BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000300020003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 15, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1C1Ob 25X1C1Ob
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Who Owes and Communists as Creditors
Who Pays and Debtors*
The Soviets' current
default of their UN
"financial obligations is a major
threat to stability of that organ-
ization. At the same time, the So-
viets are pressing for longer and
longer term credits from Western
nations.
On 28 Jan 65 Radio Moscow dis-
cussed the question, "Does the USSR
owe the United States any war debts"
in the following terms: "Edward
Stettinius, who in your country
headed lend-lease, said when a per-
son lends a hose to a neighbor whose
house is on fire he helps himself
because the fire threatens his home,
too. And Mr. Stettinius considered
it very strange to demand from your
neighbor payment for the use of the
hose. For all our help, Mr. Stet-
tinius continued, the Russians have
already paid in full in a way that
cannot be expressed in dollars - in
millions of fascist soldiers killed
- the sacrifice of millions of So-
viet sons and daughters, whose blood
cannot be evaluated in money."
To set the record straight, the
USG long ago wrote off the entire
amount of lend-lease aid to the So-
viet Union which was actually con-
sumed during the war -- military or
otherwise. Its demands concern ex-
clusively the value of goods which
were still available on VE-day --
i.e., which were not used up.
of Cyprus in defending the life of
that nation. This assistance did
not entail any conditions."
The first manifestation of the
"noble and selfless" assistance to
the (Greek) Cypriots was the January
arrival of military equipment, accom-
panied by numerous Soviet "techni-
cians." The Nicosia daily Patris re-
vealed on 29 January that within a
few days after arrival of the equip-
ment, the Soviets had informed the
Greek Cypriots that the first install-
ment of eighteen thousand pounds as
due on the debt of sixty-.a i_ -11t, tliou-
sand pounds, the cost of e 1u:i.iniient
furnished "nconditionally" by the
u
USSR.
Propaganda aside, the Communists
act as if only they deserve gifts and
credit - all others pay cash.
If at First Communists Expelled
You Don't from Congo
Succeed
Sept, 1960. Soviet
and Czechoslovak dip-
lomatic personnel are expelled from
Leopoldville for supporting anti-
government forces of Antoine Gizenga.
November,1963. All Soviet dip-
lomatic personnel (returned to Leo-
poldville after resumption of diplo-
matic relations in September 1962)
declared p.n.g. after discovery of
documentary evidence that they are
supporting armed rebellion against
central Congo government.
In like vein, Pravda stated as
follows on 3 Dec 61+: "The Soviet
Union has not only saved Cyprus from
enslavement and prevented the events
in the East Mediterranean from grow-
ing into a catastrophic war but also
rendered a noble and selfless assist-
ance to the Government of the Republic
January, 1965. Nikolai Khokhlov,
Izvestiya Leopoldville representative,
arrested for trying to set up a spy
ring in Congo.
February, 1965. Czechoslovakia
protests the arrest of Khokhlov.
To Cyp us, Greece and Turkey:
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(Briefly Noted)
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Signijicant Dates 1
MAR
1 Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Bandung (orig. sch'd 20 Feb).
2 First Congress of Third International, Comintern, Moscow, dedicated to
Communism and world revolution. 1919
5 Joseph Stalin dies. 1953 (Born 21 December 1879)
6 Soviet's Vyshinsky demands Rumania's Coalition Government be dissolved.
A Communist cabinet is placed in power. 1945 (20th anniversary)
8 International Women's Day. Originally (1910) Social Democratic cele-
bration furthering emancipation of women; appropriated since 1945 by
Communist women's front (WIDF).
12 Sun Yat-sen dies. 1925 (40th anniversary) (Born 12 Nov 1866)
12 Finland, after brief defensive war with USSR, yields Karelian Isthmus,
Viipuri, Hangoe Naval Base. 1940 (25th anniversary)
14 Karl Marx dies. 1883 (Born 5 May 1818)
15 Ten-nation Disarmament Conference opens, Geneva. Fifth anniversary. 1960
21 World Youth Week starts. Celebrated by Communist WFDY. Twentieth anni-
versary of World Youth Council, predecessor to WFDY.
25 Treaties creating European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom signed by
France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. 1957
28 Sixteen leaders of Poland's Home Army and Govt-in-exile, invited to
Soviet Occupation Hdqrs under safe conduct: arrested for "diversionary
activities" and sentenced to up to 10 years in prison. Twentieth anni-
versary. 1945
APR
1 II Afro-Asian Journalists Conf., Algiers (sponsor: Chicom-Indonesia
dominated AAJA) once postponed.
10 International Auschwitz Committee, General Session -- commemorating 20th
Anniversary of Camp Liberation, Auschwitz, Poland, 10-11 April 1945.
11 International Day of Liberation from Fascism ("Day of Remembrance") cele-
brated annually by International Fed. of Resistance Movements (FIR -
Communist).
13 II International Conf. for Teaching Resistance History, Prague, Czecho-
slovakia, 13-15 April.
NOTE: WORLD WAR II commemorative dates --
March 6, 12, 28; April 10, 11, 13.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
;46 Commentary 20 Jan-2 Feb 1965
Principal Developments:
1. With the Moscow 26-party preparatory meeting still nominally
scheduled for 1 March, a scant month from the end of this period, avail-
able evidence indicates intense Soviet political activity aimed to achieve
maximum attendance, -- while their truce: on polemics continues in the face
of considerable Chinese provocation. Soviet activities which observers
see as tied wholly or partially to this campaign include:
a. The Warsaw Pact meeting, 19-21 January. The communique was
unrevealing, and we have seen no conclusive clandestine reporting
(in fact, there has been no word of the Albanian exchange described
below). The departure of the Rumanian delegation immediately after
the formal session concluded, while others remained another day or
two, was seen as confirmation of reports that Gheorghiu-Dej had
agreed to come only if there would be no discussion of problems of
the IC4 and the world conference, -- and it is assumed that such
discussions did take place only after the Rumanians departed.
b. Discussions with British CP leaders in Moscow, 25-28 January.
Press reports opinion that the visitors came to try to induce the CPSU
to postpone the 1 March meeting but failed: no reliable information
available.
c. Visit of N. Korean Ambassador with Kosygin in Moscow, 26 Jan-
uary. Seen by some observers as part of the Soviet effort: we note
also that a N.K. Party delegation visited in Moscow 15 January, en
route home from Cuba.
d. Discussion with Iraqi Party leaders in Moscow, 27 January.
The joint communique stressed the need for a conference.
e. Visit of CPSU delegation to Mongolia, 27 January and contin-
uing. Reports point to concern on part of both about Chinese subver-
sion in border areas.
f. Meeting with a French CP delegation in Moscow on February 2,
including an FCP delegate to the 1 March meeting.
g. Visit of a Kosygin-led. Soviet delegation to N. Vir. tin m, i ;
stop in Peking en route, departing Moscow 4 February. Observers gen-
erally agreed that one of its major objectives is to build up the po-
sition and influence of the CPSTJ vis-a-vis the Chinese, and most see
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(Commentary Cont.)
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in the presence of Andropov an indication that the Soviets will try
to bring the N. Vietnamese Party to a more favorable attitude toward
their conference plans, perhaps even inducing them to attend the 1 March
meeting (on which they had not committed themselves) by assuring them
that it is not intended to excommunicate China.
2. Although Moscow did not officially re-state its commitment to the
1 March date, it did so indirectly by publishing, mid-way in the period, a
Canadian CP resolution which supported it specifically. Some clandestine
reports and published rumors have said that the meeting would be postponed
2 months or indefinitely, and a Yugoslav Radio Moscow correspondent indi-
cated that there had still been no final decision by the end of January.
3. The Chinese formally refrained from any polemics on their own
during the period, but they published and distributed a veritable flood
of polemical materials from other parties, both supporting and attacking
Chinese positions. Chinese poems ridiculing Khrushehev published on the
last day came very close to polemics.
4. On 1 February, the Albanians published 5 documents in an exchange
with the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, in connection with
the January Warsaw meeting. The documents implied that the Poles had uni-
laterally invited the Albanians to attend, and the Albanians replied with
a 7,000-word letter which they requested the Poles to distribute to partic-
ipants at the session. It was a scathing indictment of Soviet "extremely
hostile acts against Albania" since 1961, including charges that the USSR
"stole from Albania eight submarines... and Albanian ships which were
undergoing repairs in the Soviet port of Sevastopol"; that the 1961 Soviet
letter unilaterally destroying all relations with them was "signed by the
resent Soviet Premier Kosygin"; and that the Albanian Govt. has documents
proving that "a group of men, who were and still are at the head of a pow-
erful socialist state, a member of the Warsaw Pact, collaborated with the
Titoist renegades, the Greek monarcho-fascists, the U.S. 6th Fleet, and
their agents inside Albania to overthrow the Albanian people's regime by
violence and armed attack." It haughtily set its conditions -- including
immediate return of all stolen property and compensation for damages by
the USSR as well as renunciation of all arbitrary violations, and the im-
mediate cessation of Soviet weapons shipments to the Yugoslav Titoists
and Indian reactionaries -- for taking part in Pact meetings. The Warsaw
Pact reply takes cognizance of the letter and notes that "the matter of
Albania's further participation... depends on the decision of the Albanian
Govt." Tirana has the last word, denouncing the "contempt" shown in the
decision and "resolutely" standing by its demands and legitimate rights.
5. A new group of 11 Chinese scientists arrived for work at the
"Joint Institute for Nuclear Research" at Dubna, near Moscow.
6. Khrushchev was not among the CPSU elite who turned out for the
Moscow funeral of Frol Kozlov, whom he had apparently once chosen as his
heir apparent.
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Significance :
The new Soviet leaders have apparent4 launched a determined political
drive to regain the initiative and some of the old Soviet hegemony in the
Communist world, but there is as yet little evidence of the degree of suc-
cess they may be meeting. Likewise, although the 1 March date set for the
"old business" of the 26-party preparatory commission meeting is almost at
hand, the prospects are still unpredictable, with conflicting reports on
postponement, and one (Yugoslav) to the effect that a final decision has
not yet been madeo
The Kosygin mission to Hanoi apparently hopes (a) to trade increased
political and material support for a more "independent" (less anti-Soviet)
N. Vietnamese position in the conflict in world Communism, and (b) to im-
prove Soviet stature generally as a friend, and supporter of the national
liberation movement throughout the under-developed worlds The N. Viet-
namese undoubtedly genuinely welcome the Soviet initiative, not only be-
cause they need the materiel which the Soviets can supply but also as a
balance to their dependence on China, .-- but, given their position deep in
the Chinese shadow, they cannot move so far in the Soviet direction as to
endanger relations with Peking. They will certainly not attend the 1 March
meeting unless given iron-clad guarantees that it will take no anti-Chinese
action. 25X1 C1 Ob
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(Commentary)
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#46
20 January-2 February 1965
January 19-21: See Chrono #45 for Warsaw Pact meeting under way at close
of last period, with communique on 21st. Additional information: the
Rumanian delegation departed immediately on conclusion of the formal
meeting, while others stayed on another day or more, giving rise to Spec-
ulation that Gheorghiu-Dej was adhering to an original agreement to par-
ticipate in the Warsaw meeting only if problems of the 1CM and the Soviet
drive for attendance at the 1 March preparatory commission meeting would
not be discussed.
January 20-30: Chinese media continue to publicize materials from other
parties supporting or attacking COP positions in conflict with the CPSU,
as follows:
--20th, People's Daily devotes 12 pages (other papers less) to: 18 Decem-
ber speech by Japanese CP SecyGen Miyamoto (which reiterated JCP view
that Moscow preparatory meeting should not be held unless all attend --
Chrono 4); 31 October article from Danish CP organ Land og Folk;
1 December article from Finnish CP organ Kansan Uutiset; and the 28
December hat?, 20 December Pravda, 6 December Pravda, and December
Ko~t articles mentioned in Chrono #-5, 18 January-
--21st,, Chicom press publishes : the 6 January Albanian Zeri I Po it
editorial described in #45; a 27 October editorial from the organ of
the Pew vian CP Bancera Ro.ia," (actually the organ of the pro-Chinese
dissident groups which viciously denounces Khrushchev and "expresses
the hope that Khrushchev's revisionism will be liquidated without pity"
(NCNA); extracts of a Jan Szimek article,from No. 11, 1961-, of Czech
CP Journal Nova Mvsl; excerpts from 7 December speech by Bulgarian First
Secy Zhivkov; extracts from articles from two Hungarian party organs,
November Pte,,.et and December TT sadalmi Szemle; excerpts from 5 Decem-
ber speech by B. n First Secy Ulbricht; excerpts from 19 December
article inir CP weekly Rinascita; from 22 November Yves Moreau
article in Fre h CP weekly Lt Human' elt Dimanche; and from November
CPUSA monthly Political Affairs.
--28th, NCNA distributes text of article from November issue of "The
Australian Communist theoretical journal of the Australian CP --
Marxist-Leninist."
-- Oth, NCNA distributes text of 21 January Akahata editorial described
below.
January 21: Japanese CP daily Akahata 5,000-word editorial, "More on
the Question of an International Conference of CPs," blasts CPSU efforts
to convene 26-party preparatory meeting and international conference and
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reiterates the JCP position that the Soviet move must be stopped and
that "prior consultations should be held among all parties concerned,
while right now concrete agreement should be reached on the problem of
unfolding a common struggle against imperialism headed by the U.S.
Paris independent daily Figaro reports rumor from Warsaw that
Warsaw Pact meeting agreed to delay 1 March preparatory meeting two more
months as price for Rumanian participation.
Paris independent daily Le Monde runs APP Peking report that
series of consultations with Asian "fraternal parties" have begun in
Peking.
January 21-22: Belgrade daily Borba correspondent Baialski writes from
Moscow:
"The CPSU apparently does not intend to react publicly to
reports received here of Peking's increased anti-Soviet activity.
On the contrary, Soviet political workers repeat that the CPSU
will maintain its attitude in order not to thwart in any way
preparations for the meeting of the draft commission... scheduled
for 1 March. Any public reaction to the new Chinese attacks,
people here emphasize, would only worsen the climate in the ranks
of the Communist and workers movement and revive polemics, which
would certainly have an unfavorable effect on the atmosphere of
the Moscow draft commission session....
"The Warsaw meeting of party leaders, Moscow political cir-
cles assume, was also used for an'exchange of opinions on the
coming meeting of the 26-party draft commission. They expect
that after Warsaw many things will be clearer regarding the na-
ture of the 1 March Moscow conference."
On the 22nd, Belgrade Radio's Moscow correspondent Sundic also
reports that "Moscow political observers are more and more of the
opinion that the Warsaw gathering also-discussed the situation in the
Communist movement...."
January 22: The social-democratic Stockholm Tide en and the Swedish
CP organ Ny Dag carry identical texts of a long article (the first of
two) by veteran Swedish Communist Anton Julius Strand detailing his
disillusionment with the Party. Strand joined the Party at age 17 and
has been a paid functionary for 36 years, is still a member, and serves
as Secretary of the Swedish Peace Committee.
"The Swedish CP has not contributed one single new thought
to socialist theory and ideology. After 40 years of struggle,
there is nothing left of the Party except its name, and even this
should be changed, according to the thinking of some. Everything
we have struggled for -- cornerstones like the dictatorship of the
proletariat and proletarian internationalism -- has been thrown on
the rubbish heap."
(Chronology Cont.)
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As the main source of disillusionment among Party members, Strand
points to the failure of Communist theory to be matched by real it in
the countries where socialist society" has been built, the Soviet
Union,, China, and the peoples' democracies. "Bitter reality looked
different than the great and perfect ideal community we had read about
in socialist literature."
January 2,: Italian OP daily L'Unita carries article by Moscow cor-
respondent Pancaldi reporting that No. 1 of CPSU monthly Kommunist
prints long staff article on the discussion in the CPI about the prob-
lem of creating a single party of the Italian working class. It des-
cribes the much discussed Rinascita (Nov. 28) article by Giorgio
Amendola, including his observation that 50 years of ex'peerience have
demonstrated that neither the social-democratic solution as practiced
in Western Europe nor Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union has
achieved the goal of soci ist transformation of society or satisfied
the needs of the workers.
Januaz 25-28: A British CP top-level delegation of Chairman Palme
Dutt and W. Wainwright visits Moscow, meting with Brezhnev, Suslov
and Ponomarev for "frank and cordial" discussions of the problems of
"strengthening the unity of the ICM on`the basis of the principles of
M-L and the documents of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences," accord-
ing to Tass. Western press commented that the visit was intended
"apparently to try to talk the Kremlin out of the March 1 conference,
or at least to delay it," but that it failed.
January 27: A CPSU delegation headed by Presidium member and CC Secy
Steele in arrives in Ulan Bator, Mongolia "at the invitation of the
MPRP CC." Included are Biryukov, Head of the CPSU/CC Construction
Section, Mesyatsev, Chairman of the State Committee for Radio Broad-
casting and Television, and the First Secretaries of three local Party
committees in the Siberian territories near Mongolia. They are still
reported visiting factories and farms and attending meetings as the
period ended.
Pravda reports that Suslov and Ponomarev met in Moscow with Iraqi
CP leaders and issued a joint statement calling for unity in the ICM
and citing the need to prepare for a new conference of Communist and
workers parties.
Tass reports a meeting of Argentine and Chilean OP representatives
in Bue os Aires which voiced support for an international CP conference
in view of "the urgent need to discuss changes in the world and "to
strengthen the unity of the ICM."
East German Party daily Neues Deutschland reports briefly: "A
new group of Chinese staff members of the Joint Institute for Nuclear
Research in Dubna USSR) was welcomed by the Institute Director, N.
Bogolyubov. The Chinese specialists total 11 physicists and engineers."
3 (Chronology Cont.)
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January 28: Tass publicizes a resolution adopted "earlier this month"
by the Canadian CP National Committee supporting the proposal for hold-
ing a new international conference of Communist and workers parties and
also the proposal to convene on 1March this year a working committee
to prepare for such a conference.
January 31: Pravda announces that "a delegation of the Soviet Union
headed by member of the CPSU/CC Presidium and Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers Kosin will shortly leave for Hanoi at the in-
vitation of the Government of the DRV." Included are CC Secretary for
relations with other ruling parties Andropov, Minister of Civil Aviation
Loginov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Kizznetsov, Deputy Defense Min-
ister Chief Air Marshal Vershinin, and Deputy Chairman of the State
Committee for Foreign Economic Relations'Sidorovich. N. Vietnamese
coo mteent, including an authoritative Nhan' Dan editorial, em-y asize that
the visit "will certainly contribute actively to the consolidation and
promotion of the solidarity and friendship among the socialist coun-
tries," as well as its obvious impact on Soviet-N. Vietnam relations.
February 1: Moscow and Budapest release an announcement that a top-
level SU?delegation of Brezhnev and Pod.gorpy had visited Budapest
(secretly January 29-31, where they held discussions "in a cordial
and comradely atmosphere' with Kadar and other Politburo members "on
questions of interest to both sides." The Western press comments that
"it is widely assumed that the meeting dealt with the March 1 confer-
ence of the 26-member drafting commission of the ICM and notes that
the Hungarian party has been one of Moscow's staunchest supporters in
this matter.
In a dispatch from Moscow pegged to Kosygin's forthcoming trip
to N. Vietnam, Yugoslav Radio correspondent Sundic comments:
"Judging by all signs, apart from talks on international
problems in that part of the world.,' Premier Kosygin will also
discuss the state of affairs in the international workers move-
ment The CPSU is trying to insure that the planned meeting of
the g6-member drafting committee is attended by all members.
Although this is not likely,, CPSU efforts in this direction have
not weakened. Numerous consultations are in progress with those
parties which share the CPSU view and with those which oppose it
or show a certain amount of reserve. This was certainly the aim
of the Budapest meeting between Brezhnev and Kadar.... A CPSU
delegation spent a few days in Ulan Bator for the same purpose,
and. CPSU/CC First Secretary Bezhnev recently had talks in Moscow
with the DPRK Ambassador. He also received a delegation of the
British CP.
These contacts, including the recent Warsaw meeting, point
to new ante art consultation. The CPSU took this road to avoid
any complaints in connection with the convening or cancellation
of the drafting committee meeting., the latter having been sug-
gested by the CCP....
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Although it is presently imposdible to draw more definite
conclusions on the course of the talks thus far held and further
prospects."it is believed in Moscow'that the final decision on the
views of all
th
e
dxaft~n comttiittee meeting will be made o y when
eve been analyzed..'
le's Dai publishes 3 op ems by Chao Pu-chu, Vice
Pe
P
ki
e
o
ng
President of the Chinese Buddhist Association, ridiculing Khrushchev.
One describes K's fall as a change of labels and depicts him as accus-
ing the new leaders of "practicing my doctrine -- without me."
February 2: Top members of the new CPSUS leadership turn out for the
funeral of Fro). Kozlov, one-time heir apparent to Khrushchev's throne
before his stroke in the spring of 1963. Khrushchev is not present or
accounted for.
Suslov meets with two top French Co mists in Moscow, Politburo
member Raymond Guillot and Jean Canapa, Moscow correspondent of L'Humanite
and French delegate to the 1 March meeting-
Albanian Party organs Zeri I Popuilit and Bashkimi publish texts
of an exchange of documents concerned with the January meeting of the
Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee:
1. A 5 January Polish Govt note notifying the Albanian Govt of
plans to convene the WPPCC meeting and inviting them to take part.
2. A 1 January Albanian note taking cognizance of invitation
but saying that Alb. Govt is unable to reply positively "for reasons
known to the Polish Govt which are again stressed" in an attached
letter, which it requests the Poles to hand to the WPPCC plenary ses-
sion to read and study.
3. A 7,000-word Alb. letter attached to the above, addressed to
all participants. It begins stating Albania's righteous position and
honorable fulfillment of its obligations as a WP number and complains
that the other members permitted the $ovGovt headed by N. Khrushchev
to violate th Pact's fundamental provisions and tramp le upon Albania's
sovereig rights in "innumverable hostile actions," 'recalled" briefly
as follows:
(1) Soviet arbitrary and illegal de facto exclusion of Albania
from the Pact in 1961, plus boycotts and illegal decisions at irregular
meetings by other WP members.
(2) WP states permitted SovGovt to commit following "extremely
hostile acts" :
(A) SovGovt "arbitrarily tore up the bipartite amoments,"
"discontinued delivery of arms and other equipment, stole from
5 (Chronology Cont.)
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Albania eight submarines, which were the property of the Albanian
State, and Albanian ships which were undergoing repairs in the
Soviet port of Sevastopol," and "thereby weakened the defensive
strength of Albania and the socialist camp."
(B) "All relations ns were unila sally destroyed," credits cancelled,
and specialists withdrawn. The Albanians cite a 26 April 1961
letter signed by present Soviet Premier Kosygin" as serving notice
of the break.
(Cl Soviet leaders "called on the Albanian ople... to embark on
counter-revolution against the ALP and ."
(D) "To crown this..., the SovGovt for diabolical reasons brutally
broke off diplomatic relations with Albania in December 1961."
(E) "The Albaannian Govt accuses th p SovGovvtt of many overt and con-
cee?ed hostile acts.... Other WP members are aware of the above
facts. They are also aware that the SovGovt headed by Khrushchev
openly armed the Yugoslav Titoite group, which is a well-known
agency of American imperialism and has been and is continually
plotting to suppress Albania and turn it into a Yugoslav province.
They are also aware that the SovGovt openly dispatched plentiful
supplies to the Indian reactionaries, who attacked the CPR, a
socialist country, and imprisoned and tortured Indian Communists."
The letter adds that "the AlbGovt etppreciates the solicitude of
the Polish Govt, which undertook to inform it of the... meeting and
send it the invitation," but asserts that the current WP Chairman
should have consulted with the AlbGovt,beforehand and should have
sent the invitation himself. It then states four "legitimate demands"
which must be met before Albania will take part in WP meetings:
(1) "Recognition and condemnation of all arbitrary violations...
and of the illegal and hostile acts committed by the SovGovt...."
(2) "SovGovt immediate], return all military facilities, materiel,
~YYY.and ecLui t which are Albanian property, and that it repay losses
suffered by the Alb. economy... as a result of the unilateral cancel--
lation of credits, agreements, and various relations of an economic
nature." (it)... "must immediately and courageously redress the fatal
error of breaking off diplomatic relations," or it will indicate that
it is still hostile to Alb. and that the invitation was a "hoax."
"The AlbGovt demands... that the SovGovtte halt the su
of weapons to the Yugoslav Titoists, Indian reactionaries, and any
govt using these weapons for aggressive aims and to oppress its own
and other people."
(3) "The A1bGovt demands that the govts of certain WP members...
take necessary measures to normalize diplomatic relations with Albania."
6 (Chronology Cont.)
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(4) "The AlbGovt rightly desires to know the following:"
(a) What reasons led to violations? "Copies of minutes of meetings
at which illegal decisions against\were discussed and adopted
should be handed over...." Alb.
(b) "All minutes and decisions on various questions adopted during
that period.., should be sent...."
(c) "Copies of reports, discussions and decisions... by steering
organs...."
(d) "The AlbGovt wishes to know whether the Moscow treaty banning
tests of nuclear weapons... was concluded on the basis of a col-
lective decision of WP member states or whether it was the work
of a single member state to which the other states have adhered
separately.'
This is followed by a harangue on the "shameful capitulation" of
the treaty, and further denunciation of Soviet policies, including the
statement:
"The AlbGovt possesses documents and undeniable facts rovi
that a group of men, who were still are at the head of aower-
ful socialist state, a member of the WP, collaborated with the
Titoist renegades, the Greek Monarcho-fascists, the U.S. 6thFlee~,
and their agents inside Albania to overthrow the Albanian peop
regime by violence and armed attack.... Will one continue to
protect these men, and will their criminal actions remain unpun-
ished?"
The letter then sets forth its position on problems now facing
the pact, including the MLF and nuclear weapons for West Germany, an
immediate peace treaty with East Germany, and forthright denunciation
of the Moscow test ban treaty.
4. A two-sentence replyj from the?WPPCC taking cognizance of the
Albanian letter and saying. "In hese circumstances, the matter of
Albania's further participation in WP proceedings depends on the de-
cision of the Albanian Govt."
5. A two-sentence 29 January Alb. reply to the WPPCC: "The
contempt which you have shown in your unnumbered and undated decision
[i.e., para. 4 above]... imposes great responsibility on you. The
AlbGovt stands resolutely by its demands and legitimate rights based
on WP provisions."
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February 4: Kosygin delegation departs`on trip to Hanoi: it is
announced after departure that they will stop off for visit with CCP
representatives in Pekin en route. 7 porting Soviet announcement of
departure time from scow on the 3rd, Mimes correspondent Tanner
adds that "Western observers here have gained. the impression that the
Kremlin may be less firm than it was a 1'ew weeks ago in its determin-
ation to go through with a meeting of world Communist representatives
scheduled for March 1...."
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/241 78-03061 A0003MffO 151965
871. NO WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT TIIC COLD WAR 25X1 C10b
SITUATION: Current Soviet policy, which vigorously attempts to
project a peaceful image of itself, is considered harml ss by two oppos-
ing sides, namely: by the Chinese Communist Party which describes it as
"Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" an. derides it as inept revisionism
incapable of successfully pursuing revolutionary Communist goals; and by
wishful thinkers in free countries who accept Soviet statements at face
value and believe there is no further threat in a Communism which pro-
fesses peaceful coexistence -- ignoring the facts that CPSU-directed sub-
version continues on all fronts and that the Soviets have neither re
nounced nor ceased to advocate the use of force.
As shown in BPG No. 14+3 of 15 June 64 ("Not so Peacef Coexistence")9
"there is no detente in the cold war.... the limited East-West agreements
are hopeful signs but they do not yet touch the heart of the crucial issues
nor do they indicate any trend in Soviet foreign policy away from the goa.1
of Communist world domination.... In the long run, it is possible that
the Soviet policy of indirect aggression and subversion is more dangerous
than direct aggressions.... The Kremlin's continuing aggressive actions
against the free world and democratic institutions are real, no matter
how they are rationalized as necessary.... That these attacks continue
against the West in general and the U.$. in particular is a fact."
It is clear that the above assessment of "Khrushchevian" polic
written in mid-196, remains valid today despite the intervening upheaval
in CPSU leadership. The world-wide pattern of Soviet mischief-making
itemized in BPG No. 143 continues to menifest itself, to wit:
Anti-Western and anti-U.S. Propaganda. BPG No. 158, 1 Feb 65,
"Twentieth Anniversary of the End of WW II," forewarned of a massive Com-
munist campaign, using the pretext of an anniversary and featuring the
following propaganda themes.
a. Germany's war guilt and the alleged recrudescence of militarism
and Fascism in West Germany.
b. The Soviet Union's paramount role in WW IIj which it allegedly
won virtually single-handed.
c. The U.S.A.'s alleged postwar policy of remilitarizing West
Germany for aggressive purposes, including U.S. plans to make
nuclear weapons available to West Germany.
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Since the first of the year, not one day has passed that the above
allegations have not been hammered ad nauseam in Moscow press and radio,
echoed in descending volume by East Germany, Poland (Warsaw Pact meeting)
and the other satellites. Not only are these claims repeated to sicken-
ing excess of and by themselves, but they are somehow dragged into press
and radio "reporting" on virtually every conceivable subject. See un-
classified attachment.
Bloc Cold War Export Via Czechoslovakia. BPG No. 86I+, 18 Jan 1965,
"Czechoslovak Economic Reform Promised," documented the Communist exploi-
tation of once-respected Czechoslovakia for widespread export of Bloc sub-
versive penetration in developing areas of Africa, Latin America and Asia.
That Guidance and its unclassified attachment illustrate, inter alia, that
this pattern has prevailed unchanged before, during and since Khrushchev's
ouster.
Indochina. There has been no abatement in Moscow's daily propaganda
barrage and Moscow's active interference with U.S. efforts to assist Indo-
chinese countries to fend off brutal aggression from the north. The
Soviets threatened the US with dire consequences should the beleaguered
peoples be encouraged to defend themselves to the extent of pursuing the
enemy into their privileged sanctuary in the North. Less belligerent
sounding but nonetheless significant in the Soviet cold war are the fol-
lowing statements of positions:
Moscow Tass, 30 Dec 64. "A permanent representation of the National
Liberation Front of South Vietnam will be opened in Moscow early
next year. An understanding to this effect was achieved in the
course of the talks between the Soviet committee of Afro-Asian soli-
darity and a delegation of the National Front which visited Moscow."
Moscow Tass, 4 Jan 65. "The Soviet Government fully shares the con-
cern of the DRV over the present situation in Indochina that has
arisen as a result of the aggressive actions of the U.S. and its
interference in the affairs of the people of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia.... The Soviet Government demands that the U.S. discon-
tinue all interference in the affairs of South Vietnam, evacuate
troops and armaments from there, and allow the Vietnamese people
themselves to settle their internal affairs."
Cuba and Latin America. Although there are reports that Moscow has
had misgivings about the large financial burden of propping up its bridge-
head for the penetration of Latin America (Havana), there is no evidence
of any actual Soviet letup in Latin America. Moscow still supports
Castro's blustering and Castro's refusal to allow the Cuban inspection
which Khrushchev promised to Pres. Kennedy incident to their 1962 con-
frontation. The following typifies Moscow's recent pronouncements on
the subject:
Radio Moscow reporting of a Kremlin speech by Yu. V. Andropov on
29 Dec 64. "Together with all nations we declare: Hands off
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revolutionary Cuba! Having failed with their plans for throttling
the Cuban revolution economically and having failed with their
military provocations, the aggressive, militarist U.S. circles are
now trying to amalgamate against revolutionary Cuba a joint front
of the forces of reaction on the American continent and in the NATO
aggressive bloc. They are trying to justify their provocative ac-
tions against Cuba by alluding to the odious lie that Cuba is threat-
ening other Latin American countries and exporting its revolution."
Pravda, 14 Jan 65. "The upsurge of the national liberation movement
in Latin American countries has been to a great extent a result of
the activities of communist parties.... The Soviet people have re-
garded and still regard itsas its sacred duty to give support to the
peoples fighting for their independence. True to their international
duty the Soviet people have been and will remain on the side of the
Latin American patriots."
Africa. Although Soviet propaganda and subversion aimed at Africa
has not lessened perceptibly, it has been overshadowed in some areas by
the massive atrocities and political murders instigated by the Chicoms.
However, Moscow set a new record low for callous cynicism in its propa-
ganda treatment of the Belgian-American rescue operation in the Congo,
where hundreds of defenseless men, women, and children were narrowly
saved from the senseless savagery and indiscriminate butchery which had
broken out, there. While the entire civilized world was applauding this
humanitarian initiative, Radio Moscow stated as follows on 24 Nov 1964 _-
"The situation in the Congo: As we have already reported, a battalion
of Belgian paratroops, carried by American military aircraft, seized
Stanleyville airport this morning.... The Western powers8 open armed
intervention against the people of the Congo has become a fact. In
the face of this imperialist aggression, all the independent and truly
progressive forces of Africa cannot stand aside and reconcile them-
selves to acts of open "brigandage and armed interference in the inter-
nal affairs of other countries."
Moscow Tass, 2l, Nov 64. "The editorial note in todays Izvestiya says
the alarming news of the planned imperialist armed aggression against
the people of the Congo Leopoldville has been confirmed.... There is
no need to prove, the note says, that the plea of "rescuing" the white
.p6bulation in Stanleyville is utterly false."
With the propaganda line having been set by Moscow, these outrageous
falsehoods were echoed from satellite capitals all the,,way to Belgrade,
whose independent stance and reiterated neutrality have brought such hanr;.-
some dividends in U.S. aid.
Others. Another tactic was exposed when the Greek: C Srpric
the ranks of those who had learned the hard way the error of'counting on
the Communists. No sooner had Archbishop Makarios shifted virtually all,
his eggs to the basket of anticipated all-out Moscow backing for his
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demands, when he suddenly found himself holding an empty basket as Moscow
abruptly began courting Ankara and proclaiming the sacred rights of both
the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Nor was Moscow's double-
dealing offset by the sympathy-seeking tour of Africa by Dr. Lyssarides,
Makarios' cx?ypto-Communist advisor, who managed to stir up nothing but a
great deal of public apathy.
And in the UN, the USSR's cold war against the United States (as the
major Free World adversary) reached a new high over the issue of enforcing
Article 19. For years the Soviet Union had attempted to thwart UN efforts
to maintain the peace. Its refusal to pay its legal assessments for peace-
keeping missions brought the issue to a head and a large number of Member
States were intimidated into charging that the US was being bullish in in-
sisting that the principles of the UN Charter had to be upheld. Even Free
World media consistently fell prey to Soviet cold war techniques by treat-
ing the issue as though it were a battle with the United Nations itself.
When the death of Winston Churchill, Britain's most admired and re-
spected statesman, was bringing sympathetic expression from throughout the
civilized world, one of Moscow's first reactions was to comment publicly
that Sir Winston had coined the phrase "iron curtain" and had "master-
minded the cold war." 25X1 C1 Ob
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 Approved For Release 1999/08/2 P78-03061A0003 2.Ai 03 55
872. LENIN'S UNTREIIABILITATED COMRADES 25X1 C 10 b
SITUATION: Since 1956, the Soviet press has announced periodically
that certain persons have been cleared of accusations made against them
during the Stalin period, and that they are to be considered rehabilitated.
Usually, the persons in question perished in prison camps or were shot;
nevertheless, the admission that they were wrongly accused has given the
impression that the CPSU is (as the phrase goes in West Germany) "over-
coming its past," and is attempting to atone for Stalin's misdeeds. More-
over, posthumous rehabilitation has some tangible advantages for surviving
family members: confiscated property may be returned, even back pensions
paid, children admitted to higher education (from which they were barred)
or given better jobs, etc.
Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 and his 27 October 1961 speech at
the 22nd CPSU Congress described some of the crimes and miscarriages of
justice which occurred under Stalin. In both speeches, he related some
of the mysterious circumstances surrounding the murder of S.M. Kirov in
December 1934, both times stating that the case was under investigation;
apparently the investigation did not progress very far between 1956 and
1961. In the 1961 speech, Khrushchev also endorsed a proposal for some
mark of respect for the victims of Stalin, stating: "Perhaps a monument
should be erected in Moscow to the memory of the comrades who fell victim
to arbitrary rule." To date there has been no sign of such a memorial.
Khrushchev's zeal in exposing the crimes of Stalin seemed to arise much
more from a sporadic desire to discredit his rivals within the USSR and
within the Cormaunist movement than from a love of justice; still, he
seemed to hold out the prospect that justice might be done.
This prospect was almost certainly a delusion, as can be seen from
an examination of the lists of those who have and have not been rehabili-
tated. The victims of the purges who have been rehabilitated fall mainly
into two categories, the generals:
Marshal Tukhachevsky, Marshal Blyukher, Marshal Yegorov, Generals
Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, and the Chief of the Political
Department of the Red Army, J. Gamarnik,
and the party officials who had risen under Stalin in the late 1920's and
early 1930's:
G.K. Ordzhonikidze (Politburo member), I.E. Rudzutak and V.Y. Chubar
(candidate Politburo members), A.V. Kosarev (General Secretary of the
Komsomol), S.V. Kossior and V.P. Satonsky (Ukrainian CP leaders),
A.I. Ugarov and M.S. Chudov (alleged members of the "Leningrad Center"
of 1937), I.S. Unshlikt (Deputy Chief of the GPU), I.D. Kabakov
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(Oblast Secretary, Sverdlovsk), E.I. Kviring (Deputy Chairman of
Gosplan), V.I. Meshlauk (Deputy Chief of the Council of People's
Commissars), I.D. Orakelashvili (Secretary of the Transcaucasian
Party Committee), K.V. Ukhanov (Peoples' Commissar of the RSFSR),
M.L. Rukhimovich (Peoples' Commissar for Defense Industry), and
N.M. Goloded (leading official in Byelorussia).
These generals and officials were probably cleared through the initiative
of one-time comrades now in high. positions.
Two post-World War II victims who have been redeemed were A.A.
Kuznetsov and N.A. Vosnesensky, both of whom had been shot in connection
with the 19+9 "Leningrad Case." P.P, Postyshev, an old Bolshevik from
the Ukraine, is the only rehabilitated figure known to have protested
against the blood purges. Only three of those who have now been cleared
are known,to have opposed Stalin in the early 1920's. G.I. Lomov, V.A.
Antonov-Ovseenko, and A.S. Bubnov. Of 71 full members in the 193+ Cen-
tral Committee, 51 were liquidated in the purges and of these last, only
one third have now been cleared. Minor figures have been rehabilitated
and their families informed, but no public announcement is made in such
cases.
The known list of those who have not been cleared of guilt is not
only longer, but also contains much more important names. At the top are
Zinoviev and Bukharin (past Chairmen of the Comintern), Kamenev (first
Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets), Rykov (Chief
of the Government after Lenin), Tomsky (past Chairman of the Central Com-
mittee of Trade Unions), Radek (Secretary of the Comintern), and of course
Trotsky, who if he did not face trial was nevertheless executed. All these
men played leading roles in the Revolution and were associated with Lenin.
Other important victims include Joffe, Rakovsky, Preobrezhensky, Serebryakov,
Pyatikov, Mrachkovsky, Smilga, Krestinsky, Yevdokimov, Safarov, Sokolnikov,
Saluzky, Ryutin, Uglanov, Dogadov, A.P. Smirnov, and Stezky. It is sus-
pected that S.M. Kirov, V.V. Kuibyshev, and Maxim Gorky were assassinated
on Stalin's orders, so as to eliminate particularly influential critics and
to provide pretexts for the execution of others. Party membership statis-
tics indicate that over a million party members were liquidated, and judg-
ing by population losses revealed in official census returns, the number
of non-party members who died in the camps, from forced migration, or
through mass execution probably came to 15 million.
Why has the rehabilitation process been so incomplete? The fact that
Khrushchev himself was deeply involved in purges and mass executions, es-
pecially in the Ukraine, may have been one restraining factor, but (per-
haps for reasons of conscience) he did rehabilitate the Ukrainian leaders
Kossior and Postyshev; his own record apparently was not a major obstacle.
Nor can the continued disgrace of figures like Zinoviev andRykov be ex-
plained by supposing that they were opponents of Communist dictatorship;
while some of these men sometimes called for discussion within the party,
they were all supporters of one party Communist rule, and indeed all of
them except Trotsky collaborated at one time or another with Stalin.
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A more real difficulty has been that for 29 years, Stalin in effect
made all the decisions of the party, and in a sense was the party. Khru-
shehev's party history (see attachment to BPG No. l5$, item 866, 1 Feb-
ruary 1965, "The Soviets Rewrite History Again") condemned the "cult of
personality," but praised Stalin's policies--the attack on Trotskyism,
collectivization, the Five Year Plans, the "verification of party docu-
ments" (a euphemism for purging "impostors," "rogues," and "wreckers")
--and claimed that, credit for such "successes in socialist construction"
belonged to the party and the people. Many of those who remain condemned
had doubts about these policies; the party still cannot admit that honest
doubts were possible, let alone that they were justified.
Another serious problem is that, in their criticisms, some of these
victims of Stalin once claimed a right to discuss major policies within
the party. As First Secretary, Khrushchev, at least, was not prepared to
allow party members to debate major problems, such as the space program,
the development of the chemical industry, or the share of consumer goods
in the nation's output. The publication of One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich or the Liberman discussions have been exceptions, deliberately
permitted by Khrushchev to build up his own political position or to en-
courage technical improvement. Indeed, the more Liberman's proposals are
carried out, the more difficult it will be to do justice to Bukhar in,
since if Bukharin's old position becomes known, it will seem that govern-
ment policy has returned to where it started. It will begin to appear
that all the suffering of the Stalin period was useless, and was a costly,
terrible mistake.
This leads us to the greatest obstacle: to rehabilitate the major
victims of Stalin would be too great an exposure of the past. Even if
the party did not admit that these men were right, and only conceded that
execution was too severe a penalty for them, it would be calling attention
to their execution. The scale of Stalin's crime is still d'-state secret:
while parts of Khrushchev's published speech of 27 October 1961 repeated
almost verbatim his 1956 Secret Speech, he did not publicly repeat his Se-
cret Speech statements that 98 out of 139 full and candidate members of
the 19311. Central Committee were shot, and that 1,108 out of 1,966 voting
and non-voting delegates to the "Congress of Victors," the 17th CPSU Con-
gress (1934), were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes,
which were punishable by death. Even in his Secret Speech, this "true
Leninist" did not mention that out of the 21+ members of the Central Com-
mittee elected in August 1917 -- the group which helped Lenin organize
the October Revolution -- 12 were killed at Stalin's orders, two were
imprisoned (one probably died there), and one was induced to commit sui-
cide. In fact, except for Stalin himself and the two women members (one
of whom was temporarily imprisoned), all the members of this 1917 Central
Committee who were still alive in 1930 were liquidated. Exposure of this
data, or of data on the mass execution or death by hardship of the kulaks,
the alleged Ukrainian nationalists, the Chechen-Ingush, the Polish pris-
oners of war at Katyn, the Crimean Turks, the Kalmyks, or the Volga Ger-
mans would raise serious doubts as to the right of the party to rule. It
3
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would be asked, "What moral difference is there between the organizations
which carried out these actions under Stalin and other organizations which
carried out similar orders under Hitler?"
Khrushchev's partial revelations on the death of Kirov may show the
limit of what the CPStJ can admit; this limit was reached in the Secret
Speech, and could not be exceeded in the 27 October 1961 speech. To say
more might raise awkward questions about the role of the NKVD, or about
the tens of thousands who were executed for participation in Kirov's
murder. Probably the new leaders will make no more significant revela-
tions than this. Indeed, they have less interest than Khrushchev had in
exposing the crimes of Stalin, and so far indications are that they will
maintain silence on the evils which occurred. 25X1 C10b
It
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873 AF,FE,NE,WH. SECRET MEETING OF LATIN
AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
25X1C10b
SITUATION: On 18 January 1965, the Soviet News agency TASS released
the official communique of a conference of the Communist parties of Latin
America, attended by representatives of all these parties, which "took
place at the end of 1961+." No mention was made of the site of the meet-
ing or exact date. As is usually the case with such Communist conclaves,
this one was carried out under maximum security conditions. According
to reports that have subsequently leaked out of the various national
parties, several important representatives met in Moscow in Carly Novem-
ber to arrange the agenda for the Havana meeting. The delegates used
aliases and even traveled to Havana via Prague, making a journey three
to five times longer than direct travel would have involved.
The general public knew nothing about the meeting until the Tass re-
lease was published and commented on in the Western press. There was one
leak -- presumably accidental -- to a small La Paz (Bolivia) daily of du-
bious ideology, Clarin, which stated on 29 November that the conference
had begun on the 22nd in Havana and was scheduled "to end today." Accord-
ing to some reports, 22 parties were represented; according to others,
23. Since there are only 20 Latin American countries properly speaking,
there is speculation that parties from the U.S., Canada, British Guiana,
Puerto Rico, or other Caribbean islands might have sent delegates. The
CPSU was represented by Yuri V. Andropov.
The basic reason for the meeting, without doubt, was concern over
the growing divisions within the Communist Movement in Latin America.
Perhaps the immediate stimulus was fear that the pro-Chinese factions
were about to consolidate: according to a rumor, a meeting in Peking
in early October decided to schedule a conference of pro-Chinese Latin
American Communist parties in Santiago for May 1965. At any rate, the
last seven of the sixteen or more recommendations that can be isolated
in the 18 January communique form the gist of a resolution "For the Unity
of the International Communist Movement." They deal with one aspect or
another of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The first point of this resolution
stresses concern "with the situation that has developed in the inter-
national Communist movement;" another "calls for the immediate cessation
of polemics and underlines the necessity to emphasize the need to find
proper channels so that existing problems may be solved in the fraternal
spirit which should prevail in relations between Marxist-Leninist parties."
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At the party level, the resolution held that "the unity of each party
is an indispensable condition for the development of the revolutionary
process in each country. Consequently, any factional activities, no
matter what their source or nature, should be condemned categorically."
By far the most important points are those that can only be inter-
preted as calling for a shift in ern hasis in some countries from legal
and peaceful. to violent and illegal, methods to be used by the national
parties in the pursuit of Communist goals. For some time, the official
Soviet line has stressed peaceful coexistence at the international level
and the use of the parliamentary path, via the popular front, at the
national level, when it suits their purposes. Most of the Communist-
inspired violence that has occurred in Latin America in recent years
has come from the "hard-line" parties, Cuban or Chinese-oriented, or
from the hard-line faction within a Moscow-oriented Party. The latter
situation applies to the Venezuelan party, which has led the most in-
tense campaign of violence and saboe that Latin America has seen
since Fidel Castro took over five years ago in Cuba. Ominously, one of
the points made in the communique was that. "An active movement of soli-
darity of all the Latin American countries with the liberation struggle
of the people of Venezuela should be organized on a continent-wide scale."
Elsewhere the communique recommends that aid should be given to "the
freedom fighters of Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay
and Haiti." Thus the real significance of the Havana meeting is.that
the communique is tantamount to a public admission that the Soviet Com-
munists have never changed their basic strategy -- especially not for
the developing areas. They still support violence, and the communique
is a blueprint for increasing it in those countries where it has the best
chance to prosper.
In a sense, the November conference can also be looked upon as a
subtle political action operation carried out by the USSR against the
Castro regimen The opening paragraphs of the communique call on all
parties to support Cuba, by organizing an intensive propaganda campaign
and by working for the resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations
between the governments of their countries and that of Cuba. The shift
in emphasis from peaceful to violent methods is, in a sense, a concession
to the Castro thesis. The passionate appeal to all orthodox parties to
help Cuba improve her diplomatic and commercial position within the West-
ern Hemisphere certainly carries with it the obligation, on Cuba?s part,
to be a better team member, of the international Communist movement.
Therefore, the Havana conference of Latin American Communist parties,
if anything, has consolidated Moscow?s hold over the Cuban party and
hence over government policy.
pprove
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871 FE,NE. RIVAL COMMUNIST PARTIES PLAGUE INDIA
25X1C10b
SITUATION: In late December the Indian government arrested nearly 800
pro-Chinese members of the so-called leftist Communist party which split away
from the Moscow-oriented CPI and laid formal claim to being the Indian party
in November 1964. The Home Ministry charged that those arrested were plotting
treason in support of possible new attacks from Communist China. No descrip-
tion has been given the public of the evidence which led to the arrest but
there is little question that Indian opinion generally recognizes the threat
posed by an illegal apparatus which subscribes to the policies of India's most
powerful enemy, China. Thus the detention of members of the left group known
to be in sympathy with, and believed to have direct ties to, China has brought
relatively little protest from non-Communists.
The rightwing Communists, however, also have considerable capability for
subversive mishhief. They exploit India's massive problems by agitational use
of their labor and other front groups against the government, despite their an-
nounced intention of forming a people's front with that same government. Fur-
thermore, the March elections in Kerala may provide an unfortunate example of
the ability of two rival Communist parties to cooperate with each other and
with non-Communist parties when some political prize makes it expedient.
REFERENCE MATERIAL
Biweekly Guidances (Secret, *unclassified attachment)
#751 China Attempts to Split the Indian Communist Party
#791 Communist Threat to Indian Labor
#81+7 State Elections in Kerala, India
"United We Fall," Douglas Hyde London: Ampersand Books 1961 3s6d
See unclassified Fact Sheet attached.
25X1C1Ob
c ' (871 Cont. )
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875.
FREE WORLD SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNA14
25X1C10b
SITUATION: The volume of U.S. aid to South Vietnam is so massive
that it obscures the efforts of the other 14 countries who are also render-
ing aid and assistance in various forms and amounts, not to mention the 10
other countries who have recently pledged at least token assistance. (See
unclassified attachment for specific details on the countries who are aid-
ing the South Vietnamese and the form of their contribution.) Highest
levels of the U.S. government have ordered a major effort to induce addi-
tional Free World countries to show their flags in defense of the freedom
and independence of South. Vietnams The goal is not only to get contribu-
tions from those countries who are not now contributing, but also to get
increased contributions from those countries who are already contributing,
and above all, to demonstrate that the defense of South Vietnam is of
cormnon concern to the Free World, 25X1 C10b
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"i r (675 Conto)
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15 February 1965
The Anti-German Slant of Comma?nist Propaganda
Reunification: A Main Task of 1965 (New Year's Eve Address by Walter
Ulbricht) For the past 15 years we have, after all, been the only
one in Germany who have developed initiatives consistently and persistently
to overcome its division, who have submitted constructive plans for an
understanding between the German states.
All we hear from Bonn in reply is a call for more arming, and recently
even for laying an atomic mine belt, an atomic death strip along the fron-
tier between the German states.
What a monstrous thing this is. Do the citizens of the West German
state not see that a game is being played with them when the policy of re-
venge of the West German ruling circles produces such poisonous flowers?
The three Western powers should realize clearly: According access
to West Germany to join atomic arming in any zorin will not only be a
hostile act against the peace-loving states of Europe but will at the
same time destroy prospects for negotiations on unification of the German
states."
Steps to Strengthen European Security Outlined (Radio Moscow, 3 Jan 65)
West Germany is making no effort to seek ways to build up European
security; on the contrary it is even undermining peace in Europe. It is
doing its utmost to get into the nuclear club, and Washington is support-
ing it in this direction."
Peace Policy (Neues Deutschland, East Berlin, 31 Dec 61+) Correspondent
Lothar Killmer reviewed the progress made in 196+ by the GDR in inter-
national prestige due to its peace policy." "Whereas the U.S. people
unmistakably demonstrated their support of peace by reelecting Johnson,
Washington's main ally, the Bonn revanchists, strive for the atomic bomb
in order to revise the results of W II by military-political blackmail."
West Ger mAny Alarmed by Policy Setbacks (Radio Moscow, 5 Jan 65)
"... the present rulers of West Germany over the last few years have
never let the occasion pass to exert pressures on their allies regarding
the German problem. They deliberately speculate on the problem of German
unity in order to aggravate the tension in the center of Europe, and they
need the kindling of chauvinist passions in order to force the armaments
race, for the restoration of a new Wehrmacht admitted to nuclear missile
weapons."
Ardennes Victory Made Possible by Soviet Aid (Moscow Tass, 6 Jan 65)
'Eisenhower and his yes-men from the West German military camp today echo
Goebbels' propaganda. And Eisenhower is using marked cards.... Refer-
ring to Eisenhower's allegation that Germany 'suffered defeat after the
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battle in the Ardennes,' the author (V. Pavlov) writes: 'This is a
monstrous distortion of historical facts, indeed, it is well known that
in the Ardennes operation the American and British troops themselves
were on the b-:-ink of defeat. They succeeded in avoiding catastrophe only
because of the effective assistance rendered them by the Soviet Army ....'"
Rotmistrov Attacks German Mine Belt Plan (Moscow, Red Star, 29 Dec 61-)
'.... Blinded by their plans of revenge, the Bonn militarists are reck-
lessly striving to deploy as much nuclear ammunition as possible on the
territory of the German Federal Republic .... Hassel and those who
think like him in this matter, of course, refer to the need 'to strengthen
the defense.' .... It is clear to everyone, however, that motives of
defense are far from being the foundation of the current Bonn plans.
Posing itself the task of obtaining access to the 'nuclear trigger' at
all costs and in the end possession of nuclear weapons, the Bonn mili-
tarists, as the saying goes, stop at nothing. Covering their revanchist
adventurist plans with the bogey of the 'communist danger,' the West
German militarists are trying to tie their bloc partners tighter to the
strategy of revanchism and to draw them into war for the implementation
of their aggressive intentions .... Feeling its strength, the West
German militarist clique is increasingly setting the tone in the North
Atlantic bloc and is beginning to determine the entire NATO military
strategy .... The antihuman ways of the Bonn militarists time and again
underline the tremendous danger inherent in the attempts of the NATO
leaders to open access for them to nuclear weapons through the so-called
multilateral force or any other nuclear forces .... The Bonn militarist
clique is apparently sparing no means to step up the implementation of
their program of military preparations and to create the conditions for
a revision of the results of WW II. The ruling circles of West Germany,
whose policy is already openly made by the Bundeswehr generals, have
again unmasked themselves as enemies of peace."
Johnson Statement to the U.S. Congress (Ne s Deutschland, 8 Jan 65)
Johnson begins with assurances, although not quite clearly expressed,
that he favors peace, friendship, and striving for understanding ....
However, less than five minutes later, the U.S. President himself debased
his assurances .... U.S. soldiers and officers plunder and murder in the
Jungles of South Vietnam; U.S. planes and warships invade the DRV ....
But Johnson obviously especially undermines his peace assurances by his
statements, or rather omissions, on European security. For a long time,
the European public has observed with alarm the alliance of the re-
vanchist and militarist forces of West Germany with the U.S. .... The
U.S. President does not disappoint the Bonn revanchists. He avoids
mentioning the revanchist 'Germany initiative' so longed for in Bonn;
he deals with the German problem only in one sentence, and, in addition,
rather noncomittally. Yet even from this one sentence the Bonn extrem-
ists derive new hope."
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U.S. Right to Troops in Europe Not perpetual (Invest a and Radio Moscow,
11 Jan 5 ' Let us recall the events of 20 years ago. At the cost of
huge sacrifices the Soviet Union insured victory over Fascist Germany ..,.
The members of the anti-Nazi coalition solemnly proclaimed that German
militarism and Nazism would be uprooted .... Yet it is well known that
the U.TS). and her Western partners acted contrary to the policy they had
proclaimed themselves .... They took care not to uproot militarism and
revanchism in West Germany but to arm that country and include it in the
aggressive NATO bloc .... Everybody realized the danger of the creation
of an Atlantic nuclear torpedo providing the Bundeswehr with access to
nuclear weapons, the establishment of a kind of Bonn-Washington axis."
Johnson's Words Do Not Match U.S Deeds (Berliner Zeitung, East Berlin,
9 Jean 65 "It is well known in the U.S. that the greatest danger to world
peace is Bonn revanchism. This is all the more known because, after all,
West German militarism was fostered with U.S. support. 00*0 As long as
there is no change in such matters as U.S. murdering and plundering in
South Vietnam, encouragement for the atomic armament plans of Bonn, and
refusal to recognize the real situation in Germany, demonstrated by the
existence of two German states, peace and understanding is impossible,
and all promises by the U.S. President remain empty words."
GDR Leaders Congratulate Albert Schweitzer (East Berlin Radio, 13 Jan 65)
"Walter Ulbricht salutes Albert Schweitzer on behalf of the GDR popula-
tion as a great humanist, who has at all times advocated peace and under-
standing .... Walter Ulbricht says that the efforts of the West German
Government to obtain nuclear weapons and a say in their use and its
desire to lay atomic mines along the eastern frontier of the Federal
Republic constitutes a serious danger .... Notwithstanding the fact
that up to now Bonn has rejected all GDR proposals for an understanding
between the two German states., the GDR is steadfastly continuing its
efforts to insure peace in Germany."
USSR Replies to Bonn Note on Nazi Criminals (lass, Moscow, 16 Jan 65)
After noting that the majority of fascist murderers did not bear any
punishment for their crimes, A. Leontyev writes (in Red Star): 'The
gentlemen who dream of replaying WW II do not want to condemn the crimes
committed during that war. The gentlemen who are borrowing the know-
how of former Hitler generals do not want their teachers to find them-
selves behind bars. Such is the real reason why the West German legis-
lators show such concern over the statute of limitations .... Whereas
mankind remembers everything and has learned much, the American 'madmen,'
like the Bonn revenge-seekers, do not remember anything and have not
learned anything. But vain are the hopes of our adversaries, Leontyev
writes, that they would be able to save from retribution their kin, the
Nazi butchers.;"
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Bonn. is Atomic Minefield Raises Threat of War (Radio Moses, 21 Jan 65)
`fie '_enty` on wants to arm West Ger~uar.y -tt) the teeth and give that country
nuclear weapons .... The West German militarists will gain access to
nuclear weapons. They hope to revenge themselves and to undertake aggres-
sion against many peoples in Europe and Asia. History has chown that
these men will not stop at killing hundreds and hundreds of millions to
further their mad plans."
Conrcntetc rs Discuss West Gera n Militarism (Radio Moscow, 24 Jan 65)
Th. year1965 is the year of the 20th a.xruiversary of the end of W47 IT.
Perhaps the approach of this date provokes a particularly strong feeling
of bitterness and indignation when one sees the Rhine revenge-seekers
once more threatening peace and security in Europe .... Roughly, in the
last 350 years there have been more than 150 wars in Europe. It was here
that the German militarists unleashed two world wars lasting for more than
10 years and killing many millions of persons."
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Facts on the Stalin Terror
Khrushchev said in his secret Speech, 24-25 February 1956:
"Out of a total of 139 full and alternate Cer.tral committee members
elected at the 17th Party Congress, 98, or 70% were arrested and
shot.... Out of 1,956 delegates to the [17th] Congress with decid-
ing or advisory votes, 1,108 were arrested aid accused of counter-
revolutionary crimes."
95 mass graves containing 9,439 victims were discovered at Vinnitsa,
the Ukraine (then under German occupation), in 1943. Examination indi-
cated that they were killed between 1938 and 1940, when Khrushchev was
First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.
In 1961, after the 22nd CPSU Congress had openly discussed some of
Stalin's crimes, an Armenian newspaper ventured to state that Malenkov
had been responsible for the arrest of more than 3500 leading Armenians
in a few months in 1937, many of whom were shot.
According to an NKVD report dated 13 June 1941, 16,255 Latvians,
21,114 Lithuanians, and 11,102 Estonians (total 48,471) were shipped off
in 871 freight cars; many of them died later. The population of Riga,
393,000 in 1939, was 308,000 in 1943. An analysis of Lithuanian popula-
tion statistics shows that 630,000 Lithuanians were killed or deported
by the Soviets, 60,000 in 1940-41 and 570,000 in 1944-58. (250,000
others were victims of the German occupation.)
Census reports state that the USSR had 170.6 million persons in 1939
and 208.8 million in 1959. Official vital statistics indicate that 1950
population was 178.6 million. Considering territories annexed in 1940,
Soviet population in 1941 should have been about 200 million. This means
that there was an absolute population loss of about 25 million persons
during the 1941 to 1950 period. The war obviously caused much of this
loss, but the highest estimate of military deaths was 9.5 million. (Rus-
sian military deaths in World War I were 1.7 million.) Apparently the
deportation of nationalities would be one explanation for the remainder;
the sending to slave labor camps of tremendous numbers of prisoners (esp.
from territories recaptured from the Germans) would be another. A study
of Soviet population (Frank Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet Union:
History and Prospects Geneva, League of Nations, 1946) estimated that
there were 5 million "excess" deaths during the collectivization, 1930
to 1934.
(Cont.)
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In his study of the Stalin regime (Stalin and the Soviet Communist
Party, Munich, Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1559)$ Abdurakhman
Avtorkhanov estimates, using official party figures, that 1,220,93)
party members were purged and liquidated between 1 May 1935 and 1 March
1939. Stalin declared in 1939 that he had appointed 500,000 young Bol-
sheviks to leading posts in the state and party; as Avtorkhanov points
out, these were replacements for purged officials. Most of the Soviet
leaders of today were among these appointees.
Leonard Schapiro estimates (in his The Communist Party of the Soviet
Union New York, Random House, 1959) that 1,,1 40.,000 were expelled from the
party in 1933 and 1934, and that about 850,000 (36 per cent of the member-
ship in January 1937) were purged in the 1936 to 1938 period. In 1939
(at the 18th CPSU Congress), Malenkov revealed that only 8.3 per cent of
the membership had been in the party before the end of 1920; this amounted
to 132,000 persons, out of an early-1921 membership of 733,000. Less than
a quarter of those who joined from 1921 to 1928 still belonged to the
party in 1939. Of those who joined from 1929 to 1933 (when recruitment
was suspended), less than half were members in 1939. The purges also
gave Stalin a chance to create the "New Class." In two republics, only
1.7 per cent of the 1929 parties belonged to the categories of "intel-
ligentsia" and "office worker," while in 1939 these categories formed
42.8 per cent of one and 44+.5 per cent of the other. Today's party
leaders are not the heirs of the Revolution, since Stalin wiped out the
Revolutionists; today's leaders are the heirs of Stalin.
2
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Fact Sheet
15 February 1965
Text of the communique of the meeting of representa-
tives of the communist parties of Latin America:
A conference of the communist parties of Latin America, attended by
the representatives of all these parties, took place at the end of 1964.
The conference passed in an atmosphere of fraternal cooperation and in the
spirit of a sincere exchange of opinions and understanding of common
problems. There was a useful exchange of experience accumulated in the
struggle of all the peoples of the continent against imperialism, for
national liberation, peace, democracy, and socialism.
The conference devoted special attention to questions of solidarity
with the people and government of Cuba. The conference resolutions speak
among other things, of the need to extend on an increasingly greater scale
the movement of solidarity with Cuba on the whole continent, and of making
this movement more resolute and more organized in nature. By boosting the
solidarity movement, local organizations, leaders, and parties, apart
from carrying out their duty to the world and Latin America, also defend
the interest, freedom, dignity and future of their peoples.
Among the tasks confronting the solidarity movement, special attention
is devoted to the resumption of diplomatic and commercial relations with
Cuba, to the struggle against the economic blockade, and for the develop-
ment of trade; to the exposure of the preparations for aggression and of
the activities of the counterrevolutionaries and other CIA agents; to
the timely rebuff to the calua,iat.ing campaign organized and directed
by the U.S. imperialists against Cuba and its government; to the organi-
zation of an extensive propaganda campaign of the achievements of the
Cuban revolution in all the spheres; economic, social and cultural.
The conference made the following recommendations with regards to
the support of the struggle of other Latin American peoples against
imperialism:
Assistance should be rendered for the formation of a solidarity move-
ment and unions, and the campaigns against repressions should be organized
on a permanent basis so that this work will not dwindle to sporadic manifes-
tations or disunited statements.
Active aid should be given to those who are subject at present to
cruel repressions -- for instance, the freedom fighters in Venezuela,
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti.
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The movement should be developed more extensively against colonialism
on the continent, and resolute aid should be rendered to the struggle
for the independence of Puerto Rico and British Guiana; for the autonomy
of Martinique, Guadaloupe and French Guiana; for returning to Argentina
the Falkland Islands; and for rendering support to the national aspira-
tions of the British and Dutch colonies in the Caribbean basin.
An active movement of solidarity of all the Latin American countries
with the liberation struggle of the people of Venezuela should be or-
ganized on a continent-wide scale.
It is necessary to intensify the movements of solidarity with the
people of Panama who are waging a struggle against imperialism in difficult
conditions.
It is necessary to activize the campaign for the:liberation of the
communist leaders kept in jails: Jesus Faria, Gustavo Machado, and
Pompeyo Marquez from Venezuela; Pedro Saad from Ecuador; Jacques Stephen
Alexis from Haiti, Antonio Maidana from Paraguay; Mario Alves, Ivan
Ribeiro and Astrogildo Pereira from Brazil; and of all the patriots,
workers, and democratic leaders who are being persecuted.
It is necessary to develop the spirit of solidarity with the Latin
American proletariat by supporting the manifestations of protest of
workers at all enterprises and informing the World Federation of Trade
Unions and all the independent united workers centers in Latin America.
The conference also emphasized the need for promoting the rapproche-
ment between various parties, their exchange of experience and a better
knowledge of one another.
The conference carefully studied the questions dealing with the
differences in the international communist movement and adopted, in
this connection, a resolution whose main points are as follows:
For the unity of the international movement:
The communist parties of Latin America, whose representatives
gathered for an exchange of opinions, reaffirm their determination to
work actively for the unity of the international communist movement, a
unity based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and on the programmatic
documents of the meetings of 1957 and 1960.
The communist parties of Latin America consider that this unity is the
main guarantee of the success of our struggle against imperialism for the
national and social emancipation of all the peoples, for world peace, and
for the construction of socialism and communism.
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In this connection we are deeply concerned with the situation which
has developed in the international communist movement in which acute
differences occur, differences fraught with the threat of a split and
play into the hands of our enemies, whose aggressiveness keeps growing
in view of this.
The communist parties of Latin America consider that it is necessary
to exert all possible effort to clear the way for utiity, insure mutual
understanding in the socialist camp, and avoid everything that increases
the danger of the split, interferes with fraternal and constructive dis-
cussions, and makes it difficult for the fraternal parties to act in a
united front; it is necessary to do this so that it would be possible to
avoid the present differences and use all the energy for the struggle
against the imperialists and other reactionary forces.
It is necessary to use as a basis the coinciding points of view, which
are the expression of our common ideology, Marxism-Leninism, and do every-
thing possible so that an inviolable unity of principle would take the
upper hand.
In connection with this and in view.of the fact that the differences
in the form in which they are now discussed inflict harm to the inter-
national communist movement, the conference calls for an immediate end to
public polemics and emphasizes the need for finding proper channels to
solve the questions which have arisen in the spirit of fraternity which
should prevail in relations between Marxist-Leninist parties.
At the same time the conference holds that the unity of each party
is an indispensable condition for the development of the revolutionary
process in each country. Consequently, any factional activities, no
matter what their source or nature, should be condemned categorically.
The conference holds that resolute steps should be taken to insure
the unity of the international communist movement. With this aim in view
the necessary bilateral and multilateral meetings and a conference or con-
ferences of all the Marxist-Leninist parties should be held.
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Fact Sheet
15 February 1965
Indian Communism
"India faces the danger of becoming blind to the
wrongs of pro-Russian communism in its hatred and
fear of China and her agents in this country.
Dange's design for a national government which
includes himself and his fellow-travelers inside
the Congress is as dangerous for India's freedom."
HIlT, (New Delhi) Jan 8, 1965
The Communist Party of India before the split once boasted a member-
ship of between 200,000 - 300,000 and at the heiC; t of its popvlurity re-
ceived approximately 10% of the vote in the national election. The two
factions have split and reunited on many questions following the Sino-
Soviet feud but the source of greatest strain was the Chinese military
attack on India in October 1962. Many of the group now called the left
Communists maintain that India provoked the conflict. The right-wing
majority which supports the Soviet position in international Communist
affairs denounced the Chinese attack and urged adoption of parliamentary
tactics against the Indian government. In 196+ their increasingly bitter
divergence culminated in a formal split into two Communist Parties of
India, each claiming orthodoxy and each proclaiming its own strategy, for
achieving a Communist state of India.
Left Communist Conference. The rebels, suspended from the Moscow-
led central party in April 1564, convoked a Seventh Party Congress of
their own in Calcutta from October 30th to November 6th. The four hun-
dred delegates passed an amended draft party program which, they claim,
will cure all of India's political ills. The program advocated inter
alia a return to clandestine organization and revolutionary tactics
against the ruling Congress Party. The program was a triumph for the
more radical leftists among the rebels led by M. Basavapunniah, one of
those looking toward China as a model for Communist development, and a
defeat for the less militant leftist views of former Kerala Prime Minister,
E.M.S. Namboodiripad. The conference claimed to represent the majority
(101+,000) of Indian Communists and thus the authority to use the name and
flag of the Communist Party of India and to represent the Indian party at
international Communist meetings. In pursuit of these claims they deter-
mined to seek Soviet recognition as the official party and Indian permis-
sion to use the CPI election symbol.
Their organization plans are significant indication of future activ-
ity. The new constitution is reliably reported to call for a return to
a cell type organization (the usual base for conspiratorial action). The
conference elected a 38-meith r central committee and a 9-member politburo
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(the CPI's 1958 change from "politburo" to "secretariat" marked the be-
ginning of revisionism according to the leftists) and P. Sundarayya, an
advocate of extreme militancy, was elected Secretary General. This tight
command structure is readily adapted to illegal functions.
Too blatant a pro-China stance would have prejudiced their efforts
to lure members from the rightist party and to recruit new members among
the Indian public but their conference resolutions were only thinly
veiled reflections of the militant Chicom doctrine. Among others, the
resolutions called for Indian initiative in negotiating with Communist
China on their "border disputes" which were termed detrimental to "Afro-
Asian and anti-imperialist solidarity"; and praised the replacement of
Khrushchev which, they aver, will unquestionably result in
improved Sino-Soviet relations and world Communist unity on the basis of
the 1960 statement of the 81 Communist parties.
Right communist conference. On December 13th, the right-wingers
opened their own Seventh Congress of the CPI which was attended by 570
Indian delegates and representatives of 24+ Moscow-line fraternal parties.
ie convention called for a broad national democratic front, to include
workers and peasants, which will carry on a mass struggle to transform
India, "the most advanced capitalist country among the newly independent
nations," into a socialist state. Peaceful transition from capitalism
to socialism was the theme but the resolutions were more critical of the
new government than the CPI had been of Prime Minister Nehru.
Mention of the new leftist party shows both the fear of rivalry and
the need for strength through cooperation. Although the rightists also
claim a majority (over 130,000) of Indian Communists, much of their
political strength is derived from the all-India Trade Union Congress.
AITUC Secretary General is also the CPI (right) Secretary General; Presi-
dent of AITUC has joined the CPI/left. A split in AITUC -- or even worse
-- a loss of the whole labor federation to leftist leadership would be
calamitous for the right CPI. One resolution notes the threat to AITUC
but adopts an attitude of "patience, reason and fraternity" and promises
to try "to draw the rival party into joint mass campaigns while simulta-
neously exposing its wrong ideology, policies and organizational methods..."
CPI (right) reelected S.A. Dange as Chairman and left unchanged
their organizational structure: 101-member National Council; 25-member
Central Executive Committee and a 9-member Central Secretariat.
As with the CPI (left) the rightist party lacks total unanimity.
The members are still split on the authenticity of letters discovered in
the Indian archives in 1964 which were written by Dange in 1924 offering
to serve the British in return for his release from jail. A committee
assigned to the task of judging their authenticity in the face of Dange's
denial of authorship, concluded that there was no basis for disputing
Dange'a denial; a minority report dissented on the grounds that there was
no proof that he did not write the letters.'
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Differenes b2tn the Parties. The essence of their differences
lies in their separate attitudes to rd the ruling Congress Party and
their differing strategy to achieve the same goal: a Communist state.
The CPI (right) currently calls for a national democratic front which
will require temporary cooperation with the bourgeois Congress Party.
As their National Council said earlier, combining and manipulating
elements of the bourgeois Congress Party is a
"temporary tactical manoeuvre. After having shared power with the
bourgeoisie, the proletariat will fight to dislodge it from leader-
ship and assume complete leadership." (New e, CPI (right) news-
paper, October 25, 1964.)
The CPSU convention delegate, Boris Ponomaryev, Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee, confirmed the rightist position on major issues. He
mentioned the Soviet Union's concern that her foreign policy line be
supported by CPI action against imperialist efforts to "eliminate the
progressive features of India's foreign policy" -- a clear reference to
the USSR's friendly relations with the Indian government.
Ponomaryev said he was confident that the CPI would overcome the
"difficulties" of the party split and urged an international meeting of
the Communist parties which could "start to overcome in practice the
differences in the Communist movement." Only on the eve of the right
congress did Pravda mention for the first time the establishment of a
leftist party w-which they labeled "Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of
India."
The CPI (left) called for a people's democracy, or front, of all
classes under the leadership of the working class for mass action against
the government. Although they deny any plans to overthrow the government
by force, the Indian press reported that radical leftists urged building
an underground organization.
The left group is anxious to escape a pro-China label which would
be anathema in India. Equally aware of this danger, the Chinese Commu-
nists avoided the customary public fraternal greeting which could be a
kiss of death to their proteges. Not until January 22, 1965 did the
Chinese acknowledge formation of the new left group which they, of
course, call the Communist Party of India. (Peking Review reported that
the CPI Congress expelled the "renegade Dange group" which then usurped
the name of the Communist Party of India and convened a "Seventh Congress"
of their own.) Despite lack of open Chinese support of this meeting there
has been considerable conjecture on the source of funds for conference
arrangements which were rather lavish for a rump group with no large-
scale support. But Indian official interest centered on an even more
significant clue.
Pro-Chinese Leftists Arrested. According to The Statesman (New
Delhi of January , the Italian intelligence service tipped off the
Indian government on contacts which an Indian Communist had made with
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both the Italian Communist party and with Chou En-lai and Chen Yi during
their 196+ trip to Africa, Asia and Europe. A leftist secret circular
quoted as speaking of "liberating the masses" by "international revolu-
tionary forces" and describing the Chinese not as "aggressors but liber-
ators" somehow reached the Indian press. On December 30 the government,
acting on information from "reliable sources" arrested more than 700 pro-
Chinese Indian Communists charging that they were a threat to national
security at a time when Chinese troops were again behaving menacingly on
the Sino-Indian border. Although those arrested are members of the CPI
(left), the move was apparently somewhat discriminating: two prominent
leaders of the CPI (left) who had spoken out against China's actions in
the border question were not arrested. The ultra leftists have voiced
their suspicions that the Dange group played some background role in-the
the arrests but no charges have been publicly made.
Kerala State Elections. In 1957 the Commmunists won the Kerala
elections and elected E.M.S. Namboodiripad Chief Minister. The central
government suspended the Communist regime in 1959 following uncontrolled
civil disturbances. Namboodiripad, now prominent in the CPI (left) is
one of the two major leaders not now in jail -- presumably because he
has been critical of China on the border issue. The pro-China Kerala
figures now under detention are not prevented thereby from becoming
candidates in the March 5 Kerala legislative assembly elections. One
important imponderable in the election is the Communists' (of both par-
ties) ability to capitalize on undeserved halos of martyrdom ascribed to
the arrests.
If, despite all their differences, the right and left Kerala Com-
munist groups form an alliance for the state election, they might obtain
a small majority of the vote and form the next government. If they co-
operate, their election chances will be enhanced by the Congress Party's
declared intention of making no alliances with any party as well as by
the fact that the many small parties must accept election agreements with
larger ones in order to survive.
4
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25X1 C10c
Fact Sheet
15 February 1 5
Free World Support for South Vietnam
The South Vietnamese defense forces are strengthened by direct
military support not only from the United States, but from several other
countries. None of this direct military support is committed to action
against the Communist Viet Cong except in cases of self-defense. The
New Zealand government has sent a 25-man engineer detachment to build
roads, bridges and hospitals. Australian and Thai pilots fly transport
missions to deliver supplies and equipment to combat zones in support
of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Psychological warfare specialists
from Taiwan and the Philippine Islands are helping train South Vietnamese
units to combat Communist propaganda as well as to disseminate factual
information about their own achievements and programs. South Korean
military veterans teach specialized combat methods to South Vietnamese
soldiers. Malaysia has provided the South Vietnamese army with armored
cars and other military vehicles in addition to giving special training
in Malaysia for more than 2,000 army officers. Three of the countries
--the Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea--are passing on to the South
Vietnamese the benefit of their experience in having successfully de-
feated international Communist aggression against their own countries
similar to that being waged now against South Vietnam.
Medical Aid: Many countries have provided South Vietnam badly
needed medical personnel and supplies. These are especially useful be-
cause in addition to the usual needs of caring for the sick, the South
Vietnamese are faced with the necessity of caring for the many victims
of Viet Cong ambushes and innocent villagers who are subjected to Viet
Cong atrocities. Medical specialists from Australia, Italy, Japan,
New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, West Germany and the United
States, in addition to practicing their own life-saving skills, assist
in establishing and administering professional training programs for
South Vietnamese medical personnel. Medical supplies have been sent or
pledged by Austria, Brazil, Greece, Israel, Japan, Spain, Tunisia,
Turkey and the United States. Other countries have made contributions
in the form of medical equipment of various kinds. The Swiss, for ex-
ample, presented 30 precision microscopes to Saigon University for the
use of the students in the College of Pharmacy.
Direct Economic Aid: Some 10 nations are providing direct grants
of goods and services designed to bolster the economy of South Vietnam
and improve the living conditions of the people. Canada has supplied
$150,000 worth of flour, Iran has promised 1,000 tons of petroleum prod-
ucts, Thailand delivered 100 tons of cement and 10,000 sheets of metal
roofing. Several countries have sent or promised to send economic spe-
cialists to assist the South Vietnamese in the very important task of
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developing their economy and taking steps to improve the lot of the South
Vietnamese people. West Germany has sent 25 technical experts and over
75 Japanese specialists are in Vietnam working on electric-power programs.
Both the Netherlands and the Republic of China have agreed to provide
agricultural experts to help the South Vietnamese make the most of their
good potential for agricultural production.
Educational Aid: Teachers and school supplies and equipment have
been furnished to the South Vietnamese by many countries. Canada is erect-
ing a new science building and auditoriima at h:ue University and has sent
a professor of orthopedics to Saigon University. West German funds were
used to build a technical high school and a New Zealand grant was used to
build a science-faculty building at Saigon University. The United Kingdom
has provided special equipment for the medical, science and pharmacy fac-
ulties at Saigon University in addition to books and other equipment for
several secondary institutions. Over 1,000 South Vietnamese civilian
students have been given assistance to allow them to study at the uni-
versity level in Australia, Canada, the Republic of China, France, Japan
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, West Germany and the United
States.
This partial list of countries that are contributing to the South
Vietnamese struggle for freedom is indicative that many nations are aware
that they have a direct interest in the success or failure of that mis-
sion. The South Vietnamese are fighting on two fronts--against the Com-
munist Viet Cong aggression and to improve the living conditions of their
own people. Their needs are so great and so varied that almost any
country has products or services which, if they could be spared, would
be useful to South Vietnam in its hour of need.
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