BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 10, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C1Ob
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
NEXT I S S U E
of this Biweekly Propaganda Guidance (BPG)
will be one week late,
i.e. will be dated 31 August 196+ (3 weeks after this one).
R e a s o n:
We are changing printing and format of the classified section of
BPG in order to make it more handy and more readable.
Subsequent issues
will again come at two week intervals, as heretofore.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14 ? 5I - P78-03061A000 P Q0QC9-t4
Briefly Noted
moon U.rokae Ramer 7's successful mission (28-31 July) made headlines in
almost all areas. The effect of this US space success should be prolonged by
replaying all forthcoming stories on the scientific results of Ranger 7's
photography, or on improved prospects for an early Apollo manned flight to
the moon. Press Comment of 3 August carries an article by Sir Bernard Lovell
from the British scientific magazine, New Scientist, on 1 'y. Future
stories might note that even before the successful Ranger 7 shot, Sir Bernard
(not noted as being critical of Soviet space achievements) hadlu the hat
"there seems little doubt that the Russians are fast losing ground Americans." Sir Bernard also concludes (and President Johnson's comments on
Ranger 7 could be used to confirm this) that there is no sign of a real slow-
dawn in the US civilian space program. it might be further noted that Sir
moon
Bernard identified the absence
anger successful
tossoas a lve this problem both
the U US and
the US.
OAU Heads of State Meeting
African heads of state gathered in Cairo July 17th for the second OAU
meeting since its founding ]A months earlier. Accomplishments: Addis Ababa
was named permanent headquarters, Guinean Dialio Tell esecretary-general;
Nkrumah'a call for immediate union and em Africai military high Ncommand
pre-
independence passed over in favor of gradual unity urged by Tanganyika
independence borders were declared binding unless changed by peaceful means.
Problems: How to enforce the boycott against shippers and airlines who deal
with South Africa, without suffering severe commercial losses; how to coordi-
nate rival liberation movements and increase liberation committee assistance
to rebels in Portuguese territories and Southern Rhodesia.
Sukarno Plays With a Communist Pandora's Box in Malaysia.
Indonesian agents are reported contacting former Malaysian terrorists in
southern Thailand. NY Times or Press Comment 19 Julyj News of Sukarno'.s
expanding "crush Malaysia campaign comes-6n'-the heels of Mikoyan'a promise
in Djakarta to supply Indonesia with more weapons for aggression and to sup-
port Sukarno's war against "neo-colonialists." It also coincides with an
Indonesian campaign to incite Malay racial antagonisms against the Chinese
(75% of the population) in Singapore.
Most of the Malaysian Communist terrorists, many of whom not only (find
safe haven In Indonesia but are being trained there by Sukarno, are ethnic
Chinese -- whose allegiance both Sukarno and Khrushchev should have reason
to question. This strange coalition for aggression makes Sukarno's Panch
Shila and Khrushchev's Peaceful Coexistence look phonier than ever. We must
expose this deadly war-like adventure of the two self-proclaimed "peace
champions" at all opportunities.
French Nuclear Tests in Polynesia
French Prime Minister Pompidou stopped off in Papeete on 26 July to as-
s`e tho Po ynesian natives' fears over French thermonuclear blasts to be
Approved oRelease 2000/04/14: CI - 03061AOOQ&Q9 Cont.)
 ( RygA fegr fse 2000/04/ _
_ _ _ _ P78-03061 A000200080006-7
IOI~
let off in the .y midst. lie sympathized with the natives' apprehensions, and
pointed out that French atomic policy was (a) inaugurated by previous French
governments, (b) responsive to international realities ("we cannot be blamed
for terrible nuclear devices created by scientific progress") (c) non-atomic
powers are destined to disappear or must submit in future conflicts and France
intends to do neither, thus is forced to acquire these weapons, (d) scientific
activities will be a boon to Polynesian economy. The Prime Minister further
promised that there would be careful studies on effect of nuclear blasts on
Polynesian fauna and flora.
7e give suitable publicity to these tests and to the apprehensions of the
population. We connect current French and future Chicom tests
Approved For Release 2000/0 8-0306ib (86'0b6-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
3 Sept International Union of Students (IUS) Congress, Ibadan, Nigeria,
3-13 Sept.
4 Sept Socialist International Centennial Congress, 4-6 Sept, Brussels.
ffirst International founded, 28 Sept 186+7
8 Sept USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland refuse to sign peace treaty with
Japan, concluded with 48 nations, 1951-
9 Sept 13th Pug-wash Conference on Science and World Affairs in Czecho-
slovakia, 9-12 in Prague and 13-19 in Karlovy Vary.
9 Sept Chinese People's "Liberation Army" enters Lhasa, Tibet, 1950.
16 Sept II World Youth Foram sponsored by the Committee of Youth Organ-
izations of the USSR (CYO), Moscow, 16-23 Sept.
17 Sept USSR invades Poland, annexes eastern half of country, 1939.
Twenty-fifth anniversary.
19 Sept Week of International Struggle Against Fascism and liar (Com-
munist-) 19-2b Sept.
21 Sept People's Republic of China proclaimed, 1949.
28 Sept Friedrich Engels born, 1820 (note same date for founding of the
First International). Dies 5 Aug 1895.
October II Nonaligned Nations Conference (I in Belgrade), Cairo.
Sponsors: Ceylon, UAR, Yugo. October 1964.
2 Oct Mohandas Karamedhand Ghandi born, 1862 (assassinated 30 Jan 1948).
11 Oct Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung issue joint "peace and unity"
pledge" 1945.
19 Oct 13th Biennial General Council, World Federation of Trade Unions
(WFTU) Budapest, Hungary.
19 Oct USSR and Japan resume diplomatic relations without peace treaty,
1956.
S a
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000404/14
A-RDP78-03061A000200080106-7
P .O 'Lm L S GUIDE TO CO,=RJNIST DISSETNSI NN
#34
18-31 July 1964
entary
Principal Developments:
1. The Chinese replied to the CP8U15`June declaration of intent to
accelerate prep's?.tions'for a world conference in an 8,000-word letter dated
28 July, probably the most brutally arrogant reiteration yet of CCP intent
to "bury" the CPSU leaders unless they surrender (see summary in Chrono,
July 30/31)? It refutes all aspects of the CPSU letter, recalls that the
CPSU's 'special right" in convoking meetings was made contingent or prior
consultation and`unan.3mous'agreement, declares that the CCP will never take
part in a Soviet-118pttist meeting, and taunts the CPSU with having fallen
into its own trap and facing an insoluble dilemma. In addition to denouncing
Soviet betrayal"ant subversion of the Japanese GP by conniving with Shiga
and company, it charges that the CPSU is "ganging up with Indonesian reaction-
aries" against the PKI. Chinese media heavily replay anti-Soviet JCP, PKI
end N. Korean materials; also the Rumanian protest against joint Danube ex-
ploitation.
2. The open. `w9rfare between the C1'S'(J and the" Japenes`e OP described in
+33 assumed major'proportions,with new developments almost daily. The Indone-
sian and N. Korean parties openly supported the JCP against the "subversive
machinations" of the "modern revisionists," the N. Koreans adding: "We have
already had bitter experience of such an act of these people." (See Chrono,
throughout the period.)
3. Soviet media coxtinued to carry "routine" anti-COP material and
statements of support from other parties -- including specific Finnish sup-
port of a Soviet-style preparatory meeting -- while unconfirmed reports say
that behind-the-scenes preparations for such a conference are going ahead.
Pravda on the l5th'and 24th published extensive excerpts from Chinese docu-
ments and speeches -- carefully selected and juxtaposed to show how the CCP
line has changed over the past five years and more.
o~ K~irushchev, Novotny, and Ulbricbt with Gomulka in
4. The ga her ing'
Warsaw for the '~Oth anniversary -of "People's Poland," the 5-day visit of the
top-level Rumanian delegation headed by Premier Maurer to Paris, and an un-
expected 2-day visit of C?SU leader Podgorny to Bucharest added nothing to the
overt dissensions in the SCM.
5. The M ~oreim Ministry sent another protest note to the
Chinese Embassy in Ulan Bator, this time in connection with "obscene, rowdy
acts of certain' Chinese"citizens" in U.B. during Chinese Mongolian cycle
races (Chrono, July 3l).
6. As the fperiod ended, another major public batt1e, ' before non-Communist
peace partisans as wa l'as'hard-line Communists, was developing in Japan in
connection with the rival Tokyo and Hiroshima world "Ban-the-Bomb" conferences.
The Chinese and their supporters won the first round hands down, -- but the
va1I-out of''alsnost half of the delegations in support of the Soviets may have
made it a hollow victory. (See Chrono, Jul 0 and continuing.)
Approved For Release 2,000/b4/14 : CI, - - 3061AOOQ%%00 0006 ant)
oamen .
 25X1C10b
Appproved For Re ease 20ob/04/ '? P78-03061A00020008~OOU6-7
(Commentary Cont.)
Sinificance:
The 28 July COP letter, brazenly but deftly countering mostof the points
of the 15 June C1 tT letter, clearly outlined the dilemma in which the CPSU
finds its.e].f. It is' most difficult to foresee a successful outcome of Khru-
actuaolls toeconvenethaiigmeeorna or a preparatory 2b-party meeting: if he manages
which we still consider rather doubtful,
considering the opposition even among pro-Soviet CPs, let alone within the
C?SU itself (of which we kizow too little) --, then he must formalize the split
and pay a virtually unacceptable price to obtain some semblance of world-wide
support (not from the Chinese themselves who are almost certainly beyond con-
cessions, but fic'm some of the "wavering!"parties). His only other alterna-
tive is to abaodop;the plan of a world conference -- which must result in
further heavy loss of face 'tor the'CPSU and for Khrushchev personally.
Meanwhile, the non-Communist peace movement throughout the world must be
further disillusioned by the bitter public battles characterizing this year's
rival ban-the-bomb conferences in`Japan.
Approved For Release 2000/04/1
(Commentary Cont.)
-RDP78-03061 A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C1Ob
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2060/04/14:: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
CfIONt?LdGY -- C ST DISSENSIONS
#34
anese CP.
18-31 July 1961+
h broke out earlier in the month
whi
'F
o
c
are
n wa
ut the er od: Tne
u o-.and continuing) pro-
C'SiJ and the J'Cf' fee Chrono X33, July 5
duce the following results
duced
-IM (delayed); Indonesian Ci' daily 1Iarian Rakjat, full text of resolution
on unitof the I adopted at PKI First National conference (see Chrono,
July 3-9), denounces "the activities of the modern revisionists to erode,
split, and 6tr6y the struggle of the peoples of various countries" while it
"welc es with great pleasure" the "new victory" of the Japanese CP in driv-
ing out "the revisionist.Shiga=Suzuki.group." (It also reiterates PKI in-
sistence on the necessity of bilateral talks between the CPSU and the Albanian
Party as well asOPStJ=CCP before an"international conference can be held.)
Chinese press prominently publishes full text on 21st.
-- thth; JCP daily`Akahata, text of 5 July JCP reply to CPSU letters of 18
April and. 11 July to JCP, giving "inside story of ill-fated JCP delegation
visit to Moscow in "'refutation" of CPSU "slander."
Be CPSU complaint that delegation refused to sign a joint communique:
"Youforcedthe delegation to accept the draft of a ,joint com-
;
mmuniqua wh1a~ was utterly different "from the contents of the talks. it
is natural, therefore, for the delegation to have rejected ilt.
Taking up the Soviet charge that the JCP refused to publicize CPSU views, the
JCP asserts it has "intensively publicized important Soviet material, includ-
ing that differing from ` m the stand and opinion of the JCP."
"On the contrary., you have long refrained from informing the Soviet
Communists and people'of`lthe important decisions and statements of the
JCP. After all,- you arbitrarily demand that the JCP publish your ma-
terial only`and?that the SC? unconditionally agree with your stand and
opinion. You, however, have no such rights...."
Regarding the CPSU complaint that 'heir 18 April letter had not been discussed
in JCP inner circles,
"Your assertion is no true a all. In any case, just when and how our
Party's Presidium and`Cd'disciis6 the problems of the ICM and relations
with the CPStT is our Party's internal problem."
Noting that "we have mutually agreed not to announce the contents of the Japan-
Soviet party conference in'Moscow," the statement asks rhetorically:
"What is the objective of this unilateral announcementof your let-
ter? The only answer' is that you are providing materials to slander our
Party in` favor of Edhiga;' Suzuki, and other anti-Party elements who are
engaged in-subversive activities against our Party..., and also that you
ve activities against our Party."
are stepping up your subversi
Approved For Release 2000/04/141: C1 k-RDP78-03061(qp
Qg Q~~~;
 Approved FortR~Iease 2000/04/141: dIA-RDP78-03061 A000200080006-7
(Chronology Con
It closes by rea. 2 irmkx , the tCP l s ae uerm1nat .on not to tolerate ernyun-reasonable interf erenbe in the affairs of our Party by any co (sic)."
(Text front paged"by all Chinese papers on 24th.)
-41; JCP leader Sboichikasuga, addressing the national convention of the
Japanese tax fie union federation Sohyo, apologizes for his Party's error in
4-f k4 l r _ To1cyo in English on 21st), reports Japanese
s o
t th
e qu
disc Gent Communist leader Shiga s +press conference a
~a
nev "Voice of Jaran doc3.etydenouncing'the JCP's "self-criticism" of its
opposition to the April strike and s ying that neither he nor Suzuki had been
informed of the contents of the CPSU letter to the JCP, although they were
still leading'mem'6ers w1ien'the letter was sent.
--21st; Moscow central tra.e union daily trud criticizes JCP "sectarianists"
opposition to the 17 April strike and quotes "the statement made by Communist
Deputy of the Japanese Parliament I. Suzuki," condemning the JCP course in
this respect as "erroneous."
?; Akahata, Aexts of JCP ltters "to bPStU over past year and a half.
First, 6 March 1963, replies to C U 22 February 1963 letter inviting JCP to
send tends a deele attion to'Moscow" pleads delay on pretext impending local elec-
tions. p y'convention -- but "emphasizes importance of settling dispute
between CPSU sxic 'CC 'R soonest: Second, 22 October 1963, replies to CPSU let-
ter of 12 October,, which apparently tried to expedite visit: offers further
pretexts for delay and'dwel1s at'rength on differences over test-ban treaty,
complaining particularly a=bout Zhiikov report in Pravda "openly denouncing
our Party" after ''the 9th vrorld anti-bomb conference in Japan last year. The
third, 10 January 196-, replies to CPSU letter of 26 November 1963: says
that the JCP is "examining aplan-to send a delegation," and returns to the
test-ban conflict,rebu`fing an appar"ent" Soviet effort to defend the Zhukov
report.
Texts of geese'l 3 JCP'letters axed the 2 CPSU letters published 18 July
are published by``alI Chinese l papers ion 24th.
Akahata text of undated'Ltatement by Tsuyoshi Doki, JCPI CC Secretary,
rebutting theSShiga-Suzuki press conference statements of 20th. Branding
their statemen ha they learned about the 18 April CPSU letter for the
first time when it was?publishec as a downright lie, Doki writes about
Shiga's "secret visits' to the govlet ' nbass ..
! two articles - "In Reply to the Public Criticism by Mr.
Aka h
,
?
' a n d I n Refutation of t h e Radio Moscow Broadcasts a n d Other Criti-
Zhukov;
cism" -- with an'edltori - note which concludes:
"Though we shall make a necessary reply later to a seriesof unfounded
criticisms 'in the CPSU/CC's letter of 18 April, we must here openly re-
fute Zhu oa article, against"which we have so far reserved any formal
retort for nearly one year, and other criticisms....'
Chinese press publishes excerpts on 30th.
Approved For Release2000/04/14;: CIARDP78-03061A00p2000 0006-7
tCbrono ogy Cont.)
 V I i { i ,
Approved For Release 2000/b4/14 : IA-RDP78-03061 A000200080606-7
(Chronology ' Cont. )
th; Chinese pay~e:.'s, e:"?e:a^ive el:ee is of 11 July Akahata article: "Anti-
AHBomb Movement and the Splittists' Theories and Practice."
h XoreParty daily No ong Sinmun, editorial' of over 1-,000 words,
" Subversive Machinations JCP Can Never Be Tolerated," -- a severe
denunciation of CpW (un-named) policies:
?...Some people are waitoxly violating the standard guiding mutual re-
lations among hater nal parties (FPs) ...
"...These people, spreading their wrong views, try to force all
others to fo l.ow their blindly and try to put pressure on and plot
against'those"'parties which do not obey them. We have already had bit-
ter such an act of these people. They accuse others of
having started polemics'after they themselves provoked open polemics,
and they condemn others as splitters while they themselves are resorting
to splitting `nachinati.orns....
"This is'a most typicei.'great-power chauvinist act intended to es-
tablish superior-azacl-inferior'relations between FPs. Acting as if they
hold a certain central position in the 1CM, they attempt to issue orders
to others and wi 'idly?meddle.even in the internal affairs of FPs....
..That can ju ti?y su h a criminal act of backing renegades who
are trying to'subvert'the party leadership and disrupt the party...?
"Today the M P aid the J are firmly united....The unity between
the two part"ies:.. Is iuishakable.... We support in its entirety the
righteous struggle of.the JCP...."
Peking People's Daily reprints fu text on 29th.
--31st; OCI' letter' to the hP8h dated 8th and published on'31st (see Chrono,
U17-50131) condemns the CPSU repeatedly for its "unscrupulous open attacks
on the valiant JCP," its "act of betrayal," "interference and subversion,"
etc.
Jam: Pravda, article by'k" yGen Ville Pessi reiterates FCP
inn sh C? Sec
support for world conference, but also endorses Soviet position that pre-
paratory committee should consist of those parties represented on the draft-
ing for the 1960 meeting and affirms that the FCP is ready to take
part in preparations.
Jul 7.9 & 24: Pravda '' Docum'
r als ow 'ho4r th ents xpos@," two installments of Chinese CP ma-
ing the present CCP line diverges from the agreed line of
' and from earlier'speeches and documents by the Chinese leaders them-
July 21: Pravda, article byakial.ev, criticizes "substantial shortcomings"
in the 3-year plan for Zanzibar worked out by CPR specialists. "The main
shortcomings of"their plan are the absence of economic justification, its
substitution wit."bare figures, and insufficient elaboration of the questions
of profitabilit ."
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: C)A-RDP78-03061 ,qR,3P0(,8qQ467
Oth r Deevvelo sments,.
 Approved For F elease 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A00020008~0006-7
(Chronoogy Cont.
July 22: ?arsa~a ga he szt; of KIu uchchev, Novotny and. Ulbricht with Gomulka
"fo 2~th anniversary of "People's Poland" produced no overt contribution to
the struggle in the iCM.
Jul 2: Czech Party daily RudePravo, "A Strange Courtship," charges that,
in pursuing their concept of "intermediate states," "the Chinese leaders are
now courting certain circles in West Germany, and this process is reciprocal."
It concludes: "This provides an example of how birds of a different feather
can meet on the same ?twi$...'.this s-?range ? courtship is directed against the
Soviet Union."
In Izvesti ~ Canadian CP Chairman Tim Buck derider. t" "r
reiterates olsm" or "Chinese
m as Liu o-chi called it, and iCanadian CP
or Asian larx s _.
advocacy of a world conference.
July l At a Moscowpress'conference on preparations for the World Youth
Forum due to open there 16 September, Iraqi Behnan Petrus of the Permanent
. , ,., .. 1
..,.-.
baa b
eceive to two letters sent to
re
een r
y
Chi,aese youth organ zaYions but that the forum would be successful without
Chinese participation.
. y full texts of the 12)000-word Rumanian Viata
Jx26: Peking People's n
f _
for inint development
Pro
r
D
b
e vas -"t, ...~.. ...... ... --- ? ----
anu
oZ bile .tUWU.L-
Izvest_ article repudiatiiag'"the proposal(Chronos #31 and #32).
July2 -28: CPSU/CC Secretary and Presidium member Nikolay P orny made a
2-day friendly visit" to Rumania: content of discussions not divulged.
At a 3-day `Tokyo peace conference attended by some 400 religious
Jay 27-29:
leaders of different faiths from 16 countries, including Communist Bloc coun-
tries as well as Japan..., }a delegate of the Soviet Union and his Communist
Chinese counterpart T~tonday staged a strange version of the Soviet-Chinese
ideological scuiMling," The'test=ban treaty was again the main bone of con-
tention, and "the'dommunisi Chinese argument was upheld by Indonesian, Cuban,
North Korean, arid. 'Canadian (sic) representatives," according to Kyodo in
English on the 28th.
July : The top-level'Rumanian delegation to Paris, led by Premier
Maurer, brought an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and on
negotiations for a long-term commercial pact, cultural exchange and consular
convention, but the lumanians affirmed their loyalty to the USSR on major
East-West issues.
July 28: A NCNA statement'(front-paged in all Peking papers can the 29th)
rebuts the 8 July Pravda article "slanderously alleging that China collabo-
rates with Portuga , oes not deny planned establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions with that country, and uses Macao to export opium, etc."
"The a,liegations about Sino-Portuguese relations published in Pravda
are out-and-out groundless fa"brications.... China has never considered
establishment o? diplomatic relation with Portugal...."
+ivn correspond Ksyukov writes about the universal militariza-
R` OwSey/TO /A /' n?-,F~P~ 0~140~0 1~9 `0 as
the most pressing task today. (Chronology Cont.)
 Approved Far eiea a 2060/04/141: CIA.RDP78-03061A000200060006-7
{chronology Cone-
Jul 2Q: Pravda re ortc tha "recent'- the Chinese press?'rias shar~ly in-
tenifed the unbridled slanderous campaign against theWCM..., attacking
the SU aid the CPe ' es ec rally 'fervently. Ili the period from 16 to 24 July
this year, Peo le4s'Dailz,,`alone' published about 500 items attacking the CPSU
July 0 1: NCNA on 30th announceslthat tCPCC has sent a letter dated 28
July to the CPSUU in reply to its letter dated 15 June: full texts of both
are published in all Peking papers and Red Flag on 31st. The 8,000-word
COP letter -- prat bly the most brutally arrogant reiteration to date of the
Chinese ntent toy' bury" the C?SU leaders unless they surrender -- compre-
hens ively anc tots fy"refutes all aspects of, the CPSU letter, declares that
the CCP 'will never'take Part" in a Soviet-style meeting, and taunts the CPSU
with its "insoluble dilemma."
The C P letter, is divi.ed into 5 numbered parts. The first, addressing
itself to the Soviet charge' of a SYiinese ?"volte-face" on the question of a
world meeting, reviews the history of the question a la COP, beginning with
their endorsement in the'spring of''1962 of a joint Indonesian-Vietnam-New
Zealand proposal'througha thrushc1ev1 16 January 1963 statement, to show that
it is really a Soviet'"volte-race.' Of particular interest:
organization pressure to
"You b ve brought great political and
bear upon iraterna1 parties (FPs), intensified your subversive and di-
versive activities zri liin t'X's; and. extended your collusion with de-
fector ., r s, ;ky' .es, the Vito clique, and, reactionaries of
't'r ots1
every s reneg acl e
description. For exampple, you staged the act of betrayal by
l
Yoshio Shiga; 'chizo $uziuki, and others in order to injure the JCP which
upholds M-L. "You are 'busy with the Indonesian reactionaries
in order to In j ure the 'Inaones'iari which upholds M-L.
Part II denouncuesnitty" the "pure fraud!' of the CPSU claim that their meeting
"rill " seek ways to their proposal "boils down to one thing: you
when the
really want to force the 14-t parties 'to accept the revisionist line peddled
by the 20th and ~Iid congresses 6f-the CPSU."
trick is to try and make capital out of the sentence
r ;av
'"
oe
You
in the declarat on'of119~7 and the statement of"1960 concerning the 20th
Congress of the"CP?U. But you know perfectly well that the COP has
always been'against that'sentence. At both meetings of the FPs, you
made repeatea. requests, c1aim1ng that you would face great difficulties
.,. s~ i i Wn i
unless ttie sseneatenceu was incluZLed. It was out of consideration for your
r. 'ss tha ,t we made concessions on this point.... It is absolutely
fficultie
impermissibiie that you should' use this sentence as a subterfuge for push-
ing your revisionist line or 'as 'a big stick with which to attack fraternal
M-L parties."
Part III treats "the procedure and steps" advanced"bythe CPSU "for
openly splitting the'ICM."
--First, on the prepatorr meets g, the CCP repeats its proposal and dis-
misses the Soviet ?ran for participation of the 26 parties which drafted the
ent onsaY~ gnat "they have no hereditary rights." It repeats
that statem Y
is now "vastly different that two parties now exist in
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A00020008I0006-7
5 (Chronology Cont.
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
(Chronology Cont.)
some of the 26 countries and you and i?;e di fer as to which of the two should
attend." Also, "it is necessary to achieve unanimity" or "no preparatory
meeting of whatever kind will be legal."
-- Second, on CCP-CPSU talks, it notes that the CPSU is now "trying to brush,
them aside" as of little import" and preparing to call a world meeting with-
out agreement between the two. "?What is this if not a resolve to call a
meeting to precipitate a split?"
-- Third, on the composition of the international meeting, it rejects emphat-
ically the CPSU criterion for new participants, stating that "M-L parties
which have been rebuilt after breaking with revisionism...wil1 of course be
entitled to participate, and no one has any right to exclude them."
-- Fourth, on the right to convene an international meeting, it rebuts the
CPSU claim of a "special responsibility" deriving from a 1957 decision by
noting that the full text of that decision requires "consultation with the
FPs before calling any meeting."
"Moreover, we wish to point out that the principle of unanimity
through consultation among the FPs was established at the meeting of the
FPs in 1960.... Should you dare to violate this principle..., you will
have no right whatsoever to call any international meeting."
Section IV is a bold claim of the rapidly growing strength of the true
Marxist-Leninists -- which "strikes terror into your hearts" -- and reaf-
firmation of CCP "duty" to "give firm support" to them, including some of
the following passages:
"Your letter brazenly charges us with 'the intensification of
factional, disruptive activities, and the utmost exacerbation of po-
lemics.' This only serves to show that you are so terrified by the
mighty forces`df 14-L that you have taken leave of your senses and are
talking nonsense.
"The splits that ve occ6red in the CPs of Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Ceylon, and many other countries are the result of your own
pursuit of a `revisionist and divisive line and of your own frenzied
subversive and factional activities....
"So .ox as you p6r6lst i'n your revisionist line and refuse to
admit your e~rbr6 u1i icl , we will certainly continue the great debate
....~ thoiif thoroughly clarifying such major issues..., how can there
be a basis for the unity of the FPs and how can an international meet-
of the PPs be held successfully?
'soget at the root.iof the matter, time is not on your side,
Lou atdhave last faith in your own future. Reality is a compelling
orce,and your "letter, which lacks reason and conviction and is charac-
terized b a mouse-like timidity despite its air of ferocity reflects
your state of 0177. .:
In Section Vr ` the CCP' "solemn .y declares: We will never take part in
any internationaY meeting,'or any preparatory meeting for it, which you call
for the purpose of splitting the ICM." It notes that "during the 14 years
Approved For Release 2000/04/14 :6CIA-RDP78-030 ,@PPAq1QOg-7
 Approved For Re,Ieate 206OII4/14 : CIA-RDP78-03061 AO00200080006-7
___ _ t St Tr ernationcl in 191+3' to 1957 there
his did
B
u V
. --- -
was not a s ing1e' international meeting of a.s l Cr a ?
the progres's of t'he cause bf international Communism. On the contrary,
during those 14 years, the Chinese revolution triumphed.... Why should a
meeting be called'in such a great hurry now?"
"Since you have made up your minds, you will most prob..bly call
the meeting otherwise, by breaking your word, would you not become
.. ..._.... ---_,.__~..__i A
the saying Roes: You
s
L of the "Tenth t~7orldonfere ce Against
en
' ie' o
i
p
n
ontinu
Jul. d and c Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs" in Tokyo is accompanied by bitter political strug-
gle and recrimifiitions'between'the Soviet-and Chinese-line factions. This
was expected after the powerful, Soviet-sympathizing Japanese Socialist Party
had broken away :from the Hiroshima Conference last year and this year is hold-
ing its . oim "' Torlc Conference" in Hiroshima August 3-9. The Soviet and some
other delegations planned:to participate in both, but they were coldly re-
ceived in Tokyo. The Soviets charge that the Chinese, taking advantage of
the fact that only half of the delegates were on hand, began their machina-
tins during three days preceding the scheduled opening. After
tions in mee
the Chinese succeeded inTreezin$ the Soviets out of any share in the leader-
ship of the 56-nation meeting at-the opening session on the 31st (by ramming
through a rule barring any nation from participating in both the Tokyo and
Hiroshima meetings, though they could attend in observer capacity), the
Soviets lea 26 other delegations-in a walk-out from the conference. Further
developments will be reported in next installment.
Jul l: Ulan Bator Mon same service annOunCes: "on 28 July 1961 the IPR
oreign Ministry delivered a note of protest to the CPR Embassy in connection
with the obscene, rows.. acts of certain Chinese citizens who, during the
Mongolian iriese--cyclera.ces held in Ulan Bator 211-2 July, openly initiated.
2royOca,ti6ns"creating disorder on the raceway and grossly encroached upon the
liberty of certain MPR citizens and militiamen.?
Approved For Release 2000/04/14' : CIA-'RDP78-03061AO666"0c-?fpt')
w'i end by losing your skin.... We firmly believe that thed
into your grave.
t
a lauga -stioUn UUwJ.. 11j,"v u ... ..~_~ - ._
e d smount from e ti ar tare -rid . You are caught in andi -
you
ri u e emma.. You are ailing into a trap of your own making our so-
o
ealled meeting takes place will be the day You s p
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
S E C R E T 10 August 1964
813. De Gaulle's ym,.enilinour o: South America (20 September - 16 October)
25X1 C
SITUATION: De Gaulle's grand design of restoring France to the rank of
a world power -- as she had not been since the days of Louis XIV and Na- ..>;
poleon I -- has three principal aspects: in Western Europe, he wants a loose
federation of governments under French hegemony (possibly with West Germany
as a junior partner), eliminating U.S. Influence as much as possible; outside
Europe, especially in Africa -- but now also extending into Asia and Latin
America --, he wants, at the very least, to re-establish a French "presence"
by means of active diplomacy (which includes offers of intervention in matters
of little real concern to France, such as Cyprus), trade, some technical
economie aid and especially cultural relations, utlizing for these purposes
the far-flung net of former French colonies; finally, he wants to make him-
self arbiter between East and West -- which he has started by recognizing Com-
munist China, by proposing -neutralization" of Southeast Asia, arid, most re-
cently, by rapidly improving France's relations with the Eastern European
Communist regimes, at the moment focusing upon Rumania.
The tenor of de Gaulle's press conference on 23 July 64 reflected his
continuing determination to obstruct Western unification wherever it does not
meet de Gaulle's terms and to undermine U.S. influence with friendly nations.
There is every indication that his month-long Latin American tour, ambitious
sequel to his more modest visit to Mexico last March, is designed to enhance
French relations in the Western Hemisphere at the expense of US relations and
policies as necessary. De Gaulle's regime attempted to befriend leftist
Brazilian President Goulart until he was overthrown, while Peronistas in
Argentina are looking forward to the visit of the man with whom they share
enmity against the U.S., a preference for "strong-man" rule and a common
nostalgia for the policies and military tactics of the long-dead past.
De Gaulle is pre-occupied with certain themes which he adapts to the
situation or locale of the moment. The unclassified attachment itemizes some
of these recurring themes, along with pertinent rebuttals which de Gaulle has
provoked from France's own allies. It is particularly notable that the
loudest expressions of distress over de Gaulle's actions have come not from
the Communists of China, the Soviet Bloc, or France, but from France's Free
World partners. But US criticism in Latin America would be counterproductive.
25X1 C10b
pprove
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
S E C R E T
(813 Cont.)
If it appears at all necessary to counter statements by de Gaulle or
any high French official accompanying him (or comment made by officials or
media of the host countries), such counter moves should follow these guide
lines (and should not use any US comments):
1. Criticism should be based on Latin American or free world interests
and views, but not as a defense of U.S. interests and policies.
2. Perso Uv slighting attacks on de Gaulle or adverse criticism of
France or of the French people as a, whole must be strictly avoided.
3. Critical analysis of de Gaulle's grand design and his resulting for-
eign policy should emphasize that (i) France's human and material
resources clot fulfill these over-ambitious plans, (ii) weakening
of free-world unity and solidarity threatens the qgtional securit
of every free country and tends to endanger world peace, (iii) his
views on Comm=ism are utterly unrealistic ("neutralization" mans
to leave the Communists in possession of the areas they rule, e.g.
North Vietnam, while offering them a partnership in the areas they
have not yet conquered, e.g. South Vietnam).
If de Gaulle offers a host country economic advantages, media should at-
tempt to in him (or his spokesmen) down to specific figures, times and con-
ditions. Where applicable, those advantages might be compared with the host
country's gross national product, total foreign trade, or with benefits under
the Alliance for Progress. Data on French expenses for her former colonies,
especially on a per capita basis, might also be used in this context. See in
this context --
25X1C10b
See also Biweekly Propaganda Guidance #135, 24+ Feb 64 regarding de Gaulle's
foreign policy and related questions:
Item #74+7, Can Southeast Asip be Neutr ized
For unclassified material: Press Comment frequently carries relevant
articles.
2
Approved For Release 2000/04/a j : cP14PP78-03061 A000200? 06-7
 Approved For Release 200 / 4 : -RDP78-0306J6kqQlp06-7
5X. C W~
1~+. uoui Aggi~ession and the ?Jiv
SITUATION: The Chicom leaders, educated in the hard school of the Long
March, the Yenan caves and the fierce struggle to take over China, place their
confidence in violence and armed revolution as the most efficient and effective
means of solving the problems of the world. Without their "messianic" ambi-
tion, their racial arrogance and their fanatical intolerance of any view their own, Mao and his colleagues would never have been able to survive, let
alone seize power and exert control over all of mainland China. These same
characteristics have led them to arrogate to themselves the rights of sole
arbiter not only of what is good for China but what is good for the entire
world. These same characteristics cause them also to make the same mistakes
over and over and prevent their adapting their outmoded dogma to conditions
and circumstances that exist in China and in the rest of the world today.
The aggression against Tibet, Korea and India, the chaotic failure of
the Great Leap Forward, the moralizing stridency and righteousness of their
dogmatic position in the Sino-Soviet split are all evidence of Chicom deter-
mination to mold the world into her own narrow image, by force if, where and
as soon as they are able. They have allied themselves with extremists every-
where and have played on nationalistic differences and racial prejudices; they
make their appeal to the dissatisfied and the disgruntled to bring disorder
and chaos to established governments, especially those that need all of their
resources for their own people's welfare and can ill afford and supported create large
organizations to resist dissident elements encouraged g pP ea by the
Chicams.
In spite of clear Chicom behavior, beliefs and goals, many countries
sponsor or support the CPR application for UN membership. Some do so believ-
ing that she can be dealt with more effectively there, by being forced to ad-
here to UN principles, or simply that all nations should belong to the world
organization. Others, like de Gaulle, believe that nationalism will, of its
own force, win over communism everywhere and, therefore, that the Chicoms
should be treated as everyone else. Still others, who participate in inter-
national organizations and maintain various other types of relations with
the CPR, either feel obligated to extend these relations into the UN or feel
embarrassed or inconsistent in their actions if they refuse such admission.
There are those, in addition, who truly want to see Chicom membership in the
UN, for a variety of reasons which include failure to recognize any serious
consequences from such membership or an assumption that they themselves will
benefit from CPR admission (e.g. leftists or extreme nationalists in Afro-
Asian groups, those who themselves still feel they must use might to make
right in individual situations).
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/041'' 'f ??D'8-03061A00 0 Do6-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C1Ob
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000IM14 RDP78-03061A1g0g86-7
815 d. Khrushchev's Cultural Destalinization
SITUATION: Khrushchev faces a difficult problem: he needs to maintain
the rule of the CPSU and its leadership, since this is the foundation of his
power; on the other hand, he wishes to win popular support, to encourage
initiative, and to rebut Chinese Communist demands for uncompromisingly re-
volutionary policies. He tries to answer the problem by exonerating the
Party and himself, while blaming past terrorism on Stalin, and present stag-
nation and factionalism on "survivals of the personality cult." But the
logic of anti-Stalinism leads the Soviet Union, and especially its intel-
lectual avant garde, in directions which Khrushchev never intended. In parti-
cular, the conflict with Peking, and the consequent need to bid for support
from revisionist elements abroad, handicaps the efforts of the CPSU to insist
on intellectual orthodoxy at home.
Khrushchev's aims differ sharply from those of the "liberal" writers and
artists in Moscow and Leningrad. Khrushchev has sanctioned pooms and novels
which he thought would help to discredit Stalin. The younger poets, novelists,
and artists seek to extend the attack to condemn all efforts to dictate a
rigid orthodoxy. Leaving aside the old Stalinists, there is within the
liberal camp itself a range of opinion about the degree to which artistic
work should contribute to "Communist construction." Tactical compromises are
often made. But in general, the liberals bring a continuous pressure for
more freedom of expression and more freedom to travel. They promptly seize
on any apparent relaxation of party control for new publications and exhibi-
tions. After Khrushchev approved the publication of Aledsandr Solzhenitsyn's
prison camp novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, editorial offices
were (according to one of the Party's chief ideologists, L.F. Ilichev)
flooded with "vile, anti-Soviet manuscripts." ''then it was rumored that Khru-
shchev had made a secret speech in the Central Committed calling for greater
creative freedom (23 November 1962), Moscow's "underground artists" organized
within one week a public exhibition of their paintings and sculptures.
Knowing how Khrushchev would react to abstract art, conservative artists
and bureaucrats saw to it that he visited this exhibition (they also probably
helped arrange it, as provocation), and after making various unprintable re-
marks, he "declared war" on the liberals. (The remarks were printed in
Encounter, April 1963.) Conferences of writers, artists, and party leaders
were held in December 1962 and March 1963, and a party plenum in June 1963
repeated the customary calls for strict observance of the party line. During
this period sharp attacks were made against Ilya Ehrenburg,Viktor Nekrasov,
Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Vasily Aksenov, and Andrey Voznesensky, and in July 1963
the liberals lost control of the Moscow writer's organization.
But after April 1963, there was on the whole a relaxation. The leader-
ship apparently became concerned over domestic fears of a return to Stalinism,
and over hostile comment from abroad; the Italian Communist Party publicly
dissociated itself from the Soviet hard line on 17 April. The cultural aspect
of the June plenum was eclipsed--and probably influenced by--the open eruption
of the Sino-Soviet controversy. During the past year, liberal writers have
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
e V - n . M (815 Cont.)
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
(815 Cont.) a&^"I
continued to get their rnaterff.a.l pzub? ished. 1-r en the official newspaper Izvest-
published (August 1963) Aleksandr Tvardovsky's anti-Stalin poem,
'Vasily Terkin in Paradise," and the conservative magazine Oktyabr October)
objected violently, Izvestiya ruled that the conservative criticisms were
"unacceptable." Now the conservative writers are writing stories about loyal
party men who maintain their party spirit despite imprisonment, or who suffer
anguish over the terrible orders they must carry out.
It still is easy for reactionary officials to punish or harass those
whom they think remiss in party spirit. The case of Josef Brodsky shows what
can happen to a young poet. (See attachment: since attachment was written,
Victor Zorza has reported that Brodsky has been released, but on what condi-
tions is not yet known.) In Poland, once considered relatively permissive,
the regime has acted against the liberals by tightening press censorship, and
by restricting paper supplies. 34 leading Polish intellectuals signed a
letter of protest which received publicity in the west, and the regime re-
taliated against the signers by suspending their passports and stopping the
publication of their work.
The Polish government has since withdrawn most of its punitive measures
as a result of the public protest, including that abroad. As in the Soviet
case in 1963, the opinion of foreign intellectuals seems to have effect. And
even if foreign intellectuals could be ignored, the Soviets and their friends
must respond to Chicom attacks. On 11 July, Lituraturnaya Gazeta, not ordi-
narily liberal, defended. Yevtushenko, Voznesensky, and Yevtushenko's ex-wife,
Bella Akhmadulina, against Chinese charges of revisionism and, in answer to
Chinese mockery of the Soviets for only criticizing erring writers, the Soviet
Journal answered: "tidhat else would you want, to arrest them?" Domestically,
as in an article in Kommunist #10, the CPSU has tended lately to take an
"above the struggle" stance, and this kind of position is certain to be ex-
ploited by the intellectuals.
Approved For Release 200 P78-03061A0pZ0O&WQ06-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
T 10 August 196
25X1C10b
816 tqH,g. Juanita Castro's Defection
LIF-or more complete background information see unclassified attachment:
Juanita Castro Chooses Freedom and its Spanish version Juanita Castro escoge
la libertad. Either of these may be passed to indigenous assets, but with
the caution that they are to be used for the facts contained in them and
n o t reproduced verbatim. Forwarded also is a zerox copy of her statement
as it appeared in Excelsior, Mexico City, 30 June, along with an English trans-
lation. See Press Comment for further background or for any future develop-
ments
SITUATION: FYI Only. It is fairly evident, from the volume of the
news stories and the tenor of the editorial comment, that Juanita Castro's
defection has had a notable impact upon world opinion. Speaking as she did
some three weeks before the Washington meeting of foreign ministers of the
OAS, it was natural for her to make a special appeal for OAS action against
Cuba, whether or not this actually influenced any votes. In any event, the
strong wording of the resolution and the 15 to 4 decision was certainly better
than most anti-Castro observers had hoped for. Also, just how far her action
will go in weakening the internal fabric of the Castro regime time alone will
tell. All in all, her move is an important and favorable development in the
cold war against Castro.
As this is being written, it has been learned that Tuanita has sold ex-
clusive rights to her story to Life magazine. Since Life en espanol is
second in circulation only to Selecciones del Readers Ages t in Latin
America, this will serve to keep the subject in the public conscience of
that region for some time to come.
Some time during the month of August, Juanita will probably proceed to
Brazil, where she has a number of devoted and very influential friends. Her
arrival there will undoubtedly be the occasion of additional interviews and
feature stories. She received her asylum papers from the Mexican. government
on 30 July. In order to be able to re-enter Mexico after her trip to Brazil,
she will have to make a formal request for a re-entry permit. Thus, it is
not known where she will make her permanent residence. While in Mexico she
will be inhibited -- unofficially, by the government -- from making further
critical remarks about Cuba.
From the point of view of U.S. interest, perhaps the only unfavorable
development in the whole affair was the allegation in a number of papers
-- generally not included in Press Comment -- that Juanita had been secretly
working for the CIA for years. The most important of these appeared In the
Nev York Herald Tribune, 3 July 1961, over the by-line of Barnard L. Collier.
The writer did not identify his sources but claimed that the information was
confirmed by highly placed intelligence sources in Washington. See below
for treatment of this aspect of the case. End FYI Only.
(816 cont.)
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
25X1C10b
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 ?5X1C1O
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
T 10 August 196+
,ion: First Trots ite Ent Into Coalition Government
817. Cgy
SITUATION: For the first time in history, a non-Communist nation has
included a Trotskyite party in its government. Ceylon, since its independ-
ence (1947) racked by communal strife between Sinhalese and Tamils, beset
by eco_._nomicc difficulties and ruled since 1956 by a vacillating, though .auto-
cMtic, leftist and neutralist leadership, has now "broadened its base of
government by forming a coalition, in a desperate attempt to overcome eco-
nomic and communal strife as well as reckless Marxist opposition.
Communists, whether orthodox or "deviationists" (such as Trotskyites,
Titoists, etc.), n e v e r treat non-communist "allies" gs e a u a 1B
-- due to their doctrinary insistence that the future belongs to the workers
and peasants, that only one party can represent one class: and hint they are
that one party, thus entitled to monopoly rule. however disguised for
tactical reasons, Communists apply this basic strategy in all united front
combinations, whether in or out of government. This was originally demon-
strated by the first Popular Fronts in the thirties, in France and Spain.
It is now being exercised in Indonesia, where the Communists -- though not
formally in the government -- increasingly dominate Sukarno's regime, in
Cuba -- where Castro's non-Communist supporters were gradually elicit cted --
and in quite a few other instances.
Even though the government of Ceylon (where the non-Communists are
faced with an orthodox CP, now s p 1 i t into Moscow and Peking factions,
as well as with a Trotskyite Party) would appear to have a better than even
chance to keep its dangerous partners in bounds, it remains very much to be
seen whether Mrs. Bandaranalke, despite her anti-imperialism, anti-Western-
ism and neutralism, will be realistic and farsighted enough to keep the Com-
munist factions disunited and to strengthen her mass support from non-Com-
munist labor and other groups.
SUPPORT MATERIALS include an unclassified attachments: Ceylon an4 Trotsky
;god. gee also the following Biweekly Guidances:
25X1ClOb
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A0002?~Q80O06-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
(817 Cont.) ~,~``
Books
"Ceylon, Dile,s of a New Nation," by W. Howard Wriggins, Princeton
25X1
Univ. Press, 1960
"The Land and. People of Ceylon," by Donald N. Wilbur. J. B. Linnin_
Approved For Release 200e,1 78-03061A000200Q8 116-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Fact Sheets For Background Only
August 1964
The U.S. Versus Free Europe
At his 23 July press confer ice de Gaulle resumed his self-appointed
role as prophet and spokesman for Europe, and recited his favorite non
sequitur - "the division of the world into two camps led respectively by
Washington and Moscow no longer corresponds to the new situation," there-
fore, the interests of Free Europe and the U.S. are in conflict. While
de Gaulle has never explained the why and how of this vaTua assertion,
he has been using it ever more insistently to confront Free World govern-
ments with an alleged necessity to choose between French and American
policies. In the face of America's post-war rehabilitation of i',rrope,
de Gaulle presents the U.S. as economically predatory, politically domi-
neering, and militarily unreliable as a partner.
Whereas de Gaulle's reasonings are obscure, his intent to regain
the glory that was France and raise her to an eminent position as a world
power is clear. The flood of reactions by his European allies to his
latest pronouncements are likewise clear and somewi.;t more to the point.
Belgium. An article in Brussels' Le Soir criticized de Gaulle for,
"in a sense refusing to accept the world as it is. - - - ?trance cannot
again become a world pivot by simple affirmation of its gr deur." he
French term "grandeur" means greatness as well as splendor The article
added that the Gaullist concept suffers from "internal contradictions":
unwillingness to accept the "supremacy of two 'great powers' because
France is not one of them," and French inability to "oppose power consti-
tuted by two great confederations of people which axe the U.S. and USSR
with an equivalent force because it can be obtained only throe n a feder-
ation of European nations which would dissolve some of the Frencsh father-
land's prerogatives which he (de Gaulle) does not intend to renounce at
any price." The article concludes that the "European Europe" which de
Gaulle pleads for would already exist if it were not for his opposition.
-A front page editorial in Brussels' Libre BeMiaue condemned the Gaullist
concepts as "short-sighted" and asked, 'who follows de Gaulle?" The French
nuclear force concept was derided as a "design resulting from de Gaulle's
pride," and it was charged that nuclear force in the hands of such a
"middle-class power" as France is a grave peril to world security and is
bound to enhance the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The editorial con-
cluded that the world asks more than that of France.
Under a headline, "The Dramatic Isolation of France," Brussels' So-
cialist Vooruit noted that after the Americans had twice saved Europe,
"de Gaulle pretends that they would not do so a third time." Tice Vooruit
article went on to say that not only had de Gaulle faced 900 journalists
an old and solitary man, but that France is also alone, having lost marry
Free World friends, and is in the process of alienating the youngest, West
Germany.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A00020008 -.7)
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Brussels' Catholic Labor newspaper Het Volk accused de Gaulle of
seeking French CoiaLrmist support by pu ating spokes in the wheels of NATO
and Western unity. The paper suggested that French recognition of Commu-
nist China permitted de Gaulle to escape Communist propaganda in Africa,
and that his attacks on the U.S. are used to advantage with the French
Communists. He, t Volk had "the impression that de Gaulle desires to play
the role versus America that Tito plays versus the USSR."
West Germany. The irritated reaction of the West German government
to de Gaulle's 23 July press conference was an immediate news release at-
tributed to "highest Goverment circles in Bonn," and widely reported in
the 24+ July press. De Gaulle's pointed attack on the Federal Republic
was described as unexpected and troubling after the positions taken by
de Gaulle during his visit to West Germany just previously. Bonn considered
that the views expressed by de Gaulle could only be interpreted as a demand
for the Federal Republic (FRG) to choose between American and French poli-
cies and leadership. Bonn could not understand this in view of the French
knowledge that there is no real choice in the matter for Germany. Accord-
ing to the press release, the FRG considers an integrated defense and a
close alliance with the U.S. essential: de Gaulle's "characterization of
the close relationship of Europe and the U.S. in NATO as one of 'subordi-
nation' to the U.S. is rejected by the FRG." Bonn regretted that de Gaulle
failed in his press conference to define what he conceives to be a "Euro-
pean Europe" with its own independent policy. If the FRG was resisting a
disintegration of NATO and the concomitant reduction of its defensive
power, this was held to be precisely in order to enable Europe - insofar
as possible all of Free Europe - to become a genuine partner of the U.S.
Concerning de Gaulle's expression of disappointment over cooperation, up
to now, under the Franco-German treaty, Bonn regretted that the French
President evaluated the results already achieved so negatively - "In the
German view there is no basis for this."
FRG Press Office spokesman Von Hase issued an additional statement
pointing out that "German policy is dependent neither on the U.S. nor
France. It was added that a "joint policy of two gover.': nts cry not mean
that one government adopts all the viewpoints of the 1,111.1o FRG too
expressed regret that the Franco-German treaty had not ye.t led to an accord
of viewpoints of the two governments on important questioizs, such as the
Allied Multilateral Force (MGF). It was noted, however, that the FRG had
made quite clear upon signing the treaty that it wished to participate in
the MLF. France, which had indicated its intention not to do so, had re-
peatedly declared that it understood the German position.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said in a Cologne speech, "We did not
enter into the Franco-German treaty in order to take over French policy."
Lastly, the daily Frankfurter A mein saw a "dangerous inconsist-
ency" between de Gaulle's statement that Europe is an entity and his re-
jection of European political integration. "We believe that before pur-
suing a joint policy Europe has to be united - - - "
2 (Cont.)
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Itm&. De Gaul's press conference singling out of Italy, which
considers itself the most pro-European of the "Six," as obstructor of
European unity, served to whip up the strongest anti-de Gaulle reaction
in the Government and press since de Gaulle blackballed entry of the U.K.
into the European Economic Community (EEC). While the Foreign Ministry
press release was comparatively restrained, the press itself was not.
Christian Democratic 13. Popolo charged that the Gaullist grand design
was "Born in an atmosphere of daydreams of grandeur, foreign to the true
interests of Europe, the West, and the French people themselves.
Socialist daily Av nti editorialized that Italy, Belgium, and Erhard's
Germany "are not at all disposed to submit to de Gaulle's blackmail, and
as for Italy - since the General wished to single her out as responisble
for the failure of a 'Europe of Fatherlands' - it would be well to repeat
that such a Europe is not for us."
An 4genzip DemoGr atica communique universally ascribed to Social
Democratic Foreign Minister Saragat took indignant issue with de Gaulle's
call for Europe to liberate itself from American hegemony. "What hegem-
ony and what Europe? The hundred millions of Europeans in satellites
who must endure governments propped up by foreign armies? The 20 mil-
lion Germans separated by threat of 20 enemy divisions - one for every
million inhabitants - from the mother country? Countries like Italy,
Great Britain, West Germany and France itself which owe their survival
as free nations on extreme western edge of immense Eurasian continent to
the Atlantic Alliance? Would it be this Europe which ought to liberate
itself from American hegemony? One can well understand the irritation
of the German Government and the amazement of other European governments,
which are asking themselves in what dream world Frt-unce exercises its
foreign policy .... If the EEC should fail, and the Atlantic Alliance
disintegrate, there would be only one alternative: neutralism, fore-
runner of disaster for Italy and for everyone."
France. Even the French press conceded the negative foreign re-
ception of de Gaulle's press coL:forence. The Director of Paris' Lem
commented editorially that Fran a is not responsible for all difficulties
in uniting Europe, but "It remains true that Gaullist nationalism offers
all others a precedent and a sort of justification." He added that de
Gaulle had clearly signalled to France's partners'that a "European policy"
had to be a French policy. "By this fact he paralyzes effort, whose
necessity he proclaims, and throws our neighbors still more on the Anglo-
Saxons, whom he wishes so much to keep at a distance."
The Paris F_igaro commented that whatever is happening in the U.S.
and USSR, it was doubtful that European, states, themselves in disarray,
would willingly rally to a France, "whose language they considered too
rude, whose manners undiplomatic and whose ambitions quite disturbing."
3 (Cont.)
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Chatleri L1.S. Relri.abil{tar
In exhorting Western nations to look to France instead of America
for leadership, de Gaulle has repeatedly tried to raise doubts on Ameri-
can integrity by suggesting that good intentions of the present U.S. gov-
ernment would not be bind.ng on future administrations.
This is a weak and unbecoming argument in the face of the U.S. Gov-
ernment's recent demonstration of its capacity for smooth leadership
succession and policy continuity. It is even weaker in the face of the
Prospects that France, after de Gaulle, would be in poor shape indeed to
be an effective partner, much less a leader.
The "Anax1o-Saxon Menace"
To justify his disruption of Western unity, de Gaulle says that the
Western Alliance is "unhealt;ly," and "satisfies only the Anglo-Saxons."
Not since the 19th Century doctrine of Manifest Destiny have Anglo-Saxons
been heard of politically, except from de Gaulle. This anachronistic
mental reversion reveals him exercising French foreign policy in terms of
issues long dead and forgotten by the rest of mankind.
Erance: Whose Ally?
Whereas de Gaulle professes opposition to Communism, his actions
have consistently given aid and comfort to the Cozmnunists. The worst, of
course, was his diplomatic recognition of Communist China. Like the So-
viet Union, de Gaulle has refused to support UN peacekeeping operations,
financially or otherwise. It is universally recognized that his suggested
neutralization of Southeast Asia" would leave the area open to Chicom
takeover. He insinuated France back into the Vietnamese picture by talk-
ing of the four major powers concerned with "the past an. present fate of
Vietnam." However, it is questionable that his proposal for massive out-
side aid to "Indochina as a whole" is more than talk so far as France is
concerned. Any increase in France's current aid program there would im-
pose strains on the French budget which de Gaulle could relieve only by
cutting French commitments elsewhere, such as in Latin America.
4
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Fact Sheets Background Use Only
August 1964
Chicoms Advocate Violence and War
The Chinese Communist leaders see their policy problems and their
own role in world affairs in the light of their own past experience.
Their view is dominantly colored by their lengthy existence as outlaws
in the Yenan caves followed by the fierce guerrilla war against the forces
of Chiang Kai-shek. During all this time, Stalin (who was then considered
infallible in the Communist world) advised Mao to bide his. time and enter
a united front with Chiang's Kuomintang. With the exception of his collab-
oration with the government for the sole purpose of fighting the Japanese
in WW II, Mao ignored Stalin's advice. Both before and after that war,
he plunged China into a savage civil war that ended in the Communist sei-
zure of power and the destruction of any elements in Chinese society that
did not support the Communist program. In the light of this experience it
comes as no surprise that Mao and his colleagues place their entire confi-
dence in violence as the most efficient and effective means of solving
problems and that they recommend this means to others. (Nor is it surpris-
ing that Mao and Company are in no mood to listen to the advice of the So-
viet comrades -oar of anyone else for that matter--regarding the solution
of the world's problems today.)
On a great number of occasions the Chicom leaders have expressed their
preference and support for violence. In 1936 in his "Strategic Problems of
China's Revolutionary War," Mao called war "the highest form of struggle."
He also said:
"The (Chinese) Communist Party has led and continues to
lead the stupendous, sublime, glorious, and victorious revolu-.
tionary war. This war is not only the banner of China's lib-
eration, but it is also pregnant with significance for world
revo lutiou." (Emphasis added.)
In his "Problems of War and Strategy," Mao said:
"Experience in the class struggle of the era of imperi-
alism teaches us that the working class and the toiling
masses cannot defeat the armed bourgeois and landlords ex-
cept by the power of the gun."
Mao' s'report?to:the November 1938 plenum of the Chinese Communist
Central Committee plenary session, in which he made his famous observation
that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, was also quite ex-
plicit regarding his views of revolution and war. He said:
Some people have ridiculed us as advocates of the 'omni-
potence of war.' Yes, we are the advocates of the omnipotence
of revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and
is Marxist."
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A0002000$0 & 7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Mao leaves no doubt that his views on the subject are the same to-
day as they were in those ear er times. On 3 August 1963, the New China
News Agency reported that Mao said "The people who have triumphed in
their revolution should help the struggle of those who are still strug-
gling for liberation."
Fifteen Years of Violence: Not only have the Chicoms on may occa-
sions stated their views on the subject, they have demonstrated those
views by their actions. In the relatively brief 15 years in power they
have vi rious y subjugated the Tibetan people, they have made a mockery of
the U.N. Charter and the members of the U.N. by their aggressive attacks
against U.N. forces in Korea, and they have wantonly attacked India in
spite of India's earlier role as Communist China's chief apologist. Com-
munist China's refusal to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty was the final
straw for many people and nations who had earlier hoped to bring her closer
to the rest of the world.
In addition to aggressive attacks on her neighbors (not to mention the
countless occasions when the Chicoms subjected their own people to terror
and deprivation), Communist China openly advertises herself as the sup-
porter of violence and insurrection everywhere in the world. On 4 March
1964, the principal Chicom newspaper PEOPLE'S DAILY carried an editorial
on South Vietnam which applauded the Viet Cong for having "exposed" the
United States as a paper tiger. (See Pro n~ d Notes Series A, #51,
march 24, 1964.) The editorial said t
"the people of a a y country or region subjected to U.S.
aggression can win victory if only they are not overawed by
its (U.S.) apparent strength and dare and know how to struggle.
So, in this sense, the victories won by the South Vietnamese
people have u n i v e r s a l significance."
The editorial also in effect calls on the peoples of Asia, Africa
and Latin America to rise in armed insurrection against "the imperialist
aggressors"--a misnomer they apply in an attempt to denigrate the free
world.. It adds that in doing so they will not only be winning their own
battle, they will at the same time "assist the South Vietnamese people by
harassing U.S. imperialism everywhere and thus preventing it from throwing
its entire strength against the South Vietnamese people."
In case air more explicit proof of Chicom support for the Communist
Viet Cong insurrection in South Vietnam were required, that proof was pro-
vided by the Chicom delegate to the 15 February 1964 Budapest World Students
Conference, Chien Ta-wei, who said that the South Vietnamese people had no
choice but "armed struggle," which he declared to be "the most reliable roast
for the oppressed nations to win complete liberation." Chien called for
extensive mass activities and propaganda in support of the Viet Cong as well
as "substantial political and material help, including w e a p o n s."
Guerrilla Training for Latin Americans: It was reported in July 1960
that a special school had been set up in Peking for "the training of Latin
American Communists in the art of subversion" and that the curriculum in-
cluded training in organizing labor movements, education for and direction
of the anti-imperialist struggle and guerrilla warfare." In June 1963
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: GIA-RDP78-03061A000200Q OO-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
five Ecuadorans were arrested at Quito Airport as they returned from a
trip abroad. They hac,_ been in couta,ct vith C:'lieoms while abroad and in-
structions for carrying out subversive activities were discovered in the
luggage of two of the arrested persons. In November 1963 there was a sim-
ilar report from Peru. Six members of the Movimento de la Izquierda Revo-
lucionaria (MfR) left in October enroute to China, for guerrilla warfare
training. There are rumors that the NIR plans to send as many as 50 mem-
bers in small groups on a similar mission.
Peaceful Coexistence and the Bandung Spirit: The Chinese Communists,
like all other Communists, have from time to time found it expedient to mask
their basically violent views and to pose as advocates of conciliation and
peaceful coexistence. In the mid-1950's the Chicoms sought to expand their
influence among the Asian nations and the newly developing countries that
made up the majority of the so-called neutralist bloc. At the Bandung Con-
ference of Afro-Asian nations in April 1955 the Chicoms played a prominent
role in creating the "spirit of Bandung" and in publicizing the five princi-
ples adopted at the conference: (1) Mutual respect for territorial integ-
rity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference
in internal affairs; (4+) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-
existence. The Chieoms pose as the arch-advocate of peaceful coexistence
so long as it serves their purposes, but the pose has become increasingly
hard to maintain particularly since the wanton Chicom attacks against India
in violation of every one of the vaunted Five Principles of Peaceful Coex-
istence. In spite of their blatant violations of the "Bandung spirit" all
around the world, there are many people who still are vulnerable to Chicom,
exploitation on this point. Chou En-lai, for example, on his latest trip to
Africa succeeded in convincing many people, some in influential positions
that the Chicoms desire only to be left alone to develop their own country
and to help other countries who need. Chicom help. Those who are inclined
to accept this description of Communist China's aims and aspirations should
take the trouble to acquaint themselves with the long-standing (and openly
stated) views of the Chicoms.
Approved For Release 2000/04/143: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 A proved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Fact Sheet For Background Use Only
August 1964
STATUS OF THE SOVIET INS. hMLECTUAL FRONT, 1964
The meetings of Khrushchev and other party leaders with writers and
artists in December 1962 and March 1963 seemed to foreshadow serious repres-
sion; Leonid lichev condemned formalism and reaffirmed the principles of
"socialist realism," while Nikita Khrushchev roundly denounced modernism in
all the arts, attacked several writers and artists by name, and made it clear
that all intellectuals would be expected to conform to the lines prescribed
by the CPSU. A Central Committee plenum was scheduled for may 1963, with
ideology as the subject matter, and the press discussed various measures,such
as eliminating small newspapers and magazines and forming a single (conserva-
tive-dominated) cultural union, which` would effectively curb the liberal ele-
ments. Yet the plenum was delayed a{month, and when it met it failed to take
any drastic action; even though Ilichev himself endorsed the single union con-
cept, it was. not imposed by the plenum. Perhaps the incapacitating illness
of a prominent conservative, Frol Kozlov, caused a change in course, perhaps
the reaction from the West influenced the party leadership. Certainly Soviet
leaders were preoccupied with the rivalry with the Chinese Communists, which
came to a full boil just before the plenum when the Chinese published an open
letter to the CPSU. And certainly it became clear that the younger intel-
lectuals were not impressed by mere slogans, while Khrushchev was not really
ready for more drastic action, such as Stalin and Zhdanov would have taken.
Liberals Not Routed
In July 1963, the liberals did lose control of the Moscow writers' union.
But many of them kept their editorial positions, and their writing continued
to appear. That summer, Not Mir (New World) published a new Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn story, For the Good of the Cause, which showed that what was
"the cause" in the eyes of the officials was not the same thing as "the cause"
embraced by the people. On August 18, 1963, Izvestiya ran a poem by Aleksandr
Tvardovsky, entitled "Vasily Terkin in the Netherworid"; the fact that this
was preceded by an introduction by Aleksey Adzhubey inpiied that Khrushchev
himself approved the publication. When the conservative magazine Oktyabr got
into a controversy with the liberal Novr vy Mir over the propriety of Tvardovsky's
attacks on Stalinism in "Vasily Terkin, Izvestiya ruled that the conservative
complaints were "unacceptable." Viktor Nekrasov, whose reports on Italy and
the United States had caused Khrushchev to demand his expulsion from the party,
was back in print (in Novy Mir) in December 1963.
A long public debate took place as to who should be given the 1964 Lenin
Prize for literature. Liberals wished to award the prize to Solzhenitsyh for
his One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which was abhorrent to the con-
servatives: the latter focussed their criticism on the character of
Solzhenitsyn's hero, Ivan Denisovich Shukhov. One critic even indicated that
Shukhov should have attacked the guards of his camp, as a Mikhail Sholokhov
character had done against the Nazis in a German POW camp. A liberal critic,
on the other hand (N. Gubko in Zvezda (Star), February 1963), had already
argued that One Day showed "the terrifying corrupting force of uncontrolled
power which demoralizes and corrupts people," and called on Soviet writers
to lead their country out of the mire, stating: "the immediate perpetrators
of all this and their executors lost all semblance of morality and humanity."
Considering the implications of Gubko's remarks, it was somewhat surprising
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Apj,r9Ly#gEgrAeWse 2&00/ 04144:~ CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
sprof 1961 he was still on Zvezda's editorial board
and still defending One Ds ; he now demanded recognition f of e~rez?~' Sdi? 3,ua1 y gnition of the moral re-
of the events of the Stalin period, and
he condemned "the. moral corruption of people in whom uncontrolled power over
others has exterminated everything civic, everything human." Despite liberal
argument, however, the Lenin Prize went to A. G. Gonchar for Tronka, a sac-
charine portrayal of collective and state-farm life; even the conservatives
had not taken it seriously.
The Conservatives on the Bandwagon
Other novels on the Stalin period include Konstantin Simonov's Soldiers
Are Not Born, describing an officer who, after arrest in the 1937 purges, is
released to fight in the war, and who finally, after meeting Stalin personally,
suddenly realizes that Stalin was fully aware of the nature of the purges, and
Yuriy Gert's Who if Not You, on the disillusionment of young Komsomol members
who, after fervent belief in Stalin, find out about the real world. Because
of Khrushchev's political interest in denigrating Stalin's memory, such books
as this are not now very daring. Indeed, conservative writers are climbing
on the bandwagon; they Join in showing--less graphically than Solzhenitsyn
did--the suffering of the period of the cult, but their heroes are loyal party
men who never lose faith in the ideals of Lenin, and who inspire their fellow
prisoners with their own party spirit. A classic story by the conservative
leader Vsevolod Kochetov recently appeared in Okt abr, showing the prolonged
sufferings of a lieutenant who, during the Civil War period, made "excessive
demands" on the peasants; this "victim" is arrested, nearly condemned to
death, reprieved because he thought he had acted for the good of the state,
rearrested in 1937, and released when the war begins. As if to show skeptics
that some officers actually were released when the war began, the memoirs of
General Aleksandr Gorbatov appeared in print this spring; Gorbatov described
his arrest in 1938, claimed that he refused to testify falsely under torture,
described Arctic gold-mining conditions resembling those undergone by Ivan
Denisovich, and concluded with an account of his release, thanks to the inter-
cession of Marshal Budenny. This developing le gend of party courage in the
camps might be described as the domestication of Denisovich. An arrest under
Stalin is now almost a status symbol: a sto was recently told in p on ok
(Little Light) (the Soviet equivalent of Life that Stalin's agents were pre-
paring to kill Mikhail Sholokhov, the Grand Old Man of Soviet official liter-
ature, and that his life was probably saved by a friendly Cossack who knocked
on Sholokhov's door one night and advised him to hide. Needless to say,
Stalin's agents could easily have caught Sholokhov if they had really wanted
to do so.
Continued Pressure by Writers
Some writers do keep pushing, however, against the limits of what is
permitted. A. Ya. Kucherov recently wrote a novella, "Once in a Lifetime,"
(in Zvezda, X12, 1963), in which he painted an unattractive picture of con-
temporary Soviet society, still riddled with the fears and hypocrisy of the
cult years. In August 1964, a new Solzhenitsyn story described a Siberian
village whose inhabitants receive as gifts the dogs from a disbanded mining
camp. When the villagers parade on a holiday, the dogs remember their train-
cg and surround the people, snarling and baring their. teeth. Fortunately a
2
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 2 Aprisoner hasrthel preesen e of mind to l lead theB group into a2cou0rt and resembl-
ing the prison compound and the clogs stepped saerling. The story can be read
as a parable on the survival of Stalinism in Soviet society. The conflict
of generations is a sensitive subject; Khrushchev violently denied the ex-
istence of such a conflict in his speech to the writers on March 8, 1962,
while his very remarks showed the gulf between himself and the younger Soviet
public. The problem of the generations was raised in Aleksandr Shteyn's play,
"Between the Cloudbursts," (Teatr #4), based on the Kronstadt Rebellion of
March 1921. Instead of following the conventional Soviet treatment, which
blames the Revolt on counter-revolutionaries and foreign imperialists, who
are supposed to have exploited the political backwardness of young sailors
Shteyn (like most western scholars) analyzes the Rebellion as one of disil-
lusion. He opposes a bureaucratic father, Commissar Pozdnyshev, to his son,
Ivan, who joins the rebels and who accuses his father of belonging to a
"Commissarocracy" which has "betrayed the ideas" of the Revolution. Instead
of exhorting the masses, as is usual in Soviet mythology, Lenin is seen as
following the story of the Revolt in French newspapers, and as deciding to
switch from war communism to the New Economic Policy. Shteyn's play appeared
in print in April 1964, but Pravda sharply attacked him for his many "errors,"
and he has been told that the play cannot be staged unless it is re-written.
Shteyn's memoirs have also been appearing this spring; in one place,
Shteyn describes the 1949 arrest and post-Stalin release of a novelist friend,
S. A. Zonin. Zonin was unable to return to his old life, and soon died. A
more important victim of Stalin was Isaac Babel, whom western critics consider
to have been the greatest of the post-revolutionary prose writers. He ceased
to publish in the 1930's, though he continued to write, and he was arrested
and executed in 1939. Now Babel's letters and unpublished writings of the
'30's have been collected in an English translation by Andrew R. MacAndrew
and Max Hayward, Isaac Babel: The Lonely Years, 1925-1939. The Soviet maga-
zine, Moskva, is preparing to publish the memoirs of the writer Lev Nikulin,
Years of Our Life, and this will also include correspondence with Babel and
other figures of the 1920's and '30's.
Repression Continues
Even now, people are sent to prison camps for non-criminal reasons: on
July 21, 1964, Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Gazette) disclosed that members
of a sect, the True Orthodox Wandering Christians, had been sent to Siberia
for forced labor. The case of Josef Brodsky, arrested and sentenced as part
of a campaign against "parasitism," shows that those who do not have estab-
lished reputations and especially those who are Jewish are still very vulner-
able to the whims of party bigots. In May, employees of two Moscow book-
stores were arrested on charges of selling "pornographic literature"; it
seems that much of this was actually Western or unauthorized Soviet writing.
Even better known figures, like Andrei Voznesensky and Viktor Nekrasov, were
banished to factories and construction sites for a time in 1963, though they
have now been permitted to return to Moscow. It is now reported that Olga
Ivinskaya, the model for Boris Pasternak's character Lara in Dr. Zhivago, is
seriously ill and becoming blind in a prison camp 300 miles east of Moscow.
Arrested in 1960 after Pasternak's death, she received an eight year sentence
on a manufactured charge of currency speculation, and she still remains in
jail, despite personal pleas from Nehru, Bertrand Russell, and Eleanor
Roosevelt. If not released and given proper medical care, she will probably
not survive much longer.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA3RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Vested Interests
Cultural conservatism is backed by powerful vested interests. For
example, on February 7, 1964, Marshal Malinovsky spoke to a group of writers
and artists, and denounced recent "incorrect trends" in the description of
war: the'bortrayal of little, lost people in naturalistic detail," unflat-
tering descriptions of the army in peacetime, and works which undermine the
authority of commanders (as in the description of a Soviet officer evading
identification by the Germans by putting on a private's tunic). Like the
Nazis, Malinovsky has little use for the work of Erich Maria Remarque: "We
have no right mechanically to transfer Remarque's ideas into our creative art
and to deprive it of the real and true heroism natural to our life." No doubt
many people, such as the ex-KGB man who masterminded Brodsky's arrest, would
like to put a stop to all the talk about the camps and the executions.
Myth and Reality
The strategy of the top leadership is to use the writers and artists to
sweep away loyalty to Stalin, and at the same time to try to make them propa-
gandists for the present Soviet system. Instead of rigid controls, the party
seeks both to spur and to placate the intellectuals. It wants to warn them,
but it doesn't want to lose contact with them. Early in June, the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee's Ideological Commission held an expanded meeting with various
of the tamer writers, composers, and artists. It was agreed that tremendous
progress had been made since the December 1962 and March 1963 meetings, and
that:
"in the past year Soviet literature and art has taken a new stride for-
ward in the artistic embodiment of the labor exploits and the spiritual
world of the builders of Communism...the Soviet writers and artists,
having repudiated esthetic views alien to us, have rallied even more
firmly around the positions of socialist realism, whose fruitfulness
has been proved by life itself."
This picture of the situation' scarcely reflects the facts. Despite all
the sermons of 1963, there were no full-dress recantations, only a half dozen
vague promises to do better. Shteyn still wrote his Kronstadt drama, and
Viktor Rozov has had a play ("On the Wedding Day") approved for production
in which a young girl says: "They cannot understand at all that their age
is past and another is coming...." and "The old people will die off and we'll
get our way." The central character in a recent novel by Vasily Aksenov
(It's Time, Friend,It's Time), Valentin Marvich, openly expresses his anger
over the deprivation of independence and the work under orders which Soviet
artists and writers suffer. In mid-June, a controversial artist, Ilya
Glazunov, held a show at Moscow's Manezh Gallery. The conservatives first
tried to prevent the exhibition; nevertheless, it was approved personally
by Aleksandr N. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Culture. To settle the
controversy, after the exhibition had been seen by enthusiastic crowds, a
private viewing and discussion was arranged for Kuznetsov and the conserva-
tives. But a large number of young people staged a "sit-in" and demanded a
chance to take part in the debate and an extension of the exhibition, which
had been scheduled to close. The youth of the USSR will not be poured back
into the old molds.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIArRDP78-03061AO00200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
References on Soviet literature and art:
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (New York,1963)
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, For the Good of the Cause (New York, 1964)
Nathalie Babel, ed., Isaac Babel: The Lonely Years, 1925-1939. (New York,1961+)
Nikita Khrushchev, "Khrushchev on Modern Art," Encounter, No. 115, April 1963,
pp. 102-103.
Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev on Culture (Encounter Pamphlet no. 9)
(London, 1963)
Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, eds., Dissonent Voices in Soviet Literature
(New York, 1962)
Vladimir Dudintsev, A New Year's Tale (New York, 1960)
Ivan Valeriy (pseud. of Valeriy Tarsis), The Bluebottle (London, 1962)
Abram Tertz, The Icicle (London, 1963)
Abram Tertz, The Trial Begins (New York, 1960)
Abram Tertz, On Socialist Realism (Nev York, 1960) Also in Dissent, VII
(1960), No.l, 39-66; in French) Esprit, February 1959-
A special issue of Survey, No. 46, January 1963, contained many articles
on Soviet art and literature. Current numbers of Problems of Communism are
also likely to cover this subject.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
Reprinted from Forum Service
(London), June 20, 196+
THE CASE OF JOSEPH BRODSKY
Russian Writers Prot st Mainst a Gr ve Miscarriage of Justice
By Victor Frank
On March 13 last, Joseph Brodsky, 24+, a Russian poet and translator
of unusual promise, was sentenced by a Leningrad court to five years' de-
portation with hard labor on the somewhat odd charge "of earning too
little money." The verdict said literally: "Isolated instances of earn-
ings made by Brodsky do not indicate that he fulfilled one of the most
important duties laid down in the constitution, the duty to toil honestly
for the benefit of the country and for one's own well-being." The young
man, who suffers from a chronic nervous disability, and who has been
under treatment for several years, is now reported to be living on a
state farm iii the remote province of Archangel where he is employed as
a driver carting manure to the fields.
Joseph Brodsky's trial may yet become a cause celhbre in modern
Russia not because of the nature of the charge brought against him, but
because he has been courageously defended by some of the most famous per-
sonalities in Russian arts and letters. The greatest living poet, the
76 year-old Mrs. Anna Aklunatova; the translator of Shakespeare's "Sonnets"
and of Burns' poems, Samuel Marshak; the immensely popular author of
children's books, Korney Chukovsky; and the composer Dmitri Shostakovich -
were all prepared to vouch for the innocence of Joseph Brodsky, whom they
consider an outstanding poet and translator. After their efforts to pre-
vent a blatant miscarriage of justice had failed, they appealed directly
to the Central. Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and
to the Union of Soviet Writers. The text of their petition has become
known abroad. It is a remarkable document on two counts; first, it re-
veals what can and still does happen in Mr. Khrushchev's Russia, eight
years after the denunciation of Stalin's crimes; secondly, it shows that
people (some people, at least) are no longer afraid of speaking out on
behalf of innocent victims of the State.
The broad outline of the Brodsky case is as follows. In 1962, two
men, Shakhamatov and Umansky, were arrested and sentenced in Leningrad on
charges "of exerting harmful influence on young people and of preaching
mysticism (Yoga philosophy), anarcho-individualism etc." The young people
implicated in this affair included Joseph Brodsky, at that time a young man
of 22, who after leaving school at 11+, had earned his living as a stoker, a
metal worker and a laborer with a geological expedition. The case against
Brodsky was dropped, however, when the investigating magistrate learned that
Brodsky had broken with Sha'khmatov of his own accord a year earlier. The
police merely confiscated Brodsky's,.papers, among them diaries dating back
to 1956 and 1957 when Brodsky was a youth of 16-17. The diaries contained
some anti-Soviet remarks but the investigating magistrate came to the con-
clusion that Brodsky had discarded this "unhealthy adolescent mood," and
that there was no case against him.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A00680006-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
The authors of the petition do not say so in so many words, but imply
that these diaries confiscated by the police became Brodsky's perdition
eight years after their composition. There was one man in Leningrad who,
for reasons of his own, was evidently bent on Brodsky's destruction. This
was a certain Lerner who until 1956 served as an officer with the K.G.B.
(political police) and who, after dismissal from the K.G.B., became a
leading light in the so-called "people's squads," officially sponsored
vigilante groups with the task of assisting police in combating crime,
hooliganism, etc. The authors of the petition say that in performing his
duties Lerner used "methods and devices condemned by the 20th and 22nd
Party Congresses," that he forced people detained by the squads to become
informers, confiscated documents, bullied and blackmailed people, fabri-
cated false evidence, etc.
Impeccable Life
It was this frustrated ex-police bully who finally succeeded in run-
ning down Brodsky. Brodsky's friends say that, within the last few years,
the young man had become an outstandingly able translator and poet in his
own right, and that he had been leading a frugal and morally impeccable
life, devoting all his energies to his literary activities. The first
round shot by Lerner was a scurrilous attack on Brodsky in a local news-
paper, Vecherr Leningrad, which, late in November 1963, described Brodsky
as a cynical, loose-living good-for-nothing, ascribed somebody else's
poems to him, maliciously distorted lines from his own poems and generally
defamed his character. Letters to the editor in Brodsky's defence were
ignored, but Lerner visited the employers of the writers of the letters
and described them as "protectors of a political criminal." Lerner also
succeeded in enlisting the support of some local party officials and of
the secretary of the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers, the
Stalinist poet Alexander Prokofyev. A closed meeting of the branch sec-
retariat, from which Brodsky's friends were excluded, passed a resolution
demanding that Brodsky be brought to trial as ?"a parasite."
Witch-Hunt
As a result of this witch-hunt, Brodsky's health broke down, and in
January 1964 he entered a Moscow hospital. On his return to Leningrad., he
was arrested in the street on February 13 as "a parasite trying to evade
the course of justice," although (as the authors of the petition say) he
had never been served with a summons. Despite protests by the local pros-
ecutor, Brodsky was kept in prison as a common criminal. On February 18
he made his first appearance in court. He was remanded in custody, and
a number of well-known writers and scholars appealed to the relevant party
and law authorities offering evidence in Brodsky's defence. They pointed
out that the case was based entirely on Brodsky's old diaries and on new
evidence fabricated by Lerner. The court disregarded their pleas, and on
March 13 passed sentence on Brodsky - characteristically not for any polit-
ical offences, but merely for alleged moral misdemeanor. It was after the
verdict was pronounced that Brodsky's friends took an unprecedented step:
they made public the text of their petition on his behalf. In this docu-
ment they not only point to a blatant perversion of justice and to a dis-
turbing revival of old police methods, but also to the dangerous mood
2
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000206 6d))6-7
 Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
generated during the trial which was in ,e;:?pretea by the crowd as a condem-
nation of the intelligentsia in general. What shocked ethe signatories of de-
fence more was that the press was allowed to heap gross
fence - "an unprecedented fact in the history of our press (they not) : even
vin 1937-1938, counsel defending 'the enemies of the peop
in the press." It remains to be seen whether this courageous step by a
group of Russian intellectuals will achieve its purpose: the clearing of
the name and the alleviation of the fate of a young and gifted poet
only offence appears to have consisted in having aroused the wrath of a
frustrated ex-policeman.
Fish in Winter - A Poem b Joseph Brody
Fish in the winter,
Fish chewing oxygen,
Fish swimming in the winter,
Brushing the ice with their eyes,
To where it is deeper,
To where the sea is,
Fish,
Fish,
Fish,
Fish swimming in the winter,
Fish trying to swim free,
Fish swimming in darkness,
Under a wintry, weary sun.
Fish swimming away from death
Along the eternal route of fish.
Fish don't shed any tears,
Pressing their heads against ice.
In the cold water
The eyes of the fish
Are freezing.
Fish,
Fish,
Fish,
Poems about fish
- like fish -
Stick in one's gullet.
Approved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA tDP78-03061A000200080006-7
 Aug~Atpoorraved For Release 2000/04/14: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200080006-7
JUA ITA CAS 'RO C iOOS: S ,+'I,EEDOM
The defection of Juanita Castro Ruz, younger sister of Fidel and Raul,
is undoubtedly the severest blow that the Castro regime has suffered since
the missile crisis of October 1962, more embarrassing even than the findings
of the recent meeting of foreign ministers of the OAS. The revelations which
she made to the press in Mexico City on 29 June 1964 are in themselves a seri-
ous enough indictment; but coming from a devoted sister who had loyally
served the 26 of July Movement, they are symbolic of the disintegration and
disillusionment that are developing in Cuban society and government.
According to newspaper reports, Juanita had arrived in Mexico some nine
days before and had remained in seclusion at the home of a younger sister,
Emma, who is married to a Mexican engineer, Victor Lomeli. (Although Emma
has made no public pronouncement, she, too, is looked upon as a defector.)
After the Interview., Juanita again went into hiding, presumably awaiting
action by the Mexican government on her request for political asylum.: This
she received some four weeks later.
Although Juanita's defection may have come as a shock to Fidel, it was
apparently to surprise to Raul: she left the Havana airport via a scheduled
Cubana Airlines flight, with 21 pieces of luggage and in full view of dozens
of agents of the "G-2,." Castro's secret police. Subsequent stories reflect
that no less a person Raul Castro himself arranged for her flight and that
he did so in order to protect her from the wrath of their brother Fidel.
Juanita Castro Ruz appears to be the fourth of six children born out of
wedlock to Angel Castro, a wealthy plantation-owner of Oriente Province, and
Lina Ruz, a servant-laundress in the household. Angel was born in Spain and
immigrated to Cuba in 1898 as a day laborer. He soon made good and married
Maria Argota, of a respected Santiago family. There were two children born
to this family: Pedro Castro Argota, who fled to Central America in 1960,
and Lidia Castro Argota, who lives in Havana and works for the government.
Throughout the duration of this marriage, Angel consorted with Lina
Ruz and produced six children by her, born, according to the best available
information, in the following order: Ramon, Fidel, Raul, Juanita., Emma, and
Angela. There have been conflicting reports about Juanita's age. Some news-
paper writers have said recently that she is only 31 years old, others that
she is 41. She claims she was born 6 May 1933. It is definitely known that
Fidel was born. 13 August 1926.
Eventually, Maria Argota left Angel Castro and returned to Santiago,
where she obtained a divorce. Some time later, apparently when Fidel was
about 20 years old., Angel and Lisa were married., thus legitimizing the six
children, at least under civil law. Angel died in 1956, and Lima in November
1963.
By Cuban standards of the last three decades., Angel Castro was a wealthy
man. It was estimated that his assets, which consisted primarily of the sugar
plantation which he operated in conjuction with his oldest son Ramon, totaled
half-a-million dollars. The children had access to the best available educa-
tion. Fidel studied at the University of Havana, finally graduating in law.
Juanita was educated in an Ursuline convent school in the elegant Miramar
see'k oveMFGFRW&se M M%WW'=