BI - WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 21, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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IgnifIcant Dates
Nineteen-sixty-five
1965 brings the 20th Anniversary of several International
Fronts: the Communists will organize special activities, e.g.
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Feb.)
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) (Nov.)
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) (Nov.)
1965 will also be the 20th Anniversary of
The Fall of Berlin (April), and the
Liberation of the Concentration Camps
2 Fidel Castro assumes power, 1959 (Sixth anniversary)
6 Pres. Roosevelt enunciates Four Freedoms: Freedom of speech and
expression, of worship; from want and from fear, 1941
13 USSR "Doctors' Plot" arrests announced, 1953
15 Karl Liebknecht & Rosa Luxemburg, founders of German CP, killed
in Spartacus uprising, 1919
21 Lenin dies (Born 22 April 1870), 192+
21 Chicom govt orders Tibet representatives to Peking to negotiate
"peaceful solution Tibet's status," 1950
31 Leon Trotsky banished for life. 1929
31 OAS excludes Communist Cuba. 1962
FEB.
1 Pres. Lincoln signs resolution abolishing slavery (13th Amendment)
U.S. Constitution. 100th Anniversary. 1865
1 UN General Assembly condemns Chicom aggression in Korea. 1951
10 Soviet Govt. repudiates all debts incurred by Tsarist regime. 1918
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GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#43
Commentary 25 Nov-8 Dec 1964
Principal Developments:
1. The "truce" in Sino-Soviet polem~cal warfare following the
ouster of Khrushchev wore very thin during this period. The Chinese
belatedly publicized previously undisclosed bitter brawling at a closed
TUS Executive Committee meeting in Prague` November 14-17, and followed
with an exultant description of railroading an"emergency resolution"
on US "crimes of aggression in the Congo" over Soviet opposition at the
subsequent IUS Congress in Sofia. Rejoicing in the "brilliant success"
of the November 24+-30 Japanese CP Congress (which left the JCP even
more openly Chinese-aligned and anti-Soviet), Peking warned, in connec-
tion with the expelled pro-Soviet JCP dissidents who "peddled revision-
ism and splittism with the support of a foreign power" "their boss
Khrushchev has fallen... (and) anybody who still tries to use such po-
litical scum... (as Shiga) will come -to the same ignominious end." And
on December 5 People's Daily devoted almost two pages to a November 28
report by Albanian boss Hoxha which attacked by name the four top fig-
ure's in the new Soviet leadership.
2. Soviet media have been somewhat more circumspect: they avoided
attacking the'Chinese by name, and even deleted Tito's criticism of the
Chinese when reporting his December 7 speech to the Yugoslav Party Con-
gress. Nevertheless, a major Pravda editorial on December 6 rebutted
(unnamed) "critics" on the "fundamental question" -- of the CPSU posi-
tion on replacing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by a "state of
the whole people" in the USSR. The Chinese have hotly attacked this posi-
tion since their 14+ June 1963 letter and included it in the 21 November
Red~Fla, "Why Khrushchev Fell.." Pravda taunted these critics that they
need to identify all leadership with dictatorship" to justify the "per-
sonality cult" in which they are, by implication, engaged.
3. Soviet media have continued their silence about Khrushchev, de-
leting'Tito's friendly remarks about K's positive contributions in re-
porting his December 7 speech.
4. The CPSU and its supporters (Czech Novotny visiting Moscow,
E. German TJlbricht in Berlin SED plenum, Belgian CP Congress in Brussels,
Cypriot CP in Pravda article) continued to call for a world party con-
ference, -- but with no mention of specific plans. The Peking correspond-
ent of the Japanese agency Kyodo on December 1 reported that "authorita-
tive sources" in Peking "categorically denied rumors that Soviet and
Chinese leaders would hold a summit conreence" there in December or Jan-
uary. Meanwhile, several clandestine repo' its from usually reliable European
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Communist sources indicate that the CPSU sent letters during the last
week of November proposing re-scheduling the 26-party preparatory meet-
ing for March 1. Reportedly, the CPSU letter admitted that the Chinese,
Korean, Vietnamese, Albanian, and Rumanian parties had declined to at-
tend, and it said that the Indonesian and Japanese parties "requested
additional information."
5. Most observers have commented on the increasing evidence of
Rumania's growing independence, which was apparently confirmed by an
"eed plenum" of the Party's CC November 30-December 1 giving "unani-
mous approval" to the Politburo's international activities. Particularly
noteworthy was the role of the Rumanian delegates at the IUS meetings in
Prague and Sofia, where (although published accounts are still inadequate)
they seemingly lined up more often on the Chinese side in disputes against
the Soviets and called for the preparation of a new statute to prevent the
control and use of the IUS by any country for its own objectives.
6. The Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (CP)
beginning December 7 brought high-level guest delegations from some 30
Soviet-sympathizing parties. Tito's 30,000-Nord opening report presents
a very effective, reasoned case for Yugoslav views of socialism and for
independence of all parties, with a brief tribute to Khrushchev's "great
role in deStalinization and in promoting freedom of expression... safeguard-
ing world peace... (and) normalizing and improving relations between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet Union." His icy criticism of the Chinese is devas-
tating: their "ideological disagreement," he says, is "only a screen
for the real Chinese aims," which are "to impose power politics on the
world with the prospect of ultimately assuming a decisive role in the
international workers movement and in the world."
Significance:
The ousting of Khrushchev appears to have brought thus far little
lasting or basic change in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Both sides have
reasserted their old positions on practically all points at issue --
often in more adamant terms than before. The "truce" in polemical war-
fare is already wearing thin. All indications are that the Chou En-lai
mission to Moscow only emphasized the difference between the antagonists
and that no bilateral talks are scheduled. On the other hand, Moscow's
positions regarding Vietnam, the Congo and the proposed NATO multilateral
nuclear fleet [MLF] are virtually identical.
Although nothing has been stated publicly, it appears that the CPSU
has postponed the 26-party preparatory commission meeting scheduled for
Moscow 15 December, probably largely because of the delays introduced by
the Khrushchev ouster and related problems. However, the Soviets and
their supporters repeatedly reaffirm their determination to go ahead
with plans for a world conference, and the CPSU is reportedly now attempt-
ing to reschedule the preparatory meeting for 1 March 1965. Indications
are that 7 of the 26 will not attend -- the 6 which espouse the Chinese
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view of Marxism-Leninism (Albania, China, Korea, North Vietnam, Japan
and Indonesia) and "independent" Rumania. The Italians have asserted that
they will participate in order to oppose any action which should excommuni-
cate the Chinese, and others may well line up with them In this effort.
Soviet prestige, influence, and authority as the leader of the Com-
munist world appear to have declined, at least temporarily, under the com-
bined impact of the mounting political/propaganda attacks by its Communist
enemies, the growing assertion of independence and even open criticism by
its friends, and its own inability to bring about its long-demanded and
concretely scheduled preparations fora world party conference and its
action in ousting Khrushchev, with the attendant admission of errors and
failures over the past decade (added to the earlier revelation of the er-j
rors, failures and crimes of the Stalin period).
In the activities of the Communist front organizations may be seen
perhaps the most damaging (from the Communist point of view) of all aspects
of the mounting Sino-Soviet conflict and the progressive breakdown of Soviet
authority over the WCM. Almost every international front meeting over the
past year and more has brought bitter battling between the Soviet and
Chinese forces, with the Chinese repeatedly publicly accusing the Soviets
of using the fronts as instruments,of Soviet foreign policy. A natural
result has been a growth of a "plague on both your houses" attitude cul-
.minating in the Rumanian call -- at the current IUS Congress in Sofia ?R-
for a new statute which will prevent control over and exploitation of the
organization by any country for its own objectives.
On the other side of the ledger, a number of parties are trying some with considerable success a,. or will try to exploit the crumbling
of the monolith to enhance their own image and power. Outstanding among
the ruling parties has been the Rumanians and there are indications that
the Czech may be following. A fair fining to the non-Communist world
was served by the 22 November local elections in Italy, where, despite
the. turmoil attendant on the death of Togliatti and the ouster of Khru-
shchev, the Communist largely- :held their own and even advanced in some
areas for an overall small increase.
The outlook for the- WC4 in 1965 depends primarily upon several
factors, all of which contain u n p r e .l i c t a Y1. e element-s,,
as follows:
a. the outcome of the continuing succession problem in the USSR;
b. developments in China, such as Mao?s demise, possible inter-
national or domestic setbacks or successes,, etc.;
c. the extent to which international developments., in which Moscow
and Peking have certain common it verests vis-a-vis the West, would
throw conflicting Communist forces into some degree of tactical
"unity of action against the forces of imperialism," in Southeast
Asia, Africa,, etc.
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(Commentary cont.)
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Although the Kremlin, which has lost face and influence through
Peking's attacks, continues to call for a preparatory meeting for a
world conference, the prospects for this meeting remain in doubt.
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#4+3
CH(1OMLOGy -- CON MUNMST DISSENSIONS
25 November-3 December 1964
October 26 (delayed): The first issue of a Greek-language pro-Chinese
Communist monthly,, Anagennisis (Renaissance), appears in Athens, with no
attempt "objectivity."
November 14-17: November 28 and continuing: The Executive Committee of
the International Union of Students IUS net in Prague November 14.17
to prepare the agenda for an IUS Congress in Sofia. No reports of the
proceedings were published at that time. Only allude Pravo editorial on
the 18th inc:itecI conflict, warning of the danger -'to uni y from "the ill-
considered leftist actions, often accompanied by loud, radical-sounding
phrases, aimed at dividing students according to the color of their skins,
or at setting up specifically Asian, African, Latin American, and other
student associations."
On December 1, however, NCNA Peking described bitter brawling at
tMhe Prague meeting.
"Li Shu-cheng, leader of the eiegation, pointed out that the
draft report contained fundamental mistakes onc, number of major ques-
tions of principle.... Some persons continue to insist on the er-
roneous line of ca itulationism and splittism.... Moreover, the
draft report also wrongly defined the'road to the defense of world
peace as through 'peaceful coexistence' and 'general and complete
disarmament.' In the present international situation, the
demarcation line between genuine ands ious o 4sition to iL
ria1ism is whether too se U.S. 132-rlalism or not.... In de-
fiance o the resolute opposition by a number of member organizations,
the draft report reaffirmed the splittist statement concerning the
tripartite treaty [on nuclear testing] issued by the IUS Secretariat
in August last year and insisted on praising the Kiev summer school
held in August last year and the Moscow World You h Forum held last
September. Both are known for their spurious opposition to imperi-
alism and real opposition to China, their sham stand for unity and
fir real stand for split.... Opposing China will come to no good.,
and the attempt to use the IUS as a form for anti-China activities
apd to slit the unity of the students is d.ooiwC- to failure."
Li Shu-cheng proposed an amendment to delete all favorable reference
to the test ban treaty. The Soviet delegate tried to interrupt her with
a "procedural question" which the Chinese said caused great confusion in
the session and was a slanderous attack on China.
"The meeting then discussed the amendment put forward by the
Rnanian delegation, to remove the parts dealing with opposition to
all n nuclear tests and peaceful settlement of all territorial disputes
from the report and replace Lt with the demand for banning all nuclear
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weapons.... But the Brazilian delegate proposed to add 'banning all
nuclear tests' after 'banning all nuclear weapons.' ... The chairman
arbitrarily put to vote the Brazilian amendment disapproved by many
delegates together with the Rumanian amendment."
"At the 16 November session, the Ruffian delegation proposed
that the paragraph concerning the Common Market be deleted [and re-
t3 ced by one which, inter ilia., declares opposition to the attempt
to subjug- to some countries political by making use of economic
relations. It was adopted with the Chinese, Korean., Rumanian, and
the majority of delegates favoring it. Only five votes including
the Soviet Union were against it.
"The Chinese delegation then moved that the parts praising the
Moscow Youth Forum be deleted... It was seconded by the Ram,-nian and
Korean delegations.... [However,] the Indian executive chairman of
the session, in total disregard of the opposition of the delegates,
put to a vote the proposal for not discussing the amendment and an-
nounced that there were 13 votes for ,and 11 against.... Delegates
from Korea, South Vietnam, Haiti, Guadaloupe, Malagasy, and the Fed-
eration of Students of Black Africa in France condemned this anti-
democratic and despicable practice, and the delegates from Puerto
Rico and the Dominican Republic e2. osed the chairman for his trick
err in counting votes....
-w1 ?
"Before the Chinese amendment was put to vote, a Chinese dele-
gate in his speech made known the fact that certain people were
acting behind the scenes,... to turn the IUS into an instrument in
the service of the foreign policy of a certain country....
Not until the third day of the Congress in Sofia, the 30th, did
Bulgarian media indicate that there was any" quarreling: the Albanian
delegate disagreed with the Secretariat's earlier support of the test-
ban treaty; the Chinese delegate did the same; and "the Rumanian dele-
gate expressed a wish for improvement in the methods of work of the IUS,"
calling for a new statute to "reflect the new situation of the inter-
national students movement."
On December 3, NCNA distributed its own account, datelined Sofia,
30 November, of the victorious battle against the Soviet-led forces on
the 28th and 29th to push through an emergency motion adopting a statement
of protest "resolutely condemning the crimes of aggression against Congo
Leopoldville perpetrated by U.S. imperialism." Li Shu-cheng "said that
the question now was whether or not to affirm ... that U.S. imperialism
was the main enemy of the people of the world and the chieftain of imper-
ialism." NCNA reports that the Rumanian delegate supported the Chinese
draft [resolution] and "called on the Czechoslovak delegate to withdraw
his amendment."
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The Chinese statement was finally "unanimously adopted," after which
Li thanked "many delegates" for their support and "pointed out with re-
gret" that the obstructions raised by "some people" "stem from ulterior
motives."
On the 5th, the "hushed-up" Bulgarian reportage acknowledged further
ackimonious altercations, with the Chinese accusing the Indian delegate
of "meddling in.the domestic affairs of the. CPR and "levelling groundless
accusations at the Soviet Union." Sofia reports the Soviet delegate as
replying "in a calm and argued manner" that the Chinese attacks are
"'groundless and unworthy" and that the Congress was not the place to level
slanders, -- with which the Rumanian delegate agreed!
November 24+-30: The Ninth Congress of the Japanese CP reelected Nosaka
and Miyamoto as chairman and secretary general, respectively, and reaf-
firmed the Partr's Chinese-attuned, anti-revisionist line. It repeatedly
emphasized that, as Nosaka put it in his opening speech, "the dismissal
of Khrushchev ... testified to the correctness of the line and the stand
taken all along by our party."
The Congress approved the CC's earlier expulsion of Shiga, Suzuki,
Kamiyama, and Nakano.... Miyamoto, whose report was published in full
in Akahaata on November 25, was outspoken in describing the breakdown of
relations with the CPSU, "By mid-May, when Yoshio Shiga' and some others
who had hitherto maintained secret contact with the CPSU leadership began
their maneuvers to sabotage our party, the CPSU leadership immediately
came out into the open to support and encourage them, thus setting out
openly to undermine our party. This is an outrage unknowm in the history
of the ICM. By so doing, the CPSU leadership has disqualified itself
for arty talk about friendship between the CPs of Japan and the Soviet
Union....
On the question of an international conference, the Miyamoto report
repeats the JCP view that the July Soviet summons to a preparatory meet-
ing is "ille al" and again calls for an end to attempts to convene such
a meeting.
Hailing the "brilliant success" of the JCP Congress, a Peking
People's Daily editorial on December 3 points out that Miyamoto "ex-
osed the modern revisionists' foul practice of Sreat-nation chauvinism
toward fraternal parties in the guise of 'creative Marxism.' 'With the
support of a foreign power they peddled revisionism and splittism in the
country. Now their boss Khrushchev has fallen.. Anybody who still tries
to use such political scum as Yoshio Shiga and his like will come to the
sauce ignominious end as Khrushchev."
Meanwhile, in an appeal published at a press conference on December 2,
the four expellees declared that all decisions taken at the JCP 9th Con-
gress are invalid and that they will form a new party of other JCP ex-
members and of unionists -- but they set no timetable for action.
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November 27: French CP daily L'Humanite publishes a message from CPSU
dated 25th thanking for November 7 greetings. It uses the phrase: "FCP,
together with all M-L parties who hold dear..., is ... working for prepar-
ation of a new conference tending toward union of all. Comm:inists on basis
of principles of M-L and declarations of 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences."
November 22: Hoxha in Albania, celebrating the 20th anniversary of WW II
liberation, delivers the most direct attackon the new Soviet leaders thus
far, charging that "Miko an K o in Brezhnev Suslov and others" have
continued "slanderous attacks on the Albanian Party. Moscow and Yugo-
slavia) avoids polemics and even sends a greetings message to Albania for
the first time since 1961. Chinese representative in Tirana, Vice Premier
of State Council Lu Ting-i, coca t ted the Vito revisionists so sharply
that the Yugoslav Foreign Office December 3 delivered a "most energetic"
protest to the Chinese Embassy "in connection with the slanderous and
utterly insulting attacks on Yugoslavia and its leadership by ... Lu and
the Chinese press."
November 0-December 4: A top-level Czech party-state delegation headed
by First Secretary-President Novotny visits Moscow: a call for a world
conference was repeated in Novotny's speech at a Kremlin rally on the 3rd
which also included thinly veiled criticism of the Chinese) and in their
joint communique, -- but no specific plans were mentioned.
December 1: Peking correspondent Yamada of the Tokyo Kyodo agency reports
that authoritative sources in Peking have categorically denied rumors that
Soviet and Chinese leaders would hold a sump:itconference in Peking this
month or next January." Whether the proposed mid-December Moscow meeting
will take place as scheduled "is the Soviet Party leaders' business, not
China's," he reports them as saying.
December : XfTimes London correspondent Gruson reports that, "according
to reliable information reaching London," the Chinese have rejected a new
Soviet proposal for a world party conference which was contained in a let-
ter whit Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko tried to deliver to Mao or Chou
last week. "Particularly galling to the Russians ... was the refusal of
the Chinese even to accept the letter."
In an editorial criticizing the "recklessness and irresponsibility"
and "resort to brutal means" which characterize the Chinese leadership,
the Yu oosslav Party weekly organ Komunist adds: "China really endeavors
to acquire all the attributes of a-great power according to the reva
ins standard -- from the atomic bomb to subjugated partners who act under
its instructions."
The North Korean Party daily Nodong Sinmun features a 5,000 word
appeal to Strengthen the Unity of the ICM and Intensify the Anti-imperi-
alist, Revolutionary Struggle." Although thoroughly ChiCom in spirit,
the treatise is remarkably "unaligned" (vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet con-
flict) in wording and names no names. Some passages are almost enigmatic
in their thrust, such as:
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"The indiscreet act of clinging to the old line which has gone
bankrupt in life and yet egging on others to fo'_.low it must be reso-
lutely rejected, and it is important to mallte a sober, scientific
appraisal of developments, not beset by preoccu.p od (sic), subjective
views, and seek unity in the practical struggle."
Similarly, it defines as the "main danger" to the ICM "revisionism
and opportunism of all hues," and says that "our party has waged a staunch
struggle against revisionism, rejected dogmatism, defended the purity of
M-L, and exerted all efforts for the unity and solidarity....."
December : Peking PeoRle's Daily devotes nearly 2 pages to the inter-
national section of Albanian boss Ioxha's report on the 20th anniversary
of liberation which attacks the new Soviet leadars -- M:ikoyan, Ko gin,
Brezhnev and Susl.ov -- by nay ~seeTlVovc it:er 2y above).
more than 8,000 people of a dozen nationalities" in Artush, capital of
the Kezlesu Khal as autonomous region in Sinkiang which again reaffirmed
the determination of these peoples to string against (inter alia) modern
revisionism and "declared that ar,ioas att 4rgt, to disrupt tk!e nation
3inity of the country and undermine the unity of the country's various
nationalities, and any b tion to seize is to r.itor~_,by force are doomed
to failure and wile in share.."
December 6: A long editorial in Pravda openly resumes the.Eolemic with
the Chine; e (tho)gh they are still not vaned) over the important C"PSU
position on replacing the dictatorship of the proletariat by a "state of
the whole people" in the USSR. The first, and most thorough, Chinese
attack on this position was developed in the 14 June 1963 CCP letter,
sections 18 and 19 -- see Chrono #6: the latest was in the 21 November
1964 Red Flag editorial, paragraph 12 -- see Chrono #42.) Pravda empha-
sizes that this dispute really involves "fundamental questions of the
construction of socialism and Communism.' "Our party knows from its own
experiences, Pravda says, why the critics resort to such methods to in-
sist on the need to identify all leadership with dictatorship, even after
the exploiting classes are liquidated. "These are typical methods of
justifying voluntarism, arbitrariness, and unlawfulness, which are char-
acteristic of the ideology and practice of the personality cult."
December and continu : The Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League
of Communists (CP) in Belgrade brings guest delegations from some 30 pro-
Soviet parties.. In the part of his 30,000-word opening speech dealing
with Communist relations, Tito begins by noting that the "international
workers movement (IWM)," "gradually ridding itself of undemocratic methods
of achieving unity of action typical of the period of Stalin and the
Cominform," is "increasingly establishing independence of action in its
respective countries as a generally valid principle and precondition for
all unity and cooperation," which he terms a "historical reorientation."
NCN4 international service distributes a report of a meeting of
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Warning against "illusions" as to the possibility of overcoming con-
flict with the CCP leadership and its "pseusorevolutionary and sectarian
positions" by "compromise and artificial reconciliation," Tito says it
would be wrong not to counter a Chinese slener. He draws a distinction
between the "legitimate rights" of China an& the "Justified aspirations of
the Chinese people" on the one hand and the "great-power objectives and
hegemonic methods" of the leadership, which I desires "to impose power poli-
tics on the world with the aim of ultimately assuming a decisive role in
the M and in the world."
"If we analyze CCP actions over the past years, we must reach
the conclusion that it has deliberately and purposefully striven to
transfer the center of the IWM to China and to achieve a dominant
influence on world politics, regardless 'of the means it may have to
use to attain this end. China's internal ce onomic and political
difficulties have merely increased. th eed to direct the main atten-
tion of Chinese public opinion to foreigri events and to tighten the
internal system of control as much as possible in the face of "danger
from outside. "
"...The fact that ideological disagreement, which is part of
this conflict, is nevertheless only a screed for the real Chinese
aims is best borne out by the fact that, notwithstanding the con-
tinual invoking of respect for the principles of M-L, the CCP lead-
ership is prepared, in disregard for all principles and iundogmati-
cally,' to resort to any step that accords with its needs and am-
bitions. (It) ... has gone so far as to offer to set up a 'third
force' together with some capitalist countries, to provoke frontier
conflicts, and to voice territorial pretensions of vast proportions....
... Evidently overestimation their role in the world, the
Chinese leaders e x p e c t e d ... to influence the Soviet government
7 =party to ge the whole of its internal and foreign policy and
revert to the Stalinist period....
....Although in the last few years Comrade Khrushchev did have
certain failures and made mistakes, ... he played a great role in
deStalirization e,nd in promotin, freedom of expression, and also
had great merits in safe uardi world eace.... I feel I must em-
phasize on this occasion that he eserves much credit for normalizing
and =roving relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Of
coursee,'he was not alone in this respect, but was supported by the
CPSU CC, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and by the Soviet
Government. Nor do the leadership and the people of the Soviet Union
deny his merits in this respect.
Brief Soviet coverage of the speech deleted Tito's criticism of the
CCP as, well as his praise of Khrushchev.
6 (Chronology.)
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857. THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CONGO
25X1C10b
SITUATION: Fear, hatred, ignorance, deliberate distortion and po-
litical self-seeking all contribute to the woefully inaccurate picture
many countries now receive of the insurgency in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The true nature of the rebellion, the root causes of con-
flict, the roles of the USA and Belgium and of the foreign soldiers
fighting with the Congolese Army have been ignored or twisted to further
the propaganda goals and to cover the embarrassment and chagrin of vari-
ous African countries. The same distorted versions are also being used
as weapons in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and as fuel for ideological fires
of international communism.
Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Ghana, motivated by hatred
of Tshombe and by their own pan-African ambitions, describe the Congo
rebellion as a patriotic war against a colonialist puppet. So saying,
they provide arms and ammunition to the "revolutionaries" of the Congo
National Liberation committee (CNL). East African countries, emotion-
ally sensitive to "liberation" issues and frequently ignorant of facts
of the rebellion, give aid and comfort to the rebels by their insistance
on a political solution which would elevate the rebel movement to equal
status with the legitimate central government of the Congo for a negoti-
ated settlement of the rebellion. Communist-influenced governments of
Congo (Brazzaville), Sudan and Burundi are sheltering rebels and admit-
ting rebel supply and training missions which prolong and aggravate what
is essentially an African tribal war. The OAU Secretariat under leader-
ship of the Guinean extremist Diallo Telli propagandizes in favor of the
rebels, in the name of the 0AU but without consent of the organization's
members. On the other hand, certain African governments (Liberia, Tunis
among them) which recognize the legality of Tshombe government actions
hesitate to speak out against what they believe to be the African con-
sensus dominated by the vociferous voices of extremist leaders and
ruling cliques.
The shifting complexities of the Congo scene lend themselves admir-
ably to international propaganda exploitation which succeeds in direct
ratio to world wide ignorance of the facts. Khartoum, for instance,
provided a 3 December press conference for Gaston Soumialot, Defense
Minister of the self-styled "Congolese Revolutionary Government."
Soumialot produced a prodigious number of falsehoods and charges against
everything Western and the International Red Cross. In addition to false
propaganda from African and Communist states, Chinese financial and mate-
rial support to the rebels is a proven fact. The Soviets, whose diplo-
matic missions were twice banished from the Congo for subversive activities,
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TIMIKETOW (857 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 199 CIA-RDP78-03061 A000300020004-4
are reportedly offering to supply arms to the rebels, to be delivered by
Algeria and the UAR through Sudan. Both Algeria and the USSR have threat-
ened to send "volunteers" to fight with the rebels (the former may actu-
ally be doing so now). An OAU meeting tentatively scheduled for 18 Decem-
ber and a UN Security Council meeting beginning December 9th will provide
additional international settings for biased reporting and propaganda
harmful to Congo stability.
References:
See Congo Government's White Paper on the rebellion, continuing Press
Comment coverage and Biweekly Propaganda Guidance #809;'on China in Africa. 25X1 C1 Ob
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(857.)
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858.
MILITARIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMY
25X1C10b
SITUATION- Throughout 196+ the Chinese Communist Party has carried
out a major propaganda campaign to infuse a new militancy into industrial
and agricultural work. The crux of the campaign is the claim that there
is a one-to-one parity between military methods and production tasks.
The Chicom leaders have always regimented social life but Chinese
society is now moving toward complete militarization. This new effort
extends to industry and agriculture a system of dual leadership that has
been used in the People's Liberation Array (PLA) throughout its existence.
Political commissars serve alongside military commanders at all levels
of the army to insure political loyalty and ideological purity. Peking
has now established a PLA-type political commissar system in China's
economy. On 31 larch 1964 the Party Central Committee magazine Red F?1ag
declared that such a system must be used'to fully command the economy
and that "all economic, industrial, agricultural and commercial depart-
ments must establish and strengthen political work by emulating the PLA."
Thus the nation's industrial. organizations have now joined the chil-
dren, the women, the trade unions, the government bureaucrats, the scien-
tists, and the writers and artists as members (without voting rights or
or even the right to self-expression) of'a vast militarized apparatus
whose purpose is to translate the policies (whatever they may be) of a
small group of Chicom leaders into effective action. (See unclassified
attachment and excerpts of Red F?laZ article.) 25X1 C10b
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Si 'l'r (858 Cont.)
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860 WH,a. THE ORDOQUI OUSTER:
CLUE TO A POWER STRUGGLE IN CUBA 25X1 Cl Ob
SITUATION:, Late in the afternoon of 18 November 1961, Radio Havana
announced that Joaquin Ordoqui Mesa had been relieved of his duties as
Vice-Minister for Logistics in the Ministry of Armed Forces Ministerio
de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias ?- MINFAR) and ousted from his
position on the national directorate of the United Party of Socialist
Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialists - PURS), the uni-
fied Cuban Communist Partyi combining old-guard Communists and Castroites.
The announcement rerxt ox to My that the action, taken unanimously by the
party leaders, was motivated by certain aspects of his political conduct
from 1957 to the present and that these would be the object of a complete
investigation. Subsequent developments indicate that he was also placed
under arrest.
This announcement not only recalls the important role Ordoqui played
in the Marcos Rodriguez case, which dates back precisely to 1957, but comes
in the wake of a spate of rumors that suggest the existence of a real strug-
gle for power within the government of Cuba,nest,.particularly between the
old guard Communists and the former members of the 26 of July Movement.
Ordoqui first came into the limelight, and into Castro's public dis-
favor, last March, during the trial of Marcos Rodriguez Alfonso. For
more complete background on this clause celebre, see BPG #139, 20 April
1961, Item #775: "Cuba: What's behind the Rodriguez Trial?", and attach-
ments in English and Spanish.] Rodriguez was convicted of having betrayed
to Batista's police four youths who had participated in an attack on the
presidential palace on 1 March 1957. According to his own confession, he
arranged a personal interview with a police officer on 20 April 1957 and
told him where the fugitives could be found. That same day they were
gunned down in their hideaway in an apartment at No. 7 Humboldt Street.
Rodriguez took asylum in the Brazilian Embassy and was soon able to leave
Cuba, fleeing from the wrath of the youth of the Castro underground rather
than from Batista's police. In Mexico, he was befriended by Ordoqui and
his wife, Edith Garcia Buchaca, both members of the Central Committee of
the Cuban Communist Party, then called the Partido Socialists Popular
(PSP). The trial and retrial':proceedings brought out facts indicating
that Rodriguez was a regular Informer for,:the Batista police and was prob-
ably'aatitg.-underr)d scipline of the PSP. ;-Although Ordoqui was absent from
Cuba at the time of the betrayal of the "martyrs of Humboldt 7," he did
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(86a Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1991 kfl TQA-RDP78-03061 A000300020004-4
later intercede in favor of Rodriguez, asking President Osvaldo Dorticos
Torrado for a reprieve of the sentence of death in the first trial. For
this he was severely rebuked by Fidel Castro during the retrial, which
ended 30 March 1964. Rodriguez was again found guilty, the original sen-
tence was upheld, and he was executed on 18 April 1964.
Joaquin Ordoqui has a long career as a militant Communist. Born in
1901, he joined the party in 1926. In 1931 he spent eight months in the
USSR. In 1933, he participated, with Sargent Fulgencio Batista, in the
overthrow of dictator Gerardo Machado. Implicated in the machine-gun mas-
sacre of several members of the ABC party, he confessed and went into exile
in 1934, traveling to the U.S. and the USSR, Mexico, and Spain, where he
participated in the Civil War. After the Communist Party had been legalized
by Batista, he returned to Cuba and was elected to three successive four-
year terms in the House of Representatives: 1940, 1944, 1948. In 1953,
following the attack on the Moncada Barracks, he went into exile again.
Shortly after Batista's flight, 1 January 1959, he returned to Cuba and
has been prominent in party and government activities ever since. He re-
vived publication of Hoy, official Communist daily, was given the rank of
major -- the highest rank allowed in Communist Cuba -- in the Militia, and
appointed Deputy Minister for Logistics in the Defense Ministry (MINFAR)
in 1963.
On the personal side, Ordoqui has been since 1953 the common-law
husband of Edith Garcia Buchaca, former wife of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
one of the top leaders of the old PSP and several notches above Ordoqui
in the Communist hierarchy. Speculation is that Rodriguez has never for-
given Ordoqui for seducing his wife, having a child by her the same year,
and then converting the affair into a permanent union. Following the
Rodriguez trial, Garcia Buchaca was removed from her post as secretary of
the Cuban National Cultural Society.
In Communist countries, embarrassing events are seldom announced im-
mediately. There is good reason to believe that Ordoqui's ouster took
place a good week earlier and was accompanied by acts of violence that
have not become public knowledge. According to a rumor, confirmed by
several sources, Capt. Jorge Risquet Valdez, aide to Raul Castro, was
shot and killed in the Presidential Palace on or about 12 November, when
he attempted to arrest Ordoqui. The arrest had been ordered, according
to the same rumor, because Ordoqui and President Dorticos had called for
impeachment proceedings against'Prime Minister Fidel Castro before a full
session of the Council of Ministers. When Risquet moved to arrest Ordoqui,
Major Francisco Fernandez, also known as Pancho, or Panchon, chief of the
Palace Guard, tired at Risquet. When Fidel learned of the incident, he
went to Panchon and fired five shots at his head. According to another
rumor, a high-level argument ended in the announced "suicide" of one
Panchon, President Dorticos' chauffeur.
By the time Ordoqui's ouster was announced, rumors began to circulate
in Havana concerning other aspects of what can only be termed a serious
struggle for power within the ruling hierarchy, composed of an uneasy
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(860 Cont.)
 Approved For Release I 999/08 !A RDP78-03061 A000300020004-4
coalition of old Communists and new revolutionaries. A significant and
entirely new factor in this struggle is the suspicion, founded upon recent
developments, that Fidel Castro's eccentric behavior has tended to alienate
some of his former supporters. Behind the rumor, cited above, that Dorticos
had called for Castro's impeachment, are more credible reports: Soviet
leaders were pleased with Dorticos on his visit to Moscow and considered
him more level-headed than Castro. Despite being so damned with faint
praise, Dorticos gave the impression that he had more support from the
Soviets than did. Castro.
Although Castro holds the main levers of power in Cuba, Dorticos is
no ordinary figurehead president. Before, 1959, he was for a time secretary
to Juan Marinello, perhaps the most distinguished of the Communist old guard,
has always been active in Communist causes, though not always a militant
party member, and was hand-picked by Fidel Castro after the Cuban revolution
began to take its obvious leftward plunge. In spite of rumors of friction
between him and Fidel, he seems to be on good terms with Che Guevara and
Raul. The day Che Guevara returned from Moscow, where he had gone to cele-
brate the anniversary of the October Revolution, he was met at the airport
by both Raul and Dorticos. Since this happened to be the day after the an-
nouncement of Ordoqui's ouster, and since it is unusual for the President
to go to the airport to welcome a subordinate back, observers assume that
Dorticos had special reason to confer with Guevara before the latter reported
to Fidel.
At this writing, it is not known whether or not the suicide attempt
by Labor Minister Augusto Martinez Sanchez, announced 8 December, is con-,
nected with the Ordoqui case and the dissensions in the government.
Martinez does not fit quite in either faction: He has been a Communist
party member since 19144, but joined Castro in the Sierra Maestra in 1958.
Hence the confusion in the press, some dispatches saying he was a member
of the old guard and some saying he was not. 25X1 C 10 b
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~EI^A?Gi (86o Cont. )
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859 AF,FE,NE. The Afro-Asian (II Bandung) Conference 25X1 C10b
SITUATION: The Chicom--Indonesian backed II Afro-Asian Conference
(II Bandung) is. tentatively scheduled for 10 March 1965 in Algiers. Last
April, at the Djakarta preparatory meeting, the Chicoms and the Indonesians
abandoned their hope of holding II Bandung before the II Non-Aligned Nations
Conference. They apparently yielded to the African contention that there
were too many other meetings scheduled for last summer, and not sufficient
time to adequately prepare for an Afro-Asian meeting. A weightier considera-
tion was probably the need to resolve the issues of Soviet and, to a lesser
degree, Malaysian participation.
Whether II Bandung opens on schedule, if at all this spring, will in
large measure depend on how the protagonists deal with the problem of Soviet
participation and on Sino-Soviet relationships within the next few weeks.
Last April the Chicoms blocked immediate acceptance of India's proposal
that the Soviet Union be invited. The Soviet Union's subsequent campaign
for acceptance has been modified by its concurrent efforts to bring about
a reconciliation with the CPR and to improve its own image in Africa and
Asia. While Moscow is not likely to concede easily to Peking the opportu-
nity to dominate II Bandung, Peking will not want to relinquish the chance
to do so, particularly since a large percentage of the leaders attending
will probably be Africans representing newly independent nations and na-
tional fiber. tion movements who favor Peking's policies over those of
Moscow on questions relating to underdeveloped areas. The Soviet Union
and Communist China are competing for favor with these nations and groups,
hoping eventually to extend their areas of influence and brands of Com-
munism in Africa and Asia.
The preparatory meeting's choice of an African site for the conference
fits Chicom objectives in Africa:"'although co-sponsor Sukarno undoubtedly
regards it as a setback to his plans. However, since the first conference
was in Asia, both nations probably anticipated the African demand to host
the second conference, especially in view of 'the tremendous growth since
1955 in numbers of independent African states. The Organization for
African Unity (OAU) was asked to decide on a specific location in. Africa
and in July that body accepted Algeria's bid for the conference.
The Algerian offer stems from Prime Minister Ahmed Ben Bellags in-
terest in furthering Algerian designs on the African continent and in en-
hancing his own prestige as a "third world" leader. Last spring the
Algerians openly favored the II Non-Aligned Nations Conference over the
II Afro-Asian Conference although they did not oppose the latter. At the
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(859 Cont.)'
 Approved For Release 19991 -RDP78-03061A000300020004-4 ?~
Non Aligned Conference in October their position on national liberation
movements paralleled the militant Chicom-Indonesian line, having always
favored accelerating action in this area. On other issues, such as
peace and disarmament, the Algerians still are more attuned to the
Moscow line. With a foot in the camp of each of the two Communist an-
tagonists, the Algerians are open to pressure from both sides.
Algeria's current policy on handling the problem of Soviet partici-
pation seeks to appease both the Chicoms and the Soviets, favoring a
Foreign Ministers' decision on the issue at their meeting immediately
prior to the Conference. No matter what is decided then, it will be
rather late to call off the Conference. Chicoms and Indonesians support
the Algerian position, insisting that the preparatory committee be con-
cerned solely with administrative aspects of preparation for the confer-
ence. On the other hand, Soviet supporters, notably the Indians and
Guineans, argued at the ambassadorial level preparatory meetings held in
Algiers during October and November that this was the place to resolve
the problems of who should be invited. It can be presumed that Soviet
pressure on the Algerians will increase if a decision on their partici-
pation is held in abeyance too long. If forced to capitulate to Soviet
demands, Algeria can always plead financial difficulties especially
since everyone knows how much the Non-Aligned Conference cost the UAR.
Financial considerations could, indeed, result in an indefinite post-
ponement.
Soviet tactics since the Djakarta preparatory meeting have at times
seemed to belie a firm stand against a II Bandung that excluded them.
They have all along been faced with the precedent established in 1955,
when on the 'basis that it is not an Asian state, the Soviet Union was not
invited to: Bandung. Undeterred, in May, Moscow launched an open campaign
to get the Afro-Asians to invite them. They used the diplomatic venue;
even extended what amounted to economic aid bribes. But on l1. August
they appreared to reverse publicly their position. PRAVDA stated that
the Soviet Union "cannot allow the question of its invitation to be em-
barrassing for these (friendly states) or other Afro-Asian countries and
especially its use by anyone sowing discord among them and diverting their
attention from the big tasks put before the conference...." The state-
ment made it clear that "irrespective of participation in the planned con-
ference," the USSR would support it and the Afro-Asian cause wholeheartedly.
The Soviet's intent was undoubtedly to minimize the role of the Chicom ad-
versary while taking credit for keeping the Sino-Soviet dispute out of an
Afro-Asian gathering.
The ambiguity of the Soviet position has caused the Indians to ques-
tion whether they should continue to agitate for Soviet participation.
Shortly after Khrushchev's ouster they wondered if the Soviet Union might
not be more interested in appeasing Communist China than in attending II
Bandung. The period of actively seeking rapprochement with Communist
China during October/November had undoubtedly tempered the Soviet Union's
public pronouncements. However, since the Sino-Soviet dispute continues,
Moscow can be expected to work through third parties to gain admittance.
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(859 Cont.)
 "? Approved For Release 1999/08/ 78-03061A000300020004-4
For objectives, agenda, and participating countries (prospective
invitees), see unclassified attachment.
References
BPG #1j5, Item 74+8 of 24. Feb 1964
BPG #14o, Item 779 of 4 May 1964
BPG #144, Item 802 of 29 June 1964
25X1C10b
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25X1 C10c
21 December 1964
The Militarization of Chinese Society
In August 1958 the Chicom authorities launched a mass movement
called "Everyone A Soldier." The purpose of the movement was to enlist
all elements of the population in militia units as a )Z rmanent feature
of Chinese society. One province after another reported that all eligible
people had enrolled in the movement and within one year over 230 million
men and women were said to have been included in the movement. This
"Everyone A Soldier" campaign was an integral part of the Great Leap For-
ward and the formation of the People's Communes. Mao Tse-tung himself
said that the movement was "not a question of mobilizing manpower, but
of having the masses militarize and collectivize their lives." The New
China News Agency (NCNA , in discussing the communes and the militia
movement, called for "army-style organization" and pointed out that
"the habit of unified rising, eating, sleepirg, setting out to
work together and returning from work together was encouraged. This
greatly strengthened the collectivization of life and organizational
discipline, and nurtured a fighting style in production and work."
Commune members were organized and drilled on military lines, rifles
were carried to work and stacked beside the fields each day, families
were broken up and children sent to nurseries, and everyone ate their
meals in the barracks mess-halls. Production teams were actually formed
as a militia company and each commune was classified, according to its
size, as a militia battalion, regiment or division.
While this complete militarization of life for the entire populace
was particularly stressed during the Great Leap Forward, it was by no
means unique to that period. While the Great Leap Forward was finally
abandoned as a dismal failure, the militarization of Chinese life is con-
tinued and is characteristic of the way the Chicom leaders seek to solve
the problems facing the Chinese people.
Mao and his lieutenants lived most of their adult lives in guerrilla
or military situations in which a completely militarized, barracks-style
organization was essential to their existence and survival. When the
Chicoms took power in 1949, the Party, the government bureaucracy and the
Army were virtually one and the same thing. A small group of military
men around Mao constituted a far more powerful and comprehensive system
of interlocking directorates than was ever dreamed of even in the days of
unrestrained monopoly capitalism, and their common denominator was that
they had held high rank in the so-called People's Liberation Army (PLA).
Although the concentration of military personnel among the top leaders
has been watered down some in the past 15 years, even today not less than
one-half of the Central Committee members have held high military rank.
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These are not political commissars who were given honorary military
rank, but professional military men who have been given political and
ideological rank.
The Chicom leadership of course no longer operates under conditions
of guerrilla warfare, but their old, outdated concepts continue to impede
progress toward the solution of China's industrial and agricultural prob-
lems and a better life for the Chinese poeple.
Militarization of Industry: When the Party authorities outlined
plans for a new industrial upsurge in early 1964, they once again demon-
strated from the outset their essentially militaristic approach to the
problem. The February 1, 196+ People's Daily (the main newspaper of
Chinese CP) editorial "Learn from the Experience of the PIA in Political
and Ideological Work," discussed the industrialization program and called
on the entire nation to "learn from, study, and compare with" the achieve-
:ents of the Chicom Army in the political field. The Party Committee at
a factory in Shanghai, according to NCNA, pointed out that "in the PLA,
everyone carries out ideological tasks, while only a few cadres in our
plant do so." All industrial enterprises, government departments, trade
unions and agricultural cadres were told to call in PLA cadres for con-
sultation and demobilized army officers were given preferential assign-
ments in industrial enterprises where they were expected to install "the
fine tradition and working style of the PLA." When demobilized army
cadres are not available for such assignments, troops on active duty are
to be transferred to such activities.
Militarization in the Schools: In keeping with the usual pattern
of dictatorships and totalitarian governments, the Chicoms pay particular
attention to the early training of children and to preparing them to ac-
cept without question the militarization of their lives. The Peking news-
paper Kuang-wing Jih Pao (Enlightenment Daily) of July 11, 1964 carried a
long article denouncing "bourgeois" (as well as "revisionist" education
systems for "corrupting" children by "drugging them with ideas about
humanitarianism and pacificism.... They disseminate among children the
erroneous theory that 'peace is existence while war is death.' They cry
'all men must love one another,' 'don't let children know what war is,'
and 'it is a crime to talk about war to children.' They also propagandize
g Jih Pao concluded
children about the 'life of happiness....'" Kuan-min
that children imbued with such ideas become men who a e afraid of death,
difficulty, revolution and war..." and obviously not suited to the task
of defending Communism.
These are but a few examples of the extent to which all aspects of
Chinese life are militarized to serve the interests of the Chicom leaders.
The purpose of this militarization is to tighten the Party's control over
the people, to discipline them to react unquestioningly in whatever manner
the Party requires, and to guarantee the Chinese people's continued sub-
mission to personal sacrifices and low living standards.
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Fact Sheets 21 December 1964
ABUNDANT SIGNS OF POOR QUALITY
IN SOVIET RRAVY INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
Summary
The Soviet leadership often censures its heavy industry publicly
for failing to provide the Soviet economy with equipment that possesses
the degree of "longevity, durability, and trustworthiness" found in
similar goods produced in the West. There is mounting independent evi-
dence that the censure is richly deserved. In the Free World, respect
for Soviet technological achievements was heightened by the notable suc-
cesses of the Soviet space program, but it is clearly misplaced if it
covers the whole range of Soviet heavy industrial products. Moscow's
concern over the "quality" problem recently has resulted in a number of
conferences, campaigns, and managerial changes at the shop level, and more
of the same sort of thing seems to be in the offing. However, fundamental
improvements are unlikely under the present Soviet system, which continues
to reward volume of output before excellence of performance.
1. Evidence
For 3 weeks this past summer a Soviet economic delegation led by
the hard-boiled chief of the Soviet construction industry, I.T. Novikov,
crisscrossed the US visiting housing construction, irrigation networks,
factories, and powerplants. By his initial attitude, Novikov gave the
impression that he had come to boast of Communist achievements, but as
the tour progressed, the Soviet group increasingly expressed amazement
at the quality of the equipment and the construction that they observed
and openly admired the US worker's "tender care" for machinery. They
were especially interested in US construction of powerplant turbines and
admitted that there was considerable debating in the USSR over the fail-
ure of their turbines to hold up under long periods of operation.
Examples of deficiencies in Soviet heavy industry cover a wide
range of products, including some of those intended for the priority
sectors of the economy. Although there is little doubt that the USSR
is capable of producing machinery, in many cases comparable to the best
available in the Free World, the record is both uneven and inconsistent.
For example, at the recent international exhibition of construction and
roadbuilding machinery held in Moscow some Soviet equipment displayed
was quite impressive. During the last several years, however, Western
engineers have had numerous opportunities to watch Soviet construction
equipment at work, and the over-all assessment has been that it is gen-
erally less efficient", less durable, and more difficult to operate than
equipment produced by the West. In the United Arab Republic Soviet equip-
ment being used on the Aswan High Dam project was of inferior design and
quality and was unsuitable for the Egyptian climate. As a result, a very
large percentage was down for repairs.
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In Burma, bulldozers and scrapers unloaded for projects in the
Rangoon area became inoperable after a few weeks' use, and mechanical
problems were chronic with Soviet jeeps, trucks, generators, and load-
ing cranes. Similar occurrences have taken place at the Bhilai project
in India -- forklift trucks used early in the project needed major re-
pairs in less than 2 months.
In 1963 it was claimed that the blades of Soviet bulldozers in
Cuba break at the slightest strain and 3 out of 10 bulldozers fail in
the first 50 hours of operation.
The poorest performance of Soviet equipment has been in Turkey.
For example, excavators imported from the USSR pumped raw gasoline
through the engine exhaust, the welds of shovel booms broke on the first
day of operation, shovel teeth wore smooth after 70 to 80 hours of use
in earth excavation, and grader cutting blades wore out after 2?,000 hours
of work.
The situation is much the same with Soviet agricultural equipment.
80 of 120 Soviet tractors operating in Oriente Province broke down in less
than 2 months; the blocks broke and the tires wore out prematurely.
Soviet tractors in Iraq require a major overhaul after 400 to 500 hours
of operation compared with the expected operation time between overhaul
of Western-manufactured tractors of 2,000 hours. Moreover, Soviet com-
bines break down a number of times every season primarily because the
cutting bar is not strong enough.
Western experience with Soviet chemical equipment generally has
been within the USSR itself, for little is exported outside the Bloc.
Westerners generally have been unfavorably impressed with the level of
Soviet chemical processes but have indicated that many of the deficiencies
stem from a shortage of trained personnel and from the absence of preven-
tive maintenance. However, the Soviet authorities themselves have been
unusually candid about their chemical equipment industry in recent months,
and, judging from press reports, the difficulties are more comprehensive.
In March 1963, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta reported that production of ferti-
lizers was stalled at a major chemical combine in 1962 because equipment
supplied could not be used -- the welding had to be reprocessed, and
subassemblies did not fit. Early this year a Ukrainian report indicated
that last year 380 major units slated for priority chemical projects were
rejected in that republic as being unfit for use. In August the Soviet
national planning magazine admitted that the service life of some pumps
slated for use by the chemical industry is measured in hours and that
the valves and springs of some types of compressors must be replaced
nearly every week.
These deficiencies, moreover, are not confined to the civilian
economy. Although there has been considerable improvement in recent
years, the quality problem continues to trouble even the high-priority
program for military hardware. The situation with military aircraft may
be judged by Khrushchev's admission in early 196+ that turboprop engines
used in the IL-18 transports had only had an overhaul period of 500 hours,
pr; gitis /24 : CTA D f-~ i 1A'000300020004 that this
Approv?ea or Ikelease?1-99
2 (Cont.)
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condition had been rectified, but judging by remarks he made on 4 Sep-
tember, the improved engines are still not in production.
II. Background
Official Moscow has long decried the traditional fact that Soviet
industry has been better at rough cuts than at fine adjustments, but the
pinch in resources of the last few years has brought new interest to
this problem. Khrushchev, at the 22d Party Congress in 1961, labeled the
need for better quality machinery and instruments a "paramount economic
and political task." Then in April 1963, shortly after the Soviet leader-
ship took the decision to launch the costly new chemical program, he de-
voted part of a major speech to the question of improving reliability,
working life, and technological excellence of Soviet machinery. Late
last year a member of the Soviet State Committee for Coordination of
Scientific Research stated that "reliability" was now the most important
field of research in support of Soviet industry. Recently, to underscore
the importance of this emphasis, the Moscow Economic-Statistical Insti-
tute released the calculation that the Soviet economy loses 10 billion to
20 billion rubles* annually from spoilage and wastage in industrial pro-
duction because an adequate statistical system does not exist in the USSR
for monitoring quality of output.
Underlying the Soviet quality problem is the fundamental inability
of the economy to muster the required materials, technology, and scien-
tific know-how to satisfy the wide range of tasks set by Soviet policy-
makers. Apart from this condition, which is not likely to change, given
the expansive nature of Communist aspirations, the Soviet authorities
recognize that their systems of planning and incentive militate against
improvements.
In recent years, one of the chief Soviet advocates for better
quality of industrial output has been the aircraft designer O.K. Antonov.
He is unmistakably a person who is qualified to talk on the subject in
view of his own record as a successful production man. Antonov holds
that the primary motivation of any plant manager is the accomplishment
of the plan for gross output. If a plant produces an aircraft engine
with a useful life of 1,500 hours and if it is known that to expend 20
percent more labor will double the life of the engine, no economic
council or plant will do this on its own, for it would mean that output
* Ruble values are here given in new rubles. A nominal rate of exchange
based on the gold content of the respective currencies is 0.90 ruble to
US $1. This rate should not be interpreted as a precise ruble-dollar
relationship that will yield an equivalent dollar value for the ruble.
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4
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would fall a corresponding 20 percent or more. Antonov warns that the
substandard machine turned out in haste today to meet the plan serves
only to produce poor-quality goods in the years to come -- thus the pro-
blems accumulate.
Others tell much the same story. Recent national attention to
the question of quality control has been accompanied with numerous ex-
amples of the failure of factory managers to insist on even the most
elementary standards of excellence. As one Soviet authority has put it,
the factory is expected first and foremost to fulfill its output plan,
and, as a consequence, managers "put pressure" on inspectors to accept
defective products. The inspectors in turn have few grounds for resist-
ing such intimidation -- they generally have no special training for
their job and little practical experience. One official complained that
there was a general feeling among workers and officials alike that errors
and defects in machinery were a "law of nature" that could not be avoided.
Inspectors turn their backs as subassemblies pass from section to section
until, in the final assembly process, production goes to "wrack and ruin"
in a last-minute attempt to correct accumulated errors.
Finally, another point raised by the Soviet authorities themselves
is that the quality program suffers from the lack of standardization.
The Chairman of the National Committee,-?or Standards and Measures recently
complained in the press that in the automobile and tractor industry each
plant virtually goes its own way, creating its own designs and specifi-
cations for machines. This lack of standarization understandably has led
to a diversity of construction decisions and a multitude of "standard"
dimensions. The chairman blamed the situation on the fact that his com-
mittee was unable to work out standards in a timely fashion -- in most
instances taking 6 or more years to do so. Although an improvement would
not necessarily lead directly to any changes locally, it is equally un-
likely that over-all standards of quality can be raised without improve-
ment would not necessarily lead directly to any changes locally, it is
equally unlikely that over-all standards of quality can be raised with-
out improvement in the national organs that guide the program.
PT- That Is Being Done?
First, the top Soviet leadership is aware of the problem. Raising
the quality of industrial output is listed in directives for the next
Five Year Plan (1966-70) as a priority task. In August 1961+, Khrushchev
told a Czechoslovak factory audience that he clearly understood that it
is more economical to manufacture better machines., although it may mean
lowering total output.
Positive action thus far, however, has been through administrative
manipulations and exhortations. A series of lectures was given in Moscow
in the fall of 1963 on the themes of reliability and long life of machines,
the Leningrad Sovnarkhoz is setting up a system of laboratory tests on
service reliability, a conference on a statistical measurement of quality
was recently held in Moscow, and various plants throughout the country
have undertaken to increase the working life of their product. Publicity
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4 (Cont.)
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4
emanating from this campaign has been most revealing of the difficulties.
The Volga-Vyatskiy Sovnarkhoz has pledged to double the useful life of
truck engines produced in its jurisdiction to make them "comparable" to
foreign makes!
The "Saratov" system of quality control and "nondefective manufac-
ture" of machines introduced locally several years ago is receiving na-
tional acclaim -- Ekonomicheskaya gazeta recently devoted virtually an
entire issue to the subject. Under this system the prime goal in machine
building is quality rather than quantity, and the factory inspectors are
given the responsibility and power to check each manufacturing operation.
Quality requirements set up by the factory inspectors are said to be
binding on both workers and management. Defective articles, when dis-
covered, are to be returned immediately to the section that is responsible,
and workers with three infractions are subjectto dismissal. This system
has now been approved by the central authorities and is now being intro-
duced in more than 600 machine building plants in the RSFSR.
Finally, the problem of quality has been identified as one of the
important issues in the current Soviet discussion of liberalizing cen-
tral control of the economy.
V. Chances for Success
Although there is no reason to doubt that over time the Soviet
authorities can raise the quality of their industrial product, Msocow's
campaign almost certainly will not bring uniform results and, barring
fundamental alternations in the Soviet system, will not lead to wide-
spread improvement.
In spite of Soviet press publicity to the contrary, there is little
to support the view that activities such as the "Saratov" system are pro-
ducing any fundamental change in management attitudes. One Soviet of-
ficial expressed this fact informally with the statement: "Oh, sure,
quality on bottom, but quantity is still on top." There is evidence that
plants treat the payment of fines imposed on them for defective products
as a routine matter and as an expected part of the cost of operation.
The workers themselves have no stake in the new effort, and Moscow has
yet to work out a bonus system that laces primary emphasis on quality
of production, although several attempts have been made to do so.
Many Soviet industrial managers recognize the scope of the diffir
culties. At a recent industrial conference a regional economic official
pointed out that to increase the longevity and reliability of output
means additional expenses but that "planners have yet to work out any
system for allocating these funds." Furthermore, studies of cost and
economic effectiveness in connection with determining reliability and
durability are equally scarce. It is not so apparent, however, that the
top Soviet leadership, although quite vocal, really understands the com-
plexity or the problem. In a typical oversimplification, I#hrushchev re-
cently said that a Soviet aircraft engine plant managed to increase the
service life of~its product fivefold after "we [the Party) had a pleasant
A15.?et'' si%/O8~yi4-P-`i ~1'0$'04is
5
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December 17, 1964
The Truth About The Congo
Failure to understand Congo developments since the United Nations
peace keeping miscion departed in June 196+ has led to many false charges,
some of them furthered by elements who profit by the continuing agony in
this largest and richest of African countries. Charges most freg,zently
encountered are listed below; each is followed by a statement off'act.
"The Congolese rebels are fighting a war of national liberation."
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been independent since
gaining her freedom from Belgium in June 1960. Joseph Kasavubu is the
elected president of the Congo and recognized as chief of state by the
Organization of African Unity, the OAU. As President, he is obligated
to appoint a Prime Minister. Mr. Tshombe,appointed Prime Minister by the
President, is the head of government of the sovereign Congo and as such
is attempting to defend the government and its people against unlawful
insurgency which amounts to civil war.
The rebel leaders have labelled themselves the Committee for National
Liberation but they consist chiefly of disgruntled tribal groups led by
former opposition members of parliament. Instead of a revolutionary ef-
fort to establish a better order of society for the mass of Congolese
people, this is a rebellion against legitimate authority (begun against
the Adoula government); it is being carried on in the destructive and
purposeless fashion of tribal feuds which Africa is trying to leave be-
hind.
It is exactly because the rebels lack popular support that they need
outside assistance. The Communist Chinese see this tribal warfare as the
key to Communist control of Central Africa. Calling this a "peoples
war," they have for months financed, trained, advised and armed rebels
from their diplomatic posts in Brazzaville and Bujumbura.
"Congo Premier Tshombe should use Africans to protect his government
- not foreign troops."
When the UN troops departed in June 1961+, the OAU made no move to
assist the Congo although the unsettled insurgency problem and the need
for training the Congolese army were well known to all. In August, Premier
Tshombe appealed in vain to Nigeria, Ethiopia, Malagasy Republic, Liberia
and Senegal for troops. When all African assistance was refused he then
called for volunteers from other countries to augment his own forces.
President Nyerere of Tanganyika, Prime Ministers Kenyatta of Kenya
and Obote of Uganda requested and received help from the UK, whom they
trusted, in putting down the same type of threat to their own govern-
ments in January 1964. Had they not immediately done so they might be
faced today with precisely the same dangers as the government of the
(Cont.)
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Congo. The actions of these sovereign governments in protecting their
own security were well understood by the other African nations.
"African countries must fight Western neo-colonialism in the Congo."
If seeking and accepting foreign assistance is in itself to be con-
strued as evidence of "neo-colonialism," then the criterion must be ap-
plied equawly to all. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, noted on
December 15 during debate of the Congo matter: "there is hardly an
African state which has not requested and received military aid, in the
form of arms or training or both, from outside Africa. Certainly Al-
geria, for example, has received and is receiving massive foreign mil-
tnrya aid in both these categories." Algeria, increasingly -- but
probably unwittingly -- playing the role of Soviet cats-paw in Black
Africa, is one of the first to cry "imperialism" against western aid.
Interference in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign
nation of Africa was outlawed by all OAU members under Article III of
the OAU charter. Furthermore, the OAU Extraordinary Council of Foreign
Ministers passed a resolution on September 10, 196+ calling on all states
to avoid any action likely to worsen the situation in the Congo. Even
then Algeria, Ghana and the UAR were clandestinely assisting the rebels.
The Soviet Union, whose refusal to support the UN peace-keeping mis-
sion helped speed UN withdrawal, is now openly providing assistance
through its acolytes in order to regain influence lost through clumsy
subversion efforts and also to outdo the Communist Chinese who are making
a major effort to penetrate Africa through the Congo. .
This massive assistance is seldom described as interference -- even
though it is now being openly undertaken by enemies of the legal Congo
government -- because the invaders have cloaked their efforts as "anti-
imperialism" and "liberation." The ease with which they have thus
fooled responsible African governments may set a dangerous precedent
for similar action in other sub-Saharan African countries. At a minimum
it makes a mockery of the non-interference clauses of the OAU charter
and presages the radical states' refusal to be bound by other charter
provisions which hamper their own pursuit of power.
"The Central Government of the Congo and the rebels should have
agreed to a cease fire on appeal of the OAU commission under Prime
Minister Kenyatta."
Such a move would be tantamount to calling for the policemen to
refrain from chasing the murderer so that they might "negotiate" the
results of the crime. Would Kenyatta have agreed to a "ceasefire" in
order to negotiate with the Kenya rebels in early 196+? Would President
Diori agree to a "ceasefire" with the rebels in Niger? These legal
governments have an obligation to their people to put down rebellions
and maintain law and order in the country -- as Tshombe is doing today
in the Congo and Ben Bella in Algeria.
2 ( Cont. )
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"Belgium and the United States moved into the Congo only when ti+.e
lives of the whites were dangered.
The Joint paratroop operation was planned because of imminent danger
to US and Belgian hostages but some 20 nationalities.were also among the
nearly 2,000 they rescued from the rebels. No African country, even those
whose own nationals were among the victims of the vicious Congolese
tribal wa:--f'aoe,made a move to assist the government in putting down the
rebellion which had caused deaths of an estimated 10,000 Africans (source:
Congo government white paper).
On the contrary, Ghaana, UAR and Algeria who are anxious to weaken
the largest country of sub-S, gran Africa in order to strengthen their
own domination of the area, have increased material support to the rebels,
prolonging and increasing African slaughter of Africans. Neighboring
Congo (Brazzaville) and Sudan, both dominated by Soviet-trained person-
alities are providing training sites, refuge and transport Pointe for
Communist arms and ammunition.
"If the Belgians and USA had not sent in the paratroops, the hostages
would not have been 7-ft1led."
Rebel leader Christopher Gbenye--said in the 14+/15 November issue
of rebel newspaper Le Martyr (10 days before the paradrop):
"We have in our claws more than 300 Americans and more than
800 Belgians under house arrest and in secure locations. At the
least bombardment of our regions and of our revolutionary capital,
they will be sent to the great beyond, that is, they will be mas-
sacred.... We will dress ourselves in the skins of the Belgians and
Americans.... I also exhort all Congolese to hatred against the
Americans. Do not accord hospitality to the Belgians and American."
Dr. Paul Carlson, an American missionary had already been sentenced
to death on a false charge of being an army officer. Only Kenyatta's
personal appeal stayed the execution (but did not prevent his murder
later). Radio Stanleyville continuously called on Congolese people to
hate foreigners. Survivors testified they were frequently beaten and
threatened with death and that their rescue.came just in the nick of time.
"Rebel leaders claim that the rescue mission killed thousands of
Congolese.
Evidence that not all of the African countries are taken in by
such blatant falsehoods is the fact that only 18 out of 35 African coun-
tries signed the petition to the UN which charged Belgium and the US
with "intervention." (according to Nigerian Foreign Minister Jaya
Wachuku, speaking to UN Security Council on December 15.) The others
either knew the true facts or refused to be intimidated by the irrespon-
sible African Radicals.
3 (Cont.)
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020004-4
Eye witnesses rescued from the rebels in Stanleyville and Paulis
described the large scale rebel slaughter of Congolese, the extreme
cruelty of these killings and the bestial nature of the torture prac-
ticed on Congolese and hcstagco alike. They also described the deliberate
seeking out and killing of all educated Congolese and of those who held
provincial administrative posts -- the potential leadership of any de-
veloping country. (Killing of intellectuals in northern Angola is a
charge the Africans themselves have brought against Portugal.) The
use of fetished,, of drugs and tribal magic increased the savagery of the
rebel sim;a and j unease. Survivors' revelations have astounded and
horrified other African leaders who are trying to build dignity and self-
respect for the African. They are becoming increasingly concerned that
all Africa will be infected by this reversion to ancient savageries.
But rebel leaders (unquestionably with foreign advice) found a way
to continue to rid themselves of their enemies while erasing the image
of themselves as savages: blame the slauEghter of innocent Congolese on
"Europeans and mercenaries." If other Africans can be tricked so easily
into disregarding the evidence of the hundreds of survivors of all
nationalities, the rebels may subdue African protests and play into the
hands of those who profit from continuing chaos in the Congo.
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CONGO REPORT 21 December 196+
25X1C10b
African leaders, both in the Congo and elsewhere, are worried about
the damage done to the African image as a result of the barbaric and
senseless killing of thousands of civilians in the Stanleyville area.
One official of a neighboring African country said:
"We have worked for years to build our prestige at the United Nations.
We had first to destroy the myths of colonialism that we lived by black
magic and the law of the jungle. Now we are revealed as cannibals, brutes
who rip out and eat the hearts of our enemies, who burn people alive, sew
them in sacks and throw them into crocodile-infested rivers! What can our
United Nations colleagues think of us?"
More than U.N. prestige is involved, however. There are fears that
foreign technical assistance may be affected, because ta:ze experts, and the
teachers, so badly needed in developing Africa will hesitate to go to a
continent where they may face sudden and savage death. The Leopoldville
newspaper, Le Progres, pointed this out in an editorial referring to the
"loss of confidence" of countries which have sent "the best of their
people" to help the Congo.
The Leopoldville government, however, is not likely to tone down its
accusations against the rebels led by Christoph Gbenye and Gaotcfr
Soumialot. It is enraged by the open support given the diss!".ent_ by such
other African countries as Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Ghana, as
well as help rendered by Communist China through bases in neighboring
Brazzaville and Burundi.
Echoing the official view, L'Etoile du Congo, the largest circulation
newspaper in the capital, declared that these supporters of the Stanleyville
regime "share the acts of barbarism." They "are birds of a feather,"
L'Etoile said, all members of a "Pan-African Murder Incorporated."
The Tshombe government, under a continuin fire from these enemies
within the Organization for African Unity (OAU, was certain to react with
documented proofs of the wave of savagery let loose by Gbenye and his
lieutenants since last August.
Black Congolese were the chief targets of the abuse, although the out-
side world focused most attention in the plight of the whites held as
hostages at Stanleyville and other places, and on the dramatic rescue by
Belgian paratroops.
Officials here point out that the rebels killed 200 Congolese for
every white person: -- They say at least 10,000 Congolese were killed
in late November at the height of the blood-letting.
Any educated person was considered an "imperialist," a survivor of
VA ped" aPS 4a a 0 IA1ROWINN Of 1TA0003Q04) 2OW4Aue,
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anothermajor Leopoldville newspaper. He told of scores being killed
daily at Kindu, several weeks before Stanleyville was retaken. L'Etoile
du Congo wrote that "one of the characteristics of a rebellion was the
systematic massacre of the elite."
Officials here, continuing to stress the guilt shared by all who
supported this brutality, point out that the rebels justified their acts
under the banner of nationalism and anti-colonialism. They note, too, that
the rebels proudly referred to themselves as "Communists."
In Leopoldville, officials say this was mad, insane rebellion, not
truly revolution -- that Gbenye and his followers, hopped up by hemp and
marijuana, were bent on destroying everything in the Stanleyville area
that promised a better life for the people: the educated leadership, the
schools and churches, plantations, even water systems and communications
centers. They put a torch to everything that burned, and smashed machinery,
electric motors, pumps and teletypes.
"Under the banner of progress and world revolution," one Tshombe
supporter said, "they put this part of the Congo back in the 19th century.
It will take years to rebuild what they've destroyed."
While not all African leaders completely agree with Tshombe, most find
repugnant the brutality t aleashedby Gbenye and his supporters. They regret
no African solution could be found before Tshombe asked for foreign para-
troops, but recognize that African nations turned a deaf ear to Tshombe's
earlier pleas for help and that the OAU had the matter under consideration,
without getting anywhere, for some two months. Gbenye forced Tshombe to
act, it is generally believed, by his open and savage threats to hostages
on Stanleyville radio, and his refusal to heed the pleas of such world
leaders as U Thant and Pope Paul and from the International Red Cross.
The Congo exported to other lands in 1964 an estimated $360 million
worth of copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold and other products -- providing
the Leopoldville government nearly $1 million a day in export earnings.
With an unusual excess of exports over imports, the year-end balance sheet
is more impressive than any other country on the continent with the
exception of South Africa.
Copper, mined in Katanga Province, is the major export. It provides
half the foreign exchange earned over the 12 month period. Katanga is
also the world's largest known source of cobalt, which is a basic require-
ment for nuclear development.
The Congo covers a tremendous area -- some 900,000 square miles. This
is about the same as all of Western Europe, or equivalent to all of the
United States east of the Mississippi river.
There are only 15 million people living in this vast stretch of fertile
Ap Wb1ve&1r& .6?f9~'9'' ` &U'CFA- '- 099' 0 68610 04 ~
.hat many, pos si y many more.
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These are some of the factors which have made this former Belgian
colony a prime cold war target. The Russians tried to get a foot in right
after independence five years ago, by dealing with a secessionist regime
in Stanleyville. Moscow gave up, partly because of the logistic problem of
supplying its friends. Over the last year, the Communist Chinese have
had a crack at it. Officials here believe Peking will continue the effort,
even though the Chinese-backed forces suffered a major defeat in late
November when they were thrown out of Stanleyville.
Experts here believe Chinese policy planners in Peking have circled
the Congo on their global maps as Peking's prime target in Africa. The
Chinese want the Congo for three major reasons, they say, and will con-
tinue an all-out drive to install a pro-Peking government, to the fullest
extent possible within China's limited resources.
The three reasons are: (1) cobalt, (2) copper, and (3) lebensraum
(living room).
Of the three, cobalt may currently have top priority, because of
Peking's attempt to build up a psychological weapon of nuclear terror, a
drive climaxed a few months ago, after great sacrifice,by explosion of
China's first primitive nuclear device.
Communist China, reports agree, already has uranium in Sinkiang and
Szechwan provinces, so it has no urgent need of the uranium which is also
found in the Congo. Peking also has its own lead and nickel, also required
in nuclear construction. The experts say China is almost totally lacking
in cobalt, however, and is not getting any from the Soviet Union.
Cobalt can be used to build the "dirtiest" and deadliest of nuclear
bombs, when used as a casing around an explosive device. Its concentrates
also absorb slow neutron particles in a reactor and thus produce radio-
active cobalt-60. This is a powerful source of gamma ray', which can be
used to enrich uranium or manufacture plutonium.
Peking also lacks sufficient copper for its industrial development,
the experts say, but they believe that, for the Chinese point of view,
the need is not as pressing as for cobalt.
The vast amount of living space, coupled with the Congo's extremely
fertile soil, is the other major reason for China's tactics of subversion
and guerrilla war against the Congo. Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese
leaders have been extremely frank about China's need of living space for
its mounting millions -- a population which will reach a billion in
this generation.
The Congo has other riches, so vast that they continue to pour out
of a cornucopia of abundance despite the departure of the Belgian
colonialists and the harassment of rebel outbreaks in various areas. The
country continues to produce 85 percent of the world's industrial diamonds.
It ships out quantities of rubber, coffee, palm oil, mahogony and other
tropical woods.
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African experts say the Congo has mo:'e economic potential than
possibly any other area in Africa. And more, it has the economic
infrastructure in existence to permit a great expansion as soon as its
cold war troubles come to a halt.
The Congo has, for example, probably the most efficient transport
system in all of Africa. It has 300 airports capable of handling planes
up to the C-47 in size. It has thousands of miles of all-weather roads,
criss-crossing the country. It has good railroads, probably the best in
black Africa. It has some L+,800 miles of nzqigable waterways. It has
modern port facilities, capable of handling 10 ships at a time.
Despite the guerrilla warfare, the Congo's big plantations are produc-
ing at a record rate. Production would be much higher if smaller producers
were not disheartened by a sense of insecurity. A land which once exported
rice and cotton is now forced to import these items to fill local needs.
Given a period of economic and political stability, the Congo will
forge ahead, experts agree, and be an example for all Africa to emulate,
despite such inherent problems as 200 different tribal groups and the loss
of thousands of tribal leaders and literates as a result of rebel brutalities
and mass murder.
An election now scheduled for next February is expected to give Prime
Minister Moise Tshombe a political mandate to move ahead with his develop-
ment program. But observers agree the country also needs a period of
internal peace and stability to make the most of its tremendous potential.
Independent and non-western sources here have confirmed the wide-
spread atrocities committed by rebel forces in the Stanleyville area and
say that they killed at least 5,000 Congolese.
Lebanese, Asian and non-Congolese African refugees all told the same
dolorous story when they reached safety from Stanleyvil.le, and those who
heard them still remember them vividly. The stories all checked when
a methodical search was made for the real account of bloody November in
the Congo's guerrilla war.
Belgian paratroopers saved men, women and children of sixteen dif-
ferent countries when they snatched some 2,500 people from rebel territory
in late November. The Africans and other non-westerners among them told
their stories in detail.
As one Lebanese refugee put it, the rebels of Christopher Gbenye
killed anyone who could read or write or wore pants or a tie.
Fron strictly non-western sources, this account emerges:
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The killing began before Belgium gave any indication of moving para-
troops into the war-torn country. Africans, mostly black Congolese, were
first. Thousands were tortured and killed by the undisciplined, anti-
government bands. Many were gutted alive and their internal organs pulled
out and eaten on the spot. Hands, arms, ears, genital organs were cut off
living persons who had displeased the rebels in one way or another.
The Lebanese refugee, among others, estimated that the death toll over
the last several months was 200 black Congolese killed for each of the 50
Belgja.ns and Americans slain or missing at the time of the paratrooper
operation. This total of 10,000 Congolese dead is widely accepted here,
although many officials say the exact death toll among Africans may never
be known. The refugees insisted that the most conservative estimate would
be at least 5,000 Congolese dead.
Non-westerners living in Leopoldville -- more than a thousand miles
from Stanleyville--said that they were aware of the outlines of this grisly
story while it was being enacted. Many of the "mass meetings which con-
demned the Congolese leaders captured in S;;anleyville by the rebels were
broadcast by radio while they were underway, for one thing.
It was at such a meeting that Gbenye called for a verdict on the fate
of Paul Carlson, the American missionary, while discussions on his fate
were being conducted in Nairobi. The crowd chanted for death, and Gbenye
himself said Carison`s life would be spared temporarily.
The sources said, however, other rebel broadcasts reported repeatedly
that the prisoners would be killed. It was the threat of the tortures and
death being meted out to Africans that placed hundreds of white hostages
in double jeopardy and created great pressures for their rescue. The
Leopoldville government then requested foreign troops. The paratroop
operation was in response to this situation. The Belgians withdrew as
soon as the mission was completed.
In fact, this military operation was accomplished more quickly and
foreign troops removed faster than when the governments of Tanganyika,
Uganda and Kenya requested British troops to put down mutinies in their
armies several months ago. The British also withdrew promptly.
Priests and nuns serving missions in the guerrilla area reported that
a number of their students had joined up with the "simbas," as the rebel
forces called themselves. They participated in the indiscriminate raping
of nuns and other white women. Many of those religious and other whites
who escaped torture and death showed up in Leopoldville with scars of
indiscriminate beatings.
Earlier, the refugees said, the "simbas" established and maintained in
occupied cities a system for the organized raping of Congolese girls, some
of them as young as 12 years. In some instances, the girls were merely
snatched away from their families. In other cases, older women who were
sympathetic to the rebels were prevailed upon to go from house to house,
marking those with the most beautiful daughters. At night, armed "simbas"
Af3 'V' I e L$elg$9/D8124tPCI RDPY&NDB;$ADN34fl&20 0 ters.
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African refugees told of instances when, for some perverse reason,
armed rebels tried to force fathers to rape their own daughters.
Part of this was attributed by the refugees to senseless, wanton and
hysterical killing, set off by tribal animosities, the excitement of the
war and quantities of the dope, marijuana. The result was to set back the
Congo to the savagery that existed a century ago.
It was also a period for settling old scores. Congolese refugees
reported that Cbenye himself ordered the shooting of his father-in-law, a
former territorial administrator, and made no effort to hide the act.
Another rebel leader, Martin Kasongo, ordered the execution of his
father-in-law, Jean Hanus, onetime president of the provincial Assembly
in Stanleyville. The rebel commander, Nicolas Olenga, personally shot a
Congolese who, years before, had refused to hire him for a job needing
more qualifications, the refugees said, than the "general" then had.
The Lebanese refugee, who declined use of his name but who is widely-
experienced and well-traveled, noted another pattern. The murder of those
who appeared literate, he said, was extended into a more systematic purge
of most of the non-Communist Congolese in Stanleyvi.lle who held positions
of leadership or who might become future leaders.
He agreed with others, particularly Asian survivors of the massacre,
that the bulk of the "simbas" were wanton, tribal killers and not
"nationalists" in any sense but that the leaders apparently also were
implementing a prearranged plan to kill all future enemies. This was
done systematically in Communist China and has been a principal tactic
of the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. The informants noted this
parallel and said that it clearly showed the influence of the Chinese
Coxmuunists.
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REVOLT IN THE CONGO
(S'y)
Govt of Congo Leopoldville after the parachute operation published
a 40-page pamphlet "La Rebellion au Congo" (Revolt in the Congo) giving
the highlights of the efforts of Moise Tschombe and President Joseph
Kasavubu to prevent massacres of Europeans and Congolese by appealing
to rebel leader Gbenye and to the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Included are details of demarches, photos and figures on atrocities.
More complete account promised later as official white paper. Summary
highlights follows:
One of first acts of Tschombe as prime minister was to invite rebel
Cons. National de Liberation (CNL), operating in neighboring Brazzaville,
to participate in a government of unity. Only one, Andre Lubaya, ac-
cepted. Appointed Minister Health. CNL set unacceptable terms, among
them resignation President Kasavubu. Tschombe kept his promise and on
17 July freed 2,000 political prisoners, among them Antoine Gizenga.
Rebels operating out of sanctuary in Brazzaville had occupied
Stanleyville, plus large area of interior, and massacres began. Seek-
ing African solution to African problems, Kasavubu appealed to the OAU,
which met 5-10 Sept at Addis Ababa in extraordinary session. Tschombe's
proposal for series of bilateral military accords between Leopoldville
and other African nations to speed pacification of Congo rejected 18 to
17 by council of ministers of OAU. An ad hoc committee of representa-
tives of nine African nations was appointed and instructed to proceed
to Congo. Despite Leopoldville's encouragement, committee never came.
Pamphlet makes clear that most of the atrocities occurred in August,
long before the government appealed to Belgium and U.S. for aid and that
overwhelming majority of the victims were Congolese. Europeans, being
non-combattants and not parties to the dispute, thought they would be
safe if they remained. It was they who were kept as hostages. Pamphlet
details horrifying instances of torture, savagery, and even cannibalism.,
Pictures facsimile CNL newspaper 14 Nova"Le Martyr" in which Gbenye
declares: "We will make fetishes from the hearts of the Americans and
Belgians and will make clothes from their skins."
Most significant aspect of killing of Congolese is that it is
selective rather than mass. murder: In town after town, beginning in
late July, the rebels systematically murdered all native Africans who
occupied positions of importance as intellectuals, political leaders,
technicians, teachers, etc. The mayor of Stanleyville was dismembered
alive by cannibal rebels in the public square, all the leading municipal
functionaries were killed and three judges became victims of cannibalism.
In Boende 600 workers in the rubber plantations were killed in one day,
and 180 trained specialists, including 18 Malaysians brought to the
Congo to train the youth in rubber culture, were slaughtered. The
(Cont.)
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foremen and Congolese government employees were tied together, sprinkled
with gasoline, and burned alive.
The pamphlet includes texts of pertinent documents: the telegram
from rebel General Olenga ordering one of his garrison commanders to
exterminate all Belgians and Americans in case of bombardment; facsimile
of an unsigned letter in veiled language found among Gbenye&s effects
mentioning $10,500 received from (Communist) China. Letter from Tschome
to president of the International Red Cross requesting an observer be
sent to Stanleyville; pertinent portions of Geneva Convention of 19+9
concerning hostages, treatment of prisoners, wounded, etc. Photographs
include: small boys armed with pistols and machine gun; instruction
manual found on rebel on how to handle bazooka and rocket thrower.; eight
wooden cases marked "packages of TNT" in Russian; Chicom propaganda in
French; heavy and light machine guns marked with Chinese characters;
samples of .50 and .30 caliber ammo beside Chinese label.
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21 December 1964
Extract of Speech Regarding the Congo
by Mr. Doudou Thiam, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Senegal,United Nations General Assembly
December 8, 1964
In Asia, as in Africa, a colonizer withdrew so as to make room for new
masters, often unofficial ones, to be installed. Sometimes, the colonizer
himself has endeavoured to reopen the entire issue by a side approach. For
some years the word neo-colonialism has been used. Alas, it must be recog-
nized that the word has acquired a burning reality. However, we wish to
be objective and to analyse the situation. While the colonialists bear a
heavy responsibility, the peoples who were formally colonized are not
wholly exempt from all blame. Very often it is we ourselves who start the
cold war in our countries. Because of internal rivalries between men and
different political tendencies, we invite others to interfere in our
domestic affairs. Or, being in a state of conflict with a neighbour, we
appeal to a third country, often a great Power, to intervene in the
country. This leads our adversary to do likewise. We have created the
Organization for African Unity, but within it we allow tendencies to take
hold so that it becomes difficult to solve problems on an objective basis.
Yet we make decisions in terms of alliances, sympathies, rivalries, and
sometimes in terms of enmities. Frequently, there has been a wish to make
the organization play a role which does not belong to it, making cif it a
supranational organization as though, by adhering to the charter of the
Organization for African Unity, nations had abandoned their own sovereignty.
Let us not go too fast. For the time being, African unity is a tendency,
an aspiration; it is not yet an institutional reality. All these con-
tradictions paralyse us and give the world outside the impression that we
take action without having any principles or rules. The example of the
Congo is characteristic in this respect.
Since 1960, that unhappy country has been struggling against innumer-
able difficulties. It is the least successful example of decolonization
that one can think of. Of course, originally, the fault is that of the
Belgian colonizers who were less concerned with the training of men than
in exploiting the riches of the country. Undeniably, there was also the
pressure of financial groups which did not wish to withdraw from the Congo
and which went forward with the dislocation of the country. The Katanga
session had its origin there. But have we other Africans really facili-
tated the solution of the problem by coherent and concerted action? We do
not think so.
My delegation feels free to speak of the Congolese problem because we
have, from the beginning, condemned the Secession- of Kstanga"and have bent
troops to assist in halting it and to defend the territorial integrity
of the Congo. Last year, even though we understood the financial reasons
advanced in favour of the withdrawal of the United Nations troops from the
Congo, it was not without apprehension that we awaited that event.
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The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the activi-
ties of the Organization well confirms this apprehension. I quote from
his report:
"The United Nations military advisers agreed that the
Congolese army and police were still lacking the ability to
assume full responsibility for law and order in the country
and that therefore a case could be made for a need of military
assistance from outside beyond 1964."
In other words, if the United Nations withdrew, the Congolese army
would find it impossible to maintain public order and security in the
Congo and, according to the report,
"There would appear to be little basis for optimism about the
prospects for significant progress in the training and
modernization of the ANC by June 1964."
This is what we read in the report of the Secretary-General concern-
ing the Congo at the time when the United Nations troops were to be with-
drawn. Since then, Mr. Adoula has retired from the Government. Mr. Tshombe
has taken his place. It is not for us to assess the reasons and the con-
ditions for this change which has taken place within the domestic policy
of the Congo. Governments change every day in countries; sometimes
according to constitutional procedures, sometimes because of a coup d'htat.
These are domestic questions in which we should not interfere.
What is astonishing is that in Africa there has sometimes been a
systematic attempt to challenge the validity of the present Government
of the Congo. It is a dangerous precedent which we, the Senegalese, can-
not accept. If Mr. Tshombe has made mistakes, if he has acted in the
interest of the Congo, it is the Congolese people alone who must judge.
We, for our part, refrain from interference in the domestic affairs of the
Congo.
Senegal wishes to remain faithful to certain principles, whatever
happens. Any policy which is not based on respect for certain principles
is condemned to failure. However, in this matter of the Congo, it must
be said clearly, we fail to see what principles are at stake, although
one may sometimes guess what interests are sought. The recent American-
Belgian intervention in the Congo has given rise to impassioned and some-
times false indignation in Africa. Quite recently, some African Govern-
ments had requested the intervention of European Powers in order to crush
rebellions, so there was silence. We must be consistent with ourselves.
In any case, there cannot be two systems of weights and measures. I
believe that,instead of precipitating ourselves into the Security Council
chamber to stir up a question which is far from being unanimously agreed
among ourselves, we would do better, we Africans, to begin by examining
our own conscience. Have we done everything to help the people of the
Congo? We have often brought to the Congo our own internal quarrels; we
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have often helped, consciously or unconsciously, to establish anarchy
there. We approve or dondemn interventions, whether from the right or
from the left, from Washington or from Moscow.
We wish to speak as a truly non-aligned country; non-aligned with any
blocs, but also non-aligned within Africa. What binds the peoples of
Africa together is solidarity, sometimes the identity of a situation. But
solidarity does not mean subjection or submission. It postulates the
equality of all African States and mutual respect for their own sovereignty.
The Congolese problem is serious; but let us begin, we Africans, by for-
bidding ourselves to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo if we
wish to be the authoritative judges and critics of other interventions.
We believe that it would be useless to say any more about it, and we
hope that we have been fully understood. But should it be necessary to
return to this question, my delegation will do so.
Be that as it may, there are precedents which it is dangerous to
create in Africa, precedents that are all the more undesirable since the
decolonization process is not yet completed. Foreign interventions, even
when requested by ourselves, are often occasions for bringing into question
our independence and our sovereignty. But for these interventions to cease,
we ourselves must make an effort to solve our own internal troubles. We,
in Senegal, feel quite free to say this because, since our independence,
two very serious crises have shaken our country to the extent of bringing
about changes in our government. We have made no appeals to other countries
to settle our difficulties. We have settled them ourselves. There can be
no doubt that no one can challenge the right of a country in the exercise
of its sovereignty to appeal to a foreign Power to assist it in solving
its difficulties. But a country does so at its own risk. We cannot con-
demn a country for this; we can only regret it. This is what we have done
in the case of the Congo. But, in truth, the situation in the Congo is so
exceptional that we must examine it with indulgence, sometimes with
Inpility, because of our own shortcomings in this matter.
The Congolese problem calls for serious thinking. Tomorrow, in the
Portuguese colonies, we run the risk of finding ourselves in a similar
situation, especially if Portugal does not as of now take the necessary
measures to train the required technical cadres and the administrative and
political staff to take responsibility after Portugal has left.
For a long time, we have been calling on the United Nations to assume
its responsibilities. Instead of battling about the impossible appli-
cation -- not wholly desirable -- of Article 19, we would do better to
stress the direct responsibility of Portugal and South Africa, and all
those who endeavour to implant neo-colonialism, so that they may realize
that the establishment of a new international order is beyond recall and
that they may abandon an obsolete past. To deprive the Soviet Union of
its right to vote would be to create a disequillibrium fatal to the United
Nations and, finally, to peace. We believe that the application of
Article 19 is not desirable and would be inopportune. The United Nations
cannot live with the United States alone, nor with the Soviet Union alone.
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in the interests of peace. Our duty, we who belong to the "third world,"
is to advise, to conciliate, to help in finding an acceptable compromise.
We believe further that once the compromise has been found in the present
situation, we must not rest on our laurels. We must attack the basic
problem, which is to find conditions in which the United Nations can
undertake action in the interest of peace, on bases which would commit
all its Members.
Again, we wish to speak as representing a non-aligned country con-
sistent with itself. My delegation is all the happier that our country
is not engaged in any conflict, that it practices a policy of peace and
dialogue, a policy that will make it possible, without any obstacles, to
bring about the new world which all of us desire with all our hearts.
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25X1C10b
21 December 1964
II Afro-Asian Conference Pr_oposed
for Algiers in March 1965
Annotated excerpts from the official communique issued in April 1964 by
the ministerial preparatory meeting for the II Afro-Asian Conference.
Objectives
In accordance with the spirit of the first Afro-Asian conference
in Bandung in 1955 and taking into consideration the significant increase
in the number of free states and countries in Asia and Africa since the
holding of that conference and their increasingly important role in inter-
national problems, the meeting decided that the objectives of the Second
Afro-Asian Conference would be as follows:
1--To promote and strengthen mutual understanding and friendship among
the nations and peoples of Asia and Africa and further to exchange ex-
periences and information for their common benefit.
2--To attain common understanding of the basic problems arising out of
the revolutionary changes which have been taking place in all fields
in the lives of the peoples in Asia and Africa in their struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, for the achievement of
full and complete national independence.
3--To search for appropriate methods to insure continuous and close
cooperation among Afro-Asian countries for the development of Afro-Asian
solidarity on the basis of ec.uality, mutual respect for national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and noninterference in each
other's internal affairs.
4--To make policies for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for
the renunciation of threats or use of force in international relations.
5--To revive the spiritual heritage of the Asian add African peoples
and to exploit fully their natural resources so as to utilize them for
their moral and material advancement and the development of their
national identities on the basis of political sovereignty, economic self-
reliance, and cultural self-assertion.
6--To formulate guiding principles and to devise practical measures
which will: A) further inspire the peoples of Asia and Africa in their
continuing struggle against all forms of colonialism, racial discrimination,
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and foreign economic exploitation; B) secure the restoration of their
lawful rights of domicile to populations evicted from their ancestral
homes as a result of imperialist and colonialist designs and also in
violation of human rights; C) insure complete emanciapation of countries
which are still under foreign domination, thereby enabling Asian and
African countries to play their legitimate role in this changing world
in a constructive and progressive manner toward justice, prosperity,
and peace among nations, based on respect for basic human rights and
international law.
7--To strengthen economic, social, and cultural cooperation among Asian
and African countries as a means of consolidating and strengthening
their independence and raising the standards of living of their peoples.
Agenda
In accordance with the objectives referred to above, it was agreed
to adopt the following provisional agenda for the Second Afro-Asian
Conference:
1--General review of the international situation in the light of the
first Afro-Asian conference and an appraisal of Panchshila of Bandung.
2--Decolonization and the struggle against imperialism, colonialism,
and neo-colonialism. 5f the conference is held, the Chicoms, Indonesians
and their supporters, particularly certain African states and libera-
tion movements, will seek to focus on this item which, significantly,
is high on the agenda
3--Human rights: A) racial discrimination and apartheid; B) genocide.
/South Africa will probably be the foremost target)
4--World peace and disarmament: A) strict international control; B)
prohibition of all types of nuclear and thermonuclear tests; C) non-
dissemination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons; D) creation of
nuclear free zones; E) co lete prohibition and thorough destruction
of all nuclear CThe Chicoms could experience some difficulty
in reconciling their activities in this area with the established Afro-
Asian posture on nuclear proliferation, especially since their arch
Asian opponent, India, has renounced any possibility that it will join
the nuclear race)
5--The peaceful settlement of international disputes and the renuncia-
tion of threats or use of force in international relations: A) basic
principles for the settlement of Afro-Asian disputes. LThe Sino-Indian
border dispute and the Indonesian- Malaysian confrontation should be
the major considerations in this category
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6--The strengthening of the United Nations: A) review of the U.N.
Charter; B) observance of the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter;
C) implementation of U.N. resolutions by its members.
7--Economic development and cooperation: A) review of the results of
the U.N. conference on trade and development, particularly those con-
cerning the position of Afro-Asian countries vis-a-vis the industrialized
countries; B) guiding principles for cooperation among Afro-Asian coun-
tries toward economic emancipation.
8--Cultural cooperation.
9--Peaceful coexistence: A) guiding principles of peaceful coexistence.
10--The desirability of the establishment of a permanent secretariat to
facilitate effective cooperation among Afro-Asian nations.
Composition
It was decided that the following countries be invited to the
Second Afro-Asian Conference:
1--All the 29 countries in Asia and Africa which participated in the
Bandung Conference.
2--Countries in Africa which are members of the Organization of African
Unity. he inclusion of this bloc of more than thirty African nations
means that Africans will outnumber Asians suggesting that African interests
may dominate
3--Countries in Asia and Africa which will become independent.between
now and the convening of the Second Afro-Asian Conferencg.All these
are African
1+--The following: Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Cyprus, Kuwait,
West Samoa, the Provisional Government of Angola.
Representatives of all national movements from non-selfgoverning terri-
tories recognized by the Organization of African Unity in Africa and from
Asia which have not yet attained independence may attend the conference
with the right to be heard and the host country is requested to pro-
vide facilities for their attendance. This provision also applies to
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, Aden, and Palestine.
Concerning the composition of the Second Afro-Asian Conference:
1--It was proposed that an invitation be extended to the Soviet Union.
Some delegations supported and others opposed the proposal to extend
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an invitation to the Soviet Union. A number of delegations stated that
they needed cnnsultation with their governments. After discussion no
consensus could be reached. Some delegations were of the view that the
matter may be placed before the heads of states and governments at the
Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration. Some other dele-
gations were against submitting this matter to the heads of states and
governments at the Second Afro-Asian Conference for their consideration.
Therefore, no agreement was reached.
2--It was also proposed that an invitation be extended to Malaysia.
In this case, it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reaching
an agreement on the invitation would be eliminated. In this case, an
invitation should be extended as soon as possible. Some countries that
recognized Malaysia stated their position that Malaysia is fully entitled
to an invitation and should be invited. ZT-he key obstacle, of course, is
the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation, which still rages)
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