BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200050003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 97
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 10, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 February 1964
BMr.ef1 Noted
Kwame Nkrumah's Soviet-style "Legality."
Ghana's government-appointed polling officials obediently
turned in a 99.9 per cent score for "yes" votes in the signifi-
cant February first referendum. The Convention People's Party
is now designated the "vanguard of the people in their struggle
to build a Socialist society," an almost verbatim copy of the
clause from Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution. No attempt
was made to conceal the coercive nature of the registered ballots
system and the frequent unavailability of the "no" ballot box.
This predicted "victory" gives Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's President-
for-life, the trappings of legality for future dictatorial de-
cisions, foreshadowed by the December dismissal of the Chief
Justice who acquitted three former officials of a treason charge.
The elimination of an independent judiciary removes the last
facade from Nkrumah's totalitarian "socialist" state.
(Briefly Noted)
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DATES OF PROPAGANDA INTEREST
2 Mar "Trial of the 21" charging attempt to restore
capitalism by Bukharin Rykov and Yagoda et al,
(18 sentenced to death 2-13 March 1935.
5 Mar Joseph Stalin dies (born 21 Dec 1?79), 1953.
8 Mar Russia -- February Revolution (Julian Cal.
23 Feb-2 Mar) 8-15 March 1917.
13 Mar Chinese Communist attempt to arrest Tibetan
Dalai Lama, 1959.
14 Mar Karl Marx dies (born 5 May 1818), 1883.
18 Mar Kronstadt Uprising crushed (started 23 Feb), 1921.
1 Ap Berlin Blockade begins, 1948.
4 Ap North Atlantic Treaty signed in response to Soviet
imperialism in Europe, 1949 (15th anniversary).
11 Ap Liberation from Fascism - "Day of Remembrance"
celebrated annually by Commie resistance fighters,FIR,
17 Ap Nikita Khrushchev born 70 years ago, 1?94.
18 Ap European Coal and Steel Community (Europe's first
federal community) -- Treaty signed, 195-1
18 Ap Bandung Conference -- 29 Afro-Asian countries call
for self-determination, 18-27 April 1955
22 Ap Lenin born, 1870, Chicoms issue "Long Live Leninism"
statements, challenging KOarushchev, 1960.
29 Ap India and Chinese People's Republic enter 8-year
pact for "peaceful coexistence." 1954
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PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#21 18-31 January 1964
Commentary
Principal Developments:
1. While a Yugoslav correspondent in Moscow was reporting
that people there have come to realize that Peking will not cease
its anti-Soviet polemics, and thus Sino-Soviet relations "have
entered a new phase" (Chrono, Jan. 20), the Soviets undertook
some new moves against Peking. They began mass distribution
(domestically, in Russian only, as far as reported) of a new
book (signed to the press in October but evidently withheld
because of the moratorium on polemics) by top CPSU ideologists
vigorously attackin "the anti-Marxist doctrines of the CCP"
(Chrono, Jan 21 Pravda editorial on the 19th omitted mention
of any Asian party (other than Soviet-aligned Mongolia) when
listing 1963 contacts among "the socialist countries" and "their
Marxist-Leninist parties." On the 20th, TASS branded an NCNA
report as "absolutely groundless and nothing but misinformation,"
and on the 30th a Pravda article entitled "Why Mislead?" con-
demned the Chinese for trying to distort the peace initiatives
of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in exchange for guaranteed
sugar purchases, Castro signed a joint communique which confirmed
"a complete unity of views" on all questions, including inter-
national affairs and problems of the world Communist movement
(Chrono, Jan 23).
2. The December and January issues of the Soviet-captive,
multilingual, international monthly journal, Problems of Peace
and Socialism'(World Marxist Review in English edition )s which
has posed as the organ of the World Communist Movement, published
several articles signed by Communists from various countries which
clearly support Soviet and attack Chinese positions (Chrono,
Jan. 27). (The Chinese and North Koreans withdrew completely
from the PP&S operation and the Japanese decided to edit their
own edition focally during the past year.)
3. The Chinese, rejoicing in the "tremendous welcome"
given to Chou in 4 more African countries and in the agreement
with the French establishing diplomatic relations, hardly men-
tioned the terms of their dispute with Moscow during this period.
Then in the first few days of February they released several
blockbusters. People's Daily and other Peking press on the 3rd
printed the text of the Pravda "Why Mis ead?" editorial plus a
sardonic reply to it; excer stst from theiew Soviet "anti-China
books" an NCNA announcement of the first of a series of volumes
of anti-China material from the Soviet press;" and a slashing
(#21 Commentary Cont.)
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"editor's note" with the latter, asserting that "over 2000 items
of anti China material" were printed in Russian publications by
Nov. 30. The following day appeared the seventh in the Joint
People's Daily/Red Flag series pegged to the 14 July CPSU open
letter, entitled "The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest
Splitters of Our Times." This 18,000-word blast is the most
direct, insulting challenge yet to Khrushchev and the CPSU
leadership. ee hrono, Addendum, for description of these
pots deadline items.)
4. In two more non-Communist countries, Ceylon and Peru,
pro-Chinese factions set themselves up in formal opposition to
the old "revisionist leadership." In Ceylon, the dissidents
held their own "Seventh Party Congress" Jan. 19-21, formed a new
"Central Committee," and adopted resolutions repudiating Soviet-
line resolutions of the old Party (Chrono, Jan. 25). Much the
same thing happened on Jan. 18 in Peru, where the continuing
struggle between the factions led to-the proclamation of a new
Party organ, Bandera Roja (Red Flag) and the storming of the
offices of the old-line Party daily Vn idad by the pro-Chinese
forces on Jan. 27, with demolition of its installations (Chrono,
Jan. 18-27).
5. A new communique by the North Vietnamese Party con-
firmed its solidly pro-Chinese orientation Chrono, Jan. 21) --
although the Party also dispatched a top-level delegation for
Party talks in Moscow (Jan. 27). Italian CP boss Togliatti
reiterated the PCI's opposition to an early world party conference
and support of a meetings of the parties of Western Europe (Chrono,
Jan. 21). Meanwhile, additional reports from Bucharest demon-
strate the long strides taken by Rumania in the direction of
independence from Soviet domination -- and apparently in a some-
what Westerly direction (Chrono, Jan. 20 and 22).
6. An interesting note of yet undetermined significance
was introduced after the end of the period when Chou was reported
by Edgar Snow as saying in their interview that "we have reached
an agreement with the Soviet Union that negotiations be held an
the Sino-Soviet boundary questions."
Significance:
The Sino-Soviet conflict flared to a new intensity as
the Soviets -- their plea and unilateral moratorium on polemics
having failed to win Chinese reciprocity -- published a few new
propaganda thrusts, ---- only to encounter the most savage Chi-
nese attacks of all, including a taunting dare to the Soviets to
carry out their "threats and intimidation." This new Chinese
onslaught would seem to represent a "last straw," a point-of
no return in the degeneration of relations between the two parties
and states, ---- except that relations have survived a series
of previous attacks which looked like "last straws" in their
turn!
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The Soviet polemical thrusts were tin arativel mild,
hackneyed and defensive, and their most spectacular political
success -- the joint communique in which Castro testified to
"complete unity" with them -- was of doubtful value and dura-
bility: not only was it obviously paid for by economic con-
cessions, but at one point it uses the formulation "complete
identity of views as expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban state-
ment of 23 May 1963," almost as if to remind us of how freely
the Cubans interpreted their "identity" with the Soviets in the
period immediately following Castro's earlier mission to Moscow.
On the other hand, the Chinese gains -- not only in the free
world, with Chou's further personal conquests and de Gaulle's
recognition, but also in the Communist movement, with the estab-
lishment of organized pro-Chinese parties in Ceylon and Peru --
are concrete and probably irreversible, seemingly supporting the
monumental arrogance of their latest polemical blasts. Moscow's
problems in trying to handle relations with the rampaging Chinese
are truly staggering. 25X1C10b
(#21 Commentary Cont.)
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(#21 Commentary Cont.)
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CSBONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#21 18-31 January 1964
Throughout period - The Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lei
ro s on through Africa see rono, Dec, 14 and continuing), but
plans and prospects for further visits are upset in wake of re-
volts and mutinies in Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda.
Chou's charm reportedly won warm response during the remainder of
his tour of Mali (15-21), in Guinea (21-27), in the Sudan (27-30)
and in Ethiopia from the 30th. He is expected in Somalia on
Feb. 1 for a 3-day stay, but scheduled visits to Kenya and
Tanganyika have been "postponed." It was announced that the post-
ponements were decided by the Chinese, -- but Tanganyika President
Nyerere also canceled his proposed visit to China, and observers
saw the changes as tied to Chinese broadcasts attacking the use
of British troops to put down the mutinies and to indications of
Chinese complicity in the turbulent events. Moscow continued to
avoid direct comment on the Chou trip.
January 18 - An Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial commenting on
the 8 January joint Alban an- nose declaration capping Chou's
visit coined a new prase In the poem cs: a failure of the
plans of N. chev against our country proved to the world
that modern revisionism, like imperialism, is a 'paper tiger."'
Ehrushchev's rev sons group as stopped at nothing, iti says:
"it has gone so far as to plot against our country, sometimes in
a hidden or indirect manner and sometimes directly. It has acted
in the same manner against the CPR." Etc.
January 18-27 - On January 18-19, the pro-Chinese faction of the
Peruvian held its own congress at which ey ,expelVW several
old guard pro-Soviet Party leaders and "elected new leadership."
At a press conference several days later, Dr. Saturnino Paredes,
"newly elected First Secretary," states that his group "will
staunchly defend Marxist-Leninist principles" and supports Fidel
Castro. At the same time, Victor Acosta, Secretary General of
the old PCP issues a statement belittling the importance of the
rebel group. On January 27 the pro-Chinese storm the building
housing the old Party's daily Unidad and demolish the installa-
tions. (Local press and radio -reports, plus NCNA.)
January 19 - A Pravda editorial pegged to the continuing Castro
visit extolls the visits of delegations and the personal meetings
walks between leaders as "the good tradition furthering the
strengthening of friendship" of "the socialist countries their
Marxist-Leninist parties, and fraternal coup res. then re-
counts such fraternal contacts curing a pas year, including
specific reference to all contacts involving, in addition to Cuba,
the CEMA countries -- including Mongolia -- and Yugoslavia -- but
with no mention of any parties of Asia. On the same ay the major
Chinese papers publish a long excerpt from the December issue of
the Japanese 's theoretical and political journal Zenei entitled
"Sino- ov e o emics and Revisionism in Japan" whicf--is intended
to "refute the slanderous attacks on the Chinese CP by Noboro Sato
and other renegades o e Jup,
{{'*~21 Chronology Cont.)
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January 19-21 - Pro-Chinese ex ellees from the Cie lon Communist
Party o eir own T even National Congress" in Colombo Jan-
uary 19-21, elect a new "Central Committee," declare themselves
to be the CCP, and repudiate several resolutions of the old ty
leadership ich had favored the Soviet, Yugoslav, anti-Stalin
line and had condemned the Albanians and the Chinese line. All
Chinese papers prominently feature the story on the 25th.
January 20 - Belgrade Borba carries an article by its Moscow
correspondent Bayalski ating that people in Moscow think that
relations between the USSR and China have entered a new phase'
Mat they realize by now that eking is unwilling to give up its
anti-Soviet polemics, that they sharply criticize Chinese
behavior, and they believe that the dispute will continue for a
long time to come. Bayalski goes on to say that the Soviet leader-
ship is not yet decided whether it should continue to refrain from
countering the Chinese attacks, explaining that "this, of course,
is an intricate problem ... and one must always consider not only
the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, but those of all
socialist countries and of the international Communist movement.
This is how people here explain the fact that the Soviets have
refrained from polemics." Tass takes exception to a 12 January
NCNA report on the return to na o ou Hung-ching, the
n erpreter of a Chinese delegation who had defected in Tokyo
in October, which "contends that Chou was forcibly detained for
several hours at the USSR Embassy in Japan, despite alleged
appeals ... by representatives of the Japanese public and also
by the Japanese authorities." This statement, Tass declares,
"is absolutely oundless and is nothin but misinformation of
up bl c opinion.- a same me, ass announces A "a new
group of Chinese specialists has arrived at Dubna .. to work at
the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research.... The group of Chinese
workers at the institute is now the most numerous of all ire groups
of people's democratic countries."
January 20 and 22 - New York Times carries two articles by its
Bucharest correspondent Binder summing up numerous developments
in Rumania's "Independence Drive," which "a Western observer des-
cribes as e- uss ca on u the discreet official of the
Gheorghiu-De regime prefer to term 'Rumanification."' The biggest
single change came last autumn with the a'abolit the Maxim
Gorky Institute of Russian Language and Literature, which had
been a center of Soviet educational influence," and Russian was
eliminated as a compulsory language in the schools. 90 percent
of the contents of Lumea, the weekly magazine which replaces the
Rumanian edition of-Moscow's New Times (see Chrono, Dec. 27-30),
are said to be reprints from Western publications. A guide
pointed to a razed area filled with rubble and said simply: "That
was the Russian bookstore." The Russian names of several shops
and movie houses have been changed to Rumanian. Foreign trade
statistics disclose that Rumania's commerce with Western countries
grew from 20% to 33% of the total during the last 4 years, and
the press is publicizing the presence of Western concerns in the
country. Etc.
2 (#21 Chronology Cont.)
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 Jyeff Qr 1&%%?(S41`0J1J-- ?7ea%~%M8O O0959293jasit
to ugos avia w a press conference in which, according to
ayug, he said; "We have found a common attitude and pointed to
the path along which one should go towards un y. We expect to
follow the path and thus attain favorable results." Both aaggrr~e~~~e~
that "the Chinese CP attitude toward questions of peace ance-
coex stence 1son a "harms the international labor and
Communist movement. ' 'iogliatti r iterated the Italian CPts
opposition to a world co conferenof CPts at this time and its
approval of "the proposal for convening a meeting of the CP's of
The 40th snniwer of Lenin*s death serves as a peg for
a series o ommen? the world-s mists reflecting their
current stance in the "great conflict." Pravdats editorial was
]Largely an ode to magnificent Soviet achievements and majestic
prospects -- mainly in a material sense. "Supplementing Lenints
well-known formula," Pravda coined a new slogan: "Communism is
Soviet power plus the a ec r ca on o e entire country p us
h c emIcaIiza on of the national economy:"
East German CC Secretary Honecker issued a statement obse-
quiously pra sing "the Soviet Union (which) has become the basis
of the whole world socialist system." On the other extreme, the
Albanian Zeri I Popullit editorial included some of the most
vitriolic attacks to date on "the splitting and sapping activity
engaged in by the N. Khrushchev group to revise and discredit
Marxism-Leninism," on its "demagogy and intrigue," its "capitula-
tion," "treason," and "blackmail." The only Rumanian comment we
have seen was by a Prof. Bugnaru who never once mentoned the
CPSU, although the views he set forth were generally in tune with
?oe Soviet line.
The Chinese did not even mention the anniversar in any
report seen by us. The North oreanNodong Sinmu editorial
was only mildly anti-revisionist, but a or a namese chose
this date to publish in Nhan Dan the common que o e
TW=
y s
n in
,plenum in %-c-ember on a international situation and e
Party-Os n erne Iona asks," together with an editorial pegged
to it. The Party appears ever more strongly opposed to "modern
revisionism" but in an interesting departure the communique state:
"Our Party draws a clear political distinction .
era sm, and e e within the international
Communist movement who commit the error of
revisionism or r g w ngoppor un sm. our atti-
tude with regard to the Tito revisionist clique
is to expose it consistently, and, with regard to
the mistaken people within the ICBM, to struggle for
the sake of unity...."
The editorial specifically speaks of "consolidating and strength-
ening unity between the Soviet Union and China" and expresses
3 (#21 Chronology Cont. )
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their priceless support and assistance." All Chinese gapers
carried full text of this North Vietnam communique a on the 3rd.
Meanwhile, correspondents in Moscow reported (Radio Belgrade
on the 21st, Reuters on the 23ra1 and UPI on the 24th) that a new
book, appearing quietly under the innocuous title Conversations
on Political Topics, vigorously attacks the anti- s doctrines
of the EXT. it was prepared by a group of nine under genera
eTc itors p of chief CPSU ideologist Ilyichev and released for
publication on 23 October, u apparently held up due to the
Soviet moratorium on polemics. Observers saw in its appearance
a si nal that Soviet patience with the Chinese was exhausted
and the CPSU as ec e to hit back once more. a rs print-
ng is-in 200,000 copes, apparently in Russian only.
January 23 - Castro's 10-day visit with IChrushchev concluded with
a long-term agreement covering Soviet purchase of Cuban sugar at
guaranteed prices and a joint communique which declared that "a
complete unity of views was confirmed on all the questions dis-
cussed," which Included nterna onal problems of interest to
both sides and urgent question on a world Communist and
workers movement.- Later In the communique, the formulation was:
"complete Ident ty of views as expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban
statement of 23 May 1963." In amplifying on this "identity of
views," the communique states that Cuba "considers the success
achieved by the Soviet Union in the struggle for the cessation of
nuclear tests... is a step forward toward peace and disarmament," thus contradicting the strong Chinese attack on the test-ban
treaty and possibly indicating Cuba's intent to sign. It also
says that Castro "stated the support" of Cuba for Khrushchev's
new proposal for a treaty renouncing the use o orce in terri-
torial disputes, The Soviet press exulted: av a s editorial
on the ca led the communique "a documento of enormous
significance ... impregnated from beginning to end by the complete
unity of views" of the two parties and governments.
January 25 - An Albanian Zeri IIPPopuullit editorial, "The Voyage to
Africa and Albania by Comm a chou sn-Tai and the Reaction of the
Titoists," begins by denouncing the Tito gang for its violent
reaction to the Chou visit but soon goes on to its main thrust:
"While the Tito gang launched open attacks against the k an-'ic
its peace policy with the aim of obscuring ... the great inter-
national role of China, the other modern revisionists organized a
conspiracy of silence regarding a historic visit by the Premier
of the CPR tats council. Why this silence ... ?11 zjp,s answer:
My cannot reconcile themselves to Chinese policy which "unmasks
their anti-Leninist pacifist concept of peaceful coexistence....
Furthermore, the revisionists cannot norm u c opinion in their
countries, about the great success of the visit of the Chinese
government delegation to Africa, for this would cause new troubles
and new anxieties. It would show how defamatory., untruthful and
absurd-is their propaganda against the CPR...."
January 27 - Brief releases from Hanoi and Peking announce the
deparTure of a top-ranking delegation of North Vietnamese Commu-
nists, led by Fir's Secretary Le Duan, for party talks with the
QSU in Moscow. Hanoi says only that they ~~woouu11ldCCh"exchai1nge views...
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The North Korean Party organ Nodong Sinmun carries a 15,?w-
word article entitled o High the Revolutionary Banner of
National Liberation," which, like their similar effort on October
28, comprehensively presents Chinese views tailored to represent
the interests of a smaller nation. It goes out of the way to
denounce "the Dange group of the API" and "some people calling
themselves Communists" who support and praise them.
New York Times writer Harry Schwartz reviews an article
in the December issue of World Marxist Review (English-language
edition of Problems of Peace an Socialism, ' a Soviet-supported,
Prague-based, mu - ngua monthly ournal,by Luis Corvalan,
General Secretary of the Chilean CP, which sharply attacks, the
Chinese Communists for trying to force the Castro ofrevolu-
on on the OUTO-ans who are dedicated to a policy of non-
violent revolution. The letter reveals that the Chinese CP sent
"a recent letter" to the Chilean CP with this aim, c u d
the statement:
"In Latin America the 'peaceful way' which you
advocate stands in sharp contrast to the revolu-
tionary way of Fidel Castro and the other comrades
who led the Cuban people to victory."
The last issue of our Chronology reported a Reuters Moscow dis-
patch (Jan. C) reporting that the lead article in the January
issue of PP &S, signed by a Czech, a Canadian and a Syr'-
attackingie Chinese press for recognizing dissident splinter
groups as "genuine communist revolutionaries," and a subsequent
report has described another anti-Chinese article in the same
issue by Jaime Peras, Secretary of the Uruguayan CP.
January 30 - Pravda features an "Observer" article entitled "Why
sea f"""which protests that, while the Khrushchev proposal for
an international treaty renouncing the use of force in territorial
disputes has been published, welcomed and given serious study in
most countries of the world, the Chinese press organs have not
published it or any of the world reaction to it but "take it
upon themselves to comment on these documents and even to make
an assessment of them." It asks: "Why mislead the Chinese
people and turn them against the Sov a people?" Observer com-
plains:"It is as ifin na they prefer to hand newspaper
readers rea -made assertions and assessments .... IT on the same
day, the nese press features a harshly taunting article from
the December issue of the Malayan Monitor, London-published
organ of the Malayan CP, which says that "everywhere the modern
revisionists have suffered a crushing defeat in the great debate,
thanks to the staunch and well-prepared efforts of the anti-
revisionist leadership and ranks of the Communist and workers
parties of the world, in particular the CCP, the Albanian Workers
Party the eP's of Korea, Indonesia, the DRV,' etc. It taunts
Khrushchev directly:
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"In their agony of impending total defeat, they
e modern revisionists) cry -no pole cs and
nno Alit Coming from em suic, cries are
ye a insults o an arsons who, having set
e to your house, urges you not to Dower
a ou pu out the flame but to use to
g e ppeo eace. Marxist-Leninists
are not exponents o polemics for the sake of
gaining a debating point, nor are they to be
fobbed off with placatory gestures of 'unity.'
Unlike the modern revisionists, they do not
regard principle and expediency as synonymous
and interchangeable."
Lest anyone have doubts as to whom it means by "modern
revisionists," the article states clearly: "It is no accident
that both Khrushchev and Tito are now in the same ideological
camp -- openly and eves defiantly."
(In view of the importance of several developments
in the four days immediately following the close
of our reporting period, we are attaching this
Addendum to include some reference to them.)
February 2 - In an interview granted in Conakry, Guinea, to
sympathetic correspondent Edgar Snow, Chou En-lai is quoted as
saying: "We have reached an agreement with the-Soviet Union
that negotiations be held on the no- ov a boundary ques ons."
Februarv 3 - Peking Peo le's Daily features a number of items on
e no- oviet conflict:
The text of the 30 January Pravda article "Why Mislead?"
- An article replying to Pravda, entitled "A Blow at
Lyndon Johnson Stings Pravda." It begins sarcastically:
"Once upon a time there was a story of the Siamese
twins, It was said that when one of the pair "was-hit
the other felt the pain, i puzzles one now Is that
this curious kinship ould appear between the leaders
of the CPSU and the 'President of the 'U. '- asks:
a sort o a con one re ex s hir?... Does
it mean that the Soviet leaders intend to reach an
agreement with Johnson under which they would join
hands in forbidding the peoples to oppose imperialism
and start revolution? If so, Pravda has good reasons
for its nervousness...."
- Excerpts from the new Soviet book, Conversations on
Political Topics (see Chrono, Jan.2 , under the head-
line -ou licious Attacks on the CCP."
6 (#21 Chronology Cont.)
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CHRONOLOGY -- ADDENDUM
 Ap-proyl$c ri ftg RRjjVAQ8j&4aiC4fi5Dfi7PsQ39g1&2903P 0P)VPP3-3
China Materials from the Soviet Prress' goes on sale-
throughout na today,," together w the text of the
preface to the volume by the editorial board of the
World Culture Publishing House. It says that, "accord-
ing to incomplete statistics, by 30 Nov. over 2000 items
of anti-China material of all descriptions... had been
printed In 26 national papers and periodicals and 23
local papers and periodicals in the Soviet Union."
A Pee lets Daily "editor's note" which says that, "since
N. ru ev, leader of the CPSU, proposed 'an end
to polemics' on 25 October 1963, the Soviet press has
continued its anti-China propaganda right along." It
points particularly to excerpts from the "more than
gan these pages. tt "eople can Mislead" see rom this Pravda article pub-
lished
that the CPSU leader's proposal for 'an end to
public polemics is only,: a fraud, perpetrated for
ulterior motives. a propaganda in the book". it says,
"is nothing SU-stale, trite phraseology," and the
Pravda article "is even more ridiculous."
"As for the reprimand in Pravda to the effect
that the Chinese press has not published
;Qhrushchev's letter of 31 December to the heads
of governments, we can candidly say to the CPSU
leadership, what is your hurry? We will deal
with it, and will comment on it, too. A Chinese
ppubliShing house is already m-RS ing up volumes of
your anti-China articles for successive issuance.
A road must be traveled step by step, and a bill
of accounts must be settled item by item. W
e
st have hot finished answering the open Setter
you published last July. a makes you so
impatient?"
February 4 - The seventh in the series of joint People's Daily/
Red Flag articles r ng to the14 July PSU open letter is
published by the nese. Inasmuch as We re- ._vec: oa ;Tan English
language NCNA summary by our deadline, we will comment on it
only tentatively now and follow up with a more complete analysis
in our next installment. Entitled "The Leaders of the C?SU Are
the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," the article begins by
declaring unequivocally that "the leaders of the PSU headed by
rushchev have become the chief representatives of mo ern
revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in the iff'e-rnational
Communist movement." It defines splittism as follows: "Splittism
means to split with Marxism-Leninism.' Anyone who opposes and
betrays Marxism-Leninism and undermines the basis o proletarian
unity is a sp er.... Anyone who persists in a revisionist line
and turns a revolutionary proletarian party Into a reformist
bourgeois party is a Witter.... The splitters in the Communist
ranks are those who, to meet the needs of the bourgeoisie, split
with Marxism-Leninism,... and they remain splitters even when for
7 (#21 Chronology Cont.)
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 403-3
r er, I-Ir the Cebu leaders insist on marking o e majority'
from the 'minority,' we would like to tell them quite frankly
that we do not recognize their majority."
Wallowing deeper in murky "clarifications," the article
says that "opportunism and revisionism are the political and
ideological roots of splittism, and splittism is the organiza-
tional manifestation of opportunism and revisionism. It can
also be said that opportunism and revisionism are splittism as
well as sectarianism. The revisionists are the greatest and
vilest splitters and sectarians in the Communist movement."
In direct incitement to revolt in the USSR, the article
recalls the many errors in domestic and ore gn policies of the
C?SU leadership and says: "The actions of the leaders of the
CPSU have brought deep shame upon a great Soviet Union and
the and seriously damaged the fundamental interests of the
Soviet people, is none other than the leaders of the CPSU
headed y , rush ev who are anti-Soviet."
Before closing, the article predicts "the eventual burial"
of the revisionists, taunts Khrushchev on his fraudulent call
for an en to polemics ("What sort o games are you playing,
saying one thing at one time and another thing at another?"),
and dares the Soviets to make good on their "outright threat
and in m a aon In the Soviet Government statement of eptem-
er which declared that the Chinese face "the most resolute
rebuff from the CPPSU and the Soviet people" if they continue the
polemics: "Do you really believe that other people are bound
docilely to obey your orders and tremble at your roar? To be
frank, ever since 21 September we have been eagerly waiting to
see wha .e mos resolute rebuff would be."
(#21 (Mronology)
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CRONOLOGIA - DISENSIONES COMUNISTAS
#21 18-31 Enero 1964
En todo el perfodo: La dele acion china encabezada por Chou
En-lai prosigue su correr a par Africa ver Cronologra 14 y
seguido) pero los planes y perspectivas de otras visitas se
echan a porder a razz do revueltas y motinea en Zanzibar,
Tanganika, Kenya y Uganda. La simpatfa de Chou se dice que
consiguio calida respuesta por el resto de su gira per Mali
(15-21), Guinea (21-27), el Sudan (27-30) y Etlopfa desde
el 30. So le espera en Somalia el 10 para una visita do 3
dfas, poro las visitas programadas a Kenya y Tanganika han
sido "pospuestas". So anuncio quo habfan sido pospuestas
por los chinos -- pero el presidente Nyerere do Tanganika
cancelo tambien au propuesta visita a China, y los observa-
dores interprotaron los cambios como relacionados con emi-
sionos chinas atacando el emploo do fuorzas brita'nicas para
sofocar los motines y con indicios de complieidad china on
los borrascosos acontecimientos. Moacu continuo evitando
conentar directamente sobre el viaje de Chou.
18 Enero: Un editorial del "Zeri i Popullit" de Albania,
corn ntndo sobre la declaration eoniunta chino-albanesa del
8 do enero quo coron6 la visita do Chou, invents una nueva
frase on las polomicas:"E1 fracaso de los planes do N. Kru-
schov contra nuestro pats demostro al mundo que of revisio-
nisno contomporanoo, Como el imperialisrno, es un__ti~re do
a el'. ' El grupo revisionists de Kruschev no se ha de-
tenido ante nada, declara:"ha llegado al oxtroio do eomplo-
tar contra nuestro pads, a veces de nodo oculto o indirecto
y otras directamente. Ha actuado del mis,~io modo contra la
RP china". Y asf por el estilo.
18-27 Enero: El 18 y 19 de enero, la faction prochina del
PC peruano celebro su propio congreso on of cual expulsa-
ron a varios lfderes prosovieticos de la vioja guardia y
"eligioron una nueva diroctiva" En una rueda de prensa
unos dfas ras tarde, el doctor Saturnino Paredes, "rocien~
electo primer secretario", declara quo su prupo "dofendora
con enteroza loa prineipios marxistas-leninistas" y apoya
a Fidel Castro. Al misr.o tio2po, Victor Acosta, socrotario
general del viejo PC peruano, expide una declaration dos-
prociando la importancia del nuevo grupo. El 27 do enero
los elemcntos prochinos atacan el edificio del diario "U-
nidad", del antiguo partido, y deatrozan los equipos. (In-
fornes locales do prensa y radio as Agencia Nueva China).
19 Enero: Un editorial de "Pravda" con respecto a la visi-
tc. actual do Castro ensalza las visitas do delegaciones y
las reuniones y conversaciones personates ontro dirigontes
co:_o "la buena tradition que adelanta el fortalociuiento do
la a,astad" do "los parses socialistas sus artidos car-
xistaB-leninistas y los pa ses fraternos . Luego hate un
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recuento de tales contactor fraternos durante el pasado ano,
haciendo referencia espeoffica a todos Jos pafses incluyen-
do, adenas de Cuba, los pafses del Consejo de Asistencia
Econoa,ica Mutua, entre ellos Mongolia --- y Yugoslavia --
pero sin referirse aningunpartido de Asia. El nismo dfa
los principalel Deriodicos chinos, publican un largo frag-
nento de la edition de diciembe de "Zenei", el o gano teo-
rico y polftico del PC lapones, con el tftulo de "Las pole-
nicas chino-sovietioas y el revisionisno en el Japon", con
proposito de "refutar los ataques calunniosos contra el PC
chino do Noburo Sato y otros renegados del PCJ .
19-21 Enero: Las expulsados prochinos del PC ceilanes ce-
lebran su propio "VII Congreso national" en Colombo en 19-
21 do enoro, eligen un nuevo "Comite central", se autode-
nominan el FCC y repudian varias resoluciQnes del liderato
del PC antiguo que habfan favorecido la lfnea sovietica,
yugoslava, antistaliniana y habfan condenado a los albaneses
y la lfnea china. Todos los periodieos chinos destacan la
noticia el dfa 25.
20 Enero: El "Borba" de Beigrado publica un artfculo do
Bayalsdi, su corrospondal en Mosc'u, on que declara quo la
gente on Moscu tree qua las relaciones entre la URSS y Chi-
na ham ontrado on una nueva fase, quo ya conprenden que Fe-
kin no osta dispuesto a renunciar a sus pole:oicas antiso-
vieticas, que critican severaraente la conducta china y,que
croen quo la disputa va a continuar por nucho tienpo nas.
Bayalski'declara adenas que el liderato sovietico no ha de-
cidido aun si debera continuar eximiendose do responder a
los ataques chinos, explicando que "esto, por supuesto, es
un problem intrincado... y uno debe sienpre tenor on cuen-
ta no solo los intoreses del PCUS y la Union Sovietica, sino
Jos do todos los pa-fees socialistas y del noviniento coy.au-
nista international. Asf es como la gente aquf explica que
los sovioticos Be hayan exinido de las polenicas". Tass
to-ma exception de un_despacho de la Agencia del 12 de ene-
de una dolegacion china quo habfa defeccionado on Tokfo on
dospacho el cual "pretende que a Chou lo detuvie-
octubro
,
ron por la fuerza varias horaB on la Ennajada do la URSS an
el Japon, a pesar de supuestos ruegos... do representantes~f
del publico japones y tarobien de las autoridades japonesas .
Esta declaration, Tass afirma, "es absolutanente carento do
fundarnionto y no es otra cosa aue dar information falsa a
la o in o publ lica . Al iisno tienpo, Tass anuncia quo
un nuevo grupo de especialistas chinos ha llegado a Dubna
a trabajar on el Instituto Conjunto de Investigation
Nuclear,,. El grupo do trabaladores chinos on el instituto
as ahorn of nas nureroso de todos los rrruipos de Jos pafses
do democracia popular".
20 y 22 Enoro: El "Now York Ti2Ies" publica dos artfculos
do su corresponsal Binder on Bucarest resumiendo nunerosos
acontocimientos en la "Cappana Independentista" de Ru ania
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la cual "un observador occidental describe Como 'dosrusifi-
cacion' Pero que los discretos funcionarias del- regimen de
57heorghiu-Dej prefieren llamar 'rumanificacion'." El cambio
individual mayor ocurrio el otono paeado con la abolition
del Instituto Maximo Gorki de Lengua y Literatura Rusas,
que habCa sido Centro de influencia educational sovietica,
y se elimino el ruso Como lengua obligatoria an laB escue-
las. El 90 por ciento del contenido do "Lumea", el soma-
nario quo desplaza la edition an rumano del "Nuovos Tiem-
pos" de Moscu (ver Cronologfa, 27-30 diciembre),?so dice
qua as reproducido de publicaciones occidentales, Tin gufa
senalo? un solar rasado y lleno de escombros y dijo sencil-
lamente:"Eso era una librerfa rusa". Los noubres rusos de
varias tiondas y tines han sido cambiados por rursanos. Las
estadfsticas do comercio exterior senalan quo el conercio
do Ru:aania con pafses occidentales crecio del 20 al 33 por
ciento del total durante los 'ultimos cuatro anos y la pron-
sa esta dando publicidad a la presencia do compa:Ms occi-
dentales on el pats, y asf por el estilo.
21 Enero: El Caudillo Togliatti-del PC italiano concluyo
su visita do 7 d as a Yugoslavia con una conferencia do
prensa on la que, segun Tanuyg, declare:"Henos hallado una
actitud an comun y hemos Be nalado el Camino por el cual
debar unocia la unidad. Confiamos seguir dicho Ca-
mino y asf obtener resultados favorables". Ambos estan de
acuordo que "la actitud del PC chino hacia las cuestiones
do la paz y la coexistencia pat fica esta errada" y "ner-
udica of movimiento international obrero y comunista*,
Togliatti reitero la oposieion del PC italiano a una confe-
rencia mundial de PCs por ahora y su aprobacion de "la ao-
puost do convocar una reunion do los PCs de Europa Occiden-
tal ,
El 400 aniversario de la muerta de Lenin sirve do per-
cha para una serie do co:.jentarios por los comunistas mun-
dialos quo roflejan su actitud actual sobre el "gran con-
flicto". El editorial do "Pravda" fue mayoraente una oda
a las magnfficas realizaciones sovieticas y a sus :uajestu-
osas porspectivas -- principalente en sentido material.
"Como suplemento a la bien conocida formula do Lenin,"
"Pravda": invento una nueva consi;na: "El comunisJo as el
coder sovieti o :gas la electrification de todo el a a as.
la guimif is ac ion do la ec onom a mac tonal ,
El socretario Honocker del CC del partido do Alera-
nia Oriental oxpidio una declaration obsequiosa elogiand.o
11la Union Sovietica (quo so ha tornado on la base del sis-
tema socialista mundial integro". Al otro extremo, on of
editorial del "Zeri I Popullit" de Albanis se produjeron~t
algunos do los ma's vitriolicos ataques hasta hoy contra la
actitud do escision y debilitamiento a que so dedica el
grupo do N. Kruschev para revisar y desacreditar cl't:_larxis-
mo-loninisLo", contra su "demagogia e intriga , su capi-
tulacio'n", "traicion" y "ehantaje", El unieo corentario
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conentario runano que hemos visto fue el de un tal profesor
Bu3naru quo on niniun nomonto nonbro al PLUS, aunque las
opiniones. que oxpuso oran -enoralnento aeordes con la lfnoa
soviotica
Los chinos ni siquiera nonclonaron of anivorsario on
ningun informo quo nosotros hayanos visto. El editorial
dcl "Nodong Sinaun", do Corca del Norte, tuvo solazonto un
lovo tono antirrcvisionista, hero los viotnanoscs oscogic-
ron osta focha Para publicar on su "Nhan Dan ci cozunicado
dol novono plono dol CC del Partido colobrado en dici?nbre
con respocto a "la situacion internacional y las tareas in-
tornacionales del Partido" asf cono un editorial sobre esto
tong. El Partido aparace rags y pas opuesto al "revisio-
nismo contenporanoo' pero la declaraoion presenta una in-
terosante diforencia:
"Nuestro Partido ostablece una clara distin-
cion politica entre la canarilla revisionista
do Tito, lacayo del imperialism o, y la ,iente
dontro del novimiento co.:'unista internacional
quo conete el error del revisionisto u opor-
tunismo de dorecha. Nuestra act tud con ros-
pocto a la caraarilia revisionista do Tito es
donunciarla consecuentenente, y an cuanto a
los equivocados en of seno del moviraiento comu-
nista internacional, luchar on bien de la u-
nidad..,"
El editorial so refiero ospoefficamento a "consolidar
y fortaloeor la unida3. ontre la Union Sovietica y China" y
exprosa sinccras gracias a ambas "y a los otros pafses fra-
ternos por su inapreciable apoyo y asistoncia " El dfa 23
todos los diarios chinos publicaron cl texto ntorro de
co:unicado norvietnames.
los corresponsales on Moscu informaron
Entretanto
,
(la rmftio do Bel-raclo el dfa 21, Reuters el 23 y UPI of 24)
quo un nuovo libro, apareeido sin alboroto bao of inofen-
sivo t tulo "Conversaciones sobre topicos poljticos l&nza
un vig,oroso atague contra las doctrinal antimarxistas del
PC chino, Fue redactado por un grupo do nuove bajo la
direr on editorial del ideology o princ i,pal del PCUS, Ilyi-
chov, y oxpedido para ser pubiicado el 23 do octubro pero
aparentenente suspondido debido a la moratoria soviotica do
las polo'micas. Los obsorvadores vieron on su pubiicacion
of indicio do quo la pacioncia soviotica con los chinos so
hcb a acaba!o y el PLUS hab a resuelto contraatacar otra
vez. La pri:iora tirada os do 200.000 ejer2plares, parece
quo on ruso solerlente.
2 Enero: La visita do 10 dfas de Castro a Kruschev tormi-
no on un acuordo a largo plazo sobre las collpras sovieticas
do azucar cubano a precios ~arantizados y un corunicado
coniunto quo aeclaraba quo use confirmo una completa uniclad
do paroccros on todas las cuestionos discutidas , quo in-
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El escritor Harry Schwartz del "Now York Times" conen-
ta sobro un artfeulo del numero de dieiembre do "World Mar-
xist Review", (odicion en lon3ua inrlesa de "Problemas do
la Paz y of Socialisao", monsuario multilinhde subvencio-
nado por los sovieticos y con sods on Pra-a), eserito por
Luis Corvala&n, seorotario general del PC chileno, atacando
fuortomento a los conunistas chinos por tratar de iuponer a
los chilenos quo estan dedicados a la revolucion incruenta
el tipo castrista do revolucion. La carta revela quo el
PC chino dirinio "una Carta reciente" al PC chileno inspi=
rada on tal proposito, conteniendo la declaration:
"En America Latina, la 'vfa pacffica' quo
Vds propu3nan esta on agudo contrasts con la
vfa rovolucionaria do Fidel Castro y los otros
cciaradas?quo llevaron al pueblo cubano a la
victoria".
El ultimo numero do nuestra Cronologfa decfa do un
dospacho do Reuters desde Moscu (8 de onero) con respecto
al articulo principal de la edici.on de enero del "PP&S",
suscrito por un choco, un canadiense y un sirio, en quo so
atacaba a la prensa china por reconocer a Irrupitos robana-
dos coo le,` timos revolucionarios conunistas", y ;as
tarde so ha infornado otro artfculo antichino on la aisna
edition oscrito por Jaime Peras, secrotario del CC del PC
uru3uayo.
0 Enero: "Pravda" resalta un artfculo do "Observador" ti-
tu1ado: c,Por quo despistar?" en el que so protesta el he-
cho do quo, nientras quo la propuesta do Kruschev por un
tratado international renunciando al ompleo do la fuerza on
las disputas torritoriales ha sido publicada, bion recibida
y ostudiada soriamonte on la mayorfa do los pafses del uun-
do, los oranos chinos no la han publicado ni tampoco la
reaction sundial a ella porn "so pormiten comentar sobre
dichos documentos y hasta hater una valoracion do ellos".
Hace 1a ,)ro-unta:"LPor quo despistar al pueblo chino -Y
volvorlo on contra del pueblo sovietico?" So la:ionta of
Observa.dor : Es coo quo on China prefieren +)onor on Banos
do los loctores afirmacionos y valoracionos fabricadas do
antemano..." El nisno dfa la prensa china publica un ar-
tfoulo provocador de la edition de diciembre del "Malayan
Monitor", or-ano del PC ualayo publicado an Londros, que,
declara quo 'den todas partes los revisionistas contespora-
noos han padocido una aplastante derrota on el ^ran debate,
-racias a los esfuerzos resistentes y bien preparados del
liderato a ntirrevisionista y los miembros de los partidos
conunistas y obreros del mundo y en especial del PC chino,
of Partido Albanes do Trabajadores y los PC de Corea, In-
donosin, la RDV, etc. Le hala las barbas a Kruschev direc-
ta::onte:
"En la a,-onfa de su roxina derrota total
los revisionistas conte:aporaneos) clatan
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'clue no- haya polenicas' y 'que no haya es-
eision'. En bona de ellos, seuelantes ari-
tos soncono los insultos do un incendiario
que habi ndolepeado fuera la Casa del
proiimo. le aconseia no apa,yarlo sino utili-
zar las llamas Para encender 'la pia de la
aaz . Los narxistas- eninistas no son expo-
nentes de pole'micas por ,anarse un tanto on
of debate, ni se les va a enC-atusar con tes-
tos aplacantes de 'unidad'. En contraste con
los rovisionistas contenporaneos, no conside-
ran los principios y la eonveniencia coup si-
no'nimos a intercambiables".
For si alGuien tiene dudas do a quien se refiere cono
"revisionistas contenporaneos", el articulo afirma claranen-
te:"No es accidental que tanto Kruschov cono Tito ostan
ahora on el mismo Campo ideol6gico -- abierta y hasta desa-
f ladoranenta"
CRONOLOGIA - ADITAMENTO
(Por la inportancia de varios acontecimientos
ocurridos on los cuatro dfas in:aodiatamente
despue's do nuestro porfodo actual, ofrocemos
este Aditanento para dar al una cuenta do los
nisnos.)
2 Fobroro: En una entrovista on Conakry, Guinea, concedida
por Choui-lai al corresponsal bien dispuesto Edgar Snow
so lo atribuyen estas palabras:"Hemos lleGado..a un acuerdo
con la Union Sovietica an el sentido do que se lleven a Ca-
bo nor;ociaeiones sobro las cuestiones fronterizas chino-
sovioticas.
3 Fobroro: El "Diario del Pueblo" de Pokfn publica al unos
art culos sobro el conflicto chinosoviotico;
- El toxto del artfculo de "Pravda":"LPor quo' dos-
pistar?" do 30 do onero.
- Un artfcul,o contestando a "Pravda" titulado:"Un
rolpo a Lyndon Johnson le duele a "Pravda". E:ipie-
z1 con sarcasno:"Habfa una vez un cuonto do los
:aollizos siameses. Se decfa que cuando a uno so le
porrabaal otro le dolfa. Lo que me extrana ahora
es quo esta curiosa relation haya do aparecer entre
los lfdores del PCUS y el ~residente d?los EE.UU.
Pro unta:"& ue espocie de reflojo condicionado,
es este? ...bSi;nifica que los dirirentes sovie-
ticos tienen intention do lleGar a un acuordo con
Johnson nediante el cual so unirfan para prohibir
a los pueblos oponerse al i;aperialisno y lanzarse
a la revolution? En tal caso, "Pravda" tione buenos
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notivos para estar nerviosa..."
- Fraomentos del nuevo libro sovietico, "Conversacio-
nes sobre topieos politicos (ver CronoloCfa, 21
onero) bajo el oncabezamiento, "Ataques rlaliGnos
sin nesura contra el PC chino."
- Anuncio de la Arrencia Nueva China de quo "el rpi_me
toao 'Materiales antichinos (tomados) do la prensa
s o iatica' sale a la vents hay, Junto con el texto
del prefacio al torso por la junta redactora do la
Editorial Cultura Mundial. Dice qua do acuordo con
estadfsticas inconpletas, Para el 30 de novieabro
uas do 2.000 piezas contra China do todas las va-
riedades... habfan sido iapresas on 26 periodieos
y revistas nacionales y 23 periodicos y revistas
locales on la Union Sovietica."
- Una "nota editorial" del "Diario del Pueblon qua
dice que "desde qua N.S. Kruschev, lfdor del PCUS,
propuso 'un fin a las poleaicas' el 25 do octubre
do 1963, la pronsa soviotica-ha continuado sin
cesar su propajanda antichina." Senala an especial
of libro de "uas de 300 pa~lnas" y el articulo "LPor
quo despistar?" do "Pravda publicado an dichas
patinas. "La -ante puedo ver de estos riateriales
quo la propu esta del lfder decal PLUS de 'poner fin
a las polemics no as nas qua un fraude. perpetra-
do por noviles ulteriores. La props-anda del li-
bro, afirna, no as nas que fraseoloria pasada,Ifre-
ealontada-", y el artfeulo do ''Pravda' as "aun mas
ridfculo".
"En cuanto al re`ano an 'Pravda' on of son-
tido do quo la pronsa china no ha publieado
la oarta do Kruschev de 31 do diciezibre a los
jefes do 3obiernos, podenos decir con candi-
dez al liderato del PCUS: Por Quo la 2risa?
Do ella nos ocupareioos y tambien la comenta-
reaos. Una editorial china esta ya propa-
rando todos do sus artfculos antichinos para
entre-las sucesivas. Un casino hay que via-
jarlo paso a paso y un estado do cuentas ha
clue pa^arlo artfeulo por articulo. Todav a,
no heaps acabado do eontestar la carta abier-
t^ quo publicaron of ultiao 14 do Julio.
i,Por quo so inpaciontan tanto?"
4 Febroro: Los chinos publican el aoptimo artfeulo conlun-
to de Diario del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja" do la serie on
contostacion a la carta abierta del PCUS do 14 do Julio.
Habionclo rocibido solaEionte un resuaen an inr71Qs publicado
por la A-encia Nueva China al cierre do este nunero, por
ahora comentarenos provisionalmente y volverenos on nuestro
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proximo con un anolisis mas conpleto. Bajo el tftulo de
"Los diriGentes del PCUS son be escisionietas ma's Grandes
de nuastra ?oca", el artfculo eupieza deelarando sin o-
qufvoco quo 'losdirirentea de POUS encabezados nor Kru-
schev se han convertido on los rinci ales re?resentantes
del revisionisno contonporaneo as cono los nas Grandes es-
cisionistas on el oviniento conunista international".
Define el escisionisnno cono siguo:"Eaeisionismo quiore de-
cir 'excision respecto al narxismo-leninisno`. Gualguipra
quo se onontfa y traiciono al narxismo-loninismo y socave
la base de la unidad proletaria es un osoisionista,.. Cual-
guiera quo persista on una.llinea revisionista y convierta
un partido proletario revoluoionario en un partido bur-ues
refornista es un esciaionista... Los escisionistas on lax
filas comunistas son aquellos que para atender a las nece-
sidsdos do la burguesfa so escisionen del marxismo-leninis-
mo... ysiguon siendo eseisionistas aun cuando por un tie;-
Adom s, a os riven es del PCU insisten en a im
tar
.
la 'mayorfa' de la Iminorfa', quere1oe decirles muy fran-
c amente que no rec onoc ernos su mayorf a . "
Enred.andose max on turbias "aclaraciones", el artf-
culo afirma clue "el oportunisno y el revisionisno son las
rafoes ideolo3icas del escisionisno, y el escisionisno es
la manifestation orC.anica del oportunismo y el revisionis-
mo. So puede tanbion docir quo el oportunismo y el revi-
sionis-mo son escisionisno asi Como sectarismo. Los revi-
sionistas son los mayores y nos viles escisionistas y sec-
tarios dol movimiento comunista."
Incitando directamento a la revolution en la URSS,
el art culo rocuerda los mismos erroros do pol tica inter-
na y exterior del liderato del PCUS y declara:"Las actua-
cionos do los diri^rentes del PCUS han aparejado profunda
yorr onza a la -Iran Union ovietica y el PCUS y ,Derludica-
do sorianonte los interes fundauentales del pueblo soon e
tico. No son otros Cue lox dirirontes del -PCUS encabeza-
dos por Kruschev lo_ que son antisovieticos,T'
Antes do concluir el artfculo prediee "el sepulta-
mionto al fin al cabol' do los revisinistas, se burla de
Kruschev -)or su solicited fraudulenta do ar fin a lax o-
lemcas LQuo class de partidas rata u?ando, diciendo
MO en una ocasi'n y aquello on otra?,') y reta a los so-
yieticos a curjplir su "intimidation y amenaza declarada
an la declaration del gobierno soviQtioo de 21 de septiem-
bre quo doclaraba quo a los chinos les eapera "el ma's res-
uelto rochazo del PCUS y el pueblo sovie'tico" si continuan
las polomicas:"LCreen realmente que otros pueblos tienen
docilmonto que obodecer las ordones de ustedee y te:mblar
ante sus ruaidos? Francamente, desde el 21 de se tiombre
henos ostado esperando para ver en quo consistira Ol =as
resuolto rochazo.
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bourgeois eat un divisionniste... Les divisionnistes parmi
lea rings dos co :munistes sont coux qui pour satisfaire aux
besoins do la bourgeoisie, rompent avec le marxisme-leninis-
me.,, o_ aui , ostont divisio ,ates L;g~me lprsau'ils ant une
maiorit to;.aporaire ou g ils detie' nnent des pastas do din-
______ ean s Plus loin, "si lea leaders du P.C. de 1 'Union
sovietiquo insistent a faire une difference entre la majo--
rite at la ninorite", nous lour dirons tros frcnche-aent quo
nous no reconnaissons pus lour maiorite,"
S'enfongant plus avant dans des "clarifications" te-
nebrouses, 1 article declare que "1'opportunisa et le ro-
visionnisme sont lea raeinos politiques et ido'ologiques du
divisionnisrie, et le divisionnisme eat une manifestation
au 36in dune organisation do l'opportuniame at du revision-
nismo. On pout dire egalemont que 1'opportunisme et lo
revisionnisna-constituent is d1visionnisme aussi bien quo
le sectaris_ae, Les revisionnistes sont dos divisionnistes
do 1'especo la plus grando et la plus basso ainsi quo des
soct^ires dans le raouvemont eommunisto,"
lncitant directenont a la re'volto on Union sovietique,
Particle rappolle le grand nor.bre. d orreurs comrisos dans
lea politiquos internes at etrangeres par lea chefs du P.
C. do l'Union sovietique, et declare:" Les actions de cos
leaders du P.C. do 1'Union sovioti ue ont couvort do honte
le grand pays do 1'Union soXiatiguoo of soiparti coy;rzu s o
et ontorte un pre4udice sarieux aux interets fondaoon-
taux du pouple sovietique. Ce nest nuls autres que lea
loaders du P .C. de 1 U on sovvi iaue, avoc Khrouchtchof
a l~ our tcte,yui sont anti-soviets .
Avant do terriiner, l'articlo predit que lea rcvision-
nistos seront eventuel1o ont "onterrosw of couvre Khrouch-
t l fl f do sarcasnos pour son appal frauduleux en favourd u-
ne fin dos pol atues ("A quollo sorto do jeu jouoz-vous
lorsque vous doclarez quolque chose, puis l'oppose 1'ins-
tant d'cpres? ") , at defie lea Soviets de :iettre on pratigue
lours ":;onc?cos d'intinidationff contenues dans la declara-
tion du souvornoment sovietique du 21 septembro selDn la-
quollo los Chinois so truuvent on presence "do la rebuffade
la plus rc'soluo do la part du P.C. do ltUnion sovietique at
du pouplo sovietique si le pouple chinois prolongoait la
pol&:iquo:"Croyoz-vous reellement quo lea autres peuplos
sont tonus ^ obeir docilement a vos ordres et a trembler
lorsque vous rugissez? Pour etre francs, depuis lo 21 sep-
tembre nous aeons attondu avec impatience our voir co quo
cetto robuffado des plus olues pouvait etre
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CH.RONOLOGIE - DISSENTIONS CONMUNISTES
No 21 13-31 janvier 1964
Periode entierre: La dale a~tionn chinoise emmenee par Chou
En-lac roule a travers_1 A` rique voir Chronologie du 14
decembre et la suite), mais lee plans et les possibilitea
pour lea visites a venir sont deranges par suite des revol-
tea at des mutineries a Zanzibar, au Tanngganyika, au Kenya
at en Uganda. Le charme do Chou a, parait-il, obtenu des
reponses chaleureuses au cours du rests de sa tournee: on
Mali (15-21), an Guinea .(21-27), au Soudan (27-30), at an
Ethiopic, a partir du 30. I1 est attendu an Somalia le ler
janvior pour un sejour do 3 jours, mais les visites prevues
au Kenya at au Tanganyika ont ete"remisesa plus tard". I1
a ate annonce quo cette remise a eta decide par les Chinoie
macs lo pre'sident Nyerere du Tanganyika a annuls egalament
la visits qu'il projetait on Chine, at las observateurs es-
timont quo ces changemonts sont on rapport avec lea attaques
menc-os par is radio chinoise contra 1 utilisation des trou-
pes britanniques chargees d'etouffer lea mutinerics of con-
tro acs roforoncos a la complicate dos Chinois dins ces de-
sordros. Moscou continue a evitor les commontaires directs
sur lo voyage do Chou.
18 anvier: Un editorial du journal albanais "Zara 1 Popul-
lt commentant sur la declaration albino-chinoise du 8 jan-
vier a lc. fin do la visito do Chou a product cotta nouvelle
formula dens la o~ 1emiguet'L'cchec des plans de N. Khrouch-
tehof dirigcs conntrc notro pays demontre au mondo quo le
re'visionnisme modorno tout comma l'imperialismo n'ost qu'un
ro de pa for Le (rouge r:'visionniste do Khrouch-
tch no's ost arr,ta devant rion declare-t-i1. I1 est-
11 jusqu~ comploter contra notro pays, parfois d'une m.{
na.:ro caohco at indirecte, at parfois directemcnt. Il a
agi do namo contra la Republique populaire chinoise", dit-
al. Etc...
18-27 ianvior: Les 18-19 janvier, la faction pro-chinoise
du P.C. poruvion a rouni son propre Congr s :,u sours duquol
ollo ucxpuls plusiours leaders do la vieille garde pro-
sovietacuo du parts at "proceda a 1'eloction de nouveaux
leaders'. A uno oonf?rence de presso, plusiours fours plus
tard, to Dr Saturnino Paredes, "promier secretciro nouvollo-
mont olu", declare clue on groups "dcfendr3 formement loa
prinoipes marxistes-leninistes", at soutiondra ?idol Castro.
Au moms moment, Victor Acosta, socretaire gencrcl do 1'an-
cien P.C. peruvion fait para#tre une declaration chorohant
% 10
a reduiro l'importance du groups rebelle. Lo 27 janvior,
los pro-chinois ottaquent le batiment ou so trouvc lc quo-
tidian do 1'ancaon parti, "Unidad", at on brae lea instal-
lations. (Proses locale at nouvelles de la radio, plus A-
gcnce do prosao Chino nouvollo).
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19_ anvier: Un editorial de "Pravda", a 1'occsion
visite de Castro qui se~poursuit, chante lea louanges des
visites de delegations at des contacts personnels at des
conversations entre leaders an disant qua cool est "dans la
bonne tradition qui renforce 1'amitie" parmi "lea pays so-
oialistes, leura partis marxistea-1eninistes, at lea pays8
frateriiels", L editorial ensuito de ces contacts
P
fratcrnels qui eurent lieu 1'annee dernie%
re, mentionnant
particulieroment tous lea contacts auxquels participaient
an dehors de Cuba lea pays du Conseil d'a8sistance econo-
mique mutuelle, -- dont la Mongolia -- at la Yougoslavie --
mail sans mentionner aucun des artis de 1'Aaie. Le meme
jour, lea principaux iournaux c inois publiaient un low
extrait du numero de decembre du journal politique of the
orique du P.C japonais "Zenei", article intitule "Polemi-
ques sino-sovietiques at revisionrnisme au Japon", dont le
but eat do "refuter lea atta ues calombieuses dlri ces con-
tre le PAC chinois par Noburo Sato of d autres renegats du
P.C japonai s
19-21 anvier: Les membres pro-chinois expulse's, du P.C. do
Ce lan reunissent lour propro 7e Congros national" a Co-
lombo du 19 au 21 janvier, elisant un nouveau "Comite cen-
tral", so declarant 3tre le parti communiate ceylanats, st
repudient plusieurs resolutions des leaders de l'ancion
parti qui proonisaiant la politique sovietique, yougosla-
ve at anti-stalinienne, at qui condammaient lea Albanais et
la politique chinoise. Tous lea journaux chinois donnerent
de grands compte-rendus sur cat ovenement le 25.
20janvier: Le "Borba" do Belgrade publie un article de son
correspondant do Moscou Bayalski qui declare quo le su le
et to Chino sont entrees dans une nouvelle phase, qu ils
compronnont maintonant quo Pekin no vout pas abandonnor sea
polomiquos anti-sovietiqu ca, 7u'ils critiquent violemment
la conduits des Chinois et qu ils estiinent quo la dispute
continuora pendant longtemps. Bayalski va jus7 u'a dire quo
lea leaders sovietiqu::s nc savant pas encore a i1s doivcat
continuer a s abstcnir de r6pondre aux attaques ehinoises,
expli9uant quo "ceci tres cortoinornont eat un problems com-
pli3uc... et on doit toujours considarer non scule:aent lea
intorets du P.C. do 1'U.S. of do 1'Union aovietique, mais
egciomont ceux des pays socialistas et ceux du iiouvo ont
com:iunistc international. Cleat ainsi que le peuple sovic-
tique oxplique le fait quo lea Soviets se sont abstenus do
poursuivre la politique". Tess s'Eleve cantro un rapport du
12 ianvior do 1'Agence de prosse Chine nouvelle sur le ro-
tour on Chine do Chou Houng-ching, 1 interprets do la dcle-
tation chinoise qui a deserts a Tokyo on octobre, car arti-
cle protondant "quo Chou a ate detcnu contra son grc pendant
plusieurs heures "a 1'a3ba.ssado s:,vietique au Jap-.n ilalgre
do soi-disant protestations... per dos representants du pu-
blic jcponais at aussi par lea autorites japonaises...".
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Cetto declaration, annonce Tass, "est absolument sane fon-
de-font of ne fait quo dernuter l' opinion publique . En
mew teaps, Tass annonco quo in nouveau groupe do specia-
liates chinois est arrive a Dubna...-pour travaill?r Bans
1'Inatitut do rocherohes nucleaires... Le groupe do travail-
lours, chinois a l'institut est .caintenant le plus noubrux
de tous los groupenents vonant dos pays de de:aocratie popu-
la
20-22 janvior: Le "New York Tinos" public doux articles ear
son corrospondant do Buoarest Binder qui resume ce qui s est
passe on Rou:'anio pendant le mouve:~,ent "pour 1'independanoo"
quo "un obsorvateur occidental qualific do 'de'-russifica-
tion' Dais qu'un official discret du regime Gheorghiu-Doj
p+r'o foro appelor 'rounanifieation"'. Le plus grand change-
nent ost survenu cn autonne dernier avec l'abolition do
l'Institut Maxine Gorky do langue at de litterature russes,
qui a eta un centre d'influenco sovietique", la langue rus
so etant supprinee comma langue obligatoire dans las ecoles.
Quatre-vingt-dix pour-cent des textes contenus Bans "Lunoa",
l'hobdomadairo qui roupla e e 1' edition rou .ono des "Tcnps
nouveaux" do Moscou (voir Chronologie, decembre 27-30), so-
raiont,parait-il, dos reprodutions d'articles do publica-
tions occidontales. Un guide attira V attention sur ua
terrain roz pli do debris of dit si;cpleiaent: "La so trouvait
la libr"Ario russe". Los noes russos ont cte suppriucs
pour plusiours raagasins of cincmas of ont tc ro:_!placcs pa.r
dos no-,-,s rournains. La statistiquo sur lo co LiL rco extcrieur
::ontrc quo lo co:norce do la Rounanie avoc lea pays occi-
dontaux ost passe do 20 pour-cent a 33 pour-cent du total
au cours do cos 4 dcrnieros annoos, la presse de son cite
parlo do la presence do co:pagnics occidontales dans le
pays. Etc,,.
21_ anvier: Le chef du P.C. italien Tliatti a torainc sa
vsito dc 7 fours on You oslavie par uno conference do
prosso dons laquello, d apres Tunyug, it a declare:"Nous
aeons dcfini une attitude co_,nune of indique la route quo
1'on doit suivre vers 1 unite. Nous avons l'intcntion do
suivre cc che:ain et parvenir ainsi a dos resultats favora-
blos". Togliatti of le i..Durnal sent d'accord que ,''atti-
tude du P.C. chinois_a 1'egard des questions do pays at do
coexistence pacifique eat erronee" at "fait du tort au :aou-
va -:cnt ouvrier international et au aouve:cent co-T~aunistc",
T'glia.tti c onfir::a 1' opposition du P. C. italien u une con-
ference aondiale du parti con.aunisto on co w^or ont ainsi
quo 1'a.pprobation par le parti "de la proposition pour con-
voquer uno reunion dos partis co .unistos de 1 Europe Occi-
dcntalc".
Lo 40e annivorsaire do la -ort de Lenine cat un pre-
texto pour uno serio do coL.nentaires par les co:a:aunistos du
rondo, co:::ientairos qui indiq ent leur position prescnte
duns 1e "grand ccnflit". Un editorial d.: "Pravda" otait
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surtout un panegyrique dos :aagnifiques resultats obtenus
parr los Soviets of dos perspectives aajostuouscs, principa-
le wont d'u_z point do vue materiel. "Ajoutant a la foroule
do L5nine bion connue," "Pravda" Produisit un nouveau slo-
"Lcco :r:unisrae e'est la uissanca sovietigue plus 1Te'-
lectrification do touto pays Plus V introduction do la
chi::io dins 1 rcconoraio nationals,
10
taire du C.C. do 1'Alle2aano do 1'Est,
Honeckcr, socre
a fait uno declaration louant obsequiousement "l 'Union so-
vietiquo qui eat devonuo la base do tout le systeiao socia-
liste mondial". A 1'autre extr6:iic, un editorial du journal
albanais "Zeri i Popullit" contenait los attaques los plus
violontos jusqu'a present contre "1'aetivite' destructrice
ongagco par le groupe de Khrouchtchof chorchant a reviser
et a discrediter le marxisme-leninis:.ao", eontre sa "de.::ago-
gio of sea intrigues", et eontre "sa capitulation, Sc tra-
hison of son chantage". Le seul com:aontairo rouraain quo
noun avons eu otait du professour Bugnaru qui no :_entionna
anais le P.C. de 11U.S. bien que los opinions Tiit de
f enda it 'taient g'
~ienerale..lent d accord avec la politique so-
victique.
Los Chinois n'ont ja:aais ;:ientionnc l'anniversaire
d- 'ns lcs rc.ppcrts quo ncus avons eus. L editorial du "No-
dong Sin_mz" do la Ccree du Nord n' eta it que modere . ent
anti-rs'visionniste, axis les Nord-Vietnal..isns chois.irent
cetto occc sion pour publier dans lo Nhan Dan" un__c:,,.:.:uni-
quo du 9o nlcnu du C.C. du parti tonu on deco.2brc sur
situation intornationa.le et sur les tEches intornaticn:los
du parti" on me:.e tc.:ps qu'un editorial sur le ...3?x:3 thcm:e,
Le pcrti saLiblo atrc ens ro plus Oppose au "rovisionnise
:::Odcrns" .:Tais declare ccpcnl.ant qu une digression int res-
santc:?
"r?otrc parti fait une distinction politique
prociso ontro in clique revs isevi nniste Tito,
1L7quais do l' iraporialisLe, at lc$ gins du mou-
ve::ciat co~:a::lunistc international qui so renaont
eoupables do r&visionnis:7o of d opportunisa:e
do droito. 11?otro attitude a 1 egard do la
cliquo revisionnisto de Tito oat do la dcn,:)n-
cor constc::a-2ent tandia quo colic a 1' egarl
dos Bens Bans 1ierrour au scan du :::ouvo ont
coia.aunisto international oat do lutter pour l'u-
nito..."
L''ditorial acntionnc apccifiquo.ncnt "la consolilation
de 1unitc ontro 1'Union sovietiquc et la Chine" of expri::c
dos rc_;orcioents sinceres aux dcux pays "ot aux cutros
pays frctorncls pour lour soution at lour assistance do va-
1cur". Tous los iournaux chinois roproduisaient lc 23 le
tcxtc ont for do cc c o:...:uniqu6 du Nord Viet-na:a.
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:centre-tenps, lea corrospondants de Mosoou font savoir
(Radio-Bolgrade du 21, Reuters du 23 at United Press Inter-
national du 24) qu'an nouveau livro paru sous le titre in-
offonsif de Conversations sur des sujots politiquos, atta-
auont v-i,gourousement lees doctrines ant ~arxistes du P.0,
chinois. Co livre a ete re are par un M
p p groups do neuf ~er-
sonnos sous la direction du chof idoologue du P ,,G. de 1. U-
nion sovietique Ilyichov of onvoy6aa la publication le 23
ootobro, nais dont la vonte a ate retardeo Bans doute on
raison du noratoire soviotique sur lea poleniques. Los
observatours voiont Bans sa Varution un signal indiguant
Quo 13 nation o des Soviets a 1' egard dog Chizno_ie se_ trou
vast
uiseo of quo l? P.C. de
1`Union soviet auo ova
ddcid6 uno fols do plus de rendro coup pour cow, La pre-
niero 6c'ition eat on 200.000 oxo plairos, an langue russo
seulonent.a co qu'il soable,
3 anvior: La visite do 10 ours de Castro a Khrouchtohef
s ast terninoc par un accord a long torne portant sur lea
achats soviotiquos do suers cubain a des prix garantis, at
par un ~o munieue' 9ui doclarait quo "un unite cc.-o1atc de
yues 'tait confirnee sur toutes lea questions disoutoes" 01
dont "les problenes internationaux interessant les d.eux
e t6s of lea Questions urszentes intQressant le co~mmini an
jondial of le nouve ont ouyrier". Plus bas, le cocnunique'
disait:"Uno idontito coupleto do vues a e"tQ oxprinee par la
declaration sovieto-cubaine du 23 jai. 1963". En 61aborant
Bur cotto "identlto do vues" le connuniquo declare qua Cu-
ba "considere lea sucoes obtenus par 1'Union sovioti3uo
dans la lutte pour la cessation des oxperiences nucleaires
.,, co: :o un pas vors la paix of le saruemont," s oppo-
sant -insi a 1'attaque vigourouse des Chinois centre le
traits interdisant lea experiences nucleaires at indiquant
probablonont 1'intontion dos Cubains de signer co traits.
Lo coMunique declare egalejent quo Castro "avait pro"is
lo soution" do Cuba on favour do la nouvelle proposition
do Khrouchtchef pour un traits renoncant de recourir a la
force dins les disputes torritoriales. La presse sovieti-
quo exults: un editorial de "Pravda" du 24 qualifiait cc
e o mi;unique "do docunent d'uno signification anonje, , , i. -
pregnc- du c ouiionoevent ~a la fin par une identite do vues
complete" dos deux partis at des dcux Souverne.ents,
25. anvicr: Un editorial du "Zeri i Popullit" albanais
Voy~go on Afrique of on Albania du Ca:iarado Chou En-lai
of reaction des Titoistes" debuto par une denoneiati n c;o
la band.o de Tito pour sa reaction violento a la visito do
Chou ::.ais passe rapidement a son coup principal: "Alors quo
la bands do Tito langait des attaques contra la Ro~ublique
populcire~ hinoise at sa politique do paix, avoc 1 int,3n-
tion do donigror... le grand role international do la
Chino, los autres re'visionnistes jodernes organisaient une
conspiratjon du silence a 1re&ard do la visito historiguo
du t,rom3ler nintetre du Conseil dEat de la Republiouo Do-
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pulaire chinoise Pourquoi co silence..."Zeri i Po-
pullit rcypon :.: ails no peuvent Be reconcilier a la politique
chinoise qui "_~ lour conception pacifists et anti-
1oninisto do coexistence nacifiaue D'autre part, lea
revisionnistos no neuyentr inforiaer 1 opinion publigUe dans
1 urs>a s au sujot du grand sueo s re:ports par la visito
do 1G. co1egation fu gouvernemont chinois en Afriquo, car
cola occ-es i onnora it do nouveaux des ordres at de nouvolles
nxiotos. Cola demontrerait quel point lour propaganda
contro lc Repub iquo "
populaire chinoise eat diffaiatoiro,
fausse of absurde,,,
27 anvier: Courts coixiuni3ues de Hanoi at de Pekin an-
noncant lo to depart dune delectation inportante do eoauunis-
tes du Nord Viot-naa sous In direction du pre:ier seretai-
ro Lc Dua n, pour proceder a? des entretions avec le P .C. 11 ion sovietiaue a Mosco. Hanoi declaro. si:ple:aent
qu ils ";??roc 6deront a des echanges de vuos,, , cur dos pro-
bloucs cc interct comm-+un".
Lo "Nodong. Sinuun", organs du -arti do la Corse du
Nord, public un article do 15.000 lots sous le titre: Fai-
tes flottor la banniQrc revolutiDnn~ire do liberation na-
tionale" qui, a l'instar d'un article analogue du 28 octo-
bro,%prosonto on detail lo point do vue chinois arrange :1e
_aniorc a ropresenter los interets des petits pays. Il
s'^ a
ttcho a denoncer "le groups Dtngc du P.C.I." at "car-
taines porsonnos qui pronnent 1t no:.i de co s~,unistes" at
qui to supportont at le soutiennent.
Harry Schwartz, du "New York Tit::es ", passe on revue
un article du nu.:ero do decenbro de la v o ~arxiste
uonc?ialo" (cc'ition do langue analaise)et oble es !a In
_pa.ix of Cu socialisve, journal ::ionsuel multi ingue soutenu
p~~r los SDviots so trouvant a Prague, article par Luis Cor-
volan, secretaire general ccu P.C. dhilion,qui at a ue vig-
le.anont log co.izunistes chinos pour assayer di-p osor no
r volution c':u xenro Costro aux Chiliens qui sont voues a In
politiquc do revolution non violente. La lottro fait savoir
quo le 'P? C-__chinots a envoys receaaent gge._ sett e u__P,~,
chilion avec cotto intention, at quo la lettro co2pronait
In loclaration suivanto:
"En Anoriqu o Latins, le t oyon pac ifiquo'
quo vous preconisez contrasts violemment
avec la i:,ethodo revolutionna ire de Fidel
Castro at d'autres ca--grades qui ont conduit
lo peujle cubain a la victoire".
Le ,.ernier nu;aero do notre Chronologio ,2ontionnait un
coil unique de Reuters de Moscou (8 janvier) irnd.iquant quo
Particle do fond clans 1'edition -de anvier du PP&S, si-
gns par un Tchaque, un Canadian at un Syrian, attaguait la
presso chinoise pour avoir reconnu a dos grouporaents ~ftis-
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s,donts?la qualite' de "ve'ritables coanunistes revolution-
n^ires". Plus tara, un corL.uniqu o ~ urlait ~d'ur __autr arti-
a1e i.- ch1 c s dens is L70 nunero, signe Jaime ?eras,
secretairo du C. C. du P. C. uruguayon.
,120 anvicr: Un article do "L'obsorvcteur" dans "Pravda",
intitule:"Pourquoi induire on orreur?" article qui protostc
contro le fait quo, alors quo la proposition c'o Khrouchtchof
do concluro un traite intornationol rononc,ant de recourir a
la force clans~Jos disputes torritoriales a etc public`, bien
roqu at otudie se'rieuse:aent Bans la plupart dos pays l.u
,-2-Mr-lo, dos organes de la prose chinoise so soient abstonus
lc publior ou do .ontionnor les reactions dins lo mondo
cotto proposition nais qui "s tarro4ont lo droit do eo:aen-
ter sur cos docu:lents at nerve U les evaluer" L'article do
"Pravda" do:ando:"Pourguoi induiro on errour~la pouple chi-
nois of lo dresser contre le peuIjlo sovieti uee?" "L'obser-
vateur se Plaint: "C est conDe si ils preferaiont an Chine
'onner aux looteurs !as affirmations et des #va' 1uations
tc tos faites., La :Done jour, la presse chinoise publiait
un article du nuoero do deco br e du "Malayan Monitory )r-
gano du P.C. ::alais public G Londres, qui eelare clue: "Los
revisionnistes uodornes ont souffort partout uric dofaito
cr^sainto cons 10 grand bat grace aux efforts vixoureux of
bion prcparos des chefs anti-revisionnistes et grace aux
plrtis coumunistos at trav~?illistos du rondo, an particulior
10 P.C. chinois, lo parti travailliste albanais, les partis
co:iuunistes do la Corce, do 1`Indonesic, do la Republique
d
% onocratiquo du Viet-na:a, etc,,. Il s attaquo diroctoDont
a Khrouchtchof:
"Fans lour agonio d'uno d'faito totale
ncnte,, les rovisionnistcs uodornos crient:
!Pas do n-1 e aues at Pas do divisionT~Vo-.1 1 nant do lour pa~'t, des excl~ :cations do la sor-
ts sent co o dos insttltes Droforeea Dear das
incondiaires qui, avant :ais le fe a our -mat-
son. vous dentin:?ent do no as vows Zclor
teinc'ro le feu do s' on servir pour a11u-
nor lo calu::ict cle la paix. Los Larxistos-leni-
nistos no sont pas dos intorpretes do poleai1
quos pour to plaisir do :aarquer un point clans un
dobat, et ils no sont pas egale::lent dupes par
dos gostes conciliatoires d unite'. A l'encon-
tro dos re'visionnistes nodernos, ils no consi-
clorent pas quo principle at opportunite soiont
synonyos ou interchangeables,i'
Pour qu'il,nty ait aucun doute au au4et do ceux qu'ils
qualifiont de "revie1onnistes L:odernes", 1 article declare
claire:-,ont:"Ce n'est pas par accident quo Xhrouchtchof at
j_1-to so trouvent ac tuelle,:;ent tour lea deux daps e e _1e
cant/ ideoloRiquo, ouverte:aent at dome d'une fawn provo
quante,
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CHRONOLOGIE - ADDENDUM
(Et~7nt donneo l'ihportance do plusieurs eve-
noL:onts qui so sont pro?cuits dins lea quatro
fours qui ont immediatement suivi la fin de
la perio:'e couvorte par notre rapport, cot ad-
cdonduia ost destine a on donnor un aporgu.)
2 fevrior: A Conakry, en Guinee, duns une interview accor-
dee a Edgar Snow, correspondant sy:ipathisant, Chou En-lai
aurait declare: "Noun soiines parvenus in accord ayes VU
-k
nion sovitiguo de procedor des negociations sur._jes
questions de frontieros sino-sovi6tiques,"
-3 fcvrier: "Le Quotidien du peuple" de Pekin publie un cer-
tain noubro d'artielos sur le conflit sino-sovietique:
- Le toxte de 1'article do "Pravda" du 30 janvier
"P.ourquoi induire on erreur?"
- Un article reponc'.ans ^ "Pravda" intitul'e:"Un coup
port" a Lyndon Johnson atteint la 'Pravda'", L'arti-
cle debuto dune iianiere sareastiquo:"Il y ava-it
une fois une histoire concernunt des jumcaux sia-
nois. Ell o disait que lorsgue 1'un dos ju Beaux e'-
-Lai f frap;Jo. _1 autro eprouvait une sensation de dou-
lour. Ce qui etonno iaaintenant c est _quo catto pa-
rente curieuse oxisto gnnre les leaders ( C de
1 Union sovietique of le president des Etats-Unis"
1 i'ticlo degande; Que1 genre do rflexc con: ition-
no cola ropresonto-t-il?...Cola vout-il dire quo
los leaders sovietiquos ont 1'intontion do eoncluro
un accord avec Johnson aux for os duquol ils s ac-
cordoraient a interdiee aux pouplos de s'oppDsor a%
l' imperialis.::c of a pr-Reeder a des revolutions? Si
cola oat le cas, 'Pravda' a do bonnes raisons de
so sontir norvousc... "
Passages'un nouveau livro sovietique: "v, a-
tions sur dos su ots politi ues" (voir Chron71oic
du 21 janvior) sous lo titre: Attaqucs malvoillantes
contre lo P.C. ehinois."
- Un co-.unique do 1'ASonco do prosse Chine nouvelle
c'apres loquel "le nresier volume 1o uateriaux'anti-
chinois tires de la presse sovietique eat -As on
vento aujourd'hui Bans la Chine touto entiere", cvcc
lo texto do la preface a ce volume par les e~-Utours
'es Editions de la culture on:diale. Iieclaro quo
" tapres des statistiques inconpletes on 'ate du 30
novembre, plus do 2,000 articles de _.,at6riaux anti-
chinois de tous genres,., ont ate publics cans 26-"
journaux nationaux of dans 23 journaux et perm 1-
quos locaux do 1'Union sovietique".
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- Uno Note do 1'editeur dans "Le quotidian du peuple"
qui declare cue "Depuis quo N.S. Khrouohtchef, chef
~u P.C. do 1 Union sovietique, a propose do wottro
un terme aux poleniqucs le 25 octobro 1963, la pros-
se sovietique a continue sa propaganda anti-chinoi-
soL article souligne particulieremont lea ex-
traits dun livro "da plus do 300 pages" intitule`:
"Pourquoi induire an erreur?" public par la "Pravd&
Cos natericux indiquent quo la proposition du lea-
dor du P, Q. a Uni nn sovietique do cesser lea po-
1 omigues publiques ne cp a itq,e Oulu ne fraude, er-
petroe c na des buts tendanoieu~c,, La propaganda
continue dans co livre declare Particle, "n'est
rion d'autre qu'uno phraseologie defralchie at re-
battue" at Particle do la "Pravda" n'en eat "qua
plus ridicule",
"En ce qui concerno la reprimande contonuo
dans "Pravda" adresseo a la presse ehinoise
pour no pas avoir public la lottre do Khroueh-
tchof du 31 do?cembro aux chefs de 3ouvernement,
1ous pouvons demander au P.C. de 1 Union sovi-
e'tique Les raisons qu'ils ont pour se depecher?
Nous ehalement nous traitons to cotta lottre
of nous comnenterons dessus. Una maison 1Ye-
dition chinoiso constituo deja dos volumes do
vos articles anti-ehinois qui Raraftront ul-
teriourorsont, Le chooin doit etre parcouru
pas a pas et la note dovra so relor article
Dar article. Nous n avons pas encore fini
do r pondro a 1a lettrc quo vous avez public
le 14 juillet dornier. Quest-cc qui vous
rend aussi inpatients?"
4 fevrior: Lo 7edlune aerie d'articloe publie's on co un
par Le quotidian du eu le' et IL? drapeau rou^e on re-
ponso a la lettre ouverte du 14 juillot du P~CC. do VU 10
n
-povidtique , a :;t6 publl&o par lea Chinois. Etant donne quo
nous n Lvons roqu qua le resume an anglais do VAC-once do
presso Chine nouvelle, nous no ferons naintenant quo dos
co.:mentairos provisoires of nous on donnerons une cnalyse
plus co::plete dans notre numero suivcnt. Sous lc titre:
"Los leaders du P.C. do 1'Union sovietique sont lea plus
;rands faisours de division qui aient existe", 1 article de-
bute en declarant sans equivoque qua "les leaders du P.C.
de i'Union sovietique emmenes par Khrouchtchef sont devenus
lea princi aux r sentants du revis o smo m der a gin
s quo es pus Brands faiseurs do division dans le mouve-,
ment du communisme international." Il definit le division-
nisme comma suit:"Le divisionniame signifie rupture avoe
le marxisne-leninisme. Quicongue s'oppose au marxisne-le-
ninismo et le traiit at quieonque sape lea fondements de
1 uni e proletarienne eat un divisionnisto.,4 Quicongue
persisto dans La po].itique re'yisionniste at transforms un
pc:rti revolutionnairo p o taire on un parti reforuatour
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 Approved For Rele A-RDP78-WOBd OOI 03-3
730. The Lot of the Soviet Citizen
25X1ClOb
BACKGaOTJ D: Economic development requires investment in
plants and acfiines, and this means saving, i.e., foregoing a
certain amount of immediate consumption in the expectation of
greater returns in the future. But the ratio of saving to
consumption is not fixed or automatic, and is not determined
by purely economic forces. In some places, the pressures
a g a I n s t saving (or reckless consumption) have hampered
development. In others saving has been exalted into an article
of faith and a tool of power: suc s the case with the SS,.
Communist slogans suggest that the goal of Marxism-Lenin-
ism is the welfare of the ordinary citizen. In practice, however,
the main goal of Soviet planning has been to maintain and to
enhance the power of the CPSU and its leaders. By any objective
standard, the collectivization of agriculture has been a failure;
some Soviet experts foresaw the difficulties, even before col-
lectivization was introduced. But Stalin wanted to rule the
peasants, not negotiate with them. Now the prestige of the party,
as well as a large part of its power, is linked to the collective
system.
In industry, the policy of developing capital goods and
military production has served the power interests of the Kremlin,
w a n preferred to rely on secret police and anus rather than
appease popular demands or reach accommodations with foreign
powers (except Nazi Germany). Stalin's terrorism was too vicious
and self-defeating to last, and steel production is (as
Ihrushchev has admitted) no longer the yardstick of political
power: there are other weapons now besides the steel-eating
cruisers, tanks, howitzers, and H3 shells. But PSU prestige
is still invested in Stalin's system of plans, quotas, and norms,
and the new weapons require vast new investments in materials
and technical skills. Also, the planners continue to bow before
the old idols of dams and blast furnaces, partly out of habit.
Khrushchev tries to appease the Soviet consumer with words and
sometimes even with deeds, but his plans and programs still pro-
vide for industrial output to grow faster than consumer goods.
As shortages continue, he explains that consumers must defer to
the needs of national defense against the supposedly aggressive
imperialists.
Years of neglect of consumer goods, housing, and services
cannot De remedied overnight. s e a tached materials show,
Soviet housing is behind schedule and shoddy in quality; cuts
in working hours and increases in take-home pay have been post-
poned; the growth rate in consumer goods is falling off; and
bread is getting grayer. On 1 June 1962, even before the 1963
crop failure, ricer for meat and butter increased 30 per cent
and 25 per cent respectively. The failures of agriculture
733 . Continued)
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 (733,a 1t j d For Release DP78-0?06P&&AW0 3-3
hamper the production of textiles and other consumer goods, as
well as that of food. It is noteworthy that although the
October Revolution is now 47 years behind us, the Soviet citi-
zen has yet to enjoy his share of his nation's production. The
production of consumer goods fell from 60.5 per cent of total
production in 1928 to 31.2 per cent in 1950, less than 26
per cent in 1960 and 25 per cent in 1963; at the 22nd Congress,
thrushchev promised that henceforth industrial growth would
only be 20 per cent more rapid than growth in consumer goods
production -- instead of being 70 per cent higher, as heretofore.
25X1C10b
&. " " " (738. Continued)
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 (738 Qyed For Release RDP78-OjQd6j4QqfijWqO?@%Q3-3
25X1C10b
3
(730.)
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 . Approved For Release 10-030SVA U"0.13-3
739. Chicoms Seek to Break Isolation
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Communist China has recently taken several
steps to re out of a self-imposed isolation characterized
by a hard, inflexible attitude and by aggressive actions toward
neighbors. This Chicom change of tactics is apparently based
on conclusions drawn from the Sino-Soviet dispute and her posi-
tion vis-a-vis the non-Communist world, Tactical decisions of
the Chinese Communist regime are intimately affected by the
nature and extent of her ambitions and also by her arrogance.
Communist China aspires not only to leadership of the world
Communist movement and not only to a prominent role in world
affairs, but to the d o m i n a n t position in both worlds.
There is ample evidence of this aspiration in the Great Leap
Forward -- an attempt to convert, in a few short years, a back-
ward, inefficient, undisciplined agricultural society with
practically no industrial base, into the most powerful nation
on earth. That they should attempt it at all is testimony of
their driving ambition; that they should persist in the attempt,
despite warnings of their friends and overwhelming economic
knowledge and experience accrued by Marxist and non-Marxist
countries alike, provides an accurate gauge of their arrogance,
While the whole effort failed miserably, they have never
renounced it and have even shown signs that they may try it
again some day.
CC? Gains Against the CPSU. The Chinese Communists have
made headway in e r quarrel with the Soviet Union. They have
successfully captured the initiative in the Communist Parties
of Asia (See guidance item 730, 13 January 1964); they are now
ready for an intensified attack against the CPSU's hegemony
within the other Communist Parties of the world, having already
had some success in these activities. The Italian CP newspaper,
L'Unita, has said that Peking "supports fractionist groups in
Belgium., France, Greece, Switzerland and Italy." There are pro-
Chinese splinter groups in the British and Austrian Communist
Parties and Chinese sympathizers in Scandinavia. In Latin
America there are dissidents in Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela, and there is a dissi-
dent C? in Brazil. The Chinese Communists have also been active
in the Communist international front groups: they first try
to take over the front and, failing this, attempt to split it
(see guidance item 711, 13 November 1953). All of these activ-
ities are aimed at displacing the CPSU as leader of the world
Communist camp.
To this end, the Chicoms have created a vast propaganda
app aratus. They have expanded their International ra io road-
ca.s ing acilities: Radio Peking now uses 27 short wave
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 (73g4PpMvdd For Release -RDP78-03 ICM-3
transmitters to carry daily programs even in such languages as
Swahili, Tamil and Hausa, in addition to extensive programming
in all the major languages of the world. There are reports
that the Chicoms are paying the bill to expand Radio Tirana
(Albania) into a large international broadcasting center to
carry the Chinese line to Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
The New China News Agency has more than 50 offices in all parts
of the world and is still expanding. The Peking Review, which
started life as a simple vehicle to inform ra erna parties of
domestic Mainland developments, has become an organ supporting
Communist China's campaign for leadership of the Communist bloc.
It is printed in English, French, Spanish and Japanese (See
guidance item 708, 4 November 1963).
The second conclusion apparently drawn by the Chicoms
concerns their position and relationships with the non-Communist
world. The CPSU and its adherents (as we as the non- ommunis
world) have used China's hard line in general and her position
on the nuclear-test treaty in particular to isolate China and
publicize her image as an implacable advocate of violence and
nuclear war. To change this image and to gain access to denied
areas, the Chinese Communists have undertaken an extensive
campaign supported by the propaganda network mentioned above
and supplemented by such other tactics as Chou En-lai's recent
tour of Africa. Chou, in his public appearances, is impressing
the Africans with his "reasonableness" and his "understanding"
of Africa's problems (See guidance item 734, 27 January 1964).
It is safe to guess that in some of his private conversations
he is discussing China's correctness in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
At this juncture, the CPR's most prominent success is
deGaulle's recognition and agreement to exchange ambassadors.
It is to be expected that ? in the near future, Communist China
will intensify her efforts to get recognition from other Western
and uncommitted governments and to snow-ball herself into ad-
mission into the United Nations. One tactic that can be anti-
cipated is the bait of China's "vast market of 700 million
people," coupled with the threat that those who come first will
receive the most favors in negotiating trade agreements.
It is too early to predict what will happen on the ques-
tion of China's admission to the United Nations or even how
many countries will follow France's lead and grant ?eking dip-
lomatic recognition. It seems probable, for the immediate
future, that Communist China will continue all activities con-
tributing to her dual image as best suited to leadership of the
world Communist movement and, at the same time, as destined to
become the leader of an alliance of Asian, African, and Latin
American countries.
25X1C10b
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 (73App oved For Relea IA-RDP78-03b913A*Ub5-3
25X1C10b
3
(739. Continued)
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 29X3EA'9$f6Vjd For Relea DP78-03U6W&W2W -3
(739.)
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 10 February 1964
740 ;1?ves1 ~~/h0$Br dI Y RDP78-03061 A000200050003-3
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Khrushchev Slows Down. On 17 April 1964,
Khrushchev will be 70 years old, and overdue for retirement. The
Communist custom of celebrating multiple 5th and 10th anniversa-
ries and their unprecedented propaganda ballyhoo on the occasion
of Stalin's 70th birthday (21 December 1949) make this an apt
occasion for another major effort. Khrushchev has outlived the
expected life span of Soviet males (64.0 years) and has reached
the decades where the incidence of death is highest. Only one
US President has served in the White House past his 70th birthday
--Eisenhower in his last year. That Khrushchev is slowing down
is shown by the record of his speech-making. He made formal
speeches 24 times in 1958, 29 times in 1959, 21 times in 196b, 33
times in 1961, 15 times in 1962, and 14 times in 1963. His latest
pictures show-an older, thinner man than the hard-drinking, shoe-
banging activist of the late 1950's. On 24 April 1963, shortly
after his last birthday, Khrushchev gave a speech in which he
suggested that perhaps he was considering retirement--or perhaps
that others had suggested it, and he had refused to agree.
(Texts of this and other statements referred to in this guidance
are contained in an unclassified attachment, "Khrushchev Speaks,"
The texts are referred to in this section by parenthetical numbers.
25X1C10b
The Ends Justice the Means. All politicians occasionally
contradict themselves, or fail to carry out promises. Khrushchev
has, however, an almost unparalleled record for inconsistency and
failure to perform. In 1961, in the midst of a denunciation of
Stalin, Khrushchev approved of a "proposal" for A monument to the
victims of Stalin, including the former Ukrainian leaders,
Postyshev and Kosior. (2) Actually, Khrushchev himself had been
a member, together with Molotov and NKVD chief Yezhov, of a
Special Commission sent by Stalin in August 1937 to wipe out
Ukrainian nationalism. In January 1938, it was Khrushchev Who
replaced Postyshev as alternate member of the Politburo, and
Kosior as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee. On
26 May of that year, Khrushchev stated that "the peoples of the
Soviet Union rejoice that they have uprooted this foul, abominable,
treacherous gang, the loathsome Trotskyite-Bukharinite bandits,
that they have eradicated and exterminated them under the leader-
ship of our great Stalin, under the leadership of our Nikolai
Ivanovich Yezhov." (also 3,4) On 19 June 1938, a new Central
Committee was elected for the Ukraine; only three men (less than
three per cent) remained unpurged from the 1937 Central Committee.
Khrushchev's Ukrainian purge outdid Stalin's purg of the A11-
Union Central Committee: _there 16J per cent of the Central Com-
mittee members elected in 1934 were re-elected in 1939,
da~ (740 Cont,)
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(740 Cont.) ww~ 10 February 1964
Some grisly remnants of the Ukrainian purges were discovered
during the World War II German occupation: in 1943, a Ukrainian
doctor at Vinnitsa uncovered 95 mass graves containing 9,439
victims, shot in the back of the neck. Relatives identified some
of the bodies as persons arrested for "nationalism" in late 1937
and 1938, and medical experts concluded that the deaths occurred
between 1938 and 1940, that is during the period of Khrushchev's
rule.
It is charitable to assume that Khrushchev acted only to
save his own neck, and it is pleasant to note that he has repudi-
ated Stalin's methods. It is not true, however, that he rejected
Stalin as soon as the old man was dead. While Premier, Georgi
Malenkov pioneered in urging more emphasis on consumer goods, and
in saying that a new world war would mean "the destruction of
world civilization." But Khrushchev took up the cudgels for heavy
industry, attacking "right deviationists" (i.e., Malenkov) in the
old Stalinist style. (5) At that time, Khrushchev did his best
to identify himself and his allies (such as Molotov and Bulganin)
with Stalin, so that a biographical article described him in
March 1955 as "one of the closest comrades-in-arms of J.V. Stalin,"
and Khrushchev himself praised Bulganin in the same terms in a
speech of 8 February 1955. One year later, as everyone now knows,
Khrushchev denounced Stalin in a secret speech at the 20th CPSU
Congress; within four years, Khrushchev revealed that Bulganin
was a member of the "anti-Party group."
Prophecies and Promises: An Economy of Abundance for the
People. Since 1955, Khrushchev has made many promises about
catching up with the West. On 22 May 1957, in Leningrad, he
promised to catch up with the United States in milk production
by 1958, involving an increase of 40 per cent. (6) Thanks to the
excellent 1958 conditions, an increase of 19 per cent was actually
achieved; in the four years after 1958, only a further 5 per cent
was gained, according to Soviet statistics. When this speech was
republished in a series of collected speeches in 1962, the spe-
cific prophecy was omitted, and he was only said to have stated
that the USSR could overtake the US "in the next few years."
Reporting an the CPSU program at the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961
Khrushchev predicted that industrial output would increase six-
fold, and agricultural output two and one half times by 1980.
Thus industrial output, the star performer of Soviet statistics,
was to increase by an average of 9 to 10 per cent throughout the
period. Yet industrial output, according to a Soviet economist
(Valentin Kudrov), was down to 8.5 per cent in 1963 from a 1962
9.5 per cent. (Western analysts believe that all Soviet indus-
trial output figures are inflated by double counting -- e.g.,
counting both a machine and the steel used to make it -- and in
other ways, and that non-military industrial output for 1963 was
about 7 per cent. See also Peter Wiles, "Western Research into
the Soviet Economy," Survey, January 1964, p. 76; Wiles believes
most private Western analysts would put the annual average for
1959 and 1961 at 7 per cent.) Despite this 1963 drop, and de-
2
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10 February 1964
spite a decline in industrial investment since 1959, twenty-year
industrial growth could still--in terms of Soviet statistics--
reach an average of 9 to 10 per cent per year. But in agri-
culture, the twenty-year program must already--in its third year
--be regarded as a lost cause. A Pravda article of 13 January
stated that agricultural output for 1963 was 50 per cent higher
than in 1952: this "good-sounding" statistic, when compared with
other Soviet figures, indicates that the 1963 harvest was 9 per
cent below the 1962 level, which was itself a mediocre year. In
fact this 1963 harvest is below any year since 1957, when Khru-
shchev gained full control of the Soviet government. Although
nearly half of Khrushchev' s 1958-63 speeches have been on agri-
culture and related affairs, agriculture has not advanced. Since
Stalin's death, the plowed and sown area in the so-called Virgin
Lands increased 410 per cent, but output for this area for 1963
was only 48 per cent greater than in 1953; the yield per hectare
fell from 8.7 quintals to 3.1 quintals. Over the decade, yields
averaged 6.3 quintals, while the target set by Khrushchev and the
Central Committee had been 10 to 11 quintals. Actually, it is
largely Khrushchev's campaign approach to agriculture, his peddling
of one panacea after another and in particular, his attempt to
gain rapid results by plowing without fertilizing, that have
brought about the current agricultural difficulties.
25X1C10b
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25X1C10b
REFERENCES:
Konrad Kellen, Khrushchev, a Political Portrait (New York, 1961)
Roy MacGregor-Hastie, The Man From Nowhere (New York, 1961)
George Paloczi-Horvath, Khrushchev, the Road to Power (London,
1960)
Lazar Pistrak, The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power
(New York, 1961)
Myron Rush, The Rise of Khrushchev (Washington, 1958)
4
dwwbdb~ (740.)
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10 February 1964
741. AF, FE, WH Made in Czechoslovakia: New Meanin for an
Old Trademark
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Between the two world wars, Czechoslovakia
became known throughout the world as a prosperous and orderly
country with a government based on Parliament and elections by
secret ballot. Through the inherent diligence of its people,
the trademark "Bade in Czechoslovakia" became known and respected
in all corners of the globe. Heavy and precision machinery,
textiles, shoes, glass, costume jewelry, as well as the excellent
Pilsen beer and Prague hams, were as easily found in Hong Kong
as in Buenos Aires.
Following the years of Nazi occupation, the people of
Czechoslovakia were delivered into the "Soviet sphere of influ-
ence" as a result of WWII developments. The implied threat of
Soviet military intervention greatly helped the Czechoslovak
Communist Party in seizing control in 1948. After a period in
which the Communists consolidated their power, condemning 60,000
people to exile and additional thousands to prison and to the
gallows, Czechoslovakia became totally subjugated to the Soviet
Union, in domestic affairs as well as in international relations.
Once the Czechoslovak Communists had been placed in control,
the Soviet Union lost no time in exploiting the country. Not
only were there valuable natural resources and a highly developed
industry, but its pre-war reputation as a democratic, orderly
nation and a producer of fine goods made Czechoslovakia an excel-
lent carrier for the export of Communism by the Soviet Bloc.
Czechoslovakia became a spearhead for Communist subversion of
underdeveloped areas. Latin America was given high priority
because Soviet representatives are barred in many of these coun-
tries and where the Soviets do maintain diplomatic relations
they are unpopular and closely watched.
The majority of Czechoslovak trade representatives stationed
overseas resigned after the Communist takeover and sought asylum
abroad. Under orders from Moscow the New Czech regime replaced,
the former trade representatives, diplomats and military attaches
with reliable Party cadres. Many individuals sent abroad, even
in a semi-official capacity, had to undergo special training.
The former Czech Military Attache in Washington, Frantisek Tisler,
testified in 1960 that about 45 percent of Czech officials abroad
are trained in espionage and political warfare, and are actually
employed and controlled not by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
or Foreign Trade, but by the Ministry of Interior (in charge of
secret police and espionage).
r T. r. w w _ (741 Cont. )
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('41 .;ont. 7 Fe ruary
The overall scope of Czech efforts in underdeveloped world
areas has grown conspicuously out of proportion to normal econ-
omic or diplomatic activities of so small a country, especially
with domestic economic difficulties publicly admitted by Party
Secretary, Antonin Novotny, and other regime officials. the
Czech regime has followed the universal Communist pattern of
failure in agriculture and industry. Not only have these fail-
ures been visited heavily on the Czech consumer, but the coun-
try's outstanding reputation for reliable products has been
clouded by the export of shoddy goods and resulting complaints
from buyers worldwide. In the face of this, the Czech regime
has continued to give high priority to foreign programs. For
example, the Czechs are believed to have more personnel in Latin
America than the Soviet Union and other Satellites combined; the
demonstrable Czech per ca ita contribution to political activity
abroad is more than twice that of the Soviet Union.
25X1C10b
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7-2 AF,FE,WH. Cuba's Long-range Sugar Pact With Russia
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: Fidel Castro's trip to the Soviet Union, 13-23
January , has resulted in a trade pact that will have far-
reaching effects on Cuba's economy. Under the terms of the agree-
ment, Russia will buy the bulk of Cuba's sugar production for a
period of six years at a guaranteed price of six cents a pound.
Cuba, in turn, pledges to deliver a total of 24.1 million tons,
as follows: 2.1 million tons in 1965; 3.0 million tons in 1966;
4.0 million tons in 1967; 5.0 million tons each year in 1968,
1969, and 1970. In order to meet these quotas, Castro hopes to
increase the production of sugar to 10 million tons a year by
1968. This ambitious program contrasts sharply with last year's
production of 3.8 million tons and even with Cuba's highest pro-
duction: 7.2 million tons attained in 1952.
In spite of much speculation, largely stimulated by the ap-
parent suddenness of his departure and the unusual secrecy sur-
rounding the preparations, Castro's trip to the USSR did not come
about as a result of the Panama riots. That Cuban agents partic-
ipated in them, there can be little doubt. But it is almost
equally certain that Castro was as much surprised as the local
Panamanian Communist Party at the sudden manner in which the riots
escalated in magnitude and violence. Castro had probably arranged
for this trip some time before: he is reported to have told a
European visitor late in December that the two could not get to-
gether again until after January, since he was going to be absent
from Cuba during most of that month.
On balance, Castro's trip was something of a diplomatic
triumph, both for him and for Khrushchev. For Castro.. Cuba will
S be assured a stable price for its sugar over a to :.-of six
years. While six cents a pound is only a little oyerlm.lf the
current market price, it is higher than the average of the last
ten years. Castro argues that it is better for Cuba to be as-
sured of a stable price for sugar over a long period of time than
to try to make a few quick profits from momentarily high prices
at the risk of losing later when prices drop.
Sugar prices, since World War II, have fluctuated dispro-
portionately -- by comparison with metals, cotton, beef, grains,
or even coffee -- ranging from less than three to over eleven
cents a pound.
One of the things that Latin American countries have been
crying loudest for, especially the one-crop countries, is a
stable price for their key commodities. They angrily accuse the
United States of paying low prices for raw materials and selling
the finished products at high prices; they claim that manufac-
tured products have steadily risen in price while raw materials
(742 Cont.)
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have remained the same. Of course there is enough truth is this
argument to make good propaganda against the U.S. Susceptible
Latin American audiences will be impressed by this aspect of the
trade pact.
The quid pro quo in the deal, at least at the moment, for
Khrushchev, was Castro's support of Moscow in the Sino-Soviet
conflict as spelled out in a joint communique issued at the end
of the visit. Castro endorsed the Soviet interpretation of the
pronouncements of the Moscow Communist ?arty conferences of 1957
and 1960, and specifically approved Soviet measures to strengthen
the unity of the international Communist movement. He further
agreed that Moscow's peaceful coexistence policy has brought
about "a certain easing of international tensions" and somewhat
belatedly sided with the Soviets on the nuclear test ban treaty. 25X1C1Ob
2
(742 Cont.)
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(742)
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743 AT-,g. Lessons of Zanzibar
25X1C10b
BACKGROUND: A far-seeing training and indoctrination
program an assiduous attention to exploitable political wweaak-
nesses have again paid off for international communism.
new government of Zanzibar (which includes the nearby island
of Pemba), dominated by the leaders ofthe bloody
althoughcoup
under the
12 January, now looks strongly pro-Communist
nominal leadership of a veteran nationalist. Some of the sub-
versive efforts which led to the Communist success in Zanzibar
had been apparent for many months and are present and increasing
in other states with weak political traditions and poor economic
bases.
Methods of Subversion. Large numbers of Zanzibari students
went abroad -- ma n y o ast Europe and China but also to
Cuba -- for education of the Communist variety. AbdukrE.',man
Mohamed "Babu," kingpin of the revolution and now Foreign Min-
ister, personally selected many of the students who travelled
through Cairo -- many illegally -- to the Communist training
schools. Trade union officials and scores of potential leaders
tapped by the Communist World Federation of- Trade Unions
received special training courses; the Secretary of the Zanzibar
Federation of Progressive Trade Unions was trained in Peking.
The Havana office of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)
received "students," trained them in guerrilla warfare tactics
and later directed them against the legally elected government
of the newly independent Zanzibar which included the ZNP.
youth arms of the Afro-Shirazi (ASP) and the Umma p
shock troops of the revolution, did the actual fighting under
the leadership of self-styled Field Marshall John Okello and -- and perh
-- by Cuba
arm
(Fo some 40 hotheads tandnCommunist tiesaof theecoup leaders, seer
specific training
the biographic sketches attached).
Propaganda. Anti-western literature poured into Zanzibar
at a ra a perhaps exceeding that of any other country in Africa.
Lacking the continent-wide facilities
groups so usdul to Moscow, the
quantities of reading material, such as the Peking Review at
give-away prices. The New China News Agencyy
propaganda machine in Zanzibar as it is elsewhere (see Ref 1.),
is
an' Ba'ou was the local representative. The NCNAchief o
Tao Liang, based in Dar es Salaam and once expelled
New Delhi for his aggressive "unjournalistic activities on
behalf of Peking.
Financing. Babu, who founded the radical Umma party Chinese
receive-''c. -as muc~i as $50, 000 per year from tuhistposition
through the mechanism of NCNA and possibly through
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on the board of the Peking-financed Revolution, published in
France (see Ref. 3). on January 13th , wh a mews reporting
from Zanzibar was at a virtual standstill and the nature of
the revolt unclear, France Observateur carried an article by
Jacques Verges, Revoluti n' publisher, titled "Chinese Victory
in Zanzibar."
Political Moves included familiar united front tactics
whereby a u s mma party cooperated with the trade unions and
the ASp in opposition to the coalition government of mid-1963.
By so doing, they not only strengthened the anti-government
opposition but played upon -- and ultimately directed toward
revolution -- both the genuine nationalism and the African
racialism of the ASP. Following the coup, Karume of the AS?
was installed as president of the people's Republic, probably
because of his popular following. A power struggle still
appears undecided but Babu is believed to be the strongman of
the government. Soviet-sponsored Communist fronts have pro-
vided means of contacting, training an inane na g individuals
for seizing organizational power, for spreading thinly-disguised
propaganda and for increasing local front memberships. The
Cairo ZT? office had close contacts with the Cairo AAPSO office
which in turn had direct ties with Moscow and ?eking. (See Ref 4).,
25X1ClOb
(743. Continued)
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ruary
3
(743. Continued)
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(743 Cont.) .. 10 jie ruary 0
25X1C10b
L!.
wam" (743.)
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744 AF,g. AAPSO Interest in the organization of African Unity
25X1C10b
BAC4SGROUND: Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization
(AAPS?, an o~ soot of the Communist-controlled World peace
Council, was established in 1057 with Headquarters in Cairo os-
tensibly to coordinate the efforts of the Afro-Asian countries
in developing their economic and cultural resources. By 1360
the control of the Organization was firmly in the hands of the
vino-Soviet Bloc. Representatives of the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China supported by Communist party members from Asian
countries and Communist lining members of African revolutionary
movements have since a me held worn ng majorities on a
policy making and action bodies of the organization (i.e. the
Executive Committee, the Fund Committee, and the Permanent
Secretariat).
The Permanent Secretariat is funded almost entirely by
equal annual contributions from the Soviet Union, Communist China,
and the UAR. Small donations from other members are inconse-
quential. The Fund Committee, responsible for doling out
material aid to -revolutionary movements, is under the direction
of three officers: Ismail Toure, president, Chu Tzu-chi of
China and Mehdi Den Barka of Morocco, Vice Presidents. Inasmuch
as both Ismail Toure and Mehdi Ben Barka have consistently fol-
lowed the Chinese line at both the Committee and Secretariat
level, the Fund Committee is in fact under Chinese control. At
the October 1963 meeting of this Committee, Ismail Toure thanked
the Chinese for their contributions and singled them out as the
only members that had completely fulfilled their obligations to
the Fund Committee.
Since the Communists took over control of the Organization,
the major AAPSO objective has been to liquidate all traces of
colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa and Asia. To this
end, AA?uO material and propaganda support has been directed
toward militant revolutionary groups in still dependent countries
and toward radical pro-Communist opposition parties in countries
whose governments are not willing to line up with the Communist
Bloc. The AA?SO has supported among others the exiled pro-
Communis Union des-Populations merounaises (UPC) in its
efforts to overthrow President Ahidjo in the Cameroun Republic,
the Sawaba Party against ?resident Diori of Niger, and the
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) against wing Iiassan
of Morocco. It has promoted the Oginga Odinga wing of the
Kenya African National Union, Oscar Xambona in Tanganyika,
Congress Party for Independence of Madagascar and the Communist-
controlled African National Congress in South Africa.
(744. Continued)
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During the period from 1960 to 1962, a working arrange-
ment existed between the AA? C and the All African People's
Conferen k~ n a r_a can organ r.ati 5n aisle at aiding
5 ra ie f1i51m-colonial government). This arrangement enabled
the Communist-dominated AAPSO to direct the policy of the AA?C
(although there were no Bloc members in the AAPC) through:
first, influence on individual African leaders who held posi-
tions on the steering Co:nnittee of the AP.PC and also on the
xecutive Committee or Secretariat of the M.PSO; second, .
Abdculaye Diallo, Secretary General of the A.2,?C who attended
all important AiPSO meetings; and third, funds passed from the
AA?SO to the A PC (Tvhich inclnded such large sums as five
hundred thousand pcbunds sterling in March 1961. )
Due to the decreasing number of dependent African Mates,
the non-governmental AA = C became obsolete: in 1963 nd the
Organizes _f.or o African amity, an crgani:jation of governments
oT fnc?e i6nce African awe , was est~..~lish.~d. Within the
fraoewor.: of the OAU, the Committee of Nine is now the main
instrument for aiding liberat on t ovemer sin Africa. As such
it has become an object of major interest to e E S?. Dis-
cussions of how best to collaborate with the Committee of Nine
have taken place at all levels in AAPSO policy circles. The
matter has received careful attention at Secretariat meetings,
at Fund Committee meetings, and at the Executive Committee meet-
ing of September 1963. These discussions have resulted in an
AXPSO decision that "collaboration" is essential between the
two organizations interested in aiding liberation movements in
Africa, that is the AA..?SO and the Committee of Nine.
It is too soon to see whether the AAP O will be successful
in effecting a liaison with the Committee of Nine but indications
are that the AA?SO will certainly press in this direction in
the coming months. >Turther, some AA?SO leaders (e.g. Oscar
L,arbona, Ismail aoure) hold hey poste ons n the ^ommittee of
Nine, a circumstance facilitating contact between the two
organizations.
25X1ClOb
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745 WH,F. Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC)
Santiago, Chile, 9 - 14 March 6
25X1C10b
BACS.1,320U10: The Second Latin American south Congress (LAYC
or Con-reso Latino-Americano de Juventudes), a Castro-Communist
inspired and controlled vehicle to attract the youth of Latin
America to the idelista team, is slated to begin on March 0,
11"'1S4 in Santiago, Chile. The Communist-front World Federation
of Democratic Youth (T;17 7D!) and the International Union of Stu-
cents (1U S) are cor.-.ed s sponsors of the five-day scheduled
rally. If disagreeL.DntF which hampered preparations for the
Congress and forced an earlier postponement have been suffi-
ciently smoothed over, the Conference is likely to get underway
on or about the appointed date. If and when the Communist youth
of Latin America bring down the gavel in Santiago, it will be
against a background of conflict within the Communist movement
in the hemisphere. Should the Sino-Soviet dispute be kept in
the bac