BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 2, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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3riefly Noted
Rumanians split ~'ith Soviets to Supper- Nuclear-Free Latin
America
On is November, the UN General Assembly voted Sa to a,
with 14 abstentions, for a study to make Latin America a de-
nuclearized zone. `.7o points were notable about this vote:
1. Despite a history of espousing denuclearized zones,
and especially a denuclearized zone in Europe (apac'.>'
?Ian), neither the Soviet Union nor _=oland voted for the
measure : they abst? ined.
. For the first time in UN history, the Rumanian rep-
resentative did n o t follow the Soviet exa:mp?e, but voted:
2 o r the measure.
Most of the Bloc abstained out of (Soviet) regard for Cuba.
Castro claims that there can be no Latin American nuclear-free
-one unless the US formally promises not to base nuclear teapons
in the Canal Tone, '7uerto Rico and elsewhere in Latin America,
and unless the US returns Guantanamo to Cuba. The US position
is that we will support and abide by any nuclear-free zone, pro-
viding it embraces the whole region in quest.-1on, does not upset
the m litary balance of power (this is one major weakness of to
Faoacki plan), is supported by all area nations, and provides
for verification that there are no nuclear weapons. These pro-
visos, and especially verification, are what Cuba really objects
to. The :''krem?in is more anxious to caopease Castro (for fear he
may turn to '?eking) than it 9 s to follow its old policy on de-
~zuclearized zones. Actually, the Kremlin's old policy has been
merely a disguised diplomatic attempt to break down the NATO
position in Europe and win sympathy on other continents.
The Rumanian delegation expressed support for Cuba's posi-
tion, but their government felt it more important to abide by
the old policy than to follow Moscow's shift. u. an .a has re-
cently had differences with the USSR over C31,,A and other matters,
but unlike Alban-12,, she is not merely exchanging one master for
another. The Rumanian vote mar 1_-s a new step in the weakening of
Communist discipline and in the emergence of independence in the
Bloc.
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'b
~:: i;bese c..0'l::l~.,:n 5t?'3a.CtiOil to resident ibe?li2ediJ t 5 Death.
In rude contrast to the world's spontaneous tributes and
mourning at the tragic death of '?resident ;'Cennedy, an official
of the Chinese people's !republic said, "That's good news. e
, '17
r Or: ea ., r, a:,ly c. car-
was a very _yed _ an.tt CTr., wd is ' a carried a c ^i ~" The v.-. l . 5
toon Stith a cast on rea ding "I.ennedy B_1 ing the =rust, tt and de-
p:ictin : the .:'r esi dent in a position of grueso::_Se distortion. In
` .:arta the ,.. ._ t ^?_lt:i ' nu5~a~ c, alone) and d i n i ~ srt. sr- n r of f ti'e
~~. d
Indonesian 3-Overnment is proclamation, flew its x1a from the top
of the flagpole as usual. In Africa, the seven-man a-
tion to the Afro-Asian attorneys conference in Cona':ry, Guinea,
:ralhec out, al cne, when the Chairman asked members to stand for
one minute in silent tribute to the slain '?re: dent. At the
o= 71 Peace Council meeting in 17arsaci the S,--man Chinese Corn-
munist delegation protested an rily and refused to join in the
cta a ing ho 'a,ge to ?resident ienne 1y .
On April 12., 1045 Jose73h Goeabe1s received the ttuladtt sews
of the pass" n of :7resident Roosevelt with the words "This is
` ? bean qn i.c~.at.',:.i3V fO" call for. In a eto ~".itl3r he
:dG'tVc..
s,,l c1 "~:Ty s_,..tyeah ? rar, .~ .,
congratulate you. Roosevelt is ead . ;'c^.?te
G
'_as laid low your greatest enemy. God has not abandoned us.
P. miracle has hao',ened. It is written that the second half of
April will be the turning point for us. This is (note) :.'riday,
A-3ril E2. It is the turning point." 130:t little more than two
tiee'hs later, ? - tler any. his lieutenants were dead, by their own
ihaands, and the "Thousand Year L Bich" came to an and.
As appropriate to selected audiences, we compare the r eac-
'tions of the ascists and the Chinese Communists, -- pointing
Out their anat ci5_a, their self-imposed isolation from all
civilized nations -- and we note the end to iTazis:a F hich followed
upon a tragic event m e:' ret3d by then as a good omen In the i r
a zg:ression against civilized humanity.
Throughout the year 1903, the government of 1~umulo
Betancourt and the Venezuelan people have been the objects of
a -oamDa_gn of violence and sabotage without parallel in Latin
A::_er' hate also the theatrical, even e..'bibitionist, manner
?ca.
in which it has been carried out. The activists of the 1-1IXT
(1 iarzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional) are said to number less
than 539. They are stwt,ported by Fidel Castro, as evidenced by
the arms cache discovered early in November in eastern Venc ? ala.,
but it is equally certain that they are under the discipline of
(Briefly Noted Cont.)
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the official Co:n:ainist '?arty of Venezuela.
The pur ose of this spectacular ca a,ma-i a has been to b?beep:)
the elections fro', to-,-.inn- place: 1) by sabotaging public con-
fidence in the viability of democratic governiient; 2) by pro-
Vo'si.ng' President Betancourt into taking repressive measures so
severe as to alienate public support; 3) by tempting the mili-
tary to stage a coup d'etat; and 4) by frightening the voters,
,
at the last moment, into staying home on election day. I-oEjever,
over 90% of the voters went to the polls Sunday, 1 Decenber;
the FALIT has failed utterly to achieve any one of its objectives.
All it has achieved is the senseless murder and maiming of hun-
dreds of innocent people and the equally meaningless destruction
of millions of dollars of property, representing a net -loss to
Venezuela.
Regardless of who is elected, we point out the lesson to
be drawn from recent events in Venezuela: that the rule of lace
can be maintained and orderly political succession achieved if
the responsible e' events in the government shoey enough deter--mina-
ti on. .hat .any democratic governments do not realize is that
of all subversion is i n_i tiated: and carried out by a fraction
of one per cent of the copulation. :?resident Betancourt a,:r)ar-
catjy realized this and consequently refused to be intimi, ated.
7a warn other Latin American countries that Castro night now
focus his subversive exports upon their territories. '"e use
the case of V. for our continuing campaign against Castro.
?O?aJLAL./UI L ~ :...01P YS
An authoritative Communist state-.lent of
the "why and Doti!" of the popular front
tactic. "?arty Policy and the ?arty
Branch" by the French C'- is reprinted
from the .7crld I.Iarxist L eviec~ of April
1033 with e.:p an ;,ory comments juxtaposed
to rev'aaling ,passages of Co muni st objec-
tives in seeb.in ; collaboration with non-
Communist forces in free countries.
A'J? livable to the range of Communist ssub-
VersiV3 ac ~,iV? t-? es in widely d f f e r I ng
country si tu ioils.
In asbing for copies, re.Za r to
C'_?A ? A 110T313 (?IT) 27.
3
(Briefly Voted)
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DATES OF ?RO'?AGANrDA IN ER30T
December Afro-Asian Organization for 3conomic Cooperation, 4th
AAO:C, scheduled for Xarachi, 1033.
21 Dee Stalin born (1370).
23 Dec i'lao Tse-tung born (1333 - 73 years).
January LbA.Trade Union Fed. Constituent Cong. (VIFTU sponsored)
Rio de Janeiro, Jan. 1964.
2 Jan Fidel Castro assumes power in Cuba, 1959.
4 Jan XXVItb Internl. Cong. of Orientalists, New Delhi Jan.4 1',
1334
15 Jan "Trial of the 12" first show trial of Stalinist purge,
including Zinoviev and Xamenev (initial members Stalin
ruling triumvirate during Lenin's physical decline),131".
21 Jan Lenin dies, 1924 (40th anniu) (born 22 April 1370).
26 Jan Second Congress of Soviets meets: Stalin swears al-
legiance to Lenin's policies, 1924.
31 Jan Leon Trotsky banished for life, 1923 (35th anniv.)
31 Jan Cuban Marxist-Leninist Government excluded from partici-
pation inter-American system by Foreign Ministers at
?unta del 3ste, 1962.
1 Feb UNGA adopts resolution charging Chinese Communist
gression in T,orea, 1951.
2 Y b 3stonian Soviet ?eace Treaty signed: Soviet Government
"forever renounces sovereign rights over people and
territory of 3stonia," 1920.
14- Feb USSR and C?r sign treaty of alliance (Sino-Soviet Friend-
ship ?act) repudiating Soviet Nationalist Treaty
(14 August 1W), 1950.
14 Feb 'Chrushchev denounces Stalin in secret speech at C?SU 23t:
Congress, 14-25 Feb. 195G.
23 Feb Kronstadt Uprising begins by supporters of Oct. 1317
Revolution against "three-year-old atuocracy of Communist
Commissars" (1321)
25 Feb Soviets imprison leader of Smallholders' ?arty, Bela
Kovacs, in campaign to destroy major anti-Communist op-
position, hiung. 1947.
26 Feb Internl. Conf. of Youth and Students for Disarmament,
?eace and National Independence (NFDY-sponsored),X'lorence,
Italy, 26 Feb-1 Mar 1963.
27 Feb Mao Tse-tung delivers "Hundred Flowers" speech, 1357.
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?ROPAGAITDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DI3SINSIONS
# 17 0-22 November 1963
Commentary
`Principal Developments:
1. Only one major contribution to the Great Feud appeared
during this period, a 19 November 10,003-word, joint People's
Daily/ ed Flag diatribe entitled "Two Different Lines one
- ues on of ar and ?eace." Designated as the fifth in the
series of such joint Chinese articles replying rectly to the
14 Sul CPSU open letter, it is probably the most extreme oTTIl
authoritative expressions by either of the protagonists to date,
in its political/theoretical formulathns, its derisive denunci-
ation of C?SU views, and its insulting personal attacks on
x.hrushchev. (See extensive review in Chronolog=y, November 10.)
2. The Albanians published another 7,030-word tirade
against Tito which struck at Xhrushchev in passing, but a, did
not equal in intensity some of the previous Albanian attacks.
(November 90 The North Vietnamese monthly theoretical journal
Zoe Tap carried a 5,003-word article ponderously defending "the
1.avo u ionary Principles of the Two Moscow Statements, " '711 h
not only denounced the "Yugoslav revisionist clique" but also
criticized "a number of persons (w-ho) are claiming that the
analysis of the Tito clique by the 1360 statement is wrong."
(November 16.)
3. We have seen no reports of polemical materials in
Soviet or pro-Soviet or;ang: during this period, although the
Chinese claimed on the 15th that "the Soviet press is vigor-
ously keeping up its anti-China campaign," publishing more than
attacks, Soviet as well as foreign, from 23 October to
13 November. The few examples cited appeared before 3 November.
4. Meanwhile, various sources reported that the C71SJ had
taken the initiative in exploring with the Chinese the prospects
for holding a second round of bilateral talks between delegations
o:' the two parties. . mes Moscow correspondent Tanner reported
(Chrono, November 20). n-ormed sources" as saying that consult-
ations of this nature were taking place with members of the
Chinese 3mbassy in Moscow, and that "it now appears that such a
conference will take place in ?eiing.... early next yeas." Other
reports regarding discussions in Moscow during and following the
October tevolution celebration have been conflicting. epresenta-
tives of several minor parties have returned home reporting that
t .he Soviets made no attempt to draw them into any meetings. A
secret report tells of a 13 November meeting of top Belgian and
r'rench C? leaders who agreed to issue a joint resolution reject-
ing the Chinese line and expressing hope for an all-Parties con-
ference as soon as possible.
()f#17 Commentary Cont.)
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5. Meanwhile, the important Japanese C? restated its
"independent attitude toward the disputes in the international
Communist movement" in terms attuned to the Chinese line and
emphasized its views that "an international conference must be
held only after necessary conditions are sufficiently provided
through prior consultation." (November 10) Rumania further de-
monstrated her "independence" by voting in opposition to a USSR
position (on a resolution barring nuclear weapons in Latin
America) in the UN for the first time in history (November 19),
while boss Georghiu-Dej decided to take up a long-standing in-
vitation to visit Yugoslavia (November 22).
S. Among the smaller parties, the trends toward independ-
ence and split continued. The recent soul-searching in the
Swedish Cl::- produced an amazing article in the Party's daily organ
Ny _,agBy'prominent leader Landin categorical) y rejecting the
i7=oscow Declaration and advocating complete autonomy in polm-7.
with a reconstitution of the warty, goes o y in e form of a
"socialist peoples party." (Described in Chronology under Novem-
ber 23, but the date has subsequently beem.determined to be
Nov. J: please make correction to your copies.) In Britain, a
nets pro-Chinese "Committee for Communist Unity" issued-'''-a manifests
signed by 1S CPGB members appealing to all members to defeat the
pro-Soviet "revisionists" in the Party leadership a nc_-es ab. sh
a genuine :_ ar y . November 11
Significance:
Available evidence (neither clear-cut nor reliable) seems
to indicate that the Soviets have now decided to undertake to
schedule another round of W.ateral discussions with the Chinese
and are unilaterally refraining from further polemics while the
effort is being made. It seems most likely, however, that the
Soviets do not expect to achieve any resolution of the conflict
by this effort, but are making it primarily as another step in
avoiding the onus for further deterioration in relations and as
further preparation for a possible excommunication move. tdean-
cwhile, the Chinese and their allies' have shown no sign of retreat
from their extreme positions. There has been no reported shift-
ing in allegiance among the parties of the world, but evidence
indicates some further growth in "independence" and splitting
to dencies.
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CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS
#17 9-22 November 1963
November 9 - The Albanian Zeri I Popullit publishes another
7,000--w-o-rZ tirade,erAcs o Treachery by the Renegade
Tito," also denouncing "the hostile splitting activity of the
N. Khrushchev group, which supports the Tito gang and follows
in its footsteps."
November 10 - The Japanese CP Sunday weekly Akahata carries
an anonymous question---a-0--answer-type feature g v ng the
Party's views on "the so-called 'international dispute."'
It affirms that "the JCP takes an independent attitude toward
disputes in the international Communist movement," and "does
not state which party is right, who is right, or who should
be supported for the advantage of the JCP." However, it
does answer "some people (who) contend that the CCP wants war"
by stating "we believe that such a view is utterly unfounded"
and that "the Japanese people . . . could not believe that
the CPR Government and CP are warlike," and it expresses dis-
approval of "the leaders of certain Communist parties" who
started "open criticism of those parties which had not agreed
with them" at the 1960 Moscow conference, specifically,
criticism of the Albanian Workers Party and the Cam.
The feature concludes by maintaining "that an interna-
tional conference must be held only after necessary co nn itions
are su c en y provided through prior consultation between-
fraternal parties ..." (The text was reprinted in -full in all
Peking papers on the 12th.)
November 11 - The British press reports that "a campaign to
overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of Great
Britain began over the weekend." 2,000 cop es o a 5-page
manifesto signed by 14 Communists who claim they represent
"cadres" throughout Britain were mailed to leading Party
workers: it bitterly criticizes Soviet views and supports
the Chinese, appeals to all Party members to "defeat the
revisionists" in the Party leadership and establish a "genuine"
C?. It accuses Khrushchev of "outright betrayal" and attacks
General Secretary Gollan, and Daily Worker editor Matthews
for supporting him. Secretary proem of the new British Com-
mittee for Communist Unity is 34-year-old Michael Mccreery.
November 12 - The Peking correspondent of the Yugoslav agency
Tanyug reports on the meeting of the Chinese R nat-People's
congress due to open in Peking 17 November, noting that the
pre-congress atmosphere is dominated by the Sino-Soviet dispute.
'The general impression among observers in Peking, based on a
whole series of facts and documents made public there, is that
the only alternative which might be accepted by the CCP is the
full and unconditional capitulation of the other Side,"
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'November 14 - Peeking People's Daily gives the full text of an
article from the Malayan Monitor ndon) commemorating the
October Revolution anniversary which counterposed Lenin to the
old and new revisionists. "Lenin did not say: 'we are surrounded
by world imperialism, therefore we must not start an insurrection
lest we provoke a world holocaust'. . . Lenin did not say of the
revolutionary movements then in being: 'fold it up, you are
creating tensions; a single fire may start a worldwide confla-
gration." It predicts: "The great Soviet land which saw the
establishment of the first socialists to will shine again when
the clouds have cleared."
November 15 - The Chinese press features a "Joint statement by
the - na Youth Federation and the Ceylonese Federation of
Commun s an ogress ve You es re ease in PRO g on
e 14th. NCNA says that e ocumen , "ratified recently by the
two federations;"and signed by the vice president of the All-
China federation and by two members of the Ceylon federation1.e
Central Committee who "paid a friendly visit to China from 1S
to 20 July at the invitation of the All-China Youth Federation,"
declares agreement by both on "further consolidating and devel-
oping the relations of friendship, unity, and cooperation
between the two organizations, on the present international
situation, and on major questions of the present world movement."
November 16 - The November issue of the North Vietnam Party's
eoreEical monthly Hoc Tap features a ponderous 5, 0-word
editorial entitled "Let Us Resolutely Defend the Revolutionary
Principles of The Two Moscow Statements." Making the "attitude
toward the Yugoslav revisionist clique" the touchstone of "Lenin-
ism or revisionism," the article denounces the persons who
"are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1960
statement is wrong. They eulogize the Tito clique.. ...Mean-
while they seek every means to isolate a number of true Marxist-
Leninist parties . . . . To say that dogmatism is the main
danger for the present international Communist movement is to
contravene completely the spirit of the two Moscow statements."
November 16-17 - All Chinese papers on the 16th featured an
NCNA report of the 15TE-To the effect that "the Soviet press
is vigorously keeping up its anti-China campaign . . . . A
total of more than 2 000 articles and other ftems have so far
been published for a purpose. Since 27 October, Soviet papers
have given great publicity to what they call Khrushchev's appeal
to China to discontinue open polemics, but their wanton attacks
on China continued as usual after the so-called appeal was made.
Incomplete figures show that from 28 October to 10 November the
Soviet press published more than 80 editorials, Soviet as well
as foreign articles, 'reader's letters,' caricatures and other
items, all attacking the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people."
On the occasion of the 30th annivers of the establishment of
diplomatic relations be weep the USSR and the US, the Chinese
press reports on the 17th, that the Soviet papers published "a
good number of articles advocating alliance with the U.S. in
opposition to na. They also report a arg oorn,
a U.S. spy arrested by USSR security organs, was released without
trial because of the 'concern' of high U.S. officials."
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November 18 - A Cuban diplomatic mission arrives in Tirana, the
Albanian capital, o open a cuba4 Embassy. An Albanla-h-Iffibassador
has been in Havana almost two yearsbut the Cubans have hesitated
lest such a move undermine Cuba's 'neutrality' in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. Observers saw the present move as a "slap at Moscow."
November 19 - After a lapse of almost a month, the Chinese pub-
lished the fifth in their drawn-out series of joint People's
Dail/Red `Tag commentaries a ed to the 14 July (WSU open letter:
a 10,000-word article en titled o eren nes on the ques-
tion of War and Peace." (see Chrono ogy, September 6, 13t 26j,
and October or earlier articles in series). it employs some
of the most extreme formulations and insulting derision -: direerteca
at Khrushchev by name -- yet to appear in any polemics.
The first section, "The Lessons of History," details the
"pack of lies on the question of war and peace" spread by "the
renegade Kautsky" and his fellow "revisionists of the Second
International," in whose footsteps Khrushchev is following. The
gist of the second section, headed "The Greatest Fraud," is in
its opening sentence: "There is no bigger lie than the designa-
tion of the arch-enemy of world peace as a peace-loving angel....
Yet the leaders of the CPSU hold that the chief representatives
of U.S. imperialism love peace." Turning to the CPSU open letter's
question addressed to them{ "Do they really think that all
bourgeois governments lack'all reason in everything they do7"
the Chinese reply: "In a class society there is no reason that
can transcend class." ey conclude a :
the U.S. imperialists have not
become beautiful angels in spite of MrushiffievTs
tible-reach and psalm-singing; the nave not
erne Into-compassionate Buddhas sn ep e o
rus ev s prayers and ncence- urn ng. owever
hard ru c ev tries to serve the S. imperialists,
..e they continue to slap Nhrushchev in the face
and reveal the bankruptcy of s ridiculous theories
prettifying imperialism....
In the third section, "The Question of the Possibility of
Preventing a New World War," the Chinese cite Mao, Lenin and
Stalin (Stalin: "To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is
necessary to abolish imperialism.") to show how wrong Khrushchev
is. They go on to Mao's 1938 "famous thesis" that "political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun," which the enders
have cited as evidence is a is warlike": "slanders like
yours were refuted" by Mao, who 25 years ago noted that "some
people ridicule us as advocates of the 'omnipotence of war "
and answered "Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of revo-
lutionary war; that is good, not bad; s r
"What is wrong with Comrade Mao Tse-tung's remark? ...
With their guns, the Chinese people have created a socialist
political power. All except imperialists and their lackeys can
readily understand that this is a fine thing...." The Chinese
characterize as "nuclear fetishism and nuclear blackmail" the
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Soviet charge that they are hoping for a "head-on clash" between
the Soviet Union and the United States:
"Our answer is: no, friends. You had better
stop your sensation-mongering cal
The is
!ME -
rm y opposed to a -head-on clash" etween the
Soviet Union and the United States, and not in words
only. In deeds, too, it has worked hard to avert
direct armed conflict between them. Examples of
this are the Korean war against U.S. aggression,
in which we fought side by side with the Korean
comrades, and our struggle against the United States
in the Taiwan Strait. We ourselves preferred to
shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary and stood
in the first line of defense of the socialist cam
so that e Soviet non might stay on the second
line. ave the ea ers o e CzSU any sense of
pro etarian morality when they concoct such lies?"
The fourth section, "Fight or Capitulate," continues in
the same vein. "Tit-for-tat struggle" is "the correct fighting
policy put forward y M e ales communists. 11
"The CPSU leaders assert that a tit-for-tat struggle
aga ns era sm wITT lead to International
tension. Actually, ru c ev s wrong app roams
to `negotiations is itself harmful to negotiations.
The more Khrushchev retreats before the imperialists
and the more he begs, the more the appetite or e
roper alas s will grow. Khrushchev, who poses as
the greatest devotee of negotiations in history, is
a ways at unrequ ted over and too often a laughing
stock....
The fifth section, "The Road in Defense of Peace and the
Road Leading to War," is a brief summary of the features of the
Chinese line on war and peace, juxtaposed against "the line
pursued by the leaders of the CPSU (which) is diametrically
opposed to our line, to the common line of all Marxist-Leninists
and revolutionary people."
November 19 (cont.) - The UN General Assembly's Political Com-
m ee approved a tin American resolution aimed at barring
nuclear weapons from Latin America by a vote of 89 to 0, with
14 abstentions. After delegates of the USSR Bulgaria, Czech-
oslovakia Poland an Belorussia 7713 en against the reso u-
on, all members of the Communist bloc abstained in e vo ng
-- except Albania and Rumania. This was said to be the first
time a Rumania has ever acted in opposition to a Soviet
position in the UN.
November 20 - The NYTimes carries a report by its Moscow corres-
pondent Tanner who cimes "informed sources" to the effect that
Soviet and Chinese Communist representatives (members of the
nese Embassy) have been "conducting consultations here with
a view to holding a conference o their two parties on eo Tog -
cal Issues.- The meeting may a expected early next year in
4 (#17 Chronology Continued)
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Peking, "unless the consultations fail." Tanner goes' on to say
that "some observers here believe that the Russians agreed to
another meeting with the Chinese because they wanted to avoid
being blamed for bringing about a showdown at a world conference,
not because they held any hope for success in the talks."
November 20 - Swedish CP daily Dag carries article by promi-
nen leader Lan n e aandiugamputonomy in "forming policy
and judging tendencies, occurrences and events abroad." He
categorically rejects the Moscow Declaration of 1960 and advo-
cates that e be reorganized and reconstItuted, possibly
in the form of a "socialist peoples party." Urges that CP
acknowledge democratic character of Swedish Government,
repudiate utilization of. the trade union movement for Party
purposes, etc. (Note: report of this article received here
was not specific on date; November 20 is assumed)
November 21 - The Chinese press reports that, following the
return. o "ylon CF-Chairman wickremasinghe from Moscow, the
Party's w issued a statement attacking the CCP and the Albanian
Workers Party to keep time to the baton of the Soviet CP leaders"
and took punitive measures against two of its Politbureau mem-
bers. However, these measures "have met with opposition from
many of its party organizations and members, as well as mass
organizations," People's Daily devotes more than a page to "the
full text of a statement issued by 10 members of the Ceylon CP
CC on 27 September in refutation of" the CC statement of the 26th.
(See Chronology, October 8, for earlier reference to the Ceylon
CP resolution.)
November 22 - Rumanian Party/State boss Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej
arrives-"'in Ie gra es' at
the head of a state delegation in response
to a long-standing invitation to make a state visit. Welcoming
the visit, Belgrade Politika anticipates that "luestions of the
international workers movement, international relations,, and
bilateral relations will dominate the talks " (in addition to
the construction of tire on a es y oe ectric power system),
and points out that "no disputed problems exist in Rumanian-
Yugoslav relations that would make understanding and mutual
cooperation impossible."
5 (#17 Chronology)
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CRONOLOGIA -- DISENSIONES CCMLINISTAS
No 17 9-22 Noviembre 1963
9 Noviembre: El "Zeri I Popullit", de Albania, lanza otra andancda-
en 7.000 palabras, Otros actor de traici del renegado Tito",
denando tambi6m "la hostil acci6n escisionista del grupo de N. Krus-
chev, que apoya a la camarilla de Tito y sigue sus pasos".
10 Novieniare: "Akabata", 6rgano dominical de PC 'a~ pon6s,publica un
articuloen forma de preguntas y respuestas expresando los puntos de
vista del partido sobre "la llamada 'querella international' ". Afir-
ma que "el PCJ toma una actitud independiente bacia las rencillas en
el movimiento comunista international", y "no declara qu6 partido tiene
la raz6n, qui6n tiene la raz6n ni a qui6n se debe apoyar pars ventaja
del PCJ".. SI contesta, no obstante, a "algunos (que) creen que el PC
chino quiere la guerra" declarando que "creemos que semejante opini6n
est6 completamente infundada y que "el pueblo japon6s... no podria
creer que el PC y el gobienro de la RP china son belicistas", y expre-
sa su desaprobaci6n de "los d.irigentes de ciertos partisco istas"
que iniciaron "criticas abiertas de aquellos partidos qUe no
Partidoade conferencia elpre-
estado
cjs
ne to las ellos" en
cisamen
PC chino.
El articulo concluye sosteniendo que "una conferencia interna-
cional debe celebrarse solo despu6s que las conditions necesarias
han rids suficientemente creadas por la consu!ta previa entre p ti-
dos fraternos..." (El 12 fue reproducido el texto completo en toda
la prensa de Pekin).
11 Noviembre: La prensa britgn.ica informa que "este fin de semana co-
menz una caipana para derrocar la direcci6n del Partido Comunista de
Gran Bretaffa". Por correo fueron despachados a los principales tra-
bajadores del partido 2.000 ejemplares de un manifiesto de 5 paginas
firmado por 14 comunistas que dicen representar a "cuadros" en toda
Gran Bretana. El manifiesto critics acerbamente los puntos de vista
y apoya a los chinos, llamando a todos los miembros del partido a
"derrotar a los revisionistas" en la dirigencia del partido y esta-
blecer un PC "genuino". Acusa a Kruschev de "abierta traici6n" y
ataca al secretario general Gollan asi como al director Matthews del
"Daily Worker" por apoyarlo. Michael McCreery, de 34 ai'fos, es el se-
cretario interino del nuevo Comit6 Brit6nico por la Unidad Comunista.
12 Noviembre: El corresponsal en Pekin de la agencia Zugoslava Tanyug
informa sobre la reuni6n del Congreso National del Pueblo Chino a ini-
ciarse en Pekin de noviembre, apuntando que la atm6sfera precongresal
est6 dominada por la querella chino-sovi6tica. "La impresi6n general
entre los observadores en Pekin, a base de toda una serie de documen-
tos dados alli a la publicidad, es que la unica alternativa que series
tal vez aceptada por el PC chino es la ca itulaci n completes a incom-
dicional del lado opuesto".
14 Noviembre: El "Diario del Pueblo" de Pekin publica el texto com-
pleto de un articulo del "Malayan Monitor e-Londres en courrnemoraei6n
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del aniversario de la Revoluci6n de octubre contraponiendo a Lenin
a los antiguos y los nuevos revisionistas, "Lenin no dijo: 'estamos
cercados por el imperialismo mundial, no podemos pues lanzar una in-
surrecci6n so pena de provocar un holocausto mandi.al'.... Lenin no
dijo del movimiento revolucionario entonces en ciernes: 'a clausu-
rarlo, est6is creando tensiones; un solo incendio puede iniciar una
conflagraci6n mondial' ". Predice: "La gran tierra sovi6tica que
vio el establecimiento del primer estado socialista brillard otra
vez cuando se hayan disipado las nubes".
15 Noviembre: La prensa china destaca una "declaraci6n conjunta de la
Federaci n Juvenil de 7oda China y la Federacibn Ceilanesa de Li as
Juveniles Comunistas V Progresistas" becha blica el a fa 1 en Pekin.
La Agencia Nueva China dice que el doeumento, 'Tratificado reciente-
mente por ambers federaciones y suscrito por el vicepresidente de la
federaci6n de toda China y por dos miembros del comit6 central de la
federacibn ceilanesa que "hicieron una visita amistosa a China del 18
al 20 de julio a invitaci6n de la Federacibn Juvenil de Toda China",
declara el acuerdo de ambos sobre la "ulterior consolidaci6n y desen-
volvimiento de las relaciones de unidad, amistad y cooperaci6n entre
ambas organizations, sobre la actual situaci6n international y sobre
cuestiones principal.es del actual movimiento mundial".
16 Noviembre: La edici6n de noviembre de "Hoc Tap", mensuario te6ri-
co del partido de Vietnam del Norte, destaca un pesado editorial de
5.000 palabras bajo el ep grate de 'Defendamos resueltamente los prin-
cipios revolucionarios de las dos Declaraciones de Moscf.". Haciendo
de la "actitud hacia la camarilla revisionists yugoslava" la piedra
de toque del "leninismo o el revisionisto", el articulo condena a
las personas que "estdn pretendiendo que el an6lisis de la cams ills,
de Tito en la Declaraci6n de 1960 est6 equivocado. Elogian la cama-
rilla de Tito... Entretanto buscan todos los medios de aislar los
verdaderos partidos marxistas-leninistas... Decir que el dogmatismo
es el principal peligro Para el actual movimiento comunista interna-
tional es contravenir completamente el espiritu de las dos Declara-
ciones de Moscd".
16 - 17 Noviembre: Toda la prensa china destac6 el 16 un informe
de la Agencia Nueva China del 15 en el sentido de que "la prensa
sovi6tica est6 vigorosamente sosteniendo su camp ana antichina...
Con tal fin un total de m6,s de 2.000 articulos y otras pietas han
sido publicados hasta la fecha. Desde el 27 de octubre, los diarios
sovi6ticos han dado gran publicidad a lo que denominan el llamamiento
de Kruschev a China a suspender las pol6micas abiertas, pero sus ata-
ques desenfrenados contra China continuaron como siempre despu6s de
hecho el sedicente llarnamiento. Cifras incompletas com'prueban que
del 28 de octubre al 10 de noviembre la prensa sovi6tica public6 mAs
de 80 editoriales, articulos sovi6ticos asi como extranjeros, 'carters
del lector', caricaturas y otras piezas, todas atacando a los diri-
gentes chinos y al pueblo chino". En ocasi6n del 30? aniversario
del establecimiento de relaciones diplomdticas entrela URS y los
EE.UU., informa la prensa china el 17, los diarios sovi6ticos puoli-
caron "un buen nt'imero de articulos abogando por la alianza con los EE.
UU. en oposici6n a China'. Informan adem s que F.C. Barghoorn, es-
Pia norteainericano detenido por los 6rganos de seguridad de la URSS,
fue puesto en libertad sin ser procesado debido a la 'inquietud' de
altos funcionarios norteamericanos".
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18 Noviembre: Una misi6n diplomdtica cubana ilega a Tirana, capital
de Albania, para inaugurar una embajada cubana. Un embajador alban6s
ha estado hace casi dos affos en La Habana, pero los cubanos ban duda-
do por temor a que una acci6n semejante socave la 'neutralidad' de
Cuba en Is. querella chino-sovi6tica. Los observadores consideraron
este paso de ahora como un "bofet6n a MoscCt".
19 Noviembre: Luego de un lapso de casi un mes los chinos publicaron
el quinto en su prolongada serie de comentarios conjuntos del "Diario
del Pueblo" y "Bandera Roja con base a la carte abierta del PCUS de
1 de juiio, un art culo de 10.000 palabra ttitulado Dos lineas di-
vergentes sobre la cuesti6n de Is. guerra o la az". (Vea la Cronolo-
gia en 6, 13 y 2 de septiembre y 21 de octubre, en cua"to a los ar-
ticulos anteriores de la aerie). Emplea a1gunas de las formulations
m6s extremas y la burla mds insultante -- dirigida a Kruschev por su
nombre -- que haya aparecido hasta lafecha en pol6mica alguna.
La primera secci6n, "Las lecciones de la bistoria," detalla "el
mont6n de mentiras sobre la cuesti6n de la guerra y la paz" difundi-
das por "el renegado Kautsliy" y sus co "revisionistas de la Segunda
Internacional", cuyospasos sigue Kruschev. La esencia de la segunda
secci6n, titulada "El mayor fraude", est6. en su oraci6n primera:
"No bay mentira mayor que la designaci6n del archienemigo de la paz
mundial como angel amante de la paz... Sin embargo, los dirigentes del
PCUS mantienen que los principales representantes del imperialism
norteamericano amen Is. paz". En respuesta a la pregunta dirigidales
en la carta abierta del PCUS, "Se imaginan que los gobiernos burgueses
todos estdn totalmente desprovistos de raz6n en todo cuanto hacen?"
contestan los chinos: "En una sociedad de clases no hay raz6n que
ue:
n
l
q
uye
pueda trascender la clase . Conc
1istas norteamericanos no se ban convertido
i
a
Los imper
en hermosos neles pese a la lectura de la Biblia y el
canto de sa mos por parte de Kruschev, no se ban conver-
tido en Budas compasivos pese a las preces y Las ofrendas
d.e
Iruschev de servir a los imperialistas norteamericanos...
6stos siguen abof eteando a Kruschev y revelando la ban-
carrota de las ridiculas teor as de Este embelleciendo
el imperialismo...
En la tercera secci6n, "La cuesti6n de la posibilidad de preve-
nir una nueva guerra mundial", los chinos titan a Mao, Lenin y Sta-
lin (Stalin: "Para eliminar la inevitabilidad de la guerra, es pre-
71-so abolir el imperialismo") Para demonstrar c6mo se equivoca Krua?
chev. Pasan luego a la "f amosa tesis" de Mao de 1933 de que "el po-
der politico crece del caMn de un arms de Fuego", la cual los diri-
gentes del PCUS ban citado comp prueba de que China es "bicuala":
ba-
"calumnias como las de ustedes fueron refutadas por Mao, el
ce 25 atos apunt6 que "aigunos nos ridiculizanomropmosadores
d0re5 na-
de;_la 'omnipotencia de la guerre'" y replic6 quc "Si,
Bores de la omnipotencia de Is. guerra revolucionaria; eso es bueno,
no malo; es marxista .
"4Qu6 tiene de malo la observaci6n de Mao Tse-tung? ???
Con sus armas el pueblo chino ha creado un poder politico socialista.
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Todos menos Los imperialistas y sus lacayos pueden fdcilmante com-
prender clue eso es la gran coca..." Los chinos denominan "fetichis-
mo nuclear y chantaajenuclear" is acusaci6n sovi6tica de que estAn
contando con u n directo- entre la Union Soviitica y las Be-
tados Unidos:
"Nuestra respuesta es: No, amigos. Major dejen su ca-
lumnia sensacionalista. El PC chino se opone irmemente
a un 'choque directo entre la Union Sovi6tica y los Es-
tados Unidos, y no en palabras solamente. En los hechos
tambi&n ha hecho ardua labor por evitar el conflicto arma-
do directo entre ellos. Ejemplos de esto ban sido la guer-
ra coreana contra la agresi6n de EE.W., en la que luchamos
bombro a hombro con loo camaradas coreanow, y nuestra lucha
contra be EE.UU. en el Estrecho de Taiw6n. Nosotros mi$mo
preferimos arrostrar loo fuertes sacrificios necesarios y
estuvimos en la primera linea de defensa del campo
La euarta secci6n "Pelear o capitular", prosigue en la misma
segunda 1 ea. y ienen Los dirigentes del PCUS sentido
g o de la. moral proletaria cuando fabrican semejantes
mentiras?"
cuerda. "La lucha de ojo por ojo" es la "correcta politics de lucha
propuesta. por los comunistas chinos".
"Los dirigentes del PCUS afirman clue la lucha de ojo por
ojo contra el imperialism llevar6 a la tensi6n interna-
tional. En realidad, la actitud equivocada de Kru s evch
hacia las negociacLones es en of nociva a las negociacio-
nee. Cuanto m6s Kruschev ceda ante los imperialistas y
cuanto imp ore, tan to mds crecer el apetito de los
imperialistas. Kruschev, a pose como el ma or devoto
de las negociaciones an la his ria, es siempre amante
no correspondido y machas ve ec s objeto de burles..?
La quinta secci6n, "El camino en defensa de is paz y el camino
que lleva a la guerra", es un breve resumen de los puntos sobresalien-
tes de la lines china sobre la guerra y la paz, yuxtapuestos contra
"la Linea perseguida por los dirigentes del PCUS (que) es diametral-
mente opuesta a nuestra Linea, a la linea comdn de todos los marxis-
tas-leninistas y gentes revolucionarias".
19 Noviembre (cont.): El Comit6 Politico de la Asamblea General de
la ONU apro a una resoluci6n latinoamericana tendiente a proscribir
de Latinoam6rica law armas nucleares, por voto de 89 a cero, con 14
abstenciones. Luego ue los delegados de is URSS, Bulgaria, Checos-
lovakia, Polonia e]orussia hubieron intervenidocontra la resolu-
ci n, t os los mienbros del bloque se abstuvieron de votar -- salvo
Albania y Rumania. Se dijo que ester habla sido la primers vez que
Kam- i-'a iab a actuado en oposici6n a una posici6n sovi6tica en is
oNU.
20 Noviembre: En "New York Times" publica una informaci6n de Tanner,
su corresponsal en Mosed, que cite a "fuentes enteradas" en el senti-
do de que representantes comunistas sovi6ticoe y chinos (miembros de
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la embajada china) han estado "llevando a cabo aqua consultaciones
en vista a celebrar una eonferencia de amboe tidos sobre cuestio-
nee ideol ices reuni ptiede espererse a principios del pr -
ximo afto en Pekin, "a menos que fracasen las conaultaciones". Tan-
ner continda diciendo que "algunos observadores aqua creen que los
erSan evitar
rusos aceptaron otra reuni6n con los chinos porque qu
que se les culpara de producir un encuentro decisivo en una confe-
rencia mundial y no porque tuvieran esperanza alguna de 6xito en las
conversations".
20 Noviembre: El diario del PC sueco "Ny Dag" publics un articulo
por el prominsnte dirigente Landin exigiendo completa autonomta en
"la formnlaci&n de politics y el juicio de tendencies, acontecimien-
tos y suceeoe en el extranjero". Categ6ricamente rechaza la Decla-
raci6n de Moscd de 1960 y aboga porque se reorganize y se reconsti-
tuya el , posiblemente en forma de "partido socialista del pueblo".
Pide que el PC reconozca el cardcter democrdtico del gobierno sueco,
repudia el empleo del movimiento sindical para fines del partido,
etc. (Nota: la informaci6n sobre este articulo no precisaba la
fecha del mismo; se presume ser el 20 de noviembre).
21 Boviemtre: La pensa china informs que despuds del regreso de
Moscift del presidente Wickremasinghe del PC de Ceildn, el CC del par-
tido "expidi6 una declaraci6n atacando el PC chi no y el Partido de
los Trabajadores de Albania pare, ester al compels de la batuta de los
dirigentes del PC sovi6tico" y tom6 medidas punitivas contra doe de
los miembros de su politbur6. No obstante, dichas medidas "han en-
carado la oposici6n de gran ndmero de las organizations y mienbros
del partido asi comp organizaciones de mesa". El "Diario del Pueblo"
dedica mds de una plena al "texto integro de una declaraci6n hecha
pdblica por 10 mienbros del CC del PC ceilands el 27 de septiembre
refutaado" la declaraci6n del CC del 26. (Vea Cronologia, 8 octubre,
con referencia a la resoluci6n del PC ceilands).
22 Noviembre: El jefe del partido y el estad.o _, Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej, liege a Bel ado encabezando una delegaci6n de estado
en respuesta a una invittci hace tiempo en ese sentido. En bien-
venida a la visita, el diario "Politika" de Beigrado predice que
"cuestiones del movimiento obrero ternacional, relaciones inter-
nacionales y relaciones bilater es dominar las conversaciones"
(ademds de la construcci6n del sistema hidroel ctrico de Puertas de
Hierro) y apunta que "no existen problemas en dispute en las relaci-
ones rumano-yugoslavas que imposibilitaran la conprensi6n y la coo-
peraci6n mutua."
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CHRONOLOGIE --- DISSENSIONS COMMUNISTES
Numero 17 9 - 22 novembre 1963
9 novembre: Le Zeri i Popullit al'uanais publie une nouvelle tirade
de 7000 mots "Actes de trahison aaditionnels par le renegat Tito"
denoncant ?galement "1'activit6 hostile du groupe de Kbrouchtchev,
qui soutient la bande de Tito et la suit sur sea traces".
10 novedxe: L'hebdomadaire du dimancbe du P.C. japonais Akaata
publie un article anonyme sous forme de questions et de reponses
qui donne 11opinion du parti sur "1a soi-disant dispute internatio-
nale". Il affirme que le "P.C. japonais prend une attitude ind6pen-
dante h 1'egard des disputes dans le mouvement comnuniste intern-
tional", et "ne declare pas quel parti a raison, qui a raison, ou
qui devra,it etre soutenu h 1'avantage du P.C. japonais". Toutefois,
it repond bien h "certaines gene qui pretendent que le P.C. chinois
desire la guerre". En declarant "Nous croyons qu'une opinion de ce
genre est totalement sans fondement", et que "le peuple japonais...
ne peut croire que le gouvernement de la Republique populaire de la
Chine et le parti communiste soient belliqueux", et ii exprime sa
desapprobation "aux leaders de certains partis communistes" qui se
sont livres "b. une critique ouverte de ceux des partis qui n16taient
pas d'accord avec eu;:" h la conference de Moscou de 1960, et notam-
ment avec lea critiques du parti ouvrier albanais et du P.C. chinois.
L'article conclut en affirmant "qu'une conference internationale
ne devrait etre r&unie qu'aprbs que lea conditions n&cessaires soient
suffisarmnent assurees au moyen de consultations prealables entre lea
partis fraternels..." (Le texte fut reprcduit en entier dins tous
les journaix de Pekin du 12.)
11 novembre: La presse britannique fait savoir "qu'une campagne
pour renverser lea leaders du P.C. de Grande-Bretagne a debut? au
cours du weekend". Deux mille copies d'un manifeste de 5 pages si-
En6 par 14 corcrosunistes qui pretendent representer "lea cadres" en
Grande-Bretagne furent adressees aux principaux travailleurs du par-
ti. I1 critique violemment lea opinions sovietiques et soutient lea
Chinois; lance un appel a tous lea membres du parti pour "vaincre
lea revisionnistes" parmi lea leaders du parti, et pour creer un
parti connnuniste "veritable". 11 accuse IShrouchtchev "de trahison
v4ritable" et attaque le secretaire-general Gollan, et 1'editeur
I:~ ttl~e-,'s du DLily ','or'.:er -.-.cur =' c:voir sou:,,.:._u. Lc seer ftc:ire intdri-
uc.ire lu nouveau co,.At6 ri c_.._~.inuc our 'unit6 corramuniste est Mi-
chel McCreery, aoL~de""3 T Sens': -
12 novembre: Le correspondent p6kinois de 1'Agence yougoslave Tanyug
fait rapport au sujet d'une r4union du Congrbs populaire national
chinois qui doit s'ouvrit b. Pekin le 17 novembre et sou!_igne que
1'atmosphbre avant le congrbs est dominee par la dispute sino-sovi6-
tique. "L'impression generale parmi lea observateurs h Pekin, basee
sur toute une serie de faits et de documents rendus publics ici, est
que la seule alternative qui puisse etre acceptee par le P.C. chinois
serait une capitulation complete et sans conditions du parti oppo
14 noverriare: Le Quotidien du peuple de Pekin donne le contexte com-
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plet dun article du Malayan Monitor (Londres) cormorant 1'anui-
versaire de la R6vol_ution d octobre of opposant Lenin aux nouveaux
et aux anciens revisionnistes. "Lenin n'a pas dit: Nous sommes
entourds par i'imperialisme mondial, par consequent noes ne devons
pas commencer une insurrection pour ne pas provoquer de holocauste
mondial... LAnine n'a as dit des mouvements r6volutionnaires qui
existaient alors: 'repliez-vows, vous allez cr?er des tensions; un
seul incendie risque de dormer lieu b. une conflagration mondiale' .
Lenin a predit: "La grande terre sovi6tique qui a vu la creation
du premier Etat socialiste brillera de nouveau lors ue les nudges
se seront dissippes".
15 novembre: La presse chinoise publie "une declaration commune de
la d ration pan-chinoise de la jeunesse et de la F6d4ration ceyla-
naise des ligues de eunesse communistes et progres fives tionnee a
Mkin le 14. L'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle declare Clue
document "ratifi6 recemment par deux federations" et sign? par le
vice-president de la Fed?ration pan-chinoise et par deux membres du
Comite central de la federation ceylanaise qui "ont rendu une visite
amicale b, la Chine du 18 au 20 juillet h 1'invitation de la Federatioi
pan-chinoise de la jeunesse", declare que les deux organisations sont
d'accord "pour continuer b. consolider et 'a developper les relations
d.'amitie, d'unite et de cooperation entre ces deux organisations, au
sujet de la situation internationale presente et au sujet des ques-
tions rincipales interessant h 11heure actuelle le mouvement mondial'
16 novembre: Le numero de novembre de Hoc Tap, publication mensuelle
th orique du P.C. du Nord Viet-man , donne ndditorial de 5 000 mots
intitule "DLfendons r s~ olument les principes revolutionnaires des
deux declarations de Moscou". Faisant "de l'attitude envers la clique
revisionniste yougoslave" la pierre angulaire du "leninisme ou revi-
sionnisme", Particle condamne les personnes qui "pretendent que l'a-
nalyse donne par la declaration de 1960 de la clique de Tito... en-
tretemps, ils cherchent 'd isoler par taus les moyens un nombre de
partis marxistes--1eninistes veritables... disent que le dogmatisme
constitue le danger principal pour le mouvement communiste interna-
tional actuel et de se mettre enti2?rement b, l'encontre de l'esprit
des deux declarations de Moscou."
16 - 17 novembre: Taus les journaux chinois du 16 donnent un article
de 1'Agence de presse de la Chine nouvelle dat6 du 15 qui d&clare que
"la presse sovi?tique attire vigoureusement sa campagne anti-chinoise
un nombre total de plus de 2 000 articles et autres publications
ont ete publi6s 'd eet effet. Depuis le 27 octobre, les journaux so-
vi6tiques ont donn6 une publicite considerable a ce qu'ils appellent
l'appel de Khroucbtchev a la Chine pour cesser les pol?miques ouver-
tes, mais leurs attaques sans fondement contre la Chine se sont pro-
duites comme d'habitude apres que le soi-disant appel ait ete fait.
La presse sovidtique publia plus de 80 editoriaux, des articles so-
vi6tiques et strangers, des 'lettres de lecteurs', des caricatures,
etc., tous attaquant les leaders chinois et le peuple chinois". A
l'occasion du 30e anniversaire de 11etablissement des relations di-
plomatiques entre 1'Union sovi6tique et les Etats-Unix, la presse chi
noise a fait savoir le 17 que les journaux sov16tiques ont publ16
"un bon nombre d'articles preconisant l'alliance avec les Etats-Unix
en opposition la Chine . Its font savoir galement que 'F.C. Bari,
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boom, espion am4ricain arrete par lea organismes de securite de
l'Union Sovietique, a 6t6 rel the sans jugement en raison du "souci"
des hauts fonctionnaires americains".
18 novembre: Une mission diplomatique cubaine eat arrivee h Tirana,
capitale de 1'Albanie, pour y ouvrir une ambassade cubaine. Un am-
bassadeur albanais se trouvait 'a La Havane depuis presque deux ans,
mais lea Cubains avaient besit6 pour que cette mesure ne sape pas la
neutralit6 cubaine dans la dispute sino-sovietique. Les observateurs
considerent que la decision actuelle constitue one "giffle donnee h
Moscou".
19 novembre: Aprbs un delai de pros d'un mois, lea Chinois out public
le S article de leer serie donnee en commun par le Quotidien du people
et lele Deauap rouge, article con-tenant des cowmen ires stir la lettre
ouverte du P. C. de 1'Union Sovi tique date du 1 juillet. L article
de 10 000 mots est intitul : Deux lignes di.fferentes sur la question
de guerre at de paix". (Voir Chronologies, 6, 13 et 26 septembre et
21 octobre, sur lea articles precedents de cette serie). Le language
le plus extreme y eat employe ainsi que des plaisanteries insultantes,
dirigdes contre Ktirouchtchev personnellement et bL un degre encore ja-
mais atteint au cours dune polimique.
La premiere section, "Les lecons de l'histoire , donne en detail
"les foul.es de mensonges sur la question de guerre et de paix" re-
pandus par "le renegat Kautsky" et par sea camaradea "revisionnistes
de la 2e Internationale" dont Khrouchtchev embotte le pas. L'essen-
tiel de cette deuxibme partie, intitulee "La grande fraude", eat con-
tenu dans sa phrase d'introduction: "I1 n'y a pas de mensonge plus
grand que de qualifier d'ange pacifique cet archiennemi de la paix
mondiale... Cependant, lea leaders du P.C.U.S. pretendent que lea
principaux representants de l'imperialisme americainn soot pacifiques".
Reprenant alors la question de la lettre ouverte du P.C.U.S. qui
leur fut adressee: "Pensent-ils reellement que tons lea gouverne-
ments bourgeois manquent de raison dans tout ce qu'ils font?" Les
Chinois repondent: "Dana une societe de classe it n' a pas de rai-
son qui 1.'emporte sur, la class -.Its concluent que:
. lea imperialistes americains ne sont pas devenus
des anges magnifiques en d6 it de la lecture de la bible
at des chants de psaumes auxquels se livre Khrouchtchev,
ils ne sent pas devenus des boudhas pleins de compassion
en d pit des pribres que dit Khrouchtcbev et de liencens
u'' i1brile . Khrouchtchev aura beau s' vertuer a. servir
lea imperialistes americains... ceux-ci continueront L lui
donner des giffles et a faire connattre 1'echec de sea
th ories ridicules qui embellissent 1'imperialisme...
Dana la 3e section, "La question de la possibilite d'empecher
one nouvelle guerre mondiale", lea Chinois citent Mao, Lenine et
Staline (Staline: "Pour eliminer l'inevitabilite de la guerre, it
est-ncessaire d'abolir 1'imperialisme ) dans le out de montrer 'a
quel point Khrouchtcbev a tort. Its reviennent 'a la "these fameuse"
de Mao de 1938 qui vent "que le "pouvoir politique emerge d'un ton-
neau de poudre", que lea leaders du P.C.U.S. ont cit comme preuve
que la Chine etait "belliqueuse": "des calomnies come lea v8tres
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ont 6t6 refutees" par Mao qui, ii y a 25 ans, soulignait que "quel-
ques Bens nous tournent au ridicule disant que noes prechons 'l'om-
nipotence de la guerre' " et ii repondit: "Oui, nous prechons l'om-
nipotence de la guerre r6volutionaaire; cela eat o t non pas mau-
vais; cela eat marxiste".
"Qu'y a-t-il de mauvais dans la re marque du camarade Mao Tse-
tung?... Avec leurs armes, lea Chinois ont cr66 une puissance poli-
tique socialiste. Taus h 1'exception des imperialistes et de leurs
laquais peuvent se rendre compte facilement que cela eat une bonne
chose..." Les Chinois qualifient de "fetichisme nucleaire et chan-
tage nucl6aire" 1'accusation sovietique selon laquelle ils espbrent
quit y aura une collision frontale" entre l'Union Sovietique et lea
Etats-Unis:
"Notre reponse eat: Non, coma a. Vous feriez mieux
d'arreter vos calomnies a sensation. Le P.C. chinois
eat fermement oppose des collisions frontales" entre
l'Union Sovietique et lea Etats-Unis, et non seulement
en paroles. En action egalement, it a travaill? pour
6viter tout conflit arme direct entre ces deux pays.
Cawme exemple, it y a la guerre de Coree contre 11agres-
sion americaine Bans laquelle nous avons combattu cite a
c8te avec lea camarades cordens, ainsi que notre lutte
contre lea Etats-Unix dans le detroit de Taiwan. Person-
nellement nous avons prefere d'assumer lea lourds sacri-
fices qui Ltaient necessaires et nous nous sommes tenues
en premiere ligne de defense du camp socialiste afin que
1'Union Sovi tique puisse rester en deuxieme ligne. Les
leaders du P.C. de 1'Union Sovi tique ont-ils aucun sens
de moralite proletarienne lorsqu'ils fabriquent des men-
songes pareils`?"
La 4e section, "Combattre ou capituler", continue sur le meme
ton. "Lutte coup pour coup" eat "la politique de combat correcte
preconns a par lea comrnunistes chinois".
"Les leaders du P.C.U.S. affirment qu'une lutte coup
pour coup contre l' imp rialisme conduirait a une ten-
sion internationale. En r alit , la position erron e
de Khrouchtchev a 116gard des negotiations eat elle-
meme nuisible pour lea negotiations. Plus X rouchtchev
battra en retraite devant lea imperialistes et plus
it mendiera, plus 1 ap tit des imp rialistes augmentera.
Khrouchtchev, ui se pose en tant que 1'homme le plus
d you aux n gociations de 11histoire, reste toujaurs ~~
?
un amant inassouvi et trop souvent un objet de rise..
La 5e section, "La route pour la defense de la paix et la route
menant a la guerre", est un resume succinct des caraeteres principaux
~^
de la ligne chinoise sur la guerre et sur la paix, compares a "la
ligne poursuivie par les leaders du P.C.U.S. qui diam6tralement op-
posee a notre ligne, h la ligne commune de tous lea marxistes-1eni-
nistes et des Sens revolutionnaires".
19 novembre (suite): Le Comit4 politique de 1'Assemolee gen6rale
des Nations unies a approuve une resolution de l'Amerique Latine
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tendant a interdire les acmes nucleaires en Ammrique Latine par un
vote de 89 a 0, avec 14 abstentions. A ras ue les deldgues de
ltUnion Sovi6ti ue de is Bul arse de la Tch coslava uie de la
Pologne et de la Belo-Russie eussent parl contre la resolution,
tous lea membres du bloc communiste s abstinrent de voter a 1'excep-
tion de 1'Albanie et de la Roumanie. Il a et6 dit que c'etait pour
la premiere fois que la Roumanie ait agi en opposition a 1'Union
Sovidtique aux Nations unies.
20 novembre: Le Nev York Times donne un article de son correspondant
a Moscou Fanner qui cite des sources informees" selon lesquelles les
representants communistes soviets ues et chinois (membres de l'ambas-
sade chinoise auraient eu des consultations a Moscou dens le but
d'organiser une conference de leurs deux artis sur les questions
id ologiues . La r union se tiendrait au d but de 1 ann a prochaine
a Pekin moins que les consultations n'aboutissent a un echec".
Tanner ajoute que "certains observateurs estiment que les Soviets ont
accept6 une nouvelle rdunion avec les Chinois parce qu'ils veulent
6viter le bl0me pour avoir provoque une discussion ouverte lore d'une
conf6rence mondiale et non pas parce qu'ils aient espoir que ces en-
tretiens puissent r6ussir".
20 novembre: Ny Dag, Quotidien du P.C. suedois, publie un article du
leader en vue Lasidin demandant une autonomie complete dens "ltelabo-
ration de la politique et dens les jugements port6s sur,les tendances,
les faits et les 6venements a 11etranger". Il rejette cat6gorique-
ment la declaration de Moscou de 1960 et demande que le parti commu-
niste soit r organis et reconstitud, sous la forme sans doute "de
partis socialistes veritables". Ii insiste pour que le P.C. recon-
naisse le caractlre democratique du gouvernement suedois, qu'il repu-
die 1'usage des mouvements syndicalistes pour les besoins du parti,
etc. (Le rapport concernant cet article recu ici ne sp6cifie pas la
date; la date presumee est le 20 novembre).
21 novembre: La presse chinoise fait savoir qu'a is suite du retour
de Moscou du president du P.C. du Ceylan Wiekremasinghe, le Comite
central du parti "a fait paraitre une declaration attaquant le P.C.
chinois et le parts travailliste albanais afin de conserver la Mesu-
re sous la direction des leaders du P.C. sovi6tique" et qu'il prit
des mesures de represailles contre deux des membres de on politburo.
Cependant, ces mesures "se sont heurtees a 1'opposition d'un grand
nombre d'organisations et de membres du parti, ainsi qu'a celle des
organisations de masse". Le Quotidien du peuple consacre plus dune
page "au texte complet de la d claration publi pax 10 membres du C.C.
du P.C. du Ceylan le 27 septembre oti ii refute la declaration du C.C.
du 26". (Voir Chronologie, 8 octobre, au sujet des references prece-
dantes a la resolution du P.C. de Ceylan).
22 novembre: Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej, chef du parti et de 1'Etat roar
:gains, est arrive a Belgrade a la tete dune del6gation d'Etat r6
pondant a une invitation d ja ancienne de faire une visite d'Etat.
Saluant la visite, Politika de Belgrade prevoit que "les uestions
du mouvement international ouvrier, des relations internationales,
et des relations bilatdrales domineront les pourparlers". En plus
de la question de construction du systeme hydroelectrique des Portes
de fer", et souliFne que "aucun differend n'existe daps lee relations
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entre la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie qui serait de nature h rendre
impossible la cooperation et la comprehension reciproques entre
les deux pays".
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715 (not for FL). Covertly Promoting Greater Stability in
25X1 C1 Ob T ee or Governments
EACKGROUND: Recent coups d'etat in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America have focused world attention upon an important
phenomenon in the underdeveloped countries of the world:
instability in government has come to be a sort of vicious
circle. It is one of the causes of the poverty and ignorance
of the masses, and, at the same time, it encourages and
facilitates violent action on the part of irresponsible
groups, including the frequent seizure of power by the military.
We define a stable government as one that can assure
Its citizens and inter interested nationals of other governments
that its policies will not change suddenly or radically over
an extended period of time. Totalitarian governments achieve
a maximum degree of domestic stability by the arbitrary
application of force. Democratic, representative governments
seek to achieve a sufficient degree of stability through
popular support and conciliating the oftentimes conflict-
ing demands and interests of all sectors of the population.
The fact of instability has come to be more and more
the number-one pro elf the underdeveloped countries of the
world: and the former colonies of Asia and Africa, now inde-
pendent nations, have only served to swell the ranks of the
chronically unstable governments. The countries of Latin
America, having been independent for 150 years, have a long
history of instability. In the matter of military coups
alone, the casual observer has the impression that Latin
American nations prefer to solve the problem of presidential
succession violently rather than constitutionally. Indeed,
during the 34-year period beginning in 1930 and ending in
1C3, there were 103 changes of heads of state in Latin America
by violent or illegal means. In Mexico, the only exception
to the general rule during this period, presidents have been
elected and inaugurated in an orderly manner and according to
the Constitution of 1917, the oldest constitution in force
today in Latin Lmerica. If Eomulo Betancourt is able to
finish his constitutional term as president of Venezuela, it
will be the first time in the history of that country that a
legally elected president has been able to do so.
Dictatorship, or the seizure of power by military force
has not provided the answer to stability, especially in a
world increasingly convinced that sovereignty resides in the
people. The dictator at first offers advantages in efficiency
and promise of stable government. The so-called oligarchy of
many countries of Latin America has traditionally had recourse
to the dictator to protect itself against the masses. But they
a0-7N^ r, : i ^^ (715. Continued)
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forget the implacable process by which, according to Lord Acton,
"?ower tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
In addition, and by a logical dialectic, dictatorship generates
an opposition composed of many decent elements, both in and out
of the country, which becomes more and more popular, more and more
respected. The danger is not only that disruption accompanies
the removal of a dictator, but that a respectable opposition may
be captured by Communists and converted into a Castro-type force.
The succeeding government may bring something far worse than the
repressive administration of the military dictator it overthrew.
Just as Simon Bolivar saw clearly the need for a balance
between libertad y orden, the desire for stability should not
be translated into an emphasis on order to the detriment of
liberty.
Few of the countries in the underdeveloped areas have been
free from other chronic types of violence, such as: mass
demonstrations against the government; deliberate attempts to
provoke the police to use clubs, tear gas, sabers, and even fire-
arms; attempts by crganized labor to control the government
through work stoppages or general strikes; seizure of private
lands by armed peasants; indiscriminate planting of bombs in
public places; senseless destruction of the property of both
foreign-owned and domestic enterprises; the constant threat of
nationalization that hangs over many foreign-owned properties;
and the continual plotting by elements of the military for the
illegal seizure of the apparatus of government.
United States concern over instability in governments in
Latin America was underscored by President ,ennedy in the address
which he delivered on 1C November 1963 before the Inter-American
press Association at its meeting in Miami Beach. Giving voice
to some long overdue truths about the Alliance for progress, he
said:
"Nor can the failure of some to meet the goals
of the charter be placed wholly on the shortcomings
of the Alliance. No amount of external resources, no
stabilization of commodity prices, no new Inter-
American institutions, can bring progress to nations
which do not have political stability and determined
leadership. No series of hemispheric agreements or
elaborate machinery can help those who lack internal
discipline; who are unwilling to make sacrifices, and
renounce privileges. No one who sends his money
abroad, who is unwilling to invest in the future of
his own country, can blame others for the deluge which
threatens to overcome him."
The causes of instability should not be sought exclusively
in the cover y, hunger, ignorance, or generally depressed condi-
tions of the masses. These are as much a result as a cause of
instability. poverty leads to dissatisfaction, agitation, dis-
order and violence. In turn, chronic instability alienates
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foreign and domestic capital, stifles initiative, makes for
corruption in government and inefficiency in industry and
agriculture. A vicious circle is set in motion.
Nor is a high per capita income such as in Prgentina and
Venezuela, any guaranieability.
Venezuela has one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin
America but the indiscipline of erem ggroups threatens
the stability of this government perhaps more than anywhere
else in the ;Western Hemisphere.
en so, in most parts of the world, the submerged masses
are easy marks for agitators and demagogues who promise land
to the landless, bread to the hungry. Injustice has come to
be so much the rule rather than the exception that there is
a widespread tendency for groups to prefer direct action to
legal appeal. Regardless of the righteousness of their cause,
they have no faith in the governing authorities. Thus, if the
students of a university can be persuaded that the government
is not giving their school enough money, or that the rector is
incompetent, or that they should have to pay only half-fare on
all public transportation, or that certain professors should be
fired, -- then they will go on strike and physically occupy the
campus until their demands are satisfied. Sometimes the
students are justified and sometimes they are not. rut where
stability -- law and order -- suffers is that most issues are
never legally decided one way or the other.
A clever Communist agitator may be able to persuade a
community of half-starving peasants to seize the lands and
stock of a wealthier, more progressive farmer. The needs of
the many are so real and the possessions of the few so obvious
that it is difficult in such cases for those in authority to
take measures necessary to maintain public order. This situa-
tion has brought about an attitude of tolerance toward arbitrary
and illegal acts, which, when generalized, signifies the virtual
abdication of the rule of law.
Where the state permits one group to break the law because
it has some semblance of moral right on its side, other groups
are encouraged to do the same thing though they may have no
moral justification whatever. The apparatus of justice in a
given country is normally concerned with whether an act is
objectively legal or illegal, not whether it is subjectively
moral or immoral. To argue, as many presumably intelligent
Latin Americans do, that it is moral, therefore should be legal,
for the needy to take what they need by force is to encourage
a subjective, ad hoc interpretation of objective, positive law.
In such an atm-ospere, more and more people will tend to taste
the law into their own hands, which will result in a breakdown
in law and order, an end to stability.
The advantages of stability among democratic governments
thus become self evil t; Countries with stable governments
will have fewer problems of public order and hence less danger
3
000 (71E. Continued)
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from the inroads of Communist subversion. They will offer at-
tractive investment conditions for foreign and domestic capital.
They will generally have an expanding economy and a high growth
rate in the national income. The people and their leaders will
tend to be friendly because, being more prosperous, they will be
less envious of others and less liable to be infected by the
virus of nationalism.
 25X1C10b
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25X1C10b 716 EE,VZ. Poland: Lard-Line Trend
BACKGROUND: Party chief Gomulka since his advent to
power in 1755 has more or less unswervingly pursued his own
peculiar policy line during an era of tortuous change of
direction among other Communist states in fast Europe. His
goal for Poland is a national Communist welfare state with
limited individual liberties and limited free enterprise.
Me recognizes that the Poles could be brought to accept such
a system only through slow persuasion but he is determined
that the system will be ultimately accepted by them. In
following this road he has fluctuated between responsiveness
to popular pressures for greater freedom, particularly
freedom of expression, and insistence by hard-line Communists
on stricter regime controls.
Gomuiha was swept into his ;resent )osition in 1956 by
the impact of an anti-Russian and revisionist (at least
potentially anti-Communist), nationalist surge. He was
accepted, despite initial Soviet disapproval, by other Polish
Party leaders as the only alternative to internal chaos,
and the threat of consequent Soviet military intervention.
wit of the historic meeting of the Central Committee of the
United Polish "Jorkers Party (PZP,) in the autumn of 1956
came relaxation of police rule, an end to forced collectiviza-
tion of agriculture, reaffirmation of the right of peasants
to own land and a truce with the Roman Catholic church.
These reforms earned for Poland the reputation of being the
relatively most liberal country in the Soviet Bloc. However,
-- as liberalization was gradually curtailed over the follow-
ing years -- it has become evident that much of the relaxation
was owed to the weaknesses and not to the designs of the Party
leadership. Currently the Gomulka regime appears to have
accelerated the curtailment of what still remains of the
"Cctober gains" and finds itself now moving counter to new
trends toward liberalization among other East European states
of the Soviet Bloc. While there is no proof that this
hardened policy comes from other than party leader Gomulka, it
may be attributable in part to diehard dogmatists who Gomulka
has reinstated in certain key posts. At the same time, unful-
filled promises of more consumer goods have fostered growing
bitterness among the people. In a vicious circle of cause and
effect, the productivity of labor has declined to a point
bordering on sabotage and the country's economic stagnation
has been deepening. If Gomulka continues to impose harsher
controls, he will place in jeopardy all of the public support
and economic gains that have accrued to the regime as a
result of the 19'56 reforms. The pattern of tightening is
??11^ ntinued
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(71~pponY. )
evident in the realms of public expression and religion as
well as in security.
Freedom of Expression. The Poles' strongest desires for
emancipation are in this field and it is here that the Gomulka
regime has most sharply curtailed earlier concessions. The
highly popular and revisionist weekly, Po Prostu, was closed
only one year after the Polish October, signalling the regime's
return to a more rigidly repressive policy. The once flourish-
ing discussion clubs of the young intellectuals have been closed.
Distributors of offending books or periodicals have been jailed
and prize winning plays, critical of the regime, have been
banned by censors. Progressive writer and editor Henryk Holland
died in police custody in 1962, officially reported as a
"suicide, but apparently in reprisal for having had close con-
tacts with foreign journalists. The freedom of writers to
travel abroad has been severely restricted. Finally, Warsaw's
two influential literary weeklies, Nowa Nultura and Przeglad
Kulturalny, were closed in 1963 and were replaced by u ura,
the stated mission of which was to "serve the cause o
many-faceted developments of socialist culture, stressing the
achievements and perspectives of the cultural revolution in
Poland." Or, as Gomulka put it to the Thirteenth Plenum of
the PZPR Central Committee in summer of 1963, "We do not and
will not allow the propagation of ideas hostile to socialism,
ideas that are harmful from the point of view of our educational
work." With the closure of these two weeklies, the Party has
closed an era of outstanding Polish achievement in the creative
fields of literature, art, theater and the cinema. The editorial
content of the new Kultura, while less dogmatic than feared,
has reflected the emptiness of the socialist "cultural model."
Creative talents and the deep desire for freedom of expression
are still very much alive but they are silenced in Poland by
the growing control of hard-line Party functionaries over the
entire field of culture. For broader coverage of this subject,
see "Eclipse of the Polish October," from Problems
of Communism, ^ept-Oct 1963, included in Press Comment ov1363.
Religion. Gomulka saw the church-state agreement of
Detober 1956 only as establishing a modus vivendi based on the
status quo. Thus, in violation of the agreement concluded
between Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynski just prior to the
parliamentary election of January 1957, religious instruction
in public schools was subsequently curtailed.
During an interview with the Le Monde editor-in-chief in
1931, Gomulka replied to the question of whether religion was
to disappear with the older generations under Poland's "own
road" course by saying,
"Religion is deeply anchored in the greatest part
of our population. It would be senseless for us
t4 try to force changes and convictions of faith
by administrative means. . . . It is difficult
(716. Continued)
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to say how long religious belief will continue
to exist in Poland. Certainly for decades,
possibly still longer. . . . The only thing we
do not want is for the Church to be used in
opposition to us and to socialism . . . .17
GomulLka naturally failed to mention that he used pseudo-Roman
Catholic political groups in an effort to weaken the influence
of the church. Nor has the regime by any nneans forsaken "admin-
istrative means" against the church. In 1963 a pattern of
operations has emerged for regime seizure by force of property
belonging to Roman Catholic religious orders, with geographic
coordination of seizures apparently effected carefully in Vlarsaw.
By the end of August 1963 all but one of the minor seminaries,
devoted to the training of future clergy at high school level,
had been closed by the State and harassment of major seminaries
had begun. Nuns have been driven out of work in most of the
former church hospitals, which were first made state property,
and today nursing nuns operate only in sanatoria for the hope-
lessly ill and for retarded children. However, despite the
regime's unacknowledged campaign against the church as an
institution, individual religious freedom in the narrow sense
of the term does continue to exist, both for religious minorities
and for the Roman Catholic majority.
Agriculture. Agriculture has remained a major problem
despite the fa-e-f-that it has been relatively more successful in
Poland than in most Communist states. It is notable that polish
agriculture, among the most productive in the Soviet Bloc, has
always been the least collectivized. Added to this, the 1956
uprising impelled the regime to permit a mass dissolution of
collectives and additional incentives were given to farmers in
the form of higher delivery prices or lower quotas of forced
deliveries. Production increases followed. Extremely adverse
weather and crop conditions have recently hurt polish agricul-
tural production just as in the rest of Europe. Official pro-
nouncements express concern over production levels. These
pronouncements bring to mind the consistent reiteration by
Gomulka and other regime officials that the polish peasantry
'5X1C10b must ultimately be led to agricultural collectivization.
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2 December 130
717 ",'iE, a. An Italian C"-, "Declaration of Independence"
UACXG OUND: The 28 October issue of the PCI daily organ
L'Unita carried a 12,000-word statement adopted by a CC plenum
,e day before, entitled "'or a New Advance and or the Unity
of the International Communist Movement," which is the strong-
est and most effective presentation to date of their "creative
development in Marxist thinking" in accordance with the "new
situation (which) has grown up to face the Communist movement."
It presents persuasive arguments for revisionism, reformism
and polycentrism.
Ac'hnowledging that "the Communist movement as a whole
has been slow to grasp the real meaning of the changes that
have come about," the Italian Communist leaders again praise
the 20th CPSU Congress, which "constituted a first giant
step toward making up for lost time, . . . hailed by Communist
`arties throughout the world as the beginning of a grand
reformation of the entire movement." Throughout the text they
condemn a Chinese for their "dogmatic approach, closed and
sectarian" views, and their "attach=, pushed to the point of
exasperation and in fact to the limits of endurance, against
the CPU and other Communist oar,.ies.'
Along with their general rebuttal of the Chinese line,
however, the Italians subtly take advantage of the situation
to reinforce their demand for independence for their party, for
other parties and for the international front organizations,
from Soviet (as well as Chinese) om na on or interference.
Translating their concept of independence into action, the
Italians opposed an apparent Soviet plan to convene an early
conference of world parties to force the issue with the
Chinese (most observers believe that the C^'1 action was a
major factor in stopping this Soviet move), emphasized their
own conviction that bilateral relationships should be
principal form of contact, de ate and collaboration among
parties." and a "considerable benefit can be derived" from
such collaboration "among parties working in the same part of
the wor c, where all ace certain major issues and problems
in the common struggle." They declare: "Insofar as we our-
selves are concerned, we shall go on working to get such
channels established, to serve the European Common Market Prea,
and all of capitalistic :3urope.11
On the specific issues in dispute in the Communist world
today (war and peace, revolution and national liberation,
transition to and building of socialism), the Italian state-
ment sets forth views so "reformist," even "democratic," that
they could be said to verge on the platforms of some of the
free wor
s socia ist par~l`es~~t does not mince words in
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calling for "the total liquidation of those illegal restrictions
on and violations of the principles of democracy and socialist
legality which for too long have tarnished the socialist ideal
and hampered economic construction and democratic growth, both
in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist countries." eir
arguments are on a far more intelligent and persuasive (from a
free world view, at least) level than those of the Soviets or
the Chinese.
The full text of this highly significant statement in
English translation was published in No. 523 if the series
Translations on International Communist Developments, JT-S:
No. 21,771C, dated 7 November 1363. Selected passages are
quoted in an unclassified attachment to this guidance.
25X1 C10b
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5X1C10b 710 N JThe 70th Birthday of Mao Tse-tung
BACKGROUND: Mao Tse-tung was born on December 26, 1993
in the village of Shao Shan, Hunan Province. His parents were
poor peasants who, as Mao grew into boyhood, gradually improved
the family status and became rather well-to-do. Mao was given
the usual formal education but early in life turned his interest
to Marxism and to revolutionary activity. Ie was one of the
founders of the Chinese Communist Party and has devoted his
entire life to it. In 1931 he became Chairman of the Soviet
Republic of China and in 1934 he led the famed "Long March"
from 1:iangsi Province to Yenan (61,000 miles). After V!orld ViarII
he led the Communists in their civil war against the government,
ending in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Euomintang. Mao,
long the central figure in the Chinese Communist Party, has
dominated it and the government of the Chinese People's Republic
since it came to power on October 1, 1949.
Law prohibits celebration of leaders' birthdays. Mao's
upcoming birthday will probably be the occasion of at least
some celebration in spite of the fact that the CCP Central
Committee in 1949 passed a resolution prohibiting celebrations
of the birthdays of living Party leaders. Regardless of how
the Chinese Communists choose to mark the occasion, it provides
an excellent opportunity for reviewing and evaluating Mao's
contribution to the Chinese people as well as to Marxism-Leninism
and the International Communist Movement. Granted that Mao was
a great revolutionary leader and a highly skilled general in
guerrilla warfare, he is nevertheless vulnerable for the dismal
failure of Chinese Communist domestic policies and their disas-
trous results on the living standards of the Chinese people.
Similarity to Stalin. Mao, like Stalin as soon as he had
consolidated his authority, initiated a period of terror the
extent of which will never be fully known. Like Stalin's purges,
Mao's reached down into the remotest villages effecting the
lives of nearly everyone on the Chinese Mainland. Mao may have
had his differences with Stalin but he imta?- him quite delib-
erately in choosing terror as his weapon for ensuring the
permanence of the Communist revolution. Even the tactics chosen
were similar: The Communist cadres aroused the villages and
set class against class, group against group until thousands of
people had been wiped out. The purges stopped as soon as Mao
wanted them stopped -- and he wanted them stopped when in their
wake they had created an all-pervasive environment of fear. Mao
himself has said that 000,000 people were "liquidated"; Po Yi-po
later raised the figure to two million, and Kuomintang officials
put the figure at nine million. No one will ever know how many
died; all that is known is that there was a bloodletting of
Continued)
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monstrous proportions and that the innocent suffered along with
the guilty as the Communists relentlessly stamped their imprint
on the country and its people.
Mao's domestic economic policies. Each of Mao's new policy
pronouncements seems to lead to a new cycle of failure and is
abandoned just in time to avert total disaster. In the Spring
of la53 Mao decided on the wildly unrealistic goal of a 150-
percent increase in agricultural production within 12 years.
In the Autumn of 1057 he set out a new course of socialist con-
struction in China which was to rely on unprecedented organiza-
tion and exploitation of human resources -- the formation of
^eople's Communes as part of the Great Leap ~orward. The attempt
to:establish communes with their quasi-military discipline
envisaged a state of control over the lives of the peasants that
even Stalin did not consider possible.
It has been said that Mao tries to rule the vast empire
of China in the same way that he ruled a small valley in Yenan
where meal and clothing tickets largely took the place of money
-- i.e. by a single authoritarian dictatorship. A single store
in Y'enan catered to the needs of the whole population on the
basis of tickets signed by Communist officials. Such a primitive
system magnified several thousand times and applied to the whole
of China has only compounded the troubles and difficulties that
the Chinese people have had to face.
Regarding Mao's contribution to Marxism-Leninism and the
International ~:ommunis movement., for many years a was applauded
for having "adapted Marxism-Leninism to the conditions and situ-
ation in China" with the implication that the original tenets
of Marxism-Leninism were inadequate and required adjustment or
revision before they were applicable to Chinese conditions.
But now that Mao has charged Khrushchev and the other Soviet
leaders with Revisionism, Mao is no longer the adaptor but rather
the most ardent and strictly orthodox follower of the purest
form of Marxism-Leninism. Fie is, of course, not the first nor
the last Communist leader to change his definitions and his
position on Marxism-Leninism to suit the needs and demands of
the moment.
Chinese propagandists try to portray Mao as a great origi-
nal thinker and as an accomplished ideological theoretician in
the tradition of Marx and Lenin. They have tried, with Mao's
help to weave Mao's successes in the tactics of guerrilla warfare
into doctrine on "the strategy of waging revolution from self-
sustained rural bases." They also base their claim of 1.lao's
worth as a Marxist philosopher on his "On Practice" and "On
Contradictions," alleged to have been written in 1937 but not
published until 1950 and 1952 respectively. Actually, "On
Practice" is a paraphrased selection of portions of Lenin's
Philosophical Notebooks and Materialism and 23mpirio-Criticism.
n Con rac.ic ions is a similar rehash o what others have said
about the unity of opposites. Mao's real role as a philosopher
has been not as an originator or even as a skillful adaptor, but
rather as a vulgarizer and a plagiarist.
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The question of "peaceful coexistence" has played a crucial
role in the Sino-Soviet rift, for which Mao bears a large part
of the responsibility. Years ago in Yenan, in an interview with
Robert Payne, in response to Payne's question regarding what the
Chinese Communists would do if they were confronted with modern
tan';s, Mao answered that "they would tear them to pieces with
their bare hands." Mao today is still the victim of his own
experience; he thinks in terms of guerrilla warfare and is unable
to deal with questions related to the power of modern weapons
and thermonuclear destruction. At the time when other Communists
are beginning to concede that not even Lenin, let alone Marx,
could have foreseen the nature of thermonuclear war, Mao still
adheres to outmoded concepts.
Mao honors Stalin. Ironically, in view of the fact that
China was the arena of-some of Stalin's most monumental blunders,
(failure to recognize the importance of the peasantry and will-
ingness to use the CC's as a pawn in his own international
strategy) Stalin is more honored as a prophet in China than in
Russia. ^talin's words, spoken in 1945 when the Soviet Union --
li'-e China today -- still did not have atomic weapons, form the
basis for Mao's current concepts of nuclear war. Stalin said:
"I do not believe the atom bomb to be so serious a force as
certain politicians are inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs
are intended for intimidating weak nerves."
Another irony is that Mao is Stalin's staunchest defender
and imitator today, although Tiao disagreed with Stalin on many
occasions and even instituted policies against the specific
advice of Stalin, most notably the Chinese Communists' intensive
and vigorous pursuit of the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek.
The supreme irony is that Mao defends Stalin while -pursuing
policies more closely akin to the ideas of Stalin's arch enemy,
Leon Trotsky; All of these conflicting and confusing aspects
of Mao's loyalties, conceptions, and his policies are consistent
with the interpretation that Ilao's primary motivation and inter-
est is in retaining his own position of power and authority over
700 million Chinese people and in furthering the age-old national
25X1C10baspirations of the Chinese race.
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713 A ,I ,f. Co:i.Lunist Wducation of Foreign Students
BAC'NGROUI ; The Soviet Union and her European satellites
continue to expand educational opportunities for students from
uneardeveloped countries despite public criticism of strict Com-
mun,_st control over foreign students, despite the numbers of dis-
satisfied students who have fled Communist schools and revealed
the political nature of their training. Riots against repressive
treatment have ta>:en place in several of the satellites, most re-
cently in Bulgaria during February 1333 when African students
loudly voiced their protests against being forbidden to form
their o*.wn foreign students' organization and against discrin.na-
tory treatment.
Bone of the criticisms and revelations has slowed the Com-
munist education program which has roughly trebled in size since
1333. Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain. Approximately
EE,330 students from Africa alone are believed to be studying in
the Communist bloc and a total of approximately 20,030 foreign
students in all of the Communist countries. Although this does
:ot compare with the nearly 2001000 foreign students from under-
developed countries now enrolled in the United States, France,
Great Britain and :lest Germany, it represents a tremendous in-
vestment in foreign youth elites by communist countries which
need funds for capital investment themselves. Expansion of this
increasingly expensive program is positive evidence of its im-
portance to co=, unism. Some clues to why it is important may be
found in the treatment and use of the dents during their
years of schooling.
privileged Students. Not all foreign students studying
in the bloc are ban a in the same fashion. Students recently
returning to African countries have reported that there is a
privileged group among than. Some receive special allowances;
some are able to travel abroad even though they have no pass-
ports; some are accorded far better grades than their academic
achievements warrant. Fellow students believe this special
treatment represents payment for services rendered such as parti-
cipation in propaganda broadcasts or interviews for publication;
attendance at, Communist front conferences as representatives of
their home country; participation in "spontaneous d;e: ons::ra-
trons" against Waste-_"n actions; leadership of associations of
fellow students, from the homeland; and even informing on fellc:i
students.
Students Foe turn. The impact of lame numbers of students
returning horse after several years of Communist education will
not be felt for another few years, but a few returnees have
spent several of their impressionable years with their Communist
hosts. Ito consistent pattern emerges as to their political at-
titudies or the roles they will play in the community but some
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co=on features do appear. Mcst of those who return are see'Xing
jobs with their own -rovern_. ents who need and welcome trained'
personnel. /flnost all current leaders of Nast 2uropean satel-
lites were tfai ned in ,he UCSI" in the K-33s and 1940c. See
Wolfgang Leonard) "Child of the Revolution".7 Others seek posi-
tions in Maass media, youth organizations and labor groups.
2 or example, trade union activity absorbs many of the
graduates, particularly from those ;last European schools which
require that the student return to his own country after a year
any: ?gut his ::noviledge to war':. Some students have found posi-
tions with Communist front organizations. Paul Sekasi, a
Ugandan who became the Uganda secretary for the Afro-Asian
?eop?es Solidarity Organization, was educated at Earl Marx Uni-
versity in L,einzig. Two Congolese (Brazzaville) who studied
variously in !:ussia, ?vague and Budapest, were prominent in the
overthrow of ?resident Youlou in August 1003. It is no accident
that returning students seek positions with mass media. A new
anti-?estern Brazzaville weekly, Binanda, is edited by two
former students from Moscow; the cc anan of the Tanganyika
25X1C10b Broadcasting Corporation was trained in Prague and Leipzig.
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FOR, A EMU A.. VAITC" AIM FOR '2171i WI'I" ?a
I17231
about a peaceable and .democratic wa*,;, vie are tarsi ng about a
-3 'Jr'. a y
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 pLrfiWf -Qj e999/ wor~aiag' c ass and its allies i0004 003-4
nto the
seats o political power, and do so w ou recourse To -guer-
rilla warfare or to c vii war. Vie are a U n; about some n;
alive and v a .... a are -ring about a many-sided struggle,
one that hits the class enemy from every angle, one that builds
a unified movement -,;:hich, under the leadershir.3 of the working
P)6 T will be able to step in, in the shop-and in the social
clam, in tha pre-election scramble and in the government office,
and a it
s
y s may. it is through struggles line these that we
have workked,..to rally to its standard the great masses of the
people,..to push through reforms in the economic structure and
in the political establis ent designe to improve a liven
conditions o he masses an
at the-same me
strike a ow
,
,
a the pa ern o owners ip (through agrarian reform, nationali-
zation, democratic economic planning
and the like) and at the
,
organization of the State. This strategy is the direct opposite
of the do-nothing policies the Chinese comrades would attribute
to us; it is a strategy that will, as of now, build up a strug-
gle for political power, and for the advent of the rule of the
working class.
...(The) Chinese view arbitrarily lumps together, and
thereby confuses situations in which parliamentary inst-ffut#on
s
elected ass
b i
em
es and orma r t libt h:-
soeryave never
e or have a only a -marginal existence my' o ers in
which such convent ons an institutions are d
f
eep y roote
in
the consciences,--in the struggles-, and in the experience o t
f great masses ....
Cie emphatically affirm that today, in very many advanced
capitalist countries, the attack on the mastery of monopoly
capitalism, the drive to win over a majority of the people and
to build a new society, can and must develop through the insti-
tutions of representative democrat the elective political
assemblies and the rights to liberty that are I nkfed with them-
as well as along other lines.
,__ The sum total of the changes,
both objective and subjective, that have occurred in the ad--
vanced capitalist countries, have led in turn to major changes
in the arrangement and in the structures of the State. There
has been an enormous growth in the public share of the economy,
in direct E-fite intervention in the economy and in production,
an:~ in State capitalism. The re ationship between politics and
economics has drawn very close indeed. There is a whole body
of popular pressure building up behind political demands that
will affect the entire sphere of the economy, and an imposing
array of new gains that will materially affect both politics
and the economy.
In western 3urone, a socialist solution that would destroy
the basis of the economic and political power of the big capi-
talist bourgeoisie must-not only arantee food and jobs. It
3
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List so s ~.anci ready to ;uarantee a fast-paced grovith in
pyoC a ion, to i-,?Ianent an econoiic tan viit j i.nceaitives for
in ividual in'? tip tiv3, to rule society by . aranteeing a broad
u _
"ante Ol c^.;?tonoriy an:' o o1i 1c 1 Jee y, a M2 c 3:Os Gi`~3
ter-- _
free Sur su! t OT .-ern1-n7 ant the con in a exchan4C of 3as.
p Hoy .aoving, as os right now, in this di ection an vri
this prospec ct before us, can vie -"ully respond to the surging
demand fro_.l the very hart Of the masses; only so can we vin
to us and unite the :.aajori ty of the wor.Lin class and of the
people. ':e 'gave suf er3C too much in the east from narrov7
:li:l s that could not understand this need .... It is time vie re-
ile~ a bit on the objective causes an,-", tie subjective 1i ai-
tationly that. have lea the ior. er s' move-=ent into serious le-
feats in the advanced capitalist countries.
. . . Ue cannot ova-loo'-7: the power and the death or the
so- a1i s an", Catholic ':3oveElents in rl3stern Europe even W
___s the r,or'. ng class. without fa and prey to that ingantl le
eztre-m!s u rt .ich Lenin, reflecting on the experience o:. t Ee izi-
~:ac :ate post-war j~eiIod, so harshly criticized....
It is no accident that the Chinese corm nc;es' position re-
s hits in a line that is prefoun_i1y .,als - a':en on one issue vital
to the F,2tion o-: the vior~,ers I ::1oven ent : the issue of the unity,
the nature, and the o:)jectives of the mass organizations on the
i 7on G7i:.e level. :e must guar against any t3fl ency to con-
sider tine world mass or=an_2a' ions s ;tlerely proJectlons and
tools of part policy. The Chinese co ira:ses do to le this v3.evi
c1' these organizations; furtherrlore, of recent years they have
v or':ef to ua.ze thei7 the tools of the pa'p' ti cuia r political 1-Jr-3
they v:ould im-pose on all Cozraunistu, thus "imperilling our
unity.
The Italian Co.,~_:lunists stand ready to fi ht for the au-
tonc_Uy* of C-11 such organizations. The recognition and respect
of the autonomy of the vior1!, mass organiza t, ons, on everyone's
part, is an essential condition if these or anizations are to
extend their scope and their united capacity for action, and
therefore if they are to conduct a successful struujle for the
specific Coats _3rcper to each of them, and for the overall o--
jective s Of peace an't'! progress, to vlhicb the crept masses of
the people aspire....
III -- TE: ? OBI2P.Tw 01 BUiL IiTG SOCIALISLI
The
The abolition of capitalism, and the liquidation of the
old e,:~lo tang classes, lead to the and of the conflicts pe-
culiar to class societies.... And yet, even the new socialist
so_- sties shove acute and deep-rooted conflicts....
.'hen, just for example, the USSn decides to begin the dif-
fi--ult transition to a hioLer phase of socialism, its decision
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is derived from an objective necessity, from the very forces
that the builciin C of soc9 a 11s i sat in motion, from a ripening
of the entire Soviet society, not to mention the demands of
competition with capitalism. This drive of the Soviet peoples
towards greater veil-being is born of new needs that have
slowly ri2ened, of the awareness that the uasses have of these
needs, and of a desire for ?rogres that cannot be frustrated.
It is ridiculous and impossible to tell the Soviet people to
v'ait. We should instead as! the Soviet people to move forward
with courage and with vigor, because their new achievements
will provide a new drive and new enthusiasm for the whole so-
cialist camp, which will ial:e it possible, step by step, to
achieve the coupler and fair equilibrium among the varying re-
quirements of development for each country, in the interests
of the common strug,le and the common cause.
Of primary importance, not only for economic progress,
but for the continue? advance of the socialist countries and
of the entire workers' and Communist movement throughout the
vicrld, is the abolition and the total liquidation of those il-
legal restrictions on and violations of the princis3les of de-
mocracy and socialist legality, which for too long have tarnished
the socialist ideal and hampered economic construction and ?a_
1ocr atic 7rov,th both in t hl Sovief Union and in t e other
socialist countries. These grave distortions have seriously
impeded the spread of socialist influence throughout the world,
and have been, as they are to this day, a potent weapon for our
enemies. The advance of our ideals in the countries still sub-
ject to capitalist domination will be the surer anti wifter, the
more closely progress in economic construction in the socialist
countries is followed by the growth of a richly democratic life,
evidenced in every facet of society.
This is why it is so wrong and so harmful for the Chinese
comrades to try to defend the methods associated with the cult
of personality....
IV -- UHIT-1 ITT T"M I11a '71TATI0NAL COMMUNIST L'IOVEM NT: THE ISSET S
The current debate among the Communist ?ar;;ies is inevitable and'
necessary .... a,ny position which, starting from the difficulties,
tie ..'ivergent views, and the differentiations existing today,
reasoned to the abandonment of the job and the struggle for
lc'eoioCica1 and political unity in the Communist movement on
the international scale, would perforce be a mista%en one.
Therefore, the schismatic anc: sectarian activities pursued by
the Chinese comrades today are to be rejected, as a genuien
threat to this unity.
There is no contradiction between the need for unity in
our movement ani the need for autonomy and independence or
every party. What does it really mean, in fact, this autonomy
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PYpf he principle of non-interference by any party in the in-
''L~.; of f cair s of Other parties, even in the necessary debate
and comparison of opinions. It mean: that every party is re-
sponsible only to its own people for its own policy, and for
the contribution it rzahes to the general orientation and to
the progress of the mover.ent as a whole, and that no ?arty
need feel itself responsible for every position of every indi-
vidual act of other parties, in whose decisions it has no part,
and wh . ~h nay, in addition, be in conflict with the general
principles that motivate our movement....
It is on the basis of this concept of unity in diversity
and in autonony that we believe the problems of the patterns
of contact and - collaboration among Corziunist ?arties, and the
issues involving the method and tone of debate within: our move-
nent ought to be approached.
Our ?arty believes that the principal form of contact,
debate and collaboration among parties should consist of closer
bilateral relft-:Anships.... Our party has done some intensive
wool, c~ recent years on the level of exchange of delegations
an bilateral relations ....':'e shall peep trying, i x this way as
in others, to establish broader contact with revolutionary
arties and movments outside 2urope as we par icu_ar y those
in Latin Arica ano ::n racy , whose problems and needs we
thins require special study, and which may possibly profit by
a ~bnowledge of our experiences.
We also believe that considerable benefit can be derived
(witness the early experiments made in western Europe, With the
Conference of the 1? ')artles in 131: ) from contacts, meetings,
and collaboration among arties working in the sage part ca he
world, where all of then face certain major issues and problems
In the common struggle. In this field, it T11-11 probably be
found necessary to establish some formal channels for regular
consultations and coordination. Insofar as we ourselves are
concerned, we shall go on working to get such channels estab-
lished to serve the :~uropean Common L arke area, and a o
capitalist Europe.
F'Te are fully aware of the special value, at certain tines,
of international conferences attended by the entire Communist
movement. They enrich and deepen our joint appreciation of the
international situation, clarify the major lines of our global
strategy, and even help us in our approach to specific problems.
The essential condition for their convocation, however, is an
examination of the real chances they afford for furthering an
analysis of the situation and, working out a common orientation,
for reaching clear-cut conclusions, and, for achieving progress
towards unity in the movement. Important requirements for such
conferences, if they are to be useful and effective, are good
timing, adequate preparation, and a clear and realistic idea of
the topics to be discussed and of the jectives that can and
should ae achieved.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4
 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4
Our ::'arty is called upon to express some reservations
as to t1_e advisability of calling a notier international con-
ference of th Communist and cioryer s' :`artier to discuss the
situation currently existing in the Cortiunist zioveY_ent. Such
a conference might Cell, if summoned today, find itself faced
'sit.' a choice between two solutions equally prejudicial to the
Communist movement : eit :era halghtenin' of the present dif-
farances, with a possible schism, or a completely formal and
unsatisfactory compromise....
Certainly it t;ou!c1 be a truly starry-eyed innocent who
wouli fail to see that, under today's conditions, the debate
over current differences and the argument over the proper poli-
tical line cannot but be both heated anted wrathy. Eovever, very
particular condemnation is cue the insults, the anathemas, the
clao Zes of betrayal that the Chinese comrades were the first to
hurl at the other Com=aunist 'sarties, and in particular at the
O_ C J....A very different thing from legitimate
polemics is the
agitation, the sch?smatic action, and the intolerable factional
activ'ties in CLich the Chinese comrades are engaged; a very
M's":ar ent ti:.?ng, and equally eprecable, is the casual way in
which tLe Chinese couraces twist and distort the views an the
lines of the otLar arties as a standard procedure in tii it re-
pertoire of _'.ebate; ...Ls molly, there is crounz s for serious
concern in the way the growing heat of the debate has hared
State relations between socialist countries.
Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-03061A000200040003-4