districts where
they won: 46% of the seats with less than 32% of the votes.
It would normally be expected that such a system would tend to
discourage the proliferation of small parties. Nevertheless, over
sixty parties presented candidates in the 1962 and 1963 elections.
Under the new electoral law, provincial electors and members of the
National Chamber of Deputies will be chosen by the d'Hondt system of
proportional representation. The representation of all parties will
more nearly correspond to their actual electoral strength. However,
there is nothing in the new law to discourage the continued fragmenta-
tion of the Argentine electorate. All a new party has to do to qualify
is obtain signatures of 0.4% of the qualified voters (but not less than
500 nor more than 4,000) in a given electoral district. A party which
participated in the annulled elections of 1962 must show verifiable
evidence that it received at least 3% of the district vote in that
election. Thus the outlook is for an electorate as divided as ever,
with the possibility that the Peronists may again emerge as the strong-
est single party.
In spite of the fact that it looms as the most conspicuous issue
in the coming elections, Peronism is not the only problem. Inflation
has continued to plague every government in the nine years since the
overthrow of Peron and has served to conceal from the people the lack
of real progress in the Argentine economy. Pressure for wage increases
and other factors have brought about a wage-price spiral that has pushed
the cost of living index to 219 as of June 1964, using 1960 as 100.
During 1964 negotiated wage agreements have so far resulted in wage
increases of between 25% and 30%. Current estimates of unemployment
are at 12% of the labor force and up to 25% in key industries such as
textiles and steel. Although Argentina is far and away the most highly
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industrialized country in Latin America, its gross national product,
on a per capita basis, has lagged far behind that of oil-rich Venezuela:
$443 against $737 -- the two highest in Latin America. Worse still, in
spite of the dreams of the Alliance for Progress, which called for an
economic growth rate of 2.5% per capita throughout Latin America, the
Argentine economy has been in a steady decline. One reliable research
organization estimated that Argentina's GNP dropped 3.5% In 1962, meas-
ured in constant values, and 5% in 1963. When the population growth is
computed in this, the decline was approximately 5% and 6.6% respectively.
A record wheat crop, predicted for 1964, might offset somewhat the losses
in the industrial sector, but the GNP will probably not reach the levels
of 1961 and 1962.
Another major issue in the elections will be the contracts with
five U.S. oil companies. Responding to nationalistic pressures, Presi-
dent Illia made good his campaign promises and set about cancelling the
contracts a month or so after assuming power. The U.S. companies have
so far refused to accept the government offers of settlement, and litiga-
tion continues. Meanwhile, Argentine oil production, which the foreign
companies had quickly brought up to a level sufficient to satisfy do-
mestic needs, has now begun to decline. The Government oil monopoly
has begun to import crude oil.
In the elections next March, several hundred candidates for the
96 seats available will be under pressure from the electorate to de-
clare themselves, eloquently and unequivocally, on some of the practical
aspects of foreign policy, economics and civil behavior: the oil con-
tracts, foreign investments, social justice (the putative father of
"Justicialism," a term coined during the Peron era), higher pensions,
higher wages, shorter hours, more tolerance of street demonstrations,
fewer restrictions on Peronist activities. These and countervailing
pressures from the more conservative voters will put each candidate on
the horns of the democratic dilemma: in order to be elected, he must
please a majority of the voters, and in order to please a majority of
the voters he may be forced to assume positions at variance with the
longrange interests of the country as a whole.
During his nine years in power Juan Domingo Peron succeeded, as
few other Latin American dictators had done before, in divi "-a _Argentine
society into two irreconcilable segments, undoubtedly more hosts e to
each other than similarly divided groups elsewhere. The anti-Peronists,
especially among the well-to-do and well-informed minority, know what
it is like to lose their political liberties, which is what happened
under Peron. The descamisados, Peron's formerly "shirtless" followers,
know what it is like to be closely identified with the ruling clique
in an almost totalitarian state. Through Peron, they have tasted power
and found it good. They would like to get it back. It is these ten-
sions that will make of otherwise routine elections a political event
of major importance.
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