BIWEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 4, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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Briefly Noted
Majority of Brazilians Approve of Goulart Ouster:
A recent poll of 500 Brazilians, from all walks of life
and economic levels, reveals that very heavy majorities, ranging
from 55 to 65 percent of persons polled, favored the ouster of
Goulart from the Presidency (1 April 1964)and subsequent anti-
Communist policies of the new government. For example, the most
popular action taken by the Supreme Military Revolutionary Com-
mand was the removal of Communists from public office. In Rio,
35% favored the action, 6% opposed it, and 7% had no opinion.
The attached article from Washington News, 21 April, by
Scripps-Howard staff writer Hal Hendrix, "ttrazilian Voters Had
no Confidence," forwarded with Spanish translation, can be re-
published or used as the basis of appropriate commentary on this
encouraging development. Other democratic governments, plauged
by Communist subversion, will find comfort in this poll. Com-
munists are well organized and noisy, but their real strength
is never so formidable as that of the great body of decent,
democratically-minded citizens. Government leaders should base
their counter-subversive action upon this assumption.
Swedish Press Freedom Curtailed to Shield Khrushchev
The atmosphere of terror which surrounds Soviet dictators
is felt at times beyond the borders of the Soviet Bloc. Prior
to an earlier Khrushchev visit to France and at the demand of
Khrushchev's Security Police, the French Government arrested
hundreds of selected French citizens for the duration of the
visit. More recently the Swedish Government has proposed a
curious press law under which the criticism of any foreign
government official would be punishable as a seiqUus crime a-
gainst Swedish security. Since Swedish law already prohibits
the defamation of foreign Heads of State, which Khrushchev tech-
nically is not, it is clear that in this peculiar proposal the
Swedish Government aims at muzzling the mounting and well-
founded resentment in the Swedish free press of Khrushchev's
impending visit to Scandinavia in the guise of 2eace apostle.
The massive Soviet-sponsored espionage against Allied military
defenses, for which Swedish Col. Vennerstrom now stands indicted,
makes the resentment especially keen. And the recent discovery
that Khrushchev's Ambassador to Sweden, Nikolai Belochvostikov,
is an officer of the KGB, a professional spy, was almost more
than the Swedish public could stomach. Popular Swedish disap-
proval of the proposed press ban was evident when the Swedes
promptly began calling it "Lex Nikita." Press media elsewhere
have continued to deride Moscow's peaceful pretensions, 'while
a deafening silence on the subject emanates from the Stockholm
dailies.
sEPINO4hdiiiia: (Briefly Voted Cont
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Assets in Scandinavia and other Free World areas should
take note that this repression of the free press does violence
to Scandinavian democratic traditions and illustrates that who-
ever deals with the Communists risks being contaminated by Com-
munist methods to some extent, if only out of self-protection.
ONAemearP,,IT (Briefly Noted)
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DATES 25X1C10b
2C May Khrushchev arrives Belgrade, blames 1040 break on
Soria. 1355.
23 May Conf. for European Relaxation of Tensions and Security,
(WPC - supported), May 20-29. Salzburg Austria.
June Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting,
Djakarta, 1964--full conference in late 1964 or early
1065.
5 June Secretary George Marshall proposes the European Re-
covery Program ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech.
(Soviets prevent Poland and Czechoslovakia from parti-
cipating). 1947
11 June
14 June
15 June
17 June
Marshal TUkhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals
arrested, tried secretly and executed. 1937
China-Russia sign second "Unequal Treaty," Tientsin,
1050.
ussn occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and
Latvia 17 June 1940
German Day of Unity (West Germany) commemorating East
German riots of workers/youths 16-17 June 1953 quelled
by Soviet troops.
17 June Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1950.
19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges
Chicoms with genocide, 1930.
29 June Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) ceded to
USSR, 1945)
1 July Communist Party of China founded. 1921
10 July Korea ceasefire negotiations begin 1951. (Armistice
signed by UN, North Korea and Caramunist China 27 July
1953.
10 July Arrest of Lavrenti Beria for treason announced. 1953.
(Secretly tried and shot 10-23 Dec. 1953).
la July President Urrutia, in TV address, charges Communism
endangers Cuban revolution. 1959.
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#27 11-24 April 1964
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. Political and propaganda activity throughout the Communist
world was greatly intensified during this period. Developments
directly tied to the counter-offensive efforts launched by the
CPSU against the Chinese on April 3 included CC plenary sessions
in many parties, official statements of position, editorials and
commentaries in party and state organs, speeches by leaders, and
the Gomulka-led Polish delegation's visit to Moscow. The Sino-
Sovietbrawl also figured prominently in the commemorations of
two major anniversaries, Khrushchev's 70th on the 17th and the
94th of Lenin's birth on the 22nd.
2. The Gomulka visit brought -- at a Soviet-Polish friend-
ship rally on the nth -- Khrushchev's strongest, frankest and
most colorful language yet in denouncing and ridiculing the
Chinese, -- but he failed to call for any action beyond such
commonplaces as "struggling for unity" and "defending the general
line." Gomulka also went further than before in lauding and
swearing fealty to the MU, -- but he held to his reservations
about a conference unless it could give promise of bringing unity.
3. Khrushchev's birthday caused a flood of messages and
speeches ranging from polemical support of the CPSU and denuncia-
tion of the Chinese in some -- led by the East Germans and
Bulgarians -- to non-committal congratulations. Surprise was a
503-word telegram signed by top Chinese which acknowledged dif-
ferences and lack of unity but expressed conviction that "all
this is oray temporary." In the event of crisis, we "will un-
doubtedly stand together." Within the USSR, the birthday served
to bring massive tribute and affirmation of devotion, although
the adulation was carefully limited to avoid the excesses of
Stalin's 70th.
4, The CPSU made broad use of the Lenin anniversary to
reassert its line as the true Leninism, and keynote speaker
Andropov pointed to the "insincere character" of the Chinese
birthday telegram, "calculated to mislead," and to threw doubt
on the validity of its confident forecast of the two standing
together in time of crisis. Other parties treated the event as
might be expected -- except for the Chinese who seemed to slight
it.
5. In addition Soviet media continued their widespread cam-
paign to support a counter-offensive, using "statements of suo-
port" by parties throughout the world, domestic meetings, rallies,
editorials, articles, letters, the belated May Day slogans, --
and two more "heretofore unpublished documents" deriving support
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miwimlipmemimwm. (Commentary Cont.)t,
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frora the dead masters, one more from Lenin and one from Marx
and ngels! Soviet sources are not openly pushing for a world
conference, but about half of the statements of other parties
reported by Sovirif-FOTE-Tnclude such a call.
6. Meanwhile, there was no reaction to the Soviet campaign
from the Chinese camp until the 19th, when the North Korean
daily Nodong Sinmun published a harsh editorial aftack which
reverses an of Suslov's charges and sounds a call to action in
fighting against this "rampage." It concludes by saying l'we deem
IA necessary to convene AA international meeting," -- but calls
for "full preparations" first and depicts a conference in which
the "true Marxist-Leninist" would "safeguard unity" by smashing
the revisionists! the Chinese finally countered a week later
(after the end of our period), publishing on the 26th the full
text of this Nodong Sinmun editorial and on the 27th the texts
of the 3 Soviet documents from April 3 Pravda with an editorial
note derisively abusing Ehrushchev and the CSU leadership, --
and threatening to publish material proving K's former Trotskyite
leanings! On the 2Gth, the Chinese also published Chou 3n-lai's
report of his Visit to 14 countries, which included a denuncia-
tion of Vs proposal for renouncing force in territorial disputes
and "the third volume of anti-China materials from the Soviet
press."
7. On the 26th, the Rumanians released the materials from
their secret April 15-22 plenun: the suprise Is urgent call
for a meeting of the Soviet and Chinese leaders to agree to a
3-party meeting -- with the Rumanians as mediators.
B. Meanwhile, press reports (Addendum, April 25) said that
the CCP had .finally replied -- negatively -- to the CPSU letter
of March 7 which had proposed a May, June/July, and October time-
table for bilateral talks preparatory committee meeting and
world conference, respectively. The Chinese are said to have
been curt, 'Sheibbing the SOviet plan but agreeing to bilateral
talks on their own terms -- in October in Peking. The same re-
port forecast that Xhiu8hchev wotild accept the Peking suggestion,
however reluctantly, ecause o e pressure 4e ng exer e y
other parties not to force a split.
9. The millions of Words exchanged during this period in-
cludes some formulations Worthy of special note:
-- Italian CP boss Togliatti said "we must have courage to tell
the Chinese'r. that "revision is what we want," if by that we
mean the sOtt of creative development and growth which "we" and
the CPSU have been engaging in. (Chrono, April 11 and continuing.
-- Polish boss, Gomulka Went a step further in whitewashing the
term: Lenin was the _greatest revisionist of all time, as he
"enriched aarxism an allMarxist theory." (Ohrono, April 13-
13.)
2
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- Gomulka (in the same speech) frankly admitted: "there is no
Such revolutionary situation today, not in a single imperialist
country, especially not in the United States." Ne also asked
the Chinese bluntly a number of piercing questions intended to
throw doubt on whether they even believe their own line.
- Khrushchev on the same occasion dropped some frank revelations.
He acknowledged that C?SU de-emphasis of revolution in favor of
peaceful coexistence is not the result of any change in desire
but in practical lactors-rif it depended only-5E77r aesire to
make a revolution..."). Then, in deriding the Chinese experienca
with "communes vs. human nature," he is in essence acknowledging
that Communism itself can only be expected in the dim, distant
future because of the same sort of Problems with human nature.
10. And finally, eyewitness reports by Russian refugees from
Sinkiang testify to the hatred whiph the Moslems in Sinkiang
still bear toward the ChT66g6- (Chrono, April 15) and to the
clandestine distribution of Soviet passports to Moslems in
Sinkiang in f961.4; whict led directly to thebloodily-suppres-
sed riots and consequent closing of the Soviet Consulate.
Significance:
Despite the numerous tumultuous events and pronouncements of
this period, there is no clearer picture of probable Soviet
plans and capabilities to meet the Chinese threat than before.
An unconfirmed newspaper report "from qualified sources" de.
scribed in paragraph 0 above says the Chinese have finally re-
plied negatively to the timetable proposed by the CPSU letter
of March 7 and countered only with a proposed bilateral meeting
in Pelting in October -- which N. is reportedly expected to ac-
cept reluctantly. Pending further confirmation or clarification,
however, we can be sure that -- with both sides now openly bent
on "exposing" the other -- the polemical war will grow ever hott
and rougher, with potentially increasing damage to the entire
Communist movement.
This period alone has brought new acknowledgement of the
damage already done, -- and a number of frank new disclosures
(such as those described in para. 9 above) which will undoubted/7
serve -- or can be made to serve -- to disillusion and discouragL
sympathizers still further.
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#127 11-24 April 1964
April 7 (delayed) - The Albanian ?arty daily Zen i I Popullit
features a 13,303-word editorial "The Modern lievisionists on
the Path of Social Democratic Degeneration and of a Merger with
Social Democracy" with Some new, extreme formulations.
"...the modern revisionists never relaxed
their efforts to find other allies as well....
They turned...to their 'brothers' in treason --
the leaders of the social democratic right, be-
cause present-day revisionism and social demo-
cracy are two manifestations of the same
bourgeois ideology. Social democracy is a
manlfestalion of bourgeois ideology in the
workers movement wlereas revisionism is a mani-
festation ot bourpois ideology In the Communist
movement."
After castigating the Italian and French Party leaderships as
well as Khrushchev and Tito -- the Albanians call out:
Modern revisionism.. .15
"It is time for each party to react..ithe
horse' of tEU-social-
ist camp and the ICU.'"
And the "troika of Troy," say the Albanians, is none other than
"the H. khrushchev group, the Tito clique, and the revisionist
leadersfiip ol the Itilian CP!"
April 11 and continuing - Soviet and pro-Soviet media continue
to reflect support of he CPSU efforts at counter-offensive
launched April 3. Some of it specifically endorses the call
for an international conference, some expresses reservations or
opposition to same, and some fail to mention it. We shall men-
tion only the most significant among those very numerous items.
-- A "40-page special number" of the Italian CP journal Renascita
O n the 11th is devoted to latest developments, with a front-page
editorial by Toaliatti, plus a 12-page resume of the Suslov re-
port and a 3000-word extract of the 31 March Chinese joint
article. Togliatti (also published in L'Unita and Paesa Sera on
the 13th) scathingly denounces the "sheer lunacy" of the Uhinese
"campaign of subversion and disunity within the socialist camp,
making the flimsiest and silliest of charges against the great-
est and first of the socialist countries, the Soviet Union."
Togliatti speaks plainly:
"Tie must have the courage to tell the
Chinese leaders that if all their talk about
revisionism means the-aevelopment of ou:v doc-
trine and our action under conditions radically
different from those of the past, and there-
fore its growth into patterns and forms and
meanings that could never have been foreseen
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is what we want...."
(Chronology Cont.)
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However, Togliatti has nothing to say about concrete action
to counter the Chinese, except for general phrases such as "Ube
must do our best to see that the Chinese leaders are forced to
give not mere lip service, but diplomatic and political support,
to the unremitting, necessary, and all-out struggle for easing
tensions and for peace."
-- Pravda on 12th summarizes statement of support by the Haitian
National Unity Party CC and reprints article from Beirut news-
paper Al Akhbar by Syrian Muhammad Rashid Ashraf on Arab support.
-- Pravda on 13th publishes summary of resolution of lOth Con-
grin757-Canadian C? condemning CCP splitting activities and urg-
ing international conference as soon as possible.
-- cast German ?arty daily Neuss Deutschland on the 15th carries
full-page statement of SED/CC date614th which surpasses all
previous SED output (and possibly all other on the Soviet side)
in the harshness of its anti-Chinese invective and its emphatic
support of the CPSU. It specifically reiterates SED support for
the CPSU time-table (set forth in CPSU letter of Uarch 1) for
preparing an all-Party meeting in fall 1964. (Lengthy summary
published in 2ravda on 24th.)
- Pravda on 15th publishes summary of article from the Burmese
"progressive newspaper Botataung" by its editor U Thein 'L)e Myint;
"prominent leader of the national liberation movement," attack-
ing "the provocative disrupting activities" of the Chinese et
the Algiers AAPSO session.
-- Pravda on 19th features an article by Chilean Communist Pablo
Neruda affirming the support of "the Communist movement in my
country." China's errors, he states, "stem from one source --
the personality cult .Hao Tse-tung has become a living Buddha,
separated from the people by court bonzeswho interpret flarxism
and modern history according to his wishes...': He also condemns
the CCP propaganda campaign in Latin America:
"...Every day the mail brings me and thousands
of other Chilean citizens letters, pamphlets,
and all kinds of reports on one and the same
topic -- dogmatic understanding of a very problem-
atical truth. Hundreds of establishments in
capitals of the Latin American continent are
preparing this material which is harsh, erroneous,
and biased, and all this is being done to prove
that the Chinese are not mistaken. And it is
against this paper army, which is on the move
day and nialt, fhat I address my words."
^ On the same day Pravda reports a new resolution by the
Australian CP, published in Guardian, denouncing the Chinese
splitting activities which led to the foundation by E.F. Eill
of the so-called CPA (M-L). And Pass reports: that a Danish
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(Chronology Cont.)
CP plenum adopted a statement supporting the CPSU and "deeMs it
necessary to call a new meeting of representatives of the Com-
munist parties"; -- and that the CC of the Cl? of Argentina did
likewise, also "deeming" a world meeting "necessary."
-- Pravda on the 20th reprints from the Uruguvan newspaper El
POUrstrE statement by the CP, of Ecuador denouncing the
t.cuadorean "splinter group headed by Rafael Echeverria, Carlos
nodriguez, and Jorge Arellano, who "acting from without, with
support of anything but the fraternal parties fighting for the
unity of the world Communist movement," promote the "Chinese
line" and use "every opportunity to smear, distort, and slander
the positions of the CPSU and the CPE," and also "encroach on
the unity of each party separately and all parties of Latin
America and the entire VICM."
- Tass on the 21st reports from Athens that the paper AVYI has
published a decision of "the ApriT7IFEum of the Greek M7CC"
denouncing the Chinese and supporting the CPSU, including "the
speediest possible convening of a conference...."
? The extant of Soviet internal mobilization in support of the
campaign was demonstrated by a section of Literaturnayt Gazeta
on the 14th containing articles by "Soviet poets and artisis,
who write of their full support of the CSU line and denounce
the Chinese leaders' statements...." Tass bulletins on the lath
reveal that the main editorial and two majorsigned articles
(by Konstantinov and Tolkunov) in the new Kommunist treat variouL
aspects o2 the dispute.
-- And finally, further efforts were made to rally the dead to
support the CPSU in its great trial. In our last installment
(Addendum, April 11), we referred to the publication in Izvestir
of another "hitherto unpublished Lenin document" interpreted as
supporting the Khrushchev line. Pravda (which carries same on
the 12th) publishes on the 22nd "for fhe first time, Lenin's
'Amendments to and Comments on" the foregoing draft statement."
It Inlither speTas out Lenin's support of peaceful coexistence,
quoting: "...we undoubtedly consider it to be our duty to sup-
port by all means any attempts for a peaceful settlement of dis-
putes." And the April issue (No. 4) of Problems of Peace and
Socialism goes all the way back to the inVENtainheacT, publishing
'(a new document" of Marx and Engels from 1372, "discovered by
the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow." Devoted to rules
changes in the First International, it infers that if alive today
Marx and Engels would agree with Moscow and exclude ?eking from
tEe movement.
April 12-19 - The high-level Japanese CP delegation led by .
rakamada which has been visiting the ussa, China and North Korea
(see Chrono, April 3 and continuing) flew from Canton on the 12th
to North Vietnam. Hanoi on the 19th reports that the delegation
"let ganoi for home on 19 April after a seven-day friendship
vls4t to the_i-Dal "
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Chronology Cont.
April 13-18 - The "friendship visit" to Moscow of the top-
level Polish delegation led ty Gomullra and Cyrankiewicz (see
Chrono, April 9, and Addendum, Apri/ 13 for earlier referenceg)
featured a "friendship rally" on the 15th, where Khrushchev
(after announcing the extension of the mutual aid and friend-
ship treaty for another 20 years) used some of the strongest,
frankest, and most colorful language yet in denouncing and
ridiculing the Chinese (some of which came in extemporaneous
digressions from h s text which were toned down or deleted in
reported versions of the speech.
"There is no longer any doubt that the
Chinese leaders are trying o split the Communist
movement, ... the socialist camp .... to impose
their hegemony."
"The Chinese leaders are criticizing (us)
for concentrating on economic construction, for
trying to improve the economy and the well-being
of the people.... How would our Party, our people,
have taken it had we convened a Party congress
and decided...(to) produce less so as not to grow
fat and thus prevent our degeneration, a bourgeois
degeneration?.. Is this the inspiration for our
people to march ahead? Whither ahead? Into the
grave? ...
"Fut let us talk to the Chinese workers, the
Chinese peasants.... Whai do they want now, war
or rice? Yet somebody or some group of people
have had a worm go up the wrong way, you understand,
and it wriggles and turns; and he thinks, so to
speak, that it is he who in reality directs world
development. Life will show. There was Trotsky;
where is he now? Rotting....
tt ... If it depended only on our desire to
make a revolution, comrades, I guarantee you
That the CC would have done everything to see
that the bourgeois world was no more and that the
red flag Dew over the whole world. Tut, comrades
let's not indulge in fantasies about this, lut act
like people able to think realistically. The
desire ty itself is little.... One cannot play a t
revolufions. Lenin put it very well: revolution
cannot be exported....
"Only quite recently the CCP leaders were
stressing the importance of developing their
economy to show the superiority of socialism
in economic rivalry with capitalism. They have
(Chronology Cont)
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Chronology Cont.
now forgotten this....Mao Tse-tung said: 'This
year re have produced 5.2 million tons of steel.
In five years' time, there will be 13-15 million
tons of steel; after five more years, -- you see
how he said 'there will be 20-25 million tons
and in the following five years 25-40 million
tons.' And why not?...This is from one who never
smelted steel and does not know how to smelt it.
11-6-1101-7,onewaits a little at the
hearth and all at once steel comes tumbling out,
you understand, out of open-hearth furnaces....
"Chinese propaganda asserted at that time
that China 'would set an example for all for the
entr. into Communism ahead oi sehedule....Thus,
or examp e, was p annes i ie aid of small-
scale metallurgy, the 'backyard furnaces for smelt-
ing metal, to increase the year's steel output
from 5.3 million tons to 20 million. We learned
that Sun Yat-sen's widow also built a metal works
under her window, soma sort of small stove, that-
is....Some metallurgists! Well, comrades, miracles
dont happen....
',Free food and equal distribution of foodstuffs
were introduced in people's communes....But they
did not calculate the amount of food available,
peop e o oosen heir belts, and
they did! They ate, and they ate it all up!
I remember Zasyadito went to China at Chou
En-lai's invitation (in 1053 or even in 1959)
....He told me afterwards about a conversation
he bal had with Chou. said to him, listen,
where are your hens? There are no eggs there
is nothing in the country. You used fofhave all
these things!...And what did Chou say?..."Our
hens, of course, have not flown away. We have
eaten them all, and there are none to lay eggs
noi7! An that is really so, comrades, because
we ourselves know. A peasant is invited to
Join fha commune, and you know how the peasant
goes to the commune.... If he has his own chicken,
he says: let's eat it, and then we will be
Oatinq Communist chickens in the commune. And
every peabant has done this; oach ate his
chickens; they arrived at the commune without
chicken', and where are the chickens to come
from? After all they do not grow out of worms.."
K. says that he warned Mio during his 1953 visit to ?eking.
"I said: it is your affair, but we are not going to do it. To
begin with, this is not new to us; we have already done it;
...we ate the chickens once already!"
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K. then launches on a new criticism of the Chinese:
"Men the Chinese leaders failed in their
great leap forward and people'sZBE5unes policies,
they adopted yet another extreme and in essence
abandoned the industrialization of the country.
is, oo, s erroneous an incorreo . ** course,
this is their internal affair...But this now
mistake...cannot be passed over in silence, since
they are trying to depra abandoning the in-
dustrialization of the country as a kind of a
law necessarily valid for othor-aodialigT---
FfEtes
"...The Chinese leaders are attacking with
particular fury the decisions of the 20th con-
gress, which exposed the cult of personality....
The times of great and small cults have passed
irrevocably,.
"Our CC receives with profound anxiety the
reports from China that thePeking leaders
have, for some years now,..been trying to sow
and grow feelings of distrust and enmity to-
ward the Soviet people and the peoples of other
socialist countries. We are becoming in-
creasingly convinced that a petty-bourgeois
nationalist trend alien to the spirit of M-L
has gained an upper :2and among the CCP leaders.
The Chinese splitters would like to become leaders
and mentors of the revolutionary movement in Asia,
Africa and Latin America. They maliciously oppose
the national liberation struggle of the peoples
of these continents to the workers movement in
the countries of socialism. They try even there
to introduce a schism, distrust, and alienation
Their reactionary idea that allegedly the white
people will never understand the black and the
yellow people, that allegedly their interests
are different, serves the same purpose....This
Is the shameful role the Chinese leaders are play-
ing now...."
Gomulka's response, while restrained in comparison, is his
strongest statement to date. Be stated inter alia:
"One can not drown concrete reality in a
flood of revolutionary slogans....It must be
said in all honesty that there is no such re-
volutionary situation today, not in a single im-
perialist country, especially not in the United
States....If the 6CP leaders appraise the situa-
tion and the revolutionary forces in these coun-
tries as ripe and capable of independently over-
App rotbdclkireelaPSW t400198/217ket2 IDP1 iNg9/1070003 -1
6 (Chronology Cont.)
BSIAMe 2000/08/27 :CIA-RDP78-03061A0002000700031
mist .e and have understood nothin and learned
0 n 0. A n s revo ut onar l,eac
? ? ? ?
Here Gomulka digresses to introduce a poverful new formula-
tion in support of K:
?????????????P
"The PPSU leaders, especially .Comrade Inarn-
shchev, are being called (by the Chinese) the
Igrp4tqat rPY4sionists in the history of the
wotkerP PoVelizent.' I think that they are mis-
taken. ; =Sider that at least as great if
not a greater. 'revisionist' was Lenin, who en-
richedliarxiSm and all Marxist theor to an un-
upua e- en
G. concludes by saying nue would consider" a conference de-
sirable -- "if it would bring us nearer to the goal of unity.
A ril 14 - The Chinese press publishes a long sminAry (full page
in e's DailF)-6T-i Chinese-flavored article on "The ..?resent-
day Ratioail, Liberation question" from the March issue of the
North Vietnamese ?arty journal Hoc 212.
Moscow's Mayslogans -- published almost a week later
than last year -- relilia"--EN6 development of the conflict in
subtle changes. A long-standing reference to the "commonwealth"
of bloc states is deleted. A new slogan hailing "the working
class of the entire world" emphasizes their courage but struggle
"for the socialist transformation of society." The slogan for
Japan calls or friendly Soviet-Jananese relations" replacing a
reference to the Japanese quest for friendship with "neighboring
states."
April /5 - In an interview with American correspondents in Hong
TrOTIETThe leader of a group of 125 nussian refugees just arrived
from Sinkiang, Gregory Michenko, sal in - -62 the Soviet
Consulate in Kuldja had clandestinely distributed thousands of
soviet passportsto Moslems in Sin%iang who presented them to
.4nese or er au or ties demanding exit visas, thus precipitat-
ing the riot of May 2, 1932, suppressed by Chinese troops with
machine gun fire, and consequent closing of Soviet Consulate.
Michenko said Moslems still hate Chinese, long to cross into
ussn and frequently listen to prohibited and highly inflammatory
Soviet broadcasts in native languages.
An "editorial manifesto" in the new issue of the pro-Chinese
magazine Revolution reportedly attacks the pro-Soviet Thorem
leadership of the :french CP violently for "multiple betrayals"
Of the masses, appeals openly to the members to overthrow the
leadership, and announces that a conference of the pro-Chinese
elements will be held at the enirar-this year. The same issue
contains article by British ef66ident Caaadast A. H. Evans
attacking Khrushchev's agricultural policyand a summary of
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(Chronology Cont.) Ii
speech by chief editor Jacques Verges asserting that X. has
declared a 2-year truce in the revolutionary struggle merely
in order that the Soviet Union might overtake the U.S.A. in
industrial production.
April 15-22 - The Rumanian ?arty CC plenum took place in complete
secrecy:--TSee Addendum, April ne, for publication of materials.)
April 1S-19 - The old-line, Soviet-aligned C? of Ceylon he:d its
7th Congress in Colombo, with guest speeches by "F55175"gentatives
of Codhunist and-N=0s parties of more than 30 countries," in-
cluding the CPSU and 4 Moscow-following ruling parties o astern
2urope (excluding Poland and Rumania) and Mongolia. C:ee Chrono,
Jan. 19-21, for report of rump "7th Congress" held by pro-Chinese
dissidents, and March 9 for report of "Soviet recapture" of trado
union movement.) Congress resolution condemns CCP leadership
and comes out for calling a meeting of fraternal parties -- as
reported by Tag:
Aril 17 - Xhrushchev's 70th birthday celebration gathered in
scow the 15111Ty chiefs of all 3uropean Communist bloc countries
except Albania -- and Rumania. The latter had an ostensible ex-
cuse in the continuing CC plenum, and sent Premier Maurer and CC
Secretary Stoica to participate. Ho special emissaries from
Castro or Tito. Speeches at ceremonies and messages from around
the world provided further clues to the posture of parties in
the conflict, with Chinese attacked directly in messages and
speeches of at least 0, led by :last Germans. Longest, most
sycophantic defense of Xhrushchev against Chicom criticism (with-
out naming Chinese) was by Bulgarian Zhivkov. Surprisinr-ly,
Gomulka on the 15th hailed X. with rarely used term which was
standard for Stalin, "ve/ikiy vozhd," ("great leader") and called
him "vozhd" again en the 17th. Shortest and coolest was from
Japanese C? chairman: "Congratulations on your 70th birthday,
So Nosaka." The CCP sent a 500-word message signed by Mao,
Chou En-lai, Liu Sha:U=Ehi and Chu Te which saiC: "Although at
present there are differences between you and us on a number of
questions of principle concerning U-L and there is lack of unity,
we are deeply convinced that all this Eronly temporary. ni-TEu
event of a major world crisis, the two parties, our two countries
and our two peoples, will undoubtedly stand together against our
common enemy." The message from Indonesian C? boss Aidit seamed
to reflect advance coordination with lekinL; as he referred also
to "the situation characterized by differences of opinion" which
Indonesian Communists think of as "of a temporary nature," --
although no other Chinese-aligned Asian party made any mention
of differences. The frankly hostile Albanians, on the other
hand, observed the occasion by holding a meeting of the Tirana
?eople's Council to "revise its decision of 30 May 1959" which
awarded the title of "Honorary Citizen of Tirana" to K. and to
withdraw the title!
Domestically, the Soviet media devoted a majority of space
on the-17th and 13th to the anniversary, including messages,
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portraits, and award of 4th Order of Lenin. Military leaders
Malinovsky and Grecno emphasize K. role as supreme commander-
in-chief. Content considered by Uestern observers as not ex-
cessively adulatory, certainly not in comparison with Stalin's
70th.
At the award ceremony, X. limited himself to indirect at-
tacks on the Chinese and, apparently again trying to reassure
foreign parties, said: "We must not burn our boats in our rela-
tions with those with whom we are nof- at the moment in furl
r-t
unl?y. ihe visiting Party leaders disbanded immediately after
the celebration; with no evidence that a political meeting had
been held.
April 1D - The first acknowledgment in the Chinese camp of tha
Soviet move towarci a coun er o ensive came w a ,,if.'-wor
editorial in the North Korean ?arty daily Nodong Sinmun which
attacks it harshly -- without naming the cET5FITET-----
"those who have created the prosont situa-
tion...should repent and immediately stop the
open violation of the revolutionary principles
of the declaration and statement and their big-
power chauvinistic acts undermining solidairf7
....However, their anti-China campaign,...in a
nevi frenzy, and their noisy clamor about 'collec-
tive measures,' show that they are sinking deeper
into splitiism....To isolate China, comprising two-
thirds of the population of the socialist camp,
means in fact to -break up tile camp...."
After running through their extensive indictment, the North
Koreans sound the call to action:
"Such evil doings in the ranks of the Com-
munist movement cannot be permitted but must
be eliminated....The world communists and the
international' working class have before them
the sacred task of launching vigorous action
to defend unity for the victory of the ICH....
The socialist camp and the ICH are not a play-
thing of any individual or any individual party.
The rampage of certain people can be checked
when an increasing number of Communist parties
and Communists fight against it. If al/ the
parties and all Communists rho want unity pool
their strength and fight, the splitting machina.
tions win meet fiasco....
In order to defend the purity of 11-L and
strengthen the genuine unity of the socialist
camp and the ICH, sincere criticism should be
extensively unfolded within the rarias of the
Communist movement....When extensive criticism
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9 Chronology Cont.)
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is in the ri ht and who is in the wrong, and
e pur ty of
e rants o e se preserved....Ve
deem it necessary to convene an international
meeting of brof)er parties for the solution of
'the differences,"
-- but they follow this with a 400-word conclusion which make$
it clear that the conference should come only after "full pre-
parations" are made and that it will be a conference in which
"the Marxist-Leninist parties and the true Communists" will
"safeguard unity" by "shattering the splitting maneuvers" of the
wild revisionists.
Also on the 10th, the Bast German cultural weekly Sonntag
publishes a long article attadking the revisionist views (a
"direct attack on socialist state power") expressed by Austrian
CP leader 3rnst Fischer in lecture at Prague University and
published in Nos. 17 and 20 of the German-language Czech news-
paper Autbau and rrieden.
oril 20 - Speaking in Iarsaw on the 19th anniversary of the
ov e .olish mutual aiciand friendship treaty, Gomulka quotes
from the Chinese message to Xhrushchev the passage about the
difference0 being only A temporary manifestation and adds:
"It 'would be extremely useful if the
Chinese comrades would begin as qu'relly as
1766616/15-V5-66-rjuided by this attitude. The
near future will sfiow whether their words cor-
respond with the CCP's practicAl activity."
April 20-23 - The Bulgarian Chairman of the Presidismof the
rational Assembly (titular chief of state), Dimitur Ganev died.
He had also been a Politburo member of the BC?. On the 23rd,
the National Assembly "approved" the "nomination" by BC? boss
Zhivkov of Georgi Traykov to succeed Gnnev: he is nominally not
a Communist, but "secretary and most eminent viorkerbf the
Nationillrerarian Union, an organization which in the "Father-
land Front" "has developed as a militant assistant of the BC?
in the construction of the new life."
April 22 - The 94th anniversary of Lenin's birth brings a new
1pateof materials farrecting the current slage of the conflict.
Keynotespeaker in Uoscow is CC Secretary for Relations with Bloc
Parties Andropov. He devotes the last quarter of his 7500-word
speech to fhe troubles with the Chinese, who, "in the struggle
for hegemony, are increasingly and openly replacing Leninism -wit
Mao Tse-tungism." ecen y .ey ave e open y proc axme
that the only chance to avert a split in the Communist movement
consists in. ..unconditional capitUlation, and accepting the line
of the CCP leadersEip.-...Is for the-UT66 which the CCP leaders
are now feverishly trying to knock together on unprincipled
-
grounds, it is doomed to failure...."
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Andropov refers to the Chinese DirtntlAgggage0E8Onfl
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"All who read it could not but notice the
insincere character of that document....How
T3-1106761177171-TE76-Ectivities of the Chinese
leaders who, having sent the congratulations,
at the same time, on that vary day, published
in the Chinese press foul anti-Soviet materials?
...Vas not the telegram calculated to mislead
the Soviet and world public, to create the im-
pression among the Chinese people...that the
CCP leaders really care about strengthening
Soviet Chinese friendship? By the way, com-
rades, the telegram expresses the confidence
that if serious major events occur in the
world, as they write, the CC? and the CPSUI the
CPR and the USSR, will fight together (telegram
said "stand together") against a common enemy.
This is, of course,. an. important statement, but
WV i. it to be reconciled with the slanderous
assertiOns of ChideSe P-ropaganda that allegedly
our country has joined a plot with the imperial-
ists,has concluded with them some sort of al-
liance?"
However, Andropov keeps the olive. branch-in-sight:
"Mile openly exposing the splitting
course of the CCP leadership and fighting
against it, our Party at the same time does
not refuse to continue, as in the past, to look
for ways to normalize relations with the CCP....
There are people who allege that the CPSU is
strivirrr to expel China from the socialist cari2.
S s, o course nonsense....
Pravda pUbltthes the text of an 0,000-word editorial from
the lio-rigue of Party Life on the occasion, most of which is a
defense of the current concept of "the transformation of the
CPSU into a party of all the neonle" and the USSR into an "all-
people's state." New Times also features the anniversary with
an editorial which stresses the "reality of the socialist society
in one country" which serves as "an example forthe peoples of
all states."
The Chinesepon the other hand, almost slight the ocoasion:
People's Daily marks it only with a 5th-page article of routine
content by an unknown Xuan Ya-ming, and the North Zorean and
North Vietnamese Articles are of a routine nature.. The A/banians
anFin a "routine" Zen i Popullit editorial -- denounce the
modern revisionists who are "mutilating Lenin."
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Addendum to Chronology weil
Post-deadline items
April 25 - News reports from London cite "qualified sources" as
.715.711Tat the Chinese had replied negatively to the C?SU's
letter proposing:7r= Sino-goviet talks in gay, a preparatory
56-6=2; of selected parties in June and a world conference in
October. "China's reply was reported to have been curt, snubbin:;
the Soviet plan but agreeing to bilateral ideological talks on
its own terns -- in October and in Peking." The press also re-
ported: "authoritative informants believe Xhrushchev will ap-
prove the Peking sugr,estion, howev&F-F3TUF5=77--nowever,
TrEasinrdEre pressu,6-Tr7-5-eing exerted on ET5-Ziemlin against
a summit showdown with China from satellite and other ranking
Communist leaders."
April 2G - TheRumanian ?777g7arty daily Scinteia publishes the
175=171s of th:i-r77-,-plenum,-7757=ing of a "s4atement"
and a "policy znaiy=1-rufiEIng 17-more than 12,000 worc.se ac-
cording to plass; repoFts -- but the text is not available here at
the time this goes to press. The feature is an urgent call for
a meeting of the Soviet and Chinese leaders -- with the Runanaanc
as mediators -- to make preparations for a wor/d-wfde neefing
of C.7 leaders. The statement also says that the Soviets have
"agreed in general" to the plan but that the Chinese had taus
far failed to heed it.
In Peking on the same day, Peeple's Daily publishes the
full tazt (summary in other papdR) 61te North Korean Nodo-ag
Sinnun editorial of April /9 striking back ET-I-EU-nev 0oVrit
1777Tritive, and all papers feature under banner headlines Chou
3n-1aiis report on his visit to 14 countries -- which included
a denunciation of Ehrushcaev's call for agreement to renounce
the use of force in settlement of territorial disputes as "a
new fraud." NCNA also announces that the "third volule of
anti-ZETHa materials from the Soviet press" went on sale through-
out China.
April 27 - People's Daily devotes C pages to the full texts of
Tr3-776viet documents published in April 3 Pravda: the Suslov
plenum report, the plenum decision and .1Travda's editorial,
together with a 1,000-word PD editor's note which reaches new
extremes in derisive abuse OT Khrusachev and the CPSU leadership.
It implies that Z. had once been forced "to make self-criticisu
for committin5 fEe error of Trotskyism" and declares that 'cte
are prepared to publish the relevant materials when necessary."
(Fuller comments will be included in next installment.)
(Addendum.)
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3Oqn.9,903-1
.778. SEATO Council Rejects Neutralization of South Vietnam
25X1 C 1 Ob
BACKGROUND: At the mid-April SEATO meeting in Manila,
French Foreign ginister Couve de Murville again advocated a
"political solution" to Communist insurgency against the South
Vietnamese government. SEATO's Council of Ministers rejected
their French colleague's proposal unanimously, endorsing instead
the new military and political program of the South Vietnamese
government. The SEATO communique says:
"The Council agreed that defeat of the Com-
munist campaign is essential not only to the securi-
ty of the Republic of Vietnam, but to that of South-
east Asia. It will also be convincing proof that
Communist expansion by such tactics will not be
permitted."
The SEATO treaty specifically provides that members of the
alliance guarantee the security of South Vietnam, and in this
context the communique says:
"The Council agreed that members of SEATO
should remain prepared if necessary to take further
concrete steps within their respective capabilities
in fulfillment of their obligations under the treaty."
Other sections of the communique charged North Vietnam with
directing, supplying, and supporting the Viet Cong guerrillas.
The communique was signed by Australia, Great Britain, New Zea-
land, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States.
The French delegate concurred in general with the communique,
including those portions dealing with Communist aggression and
subversion in Southeast Asia, but abstained from the section deal-
ing with South Vietnam.
Most delegates and observers at the SEATO meeting agreed
that France had suffered a diplomatic set-back, not so much for
the failure to persuade other delegations to support their neu-
tralization policy as for the unwillingness or inability of the
French delegation to produce any practical plan for their grand
concept. President De Gaulle referred to such a conception as
long ago as last summer and prior to his 31 January 1964 press
conference it was widely anticipated that he would on that oc-
casion offer the world the particulars of his plan. Nowever,
his remarks at that time were no less vague than they had been
before. The delegates thought that by the time of the SEATO
conference, more specific and concrete planning might have been
done and their French colleagues might bring forth dramatically
specific proposals -- and perhaps even some indication that the
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dftwitimoolmomp? (778 Cont.)
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
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(773 Cont.) 41114111MOIMNMPEPED
Chicoms vould accept real neutralization of Southeast Asia.
Such was not the case. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
limited himself to nothing more concrete than describing the
neutralization concept as "a long-range proposal."
Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman described the
French proposal as "tantamount to the delivery of the country,
bound hand and foot, to the northern aggressors." Other dele-
gates were equally firm and sharp in their rejection of the
French proposals. Most of the delegates, in calling the con-
cept "utopian," "visionary," etc., referred to neighboring Laos
as an example of a failure of neutrality to bring peace. That
country had been "neutralized" by agreement among 14 countries
and yet the Communist Pathet Lao had consistently and at will
violated the neutrality agreements. They had, at the behest of
Pelting and Eanoi, frustrated all the attempts of the Internatiom
Control Commussion (ICC) to police the neutrality and guarantee
the Laotians freedom from outside interference and assaUlt. The
"neutralization" of Laos has permitted Eanoi and ?eking to sup-
ply, support and reinforce the Communist Pathet Lao's subversive
attempts to expand their control over the country and has also
made possible the continued use of the "Ho Chi Minh tr il" to
send men and material to sustain the Viet Cone insurgents in
South Vietnam.
The real problem, in fact the tragedy, of vague and inane
tal% of a "political solution" or "neutralization" in Southeast
Asia is that it is cruelly deceptive for those very people who
are willing to fight to defend their freedom. Such tan has two
effects on the South Vietnamese people, Many of whom are under-
standably war-wear g; both equally pernicious and defeatist: Firs
it encourages the more naive elements in South Vietnam to believ
that if the Khanh government were overthrown, the successor
government could end the war by a "political solution" and remai
Tree from domination by Eanoi and ?clang; second, such misguided
efforts by those who fall for the "neutrality" siren song forces
the Ehanh government to withhold part of its strength from the
struggle against the Viet Cong in order to immunize itself againf
coun attempts by elements foblish enough to conclude that a
/itical solution" is available if only it is sought. The facts
do not support such.a conclusion.
? ? 41,
25X1C10b
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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IJilauli 4 May 1034
779 AFIFE1
IE, g.
25X1C10b
"Bandung" Afro-Asian Conference Scheduled for
Alrica 1035 (See also BPG #135, item 743, dated
24 Feb 1954)
BACKGROUND: The outcome of the ministerial-level pre-
paratory meeting for a Second Afro-Asian (Bandung) conference,
held in Djakarta from 10-15 April, ought to have been a disap-
pointment for the Chicoms and the Indonesians. Nonetheless,
NMI termed the Conference a "great success" (as seems now
standard Communist practice no matter how the Sino-Soviet con-
flict rages at international front and other gatherings -- sea
BPG #139, item 722, dated 20 April 1964) and quoted Indonesian
C? chairman Aidit as terming it a "total victory" which smashed
the "imperialist plot" against Afro-Asian unity. The importance
attributed to the preparatory conference by the Chicoms became
evident with the dispatch of Foreign Minister Chen Yi as the
head of a large, senior delegation. While the results of the
meeting undoubtedly did not fulfill Chicom expectations, the
meeting did provide -- as will the main Conference -- an impor-
tant arena for the Chicoms to further break out of isolation.
Twenty-two nationsl were represented at the meeting. It
Is important to note that the Chicoms were not scheduled to
participate and ended up as co-sponsors of the meeting. They
came to Djakarta late, kept in the background "on a stand-by
basis," asked for and accepted Indonesia's invitation -- after
most major participants had arrived or were firmly committed to
participation.
The three major areas on which the Chicoms and Indonesians
were forced to concede or to compromise were:
1. The Date and Site of Conference. Following India's
motion, supported by pressures from African and non-African
Arab countries, the meeting decided to hold the Conference in
Africa beginning 13 March 1955 with the actual Conference site
likely to be decided by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
Chicoms and Indonesians had treated the Conference matter as
"urgent" and persistently pressed for an early conference date,
aiming no doubt ataConference before the second Non-
aligned (Belgrade) Conference (scheduled to be held in Cairo
in the first week of October 1964). More surprising than the
late date, however, is the decision to hold the Conference in
Africa. Indonesia's approach over many months implied that a
second Bandung Conference would take place in Indonesia, where
'Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ceylon, the CPR,
Fithiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Liberia,
Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philimines, Syria, Tanganyika,
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40010WiWillam46, (779 Cont.)
(44frexR.E1.5or Release 2000/DP78-03061A000200070003-1
Sukarno with Chicom guidance and support would have set ,the
stage. An African site will most likely diminish Chicom/.
Indonesian influence in this Conference, and assert African in-
terests in the overall Afro-Asian framework at the expense of
the former's "leadership," be it on governmental or non-govern-
mental (AAPSO) levels. According to best indications available,
the Indonesians appear to want to save face by accepting the
decision on the Conference site in good grace, acquiescing to
the validity of African and Arab demands.
2. Soviet admission. The USSR's participation, suggested
by India and strongly supported by Ceylon, led to major debates
and conflicts of opinion. No agreement was reached on whether
the USSR should attend, or whether the question of admission
should be submitted at the Conference. In other words, the
Chicoms apparently did not succeed in having the Soviets excludeC
According to an AP report of 25 April, PRAVDA leveled an angry
2,500-word blast at the Chicoms for blocking an immediate Soviet
invitation to the Conference. The article accuses the Chicoms
of shameless slander and cheating and charges them with trying
to isolate the Soviet Union from the nations of Asia and Africa.
India had pleaded the case for Soviet admission on the
basis of the Soviet presence in many Afro-Asian non-governmental
bodies, the geographic position of some Soviet provinces, and the
consistent Soviet backing of Afro-Asian actions and aspirations.
India's move for Soviet participation was interpreted by op-
ponents of the proposal as a deliberate attempt to obstruct the
proceedings.
The proposal to have the Soviets included drew fire from
Chen Yi and was also strongly opposed by Pakistan. Chen Yi and
others argued that the seat of the Soviet Government is in
3urope; the CPR had opposed Soviet participation in the first
Bandung Conference when there was no dispute between the two
countries; and the CPR's opposition had nothing to do with the
present ideological conflict. Grounds for rejecting the pro-
posal also rested on the fact that if the Soviet Union were in-
cluded in this Afro-Asian regional conference, there would be
no basis for rejecting the participation of others, e.g. the
United States with its negro population, (the states of Navaii
or Alaska), Albania which has a Moslem population, or Spain whic::k
has relations with African countries, etc.
3. Malaysian admission. India was also responsible for
the submission of the proposal for Malaysia's admission. The
communique issued at the end of the meeting ambiguously stated
that "it was hoped that the obstacles which prevented reaching
an agreement on the invitation would be eliminated," in which
case "an invitation should be extended as soon as possible." --
Indonesia had led the opposition to Malaysia's admission and was
mapported by the CPR, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Some of
the countries which recognize Malaysia maintained that Malaysia
is a sovereign country and is entitled to be represented at the
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(779 Cont.)
immwOMOmOMOMOOD....
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Composition of Conference. The meeting resolved to invite the
following categories of countries to the Conference: All the
20 countries which participated in the Bandung conference; all
members of the Organisation of African Unity; Afro-Asian coun-
tries 'which will attain independence between now and the conven-
ing of the conference, as well as Mongolia, North Korea, South
Korea, Cyprus, uwait, Uest Samoa, and the provisional government
of Angola. Additionally, representatives of all national move-
ments from nonself..governing territories in Asia, and those in
Africa which are recognized by the Organization of African Unity,
may attend with the right to be heard -- a provision specifically
to apply to South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, Aden, and
Palestine.
Conference agenda. The communique contains a 10-point provision..
agenda for the Conference, including the heading "world peace
and disarmament" under which is listed "nondissemination of nu-
clear gad thermonuclear weapons," as well as strict internationa7.
control, prohibition of all types of nuclear and thermonuclear
tests, creation of nuclear-free zones, and complete prohibition
and destruction of all nuclear weapons. Another heading on the
agenda, which is also listed in the communique as one of the con-
ference objectives, is "the peaceful settlement of disputes and
the renunciation of the threat or use of force in international
relations." In addition to such subjects as peaceful coexistenc
and the anti-imperialist struggle, the agenda includes items on
the strengthening of the United Nations and the desirability of
establishing a permanent secretariat to facilitate cooperation
among Afro-Asian nations.
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700. 20 July 1954: Twentieth Anniversary of the Anti-Hitler
11Aot
BACKGROUND: [Note. The Communists were never anti-
PEFETAT-Iii the sense of being against oppressive
totalitarianism. They were and are against every-
thing, including free democratic ideologies, that
might thwart their imposition of their own brand of
totalitarianism. They indifferently support any-
thing or attack anything in maneuvering toward their
own goal of eventual domination. It would be dif-
ficult to present evidence proving conclusively
that the Communists, as a tactic to insure their
own takeover in Germany after her defeat in WW II,
intentionally informed the Gestapo of the conspiracy
against Hitler in June 1944. It would be simpler
to prove that the German Communists, due to their
own lack of security precautions, were penetrated
by the Gestapo. However, established writers have
made statements in their published works which at
least implicate the Communists in exposing this
last plot to kill Hitler. These statements can
be used to seriously damage the self-image the Com-
munists try to create of being the saviors of those
threatened by Fasnism.]
"Fascist resurgence and Nazi revanchism" is a dead horse
which Communist propagandists have flogged ad nauseam since WW
II. The twentieth anniversary of the attempt to assassinate
Hitler on July 20th offers good occasion for a public reminder
that Hitler and Fascism could never have come to power without
the support of Stalin and the German Communist Party, acting
under direction from Moscow. Different writers have suggested
that the Communists actually saved Hitler in 1944 by deliberatel-,,
betraying the assassination plot to the Gestapo. (See unclassi-
fied attachment). The failure of the assassination attempt led
to the near obliteration of what moral fiber remained in German
officialdom, while causing incalculable and needless additional
human suffering.
Numerous eminent or high ranking personages in Nazi German:
were convinced that Hitler must be killed and were fully prepare
to do so personally. Elaborate plots and active attempts were
made by different groups from 1939 onward, all of which were
thwarted by mischance or the fantastic security measures surrounC
ing Hitler's person. Spurred to new efforts by the success of
the Allied invasion in mid-1944, a conspiratorial group centered
around Dr. Karl Friedrich Goerdler began to take desperate meas-
ures to assassinate Hitler and depose his Nazi retinue. This
conspiracy included all of the numerous anti-Nazi elements in
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emlnilmaimithami
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remnants of which had been driven underground. On 22 June 1944
the conspirators reluctantly broke a long-standing resolve by
taking into their confidence two surviving members of the XPD,
hoping that the latter could at least be counted on to cooperate
against the Nazis, Two Social Democrats among the conspirators,
Reichwein and Leber, met with XPD representatives Saefkow and
Jacob, who brought with them a third man. introduced as "Rambow."
Rambow? turned out to be a Gestapo informer, and Reichwein and
Leber were arrested by the Gestapo on July 4th and 5th. This
forced precipitate action, and Count Claus von Stauffenberg was
nominated to personally plant a brief-case bomb under the staff
conference table during the 20 July visit by Hitler to his
Rastenburg field Headquarters in East Prussia. Owing perhaps to
the haste of the preparations, Hitler survived the blast with-
out serious injury. His revenge was a fratricidal purge which
involved 7,000 arrests and socia deaths, eliminating the po-
tential for any further anti-Nm7i4mavement within Germany. Dur-
ing the winter of 1944-45 what remained of the spiritual elite
of Germany was behind bars. Those who remained alive in April
1945 were, so far as possible, shot out of hand by the S.S. lest
they survive the war and play the part that would naturally have
been theirs in post-war Germany.
According to all logic of motive, betrayal of the anti-
Hitler group to the Gestapo, was consistent with and typical of
Moscow's methods -- before, during and after the war. While
undermining and betraying its "allies" and "enemies" of the
moment with fine impartiality, Moscow managed to build for it-
self a popular image of heroic anti-Fascist struggle. The falsi-
ty of this image has been extensively documented, as reflected
in Prop Note 19 (B), 5 June 63, with its accompanying unclassi-
fied publication and bibliography, "Communist Nazi Relations:
The Myth of Communist Anti-Fascist Resistance in WW II" (e.g.
after two years of outright Soviet-Nazi cooperation at the start
of VW II, all Communist Parties followed the Soviet lead in at-
tacking Germany and Fascism after Hitler attacked the USSR; CPIs
in all countries involved in the war, joined the resistance
movements which they had denounced and fought while Hitler was
attacking only non-Communist countries.) This study affords a
broad perspective of the grievous human tragedy which has been
inflicted by Moscow throughout the length and breadth of Eurasia
in times of peace as well as in war.
Mounting difficulties, foreign and domestic, have beset
the Soviet regime in recent years. The perennial agricultural
and economic problems at home have not yielded to Marxist-
Leninist theorists. The European satellites have grown more in-
dependent and restive, while the Sino-Soviet schism threatens to
destroy what remains of the Kremlin's monolithic power posture.
Moscow badly needs a period of "peaceful co-existence" and help
from abroad to cope with its internal problems and re-assert its
2
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25X1C10b732 AF,g Dictatorship in Ghana
BACKGROUND; "To build a Socialist society, Ghana marches
on, guided by immutable principles of Marxism-
Leninism. Long live Kwame Nkrumah, founder of
GIv.na! Long live the Central Committee of the
revoluti!Jnary Convention Peoples Party!" (Ghana
Evening News, February 19, 1964.)
As Ghana is being rapidly turned into an authoritarian
society, she is just as rapidly adding a number of Communist
features. A completely controlled party-state structure is
President Nkrumah's evident aim; radical 1efti9t advisors are
infusing public media and institutions with Soviet-style concepts
and are apparently gaining influence in the conduct of Ghanaian
affairs and in Nkrumah's councils as well. Whatever the moti-
vations, the facts are incontestable. The following deve1opment2
are a measure of the Soviet style totalitarian trends in Ghana:
1. The Soviet presence in Ghana is rising. Military and
technical teams arrive in-USE5F-IR-YEFEF-NERE6Fs. In addition,
persistent rumors say that Nkrumah has had at least one Soviet
bodyguard in constant attendance since the most recent assassi-
nation attempt. A reported switch from British to Soviet arms
sources would undoubtedly increase both the numbers of Soviets
in Ghana and the numbers of Ghanaians going to the USSR for
military training.
2. Ghana is receiving Communist bloc support for Nkrumah's
pan-African organizational schemes. 'rife Ghanaian Vice President
ox e r can ra e inion e eration, J. Tettegah, is the
leading advocate of a Communist-backed scheme for African trade
union organizations to disaffiliate from either the Communist
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) or the free world Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Hidden
Communist ties and influences could then exploit labor organiza-
tions more easily. The new Secretary General of the Accra-based
Pan African Union of Journalists is the former editor of Ghana's
extremist paper, Spark, modelled after Lenin's Iskra, which
has the same mea617177- The Communist International Organization
of Journalists assisted Ghana in organizing the conference.
3. Opposition has been stifled. All political parties
except tii6755Evention Peoples Party (CPP) have been outlawed,
opposition press has been banned, the principle and practice of
an independent judiciary have been abandoned, opposition leaders
jailed or exiled.
4. Popular referendum was rigged. Improper threats and
preilivalw-MEMZEWIRMIDEPF8t0t1061A00121301)9176en
(732 Cont.)
25X1C10
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ballot counting procedures were all used to obtain a patently
false approval for Ukrumah's party-controlled state.
5. Personality cult is increasing. The press deifies
Nkrumah, ca"--711"En?"sat"--(IreoYr(-"Wer"), "messianic dedication"
and "Great One." "And so let the word go forth that indeed we
do have a miracle called Kwame Nkrumah who walks the face of
Africa today." Ghanaian Times, Jan 11, 1962.
6. A deteriOratin economic situation receives little
attention. ay ng police wi e econom c sec or an ail-
ing to show concern for the worsening plight of the people have
brought the once active Ghanaian economy to a deplorable state.
However, the serious depletion of the treasury has not cancelled
exponditnres for subversive activities in other African countries
or for prestige developments at home.
7. Propaganda attacks against non-Communist countries are
increasing. Despifii the desperate need for capital iniEFETE5f?
and despite developmental assistance given Ghana by the West,
tirades against the US and UK are frequent occurences. The
government-controlled press often couches the attacks in familiar
Communist terminology and berates the usual sins of the non-
Communists.
G. Key areas of press, labor and youth are now directed
by extremisfs with Communist bloc ties (see attached unclassi-
fied Biographic Sketches).-
9. Moderating influences have all but disappeared from
the government. ATIFEW-have removed independent, moderate
elementsfrom police and civil service, leaving the extremists
as Ukrumah's only source of advice and so-called information.
Ile is said to believe, for instance, that the 99% vote which
approved restrictive constitutional amendments accurately re-
flects the will of his people and his own undiminished popularity.
10. Ghana has declared a class war. The middle class of
merchants, professional men and civil servants is to be deprived
of its role in developing the country. The farmer and worker
are now extolled as builders of the future; a move unsuited to
Ghana's needs but necessary to "scientific socialism."
References:
'Pr
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731 AF,VE,N3,WE. Firm Government Action Defeats Communist
Subveinon
25X1C10b
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: [This guidance has three unc ass e
ments: a-Fab:ST-copy of an article by Eudocio Ravines,
"kpaciguamiento y Tharmidor en Bolivia," which appeared in
3ste y Geste, 1-15 March 1964, Year II, No. 40, a summary in
3n-lisha summary in Spanish of the article.
There is general agreement that Communist-led violence
will thrive wherever conditions of poverty and underdevelop-
ment impel' the masses of the people to take desperate measures.
It is equally true that it is not always among the poverty-
stricken societies that the pialaem of Communism is the most
serious. However, even where serious economic problems exist,
judicious firmness by the governing authorities in resisting
pressure and in handling individual cases of illegal Communist
subversion will have a more immediate effect than the best ef-
forts to improve the e6666a-E-Ia-BY-t1e"-F5ple. The material
conditions of the poorer nations of the world are not improving
fast enough to give much hope for the present generation and the
gap between the wealthy and the poor nations is widening instea-
of narrowing.
25X1C10b
This does not mean that Communist subversion should be
considered purely a police problem. As pointed out in a previons
25X1C10bguidance [Stability in Free World Governments, 25X1C10b
1=.1==11111111111111FEe-iiaTi76 must be given some hope tnrougn au-
gible reforms and an expanding economy. Mexico is an outstanding
example of a country whose government has been for many years
responsive to the needs of the masses, and while Communists see!:
influence throughout the society, Communism is not an important
issue, especially when compared with most other underdeveloped
countries.
But Communists, particularly in Latin America, are more
and more resorting to illegal actions -- subversion, aggression,
intimidation -- in efforts to force their way into power. Dur-
ing the last year two governments -- Venezuela and Bolivia --
successfully resisted extreme cases of barbarian Communist as-
saults and maintained stability in their countries.
The attached article by the well-known Peruvian author
and former Communist, Eudocio Ravines, touches upon Communist
attempts to prevent the Venezuelan election but is mainly con-
cerned with the crisis that shook Bolivia for ten days last
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(761 Cont.)
December and ultimately vindicated government firmness in the
face of Communist threats, The striking miners of the Bolivian
sierra had kidnapped 21 foreigners, including four Americans,
and were using them as hostages to force President Victor Paz
Estenssoro to release three Communists then being tried for
common crimes. Paz Estenssoro refused to negotiate: he took
a calculated risk of civil war and von a complete victory.
25X1 C1 Ob
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selectea References
on
Anti-Hitler Plots and the Communists
BOURI, Margret
Treason In The Twentieth Century, Putnam, N.Y. 1963
(German Title: Der Verrat in 20. Jahrhundert)
P. 281. "Leber and Reichwein were the two who made the ill-fated
contact with the Communists in the early summer of 1944. Leber
did this in the full knowledge of the dangerous aspects of an
alliance with the Communists and of the possibility of Communist
penetration of the Kreisau movement. Wilhelm Leuschner, the
grand old man of the SPD, opposed Leber's intention strongly on
the grounds that the formation of Communist cells precludes ex-
act knowledge of the individuals included, and that therefore
Leber might in effect be inviting Nazi spies already ensconed in
the Communist groups into the Kreisau movement. In retrospect,
one must say that both were right. Leber was certainly on the
right track in his over-all conception of an aroused Volk, a
state of agitation in the people only to be achieved by complete
cooperation of all the resistance groups. Leuschner was un-
happily all too prescient of the immediate consequences. In
fact a Gestapo agent was present at Leber's meeting with the
Communists which led directly to Reichwein's arrest on the 4th
of July and Leber's on the 5th. These arrests in their turn
forced Stauffenberg's hand...."
FITZGIBBON, Constantine
20 July (British edition: The Shirt of Nessus). Norton, New
York 1956.
p. 143. "Now, however, the relationship between the conspirators
and the Communists assumed a new and disastrous importance.
Adolf Reichwein...had retained a link with what remained of the
Communist underground within Germany....Such contact was approved
by Julius Leber, though on different grounds. According to Frau
Leber, her husband had no intention of collaborating with the
Communists. But, she has told the author, he said that the con- '
spirators must find out what those people are doing behind our
backs and what line they proposed to follow if the assassination
were successfully accomplished....
p. 144: "The first meeting took place on June 22nd in eastern
Berlin, with Reichwein and Leber representing the Social Democrats,
Saefkow, Jacob and a third man by the name of Rambow being the
Communists present. Rambow was unknown to Reichwein and Leber.
The Communists seem to have been already far too well informed
about the conspiracy. They demanded a further meeting, particu-
larly with the military leaders, which was provisionally fixed
for July 4th....Rambow was an informer. Reichwein attended the
second meeting and was there arrested with Saefkow and Jacob.
LebeArvanalcOlgot Risithoset2.060.Wo(31A-REEP71134306111#0002000713110.3.1
It haiP MiadbFaiiRaetclaRiESIPWaihq1A-f141PHMWAgiciaitmosad
act of Judas solely in the role of Nazi stool pigeon or whether
he was simultaneously acting as a Communist agent...."
GISEVIUS, Hans Bernd
To the Bitter End. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1947. Wisp in
German)
p. 504: "The day before yesterday his (i.e. Stauffenberg's) in-
termediaries, Leber and Professor Reichwein, together with three
leading Communists, had been arrested, just as they were on the
point of arranging a meeting between Stauffenberg and the Com-
munists. Goerdeler did not yet know that one of the three Com-
munists had been a Gestapo spy, but he was outraged...."
HELLWIG, Joachim and ()LEY, Hans:
Der 20. Juli 1944 und der Fall Heusinger
Verlag Der Nation, Berlin (East). 1959. Pictures and Text.
COMMENT:
nis glossy propaganda book serves two purposes: to impress
readers with the role of the Communists in war-time German re-
sistance and to blame Heusinger for having betrayed the 20th
July conspirators and for having cooperated with Hitler again
afterwards.
NITZSCHE, Gerhard
Die SAEFKOW-JACOB-BASTLEIN Gruppe. Dohumente und Materialism des
illegalen antifaschistischen gampfes.
(Institut fur Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zg der SED). Dietz, East
Berlin 1957.
COMMENT:
This official Communist document is particularly interesting be-
cause of what it does not say: it does not connect the arrest
and execution of SALTOW-ivith the 20 JulTEOnspiracy and does
not mention any date for meetings with Leber and Reichwein later
Win October 1943 (p.69). It condemns the conspiracy as a whole
as reactionary, militaristic, etc. (pp. 65-60). It does not
identify the informer who betrayed the entire group -- unlike
FITZGIBBON (q.v.).
CEM, Rudolf
Deutscher Widerstand. Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Zurich 1947
p. 94: "nen Saefkow and Jacob...held meetings with the Social
Democrats Dr. Leber and Prof. Reichwein, both of whom belonged to
the greisauer circle, the Gestapo succeeded in smuggling an in-
f orrApp dovedif araMbatta2060/08/1,71q GIA-OZIOR/3811MM90)0?204b70003-1
2
secARITRYggaiPAVWARWonURIMMINNPROIRRa83
Milano, 26-29 March 1961 (reproduced from typewritten copy)
"The German Resistance and the Allies during the Second World
Wex" by Prof. Dr. Walter Bartel
P. 17: "On 22 June 1944 Anton Saefkow and Franz Jacob and the
representatives of the Social Democratic ?arty, Leber and
Reichwein, members of the Kreisauer circle, met. Agreement was
reached for future collaboration in the common fight against
Hitler. This collaboration was never effected because on 4 July
1944 the Gestapo arrested all participants. Existing documents
lead to conclude that a provocateur had introduced himself into
the Kreisauer circle and the Gestapo had knowledge of that meet-
ing....(reference: Otto WINZER, 3wolf Jahre Kampf gegen
Vaschismus und Krieg, Berlin 1955, p. 227).
mum, William L.
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster, New
York 1930.
9. 1343: "From the beginning the Beck-Goerdeler-Hassell circle
had declined to have anything to do with the Communist under-
ground, and vice versa. To the Communists the plotters were as
reactionary as the Nazis and their very success might prevent a
Communist Germany from succeeding a National Socialist one.
Beck and his friends were well aware of this Communist line, and
they knew also that the Communist underground was directed from
Moscow and served chiefly as an espionage source for the Russians
Po /044: "Reluctantly he (i.e. Stauffenberg) agreed to Leber
and Reichwein meeting with the underground Communist leaders on
June 22. But he warned them that the Communists should be told
as little as possible. The meeting took place in East Berlin
between Leber and Reichwein, representing the Socialists, and
two individuals named Franz Jacob and Anton Saefkow who claimed
to be -- and perhaps were -- the leaders of the Communist under-
ground. They were accompanied by a third comrade whom they in-
troduced as "Rambow." The Communists turned out to know quite
a bit about the plot against Hitler and wanted to know more.
They asked for a meeting with its military leaders on July 4.
Stauffenberg refused, but Reichwein was authorized to represent
him at a further meeting on that date. When he arrived at it,
he, along with Jacob and Saefkow,were promptly arrested. "Rambow,'
it turned out, was a Gestapo stool pigeon...."
23. Juli 1944
Herausgegeben von der Budeszentrale fur Meimatdienst, Bonn 1060.
p. 239: "Julius Leber was arrested on 5 July 1044. He was the
victim of an informant who had gained entrance into the highest
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leadership of the illegal IPD with whom Leber had established
contact with all due security measures...."
WEISMBORN, Gunther, ed:
Der Lautlose Aufstand
Rowohlt Verlag, Eamburg 1954
p. 175: "One of the largest organizations of the German re-
sistance movement was undoubtedly the SAMOW group .In July
1944, a GESTAPO informant succeeded to penetrate into its ranks
and soon the largest part of this organization was arrested.
Saefkow with almost 100 activists of his group was executed in
Brandenburg...."
4
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APACI(RUAMIENTO 0 FIRMEZA FRENTE A LA SUBVERSION COMUNISTA
(Resumen del articulo, "Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia,"
de Eudocio Ravines. Este y Oeste, 1-15 de marzo de 1964,
Ano II, Nt 40.)
En todas partes, los nuevos gobiernos democrdticos han sentido la
necesidad de diferenciarse de los regimenes dictatoriales que los ante-
cedieron. Para acentuar la diferencia, han querido dar a la prdctica de
la demociacia un cardcter tal de tolerancia que beneficia a los agentes
del comunismo internacional. En muchos casos, los comunistas actdan bajo
la sombra de la impunidad que les otorga la tolerancia democrdtica para
llevar adelante su labor de propaganda, penetraciOn y subversiOn. A
veces los gobiernos dejan de aplicar la represiOn necesaria por temor a
una resistencia masiva del pueblo. Recientemente, dos gobiernos han
demostrado que la firmeza paga buenos dividendos, que allf donde los
comunistas pierden su impunidad, suelen hacer una retirada tdetica.
En Venezuela, las elecciones del mes de diciembre proximo pasado
cerraron un aft? entero de violencia y sabotaje sin paralelo en la
Amdrica Latina. El gobierno de ROmulo Betancourt se habfa esforzado
conscienzudamente en observer las libertades civiles, y se vaticinaba
en muchos lugares que la subversion Comunista llegarfa a tal punto de
violencia como para impedir las elecciones o precipitar una revoluciOn.
Pero el gobierno hizo un despliegue de fuerza y determinaciOn, y la
jornada electoral result6 tan tranquil? como cualquier dia corriente.
Un ejemplo aun mds aleccionador es la manera en que el gobierno
de Bolivia trat6 el cdlebre caso de los mineros en huelga y sus veintidn
rehenes.
Este incidente tenfa sus raices en el conflicto entre el presidente
Victor Paz Estenssoro y su vice-presidente filocomunista, Juan Lechin
()vend?. Este ten/a ambiciones presidenciales pero no tenfa el res-
paldo de los elementos moderados del Movimiento Nacional Revolucionaria
(MR -- El partido oficialista). Cuando Paz Estenssoro regres6 de una
visita a Washington, donde se entrevist6 con el Presidente Kennedy, los
comUnistas le acusaron de actuar cono "agente del imperialism yanqui,"
como "entreguista," y como realizador de una "operaciOn thermidoriana."
Entretanto, el gobierno procesaba a tres miembros de la Federacion
Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros, Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar, y
J rge Zaral, todos comunistas conocidos. Los dos primeros eran acusados
de haber asesinado a un dirigente sindical oponente. El tercero era
culpable de malversiOn de fondos destinados a la construccion de
vivendas para los mineros. Los comunistas, sobretodo los fidelistas
y trotzkistas, vefan este proveso como un desaffo a su posicion dentro
del MDR, y exigieron la liberacion de los prisioneros. El gobierno se
mantuvo inamovible.
Despuds de mucha agitaci6n, los mineros de Catavi, azuzados por
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los comunistas, se lanzaron, el 6 de diciembre, contra un gruno de
extranjeros que estaban de paso en la zone minera y secuestraron a 21 de
ellos como rehenes. Cuatro de las victimas eran norteamericanos: el
agregado obrero de la Endbajada Norteamericano de La Paz, un miembro del
Cuerpo de Paz, y dos funcionarios del Servicio period/stico de In1or-
Maci6n (USIS).
Desde el comienzo, Juan Lechfn daba su respaldo completo a los
mineros, quienes habTan declarado la huelga, y reclamaba la libertad
de los tres criminales comunistas coma rescate de los 21 rehenes. El
9 de diciembre, Lechln emitia un comunicado sobre la situaci6n, en el
que aseveraba que los rehenes estaban sanos. Al mismo tiempo, cargaba
toda la responsabilidad de los hechos sobre Paz Estenssoro.
A este altura, los rehenes hablan sido llevados a la Mina Siglo
Veinte, donde estaban rodeados por 6,000 mineros armados, y estre-
chamente guardados par las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de cargas
de dinamita con sus respectivos fulminantes.
Llegaron las protestas y las silplicas de muchas fuentes : de la
Cruz Roja, del Arzobispo de La Paz, y sobre todo del gobierno de Los
Estados Unidos.
Para toda contestacion a Lech/n y los comunistas, Paz Estenssoro
con toda premeditacion orden6 que las tropas pusieran cerco a los
mineros rebeldes. Simultdneamente, el MNR orden6 la mobilizacion de
las Milicias Campesinas del Departamento de Cochabamba. El 14 de
diciembre, mientras las tropas y las Milicias converglan sobre la
zona minera, Juan Lech/n habl6 par radio y ofrec/a liberar a los
rehenes bajo dos condiciones: a) que los tres prisioneros conmnistas
fueran procesados en La Paz en ves de en PotosT, y b) que las tropes
se retiraran de la regi6n minera. Una vez ins, el gobierno qued6
inamovible, negdndose a aceptar las condiciones.
Dos dlas man tarde, el 16 de diciembre, los rehenes fueron liberados
sanos y salvos. Ninguna de las condiciones de Lechfn habia sido
aceptada, no hubo derrame de sangre, y la firmeza del gobierno habla
resultado en un golpe tremendo contra el prestigio del movimiento
comunista de Bolivia.
La crisis que estremeei6 a Bolivia durante diez dlas llenos de
suspenso ha venido a demostrar tres verdades polfticas concluyentes:
a) Los gobiernos latinoamericanos que toman una fuerte
posicion anticomunista no deben tamer las cr/ticas en el sentido
de que su independencia o su soberan/a haya amainado. Aunque el
gobierno de los Estados Unidos di6 Pleno respaldo al procedimiento
de Paz Estenssoro, esta crisis fue resuelta par el gobierno boliviano
y con los medios que dl tenia a mano.
2
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
b) No es s6lo la miseria, sino tambidn la impunidad la que
favorece la 6ubversi6n comunista. La falta de firmeza de parte
de los comunistas coo instrumentos politicos y electorales son
las fuerzas que estan ayudando al comunismo en la Amdrica Latina.
c) La divisi6n entre las dos facciones del mavimiento comunista
es rods aparente que real. A veces simulan marchar separadamente,
pero la hora de la accion, que es la hora de la verdad, los encuentra
combatiendo juntos. En la crisis boliviana, el ministro del interior,
Antonio Arze Marino, tenia pruebas documentaleb de la existencia
de una frente popular ad hoc compuesto del ala izquierda del MR,
los comunistas de filii7E7moscovita, y los trottkistas.
La "batalla de Catavi" la gan6 espectacularmente el Presidente
Paz Estenssoro, y los comunistas sufrieron una severa derrota. Sin
embargo, no hay que olvidar que los comunistas de Bolivia han perdido
s6lo una batalla: sus fuerzas permanecen numdricamente intactas.
Aunque las condiciones para la campalla electoral del mea de junio no sean
ni mejores ni-peores que antes, lo que si es autdntico es que la crisis
ha servido para definir posiciones y esclarecer actitudes.
3
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
APPEASEMENT OR FIRMNESS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
(Summary of an article: "Apaciguamiento y
Thermidor en Bolivia," by Eudocio Ravines.
Este y Oeste, 1-15 March 1364, Year II,N0.40)
W.1.6????mma ???? *101/11?....iMa
Everywhere in Latin America, new democratic governments
have felt a special obligation to be different from the oppres-
sive regimes which they replaced. And in order to accentuate
this difference, they have sought to give to the practice of
democracy a tolerance which only benefits the agents of inter-
national Communism. In all too many cases, Communists operate
under the cloak of democratic tolerance in order to carry for-
ward their propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Sometimes
governments refrain from taking the necessary repressive meas-
ures for fear of massive resistance from the populace. Two
governments have recently demonstrated that firmness pays; that
where Communists are deprived of their impunity, they make a
tactical retreat.
The Venezuelan elections last December climaxed a whole
year of Communist-led violence and sabotage without parallel
in Latin America. The government of Romulo Betancourt had leaned
over backwards in observing civil liberties, and it was widely
predicted that Communist subversion might reach a climax on
1 December and prevent the elections or precipitate a revolution.
But the government made a determined show of force, and election
day turned out to be quieter than the average for the year.
An even more eloquent example is the manner in which the
Bolivian government handled the now-famous case of the striking
miners and their twenty-one kidnap victims.
This incident had its roots in the conflict between Presi-
dent Victor Paz Estenssoro and his pro-Communist vice-president
Juan Lechin Oquendo, whose presidential ambitions were opposed
by the more moderate elements in the Movimiento Nacional
Revolucionario (MNR, the government party). When Paz Estenssoro
returned from a visit to Washington, where he interviewed Presi-
dent Kennedy, the Communists accused him of being an agent of
"Yankee imperialism" and of having tried to institute a "thermi-
dorean operation" within the Bolivian revolution.
Meanwhile, the government was prosecuting three members
of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros: Irineo
Pementel, Federico Escobar, and Jorge Zaral, all well-known Com-
munists. The first two were accused of murdering an opposition
labor leader, and the third, of misappropriation oftinds des-
tined for the construction of miners' dwellings. The Communists,
especially the Castroite and Trotskyist factions, considered the
trial a challenge to their position within the labor movement,
and demanded release of the prisoners. The government refused.
After considerable agitation, the miners in the Catavi region
were induced, on 6 December 1063, to seize as hostages 2/ of a
gmnp?rOvVarghkedigag?26/Regili/d: eAli*Dizat84180e4-A66620M800g1
1
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
these, four were Americans: the labor attache of the U. S.
Embassy in La Paz, a member of the Peace Corps, and two officers
of the U.S. Information Service.
From the beginning, Juan Lechin supported the miners, who
had now declared a strike, and called for the release of the
three Communist prisoners in exchange for the 21 hostages. In
a communique dated 9 December, he reported on their physical con-
dition and assumed full responsibility for the action.
By now, the hostages had
mine, were surrounded by 6,000
by miners' wives equipped with
Protests and pleas came to the
Red Cross, the Bolivian Church
the U. S. Government.
been removed to the Siglo Veinte
armed miners, and closely guarded
dynamite charges, caps, and fuses.
miners from many sources: the
Hierarchy, and especially from
In answer to Lechin and the Communists, Paz Estenssoro
deliberately ran the risk of a civil war by ordering troops to
surround the striking miners. At the same time, the MWR high
command ordered the peasant militia in the department of
Cochabamba to be mobilized. On 14 December, as the troops and
militia were converging on the mining region, Juan Lechin spoke
on radio and agreed to release the hostages on two conditions:
a) that the prisoners should be tried in La Paz instead of in
Potosi, and b) that the troops should be withdrawn from the min-
ing region. The government refused to meet either of these con-
ditions.
Two days later, 16 December, the 21 hostages were freed
from their captivity unharmed. Lechin's conditions had not been
met, no blood had been shed, and the government's firmness had
resulted in a serious blow to the prestige of the Communist move-
ment in Bolivia.
Three important truths can be derived from this crisis that
shook Bolivia for ten suspenseful days:
a) Latin American governments that assume a
strong anti-Communist attitude need not fear criti-
cism to the effect that national pride, independence,
or sovereignty have suffered in the slightest. Al-
though the U. S. Government fully supported Paz
Estenssoro's position, this crisis was solved by
the Bolivian government and with the means it bad
at hand.
b) It is not poverty alone that favors Com-
munist subversion: impunity is also to blame. Lack
of firmness on the part of governments, political
corruption, and the utilization of Communists as
political and electoral instruments are the forces
that help Communism in Latin America.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
c) The division between the two major factions
of the Communist movement is more formal than real.
They sometines pretend to march separately, but the
moment of action, which is the moment of truth,
finds them fighting side by side. In the Bolivian
crisis, the minister of the interior, Antonio Arze
Murillo, had documentary proof of the existence of
an ad hoc popular front composed of the left wing
of Tremm, the Moscow Communists, the Trotskyists,
plus two right wing factions!
The "battle of Catavi" resulted in a victory for President
Paz Estenssoro and a severe defeat for the Communists. Never-
theless, it must be remembered that the Communist forces in
Bolivia have lost only a battle: they remain numerically intact.
Although the conditions that bear upon the forthcoming June
elections may be neither better no worse than before, the crisis
has served to define positions and clarify attitudes.
3
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
1.111101110..., s...01111.1111.=
14 f
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061 A Oct 3-1
APPEASEMENT OR FIRMNESS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION
(Summary of an article: "Apaciguamiento y
Thermidor en Bolivia," by Eudocio Ravines.
Este y Oeste, 1-15 March 1964, Year II,No.40)
Everywhere in Latin America, new democratic governments
have felt a special obligation to be different from the oppres-
sive regimes which they replaced. And in order to accentuate
this difference, they have sought to give to the practice of
democracy a tolerance which only benefits the agents of inter-
national Communism. In all too many cases, Communists operate
under the cloak of democratic tolerance in order to carry for-
ward their propaganda, penetration, and subversion. Sometimes
governments refrain from taking the necessary repressive meas-
ures for fear of massive resistance from the populace. Two
governments have recently demonstrated that firmness pays; that
where Communists are deprived of their impunity, they make a
tactical retreat.
The Venezuelan elections last December climaxed a whole
year of Communist-led violence and sabotage without parallel
in Latin America. The government of Romulo Betancourt had leaned
over backwards in observing civil liberties, and it was widely
predicted that Communist subversion might reach a climax on
1 December and prevent the elections or precipitate a revolution.
But the government made a determined show of force, and election
day turned out to be quieter than the average for the year.
An even more eloquent example is the manner in 'which the
Bolivian government handled the now-famous case of the striking
miners and their twenty-one kidnap victims.
This incident had its roots in the conflict between Presi-
dent Victor Paz Estenssoro and his pro-Communist vice-president
Juan Lechin Oquendo, whose presidential ambitions were opposed
by the more moderate elements in the Movimiento Nacional
Revolucionario (MNR, the government party). When Paz Estenssoro
returned from a visit to Washington, where he interviewed Presi-
dent Kennedy, the Communists accused him of being an agent of
"Yankee imperialism" and of having tried to institute a "thermi-
dorean operation" within the Bolivian revolution.
Meanwhile, the government was prosecuting three members
of the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros: Irineo
Pementel, Federico Escobar, and Jorge Zaral, all well-known Com-
munists. The first two were accused of murdering an opposition
labor leader, and the third, of misappropriation ofihnds des-
tined for the construction of miners' dwellings. The Communists,
especially the Castroite and Trotskyist factions, considered the
trial a challenge to their position within the labor movement,
and demanded release of the prisoners. The government refused.
After considerable agitation, the miners in the Catavi region
were induced, on 6 December 1033, to seize as hostages 21 of a
group of foreigners who happened to be in the mining zone. Of
Approved For Release 2000/08/21 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
these, four were Americans: the labor attache of the U. S.
Embassy in La Paz, a member of the Peace Corps, and two officers
of the U.S. Information Service.
From the beginning, Juan Lechin supported the miners, who
had now declared a strike, and called for the release of the
three Communist prisoners in exchange for the 21 hostages. In
a communique dated 9 December, he reported on their physical con-
dition and assumed full responsibility for the action.
By now, the hostages had
mine, were surrounded by 6,000
by miners' wives equipped with
Protests and pleas came to the
ned Cross, the Bolivian Church
the U. S. Government.
been removed to the Siglo Veinte
armed miners, and closely guarded
dynamite charges, caps, and fuses.
miners from many sources: the
Hierarchy, and especially from
In answer to Lechin and the Communists, Paz Estenssoro
deliberately ran the risk of a civil war by ordering troops to
surround the striking miners. At the same time, the MR high
command ordered the peasant militia in the department of
Cochabamba to be mobilized. On 14 December, as the troops and
militia were converging on the mining region, Juan Lechin spoke
on radio and agreed to release the hostages on two conditions:
a) that the prisoners should be tried in La Paz instead of in
Potosi, and b) that the troops should be withdrawn from the min-
ing reaion. The government refused to meet either of these con-
ditions.
Two days later, 16 December, the 21 hostages were freed
from their captivity unharmed. Lechin's conditions had not been
met, no blood had been shed, and the government's firmness had
resulted in a serious blow to the prestige of the Communist move-
ment in Bolivia.
Three important truths can be derived from this crisis that
shook Bolivia for ten suspenseful days:
a) Latin American governments that assume a
strong anti-Communist attitude need not fear criti-
cism to the effect that national pride, independence,
or sovereignty have suffered in the slightest. Al-
though the U. S. Government fully supported Paz
Estenssoro's position, this crisis was solved by
the Bolivian government and with the means it had
at hand.
b) It is not poverty alone that favors Com-
munist subversion: impunity is also to blame. Lack
of firmness on the part of governments, political
corruption, and the utilization of Communists as
political and electoral instruments are the forces
that help Communism in Latin America.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
Approved ForRelease2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
c) The division between the two major factions
of the Communist movement is more formal than real.
They sometimes pretend to march separately, but the
moment of action, which is the moment of truth,
finds them fighting side by side. In the Bolivian
crisis, the minister of the interior, Antonio Arze
Murillo, had documentary proof of the existence of
an ad hoc popular front composed of the left wing
of TEe?E7a, the Moscow Communists, the Trotskyists,
plus two right wing factions!
The "battle of Catavi" resulted in a victory for President
Paz Estenssoro and a severe defeat for the Communists. Never-
theless, it must be remembered that the Communist forces in
Bolivia have lost only a battle: they remain numerically intact
Although the conditions that bear upon the forthcoming June
elections may be neither better nor worse than before, the crisis
has served to define positions and clarify attitudes.
3
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
1 - 15 MARZO 1964
QUINCENAL
ARO II N9 40
ESTE&OESTE
REDACCION:
86, BOULEVARD HAUSSMANN
PARIS 89 (FRANCIA)
ADMINISTRAUION:
iiPARTADO DEL ESTE 11.248
CARACAS (VENEZUELA)
EDICION ESPECIAL PARA AMERICA LATINA DEL BOLETIN DE LA ASOCIACION DE ESTUDIOS
E INFORMACIONES rouTicAs INTERNACIONALES (B.E.I.P.I.) DE PARIS
Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia
CARACTERISTICA de la politica do-
tnestica de las repablicas de America La-
tina en la etapa presente, ha sido el mar-
cado apaciguamiento empleado por los
gobiernos frente a los comunistas.
LA TES1S del determinism? economic?,
fabricada por los intelectuales y periodistas
de Washington, ha servido para arrojar toda
la responsabilidad de la subversion sobre la
pobreza, la miseria y las condiciones de sub-
desarrollo. Y asimismo para acordar en mu-
chos campos, a la sombra de esa filosofia, una
creciente y progresiva impunidad a las accio-
nes de todo Otero emprendidas por los co-
munistas.
En todas partes, los nuevo,s gobiernos han
sentido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los
dictadores que les antecedieron. Para acen-
tuar la diferencia, han querido dar a la prac-
tica de la democracia un caracter tal de to-
lerancia, que beneficia a los agentes de Rusia,
China, Cuba y Yugoslavia.
La politica de apaciguamiento tiene, ade-
mas, mOviles m?inmediatos e intereses m?
directos, para los gobiernos latinoamericanos.
Ante todo, esta politica de tolerancia favorece
los intereses electorales del bando en ascenso
y ejerce influencia en la intrigante politica do-
mestica. De otro lado, suministra las dosis
1
de chantage adecuadas para presionar a Was-
hington. Y pone en manos de los gobiernos
el instrumento agresivo que consiente en de-
jarse utilizar contra los opositores del go-
bierno.
Los cambios recientes que han intervenido
en Washington, asi corno la necesidad de
a frontar procesos electorales decisivos, han de-
terminado cambios que pueden tornarse reac-
clones saludables a condiciOn de extenderse
y de ser consecuentes.
Dos gobiernos, el de Venezuela? y el de
Bolivia, se han visto forzados a emplear una
politica de firmeza frente a la subversion co-
munista, demostrando que, por sobre todo, tal
clase de plaga en este lado del mundo, es el
engendro de la impunidad que los gobiernos
otorgan a los comunistas. Tan pronto como
la tolerancia cesa y la impunidad disminuye,
el peligro amaina, la subversiOn y sus capi-
tostes pierden la cara, la insurgencia de las
masas entra en quiebra.
Las elecciones del mes de diciembre de
1963, obligaron al gobierno de Venezuela a
desplegar la fuerza para someter al terroris-
mo que asolaba el pais y que proclam6 su vo-
luntad de impedir la realizaciOn de las elec-
clones. El despliegue de fuerza del gobierno
bast() para que el apocalipsis comunista se
transformase espectacularmente en farsa. Du-
rante la jornada electoral hubo menos victimas
que en cualquier dia corriente de terrorismo.
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2
SOlo dos personas, en todo el pals, fueron vic-
timas de actos de terror.
El fenOmeno politico venezolano acaba de
recibir consagracion histOrica en los baluartes
comunistas de Bolivia. La prisiOn de tres de-
lincuentes comunistas y la captura y libera-
ciOn por los comunistas, de los rehenes ex-'
tranjeros, al propio tiempo que la rirmeza-
de la politica del gobierno de Bolivia, han
demostrado lo que ta impunidad signi,ica en
todo el siniestro juego politico de la actual
etapa latinoamericana.
BOLIVIA se encuentra en la vispera de
una contienda electoral. Ella ha puesto trente
a frente a los dos protagonistas de la revo-
luciOn boliviana de 1952: Victor Paz Esten-
soro, actual presidente de la Reptiblica, y Juan
Lechin Oquendo, Vice-Presidenie. A estas ho-
ras, cada uno de estos personajes comanda un
ala del Movirniento Nacionalista Revoluciona-
rio, la organizaciOn politica promotora y reali-
zadora de la RevoluciOn. El conflict? es erni-
nentemente ideolOgico: mientras Paz Esten-
soro retorna a los caminos del nacional-refor-
mismo y a las vias capitalistas, Juan Lechin
opera como el jefe de la facciOn del MNR.
protundamente intiltrada por los comunistas
de Moscit, y mucho was energicamente ?como
acaban de probarlo hechos macizos-- por los
fidelistas y comunistas de la obediencia de
Fekin y de La Habana.
Esta ya a m?de doce atios de distancia
el dia en que Juan Lechin, con la anuencia de
Paz Estensoro y en su beneficio, negoci6 el
pacto de union entre el Movimiento Naciona-
lista Revol'Acionario, la FederaciOn Sindical de
Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia y el Partido
Comur,ista boliviano. El compromiso, negocia-
do en abri: de 1951, const6 de once puntos y
fue firmadD el 3 de mayo de 1951 por Jos?
Fellman Velarde ?actual Ministro de Rela-
ciones Exteriores? por el M.N.R.; Juan Le-
chin Oquendo firmo en representaciOn de la
FederaciOn de Alineros y Jorge Quiroga Vargas
como repr,sientante autorizado del Partido Co-
munista de Bolivia.
Bajo las m?variadas circunstancias y a pe-
sar de todos los avatares politicos de Bolivia, la
alianza de 1951 se ha mantenido. A traves
de m?de doce afios, el M.N.R. utiliz6 al
Partido Comunista para golpear despiadada-
mente a sus opositores de toda clase. A cam-
bio de tales servicios, el comunismo ha disfru-
tado en Bolivia de todas las libertades que el
pacto del 3 de mayo de 1951 le concedia, in-
cluyendo la de organizar las Milicias Obreras
y Campesinas. Estas milicias son las que ban
intentado presentar combate en la crisis que
ha tenido una resonancia internacional en el
mes de diciembre.
La situacion conflictiva creada por las elec-
clones de junio proximo, alcanzd aguda ten-
sift despues de la visita que el Presidente
Paztensoro realizara a Washinton, al
1 -15 MARZO 1%4
nalizar el rues octubre. El jefe de la re-
volucion boliviana y actual Presidente su
pais, recibiO lionores especiales y el Presiden-
te Kennedy, en discurso sefial6 a Bo-
livia como el ejemplo que debia ser imitado
por las &mils naciones de la America Latina.
A su retorno de Washington, Paz Esten-
soro fue acusado por los comunistas de la obe-
diencia de Pekin, de actuar como "agente del
imperialism? yanqui", corno "entreguista" y
como realizador de una "operaciOn thermido-
riana".
Al mismo tiernpo se hizo evidente para to-
dos que el Presidente Paz Estensoro y el sector
del M.N.R. que le sigue, no apoyaria la can-
didatura a la Presidencia de Juan Lechin,
en las elecciones prOximas.
La circunstancia critica y la atmOsfera de
la crisis quedaron as! creadas. Hubo ruido de
escudos en las minas de Catavi, baluarte de:1
comunismo y del Vice-Presidente Juan Lechfn.
La propaganda comunista contra Paz Esten-
soro se hizo m?violenta en el tono y was as-
pera en el contenido.
El Presidente Paz Estensoro reorganiz6 su
Gabinete Ministerial el 6 de diciembre, reno-
vando solamente tres carteras: Minas, Asuntos
Campesinos y Agricultura. En los dos pri-
meros, coloc6 a dos jefes militares retirados.
Hay que considerar que estats tres carteras son
fundamentales en la circunstancia actual boli-
viana.
ENTRE TANTO, el Poder Judicial venia
conociendo los procesos seguidos, por homi-
cidio y por robo, contra los dirigentes sindica-
les Irineo Pirnentel, Federico Escobar y Jorge
Zaral. Los dos primeros estaban acusados de
haber asesinado o hecho asesinar a un dirigen-
te sindical oponente. El tercero era culpable de
apropiaciOn ilicita de fondos destinados a la
construccion de viviendas para los mineros
precisamente. El Fiscal que conocia la causa
habia dispuesto la prisidn de los tres acusa-
dos, quienes eran tres conspicuos dirigentes co-
munistas. Su prision determinO el estallido de
la crisis que conmovia a r y .",_?1,-":-
rica Latina durante diez dias con sit.3
Pimentel y Escobar eran dos comunistas
de la intimidad de Juan Lechin. Su prisi6n fue
estimada como un reto, circunstancia que fue
aprovechada por los comunistas de tendencia
fidelista y trotzkista, para organizar las re-
presalias.
Tras una vigorosa propaganda anti-yanqui,
que acuso a Paz Estensoro de "traicionar a la
revoluci6n" y de "venderla al imperialismo yan-
qui", los comunistas lograron lanzar a los mi-
neros armados contra un grupo de extranjeros,
algunos de ellos diplornaticos, que se encon-
traban en la zona minera. Veintiun personas
fueron apresadas como rehenes, exigiendo a
cambio de su libertad la de los tres presos co-
La.)WNW? eig
Approved For Release 000/08/27 . 8ab liM/ff
- _003-1
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
1-15 MARZO 1964
Entre los rehenes se encontraban cuatro
norteamericanos. Uno de ellos, Agregado Obre-
ro de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, un
miembro del 'Cuerpo de Paz", una de las
creaciones de la Alianza para el Progreso, y
dos funcionarios del Servicio Periodistico de
InformaciOn de la Embajada de los Estados
Unidos. Ademas, les acompailaban tres cana-
dtenses, un ingles naturalizado, un aleman y
un holandes. Todos ellos estaban destinados
a ser canjeados por los tres presos comunis-
tas, acusados por la justicia boliviana de de-
tilos cornunes.
La exigencia comunista colocO ante el mu-
ro al gobierno de Paz Estensoro. La circuns-
tancia obligaba a Bolivia a decidir la alterna-
tiva que los mineros arrnados, acaudillados por
los comunistas, planteaban. Y Paz Estensoro
acogiO el desatio, to enfrento y cancelo la po-
litica de apaciguamiento de que ha sido cam-
peon el gobierno de Bolivia.
El Ministro del Interior Antonio Arze Mu-
rillo, proclarnO la decision del gobierno de re-
chazar cualquiera negociaciOn sobre canje,
afirmando la exigencia de liberaciOn inmedia-
ta de los rehenes, sin condiciones. Al propio
tiempo ante los periodistas, en conferencia de
prensa, el Ministro exhibiO documentos que
probaban la formaciOn de un "frente" cons-
tituido por el ala izquierda del M.N.R. opues-
ta a la politica del gobierno, por el Partido
Comunista, por los Trotzkistas, por el Partido
Revolucionario Autentico y por la Falange So-
cialista Boliviana. Independientemente de la
validez de los documentos exhibidos, el Mi-
nistro estaba trazando la linea divisoria que
separaba dos politicas: la que favorecia a los
comunistas y la que se comenzaba a oponer
frontalmente a ellos.
El Gobierno de Estados Unidos anunciO
que ofrecia "Asistencia Plena" at Gobierno
de Bolivia para que impusiese la autoridad de
la ley y liberase a los rehenes, sin condiciones.
El Gobierno de La Paz, ordenaba la moviliza-
don de tropas sobre la ciudad de Oruro, a las
Ordenes, del General Alfredo Ovando, Jefe de
las Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia. Por su parte,
la FederaciOn de Mineros, que comanda Juan
Lechin Oquendo, decretO la realizacien de
huelgas escalonadas y la movilizaciOn general
de sus milicias. Convocaba al mismo tiempo a
Las Milicias Campesinas de la region de Oru-
ro a ponerse en pie de guerra y dar apoyo a
los mineros.
Juan Lechin, en su caracter de Vice-presi-
dente de la Republica, otorg6 pleno apoyo a
los mineros y exigiO el came de los tres co-
munistas presos por la veintena de rehenes,
que fueron trasladados para mayor seguridad,
a las Minas Siglo XX.
En esta forma se cancelaba la alianza que
fuera sellada en mayo de 1951. La presian de
los comunistas de obediencia castrista y pe-
kinesa se habia impuesto de manera total. Los
comunistas de obediencia moscovita se suma-
balAppfroinutiPairsReisalaba20110/08t27
vas que venian de Catavi. El 9 de diciembre,
Juan Lechin emitia un comunicado oficial so-
bre la situaciOn, en el que aseveraba que los
rehenes estaban sanos, aunque prisioneros en
espera del canje exigido. Lechin cargaba toda
la responsabilidad de los hechos sobre la ac-
titud asumida por Paz Estensoro.
ANTE la exigencia de Lechin y de los
comunistas, el Gobierno de la Paz reacciono
ordenando a las tropas de Oruro poner cerco
a Catavi. Simultaneamente, el Movimiento Na-
cionalista Revolucionario teal ordenaba la mo-
vilizaciOn de las Milicias Campesinas del De-
parlament? de Cochabamba, ordenandoles que
marcharan sobre Catavi y las minas.
Bolivia se convirtiO en el escenario de una
movilizaciOn espectacular de personalidades.
El Vicario de la Iglesia, Monsefior Andrew Ken-
nedy y el Arzobispo de La Paz, Embaj adores
de casi todos los paises americanos y altos
dirigentes de la Cruz Roja, dirigentes estu-
diantiles y emisarios sindicales, se desplazaron
a la region minera para obtener la liberaciOn
de los reheneg. El Gobierno de La Paz se man-
tenia firme en su posiciOn de no negociar. No
podia haber canje de gente honrada, captura-
da con infracciOn de toda norma juridica, con
delincuentes comunes, responsables de delitos
ante la justicia.
El 10 de diciembre por la matiana, los mi-
neros francamente sublevados contra el go-
bierno de La Paz, daban un ultimatum. Exi-
gian la libertad inmediata de Pimentel, Esco-
bar y Zaral, dentro de las 24 horas. En caso
de negativa, la declaraciOn oficial sentenciaba
que "el gobierno cargaria con las consecuen-
cias".
Los funcionarios del Departamento de Es-
tado de Washington multiplicaban las notas
de protesta. Renovaban los ofrecimientos de
"Ayuda Plena" del Presidente Johnson y ret-
teraban las notas conminatorias pidiendo la
liberaciOn de los rehenes norteamericanos.
El Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou-
glas Henderson, envio un mensaje telegratico
a Juan Lechin, haciendole responsable de lo
que les pudiese ocurrir a los cuatro. rehenes
norteamericanos. En aspera replica, Lechin res-
pondiO que los rehenes norteamericanos no
obtendrian su libertad mientras el gobierno
de La Paz no liberase a los tres sindicalistas
dctenidos por orden judicial.
Lechin asevero a traves de la prensa y de
la radio, que sus tres amigos habtan sido re-
ducidos a prision arbitrariamente por el Mi-
nistro del Interior. Que el Agregado Obrero
dc la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, habia
sido capturado por los mineros a causa de
haberse entrometido en la politica interna de
Bolivia, pretendiendo formar una organizacion
sindical distinta de la sue diri. la Lechin. Rei-
: Cliek-RDP78u03081cA000120,0 P 7OR r1ta de los
4
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ties comunistas presos y anuncio que seis mil
rnineros, con las armas en la mano, Sc encon-
tiaban en ese moment() en pie de guerra.
La perspectiva de guerra civil se abrio ante
Bolivia dramaticamente. El Presidente Paz Es-
tensoro mantuvo su posiciOn primitiva y or-
dello reforzar Ia guarniciOn militar de Oruro,
elevando a seis m:.1 el mimero de soldados.
El 11 de diciembre, se produjo un duelo
tclegrafico entre Juan Lechin y el Embajador
de los Estaclos Unidos. El Embajador le te-
legrafi6 directamente a Lechin, diciendole:
"El crirnen de secuestro es visto con ho-
rror y repugnancia en el mundo entero."
Juan Lechin, en su respuesta se Mita a
reiterar su decision de mantener presos a los
rehenes mientras Paz Estensoro no aceptase
las condiciones planteadas por los comunistas.
Alientras tanto, Dean Rusk, Secretario de
Estado de Washington, Teodoro Moscoso, de
la Alianza para el Progreso, Pierre Salinger,
JLie de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, Walter
Reuter, dirigente sindical de los obreros del
autornOvil de los Estados Unidos y otras pei-
sonalidades, se dirigieron a Juan Lechin, con-
minandole a ordenar la liberaciOn de los re-
henes.
Los comunistas y Lechin se mantenfan en
su posiciOn, mientras los rehenes prisioneros
sc apiriaban en una habitacion de cuatro me-
tros por seis. Sabre el suelo estaban extendidos
colchones, en cada uno de los cuales reposaban
Inas de dos prisioneros. La guardia la realiza-
ban las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de
cargas de dinamita, y con sus respectivos lut-
a:Mantes.
A esta hora de la crisis, todos los comu-
nistas se habian unificado: los que obeclecian
a Pekin tanto como los fidelistas, los trotzkis-
tas y los de obediencia moscovita. La uniclad
era total: las cliscrepancias habian quedado
reducicias a literatura sobre temas internacio-
nales. En Catavi no existian discrepancias. Las
que existfan tres Was atras, solamente, habian
dcsaparecido.
LOS PARTIDARIOS de Juan Lechin y los
comunistas, convocaron a una gran manifesta-
clan en La Paz, con la finalidad de ejercer
presiOn sobre el gobierno y obligarle a ceder.
Los comunistas de las diversas observancias
se mostraron activos. Pero, al fin, la manifes-
taciOn no logro movilizar a tres mil mantles-
tantes. Ningun sector importante del trabajo
fue paralizado en la capital del pais. Los co-
munistas desfilaron al grito de "Paz Esten-
soro... at parecion... Juan Lechin, al Po-
der.
Ante el fracaso de la manifestaciOn de ma-
sas de La Paz, el Ministerio del Trabajo ditto
una serie de arnenazas contra los mineros huel-
guistas. La Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, la
empresa nacionalizada, suspenderia sus ope-
raciones en las minas de Catavi y Siglo XX.
1-15 MARZO 1964
Esto implicaba un "lock-out" contra siete mil
trabajadores, a quienes se cortaria el sumi-
nistro de abastecnnientos. Se suprimiria, ade-
mas, el pago del aguinaldo de Navidad y el
de los salarios por los dias no trabajacios.
En aquel mismo moment?, Justicia ini-
ciaba un proceso contra los quince principales
dirigentes de la operacian cornunista que ha-
bia capturado a los rehenes en la zona mi-
nera.
La ofensiva del gobierno causO impact?
profundo en las filas cornunistas. La actitud
clesatiante fue abanclonada. Los gritos destern-
plados contra el imperialism? yanqui fueron
cambiados en recriminaciones al gobierno por
su "actitud testaruda, antirrevolucionaria, anti-
obrera...". Y la propaganda se hizo calurosa
sobre Ia actitud generosa y benevolente de los
mineros, que "trataban a los rehenes como a
hermanos...", "sin hacerles clan? alguno y
tratando solarnente de canjearlos...".
Juan Lechin Oquendo presento nuevas con-
diciones. El mismo, renunciaria a su cargo y
a la investidura de Vicepresidente de la Re-
publica de Bolivia. Se someteria a proceso
penal ante los Tribunales de Justicia, reem-
plazando a los tres dirigentes sindicales pre-
sos. Tan pronto como esta nueva proposiciOn
hubiese sido aceptada por el gobierno de La
Paz, los rehenes serfan puestos en libertad.
Paz Estensoro rechazo ulminantemente la
nueva proposici6n. Respondio exigiendo la li-
bertad inmediata y sin condiciones de los re-
henes. Nothico que los tres dirigentes sindi-
cales quedarfan presos y sometidos al proceso
judicial que se les habia iniciado. Anuncio que
los dirigentes de Catavi que habian dirigido
la operacion de captura de los rehenes serian
procesados.
Mientras tanto, las tropas de Oruro avan-
zaron sobre Catavi y las Milicias Campesinas,
que habian partido de la localidad de Ucure-
na, a las ordenes del Coronel Osinaga, mar-
chaban sobre la zona minera. Los mineros
iban a ser tratados como rebeldes.
Un aviOn de reconocimiento se estrello en
la zona minera y sus dos ocupantes perecieron,
siendo as finicas vfctimas de toda la crisis.
El Cuerpo Diplomatic? acreditado en La
Paz se moviliz6 rumbo a la regi6n de Catavi;
los dignatarios de la Iglesia, los dirigentes es-
tudiantiles, los jefes sindicales y politicos in-
tentaron realizar la mision de mediadores.
Juan Lechfn respondi6 a todas las gestiones
afirmando que todo dependfa de la resolucian
del gobierno y de Paz Estensoro.
Stibitamente y en forma dramatica, un abo-
gado norteamericano, hermano de uno de los
rehenes prisioneros, dio a la publicidad una
carta en la que Irineo Pimentel y Federico Es-
cobar, dos de los comunistas presos, acusados
de homicidio, pedlar' a sus camaradas mineros
poner en libertad a los rehenes, sin condicio-
nes, por el bien de Bolivia y de los trabajado-
res. En un fragmento, la carta decia, textual-
mente:
Approved For Release 2000/08/7 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
1-15 iPRlifnd F98-#
- 1111:
..??? !I a
"Estando en duro trance de sacrificio los
mineros de Catavi y Siglo XX, y ante el des-
plazanziento de tropas del Ejercito y queriendo
evitar una masacre roja, deponiendo toda ac-
Mud sectaria y pensando en los trabajadores,
llamamos y rogamos, para dar una leccidn a
los bcirbaros, poner en libertad a los rehenes,
exigiendo al pro pio tiempo la normalizacion
de las labores en las minas, el pago de los
haberes por los dias de huelga y que el go-
bierno atienda a las demandas de mejoras sin-
dicales. ..".
La carta fue tacjiada de apOcrifa por los
comunistas. Desde Washington, Edwin M.
Martin, alto funcionario del Departamento de
Estado, telegrafiaba a Juan Lechin pidiendole
que diera fe a los mineros de la autenticidad
de tal carta, certificando que ella habia sido
firmada por Pimentel y Escobar libremente y
sin coacciOn.
Los comunistas plantearon una nueva con-
dicion. Se pondria en libertad a los rehenes,
pero los presos comunistas no serian juzgados
en La Paz, donde "no tenian garantias", sino
en Potosi, donde si las tenian. El gobierno
de La Paz, rechaz6 categoricamente la nueva
condiciOn y exigi6 la inmediata libertad de los
rehenes.
EN LA MADRUGADA del sabado 14 de
diciembre, el cerco militar en torno a Catavi,
cerraba sus tenazas. El General Ovando asu-
mia el mando de las tropas y una operaciOn
de catheter militar iba a comenzar objetiva-
mente. Lechin se convenciO que el gobierno de
Paz Estensoro estaba resuelto a imponer auto-
ridad sin consentirle siquiera salvar la cara.
Al atardecer, la radio dejaba escuchar la voz
conmovida de Juan Lechin:
"El pueblo ha ganado Ia batalla... En co-
nocinziento de que las tropas se encuentran, en
estos momentos, a escasos kilometros de Cata-
vi y Siglo XX, con las trdgicas consecuencias
que son previsibles para los tiabajadores bo-
livianos y para los tecnicos extranjeros y los
diplomdticos norteamericanos, con el fin de
evitar derramamiento de sangre y horas trd-
gicas, la Federacion de Trabajadores Mineros,
acepta la propuesta del gobierno...".
"Los rehenes prisioneros ?alzadid Lechin?
serdn entregados a Monserior Abel Antezana,
Arzobispo de La Paz, quien habia venido ac-
tuando como mediador."
Las condiciones del arreglo fueron:
? LiberaciOn incondicional de los rehenes.
? Proceso a los tres dirigentes comunistas
en La Paz, no en Potosi.
Retiro de las tropas de la zona de Catavi
y Siglo XX.
?
5
glas Henderson y el Vicepresidente Juan Le-
chin.
?"e,COmo permitiO usted que se enviaran
tropas contra los mineros... ?' ?increp6 Le-
chin al Embajador.
?"Yo no he venido a este pais para man-
dar", replicO Henderson.
Horas m?tarde, los rehenes eran libera-
dos, sin que ninguna de las condiciones comu-
nistas hubiesen sido aceptadas. Habia preva-
lecido la firme actitud del gobierno y la ba-
talla la habia ganado rotundamente Victor Paz
Estensoro.
LA CRISIS boliviana del mes de diciem-
bre ha venido a demostrar tres verdades po-
liticas concluyentes:
? Cuando el gobierno de Washington "da
Apoyo Pleno" a la acciOn contra el comunis-
mo, los gobiernos de America Latina se de-
ciden, varian su posiciOn apaciguadora, cam-
bian sus actitudes de tolerancia interesada. No
por esto, ni a causa de esto, llega a sufrir un
rasgurio la soberania, ni la independencia, ni
el orgullo nacional.
? No es la miseria sino la impunidad lo que
favorece la subversiOn comunista. La falta de
firmeza de los gobiernos, la actitud democth-
tica claudicante, la corrupciOn politica, la uti-
lizacion de los comunistas como instrumentos
electorales y como ingredientes de la intriga
palaciega, constituyen las fuerzas que estan
ayudando al comunismo en America Latina.
La iniiltracion y la subversiOn prosperan, no
alli donde hay m?miseria, sino donde mayor
es la tolerancia y donde m?altos grados al-
canza la impunidad.
? La division entre los comunistas que obe-
decen a Moscri, los que obedecen a Pekin y
los que siguen a La Habana, es meramente
formal. En Bolivia se ha hecho claro a traves
de esta crisis que los fidelistas, los trotzkistas
y los obedientes a Pekin no estan separados
por ningfin desacuerdo real. La oposiciOn de
los que obedecen a Moscri se enardece en las
palabras, estalla en palabreria traducida del
ruso, para acallarse totalmente a la hora de la
acciOn, que es la hora de la verdad. Tanto en
Bolivia, como en Venezuela, los comunistas de
las diversas corrientes dejan una experiencia
probada: simulan estar separados o marchan
efectivamente separados, pero en la hora de la
acciOn, el combate los encuentra juntos.
La batalla de Catavi la gano, de manera
campal, Victor Paz Estensoro y la corriente del
M.N.R. acusada de "Thermidoriana" por los
comunistas. Esta lucha ha demostrado que el
comunismo en Bolivia, y en America Latina,
ha sufrido una severa derrota, pero esta pro-
bado asimismo que el comunismo no ha sido
vencido. Ni en Venezuela, ni en Bolivia. En
gdentalrattikdosiona Catavi se le ha permitido replegarse en orden
: CIA-Ru con-
Paz el n
'Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou- 5 (Pasa a la p g. szguiente)
min Pie a ea27 plivosertvettibffmeffle.iser
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
(Viene de la pcig. anterior)
siderada como estrategica. Las fuerzas del co-
munismo en Bolivia permanecen intactas nu-
maricamente.
Las condiciones para la campatia electoral
del mes de junio, quiz d no son mejores ni peo-
res que antes de la crisis. Lo que sI es auten-
tico es que la crisis ha servido para definir
posiciones, para delimitar fronteras y esclare-
cer actitticles. En las elecciones de junio no
habrd alianza intima entre el M.N.R. y el Par-
tido Comunista. Cualesqufera que fueren las
maniobras quo realicen los comunistas de obe-
diencia moscovita, la corriente fidelista y pe-
kinesa les arrastrara a posiciones que no son
de coexistencia pacffica, sino de aspera opo-
sicion al gobierno acusado de "thermidoriano".
EUDOCIO RAVINES
6
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Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
1 - 15 MARZO 1964
QUINCENAL
ARO II - Ng 40
ESTE&OESTE
REDACCION:
86, BOULEVARD HAUSSMANN
PARIS 89 (FRANCIA)
ADMINISTRACION:
APARTADO DEL ESTE 11.24$
CARACAS (VENEZUELA)
EDICION ESPECIAL PARA AMERICA LATINA DEL BOLETIN DE LA ASOCIACION DE ESTUDIOS
E INFOR3IACIONES POLITICAS INTERNACIONALES (B.E.I.P.I.) DE PARIS
Apaciguamiento y Thermidor en Bolivia
CARACTER1STICA de la politica do-
mestica de las reptiblicas de America La-
tina en la eta pa presente, ha sido el mar-
cado apaciguamiento empleado por los
gobiernos frente a los comunistas.
LA TES1S del determinism? econOmico,
fabricada por los intelectuales y periodistas
de Washington, ha servido para arrojar toda
la responsabilidad de la subversion sobre la
pabreza, la miseria y las condiciones de sub-
desarrollo. Y asimismo para acordar en mu-
chos campos, a la sombra de esa filosofia, una
creciente y progresiva impunidad a las accio-
nes de todo Omer? emprendidas por los co-
munistas.
En todas partes, los nuevos gobiernos han
sentido la necesidad de diferenciarse de los
dictadores que les antecedieron. Para acen-
tuar la diferencia, han querido dar a la prac-
tica de la democracia un caracter tal de to-
lerancia, que beneficia a los agentes de Rusia,
China, Cuba y Yugoslavia.
La politica de apaciguamiento tiene, ade-
m? mOviles m?inmediatos e intereses m?
directos, para los gobiernos latinoamericanos.
Ante todo, esta politica de tolerancia favorece
los intereses electorales del bando en ascenso
y ejerce influencia en la intrigante politica do-
mestica. De otro lado, suministra las dosis
1
tie chantage adecuadas para presionar a Was-
hington. Y pone en manos de los gobiernos
el instrumento agresivo que consiente en de-
jarse utilizar contra los opositores del go-
bierno.
Los cambios recientes que han intervenido
en Washington, asi corno la necesidad de
a frontar procesos electorales decisivos, han de-
terminado cambios que pueden tornarse reac-
ciones saludables a condiciOn de extenderse
y de ser consecuentes.
Dos gobiernos, el de Venezuela y el de
Bolivia, se han visto forzados a emplear una
politica de firmeza frente a la subversiOn co-
munista, demostrando que, por sobre todo, tal
clase de plaga en este lado del mundo, es el
engendro de la impunidad que los gobiernos
otorgan a los comunistas. Tan pronto como
la tolerancia cesa y la impunidad disminuye,
el peligro amaina, la subversiOn y sus capi-
tostes pierden la cara, la insurgencia de las
masas entra en quiebra.
Las elecciones del rues de diciembre de
1963, obligaron al gobierno de Venezuela a
desplegar la fuerza para someter al terroris-
mo que asolaba el pais y que proclamo su vo-
luntad de impedir la realizaciOn de las elec-
ciones. El despliegue de fuerza del gobierno
bastO para que el apocalipsis comunista se
transformase espectacularmente en farsa. Du-
rante la jornada electoral hubo menos victimas
que en cualquier dia corriente de terrorismo.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
2
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SOlo dos personas, en todo el pais, fueron vic-
timas de actos de terror.
El fen6meno politico venezolano acaba de
recibir conscgracion historica en los baluartes
comunistas co Bolivia. La prisiOn de tres de-
lincuentes comunistas y la captura y libera-
cion por los comunistas, de los rehenes ex-
tranjeros, al propio tiempo que la tirmeza
de la poliiica dei gobierno de Bolivia, han
demostracio lo que la impuniclad signidca en
todo el siniestro juego politico de ia actual
etapa latinoamericana.
BOLIVIA se encuentra en la vispera de
una contienda electoral. Ella ha puesto trente
a frente a los dos protagonistas de la revo-
luciOn boliviana de 1952: Victor Paz Esten-
soro, actual Presidente de la Republica, y Juan
Lechin Oquendo, Vice-Presidente. A estas ho-
ras, cada uno de estos personajes comanda un
ala del Movimiento Nacionalista Revoluciona-
rio, la organizaciOn politica promotora y reali-
zadora de la RevoluciOn. El conflict? es emi-
nentemente ideolOgico: mientras Paz Esten-
soro retorna a los caminos del nacional-refor-
mismo y a las vias capitalistas, Juan Lechin
opera como el jefe de la facciOn del MNR.
protundamente intiltrada por los comunistas
de Moscii, y much? m?energicamente ?como
acaban de probarlo hechos macizos-- por los
fidelistas v comunistas de la obediencia de
Fekin y de La Habana.
Esti ya a m?de doce altos de distancia
el dia en cue Juan Lechin, con la anuencia de
Paz Estensoro y en su beneficio, negocio el ENTRE TANTO, el Poder Judicial venia
pacto de union entre el Movimiento Naciona- conociendo los procesos seguidos, por homi-
lista Revolucionario, la Federacion Sindical de cidio y por robo, contra los dirigentes sindica-
Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia y el Partido les Irineo Pimentel, Federico Escobar y Jorge
Cornunista boliviano. El compromiso, negocia- Zaral. Los dos primeros estaban acusados de
do en abri 1 de 1951, const6 de once puntos y haber asesinado o hecho asesinar a un dirigen-
fue firmado el 3 de mayo de 1951 por Jos?e sindical oponente. El tercero era culpable de
Fellman Velarde ?actual Ministro de Rela- apropiacion ilicita de fondos destinados a la
ciones Exteriores? por el M.N.R.; Juan Le- construcciOn de viviendas para los mineros
chin Oquendo firm6 en representacion de la precisamente. El Fiscal que conocia la causa
FederaciOn de Mineros y Jorge Quiroga Vargas habia dispuesto la prisi6n de los tres acusa-
como representante autorizado del Partido Co- dos, quienes eran tres conspicuos dirigentes co-
munista de Bolivia. munistas. Su prision determin6 el estallido de
Bajo las m?variadas circunstancias y a pe- la crisis que conmoviO a D.;!?..A?.:::.-
sar de todos los avatares politicos de Bolivia, la rica Latina durante diez dias con sus,' ..,...:....,.:,.
alianza de 1951 se ha mantenido. A traves Pimentel y Escobar eran dos comunistas
de m?de doce altos, el M.N.R. utiliz6 al de la intimidad de Juan Lechin. Su prision fue
Partido Comunista para golpear despiadada- estimada como un reto, circunstancia que fue
mente a SIAS opositores de toda clase. A cam- aprovechada por los comunistas de tendencia
bio de tales servicios, el comunismo ha disfru- fidelista y trotzkista, para organizar las re-
tado en Bolivia de todas las libertades que el presalias.
pacto del 3 de mayo de 1951 le concedia, in- Tras una vigorosa propaganda anti-yanqui,
cluyendo la de organizar las Milicias Obreras que acus6 a Paz Estensoro de "traicionar a la
y Campesinas. Estas milicias son las que han revolucion" y de "venderla at imperialismo yan-
intentado presentar combate en la crisis que qui", los comunistas lograron lanzar a los mi-
ha tenido una resonancia internacional en el neros armados contra un grupo de extranjeros,
mes de diciembre. algunos de ellos diplomaticos, que se encon-
La situacion conflictiva creada por las elec- traban en la zona minera. Veintian personas
clones de junio proximo, alcanz6 aguda ten- fucron apresadas como rehenes, exigiendo a
siOn despues de la visita que el Presidente cambio de su libertad la de los tres presos co-
PAzgAtema PeeivefeWegltitob/687 : 9A-Ftbp708,-03061-Aatfohdoztlaaa03-1
,
1-15 MARZO 1964
nalizar el mes de octubre. El jefe de la re-
voluciOn boliviana y actual Presidente de su
pais, recibi6 honores especiales y el Presiden-
te Kennedy, en discurso oficial, sefialO a Bo-
livia como el ejeinplo que debia ser imitado
por las dens naciones de la America Latina.
A su retorno de Washington, Paz Esten-
soro fue acusado por los comunistas de la obe-
diencia de Pekin, de actuar como "agente del
imperialism? yanqui", como "entreguista" y
corno realizador de una "operaciOn thermido-
riana".
Al mismo tiernpo se hizo evidente para to-
dos que el Presidente Paz Estensoro y el sector
del M.N.R. que le sigue, no apoyaria la can-
didatura a la Presidencia de Juan Lechin,
en las elecciones proximas.
La circunstancia critica y la atmOsfera de
la crisis quedaron asi creadas. Hubo ruido de
escudos en las minas de Catavi, baluarte del
comunismo y del Vice-Presidente Juan Lechin.
La propaganda comunista contra Paz Esten-
soro se hizo m?violenta en el tono y m?as-
pera en el contenido.
El Presidente Paz Estensoro reorganizo su
Gabinete Ministerial el 6 de diciembre, reno-
vando solamente tres carteras: Minas, Asuntos
Campesinos y Agricultura. En los dos pri-
meros, coloc6 a dos jefes tnilitares retirados.
Hay que considerar que estas tres carteras son
fundamentales en la circunstancia actual boli-
viana.
1 - 15 Apprzued9Ror Release 2000/1*-
? LA TS"
Entre los rehenes se encontraban cuatro
norteamericanos. Uno de ellos, Agregado Obre-
ro de la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, un
iniembro del 'Cuerpo de Paz", una de las
creaciones de la Alianza para el Progreso, y
dos funcionarios del Servicio Periodistico de
Informacion de la Embajada de los Estados
Unidos. Ademas, les acomparlaban tres cana-
dienses, un ingles naturalizado, un aleman y
un holandes. Todos ellos estaban destinados
a ser canjeados por los tres presos comunis-
tas, acusados por la justicia boliviana de de-
tos comunes.
La exigencia comunista coloc6 ante el mu-
ro al gobierno de Paz Estensoro. La circuns-
tancia obligaba a Bolivia a decidir la alterna-
tiva que los mineros armados, acaudillados por
los comunistas, planteaban. Y Paz Estensoro
acogi6 el desario, lo enfrent6 y cance16 la po-
litica de apaciguamiento de que ha sido cam-
peon el gobierno de Bolivia.
El Ministro del Interior Antonio Arze Mu-
rillo, proclaim!, la decisiOn del gobierno de re-
chazar cualquiera negociacion sobre canje,
afirmando la exigencia de liberaci6n inmedia-
ta de los rehenes, sin condiciones. Al propio
tiempo ante los periodistas, en conferencia de
prensa, el Ministro exhibi6 documentos que
probaban la formaciOn de un "frente" cons-
tituido por el ala izquierda del M.N.R. opues-
ta a la politica del gobierno, por el Partido
Comunista, por los Trotzkistas, por el Partido
Revolucionario Autentico y por la Falange So-
cialista Boliviana. Independientemente de la
validez de los documentos exhibidos, el Mi-
nistro estaba trazando la linea divisoria que
separaba dos politicas: la que favorecia a los
comunistas y la que se comenzaba a oponer
frontalmente a ellos.
El Gobierno de Estados Unidos anunci6
que ofrecia "Asistencia Plena" al Gobierno
de Bolivia para que impusiese la autoridad de
la ley y liberase a los rehenes, sin condiciones.
El Gobierno de La Paz, ordenaba la moviliza-
ciOn de tropas sobre la ciudad de Oruro, a las
Ordenes, del General Alfredo Ovando, Jefe de
las Fuerzas Armadas de Bolivia. Por su parte,
la FederaciOn de Mineros, que comanda Juan
Lechin Oquendo, decret6 la realizaci6n de
huelgas escalonadas y la movilizaciOn general
de sus milicias. Convocaba al mismo tiempo a
las Milicias Campesinas de la region de Oru-
ro a ponerse en pie de guerra y dar apoyo a
los mineros.
Juan Lechin, en su caracter de Vice-presi-
dente de la Republica, otorg6 pleno apoyo a
Los mineros y exigi6 el canje de los tres co-
munistas presos por la veintena de rehenes,
que fueron trasladados para mayor seguridad,
a las Minas Siglo XX.
En esta forma se cancelaba la alianza que
fuera sellada en mayo de 1951. La presion de
los comunistas de obediencia castrista y pe-
kinesa se habia impuesto de manera total. _Los
: C
ban a los n
comunistA pipritivekinFornikeletisee2080/08/2 urgentes y acataban las directi- 3
_ZILCULWILLL -
3
vas que venian de Catavi. El 9 de diciembre,
Juan Lechin emitia un comunicado oficial so-
bre la situacion, en el que aseveraba que los
rehenes estaban sanos, aunque prisioneros en
espera del canje exigido. Lechin cargaba toda
la responsabilidad de los hechos sobre la ac-
titud asumida por Paz Estensoro.
ANTE la exigencia de Lechin y de los
comunistas, el Gobierno de la Paz reaccion6
ordenando a las tropas de Oruro poner cerco
a Catavi. Simultaneamente, el Movimiento Na-
cionalista Revolucionario leal ordenaba la mo-
vilizaciOn de las Milicias Campesinas del De-
partamento de Cochabamba, ordenandoles que
inarcharan sobre Catavi y las minas.
Bolivia se convirti6 en el escenario de una
movilizaciOn espectacular de personalidades.
El Vicario de la Iglesia, Monserior Andrew Ken-
nedy y el Arzobispo de La Paz, Embajadores
de casi todos los paises americanos y altos
clirigentes de la Cruz Roja, dirigentes estu-
diantiles y emisarios sindicales, se desplazaron
a la region minera para obtener la liberaciOn
de los rehenes'. El Gobierno de La Paz se man-
tcnia firme en su posiciOn de no negociar. No
podia haber canje de gente honrada, captura-
da con infracciOn de toda norma juridica, con
delincuentes comunes, responsables de delitos
ante la justicia.
El 10 de diciembre por la maiiana, los mi-
neros francamente sublevados contra el go-
bierno de La Paz, daban un ultimatum. Exi-
gian la libertad inmediata de Pimentel, Esco-
bar y Zaral, dentro de las 24 horas. En caso
de negativa, la declaracion of icial sentenciaba
que "el gobierno cargaria con las consecuen-
cias".
Los funcionarios del Departamento de Es-
tado de Washington multiplicaban las notas
de protesta. Renovaban los ofrecimientos de
"Ayuda Plena" del Presidente Johnson y rei-
teraban las notas conminatorias pidiendo la
liberacion de los rehenes norteamericanos.
El Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou-
glas Henderson, envie, un mensaje telegrafico
a Juan Lechin, haciandole responsable de lo
que les pudiese ocurrir a los cuatro. rehenes
norteamericanos. En aspera replica, Lechin res-
pondi6 que los rehenes norteamericanos no
obtendrian su libertad mientras el gobierno
de La Paz no liberase a los tres sindicalistas
dctenidos por orden judicial.
Lechin asever6 a traves de la prensa y de
la radio, que sus tres amigos habian sido re-
ducidos a prisiOn arbitrarramente por el Mi-
nistro del Interior. Que el Agregado Obrero
dc la Embajada de los Estados Unidos, habia
sido capturado por los mineros a causa de
haberse entrometido en la politica interna de
agociam
trdigleoin
ter6 su exigencia de libertad inmediata de los
4
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
ties comunistas presos y anuncio que seis mil
mineros, con las armas en la man?, se encon-
ti aban en ese momento en pie de guerra.
La perspectiva de guerra civil se abrio ante
Bolivia dramaticamente. El Presictente Paz Es-
tensoro mantuvo su posicion primitiva y or-
dello reforzar la guarniciOn militar de Oruro,
elevando a seis mil el minter? de soldados.
El 11 de diciembre, se produjo un duelo
tclegrafico entre Juan Lechin y el Embajador
de los Estaclos Unidos. El Embajador le te-
legrafici directamente a Lechin, diciendole:
"El crimen de secuestro es visto con ho-
rror y repugnancia en el mundo entero."
Juan Lechin, en su respuesta se limita a
reiterar su decision de mantener presos a los
rehenes mientras Paz Estensoro no aceptase
las condicienes planteadas por los coniumstas.
Mientras tanto, Dean Rusk, Secretario de
Estado de Washington, Teodoro Moscoso, de
la Alianza para el Progreso, Pierre Salinger,
Jcie de Prensa de la Casa Blanca, Walter
Reuter, dirigente sindical de los obreros del
autornovil de los Estados Unidos y otras pet-
sonalidades, se dirigieron a Juan Lechin, con-
minandole a ordenar la liberaciOn de los re-
henes.
Los comunistas y Lechin se mantenian en
su posiciOn, mientras los rehenes prisioneros
sc apitlaban en una habitaciOn de cuatro me-
tros por seis. Sobre el suelo estaban extendidos
colchones, en cada uno de los cuales reposaban
mas de dos prisioneros. La guardia la realiza-
ban las mujeres de los mineros, provistas de
carps de clinamita, y con 3US respectivos ful-
minantes.
A esta hora de la crisis, todos los comu-
nistas se habian unificado: los que obedecian
a Pekin tar,to como los fidelistas, los trotzkis-
tas y los de obediencia moscovita. La unidad
era total; las discrepancias habian quedado
reducidas a literatura sobre temas internacio-
'tales. En Catavi no existian discrepancias. Las
que existian tres dias atras, solamente, habian
dcsaparecido.
LOS PARTIDARIOS de Juan Lechin y los
comunistas, convocaron a una gran manifesta-
clan en La Paz, con la finalidad de ejercer
presiOn sobre el ,gobierno y obligarle a ceder.
Los comunistas de las diversas observancias
se mostraron activos. Pero, al fin, la manifes-
tacion no logro movilizar a tres mil maniles-
tantes. Nino-6un sector importante del trabajo
fue paralizado en la capital del pais. Los co-
munistas desfilaron al grito de "Paz Esten-
soro... al pareclon... Juan Lechin, al Po-
der.
Ante el fracaso de la manifestaciOn de ma-
sas de La Paz, el Ministerio del Trabajo dicto
una serie de amenazas contra los mineros huel-
guistas. La Corporacion Minera de Bolivia, la
empresa nacionalizada, suspenderia sus ope-
ra015t6V6t1 P8IPR416W 2Obt00g27
1-15 MAR ZO 1964
Esto implicaba un "lock-out" contra siete mil
trabajadores, a quienes se cortaria el sumi-
nistro de abastecimientos. Se suprimiria, ade-
mas, el pago del aguinaldo de Navidad y el
de los salarios por los cifas no trabajados.
En aquel mismo moment?, Ia Justicia ini-
ciaba un proceso contra los quince principales
dirigentes de la operaciOn comunista que ha-
bia capturado a los rehenes en la zona mi-
nera.
La ofensiva del gobierno caus6 impact?
profundo en las filas cornunistas. La actitud
clesatiante fue abanclonada. Los gritos destem-
plados contra el imperialism? yanqui fueron
cambiaclos en recriminaciones al gobierno por
su 'actituct testarucla, antirrevolucionaria, anti-
obrera...". Y la propaganda se hizo calurosa
sobre la actitud generosa y benevolente de los
mineros, qtte "trataban a los rehenes como a
hermanos...", "sin hacerles daiio alguno y
tratanclo solamente de canjearlos...".
Juan Lechin Oquendo presentO nuevas con-
diciones. El mismo, renunciaria a su cargo y
a la investidura de Vicepresidente de la Re-
publica de Bolivia. Se sorneteria a proceso
penal ante los Tribunales de Justicia, reem-
plazando a los tres dirigentes sindicales pre-
sos. Tan pronto como esta :nueva proposiciOn
hubiese sido aceptada por el gobierno de La
Paz, los rehenes serian puestos en libertad.
Paz Estensoro rechazo fulminantemente la
nueva proposiciOn. Respondi6 exigiendo la li-
bertad inmediata y sin condiciones de los re-
hones. Notifico que los tres dirigentes sindi-
cales quedarian presos y sometidos al proceso
judicial que se les habia iniciado. Anuncio que
los dirigentes de Catavi que habian dirigido
la operacion de captura de los rehenes serian
procesados.
Mientras tanto, las tropas de Oruro avan-
zaron sobre Catavi y las Milicias Campesinas,
que habian partido de la localidad de Ucure-
na, a las ardenes del Coronel Osinaga, mar-
chaban sobre la zona minera. Los mineros
iban a ser tratados como rebeldes.
Un aviOn de reconocimiento se estre116 en
La zona minera y sus dos ocupantes perecieron,
siendo las Unicas victimas de toda la crisis.
El Cuerpo Diplomatic? acreditado en La
Paz se moviliz6 rumbo a la regiOn de Catavi;
los dignatarios de la Iglesia, los dirigentes es-
? tudiantiles, los jefes sindicales y politicos in-
? tentaron realizox la misi6n de mediadores.
Juan Lechin respondio a todas las gestiones
afirmando que todo dependia de la resolucion
del gobierno y de Paz Estensoro.
Stibitamente y en forma dramatica, un abo-
gado norteamericano, herma:no de uno de los
rehenes prisioneros, dio a la publicidad una
carta en la que Irineo Pimentel y Federico Es-
cobar, dos de los comunistas presos, acusados
de homicidio, pedian a sus camaradas mineros
poner en libertad a los rehenes, sin condicio-
nes, por el bien de Bolivia y de los trabajado-
res. En un fragment?, la carta decia, textual-
: CIA-K15078-03061A000200070003-1
4
1 .15 ATRM8dggir "elease 2nnntnR/27 rIA_Pnci751_nq064,4000200 5
"Estando en duro trance de sacrificio los
*low mineros de Catavi y Siglo XX, y ante el des-
plazamiento de tropas del Ejercito y queriendo
evitar una masacre roja, deponiendo toda ac-
Wad sectaria y pensando en los trabajadores,
llamamos y rogamos, para dar una leccidn a
los bdrbaros, poner en libertad a los rehenes,
exigiendo al pro pio tiempo la normalizacion
de las labores en las minas, el pago de los
haberes por los dias de huelga y que el go-
bierno atienda a las demandas de mejoras sm-
dicales...".
La carta fue tacb.ada de apocrif a por los
comunistas. Desde Washington, Edwin M.
Martin, alto funcionario del Departamento de
Estado, telegrafiaba a Juan Lechin pidiendole
que diera fe a los mineros de la autenticidad
de tal carta, certificando que ella habia sido
firmada por Pimentel y Escobar libremente y
sin coacciOn.
Los comunistas plantearon una nueva con-
dici6n. Se pondria en libertad a los rehenes,
pero los presos comunistas no serian juzgados
en La Paz, donde "no tenian garantias", sino
en Potosi, donde si las tenian. El gobierno
de La Paz, rechaz6 categoricamente la nueva
condicion y exigio la inmediata libertad de los
rehenes.
EN LA MADRUGADA del sabado 14 de
diciembre, el cerco militar en tomb a Catavi,
cerraba sus tenazas. El General Ovando asu-
mia el mando de las tropas y una operaciOn
de caracter militar iba a comenzar objetiva-
mente. Lechin se convenci6 que el gobierno de
Paz Estensoro estaba resuelto a imponer auto-
ridad sin consentirle siquiera salvar la cara.
Al atardecer, la radio dejaba escuchar la voz ? La division entre los comunistas que obe-
conmovida de Juan Lechin: decen a Moscu, los que obedecen a Pekin y
los que siguen a La Habana, es meramente
"El pueblo ha ganado la batalla... En co- formal. En Bolivia se ha hecho claro a traves
nocimiento de que las tropas se encuentran, en de esta crisis que los fidelistas, los trotzkistas
estos mom entos, a escasos kilometros de Cata- y los obedientes a Pekin no estan separados
vi y Siglo XX, con las trcigicas consecuencias por ningun desacuerdo real. La oposiciOn de
que son previsibles para los tiabajadores bo- los que obedecen a Moscu se enardece en las
hvianos y para los tecnicos extranjeros y los palabras, estalla en palabreria traducida del
ciiplomciticos norteamericanos, con el fin de ruso, para acallarse totalmente a la hora de la
evitar derramamiento de sangre y horas trd- acciOn, que es la hora de la verdad. Tanto en
gicas, la Federacidn de Trabajadores Mineros, Bolivia, como en Venezuela, los comunistas de
acepta la propuesta del gobierno...". las diversas corrientes dejan una experiencia
"Los rehenes prisioneros ?arzadid Lechin? probada: simulan estar separados o marchan
sercin entregados a Monseclor Abel Antezana, efectivamente separados, pero en la hora de la
Arzobispo de La Paz, quien habia venido ac- acciOn, el combate los encuentra juntos.
tuando como mediador." La batalla de Catavi la gan6, de manera
Las condiciones del arreglo fueron: campal, Victor Paz Estensoro y la corriente del
M.N.R. acusada de "Thermidoriana" por los
comunistas. Esta lucha ha demostrado que el
comunismo en Bolivia, y en America Latina,
ha sufrido una severa derrota, pero esta pro-
bado asimismo que el comunismo no ha sido
vencido. Ni en Venezuela, ni en Bolivia. En
rt'endo h ? Catavi se le ha permitido replegarse en orden
min*. ef4aWiniedge ttikkii#A446Xilpti rLqiiigki7 : CIA-RDPfMtt Ceitilfiedobbluei!er con-
Paz el 'Embajador de los Estados Unidos, Dou- 5 (Pasa a la pdg. szguiente)
glas Henderson y el Vicepresidente Juan Le-
chin.
?"e,COmo permiti6 usted que se enviaran
tropas contra los mineros... ?' ?increp6 Le-
chin al Embajador.
?"Yo no he venido a este pais para man-
dar", replic6 Henderson.
Horas mas tarde, los rehenes eran libera-
dos, sin que ninguna de las condiciones comu-
nistas hubiesen sido aceptadas. Habia preva-
lecido la firme actitud del gobierno y la ba-
talla la habia ganado rotundamente Victor Paz
Estensoro.
LA CRISIS boliviana del mes de diciem-
bre ha venido a demostrar tres verdades po-
liticas concluyentes:
? Cuando el gobierno de Washington "da
Apoyo Pleno" a la acciOn contra el comunis-
mo, los gobiernos de America Latina se de-
ciden, varian su posiciOn apaciguadora, cam-
bian sus actitudes de tolerancia interesada. No
por esto, ni a causa de esto, llega a sufrir un
rasgurio la soberania, ni la independencia, ni
el orgullo nacional.
? No es la miseria sino la impunidad lo que
favorece la subversion comunista. La falta de
firmeza de los gobiernos, la actitud democrd-
tica claudicante, la corrupciOn politica, la uti-
lizaciOn de los comunistas como instrumentos
electorates y como ingredientes de la intri a
palaciega, constituyen las fuerzas que est ?
ayudando al comunismo en America Latina.
La inlittraciOn y la subversion prosperan, no
alli donde hay m?miseria, sino donde mayor
es la tolerancia y donde m?altos grados al-
canza la impunidad.
? LiberaciOn incondicional de los rehenes.
? Proceso a los tres dirigentes comunistas
en La Paz, no en Potosi.
? Retiro de las tropas de la zona de Catavi
y Siglo XX.
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000200070003-1
(Viene de la prig. anterior)
siderada como estrat6gica. Las fuerzas del co-
munismo en Bolivia permanecen intactas nu-
mericamente.
Las concliciones para la campafia electoral
del mes de junio, quiza no son mejores ni peo-
res que antes de la crisis. Lo que Si es auten-
tico es que la crisis ha servido para definir
posiciones, para delimitar fronteras y esclare-
cer actitudes. En las elecciones de junio no
habra alianza intima entre el M.N.R. y el Par-
tido Comunista. Cualesquiera que fueren las
maniohras que realicen los comunistas de obe-
diencia moscovita, la corriente fidelista y pe-
kinesa les arrastrara a posiciones que no son
de coexistencia pacifica, sino de aspera opo-
sicidn al gobierno acusado de "thermidoriano".
EUDOCIO RAVINES
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